Hegelianism
[From Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]


As an intellectual tradition, the history of Hegelianism is the history
of the reception and influence of the thought of G.W.F. Hegel. This
tradition is notoriously complex and many-sided, because while
some Hegelians have seen themselves as merely defending and
developing his ideas along what they took to be orthodox lines,
others have sought to ¡®reform¡¯ his system, or to appropriate
individual aspects and overturn others, or to offer consciously
revisionary readings of his work. This makes it very hard to
identify any body of doctrine common to members of this tradition,
and a wide range of divergent philosophical views can be found
among those who (despite this) can none the less claim to be
Hegelians.

There are both ¡®internal¡¯ and ¡®external¡¯ reasons for this: on one
hand, Hegel¡¯s position itself brings together many different
tendencies (idealism and objectivism, historicism and absolutism,
rationalism and empiricism, Christianity and humanism, classicism
and modernism, a liberal view of civil society with an organicist
view of the state); any balance between them is hermeneutically
very unstable, enabling existing readings to be challenged and old
orthodoxies to be overturned. On the other hand, the critical
response to Hegel¡¯s thought and the many attempts to undermine it
have meant that Hegelians have continually needed to reconstruct
his ideas and even to turn Hegel against himself, while each new
intellectual development, such as Marxism, pragmatism,
phenomenology or existential philosophy, has brought about some
reassessment of his position. This feature of the Hegelian tradition
has been heightened by the fact that Hegel¡¯s work has had an
impact at different times over a long period and in a wide range of
countries, so that divergent intellectual, social and historical
pressures have influenced its distinct appropriations. At the
hermeneutic level, these appropriations have contributed greatly to
keeping the philosophical understanding of Hegel alive and
open-ended, so that our present-day conception of his thought
cannot properly be separated from them. Moreover, because
questions of Hegel interpretation have so often revolved around
the main philosophical, political and religious issues of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hegelianism has also had a
significant impact on the development of modern Western thought
in its own right.

As a result of its complex evolution, Hegelianism is best understood
historically, by showing how the changing representation of
Hegel¡¯s ideas have come about, shaped by the different critical
concerns, sociopolitical conditions and intellectual movements that
dominated his reception in different countries at different times.
Initially, Hegel¡¯s influence was naturally most strongly felt in
Germany as a comprehensive, integrative philosophy that seemed to
do justice to all realms of experience and promised to preserve the
Christian heritage in a modern and progressive form within a
speculative framework. However, this position was quickly
challenged, both from other philosophical standpoints (such as
F.W.J. Schelling¡¯s ¡®positive philosophy¡¯ and F.A.
Trendelenburg¡¯s neo-Aristotelian empiricism), and by the
celebrated generation of younger thinkers (the so-called ¡®Young¡¯
or ¡®Left¡¯ Hegelians, such as Ludwig Feuerbach, David Strauss,
Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge and the early Karl Marx), who insisted
that to discover what made Hegel a truly significant thinker (his
dialectical method, his view of alienation, his ¡®sublation¡¯ of
Christianity), this orthodoxy must be overturned. None the less,
both among these radicals and in academic circles, Hegel¡¯s
influence was considerably weakened in Germany by the 1860s
and 1870s, while by this time developments in Hegelian thought
had begun to take place elsewhere.

Hegel¡¯s work was known outside Germany from the 1820s
onwards, and Hegelian schools developed in northern Europe,
Italy, France, Eastern Europe, America and (somewhat later)
Britain, each with their own distinctive line of interpretation, but all
fairly uncritical in their attempts to assimilate his ideas. However,
in each of these countries challenges to the Hegelian position were
quick to arise, partly because the influence of Hegel¡¯s German
critics soon spread abroad, and partly because of the growing
impact of other philosophical positions (such as Neo-Kantianism,
materialism and pragmatism). Nevertheless, Hegelianism outside
Germany proved more durable in the face of these attacks, as new
readings and approaches emerged to counter them, and ways were
found to reinterpret Hegel¡¯s work to show that it could
accommodate these other positions, once the earlier accounts of
Hegel¡¯s metaphysics, political philosophy and philosophy of
religion (in particular) were rejected as too crude.

This pattern has continued into the twentieth century, as many of
the movements that began by defining themselves against Hegel
(such as Neo-Kantianism, Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism,
post-structuralism and even ¡®analytic¡¯ philosophy) have then come
to find unexpected common ground, giving a new impetus and
depth to Hegelianism as it began to be assimilated within and
influenced by these diverse approaches. Such efforts at
rapprochement began in the early part of the century with Wilhelm
Dilthey¡¯s attempt to link Hegel with his own historicism, and
although they were more ambivalent, this connection was
reinforced in Italy by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile. The
realignment continued in France in the 1930s, as Jean Wahl
brought out the more existentialist themes in Hegel¡¯s thought,
followed in the 1940s by Alexander Kojève¡¯s influential Marxist
readings. Hegelianism has also had an impact on Western Marxism
through the writings of the Hungarian Georg Lukács, and this
influence has continued in the critical reinterpretations offered by
members of the Frankfurt School, particularly Theodor W. Adorno,
Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas and others.
More recently, most of the major schools of philosophical thought
(from French post-structuralism to Anglo-American ¡®analytic¡¯
philosophy) have emphasized the need to take account of Hegel,
and as a result Hegelian thought (both exegetical and constructive)
is continually finding new directions.

1 The Hegelian School in Germany 1816-40

Initially, Hegel¡¯s influence was naturally most strongly felt in Germany,
and can be seen in the relatively rapid formation within the
philosopher¡¯s lifetime of something like a ¡®Hegelian school¡¯. The
representatives of this school procured a considerable influence for
themselves not only through the personal prestige of Hegel, but also
through the foundation of important journals more or less expressly
designed to propagate and disseminate the philosophical principles of
Hegel himself and apply them to central theoretical and practical issues
of the day. But the very comprehensiveness and richness of Hegel¡¯s
systematic synthesis placed his more original students in an ambiguous
and paradoxical position. Eduard Gans wrote ¡®Hegel has left behind a
number of gifted students but no successor. For philosophy has now for
the first time completed the cycle of its existence; further advance can
only be expected as the further intelligent penetration of the material of
knowledge.¡¯

One of the earliest explicit champions of Hegel¡¯s thought was Georg
Andreas Gabler (1786-1853), a student from Hegel¡¯s Jena period
1801-07, who later succeeded to Hegel¡¯s chair in Berlin (1835) and was
one of the few students to write intensively on (part of) the
Phenomenology, with theKritik des Bewu©¬tseins (Critique of
Consciousness) (1827). When Hegel moved to take up his first chair in
Heidelberg in 1816 he also found an ardent supporter in the theologian
Karl Daub (1765-1836), who expounded a thoroughly Hegelian
approach to religious questions with Die dogmatische Theologie
jetziger Zeit (The Dogmatic Theology of Our Times) (1833). But it
was essentially during his final Berlin period (1819-31) that Hegel began
to develop a proper ¡®School¡¯ around him, with the founding of a
Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Kritik (Society for Scientific
Criticism) in 1825 and the consequent launching of the journal
Jahrbücher der wissenschaftlichen Kritik (Yearbook of Scientific
Criticism) under the editorship of Hegel and his more prominent
students. The journal explicitly began to disseminate a Hegelian line on
contemporary philosophical and cultural issues and was soon dubbed the
¡®Hegel newspaper¡¯ by its opponents.

Other followers at this time who produced Hegelian interpretations in
the fields of ethics, history of philosophy, speculative theology, law and
political thought were Leopold von Henning (1791-1866) with his
Prinzipien der Ethik in historischer Entwicklung (Principles of
Ethics in Historical Development) (1824), Karl Ludwig Michelet
(1801-93) with the Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in
Deutschland (History of the Most Recent Systems of Philosophy in
Germany) (1837-38), Philipp Karl Marheinecke (1780-1846) with Die
Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft (The
Fundamental Doctrines of Christian Dogmatics as Science) (1827)
and, one of the most interesting and original, Eduard Gans (1798-1839).
Gans had become a friend of Hegel¡¯s in Heidelberg and strongly under
his influence produced his major work Das Erbrecht in
weltgeschichtlicher Entwicklung (The Law of Inheritance
Considered in its World-Historical Development) (1824-35) which
forcefully pursued Hegel¡¯s own criticism of the ¡®Historical School¡¯ of
jurisprudence defended by Karl von Savigny. Gans also lectured on the
philosophy of world history from a liberal-progressive Hegelian
perspective as well as upon law and may well have been a powerful
influence upon the young Karl Marx who heard him lecture in Berlin in
the mid-1830s (see Marx, K. ¡×2). These early protagonists of Hegel¡¯s
thought are sometimes described as the ¡®Old Hegelians¡¯ because they
represented the first generation of the ¡®School¡¯, by contrast with the
later so-called  ¡®Young Hegelians¡¯ of the 1840s, but the label is often
quite uninformative about the substance of their teachings or their
political and religious persuasions.

Karl Rosenkranz (1805-1879) was another of these early disciples who
remained perhaps most faithful to the original Hegelian vision but also
showed himself an independent thinker in his wide-ranging oeuvre.
Rosenkranz consciously strove to defend and re-articulate Hegel¡¯s
position in all its dialectical complexity and, unlike most of Hegel¡¯s
followers, laid particular stress upon Hegel¡¯s fundamental debt to Kant
and aspects of the Enlightenment heritage. Rosenkranz expressed his
faith in the Hegelian ¡®middle¡¯ in declaring that ¡®only all of his students
taken together are the equal of Hegel; each one on his own account
merely represents a one-sided moment of Hegel¡¯ (Rosenkranz 1840a:
xxxv).

