Westray Coal Mine Disaster

Pictou County, Nova Scotia

At 5:20am on 9 May 1992
the Westray coal mine exploded
killing 26 miners

John Thomas Bates
Larry Arthur Bell
Bennie Joseph Benoit
Wayne Michael Conway
Ferris Todd Dewan
Adonis Joseph Dollimont
Robert Steven Doyle
Remi Joseph Drolet
Roy Edward Feltmate
Charles Robert Fraser
Myles Daniel Gillis
John Philip Halloran
Randolph Brian House
Trevor Martin Jahn
Laurence Elwyn James
Eugene William Johnson
Stephen Paul Lilley
Michael Frederick MacKay
Angus Joseph MacNeil
Glenn David Martin
Harry Alliston McCallum
Eric Earl McIssac
George James Munroe
Danny James Poplar
Romeo Andrew Short
Peter Francis Vickers

• Nova Scotia Legislature, Halifax,   2001 May 9
• House of Commons, Ottawa,   2001 May 9:
  ...It is some time since the Justice Committee recommended that the criminal code be amended so as to make sure that the kinds of people who are responsible for these kinds of events do not literally get away with murder, as is sometimes the case...
• House of Commons, Ottawa,   2000 March 13
• Newfoundland Legislature, St. John's,   1999 December 2
• Prince Edward Island Legislature, Charlottetown,   1999 May 4
• House of Commons, Ottawa,   1997 December 2:
  ...The report released yesterday reveals a chain of obvious preventable safety problems. As project financier, Ottawa must share the blame for turning the federally assisted job project into a tomb, a mine so unsafe that eleven bodies have yet to be recovered, and a whole region in Nova Scotia remains in mourning...
• Ontario Legislature, Toronto,   1997 September 29
• Manitoba Legislature, Winnipeg,   1996 April 3
• Saskatchewan Legislature, Regina,   1996 March 15
• Yukon Legislature, Whitehorse,   1993 March 15
• Alberta Legislature, Edmonton,   1992 July 2
• British Columbia Legislature, Victoria,   1992 June 19:
  ...On May 9, 1992, just before dawn, a thunderous methane explosion roared through Westray's Plymouth, Nova Scotia, underground workings, killing 26 miners. For six long, agonizing days Canada watched and waited, clinging to the hope that some might be found alive...
• British Columbia Legislature, Victoria,   1992 May 11:
  ...I therefore propose to send a telegram to the Mines minister of Nova Scotia and the mayor of Plymouth as follows: "We share your sorrow at the loss of 11 lives in the Westray mine disaster and pray that you will reach the other 15 while they are still alive...

July, 1991

This report describes the results of an analysis of the public inquiry hearings held after the Westray Coal accident in May 1992. At the request of Mr. Justice K. Peter Richard, Commissioner, I investigated the content of the hearings in order to develop insight into the degree to which Westray employees perceived the risk of accident as imminent and why the miners either accepted or rejected the risk they perceived. While some miners terminated their employment with the mine because they were unwilling to accept the accident risk, others continued to work until the accident happened. Various factors that contributed to the employee perceptions of accident risk were identified, and it may be inferred that the perceived probability and expected seriousness of an accident was both high and general throughout the underground workforce. Moreover, the willingness to accept high levels of danger amongst those miners who did not quit may be atrributed to the operation of various factors, among which economic pressures and economic incentives played a major role. Mine management, rather than putting in place a safety-incentive programme of a type known to significantly improve cautious and accident-free performance, instituted instead a remuneration schedule with a progressive production bonus component that appears to have exacerbated risk acceptance and the frequency of imprudent practices among the miners. The pursuit of short-term economic gain may well have set the stage for the fatal explosion and the mine's premature demise.

Abstract: Technological crises are predictable and inevitable, particularly in a high-risk industry such as mining. Corporations are advised to have a crisis communication plan to facilitate proactive behaviour. Such a plan presumes a commitment to honesty, openness, and ethical behaviour. Journalists are also encouraged to have a crisis communication plan so that they are prepared for inevitable events, informed about the industries in their area, and able to tell the story substantively, accurately, and in context. The Westray coal mine, owned by Curragh Incorporated of Toronto and located in Pictou County, Nova Scotia, exploded on May 9, 1992, killing the 26 miners who were underground. This paper analyzes the relationship between Curragh and the media, particularly during the week following the explosion. It observes that the relationship was severely tested, as is often the case in time of crisis and human tragedy. The paper also observes that neither Curragh nor the participating media had crisis communication plans, which negatively affected their performance. It concludes that Curragh did not satisfy legitimate media needs and that the company's lack of open, prompt, and accessible communication fed a media suspicion that officials had something to hide. On the other hand, journalists relied on human interest, made mistakes, and decontextualized their coverage of the story.

...Coal mining is dangerous and underground mining in Pictou County has always been very dangerous. From 1838 to 1950, when it ceased due to the advent of fuel oil, aging facilities and deep seams too expensive to mine at the time, 246 miners had been killed in a series of explosions. From 1866 to 1972, another 330 were killed in other kinds of accidents (i.e. stone falls, crushing by coal cars, mangled in machinery). The Foord coal seam, of which the Westray mine was a part, while particularly dangerous, was singularly attractive. Unusually thick, with low sulfur content and high BTU rating, its reserves were estimated at 45 million tons. The location is known to exude large quantities of methane, is geographically faulted so that mine roofs will collapse, and has a problem of spontaneous combustion (even in the absence of sparking machinery.) Indeed, almost a year before the disaster, one provincial opposition politician argued, "[b]ecause of the fault structure and gas contained in the formation of coal seams in Pictou County, Westray mine is potentially one of the most dangerous mines in the world"...

Westray was an underground coal mine in Stellarton, near New Glasgow, Pictou County, Nova Scotia that blew up on May 9, 1992 killing all 26 people working in the mine instantaneously. Westray was a corporation wholly owned by Curragh Resources, a company controlled by Clifford Frame and based in Ontario. The development of the mine in Stellarton received considerable political support from the provincial and federal government despite the opposition of technical experts and despite the history of mining fatalities in the area. Local historian James Cameron estimates that 576 deaths occurred between 1866 and 1972 in mining in Pictou County and that 625-650 died "from colliery misadventures in Pictou County" since the industry's debut in the early 1800s. The Federal MP for Pictou County was Brian Mulroney, later Prime Minister of Canada and the Provincial MLA was Donald Cameron, then Minister of Industry and subsequently Premier of the province ... What has been done about the recommendations of the Westray Inquiry? The Nova Scotia government hired a consultant, Ian Plummer, a former Inspector of Mines of Ontario, to review the activities of the Ministry of Labour. Plummer's report was released with no substantive recommendations to improve health and safety of workers in the province. Instead, he hides behind bureaucratic reorganization of the department without any consideration of the lack of effectiveness in protecting workers' lives. Ian Plummer, as a mines inspector, sat on the panel of industry experts which awarded Westray the mining industry's J.T. Ryan Award for Safety as the safest coal mine in Canada in 1991, eleven days prior to the explosion that killed 26 men...

...A safe workplace demands a responsible and conscientious commitment from management – from the Chief Executive Officer down. Such a commitment was sadly lacking at the Westray mine. Since there was no discernible safety ethic, including a training program and a management safety mentality there could be no continuum of responsible safety practice within that workplace. Complacency seemed to be the prevailing attitude at Westray – which at times regressed to a heedless disregard for the most fundamental safety imperatives. As I stated in the report, compliance with safety regulations was the clear duty of Westray management. To Insure that this duty was undertaken and fulfilled by management was the legislated duty of the inspectorate. Management failed, the inspectorate failed, and the mine blew up.

