04 - January 24th thru January 30th
2000, Vol X
Small
Enterprises: Reality and the Horizons of their Development in Yemen
Ismail Al-Ghabiri,
Yemen Times
Small industrial enterprises Yemen account to 31,738, or 95% of the
total industrial institutions, constituting 48% of the total labor force
in this sector. The industrial survey and analysis conducted by the ministry
of industry in 1996 had shown that there was a dysfunction in the small
businesses, where food industries come in the first place and there was
a drop in the level of its participation the economic indicators. Small
enterprises participation in economic shares amounts to 25% of production
value, 48% of employment value, 21% of wages value and 32,6% of the additional
value. Most of those industries are concentrated in Sana'a and Ibb and
in less amount in other governorates. This sector depends on personal activity
and without definite direction or program. In addition to this, production
of this sector for the local market is mostly characterized by the imitation
along with absence of the idea of exportation due to bad quality of its
products.
First of all there must be an illustrative definition of small enterprises
as a basis from which we can move to explore the essence of the subject.
Concepts and criteria differ about defining small industrial enterprises.
Among these prevalent criteria are those of labor and capital. Or as some
define them as industries that form a productive unit employing ten workers
and the value of production machines used in it amounts to 1-2 million
riyals and that of a production unit, the value of its machines exceeds
2 million riyals and uses ten workers. As for the criterion of development
unit depended for small industries, it is the criterion of the invested
capital that does not exceed a sum of 200 thousand dollars.
Out of this we can infer that the tendency towards such industries has
increased nowadays. The main reason is the big challenge facing big businesses
and their incapability of keeping pace with the technological development
and the fierce competition of prices and quality, the present policy of
openness is now imposing, added to that the big businesses failure to realize
the balance between the economic and social requirements and the difficulty
of implementation and adjustment with the goals for which they have been
built. Against this situation the importance of the tendency of light industries
increased because of their ability to depend on limited materials and due
to their having social and economic dimension and concept.
The reality of small enterprises and handicraft in Yemen is weak and
simple. It is still confined to old stereotype and has not been upgraded
to the level of small enterprises that have largely developed. It could
not reach a high quality or achieve developed growth. This conclusion is
based on indicators of the first industrial survey of 1996. If we look
at the geographical distribution of small industrial enterprises, we find
that they are concentrated in the cities of Sana'a and Ibb, and this could
be attributed to population density. The woman role in this field is mainly
confined to work depending on the skill of careful use of hands such as
sewing and embroidery. Woman labor in this field forms 2.4% of the total
volume of labor, i.e., 1258 employees.
Among the reasons behind weakness and inability of these industries
in Yemen are attributed to their dependence on self efforts without any
specified program. This sector did not rise to the level of small industrial
enterprises due to its incapability of providing big industries with their
needs of materials and therefore those industries are mainly dependent
on importing their needs from abroad. Moreover, this sector cannot benefit
from products of big enterprises because of non-existence of integration
and absence of modern technology, added to that is that these these industries
based on handicraft profession based on individual skills.
To develop this sector and make publicity for it abroad, industrial
zones or industrial complexes must be founded without making it sustain
large sums of money for buying pieces of land and for erecting buildings
and also prevent its random spread in Yemen. To enable this sector to develop
and be qualified to play an effective role in the national economy, we
have to amend the commercial banks credit policy by allotting part of their
funds for financing this activity through easy conditions regarding interest
rates and encouraging the establishment of associations patronizing small
enterprises. There must be encouragement of of founding a social fund in
which the government must participate through financing houses, associations,
industrialists and assistance from sisterly and friendly countries.
To develop this sector in order to participate in the process of development,
the state should take a host of measures represented by the following:
1- Systematic arrangements represented by founding a supervising
party to regulate its work and activity.
2- Promoting its products by holding commercial markets and
exhibitions through different information media.
3- Improving the level of production by creating qualified and
well-trained cadre capable of dealing with advanced technology and activating
the role of woman, also by training and qualification.
4-The geographical distribution of the handicraft industries
must be according to the aims of those industries.
5- Distributing the utilities on industries dependent on local
raw materials and industries feeding medium and big industries.
6- Developing and adjusting the financing policy of local funding
institutions and the foreign donors.
Reformation
Process in the Market
and State in Yemen
Mohammed
al-Maitami
Associate Professor of Economics,Sanaa University
Visiting scholar - University of California , Berkeley
It is probably necessary to begin my 10 limited minutes of presentation
by restating the most basic principle of macroeconomics which says that
the political, social and military fate of any nation depends greatly upon
its economic success. Today there is no area of economics more vital to
a nation's success than its macroeconomic equilibrium and macroeconomic
performance.
It is also necessary to restate the most basic tenet of the institutional
economics, which says that a functioning national market can not exist
without a modern and strong state - without effective legal, administrative,
and regulatory institutions, maintained by the state.
