On June 21, 1998 skydiver Denise Daddio was fatally injured at Skydive Cross Keys, in New Jersey, following a main/reserve entanglement. Fliteline Systems, Inc. has now completed its investigation of this incident. The following report is derived from a detailed study of facts compiled from different investigative sources. Great effort was made to keep speculation and guesswork out of this process.

Summary of the Findings

1. The deceased experienced a main parachute bag-lock malfunction as a result of an out-of-sequence opening. This conclusion was reached after careful analysis of the field investigators’ reports, interviews with them, physical testing, and a thorough examination of the equipment.

2. The deceased did not cutaway her main parachute prior to deploying her reserve. The cutaway handle was found still attached to the harness. It was easily extracted on the ground.

3. Drop zone investigators were not allowed to examine the equipment at the scene nor did they bring any type of recording device such as a video or still camera.

4. The equipment investigation was compromised when the deceased, still wearing her equipment, was transported to the local medical facility. It was not until the next day that the drop zone investigators were allowed to examine the equipment. No recording devices were brought to this session either. The equipment had been removed from the deceased at some point prior to their arrival.

5. Williamstown Police Department forensic photographers took still pictures of the scene including the equipment. The drop zone investigators did not wait to obtain this evidence prior to issuing their reports, nor did they make any attempt to obtain the photographs at a later date to validate their original conjecture.

6. Analysis of the Police photographic evidence contradicts key observations made by the drop zone investigators (Mike Williams - S&TA and Mark Kruse), most notably that the "absence of the CatapultÒ secondary pilot chute would have greatly increased the likelihood of a reserve deployment."

Evaluation of the Evidence

After breaking off from a two-way relative work jump the deceased began tracking away from her partner. Sometime during this track, her main bridle (leg strap mounted) became dislodged from its VelcroÒ attachment point on the main container and started to flap around. There was sufficient drag created by the one-inch wide main bridle to deploy the curved closing pin on the main container. At this point, the main deployment bag was now free to escape the main container and started to move about. However, the main deployment bag remained tethered to the jumper by the stowed main pilot chute. This condition allowed the bag to rotate at least twice in the disturbed airflow behind the jumper, and, in turn, loop the partially deployed lines around the main bridle. Both the left and right line groups of the main parachute were found wrapped twice around the main bridle at its attachment point on the bag.

At this point, the main pilot chute was thrown. The main parachute remained trapped in its deployment bag with six line stows still in place. Experiments conducted with the same deployment setup confirmed this condition could only be induced when the main bridle is under no tension from the main pilot chute. This fact precludes a pilot-chute-in-tow situation suggested as another alternative very early on in the investigation. A pilot-chute-in-tow keeps constant tension on the main bridle, preventing the main deployment bag from flipping and twisting around it.

The pile Velcro used to attach the main bridle to the outside of the main container was found to have minimal holding strength. It appears to be the original factory installation indicating the Velcro had gone through approximately four hundred deployments. Industry experience has shown worn or weak Velcro to be factor in many out-of-sequence deployments.

The deceased made no attempt to jettison the bag-locked main parachute, but instead, deployed the reserve parachute directly into the trailing main deployment assembly. The result was a main/reserve entanglement in which neither canopy was able to clear its respective deployment bag. Evidence at the scene indicated the deceased deployed her reserve manually as the ripcord was still in her hand at the site. Further investigation revealed the CypresÒ had fired, but the reserve closing-loop was not cut. This indicates a ripcord pull above 750 feet, which is the Cypres predetermined activation altitude.

Drop zone personnel arrived at the scene without the aid of video or still cameras. Additionally, they were only allowed to stay at the scene for just a few minutes. A Williamstown Police Department photographer took photographs of the scene. Fliteline Systems, Inc. and its independent investigator utilized these photographs to help separate fact from speculation during their subsequent investigations.

Review of Photographic Evidence

One particular photograph in the sequence shows a long view of the scene and was useful in determining the relative position of all components in relation to the deceased. This photograph made it clear that the scene was compressed into a much smaller area than the field investigators depicted through their video reconstruction presented to Fliteline and its independent investigator. This compression of the scene on the ground is compelling evidence that the deployment mechanisms were thoroughly entangled at multiple points, not just one primary area, as suggested by the field investigators.

Another photograph shows, in great detail, a wrap of reserve suspension lines along with both main and reserve bridles around the reserve free bag. The wrap of lines and bridles appears to be wound quite tightly around the center of the bag from top to bottom. This indicates the reserve deployment bag was tumbling during deployment. The reasons for such a tumble can be explained by having little to no tension applied to the reserve bridle during this time. The most likely cause for this condition is both pilot chutes and bridle of the reserve deployment system were involved in the entanglement with the main parachute bag, suspension lines, bridle and pilot-chute. The reserve deployment bag is shown sitting adjacent to the main deployment bag, indicating they were in very close proximity to one another during freefall.

Conclusion

The fatality report was filed by Anne Helliwell, DPRE / S&TA, on July 13, 1998. Based on the evidence contained therein, Fliteline Systems, Inc. concurs with Ms. Helliwell’s findings that the deceased experienced an out-of-sequence opening due to worn Velcro on the main bridle. This resulted in a main parachute bag-lock malfunction. The failure to carry out correct emergency procedures (SIM 4.18, USPA recommended training procedure – jettisoning the main prior to initiating reserve deployment) resulted in a main/reserve entanglement.

After careful review of the field reports from Mark Kruse and Mike Williams, and after comparing those reports to the police department photographs taken at the scene, Fliteline Systems, Inc. feels that an incorrect conclusion was reached by the field investigators regarding the Catapult pilot chutes’ level of involvement. Upon reviewing the evidence contained in the photographs from the scene, it is apparent the two deployment systems (main and reserve) were entangled in such a way as to make either main or reserve deployment impossible. Due to the multiple entanglement points, and their severity, no single element of the reserve deployment system can be singled out as the cause of the reserve system failure. We believe that at some time during the transportation and handling of the deceased, or the subsequent removal of her equipment, much of this entanglement evidence was compromised.

Fliteline Systems, Inc. manufactures the Reflex harness / container system in Lake Elsinore, California. For more details on the Reflex and Catapult systems, please visit our web site at www.fliteline.com, fax to 909-245-8825 or write to 570 Central Avenue, Suite I-1, Lake Elsinore, CA 92530.