...Nothing better illustrates the incompetence with which the inspectors dealt with the dust problems at Westray than their actions after the coal dust orders were issued on April 29th, 1992 (ten days before the mine exploded). The order had four parts: The coal dust was to be removed immediately and stone dusting was to be done immediately. Within fifteen days, a stone dusting plan was to be developed and filed and within fifteen days a dust sampling program was to be developed and filed. The company was to notify the Department, in writing, when it had complied with each part of the order. As we know from the evidence, nothing was done ... What is worse, nothing was done by the Department to monitor compliance ... One reason for the paralysis of the inspectors may lie with the dominant philosophy in the health and safety division of the Department. It was, and apparently still is, a philosophy of non-engagement that in this case encouraged blind deference to the decisions of the mine operator ... There was a sinister side to the management of the mine beyond the incompetence and the neglect ... However, it would be wrong to suggest that Westray or Curragh were rogue companies that can be set aside as anomalies. They were part of the Canadian mining industry. Their executives were leading lights in that industry. In a sense, the industry as a whole must bear some responsibility for what happened here. We regret the fact that both the Coal Association of Canada and the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum refused your invitation to participate in these hearings. The Institute was the body which awarded Westray the John T. Ryan Trophy for mine safety a few weeks before the mine blew up ...

...The lack of training and education of miners and company officials in safety matters played a prominent role in the failure to develop a culture that rejects acceptance, condonation, and participation in activities which present unmanageable safety risks. We agree that we could have done more to detect that deficiency, we agree we could have done more by way of education. Policies, procedures, and safety practices should have been scrutinized more systematically for their adequacy, and more effort should have been made to determine their impact on day to day activities. We now know that the reality at Westray often did not match company records, or what the inspectors were led to believe by management, or the things they saw at the mine ...

...On the eve of our national holiday, Canada Day, July 1, 1998, government prosecutors have announced that the Westray managers, Phillips and Parry, will no longer have to face criminal prosecution for their role in the death of 26 men on May 9, 1992. Despite the public testimony, and the two volumes of documentation of mismanagement, violations of safety regulations and practices, and failure to protect the safety of the workers from the Public Inquiry into the Westray Explosion, this is not enough to prove a crime by a corporate manager, according to the Crown Attorney in charge. Mr.. Justice Richards was very careful in his report to describe the behaviour of the Westray managers as "willful blindness" towards what was happening and the tragic consequences that could and did result. "Willful blindness" is a standard of proof sufficient to convict you or I of any crime, but not, so it seems, managers and CEO's. The behaviour of the office of the Crown Attorney from the beginning has been nothing more than a cover-up and a screw up. The Supreme Court of Canada had to order them back to trial! Judges at all levels have commented on the bad behaviour of the prosecution. Now we are expected to accept their judgement to give up. ...

Westray Mine Public Inquiry Commission
Stellarton, Nova Scotia

3 days Preliminary, 12 & 13 July 1995 and 4 October 1995.
77 days In Session, from 6 November 1995 to 22 July 1996.



Mr. Justice K. Peter Richard, Commissioner
John P. Merrick, Q.C., Commission Counsel
Jocelyn M. Campbell, Associate Commission Counsel
Deirdre Williams-Cooper, Chief Administrator

Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report issued 1 December 1997 Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Contents Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Executive Summary Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, In Conclusion Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Consolidated Findings Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Report, Consolidated Recommendations A Westray Coal Mine Public Inquiry Chronology was available in 1998 at http://www.gov.ns.ca/labr/westray/about.htm but for some reason has since been removed from the Government website.

Media Advisory – Westray Mine Public Inquiry

Media Advisory – Westray Mine Public Inquiry

Media Advisory – Westray Mine Public Inquiry

Steelworkers Welcome Westray Inquiry

• The union wants the Westray inquiry to:
• Ensure that all facts about the establishing and operation of the Westray mine are exposed, and that all those responsible for the unsafe conditions at Westray are held publicly accountable;
• Identify as precisely as possible the circumstances that led to the explosion;
• Look closely at the actions of the politicians, who lobbied for the establishment of the Westray mine, and the public servants responsible for ensuring it was developed and operated safely;
• Work with the Commissioner to develop recommendations for effective health and safety regulations that will provide protection for people who work in mining and in industry in general.

Westray Motion Just a First Step:
Steelworkers Continue Fight to Change Criminal Code

Westray Criminal Trial
Pictou, Nova Scotia

44 days in session, from   6 February 1995   to   9 June 1995

Courtroom Rules, Westray Criminal Trial

Brief Overview of the Westray Criminal Trial

Administration of Justice Brought into Disrepute

"Clippings" about
The Westray Coal Mine Disaster

Books About the Westray Coal Mine

From fields as diverse as public relations, criminology, and journalism, select experts tackle the difficult issue of the underlying causes of the explosion at the Westray Mine in Nova Scotia and how it was subsequently handled by the government, the corporation, and the media. The analysis is firmly based in criminology but the forays into media analysis, politics, law, and engineering will expand the reader's awareness of how such a tragedy could happen. Graphs, charts, news articles, transcripted interviews.

"Shaun pulls no punches and gives no quarter to those responsible for what took place on May 9th, 1992. This is a book that Canadians will want to read. The company, as Shaun states in his book, tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the public. They were not fooled. Shaun's book gives the screaming truth of the incompetency and lack of regard for human life by company officials and politicians."
– Mike Piche, United Steelworkers

At 5:20 in the morning on May 9, 1992, a miner working in the Southwest section of the Westray mine was using a continuous miner to cut coal. As he cut into the coalface, the picks on the cutting head struck some pyrite embedded there, causing a shower of sparks. He had seen the sparks before, but this time they ignited some methane gas seeping from the coal seam. He jumped down off the miner, terrified at what he saw as he tried to put on his survival equipment. In moments he was dead...

The Report of the Westray Public Inquiry Commission

Statements in the Legislature
as reported in Hansard, 1 December 1997

Premier's Office
Westray Response Committee
List of Committee Members

Department of Transportation & Public Works
Westray Response Committee

Prosecute Westray 'cowards, tricksters,'
Hotline callers say

The Daily News Hotline allows readers to speak out on current issues. It does not purport to be a scientific sample of public opinion. Questions appear Wednesday and Sunday. Results appear Saturday and Wednesday.

• 1975   Manitoba
• 1976   British Columbia
• 1976   Northwest Territories
• 1977   Saskatchewan
• 1979   New Brunswick
• 1979   Newfoundland
• 1979   Ontario
• 1981   Alberta
• 1981   Yukon Territory
• 1987   Prince Edward Island
• 1996   Nova Scotia

Coal dust, a recognized mining hazard for decades, played no role in the deadly explosion more than five years ago at the Westray mine, Clifford Frame claims. That's among the assertions the Westray inquiry will hear if it manages to force the defiant Toronto mine promoter to testify. In exclusive, wide-ranging interviews with this newspaper, the man who built and operated the Pictou County mine offered his views on key events and issues surrounding the 1992 explosion that killed 26 workers. Among them is his fervent belief – despite the findings of mining experts and the sworn testimony of dozens of his former employees – that coal dust was not a problem at the mine or a factor in the explosion. "That crap about them trying to call it a dust explosion," Frame, former chairman of Westray's parent company, Curragh Inc., said in disgust, "they are never going to prove that." The allegation that dust fuelled the explosion goes to the heart of charges of manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death filed against now-bankrupt Curragh and former Westray officials Gerald Phillips and Roger Parry. Coal dust is combustible and can fuel a powerful explosion if it becomes suspended in the mine air in the presence of open flame. The most common source of flame is methane – a flammable gas that seeps from coal. In a scenario that has been played out in many mine disasters, a methane fire or explosion stirs up coal dust, which fuels a powerful explosion capable of wrecking an entire mine ... He did not follow the inquiry's proceedings closely and displayed little detailed knowledge of evidence presented during 77 days of hearings in 1995 and 1996. For instance, he claimed some victims suffocated when fire sucked oxygen out of the air – they were actually overcome by carbon monoxide produced by the methane fire – and suggests this proves the explosion did not cause their deaths. "The 11 that were killed up in the area where the detector was tampered with, they suffocated. But what do they care – I'm sorry to put it this way – but the coal dust or the gas explosion or whatever wouldn't have anything to do with their deaths." All of this leaves Frame with a clear conscience. "Christ, I'm sitting up here in Toronto ... How in the name of God would I know that anybody was adjusting a methane detector? How the hell would I know that? And if I didn't know that, how could I have any feeling of guilt, other than the fact that I shouldn't have developed the Goddamned mine in the first place." Frame was asked about other allegations – what he calls "all those extraneous things" – such as men threatened with suspension or firing if they complained about unsafe practices. "That's where Gerald and Roger will have to stick up for themselves," he responded. And he distanced himself from Phillips and Parry, who stood trial in 1995 and face a retrial...

Clifford Frame is a busy man. Just last month his bid to escape testifying at the Westray inquiry was squashed by an Ontario court. Mr. Frame brought the case to Ontario after being ordered to testify by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, he has made it clear he will now take the matter to the Ontario Supreme Court. For families of the Westray victims, the process has been frustrating. It has been five years since the disaster and officials are still waiting to speak with the man who held the final authority at the Westray Coal Mine.

With the Westray Inquiry stalled out, Clifford Frame has set his sights on getting back into the coal mining business. As the president of an aggressive little company, he is trying to wrest control of a coal project in West Virginia from its Australian owners. Frame is mounting a hostile takeover bid of Australian listed Greenfields Coal Company. Greenfields' executives say they only recently became aware about Frame's involvement at Westray. Now the accusations are flying and the situation has gotten nasty enough to attract the attention of the Australian Securities Commission and regulators of the Toronto Stock Exchange.

When Curragh Resources' mining boss Clifford Frame started talking about opening a mine in the economically depressed area of Stellarton, Nova Scotia, in the late 1980s, politicians flocked to him like seagulls at the beach. The Foord coal Seam had been mined intermittently since the 1830s. With its high levels of methane and poor ground conditions, the Foord Seam had already claimed 244 lives.

Curragh talked brightly of using new technology to make the operation safe and viable. Politicians predicted the mine would bring steady development to the region for decades. The only stumbling block was that in order to make the plan viable lots of government grants and concessions would have to be forthcoming. Premier Donald Cameron tied his own political aspirations to the success of the mine and the regulatory green light was given at every step of the way. The Feds and the Provincial government sank almost $100 million in getting Westray off the ground.

Publicly, the Westray operation was a model of safety and mining ingenuity, an example of what government and industry could do when they worked together. Inside the mine, however, life was far from rosy...

• Resolution 1 - to place 10,350,000 redeemable convertible cumulative preference shares of 20 cents each at issue price of 26 cents each to Vilo Resources, an independent company introduced by the Victor Smorgon Group. This will raise $2.6 million.
• Resolution 2 - to apply up to $3.14 million from the Greenfields share premium account. Greenfields now plans a pro-rata rights issue on a 2 for 5 basis at 13 cent's per share, with 7 cents per share being met from the share premium account. This will raise $5.2 million.

* Greenfields nomination
# MRC nomination
Valid votes and proxies available at meeting   74,624,185

So where is Greenfields Coal Company now?
On 6 May 2001 I tried to find out the current status of this company, but it seems to have disappeared. There are occasional references to "Antaeus Energy Ltd., previously Greenfields Coal" and "Antaeus Energy, a U.S. subsidiary of Greenfields Energy Corp. of Sydney, Australia" but little else. There was a passing mention of a new website at
    http://www.anten.com/company.htm
but it contained no information.

Westray Coal Mine in General

Curragh Inc. Suspends Operations
at Yukon Lead and Zinc Mines