We all have seen the overall deterioration of the Economic Reform Program
(ERP) The Rate of the real GDP growth was (-) 0.2%. Core inflation - 75%,
budget deficit - 17% of GDP, account balance (-) 12% of GDP, GDP per capita
$ 265, unemployment 25%, population under line poverty 21%, dramatic fluctuation
of Yemen currency from 30 R/D to 140-160 R/D.
Since 1995 Yemeni government began to implement a large-scale program
of reform. The Program was formulated in cooperation with the IMF and the
World Bank and it is considered a liberal program aimed at making the market
the dominant regulator of the economy. Unfortunately, the outcome of this
reform is not encouraging even though 1995 and 1996 were nominally successful
years for the program. Any shocks have reversed previous optimistic expectation
and revealed the underlying weaknesses of the program. The ERP program
has put the cart before the horse.
Of course, there are objective and subjective determinants of the current
situation. In terms of the objective determinants, we may include the economic
backwardness of the country, scarcity of human capital, capital and technology.
Also we could include the international economic situation, particularly
the present Asian economic crisis, which directly effects Yemeni economy.
For example, oil revenue has decreased to roughly 30% of 1997's level and
budget deficit has risen this year to 13% because 95% of Yemeni exports
are oil products, and 76% of Yemeni exports go to southwest Asian countries.
In the subjective factors we initially include the absence of a modern
and strong state. Lawlessness, corruption and bribery are widespread in
Yemeni institutions and this poses a major obstacle to any corrective program
and more generally to any development program in Yemen.
All economic and social indicators point to the Economic Reform Program,
in spite of the achieved successes in the fields of monetary and fiscal
reform in 1995 and 1996. Even those successes have dissipated in the years
of 1997 and 1998 as a result of first external shock.
Let us look in brief at the main economic indicators, which were the
subject of the reformation process: real GDP growth, the rate of inflation,
budget deficit, national account balance, the coefficient of investment.
What do these indicators show us? The real GDP growth increased from -0.2
1994 to 5,1% and 4.3% in 1995, 1996. But it fell again to 3.6 and 2.5 in
1997 and 1998. Core inflation fell from 75% in 1994 to 20%, 10% and 5%
in 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively, but it rose again to 55% in 1998.
The budget deficit as percentage of GDP was reduced from 17% in 1994 to
6%, 4%, and 2% 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively. Currently it is rising
again to 12%. The deficit in the national account balance fell from - 11.6%
in 1994 to - 10,1%, 3,5%. - 1,5% in 1995, 1996 and 1997 respectively. but
it is rising again to 10.0% in 1998. The exchange rate rose from 125-130
R/D the average designed level drawn by program to 160 R/D in 1999. Investment
coefficient is less more 4 time than planed. The standard of living is
falling according to UN sources. GDP per capita is less than $ 240. Unemployment
is more than 35%. The percentage of the population living under the poverty
line is more than 50%. The Majority of infrastructure is deteriorating
rapidly. We are witnessed of growing of collapse of Yemeni national industry.
More than 30 firms were closed within the last two years, more than 5000
industrial worker were fired. The main sector in Yemen-agriculture produced
only 13% of GDP, while 56% of the labor force in concentrated in this area.
There are in my viewpoint two major factors standing behind the impeding
of the ERP: First- the fragility of the Yemeni state and Administrative
Anarchy. Second- Theoretical weaknesses in the design of the ERP. I am
not going to focus my presentation on the first factor. There are possibly
others who will address this factor. I would prefer to concentrate a little
bit on the second factor. No doubt that without reforms the Yemeni people
would be in far worse condition. There is also no doubt, that our people
have faced far greater hardship than the current hardship resulting from
the implementation of the reform program. These are facts with which it
is difficult to argue. At the beginning of reformation process there were
some positive results which we have previously mentioned. Those achievement
were realized initially with financial support from abroad. But the main
goals of growth and sustainable development (real GDP in material sectors,
Coefficient of investment, unemployment remain static.
The question of investment has not made any significant progress. Investments
in Yemen has been due to the lack of an appropriate environment for investment.
The FIAS report fro Yemen of June 1997 stated that "..constrained public
budget, low income level, decentralized population and difficult physical
environment; under-developed legal system and weak institutional capacity;
underdeveloped local capital markets; and (most critically) Yemen's high
political risk rating, as well as.....(the fact that) the state, the government
of Yemen is still viewed as weak, unreliable and lacking credibility."