2 The Critique of Hegelian idealism 1840-70

Rosenkranz¡¯s preface to his biography of Hegel, Hegels Leben
(Hegel¡¯s Life) (1844), reveals something of the fervent ideological
climate of the early 1840s and reflects the various splits within the
Hegelian school which had developed in the previous decade, not to
mention the counter-reaction to Hegel¡¯s influence in the later work of
Schelling, Hegel¡¯s former friend and collaborator (see Schelling, F.W.J.
¡×4). For it was during the 1830s that the apparent solidity and impressive
unity of Hegel¡¯s achievement gradually began to fissure and the
potentially centrifugal tendencies of the system revealed themselves
under the pressure of significant new social and cultural developments.

These divisions first appeared in theology and the philosophy of religion
as Hegel¡¯s successors attempted to clarify the contemporary
implications of Hegel¡¯s famous philosophical appropriation of Christianity
as the ¡®consummate¡¯ religion corresponding to the ¡®absolute¡¯
perspective of the speculative system. Nevertheless, it was far from
clear how much of what many of Hegel¡¯s contemporaries still took to be
the essence of Christianity really was preserved and adequately
reformulated in Hegel, especially traditional dogmatic beliefs concerning
individual immortality and the afterlife, the personal and transcendent
God of theism, the uniqueness of the incarnation and the entire
eschatological dimension.

The figure who brought the interpretation of Hegel¡¯s philosophy of
religion to a head under all these aspects was David Friedrich Strauss,
whose Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet (The Life of Jesus,
Critically Examined) (1835-6) represents a watershed in
nineteenth-century religious Protestant thought (see Strauss, D.F. ¡×1).
Hegel himself had spoken of religious language in terms of pictorial
representation, symbolism and on occasion myth, but it was Strauss who
fearlessly subjected the received Gospel accounts to a
¡®demythologizing¡¯ technique and attempted to reveal the intelligible
ethical and spiritual truths misleadingly couched in archaic symbolic form
in the original texts of the tradition. He not only expressed doubts about
the historical verisimilitude of the stories and discounted the miraculous
and supernatural elements, but also reinterpreted the idea of special
revelation in terms of an unfolding historical revelation and rejected
traditional accounts of Christ¡¯s uniquely divine status. Thus Strauss
brought latent tensions in Hegel¡¯s legacy into the open and considerably
sharpened the ensuing debate. It is in this theological context that
Strauss himself first made the distinction in his Streitschriften zur
Vertheidigung meiner Schrift (Polemical Writings in Defence of My
Work) (1837) between ¡®right¡¯, ¡®centre¡¯ and ¡®left¡¯ positions in the
spectrum of Hegelian philosophy: the right held to orthodox tradition in
emphasizing divine transcendence, personal deity and the doctrine of
immortality; the left dissolved the radical uniqueness and sometimes
even the historicity of Christ and adopted a progressive humanistic
domestication of Christianity as a social creed not so far removed from
the ¡®religion of humanity¡¯ of Auguste Comte, (see ¡×6); while the centre
attempted the most difficult task of all, upholding the complexity of the
original Hegelian ¡®middle¡¯ and avoiding alike the extremes of traditional
theism, romantic pantheism or humanist reduction.

Some of those who attempted to negotiate this path in a sensitive and
interesting way, apart from Rosenkranz, fell into neglect once the poles
of the ensuing debate had ossified into fixed positions. Thus Ferdinand
Christian Baur (1792-1860), although he never considered himself a
strict adherent of the ¡®School¡¯ in any of its forms, developed in his Die
christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer
geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Christian Gnosis, or the Christian
Philosophy of Religion in its Historical Development) (1835) a kind
of speculative hermeneutic of biblical texts and traditional dogmas that
remained closer in certain important respects to Hegel¡¯s spirit than the
investigations of Baur¡¯s pupil Strauss. And Strauss¡¯ friend Wilhelm
Vatke (1806-82) brought a Hegelian perspective to the study of Judaic
thought, a neglected subject at the time, with Die Religion des alten
Testaments (The Religion of the Old Testament) (1835), and produced
detailed work on central religio-philosophical questions with Die
menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und Gnade
(Human Freedom in its Relation to Sin and Divine Forgiveness)
(1841). Alois Emanuel Biedermann (1819-1885) was another thinker
who engaged with the theological debates on the left and later continued
to exploit Hegelian ideas in the quest for a responsible modern
Christology which would avoid the pitfalls of anthropological reduction
and antiquated supranaturalism in his Christliche Dogmatik (Christian
Dogmatics) (1868).

The traditional division between ¡®right¡¯ and ¡®left¡¯, with the ¡®centre¡¯ being
largely ignored, is an extremely inadequate intellectual shorthand that
threatens to obscure rather than illuminate the complexity of the central
issues, especially in the 1830s. For it is really only with the development
of a radically secular and increasingly naturalistic worldview in the next
couple of decades that the earlier Hegelian positions could globally be
labelled as ¡®right-Hegelian¡¯, and it is historically anachronistic to regard
thinkers such as Gans and most of Hegel¡¯s earlier students as politically
¡®conservative¡¯. In fact many representatives of the ¡®School¡¯ supported
liberal-progressive causes and were not initially disappointed by the
revolutionary events of 1848.

>From the end of the 1830s and throughout the 1840s the ideological
fronts sharpened radically in the context of social and political thought.
Thus the continuing concern with ¡®saving¡¯ historical Christianity through
philosophy on the part of nearly all the original Hegelians came
increasingly to seem an antiquated and regressive debate with the
growing importance of radical humanistic political thought as the primary
site of opposition to entrenched and anti-liberal state social policies in the
period up to 1848. It was symptomatic of this trend when the Polish
Count August von Cieszkowski reinterpreted Hegel¡¯s philosophy of
religion in terms of a secularized eschatological philosophy of history
with practical intent in his Prolegomena zur Historiosophie
(Prolegomena to the Wisdom of History) of 1838. He had concluded
that the ultimate logic of Hegel¡¯s thought demanded not a contemplative
or predominantly theoretical relation to reality but rather a
¡®philosophy of action¡¯ (¡®praxis¡¯). If, as Hegel had claimed, the future
could not be predicted, it could nevertheless be shaped with will and
consciousness: the task therefore was no longer to recognize the
supposed actuality of reason, but actively to procure a place for the
emerging rationality of the future. In emphasizing the open and dynamic
element of Hegel¡¯s thought, stressing the immanent negativity of the
dialectical ¡®method¡¯ at the expense of the apparently static ¡®system¡¯,
and in elevating the active will over purely retrospective thought,
Cieszkowski epitomized the Young Hegelian approach to Hegel¡¯s
philosophical legacy. A similar position was adopted by Moses Hess
who also preached the transformation of traditional religious ideas into
an ethical programme for the future with Die heilige Geschichte der
Menschheit (The Sacred History of Humanity) (1837).

The remarkable intellectual career of Bruno Bauer vividly illustrates
these developments since he began as a protagonist of the theological
Hegelian right and subsequently progressed through the centre towards
a radically atheistic stance: in his Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts
über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen (The Trumpet of the Last
Judgement upon Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist) (1841), Bauer
ventriloquized strategically from an apparently orthodox theological
perspective precisely in order to reveal the ultimately heterodox and
destructive implications of Hegelian philosophy for traditional Christian
belief. These radical developments within the Hegelian school were
most clearly registered in the journal founded by Arnold Ruge and T.
Echtermeyer in 1838, the Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche
Wissenschaft und Kunst (Halle Yearbook for German Science and
Art). Although initially representatives of the whole spectrum of the
school published articles in the journal, the general tenor of the
contributions soon began to reflect the most advanced position of the
left. In this respect the article ¡®Zur Kritik der Hegelschen
Philosophie¡¯(Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy) (1839) by
Ludwig proved symptomatic. Indeed it was Feuerbach¡¯s influential book
Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity) (1841)
which seemed in the eyes of many to draw the ultimate conclusions
from Hegel¡¯s philosophy of religion and Strauss¡¯s development of it by
¡®unmasking¡¯ all theological discourse as an alienated and ¡®inverted¡¯
projection of human imagination and desire. He proposed to reveal
through his ¡®transformational method¡¯ that the ultimate truth of theology
is anthropology (in the sense that chemistry is the truth of alchemy).
This interpretation of religion generally as a compensating ¡®ideology¡¯
has proved enormously influential in modern thought (see Feuerbach,
L.A. ¡×2).

Feuerbach also turned his critique of religion against Hegel¡¯s philosophy
itself, and in particular against his idealism, accusing speculative
philosophy of making the same mistake as theology: it prioritizes the
infinite over the finite, thought over sense, the abstract over the
concrete, and so ends up as a panlogistic idealism which sets essence
above existence. This nominalistic attack on Hegel exerted a great
influence, and marks the beginning of a turn away from idealism
towards a new materialist metaphysics, as the dominant philosophical
outlook ceased to be speculative and became anthropological and
naturalistic.

3 The critique of Hegelian idealism 1840-70 (cont.)

Under the influence of this critique of Hegel¡¯s idealism, those who
succeeded Feuerbach among the so-called ¡®Young Hegelians¡¯ (such as
Ruge, Friedrich Engels, Hess and the early Marx) extended it to include
Hegel¡¯s political thought, while at the same time this turn towards
naturalism was treated as a key to the reinterpretation and radicalization
of some of Hegel¡¯s fundamental doctrines. Thus, in the first place, Ruge
objected that Hegel¡¯s ¡®metaphysics of politics¡¯ lacks a proper critical
standpoint because it ¡®would offer us the passing realities of history as
eternal figures¡¯, and is thereby rendered ¡®impotent¡¯: ¡®Hegel undertook to
present the hereditary monarch, the majority, the bicameral system, etc,
as logical necessities, whereas it had to be a matter of establishing all
these as products of history and of explaining and criticizing them as
historical existences¡¯ (Ruge (1842: 763) 1983: 228). In a similar vein,
Marx accused Hegel of ¡®logical, pantheistic mysticism¡¯, of attempting
¡®to provide the political constitution with a relationship to the abstract
Idea, and to establish it as a link in the life-history of the Idea - an
obvious mystification¡¯ (Marx 1975: 69-70). It is evident, therefore, how
the turn against Hegel¡¯s idealism decisively influenced the Young
Hegelians in their attitude to his Philosophy of Right and its place in the
speculative system.

In the second place, the Young Hegelians saw the need (in Marx¡¯s
famous phrase) to locate properly the ¡®rational kernel within the mystical
shell¡¯ of Hegel¡¯s philosophy: to rescue what is valuable in Hegel from
his idealistic metaphysics. So, for example, Engels argued that Hegel¡¯s
dialectical procedure, while apparently based on an abstract logic of
concepts, is (as Marx¡¯s work showed) nothing more than a historical
method, ¡®which ultimately amounts to the discovery of the general laws
of motion which assert themselves as the ruling ones in the history of
human society¡¯ (Engels (1886) 1968: 612). Likewise, Marx himself took
Hegel¡¯s analysis of the estrangement between man and nature, based on
his conception of nature as the ¡®otherness of the idea¡¯, and interpreted
this in anthropological terms, as the separation of man from the human
process of productive activity. By approaching Hegel in this heterodox
manner, the Young Hegelians hoped to recover the radical historicism,
humanism and social critique that lay obscured in the empty abstractions
of his metaphysical idealism.

If most of the Young Hegelians of radical political persuasion tended to
substitute the idea of a new collective humanity or an appropriately
transformed ¡®species being¡¯ for the spiritual teleology of Hegel¡¯s
thought, it was left to Max Stirner (pseudonym of Johann Kaspar
Schmidt) to develop the other individualistic extreme of the Hegelian
mediation with Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (The Ego and Its
Own) (1845), exalting the sovereign negativity of the singular ego in an
almost proto-Nietzschean sense to create and recreate its own value
systems and emancipate itself from all heteronomous givenness through
tradition and previous history. In drawing the ultimate conclusions from
the modern liberal emphasis upon subjective freedom Stirner¡¯s
philosophy of the liberated ¡®self¡¯ represents the extreme counter-position
to Feuerbach¡¯s and Marx¡¯s conception of the ¡®social individual¡¯.

Alongside this revolt against idealism brought about by the turn towards
naturalism and materialism by the Young Hegelians, Hegel¡¯s alleged
panlogicism also came under attack from F.W.J. Schelling and his
¡®positive philosophy¡¯, which he adopted from around 1827 until his
death in 1854. This position was explicitly conceived in contrast to the
¡®negative philosophy¡¯ Schelling claimed to find in Hegel, which is
confined to concepts and essences, but neglects being or existence; as a
result, it overlooks the fact that it cannot answer the fundamental
question ¡®Why does anything exist at all? Why is there not nothing?¡¯,
and so cannot make the transition from the Idea to nature. Schelling
therefore insists that Hegel fails to surmount the ¡®nasty broad ditch¡¯
between the first and second parts of the Encyclopedia, because
concepts are mere abstractions from the empirical world, and so cannot
be treated as ideal forms from which the latter can be deduced; on the
contrary, the limits of Hegel¡¯s rationalistic metaphysics are shown by the
fact that existence must be taken (by us) to be an inexplicable prius. In
attacking Hegel¡¯s idealism in this way, Schelling began an
antirationalistic revolt against his panlogicism which has become one of
the fundamental critical reactions to his thought.

Another significant strand in this broadly existentialist critique of
Hegel¡¯s idealism which emerged in the 1840s lies in the assertion that
Hegel is unable to grasp the reality of becoming, finitude and
temporality, despite his talk of movement in his dialectical treatment of
the categories. The claim (made, for example, by F.A. Trendelenburg
(1802-72) and echoed by Kierkegaard) is that like all idealists, Hegel
posits a world of abstract essences behind the world of time and
transience, and so fails to give due weight to the reality of finite
existence; where Hegel is deceptive, however, is in the way in which he
attributes a dynamic interrelation to the categories, and talks in terms of
¡®transition¡¯, ¡®development¡¯ and ¡®movement¡¯. Hegel¡¯s critics insisted,
however, that this talk of movement can only be figurative, and that in
fact it is senseless to talk of real change and development in connection
with Hegel¡¯s Logic. Hegel¡¯s followers tried to respond to this wave of
anti-idealist criticism: Rosenkranz, for example, insisted in vain that
Hegel was not a Platonist, to be  ¡®reproached with offering up the world
of blooming life to the idea as to a desolate Hades¡¯ (Rosenkranz (1870:
125) 1993 I: 283-4); on the contrary, he argued, Hegel saw universals as
more like souls that must be embodied in concrete particulars.

None the less, the effect of this materialist and existentialist critique
meant that from around 1860 only the more moderate epistemological
idealism of the Neo-Kantians was taken seriously as a systematic
philosophy; among those self-confessed Hegelians who remained
academically active, the scope of their operations was considerably
narrowed, so that Johann Erdmann (1805-92), Eduard Zeller
(1814-1908) and Kuno Fischer (1824-1907) are principally known as
historians of philosophy. Another figure whose considerable output
reflects something of the vicissitudes of the Hegelian tradition in
Germany throughout this period is the prolific writer and critic Friedrich
Theodor Vischer (1807-87). His earlier works, such as Über das
Erhabene und Komische (On the Sublime and the Comic) (1837) and
the monumental Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen (Aesthetics
or the Science of Beauty) (1845-57), express more or less total
commitment to Hegel¡¯s philosophy as a whole; but his later contributions
represent a progressive abandonment of all ambitious metaphysical
claims for art and religion in the modern world in favour of an
increasingly sceptical and critical relationship to social reality and to the
classical Hegelian project of reconciliation as he had earlier understood
it.

4 Hegelianism outside Germany in the nineteenth century:
France, Northern Europe and Italy

While Hegelianism in Germany was gradually eclipsed, in several other
countries it continued to have an impact into the second half of the
nineteenth century. Although in its earlier stages, the reception of Hegel
in these countries broke little new ground, none the less an inevitable
diversification occurred as Hegel¡¯s ideas were taken up in different
climates of thought, while Hegel was later read both as part of the
broader development of German Idealism, and as closer in outlook to
some of his critics. This process has continued into the twentieth
ccentury, and has yielded some profound reassessments of his ideas.

France. Although French Hegelianism is best known for its influence on
European thought in the 1930s onwards (see ¡×6 below), France was
also one of the first countries outside Germany to feel the impact of
Hegel¡¯s ideas in the nineteenth century, largely due to the efforts of
Victor Cousin. Having met Hegel in Heidelberg in 1817, Cousin became
an enthusiastic admirer, returning several times to Germany thereafter.
He helped give currency to Hegel¡¯s ideas through his lectures of 1828-9
at the École Normale in Paris, and with the advent of the July Monarchy
in 1830, he was able to acknowledge Hegel¡¯s influence explicitly. In his
later work, however, he was more guarded, partly due to his growing
support for Schelling, and partly due to his increasingly conservative and
conformist position. None the less, it was through Cousin that many in
France came to know of Hegel¡¯s work (such as Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon), while he also encouraged others, such as the Italian Augusto
Vera (1813-85), who later translated several of Hegel¡¯s works into
French.

With the advent of the Second Empire in 1852, Cousin lost his official
posts, while the growing influence of Auguste Comte meant that the
outlook of many thinkers in France became increasingly positivisitic. As
a result, Hegel came to be viewed in a new light, as attempts were
made to find a fruitful synthesis of both positions, particularly by Ernest
Renan (1823-92) and Hippolyte Taine, both of whom had discovered
Hegel in the 1840s. Renan sought to develop a less secularized
positivism, using Hegel¡¯s conception of progress as bringing a divine
consciousness into existence through the realization of reason. Taine
was likewise attracted to Hegel¡¯s idea of a temporal development of
reason, and tried to use it to give a historical dimension to the static
metaphysics of Spinoza, while fusing the rationalism of the latter with a
positivistic recognition of empirical knowledge and apparent
contigency.

By the 1850s and 1860s there was a growing awareness of the critical
debate surrounding Hegel that had developed in Germany, while Vera
attempted to win disciples for the Hegelian cause in France with his
Introduction à la Philosophie de Hegel (Introduction to the
Philosophy of Hegel) (1855), though with little obvious success.
Publications by Vera, Rosenkranz and Hegel¡¯s critic Rudolf Haym,
were reviewed by Edmond Scherer in 1861, who commented that
¡®Hegel cannot begin to be known, and his philosophy assessed, since
there are no longer any Hegelians¡¯ (Scherer 1861: 813). He himself
offered an influential assessment of what was valuable in Hegel¡¯s
thought, emphasizing broadly Left Hegelian themes (such as Hegel¡¯s
notion of contradiction and historical change), and analysing his
Philosophy of Right and philosophy of religion (which he considered in
relation to D.F. Strauss¡¯ Leben Jesu). However, positive discussion and
dissemination of Hegel¡¯s ideas was brought to a halt by the Prussian
invasion of France in the 1870s, as (not for the first time) he was blamed
for fostering the expansionist nationalism of his country.

The credit for subsequently rehabilitating Hegel in France is usually
given to Lucien Herr (1864-1926), who wrote an article on him for the
Grande Encyclopédie (1893-4). Moreoever, as librarian at the École
Normale Superieure from 1886, Herr was able to introduce a large
number of philosophy students to Hegel¡¯s ideas during this period. In his
article, Herr emphasized and appreciated Hegel¡¯s systematic ambitions,
and placed considerable emphasis on the Logic. Though he did not try to
resolve any of the philosophical cruxes of his thought, Herr did none the
less present a reasonably clear and appealing synopsis of Hegel¡¯s views.
An equally sympathetic but more partisan view of Hegel, intended as a
rebuttal of positivism and Neo-Kantianism, was offered by Georges
Noël in his study of Hegel¡¯s Logic. It is significant, too, that by this time
Hegel was being recognized as an important precursor of Marxist
thought, and that this rapprochement led to a less panlogistic and
quietistic reading of his work (as can be seen in René Bertholet¡¯s
address to the French Philosophy Society of 1907).

Northern Europe. Around the middle of the nineteenth century,
Hegelian ideas had an important impact on the intellectual life of several
northern European countries.

In Denmark, the person most responsible for introducing these ideas
was the dramatist and man of letters Johan Ludwig Heiberg
(1791-1860). Heiberg met Hegel in Berlin in 1824, and in the same year
he brought out his Om den menneskelige Frihed (On Human
Freedom), in which he makes several references to Hegel, while using
distinctly Hegelian ideas and terminology in his dispute with F.G. Howitz
over this issue. Heiberg subsequently produced other works that
established him as a spokesman for Hegelianism, and in June 1837 he
began publication of Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. At
the same time, Hegel¡¯s ideas were also being critically discussed by
Poul Martin Moller (1794-1838) and Frederich Christian Sibbern
(1785-1872). The former left Denmark to occupy a chair at Oslo
University from 1826-31, and introduced the study of Hegel into
Norway.

Among a slightly younger generation, Hegelian ideas were
enthusiastically taken up by Hans Martensen (1808-84) and Rasmus
Nielsen (1809-84). Martensen saw Hegel in much the same way as he
presented himself - as attempting to bring modern philosophy to its
highest standpoint by overcoming all previous one-sided approaches, and
as therefore forming the culminating point of philosophical development.
Martensen also argued that Christian orthodoxy had nothing to fear from
Hegel, whom he followed in seeking to reconcile philosophy and
theology by making the latter speculative, and applying the methods of
philosophy to the received dogmas of the church. Nielsen also lectured
and wrote extensively on Hegel, and his main work Grundidéernes
Logik (The Logic of Fundamental Ideas) of 1864-6 gave a full
account of his Hegelian views in this area. None the less, he came
under the influence of Kierkegaard¡¯s attack on Hegel¡¯s treatment of
religion, and so criticized Martensen¡¯s position as being too complacent
in this regard. In 1860, Nielsen was joined at Copenhagen as a professor
by Hans Bockner (1820-75), who also thought and wrote as a Hegelian,
principally on the history of philosophy.

As well as having an influence on Hegel¡¯s reception in Denmark,
Kierkegaard is clearly the most philosophically significant thinker to have
responded to his work in this country. While Kierkegaard attacked
Hegel from a theistic perspective, his own form of Christianity was
sufficiently radical to set him apart from any standard Right Hegelian
approach; his critique can rather be seen as undermining Hegel¡¯s entire
project, which was apparently to provide a systematic, rational and
complete conception of the world, of the sort traditionally associated
with a divine understanding. In rejecting this ambition as ¡®comic¡¯ and
¡®absurd¡¯, Kierkegaard therefore gave a very special twist to some of
the themes found earlier in Schelling, and so deepened this existentialist
reaction to Hegel¡¯s work. Kierkegaard came to this position out of a
desire to save the religious outlook from the claim (made by Martensen,
for example) that this Hegelian standpoint could give Christianity a
rational basis. Kierkegaard argued that this was impossible, as
philosophical speculation could never assimilate both the metaphysical
and ethical paradoxes of true Christian faith: that God has become man,
that religious knowledge can be based on subjective feeling, and that the
religiously inspired individual (such as Abraham) may act out of a purely
individual sense of the will of God. Kierkegaard therefore sets
Christianity against the Hegelian conception of philosophy and
philosophical reason, in order to demonstrate the limitations of the latter
(see Kierkegaard, S.A. ¡×2).

In Holland, Hegel¡¯s earliest follower was P.G. van Ghert (1782-1852),
who was a student of his in Jena and later became his friend. A more
significant spokesman for Hegelianism was G.J.P.J. Bolland
(1854-1922), who, as professor at Leiden (from 1896), established a kind
of Hegelian sect which later infiltrated all parts of Dutch intellectual life
(J. Hessing (1874-1944), J.G. Wattjes (1879-1944) and Esther Vas
Nunes (1866-1929) being his most important pupils). However, this
school lost its influence after the Second World War, due to the
anti-Semitic views of Bolland himself, and the extreme right-wing
affiliations of his pupils.

Italy. While Gioberti and Rosmini drew in a general way on aspects of
post-Kantian German Idealist metaphysics, Hegel¡¯s ideas were more
explicitly introduced into mainstream Italian culture through the efforts
of Augusto Vera and Bertrando Spaventa (1817-82), who founded an
influential Hegelian school in Naples and expounded Hegel¡¯s social and
political thought with his Studi sull¡¯etica hegeliana (Studies on
Hegelian Ethics) (1869). Hegelian ideas were also represented by
Francesco de Sanctis (1817-83), whose classic literary history, La storia
della letteraria italiana (History of Italian Literature) (1870-1) is
much influenced by Hegel¡¯s aesthetics, and by Raffaele Mariano
(1840-1912) and Pasquale d¡¯Ercole  (1831-1917). One of Spaventa¡¯s
pupils was Antonio Labriola, who later proved to be an independent
Marxist thinker who appreciated the importance of Hegel for the
evolution of historical materialism. He avoided the reductive positivist
interpretation of Marxism which was currently being codified as a
system of ¡®dialectical materialism¡¯ and was not inhibited from drawing
freely on his Hegelian teachers and predecessors. For him as for them
the living heritage of Hegel lay in his profoundly historical conception of
social and political life, not in his metaphysical ambitions. In regarding
Hegel as pre-eminently a great philosopher of culture Labriola
anticipated much of the later Italian reception of Hegelian thought, by
Marxists and non-Marxists alike. Labriola¡¯s expressly non-positivist
interpretation of Marxism as essentially a ¡®philosophy of praxis¡¯ rather
than a supposedly scientific and comprehensive worldview was a
significant precursor of the Hegelian-Marxist approach that would
emerge in Germany in the 1920s.

5 Hegelianism outside Germany in the nineteenth century:
America and Britain

America. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Hegel¡¯s ideas
came to play an important part in the intellectual life of the USA, where
two centres of Hegelian thought began to develop. The first was a
loosely associated group of friends and acquaintances based at this time
in Cincinnati, Ohio, the most important of whom were John Bernard
Stallo (1823-1900), August Willich (1810-78) and Moncure Conway
(1832-1907). Broadly speaking, the Cincinnati Hegelians offered a
left-wing interpretation of his views, which stressed his conception of a
cosmos ¡®full of life and reason¡¯ (as Conway put it), in which scientific
and social progress were possible, leading to a more liberal and rational
political and religious order.

A similar outlook can be found in the second centre of Hegelian ideas at
this time, in St Louis. The leading figures here were Henry Conrad
Brokmeyer (1826-1906) and William Torrey Harris (1835-1909). After
the Civil War, members of the Kant Club in St Louis formed the
Philosophical Society, inaugurated in 1866 with Brokmeyer as president,
Harris as secretary, and Denton Snider (1841-1925), G.H. Howison
(1834-1916), A.E. Kroeger (1837-82) and Thomas Davidson
(1840-1900) among its leading members. All were to contribute articles
and translations to The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, which
Harris edited from 1867 to 1893. The Journal had considerable
influence in making Hegelian ideas part of the mainstream philosophical
discussion in America, while Harris¡¯s own large output made a major
contribution to the study of Hegel¡¯s works. Many of the St Louis
Hegelians (including Brokmeyer and Harris) also had important
institutional positions, in which they tried to apply his ideas in the fields of
government and education.

Of this group, Harris was perhaps the most successful in developing a
general philosophical outlook that is clearly Hegelian in character. He
argued that in its highest stage, knowledge reveals ¡®independence and
self-relation underlying all dependence and relativity¡¯ (Easton 1966:
481); and he used this structure, as Hegel had done, to develop a
dialectical conception of ¡®identity-in-difference¡¯ that provided the basis
for his account of the universe, God¡¯s relation to the world and the
place of the individual in society.

By the end of the nineteenth century, many of the major academic posts
in America were occupied by self-styled idealists, who accepted
Hegel¡¯s central place in this tradition of thought. At this time, Hegel in
particular and idealism in general were used to come to terms with the
growing impact of Darwinian ideas on theology and philosophy, in part
by using the notion of the dialectic to find reason in the process of
evolution itself.

>From the 1880s onwards, however, the claim by Hegel¡¯s earlier
American disciples that he represented the highest point of German
thought began to be challenged, as pragmatism started to make its mark
in academic philosophical circles (see Pragmatism). This drew on a
much broader range of idealist thinkers than just Hegel, who was no
longer viewed as the culminating point of the tradition. Thus, for an
influential figure such as William James, the less rationalistic and
metaphysical idealism of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lotze was more
congenial to his pragmatic outlook. The central target of James¡¯ attack
was Hegel¡¯s ¡®vicious intellectualism¡¯, to which he opposed his own
radical empiricism (James 1909: 105). James argued that the concrete
world of experience has a different structure from the world of thought,
and that the particularity of things can never be adequately
conceptualized. He criticized intellectualism for substituting ¡®a pallid
outline for the real world¡¯s richness¡¯, and (like Kierkegaard) claimed
that it sought to transcend becoming and temporality by abandoning the
human point of view. In voicing these misgivings about Hegel¡¯s alleged
essentialism, James was developing a familiar line of criticism, but in a
way that was new in the American reception of Hegel¡¯s work.

The effect of this critique can be seen in the writings of James¡¯ Harvard
colleague and contemporary, Josiah Royce. Unlike James, Royce was
prepared to follow through the developments in idealism that led to
Hegel, and so became his most sympathetic and sophisticated interpreter
in this period, basing his conception of the Absolute on Hegel¡¯s account
of the concrete universal as an organic unity of individual minds. In his
posthumously published lectures on ¡®Aspects of Post-Kantian Idealism¡¯,
delivered in 1906, Royce broke new ground by laying greater stress on
the Phenomenology of Spirit than the Logic, emphasizing the
voluntaristic aspects of the former, as showing that ¡®for Hegel, thought
is inseparable from will¡¯ (1919: 145). By adopting this approach, Royce
hoped to show that Hegel¡¯s real intention was to portray a ¡®logic of
passion¡¯, and of the conflicts of the will, and not a system of abstract
thought; this would demonstrate the continuity of Hegel¡¯s ideas with the
outlook of pragmatism.

The other leading American pragmatists, C.S. Peirce and John Dewey
were also influenced by their encounter with Hegel. While Peirce was
quick to distance himself from American Hegelianism as a school
(entering into a sharp critical exchange with W.T. Harris in 1868), he
none the less acknowledged the affinities that existed between Hegel¡¯s
outlook and his own, while more broadly he may be seen as a
Neo-Kantian. The greatest convergence comes in Peirce¡¯s
phenomenological deduction of the categories of Firstness, Secondness
and Thirdness, and his demonstration that our immediate perceptual
judgments (Firstness) and our relational judgments (Secondness) require
mediation by reference to generalities (Thirdness); as Peirce admits in
his Lectures on Pragmatism (1903), this deduction echoes Hegel¡¯s
opening arguments in the Phenomenology (see Peirce, C.S. ¡×7). None
tthe less, Peirce complains that Hegel appears to reduce Firstness and
Secondness to Thirdness, instead of recognizing that all three categories
must be present in any coherent conception of the world. In Dewey, the
influence of Hegel is more diffuse, as he was attracted more to his
¡®dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls¡¯, rather than any particular
doctrine, although he was prepared to defend Hegel¡¯s criticisms of Kant
in his important early essay ¡®Kant and Philosophic Method¡¯ (1884) (see
DDewey, J. ¡×1).

Britain. If the pragmatists took Hegel seriously, this was not just
because of his impact in America, but also because of the importance of
Absolute Idealism in Britain in the 1880s and ¡®90s, which represented
the high point of Hegel¡¯s influence there.

In Britain, the initial reception of Hegel¡¯s work came relatively late. His
ideas were given some limited attention in the writings of William
Hamilton and James Ferrier, and figured briefly in the historical accounts
of German Idealism by J.D. Morrell and G.H. Lewes, while the first
translation (of part of Hegel¡¯s Logic) appeared in 1855. It was not until
J.H. Stirling¡¯s The Secret of Hegel (1865), however, that any
substantial sympathetic treatment of Hegel¡¯s work became available,
and it marks the real beginning of Hegel¡¯s influence. While he was
aware of the sustained critique of Hegel as a Platonic idealist and
essentialist that had gained currency in Germany in the 1840s and ¡®50s,
Stirling still adopted this reading, proclaiming that for Hegel ¡®organic
Reason (is) a self-supported, self-maintained, self-moved life, which is
the all of things, the ultimate principle, the Absolute¡¯ (Stirling (1865)
1898 I: 96).

Stirling¡¯s book was followed in 1874 by a translation of Hegel¡¯s
Encyclopedia Logic by William Wallace (1844-97), together with a
long introduction entitled Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel¡¯s
Philosophy. Like Stirling, Wallace sought to use Hegel in the critique of
positivism and scientific naturalism, and interpreted his idealism as a kind
of thoroughgoing holism, while, like his American contemporaries, he
sought to show how Hegel¡¯s notion of the dialectic might be used to
bring out the rationality of Darwinian evolution. A similar set of
concerns is reflected by Edward Caird (1835-1908) in his Hegel (1883),
for whom ¡®the task of philosophy is to gain, or rather perhaps to regain,
such a view of things as shall reconcile us to the world and to
ourselves¡¯ (Caird 1892 I: 191). It was this search for unity that Caird
found in Hegel¡¯s work, particularly in relation to the opposing claims of
freedom and necessity, subject and object, God and the universe, and he
therefore interpreted Hegel¡¯s Absolute as such a reconciling principle.

As well as these published accounts of Hegel¡¯s thought, a positive view
of Hegel also began to emerge more indirectly, as he was taken up by
the important group of idealist thinkers who were becoming increasingly
influential at this time. One of the first of these was T.H. Green, who
was led to read Hegel by his tutor and later colleague at Balliol,
Benjamin Jowett. Green¡¯s critique of empiricism had both Kantian and
Hegelian elements, while his account of self-consciousness as a single,
actively self-distinguishing spiritual principle which expresses itself in
temporal human intelligence reflected his understanding of Hegel¡¯s
conception of Geist. None the less, Green declared himself unhappy
with Hegel¡¯s method for arguing to this conception, stating that ¡®it must
all be done again¡¯. Likewise, while he was clearly helped to his own
account of freedom by his reading of Hegel, he remained suspicious of
what he took to be the latter¡¯s uncritical acceptance of the modern state,
in which this freedom was to be realized.

This equivocal attitude is also reflected in the relation of one of the other
leading British Idealists to Hegel, F.H. Bradley. Hegel¡¯s influence can
be traced in Bradley¡¯s critique of Kantian ethics in his early Ethical
Studies (1876); in his hostility to the classical empiricist¡¯s view of our
experience of reality as divisible into discrete simple elements; in his
treatment of judgment, the concrete universal and the problem of
relations; and in his conviction that from the perspective of the Absolute,
all aporiai in our understanding of reality would be overcome. None the
less, Bradley remained critical of central aspects of Hegel¡¯s thought and
method, famously dismissing his Logic as an ¡®unearthly ballet of
bloodless categories¡¯, and with it the panlogist metaphysics this seemed
to represent.

Bradley¡¯s contemporary Bernard Bosanquet was less openly critical of
Hegel, as he developed Bradley¡¯s Hegelian approach to the logical
forms of thought (such as judgment and syllogism), in order to show how
in these forms, all abstraction from the whole turns out to be incoherent.
Bosanquet carried this holism over into what was seen as a Hegelian
conception of the individual and society, claiming that for human beings
¡®their true individuality does not lie in their isolation, but in that distinctive
act or service by which they pass into unique contributions to the
universal¡¯ (Bosanquet [1899] 1923: 170). In his work on aesthetics,
Bosanquet focused attention on this aspect of Hegel¡¯s system, with his
translation of the introduction to Hegel¡¯s Lectures on Aesthetics (1886),
and his account of Hegel in his influential History of Aesthetics (1892).

Bosanquet was not alone among the British Idealists in offering
interpretative commentaries on Hegel¡¯s work, although towards the end
of the 1880s, these became increasingly critical and critically informed.
A decisive moment came in 1887, with the publication by Andrew Seth
(later Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison) (1856-1931) of Hegelianism and
Personality, in which he followed Schelling, Trendelenburg and others,
and criticized Hegel¡¯s apparent panlogicism; following the Left
Hegelians, he gave this attack an ethical and political dimension, arguing
that by hypostatizing universality, Hegel gives priority to the species over
and above the individual, a move which Seth set out to oppose with his
own so-called ¡®Personal Idealism¡¯. For Hegel¡¯s followers in Britain Seth
therefore represented a parallel to the existentialist critique of his system
already developed in Germany, but which had not been properly
addressed by the British Idealists before.

In response, interpretations of Hegel emerged which played down his
apparent panlogism, and instead began to treat the Logic as a kind of
category theory. For example, in an influential article on ¡®Darwin and
Hegel¡¯ (1890-1), D.G. Ritchie  (1853-1903) argued that Hegel does not
have to be read as a speculative cosmologist; rather,  ¡®we (will) find that
his logic and the whole of his philosophy consist in this perpetual
"criticism of categories", i.e. in an analysis of the terms and concepts
which ordinary thinking and the various special sciences use as current
coin without testing their real value¡¯ (Ritchie 1890-1: 61). This approach
was most fully developed in the commentaries on Hegel¡¯s system by
J.M.E. McTaggart. McTaggart argued that the aim of Hegel¡¯s dialectic
was to show how the categories of ordinary thought provide only partial
or imperfect conceptions of the truth, which point towards a highest
form of thought - the Absolute Idea - in which these imperfections are
finally overcome. Where McTaggart criticized Hegel was for
underestimating the difficulty which we have, as limited intellects, in
conceiving of the world in these terms, so that although he accepted the
Hegelian claim that a resolution of all aporiai must be possible, he
questioned whether such a view of reality was achievable by us. This
approach to the reading of Hegel led McTaggart to emphasize the many
apparent contradictions in how things appear to us (most famously, as
events occuring in time), and to claim that therefore these appearances
must be unreal, opening the way for him to indulge in extravagant
metaphysical theorizing about ultimate reality at odds with our
experience of the world.

By the beginning of the First World War, the taste for such theorizing
had changed, as the Idealist¡¯s claims about the contradictory nature of
hhow things appear to us seemed increasingly spurious, thereby disposing
of the need to overcome these contradictions in a view of reality as
somehow monistic, atemporal, changeless or immaterial. Anglo-Hegelian
idealism was therefore increasingly viewed as irrelevant and poorly
grounded by the leaders of the next generation of philosophical thinkers
(such as Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore), while at the same time the
¡®New Liberals¡¯ (such as J.A. Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse) submitted
the idealist¡¯s theory of the ¡®organic¡¯ state to merciless attack, an attitude
which hardened once the war against Germany had begun.

6 Hegelian influence in the twentieth century: Germany, Italy

While towards the end of the nineteenth century it may have appeared
that Hegel¡¯s philosophy was destined to have only a marginal
significance in twentieth-century thought, in fact its impact has been
remarkable. This renewed interest in Hegel¡¯s position was made
possible by a broader understanding of his project, which made many of
the standard nineteenth-century criticisms (of panlogism, quietism,
anti-individualism and theistic romanticism) appear crude and simplistic,
reflecting a misconception of his work.

Germany. During a period in which various forms of positivist
naturalism or Neo-Kantian schools dominated the German philosophical
scene the Hegelian and idealist legacy generally had found some refuge
within the traditional humanistic disciplines which escaped subjection to
the methodological canons of the natural sciences. A broadly Hegelian
approach thus survived in a largely non-systematic and
non-metaphysical hermeneutic form which seemed to offer significant
elements at least for the construction of an alternative methodology for
the newly developing social and human sciences, the
¡®Geisteswissenschaften¡¯. Wilhelm Dilthey was particularly influential in
reawakening interest in the world of early German Idealism with his
path-breaking study of Hegel¡¯s early development, Die
Jugendgeschichte Hegels (The Young Hegel) (1905). It was also
under Dilthey¡¯s direct encouragement that his student Hermann Nohl
first thoroughly edited and published most of Hegel¡¯s surviving early
manuscripts of 1790-1800 as Hegels theologische Jugendschriften
(Hegel¡¯s Early Theological Writings) in 1907, an event which
inaugurated that German resurgence of interest in Hegel¡¯s philosophy
during the first couple of decades of this century which culminated in the
broad movement known as ¡®Neuhegelianismus¡¯. Hegel¡¯s early writings
challenged the image of the systematic rationalist metaphysician of
tradition and seemed rather to reveal a thinker passionately concerned
with restoring a concrete sense of cultural wholeness and identification
with the natural and historical world of lived experience.

The interest in Hegel and the tradition of German Idealism in general did
not simply displace the still vigorous forms of Neo-Kantianism but rather
entered initially into a complex symbiotic relationship with certain trends
within that movement, especially the so-called Southwest School
associated principally with Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) and Wilhelm
Windelband (1848-1915) (see Neo-Kantianism ¡×4). Like Dilthey, these
thinkers were attempting to develop an appropriate philosophical
approach to the entire sphere of cultural and spiritual life as an
autonomous domain alongside the sphere of the natural and the exact
formal sciences. Many of them believed that the Kantian tradition
required significant extension and supplementation to do justice to this
dimension of experience and looked to Hegel in particular for intellectual
resources adequate to the task. A symptomatic document for the period
was Windelband¡¯s influential address of 1910, ¡®Die Erneuerung des
Hegelianismus¡¯ (The Renewal of Hegelianism). Eventually a
fully-fledged neo-Hegelian school began to form as part of a broader
cultural project of German intellectual renewal, a process that was
actually encouraged rather than weakened by the catastrophic
experience of the First World War and the ensuing social and political
instability.

An important figure in this development was Georg Lasson (1862-1932)
who tirelessly promoted a strongly religious interpretation of Hegel¡¯s
philosophy as the appropriate antidote to the disintegrative and sceptical
tendencies and sense of cultural alienation of the time. The intrinsic
philosophical significance of Lasson¡¯s work is negligible and often
represents little but nationalistic edification, as in Was heisst
Hegelianismus? (What is Hegelianism?) (1916), but he performed an
extremely important role as an indefatigable editor of Hegel¡¯s works.

Other principal figures associated with or broadly sympathetic with
Neuhegelianismus were Hermann Glockner (1896-1978), also
important as an editor of Hegel, with his synoptic monograph Hegel
(1929-40); Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), who drew strongly on Hegel
in his own work and provided a classical ontological interpretation of the
philosopher in his Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus (The
Philosophy of German Idealism) (1923-9); Richard Kroner
(1884-1974) perhaps the purest and most dedicated representative of the
movement, who wrote a standard neo-Hegelian history of German
Idealism Von Kant bis Hegel (From Kant to Hegel) (1921-4) but
reverted in his later writings to a more Kantian position influenced by
Kierkegaard; Theodor Litt (1880-1962) who remained strongly
influenced by Dilthey¡¯s philosophy of culture and Heidelberg
Neo-Kantianism and later attempted to synthesize contemporary trends
in a quasi-Hegelian fashion in Denken und Sein (Thought and Being)
(1948), Mensch und Welt (Man and World) (1948) and Hegel (1953).
Kroner helped to establish the journal Logos which functioned as the
organ of the German neo-Hegelians and sympathetic Neo-Kantians
during the 1920s. There were also a number of more important and
original thinkers on the fringes of the movement who were profoundly
influenced by the resurgence of interest in German Idealism and Hegel
in particular. These included Georg Simmel, Ernst Cassirer and Franz
Rosenzweig, who all engaged with central Hegelian problems in their
work and occupied something of an ambiguous and contested space
between Kant and Hegel.

By the end of the 1920s, in the context of the German crisis of
democracy and the rise of fascism, the vague romantic and
undifferentiated aspiration to living ¡®wholeness¡¯ as a supposed
alternative to social atomism readily lent itself to ideological mystification
and exploitation. Some neo-Hegelians made uncritical appeal to the idea
of ¡®Sittlichkeit¡¯ or concrete ethical life as a model of organic
community, but increasingly detached from its original context in
Hegel¡¯s elaborate conception of the rational modern constitutional state
as the climax of the philosophy of history and the evolution of the
consciousness of freedom. The Hegelian notion of the ¡®Volksgeist¡¯ or
¡®spirit of the people¡¯ was also interpreted more in the spirit of Savigny
and the ¡®Historical School¡¯ than in that of Montesquieu or even Herder,
and the resulting simplification was urged in support of an illiberal
communitarian ideology. Certain tendencies in this direction are clearly
discernible in the works of Lasson, Glockner and in the monumental
study by Theodor Haering (1884-1964) of Hegel¡¯s development, Hegel.
Sein Wollen und sein Werk (Hegel: His Project and his Work)
(1929-38). In all these authors romantic over-interpretation and a
celebration of the supposedly ¡®irrational¡¯ character of the dialectic
almost completely effaces the universalist and rationalist dimension of
Hegel¡¯s thought and minimizes the significance of his relationship to
Kant and eighteenth-century thought. None the less, except for similar
interpretations by fascistically inclined legal theorists such as Julius
Binder and Karl Larenz the official ideology showed little interest in
reclaiming Hegel for the cause of National Socialism.

The significant alternative to the repristination of Hegel under the sign of
cultural philosophies of life and value during this entire period was
provided by the intellectual renewal of Marxist thought and the
emergence of what later became known generically as ¡®Western
Marxism¡¯ and ¡®Critical Theory¡¯. The early work of Karl Korsch
(1886-1961), especially his Marxismus und Philosophie (Marxism and
Philosophy) (1930) and of Georg Lukács, with Geschichte und
Kla©¬enbewusstsein (History and Class Consciousness) (1923),
proved to be the initial stimulus for this development. Both rejected the
positivist interpretation of Marxism as a scientific worldview supposedly
in secure possession of the ¡®laws¡¯ of social and historical development
and regarded the ¡®dialectics of nature¡¯ as a theoretical illusion and a
practical irrelevance. Lukács extrapolated from Marx¡¯s mature work to
his Hegelian origins and outlined a non-deterministic philosophy of praxis
and potential self-liberation which owed much to Hegel¡¯s
Phenomenology. Although Lukács later repudiated his earlier work in
certain respects as ¡®idealist revisionism¡¯, he continued to emphasize the
enduring significance of the Hegelian legacy in Marx against the
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy with Der junge Hegel (The Young Hegel)
(1948), and drew equally heavily on Hegel in his own later works, like
the massive study on aesthetics (Die Eigenart des Asthetischen (The
Specificity of the Aesthetic)) (1963) and the unfinished treatise Zur
Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins (The Ontology of Social
Being) (1971-2). The contemporary need to reinvestigate the entire
relationship of Hegelian and Marxist thought was also stimulated during
this period by the continual publication of previously unknown texts by
both Hegel (especially the Jena writings then issued as his
Realphilosophie in 1933) and Marx (particularly the Economical and
Philosophical Manuscripts in 1932), writings which did much to
confirm the insights of Lukács¡¯ contested interpretation of Marx¡¯s debt
to Hegel.

Herbert Marcuse was influenced in his early period by Diltheyan
philosophy of life, Heidegger¡¯s existential phenomenology, and the
rediscovery of Hegel¡¯s early work. After his study Hegels Ontologie
(Hegel¡¯s Ontology) (1932), Marcuse turned explicitly to Marx whose
thought he interpreted in a humanist manner in the light of the early
Hegelian manuscripts, stressing like Lukács the key concept of
alienation and the ineliminable moment of social subjectivity against
more standard mechanistic interpretations. Marcuse also defended the
Hegelian tradition directly against the charge of totalitarianism and
articulated the deep continuity between the thought of Hegel and Marx
in Reason and Revolution (1941). In his later work Marcuse focused
on the question of the aesthetic dimension and its emancipatory potential
as a prefiguring of a non-repressive relation to inner and outer nature,
attempting to mediate the heritage of classical German philosophy with
elements of Freudian thought.

Although Theodor-Wiesengrund Adorno repeatedly made Hegel an
object of privileged critique, as in the Drei studien zu Hegel (Three
Studies on Hegel) (1963), he could also be regarded as the most
profoundly Hegelian of modern thinkers in terms of the fundamental
themes of his philosophy and its elaborate dialectical conceptuality. His
major works, Negative Dialektik (Negative Dialectics) (1966) and
Ästhetische Theorie (Aesthetic Theory) (1970) are a sustained critical
engagement in a Marxist spirit with the tradition of Hegel and German
Idealist thought and are unintelligible without constant reference to the
concepts of totality and dialectic subject-object identity. Adorno sought
to reclaim the concept of reconciliation (of social antagonism, spirit and
nature, universal and particular) from its apologetic use in speculative
philosophy and employ it as a critical measure of existing contradiction
and unfreedom. He drew strongly on Hegelian patterns of argument to
criticize other thinkers, such as Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger.

Italy. At the turn of the century the tradition of neo-Hegelian thought in
Italy was principally represented by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni
Gentile. Croce¡¯s reception of Hegelian thought was selective and highly
reconstructive, in some respects paralleling the initial German renewal of
Hegelian studies in Dilthey¡¯s wake. Again it was not the metaphysical
dimension of Hegel¡¯s thought, but rather the doctrine of concrete
spiritual agency and its self-objectification in social and cultural life
which attracted Croce, as can be seen from his Ciò che è vivo e ciò
che è morto nella filosofia di Hegel (What is Living and What is
Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel) (1907). However, Croce¡¯s
aesthetics owes at least as much to Kant in its emphasis upon the
priority of intuition and the total autonomy of the art work; he also
rejected the concept of aesthetic genre which was central to Hegel¡¯s
historical construction of art. He also repudiated the supposed ¡®death of
art¡¯ thesis which he influentially took to be implied in Hegel¡¯s
subordination of art to religion and philosophy. However, Croce
entertained no qualms about the apparent supercession of the religious
dimension in speculative philosophy and his appropriation of Hegel was
thoroughly immanent and humanistic.

If Croce stressed the autonomy of the different domains of spiritual
activity, his erstwhile friend and collaborator Gentile followed Hegel
more directly in grasping all human activities as interrelated
manifestations of creative spirit. Similarly in his philosophy of art Gentile
defended a less formalist position than Croce. Gentile¡¯s philosophy
generally is also marked by a strong voluntarist emphasis and an ardent
educational idealism that has affinities with Fichte. Croce finally broke
with Gentile when the latter attempted to provide a Hegelian justification
of the new, fascist ¡®Corporate State¡¯ as the concrete realization of
ethical life. In spite of his political affiliations Gentile¡¯s thought continued
to exercise a significant influence on Italian thought at both ends of the
political spectrum. Hegel¡¯s influence was also strongly registered by the
Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci through the contemporary
example of Croce and Gentile. Gramsci developed a philosophy of
praxis that closely paralleled Lukács¡¯ interpretation of Marx and
rejected the quasi-naturalistic conception of dialectical materialism,
seeking rather to transcend and preserve the heritage of bourgeois
culture and philosophy and endow the Marxist perspective with the
potential for cultural hegemony. As with the Western Marxists
generally, Gramsci distrusted the mechanical application of any simple
basis/superstructure distinction and attempted to grasp the complex
mediation between social determinants and the collective
self-consciousness of human agents in more dialectical fashion.

7 Hegelian influence in the twentieth century: Britain, America
and France

Britain and America. The appropriation of Hegelian idealism by Croce
and Gentile influenced R.G. Collingwood, who was one of Hegel¡¯s few
sympathetic readers in Britain between the wars. Like the Italians,
Collingwood believed that Hegel¡¯s Platonism had stopped him properly
overcoming the opposition of art and logic, feeling and thought, and in his
own method of question and answer he sought to present Hegel¡¯s
dialectic in less panlogistic, more historicist terms, which did not seek to
escape the ¡®absolute presuppositions¡¯ of its time. Moreover, in taking
up a Crocean approach to the historical method (summed up in Croce¡¯s
dictum that ¡®every true history is contemporary history¡¯), Collingwood
drew attention back to Hegel¡¯s philosophy of history, from which
Croce¡¯s was a critical development.

In America in this period, direct interest in Hegel had also waned,
although a continuing commitment to the idealist tradition can be found in
the work of W.M. Urban (1873-1952) and Brand Blanshard
(1892-1966), whose coherence theory of truth refers back to the British
school of Absolute Idealism, and thus indirectly to Hegel.

France. As in Germany and Italy, the view of Hegel that emerged in
France in the twentieth century no longer set him in opposition to the
humanistic, non-metaphysical, anti-essentialist perspective of his critics,
but instead treated him as an important precursor and source of this very
perspective. Within French thought, the beginnings of this reassessment
can be traced back to Jean Wahl¡¯s Le Malheur de la Conscience
dans la Philosophie de Hegel (The Unhappy Consciousness in the
Philosophy of Hegel) (1929). In this work, Wahl (1888-1974)
attempted to uncover a side to Hegel¡¯s thought that was darker, more
romantic and less rationalistic than had previously been noticed, and to
cast fresh light on the whole direction of his philosophy. He was helped
towards this reinterpretation by the publication of Hegel¡¯s early writings
by Dilthey and Nohl, which revealed to Wahl that Hegel¡¯s real
preoccupations and concerns were close to those of a Christian
existentialist like Kierkegaard, a fact that had been obscured by the
speculative approach of the later Encyclopedic system. Wahl was
therefore led to look anew at the Phenomenology of Spirit, treating it
not merely as a prolegomenon to the mature system, but as the highest
expression of Hegel¡¯s troubled vision; at the centre of his reading of the
Phenomenology, Wahl placed Hegel¡¯s treatment of the Unhappy
Consciousness, in which (he argued) the sense of loss is epitomized.
Thus, although Wahl himself was not prepared to call Hegel an
existentialist, his influential study of the Phenomenology showed how
existentialist themes could be uncovered in Hegel¡¯s thought (see
Existentialism).

In the wake of Wahl¡¯s study, the Hegel renaissance in France was
taken further and given greater impetus by the work of Alexandre
Kojève and Jean Hyppolite (1907-68). Kojève gave an important series
of seminars on the Phenomenology from 1933 to 1939 at the École
Pratique des Hautes Études, which was attended by many who were to
become leading luminaries of French intellectual life, as well as
influential interpreters of Hegel in their own right, including Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Eric Weil (1904-77), Georges Bataille and Jacques
Lacan. The text of these seminars was published in 1947, and it remains
one of the most challenging readings of Hegel¡¯s thought. Equally
important were the efforts of Hyppolite, who published the first volume
of his magisterial translation of the Phenomenology in 1939 and the
second in 1941, and in 1946 completed his commentary on the text,
entitled Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l¡¯esprit de
Hegel (Genesis and Structure of Hegel¡¯s Phenomenology of Spirit).

Kojève made the master-slave dialectic the key to his treatment, into
which he wove both Heideggerian and Marxist themes. He cites as an
epigraph to his lecture on the Phenomenology Marx¡¯s comment that
¡®Hegel¡¦ sees labour as the essence of man, the self-confirming
essence, of man¡¯ (Marx 1975: 386) and, like Marx, identifies the work of
the slave as an essential moment in self-objectification. At the same
time, with Heidegger he emphasizes the slave¡¯s experience of death,
and his recognition of finitude, out of which the slave also feels liberation
from the natural world. Kojève therefore interprets Hegel¡¯s move to
idealism in this light: it is an attempt to show how the human mind can
overcome the material world of nature, by creating its own world
through the power of speech, language and thought, an ideological realm
in which we feel at home and free. This free creativity also has a more
tragic aspect, however, as it is limited and defined by an awareness of
finitude and death; at the same time the capacity to die represents our
liberation from the control of any transcendent creative power, such as
God, and is thus the dialectical expression of our highest freedom.

Perhaps Kojève¡¯s best-known and most remarkable contribution to the
interpretation of Hegel arises directly from the conjunction of Marxist
and existentialist aspects in his account: for, drawing on both Heidegger
and Marx, Kojève argues that for Hegel history began with the sense of
otherness, and can end in the universal satisfaction of the desire for
recognition, putting a stop to our urge to negate and overcome all
externality. Thus Kojève arrives at a non-metaphysical, secularized
conception of Hegel¡¯s philosophical history, and reads the end of his
system in anthropological, not theological terms; he therefore takes
another step away from the nineteenth-century image of Hegelianism,
and offers a new vision of this notoriously problematic aspect of
Hegel¡¯s work.

For readers of Hegel, however, Kojève¡¯s interpretation raises almost as
many problems as it solves, and many have felt (with Jean Wahl) that
¡®it is quite false but very interesting¡¯. Hyppolite¡¯s approach is rather
more judicious, while he too is influenced in his reading by existentialism
and Marx. Like Wahl, he holds that  ¡®unhappy consciousness is the
fundamental theme of the Phenomenology¡¦. The happy
consciousness is either a naïve consciousness which is not yet aware of
its misfortune or a consciousness that has overcome its duality and
discovered a unity beyond separation. For this reason we find the theme
of unhappy consciousness present in various forms throughout the
Phenomenology¡¯ (Hyppolite 1946 I: 184; 1974: 190). Also like Wahl,
Hyppolite argues that  ¡®we find (Hegel) in his early works and in the
Phenomenology, a philosopher much closer to Kierkegaard than might
seem credible¡¯ (Hyppolite 1971 I: 93): although Hegel admittedly ends in
Absolute Knowledge which seems to transcend all diremptions, the
journey of consciousness is nevertheless characterized as ¡®the way of
despair¡¯. At the same time, Hyppolite emphasizes Hegel¡¯s
foreshadowing of Marx¡¯s account of alienation, and agrees with Kojève
that recognition is capable of overcoming the tension between self and
other. None the less, in his later writings on Hegel (such as Logique et
existence (Logic and Existence) and ¡®Essai sur la Logique de Hegel¡¯
(¡®On the Logic of Hegel¡¯)), Hyppolite gave greater weight to the Logic
than hitherto; for, he argues, the claim to Absolute Knowledge, and the
transition to the Logic must be made, if ¡®the phantom of the
thing-in-itself¡¯ is to be avoided, and with it the sense that we are out of
touch with Being. Hyppolite acknowledges, however, that there is a
tension between this return to the Logic and metaphysics, and the more
humanistic, anthropological method of the Phenomenology, a tension
which he sees as fundamental to Hegel¡¯s thought.

It is partly thanks to this reading of Hegel by Kojève and Hyppolite that
Marxism and existentialism became so interlinked in the intellectual life
of post-war France; and it is clear that they helped bring about a
rapprochement between Hegel and Marx in this period by treating
existentialism as a kind of common ground on which Hegelianism and
Marxism could be reconciled. While some (such as Althusser) remained
hostile to this development, existentialism also served to bring about the
same kind of reconciliation outside France, as the themes of alienation,
reification and estrangement from nature were discovered in both their
works.

8 Contemporary developments

In the last third of the twentieth century, Hegel has continued to have a
considerable influence on philosophical thought, both as a major figure
within the canon of ¡®continental¡¯ philosophy, and (more recently) within
Anglo-American ¡®analytic¡¯ and post-analytic philosophy.

France. Since the end of the 1960s the reception of Hegelian thought in
France has been significantly determined by successive waves of
intellectual reaction to the previously dominant philosophies. The
structuralist movement which partially supplanted the phenomenological
and existentialist tradition tended to minimize the Hegelian elements in
Marx¡¯s thought and emphasize the radical incompatibility of
¡®¡®idealist¡¯ and scientifically ¡®materialist¡¯ approaches to the constitution of
social reality. The emergence of a genealogical mode of critical
discourse in Michel Foucault, the libidinal materialism of Gilles Deleuze
and the postmodern pluralism of Jean Lyotard represented a decided
antirealism and anti-foundationalism which questioned the central
assumptions of the classical philosophical tradition and its metaphysics of
truth. The pervasive influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and the
perceptible political retreat from a hitherto powerful Marxist tradition,
has conspired in the French context to produce something resembling a
regnant anti-Hegelianism as a negative mirror image of the era of
Kojève, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. The critique of the metaphysical
tradition of ontology and its supposed prioritizing of self-presence has
inspired the ethically oriented philosophies of alterity like those of
Emanuel Levinas in Totalité et Infini (Totality and Infinity) (1961)
and Jacques Derrida in Glas (1974) respectively. For both thinkers,
though in subtly distinct ways, Hegel again represents an exemplary
case of all-consuming totalizing discourse and consequently a privileged
object of critical analysis. What is at stake here is the claim to articulate
a logic which can grasp difference positively rather than in terms of
opposition, and the rejection of dialectic as an appropriate conceptual
resource for this task.

Italy. Since the 1970s, the influence of alternative models of radical
philosophy like French structuralism, post-structuralism and
deconstruction has partially eclipsed the previous Marxist monopoly on
critical social thought in Italy, while as in France, the rejection of ¡®grand
narratives¡¯ and supposedly totalizing metaphysical discourse has led to a
developing critique of the idealist tradition as a whole, and Hegelian
philosophy in particular. One result has been an increasingly scholarly
and interpretative engagement with Hegel and the modern German
tradition, but less evidence of any productive appropriation of dialectical
thought.

Germany. After the neo-Hegelian movement of the pre-war period in
Germany one cannot accurately speak of any Hegelian ¡®School¡¯ of
thought. None the less, the significance of Hegel continued to make
itself felt indirectly in the hermeneutic version of phenomenology
developed by Martin Heidegger. Heidegger¡¯s reading of the European
metaphysical tradition, supposedly culminating in Hegel, exercised
considerable influence upon the interpretation of Hegel¡¯s thought. If
Heidegger¡¯s own attitude to Hegel was problematically ambivalent, his
student Hans-Georg Gadamer developed a critical but productive
relationship to Hegel mediated by his appropriation of Heidegger¡¯s
thought as a universal ontological hermeneutics. In Wahrheit und
Methode (Truth and Method) (1960) he drew especially on Hegel¡¯s
account of experience and endorsed the anti-subjectivist thrust of
Hegelian philosophy in his rejection of the psychologistic hermeneutics
he associated with Schleiermacher and Dilthey.

It was also in the context of the hermeneutic tradition that a distinct
renewal of theological interest in Hegel first arose after the war, a
development that was subsequently intensified by the social turn in
modern theology with the influence of the Frankfurt School and issues of
Marxist-Christian dialogue. Although Karl Barth had always emphasized
the autonomy of theological discourse, his evolving thought eventually
led him from an initial commitment to a paradoxical dialectic indebted to
Kierkegaard towards a position of theological realism, a quasi-Hegelian
insistence upon systematic objectivity grounded in the trinitarian nature
of God¡¯s unreserved self-disclosure. A number of Barth¡¯s students and
interpreters pursued the critical turn against exclusively existentialist
emphasis upon individual subjectivity and an apparent neglect of social
reality and historical revelation. Jürgen Moltmann (1926-) responded to
impulses from Ernst Bloch and the Frankfurt School and adumbrated a
dialectical theology of liberation with his Theologie der Hoffnung
(Theology of Hope) (1965) and Der gekreuzigte Gott (The Crucified
God) (1973). The work of Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-) reflects the
new confidence in systematic theology that draws comprehensively on
the classical idealist tradition and Hegel¡¯s incarnational metaphysics in
particular. Sharing Moltmann¡¯s insistence on an open dialectic with a
liberatory eschatological dimension, Pannenberg has also attempted a
qualified and critical re-appropriation of Hegelian insights. Although
profoundly influenced by Heideggerean hermeneutics, Eberhard Jüngel
(1934-) also pursues the arguably Hegelian insistence on the radical
humanity of God in the later Barth and addresses the question of the
¡®death of God¡¯ through close engagement with German Idealism and
the Left Hegelian tradition in his Gott als Geheimnis der Welt (God as
the Mystery of the World) (1977). What unites these theologians,
despite significant differences of emphasis, is the attempt to exploit the
conceptual resources of the dialectical tradition to overcome the abstract
antithesis of atheism and theism and restate the trinitarian character of spirit.

Naturally Hegel also remained a permanent point of reference for the
more orthodox strains of Marxism in Germany throughout this period.
None the less, the most significant and vital engagement with the
Hegelian tradition was still to be found among the heirs of the Frankfurt
School and those broadly sympathetic to the aspirations of Critical
Theory. Thus Jürgen Habermas has responded intensively to aspects of
Hegel¡¯s thought in his reformulation of an emancipatory social
philosophy. While rejecting Hegel¡¯s supposed metaphysical philosophy
of identity in favour of a quasi-transcendental account of irreducible
constitutive interests, Habermas exploited Hegel¡¯s insights into the
communicative dimension of social interaction and the centrality of the
concept of recognition. In contrast with his predecessors, Habermas has
attempted to reorient critical theory through the turn to intersubjectivity
as an alternative to traditional philosophy of consciousness. In his later
work, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity) (1985), Habermas recognizes Hegel¡¯s
contribution to the formulation of the concept of modernity and pursues
a post-metaphysical appropriation of aspects of the idealist tradition for a
non-foundational universalist ethics.

Karl-Otto Apel (1922-) originally revealed the influences of
Heideggerian hermeneutics, philosophical anthropology and Litt¡¯s
neo-Hegelian idealist philosophy, subsequently modified by an increasing
interest in Critical Theory. Like Habermas, Apel¡¯s critical relation to the
tradition was motivated by the accommodations and failures of pre-war
historicist philosophies of culture and ossified Marxism in the face of
aauthoritarianism on right and left. Accepting fundamental features of
Hegel¡¯s critique of Kant, he has drawn extensively on the American
idealist and pragmatic tradition of Royce and Peirce in his
Transformation der Philosophie (Towards a Transformation of
Philosophy) (1973) to develop a social conception of the rational
community as the ultimate normative presupposition of enquiry. Apel is
committed to the dialectical mediation of abstract alternatives in
contemporary philosophy and overcoming the opposition between
rational grounding and practical ethical orientation in transcendental
self-reflection, employing Kantian and Hegelian elements as mutual
correctives of one another. The communicative turn and the question of
intersubjectivity is also central for Michael Theunissen (1932-) who has
interpreted and productively appropriated aspects of Hegel in sustained
interaction with Kierkegaard and constant conjunction with
developments in contemporary thought. In his attempt to relate the
insights of dialogical and dialectical thought his work reflects all the
different currents of existential phenomenology, theology and critical
theory in which Hegel has been a latent presence or critical point of
reference throughout the century.

Britain and North America. Until recently Hegel was left largely
unread by those working within the ¡®analytic¡¯ tradition of
Anglo-American philosophy, while the issues raised by Hegelian
idealism were only discussed by those at the margins of this movement,
such as J.N. Findlay (1903-87) and G.R.G. Mure (1893-1979). Since the
1970s, however, respect for Hegel¡¯s thought has grown, partly because
of his influence on the communitarian and historicist ideas of Charles
Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, and partly because Hegel¡¯s attack on
the Kantian division of ¡®form¡¯ and  ¡®matter¡¯ in experience has been
echoed by those (such as Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam and Richard
Rorty) who question the scheme/content distinction in epistemology, and
who thereby seek to go beyond Kant¡¯s ¡®subjective idealism¡¯ in a
somewhat Hegelian manner.

Thus, as the ¡®continental¡¯ and ¡®analytic¡¯ traditions have come together
over the question of how far metaphysics is possible after the Kantian
turn, the current intellectual landscape is characterized by a continuing
interest in examining, clarifying and exploiting the conceptual resources
of the German Idealist tradition, for which the interpretation,
appropriation and contestation of Hegelian philosophy will inevitably
represent a permanent point of reference.

See also: Absolute, the; American philosophy in the 18th and 19th
centuries ¡×2; Dialectical materialism; Frankfurt school; German
idealism; Hegel, G.W.F.; Idealism; Italy, philosophy in; