School of Real-Life Results
Student: North American Free Trade Agreement
Grading Period: January 1, 1994 to January 1, 1999
U.S. Job Creation and Job Quality........................................................................................................................
Wage Levels in the U.S. and Mexico....................................................................................................................
Economic Development and Living Standards in Mexico...................................................................................
Sovereignty and Democratic Governance............................................................................................................
Highway Safety, Drug Enforcement and Smuggling............................................................................................
Labor and Environmental Side Agreements and Training Programs..................................................................
Comments: NAFTA's proponents promised benefits for the U.S., Canada and Mexico. The promises 200,000 new U.S. jobs from NAFTA per year, higher wages in Mexico and a growing U.S. trade surplus with Mexico, environmental clean-up and improved health along the border have all failed to materialize. However, as this report illustrates, after five years, NAFTA fails to pass the most conservative test of all: a simple do-no-harm test. Under NAFTA, conditions have deteriorated in many areas in which gains were promised. In each subject NAFTA's grade is a failing one data and examples are provided to explain why.
NAFTA at 5
January 1, 1999 is the fifth anniversary of the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement: NAFTA now has an extensive real life record. Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch conducted a detailed review of that track record, assessing the results of NAFTA in several crucial areas. This Report Card reflecting the results of our review grades NAFTA on the major issues.
NAFTA's proponents promised the pact would create new benefits and gains in each of these areas. The promised benefits 200,000 new U.S. jobs from NAFTA per year, higher wages in Mexico and a growing U.S. trade surplus with Mexico, environmental clean-up and improved health along the border have to a one failed to materialize.(1)
However, as this report illustrates, after five years, NAFTA fails to pass the most conservative test of all: a simple do-no-harm test. Under NAFTA, conditions not only have not improved, they have deteriorated in many areas. As a result, on each of the issues examined, the only fair grade for NAFTA is a failing one hard data and real-life examples tell the story.
The American Public Also Grades NAFTA a Failure
Recent opinion polls show that the majority of Americans are aware of NAFTA's poor performance. Asked for their views, everyday citizens give NAFTA "F's" for benefitting the public interest and "A's" for boosting big corporations.
U.S. Job Creation and Job Quality.................................................................................
On the issue of U.S. job creation, the central focus of pro-NAFTA campaigning, it is fair to measure NAFTA's real-life results against its backers' expansive promises of hundreds of thousands of new, high-paying U.S. jobs. However, even measured against the more lenient "do no harm" standard, NAFTA has been a failure. Using trade flow data to calculate job loss under NAFTA (incorporating exactly the formula used by NAFTA's backers to predict 200,000 per year NAFTA job creation) yields net job destruction numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Whether the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs qualifies as "a giant sucking sound" depends on the ear of the listener. It is clear, however, that NAFTA has indisputably led to widespread job loss, with over 200,000 U.S. workers certified as NAFTA casualties under just one narrow government program. The fact that job growth totally unrelated to NAFTA has produced a net gain in U.S. employment during this period in no way changes the reality that NAFTA has cost large numbers of individual workers their jobs most of whom are now unemployed or working at jobs that pay less than the ones they lost.(8)
The U.S. economy has created jobs at a fairly rapid rate in the 1990s, but without NAFTA, hundreds of thousands of full time, high wage, benefit-paying manufacturing jobs would not have been lost. It is also important to note that while the U.S. economy is generating substantial numbers of new jobs in absolute terms, the quality of the jobs created is often poor. The U.S. Department of Labor projects that the professions with the greatest expected future growth in the U.S. are cashiers, waiters and waitresses, janitors and retail clerks.(9) These and other lower-wage service jobs are the kind that will most likely be available to workers displaced by NAFTA.
Economic surveys of dislocated workers shows that the jobs lost to NAFTA, in many cases high-paying manufacturing jobs, are, in the majority of cases, replaced by lower-paid employment.(10) NAFTA also has had a negative effect on the wages of many Americans whose jobs have not been relocated but whose wage bargaining power with their employers is substantially lessened; NAFTA puts them in direct competition with skilled, educated Mexican workers who work for a dollar or two an hour or less. NAFTA was supposed to ameliorate this problem by raising Mexican living standards and wages. Instead, both have plummeted, harming the economic prospects for workers on both sides of the border.