At the first external shock these achievements disappeared, because
of lack of cohesion of the program. The architects of the economic reform
program assumed that the problems of the Yemeni economy consisted primarily
of government deficit, negative balance of payments, sharp fluctuations
in the value of the Yemeni Rial and the existence of an inefficient and
unproductive public sector. Based upon these assumptions the economic reform
program anticipated that simply relieving the pressure on the balance of
payments, reducing the government deficit through cutting expenditure and
cutting government subsidies, making social services cost effective and
privatizing the public sector business will allow these market forces mobilize
and establish the proper levels of investment, production, consumption,
importation and exports in light of current resource endowments. The program
ignores that the deeper roots of the economic crisis which are not restricted
to financial and monetary policy, but rather these are merely symptoms
on the surface of more fundamental and ongoing contradictions and difficulties
in the material production and administrative-political management. The
question arises today, is it possible for the market to operate effectively
in the absence of the state or even in its presence, but in a weak and
fragile condition,
The answer for this question comes from the world bank itself in the
statements made in the report of the World Bank in its yearly meeting held
in Hong Kong on the 23-26 of September 1997: "In the absence of an effective
state it is impossible to produce any economic or social progress...and
without protection from theft and violence and repressive behavior by the
state and without a fair judiciary which is able to enforce its rulings,
it is difficult for markets to grow and develop. The final address by James
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank Group, to the Board of Governors
of the World Bank Group, at the Joint Annual Discussion on October 6-8
1998, confirms our believes that any economic reforms and measures "...if
they do not fight corruption and put in place good governance, if they
do not introduce social safety nets, if they not have the social and political
consensus for reform, if they do not bring their people with them, their
development is endangered and will not last."
The
National Company for Tobacco and Matches and Stray Arrows
By:
Mutahar Al-Ashmory
Of course, the budget of a state must be accurate in its figures and
estimates. Discussion of every institution must be carefully studied through
associating each year's budget with that of the previous one. Proceeding
from the fact that we have already entered the 21st century and the third
millennium- an age of information, technology and computer- a stage that
has overcome the possibility of committing mistakes in the state budget,
then committing a mistake or let it happen is something regrettable, particularly
in Yemen.
What has aroused my attention is a news regarding a tendency for the
privatisation of the National Company for Tobacco and Matches "Kamaran".
As much as I was surprised by the new drive of privatization, I was astounded
by the news that contained information in regard to the budget of the company.
This information is presented by the Ministry of Finance indicating that
the company has showed a mark-down in its revenues for 2000, estimated
at YR10 million.
I have been very much interested in following the conditions of the
company as part of my interest in the privatization campaign, especially
regarding successful state institutions. I have written about privatization
and said that privatizing the tobacco Company was a grave mistake implying
a tendency against the public interest. Capitalist countries such as Canada
or South Korea or Jordan usually makes the industry and importation of
tobacco the responsibility of the state as its being considered a highly
profitable merchandise. They may redouble cigarettes prices according to
certain social policies.
However, with the statistics presented by the Ministry of Finance in
the general budget, it becomes quite difficult to defend such a national
establishment in the face of Privatization.
After weeks of investigation, I could uncover the underlying mystery
of this puzzle that agitates me for a while. It was a grave mistake made
by the Ministry of Finance and its staff who used figures different from
those presented by the company. These figures are far much different, for
billions were replaced by millions and millions and thousands by hundreds
and by very small coins. I can't say for certain whether this mistake was
done intentionally or was an oversight. However, what is apparent is that
this has negatively affected the public sector and has been used much for
the privatization drive which appears like a monster eating away many successful
organizations of the public sector. The news was not a mistaken on, but
unfortunately it was based and derived from wrong information given in
the state budget presented to the parliament.
It is true that we have stepped into the third millennium that is characterized
by and considered to be the age of information, technology and computer.
This makes the possibility of making such mistakes very unlikely to happen.
However, making such a mistake and in the general budget of the state is
a sorrowful event and means a lot, for it may have never happened in the
19th century.
Any accountant or a trainee in the financial or accounting work would
never believe the revenues of a company go down from YR 11 billions to
YR 1 billion within a year. It is also quite unbelievable that a public
organization spends and earns YR1 billion. What is more unreasonable and
unacceptable that such procedures and standards used in discussing budgets
to be ratified, are adopted by the ministry of finance and its experts.
The real budget of the company for 2000 presented to the Ministry of
Finance was YR11,126, 000,000. This means that there was not any kind of
fall back in the company's activities nor a slump in its revenues. On the
contrary, the activities have prospered and developed, especially as Mr.
Tawfeek Saleh, a qualified and competent personality, is the chairman of
its board of directors.
As we are dealing with a very important issue of public interest, I
very much trust Mr. Alawi Al-Salami, minister of Finance who has showed
his understanding of this horrible mistake. He made those responsible for
it hold accounted. He has also followed the procedures to correct the mistake
and to make a new report that would be presented to the Parliament. Though
this won't compensate the harm that has befallen the company, it will disclose
a fact and prove that the public sector is not at all that depicted failure,
and that what it needs is sincere people and commitment.
What has happened may be the result of "privatization drive"
plague that tends to spoil all the successful organizations of the public
sector.
What I want to stress in this context is that we are not against privatization
, as a modern economic concept, but refuse to use it as a slogan to destroy
the public interest, as it was about to happen to the National Tobacco
and Matches Company. Irrespective of all the aggressive campaign launched
against the company, we express our appreciation of the good efforts and
achievements of the Administration of the company and all its workers.
From Al-Thawrah Newspaper
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