U.S. agriculture is in crisis. The "free market-free trade" farm policies of the 1990s have eviscerated U.S. wheat, winter fruit and vegetable, and tomato producers. And they have tied the hands of policymakers preventing them from safeguarding U.S. farmers from the dumping that has resulted from recent shocks like the currency depreciation in Canada and the suppression of worldwide demand for commodities caused by the Asian financial crisis. In addition, as a result of NAFTA, U.S. producers are now forced to compete with products from Mexico, where agribusiness though not farm workers or consumers benefit from lower wages and less rigorous standards on pesticide residues, bacterial contamination and other potential public health threats. Meanwhile, since NAFTA, the number of small U.S. farmers has declined nine percent while the percentage of U.S. farm households at or near the federal poverty level has skyrocketed to 93%.(22) Consumer prices for food, however, have not dropped.(23)
Where's the Beef? Consumers Prices Do Not Fall Under NAFTA
In theory, tariff cuts and new competition under NAFTA are supposed to benefit consumers by reducing costs. These savings are supposed to trickle down from producers to packing plants to retailers and ultimately to consumers. In a number of prominent instances under NAFTA, consumer prices have actually risen.
U.S. Farmers Can't Compete with $6/Day Labor In Mexico
While its namesake is the capital of Belgium, 93% of brussels sprouts consumed in the U.S. are grown in California but not for long. "It's simple math," said Steve Bontadelli, third generation California brussels sprouts producer. In Mexico, they pay workers $6/day. That's what we're paying per hour. We just can't keep up."(34) From 1993 to 1998, brussels sprouts imports from Mexico increased 49%.(35)
When NAFTA was being debated in 1993, concerns were raised that additional industrial activity generated by NAFTA would exacerbate pre-existing environmental and public health problems caused by a high concentration of export manufacturing plants in the free trade zone along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Clinton Administration echoed these concerns, agreeing that the "maquiladora" sector posed a grave risk to border ecology and public health. The Administration promised that NAFTA would relieve pressure on the border region by extending trade benefits to Mexico's interior, thus reducing the incentive for U.S. industrial firms to locate along the border. Indeed, the Administration went so far as to claim that without NAFTA, the growth of the maquiladora sector would cause an environmentally devastating spiral of industrial and population growth and resulting air and water pollution.(41)
Yet rather than reversing, this trend has accelerated. During NAFTA's first five years the maquiladora zone along the U.S.-Mexico border has undergone explosive growth, compounding pre-existing environmental and health problems. The latest count puts the number of border maquiladoras at 1,947, 37% more than in 1993.(42) In Tijuana alone, maquiladora employment has skyrocketed by 92%.(43) Worse, the promised clean-ups and new environmental infrastructure never materialized. And NAFTA has been wielded as a weapon to attack federal and subfederal environmental and public health safeguards, with a series of legal challenges to countries' environmental laws launched by corporations using NAFTA's investment provisions (Chapter 11).
Surge in Industrial Activity in Tijuana Leads to $250 Million Mess
Starting in early 1999, each day 25 million gallons of "treated," but still toxic Mexican sewage will be discharged off of Imperial Beach, California.(54) The International Wastewater Treatment Plant, being constructed on the U.S. side of the border for a cost of $250 million, will treat sewage from Tijuana. The city has undergone a 92% explosion in maquiladora employment under NAFTA,(55) but did not have infrastructure to treat the pre-boom waste water.(56) With "treated" sewage dumped into 100 ft. deep water only a few miles from the shore, testing conducted by the U.S. EPA has determined that it will fail to meet acute toxicity limits of the U.S. Clean Water Act.(57) Some of the toxic substances found in Tijuana's sewage system include dioxins, pesticides including DDT, solvents, and heavy metals.(58) Compounding the potential health risks caused by exposure to dioxins and heavy metals and the threat to marine life, the water where the dumping will occur contains currents which circulate water back towards land.
Concerns about new threats to food safety raised during the 1993 NAFTA debate were dismissed with promises of improved practices in Mexico and better border inspection. Yet NAFTA and its implementing bill weakened existing food safety standards, for instance allowing meat and poultry imports that did not meet U.S. safety standards and specifically limited border inspection (see NAFTA §717). Under NAFTA, the U.S. has experienced a major upswing in produce imports from Mexico. At the same time, the US Food and Drug Administration now inspects far less imported food than it did prior to NAFTA. The result with volume up and inspection down: Americans in every state now face a substantially greater risk of exposure to unsafe food as a direct result of NAFTA.
In addition, serious public health problems in border communities linked to high levels of environmental contamination generated by maquiladora production have worsened under NAFTA. In particular, certain types of fatal birth defects and sanitation-related diseases are on the rise.
I. Food Safety
Latest NAFTA Food Safety Crisis:
Minnesota state health officials attribute a shigellosis outbreak in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area this past summer to parsley imported from Mexico. Shigellosis is caused by fecal contamination of food products and is contagious. Over 150 people were sickened. Imported Mexican parsley has since been linked to outbreaks this past summer in 3 other states and two Canadian provinces.(73)
II. Environmentally Linked Health Threats
Wage Levels in the U.S. and Mexico..............................................................................
U.S. Workers Forced by NAFTA to Compete with Maquila Wages: Production workers in manufacturing in the U.S., where average hourly compensation is approximately $18.74/hour,(83) must, as a result of NAFTA, compete directly with maquila workers now located in new foreign-owned high-tech plants who are paid $1.51 per hour.(84)
NAFTA's 5th Year Casualties: The Disappearance of American Icons
Huffy Bicycles closed the world's largest bicycle plant, in Celina, Ohio laying off 650 workers and shifting production to Mexico.
Bass Shoes shifted production to Mexico after being located in Maine for 122 years, laying off 350.
Thomson Consumer Electronics, successor to RCA-Victor, moved what was once the world's largest TV factory located in Bloomington, Indiana the self-proclaimed "Color Television Capital of the World" to Mexico, laying off 1,200 workers. The Indiana Department of Workforce Development has tracked the Thomson workers: Only 8% found jobs that match or better their old pay. The rest are either working for less, are unemployed, or have left the work force. Workers at Thomson's plant in Ciudad Juarez earn typically meager maquiladora wages and have little hope of better earnings in the future: management has announced that it won't raise wages as a matter of principle even though the plant has vacancies and high turnover. Their stated reason? Raises increase the cost of business.(93)
Economic Development and Living Standards in Mexico..............................
NAFTA was supposed to be a win-win proposition, providing hope, economic development and a better life for Mexicans as well as Americans. NAFTA was to make Mexico, in economic and social terms, more like the United States a more prosperous society with a middle-class. In order to enter into NAFTA, the Mexican government had to make extensive changes to its Constitution. These changes included amending Article XVII the Revolutionary-era land redistribution program in order to attract and accommodate foreign acquisitions in agricultural and other land. These changes have led to increased foreign investment in Mexico under NAFTA, but also to a decline in living standards among Mexican workers and extensive failures among Mexican small- and medium-sized businesses.
I. Mexican Economic Development
II. Mexican Living Standards
Respect for Sovereignty and DemocraticGovernance........................................
An important, but little-known component of NAFTA is the new power it grants to private corporations to directly attack laws and policies they deem harmful to profitability. Under NAFTA's new investment protections (Chapter 11), the decisions made by local and national governments in all three NAFTA countries are now subject to challenge before NAFTA tribunals by corporate plaintiffs. This provision of NAFTA, which only took effect in 1996, has already produced seven challenges, demanding damage payments in excess of a billion dollars. Remarkably, in every instance these challenges have had little or nothing whatsoever to do with international trade. Rather, public health, environmental zoning and state court civil procedures have been attacked. One such challenge already has led to the repeal of a major public health law in Canada. And knowledgeable observers believe that this initial spate of suits may be the harbinger of a far larger legal onslaught in the coming years as more corporations discover the potential uses of the new tool NAFTA provides. Laws and policies can be challenged whether or not they have anything to do with international trade as long as an investor or corporation in one country has some actual or potential business interest in the country it wishes to sue.
Suggested Non-Trade NAFTA Uses:
International trade lawyer Barry Appleton the attorney for the plaintiff in two major NAFTA-inspired lawsuits urged the Canadian government to investigate whether state and local subsidies given to National Hockey League teams in the United States violate NAFTA.(117)
Highway Safety and Law Enforcement..............................................................................
On September 22, 1998, Mexico formally requested formal dispute resolution (a binding arbitration panel) under NAFTA to force the U.S. to open its border to Mexican trucks with destinations anywhere in the U.S. (presently, Mexican trucks are limited to destinations within a certain distance from the U.S.-Mexico border). The border had been scheduled to open on December 17, 1995, but the U.S. Department of Transportation denied full access to the U.S. market to Mexican truckers because of safety concerns. If the arbitration panel decides in Mexico's favor, the U.S. will be forced either to open its border to Mexican truckers or pay compensation to Mexico. A 1997 U.S. government report highlighted many environmental reasons and environmental reasons for not opening the U.S. border to Mexican trucks. In the five years since NAFTA went into effect, none of the concerns regularly voiced by the U.S. government and public safety advocates like the existing problems of drug and gun smuggling across the border have been addressed.
Programs for Harmed Workers and NAFTA Side Agreements..................
I. Worker Adjustment Assistance and Training
NAFTA's Trade Adjustment Assistance Program (NAFTA-TAA) was designed to provide assistance to workers who lose jobs due to NAFTA. Unfortunately, five years later, it is clear that the majority of workers displaced by the agreement never receive benefits. Indeed, the program's harsh eligibility restrictions virtually guaranteed this outcome: workers are only eligible if they produce a "product" that is "directly affected" by NAFTA. Thus, all service workers and all retail and agricultural workers are automatically excluded, as are all manufacturing workers who lose their jobs because their industry is indirectly affected by the agreement - for example, makers of inputs for manufacturers who have relocated to Mexico.
II. Labor Side Agreement
NAFTA's so-called "side agreements" were supposed to be its saving grace counterbalancing any NAFTA damage to the environment and the rights and interests of workers. The labor side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) added to NAFTA by the Clinton Administration in order to win Congressional votes crucial to the pact's approval has been a model of regulatory toothlessness. Despite repeated efforts by labor unions and others to use the labor side agreement for the purposes for which it was intended to stop the abuse of workers the agreement has proven useless. Major instances of abusive practices have been identified by the new NAFTA labor commission, yet, to date, not a single enforcement action has been leveled against an offending country nor a targeted practice abolished.
III. NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement
It is widely recognized that the institutions established under NAFTA's environmental side agreement have failed to ameliorate the infamous environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border.(138) First, these institutions have proved to be structurally flawed: the Commission for Economic Cooperation (CEC), which can investigate governmental non-enforcement of environmental laws, itself has no enforcement power. The North American Development Bank (NADBank), designed to finance waste water treatment projects along the border, places market considerations above all else in its financing criteria, even though it is dealing with some of the poorest communities in North America communities not likely to have any credit ratings, much less good credit ratings. Indeed, many of the communities most in need of clean water are grouped in "colonias," which do not have standing as incorporated entities. Also, the environmental institutions were bound to fail from the start because of NAFTA's enforceable market access provisions, which encouraged even more environmentally unsound growth along the border. Despite the fact that 72% of Americans believe that it is "very important" that environmental standards are included in trade agreements,(139) five years under NAFTA's side agreements has shown that they are unable to play a proactive or even protective role on environmental policy.
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1. See Public Citizen, The Border Betrayed (January 1996), Failure to Create U.S. Jobs (February 1997) and Fast Track to Unsafe Food (September 1997).
2. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
3. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
4. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
5. 12/03/98-12/06/98 Wall Street Journal/NBC News Survey conducted among 2,106 adults.
6. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
7. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
8. The Department of Labor has determined that there is a 2 :1 chance that laid-off workers will not find a better job. See "More Than 43 Million Jobs Lost, Reaching Every Walk of Life," New York Times, reprinted in National Times, December 1996. Since March 1998, 198,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost. The service sector has been able to absorb the layoffs, but the displaced workers are usually paid less than they had been in the manufacturing sector. See, Louis Uchitelle, "The Economy Grows. The Smokestacks Shrink," New York Times, 11/ 29/98.
9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1996-1997 Jobs Outlook.
10. See Chicago Tribune, NAFTA at 5, Promises & Realities, November 29, 1998.
11. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/www/deficit.html
12. The latest data available are the October 1998 trade balance figures. Year-end projections have been calculated by Rob Scott of the Economic Policy Institute. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico for October 1998 is $13.2 billion and for Canada is $15 billion.
13. International Trade Commission, Production Sharing: The Use of U.S. Components and Materials in Foreign Assembly Operations, April 1997.
14. Rothstein, Jesse and Rob Scott. "NAFTA's Casualties," Economic Policy Institute: September 19, 1997.
15. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration data, 1993-1997.
16. U.S. Labor Department NAFTA-TAA data, as of December 18, 1998.
17. See, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, NAFTA's Broken Promises: Failure to Create U.S. Jobs, February 1997.
18. Dailey, Rickey. "NAFTA Gets Mixed Reviews," The Brownsville Herald, August 22, 1998.
19. "Border Counties Poorest in Nation," The Brownsville Herald, July 23, 1998.
20. New Mexico State University, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
21. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
22. USDA, Number of Farms and Net Cash Income by Size Class, 1993, 1997; "The fast track myth," Agri News, July 16, 1998, letter to the editor by Steve Suppan.
23. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumer prices for food in general have risen slightly since 1993. For fruit and vegetables much of which is imported under NAFTA, consumer prices have risen 7% in real terms since 1993.
24. USDA, Number of Farms and Net Cash Income by Size Class, 1993 and 1997.
25. Export data from U.S. Aggregate Foreign Trade Data, U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. Canadian farm income data in Adrian Ewins, "Review Farm Policy Now, Demands Departing NFU Head," The Western Producer, 12/10/98.
26. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI data on Pork: 1993-1998 (first 11 months of 1998). Also see, Barboza, David. "Farmers Are in Crisis as Hog Prices Collapse," The New York Times, 12/13/98.
27. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI data.
28. "Message Delivered Through Free Pork," The Western Producer, 12/10/98.
29. USDA, U.S. Total Agricultural Trade Balances with Individual Countries, 1991-97.
30. U.S. International Trade Commission, "Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the U.S. Economy and Industries: A Three Year Review," June 1997, pp. 6-65.
31. Florida Tomato Grower Association, interview with Wayne Hawkins.
32. Letter from Florida Tomato Exchange to Congressman Joe Scarborough, August 25, 1997.
33. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI data, 1993-1997.
34. "NAFTA Increases Brussels Sprouts Woes," Financial Times, 11/30/98.
35. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, "US Agricultural Consumption Imports," January 1993 to December 1997.
36. Barboza, David, "Farmers Are in Crisis as Hog Prices Collapse." New York Times, 12/13/98.
37. October 8, 1998 Hearing in the House Agriculture Committee, "Agricultural Trade Issues with Canada."
38. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI data on Pork 1993-November 1998. Barboza, David. "Farmers Are in Crisis as Hog Prices Collapse," The New York Times, 12/13/98.
39. As of July 1998, the U.S. has 720 million bushels of wheat in carry-out stocks. See Paul Menser, "Trading Blame: Idaho Farmers are struggling to see how NAFTA benefits their bottom line," Post Register, 7/12/98.
40. Paul Menser, "Trading Blame: Idaho Farmers are struggling to see how NAFTA benefits their bottom line," Post Register, 7/12/98, quoting Mike Lipscomb of the Idaho Rural Council.
41. Clinton Administration, Report on Environmental Issues, November 1993, ES-8.
42. United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, "The North American Free Trade Agreement at Four Years (sic): What it Means for the U.S. and Mexico," June 1998.
43. Twin Plant News, Maquila Scoreboard, September 1993 and May 1998.
44. Sources: International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); Appleton & Associates. ICSID is the only investor-to-state arbitration facility that keeps a public listing of its cases. Under NAFTA, investors may also use the United Nations Center for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules to sue governments. Unlike ICSID, UNCITRAL is not an agreement nor an institution; it is merely a set of rules. There is thus no Secretariat to maintain publicly accessible records on each case. Thus, there is the distinct possibility that other NAFTA Chapter 11 cases exist, but have not been leaked to the public.
45. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (being arbitrated at the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); Azinian, et. Al v. Mexico (being arbitrated at ICSID) and Waste, Inc. v. Mexico (ICSID).
46. Sun Belt, a California-based water importer, has filed a notice of intent with the Canadian government. Under NAFTA, a foreign investor that moves to sue a government must first submit a notice of intent to file claim and wait 90 days for the government to respond. If it has not settled the claim in 90 days, the investor becomes free to file it an investment tribunal. In recent press reports, Canada has indicated that it will fight rather than settle the Sun Belt claim. (See Heather Scoffield, "B.C. Water Export Ban Brings U.S. Lawsuit." The Globe and Mail, 12/9/98.) S.D. Myers v. Canada is being arbitrated under the UNCITRAL rules. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada was settled this summer.
47. EPA, HazTraks data; Interview with Joseph Schultes from the Environmental Protection Agency, December 14, 1998.
48. EPA, HazTraks data; Interview with Joseph Schultes from the Environmental Protection Agency, September 14, 1998; December 14, 1998.
49. Texas Department of Transportation; Interview with Major Lester Mills 12/14/98. Mexican trucks have a 45-48% forced-out-of-service rate as opposed to a 25% forced-out-of service rate for U.S. trucks.
50. U.S. HazTraks data; interview with Jack Schultes of EPA, 12/15/98. Data from 1991-1998.
51. U.S. HazTraks data; interview with Jack Schultes of EPA, 12/15/98. Data from 1991-1998.
52. "International help sought for Tijuana lead waste cleanup," San Diego Union-Tribune, October 21, 1998.
53. "International help sought for Tijuana lead waste cleanup," San Diego Union-Tribune, October 21, 1998.
54. "State panel allows discharge of Mexican sewage into ocean," San Diego Union-Tribune, October 15, 1998.
55. Twin Plant News, Maquila Scoreboard, September 1993 and May 1998.
56. Lori Saldana, "Tackling the Border Sewage Problem," San Diego Union-Tribune, October 14, 1998.
57. Lori Saldana, "Tackling the Border Sewage Problem," San Diego Union Tribune, October 14, 1998. Also see "The Trouble with Tijuana's Toxins," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 17, 1998.
58. "The Trouble with Tijuana's Toxins," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 17, 1998.
59. Twin Plant News; data from September 1993 to May 1998. Data provided by INEGI.
60. Brandon, Karen, "NAFTA at 5: Changes to the Landscape are Slow in Coming," Chicago Tribune, 11/29/98.
61. U.S. EPA, United States-Mexico Border Environmental Indicators 1997.
62. "Don't Place Hurdles in Front of NAFTA, Governors say," Valley Morning Star, June 27, 1998.
63. Texas Department of Transportation, Interview with Joe Cameron, October 1998.
64. "U.S. Border Towns Suffer From Post-Nafta Syndrome," The Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1998.
65. "U.S. Border Towns Suffer From Post-Nafta Syndrome," The Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1998.
66. U.S. EPA, United States-Mexico Border Environmental Indicators 1997.
67. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S. Total Agricultural Imports to Individual Countries, 1991-97; USDA data.
68. GAO, Food Safety: Federal Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Imported Foods are Inconsistent and Unreliable, 5/98.
69. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Examen de las Politicas Agricolas de Mexico, 1997.
70. "New Dangers Make Way to US Tables", Boston Globe, September 20, 1998.
71. See Public Citizen, Fast Track to Unsafe Food, September 1997.
72. USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Trade Update, 1998 data.
73. "Parsley Likely Cause of Shigellosis Outbreak," Star Tribune, 12/17/98; "State Health Officials Say They've Linked a Food-poisoning Outbreak at Last Summer's Goodhue County Fair to Cases in the Twin Cities," Food Poisoning Link (States News Service) 12/16/98.
74. Selcraig, Bruce, "From Great River to Foul Gutter: The Descent of the Rio Grande; A Testing Program by Mexican, American Students Confirms that the Artery is Being Choked to Death with Waste, Neglect," Los Angeles Times, 5/19/94.
75. Texas Department of Health; interview 12/15/98.
76. Texas Department of Health; data for the first 11 months of 1998.
77. Nusser, Nancy. "Border Still Polluted Despite U.S. Promises," Austin American-Statesman, 12/17/95.
78. Texas Department of Health Neural Tube Defect Surveillance and Intervention Project, Quarterly Report, April 1995.
79. Dr. Russel Larsen, Texas Department of Health; Interview, 12/15/98.
80. Wilkinson, et al. "Epistemiologic Study of Neural Tube and Other Birth Defects in the Lower Rio Grand Valley," The University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas, unpublished study, summer 1995.
81. Texas Department of Health; data for first 11 months of 1998.
82. INEGI, Estadisticas de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion.
83. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statics, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics, "Comparative Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing Industries, Selected Countries: 1997."
84. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics data.
85. William R. Kline, Trade and Income Distribution, IIE, 1997.
86. Bronfenbrenner, Kate. Final Report: The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat of Plant Closing on the Right of Workers to Organize, Submitted to the Labor Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor Cooperation, September 30, 1996.
87. Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social, Encuesta Nacional de Empleo 1998. 6,186,938 Mexicans were documented as earning less than Mexico's legal minimum wage in 1993.
88. Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
89. Mexican Market Basket Assembled by Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, October 1998 data.
90. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
91. Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
92. U.S. Department of Labor data; "U.S. Border Towns Suffer From Post-Nafta Syndrome," The Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1998.
93. Brandon, Karen. "NAFTA at Five: Promises and Realities," Chicago Tribune, 11/29/98.
94. Sutter, Mary. "Mexico's Commerce Chief Banks on Nafta to Heal Economic Woes," Journal of Commerce, 11/9/98.
95. "Poll conducted in June 1996 by Mexico City-based Reforma newspaper mentioned by the New York Times, August 4, 1996.
96. "Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion," Instituo Nacional de Estadistica Geografia E Informatica, Juno 1998, p.8.
97. "Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion," Instituo Nacional de Estadistica Geografia E Informatica, Juno 1998, p.8.
98. 98Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
99. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statics, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics, "Comparative Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing Industries, Selected Countries: 1997." Maquiladora wages from BLS, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics data.
100. Mongelluzzo, Bill, "Non-border Maquiladora Growth Lures LTL Firms," Journal of Commerce, 12/2/98, p. 14A.
101. "Mexico's Makeover," Business Week, 12/ 21/98.
102. SUNS: South-North Development Monitor, "Mexico: Opinions sharply divided on NAFTA," #4345, 12/15/ 1998.
103. Imaz, Jose Maria. "NAFTA Damages Small Businesses," El Barzon (Mexico City), January 1997.
104. "Mexican Farmers Request Temporary Suspension of NAFTA," FuturesWorld, 12/16/98
105. Petras, James, Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Zeta Magazine, April 1997.
106. See Robert Blecker, "NAFTA and the Peso Collapse: Not Just a Coincidence," EPI Briefing Paper, Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 1997.
107. RMALC (Mexican Action on Free Trade). Mirage and Reality: NAFTA Three Years Later, Analysis and Proposals from Civil Society, Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Comercio, April 1997.
108. Business Week, "Mexico's Makeover," 12/21/98.
109. INEGI, "Manufacturing Industry Productivity, Various Countries January 1993-September 1998."
110. Imaz, Jose Maria. "Provoked by Debt, Mexicans Find a Voice," Los Angeles Times, 4/22/96.
111. Petras, James, Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Zeta Magazine, April 1997.
112. United Nations Development Program, "Human Poverty Profile and Index; UNDP 1998 Human Development Report." UNDP measured poverty rate from 1989-1994. See, Diana Alarcon, National Poverty Reduction Strategies of Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, UNDP, September 11-12, 1997, for information on the constancy of Mexico's poverty rate since 1984.
113. Petras, James, Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton, Zeta Magazine, April 1997.
114. Ethyl Corporation, "U.S. Company Files Notice to Seek $200 Million in Claim Against Government of Canada," Press Release, September 10, 1996.
115. "NAFTA Lawsuits Cloud MAI Discussions," Parliamentary Bureau, August 24, 1998.
116. See "'Expropriations' Takes on New Meaning: MMT Case Sets Far-Reaching Precedent," The Financial Post, 7/28/98.
117. "NHL Meets NAFTA," The Arizona Republic, 5/13/98.
118. Government Accounting Office (GAO), Commercial Trucking: Safety Concerns about Mexican Trucks Remain Even as Inspection Increases, April 1997.
119. Government Accounting Office (GAO), Commercial Trucking: Safety Concerns about Mexican Trucks Remain Even as Inspection Increases, April 1997. Texas Department of Public Safety, 12/14/98 interview with Major Lester Mills.
120. Texas Department of Public Safety, 12/14/98 interview with Major Lester Mills.
121. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General Audit Report: Motor Safety Carrier Program for Trucks at U.S. Borders, December 28, 1998.
122. Texas Department of Public Safety; 12/14/98 interview with Major Lester Mills; U.S. Department of Transportation data.
123. Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways, NAFTA: The Facts, September 1997.
124. Langford, Mark. "Nugent: Mexican Trucks Breaking State Law," UPI, October 28, 1997, quoting Nugent, Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission.
125. Washington Post, September 25, 1996.
126. "U.S. Task Force Says Smugglers Exploit Rising Cross-Border Trade," Dallas Morning News, 5/11/98.
127. Shannon, Kelly. "NAFTA's increased truck traffic is cited for rise of heroin in U.S.," Austin-American Statesman, 1/3/98.
128. Shenkle, Lisa. "200,000 stolen vehicles shipped from U.S. Ports; Mexico is Gateway to Latin America," Journal of Commerce, 10/22/98.
129. Washington Post, 12/9/96.
130. Calculations based on number of workers certified by the NAFTA-TAA program by May 1998, and amount of money spent on workers, as documented by Journal of Commerce, May 13, 1998.
131. Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
132. Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
133. Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
134. Brandon, Karen."NAFTA at Five," Chicago Tribune, November 29, 1998.
135. There is no judicial remedy under the Labor Side Agreement for governments that do not uphold and enforce the right to organize.
136. U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Public Report and Review of NAO Submission Nol 9702, April 28, 1998.
137. U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, "The North American Free Trade Agreement at Four Years (sic): What it Means for the U.S. and Mexico," June 1998.
138. Wall Street Journal, 10/15/97. The article states, " Both supporters and opponents of NAFTA agree that the side agreements have had little impact, mainly because the mechanisms they created have no enforcement power."
139. Poll Conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the AFL-CIO, July 18-22, 1997.
140. CEC, Taking Stock: North American Pollutants and Transfers, 1995.
141. "The Sewer Wars," The Economist, August 8, 1998.
142. "The Sewer Wars," The Economist, August 8, 1998.
143. NADBank, "NADB Projects as of September 15, 1998."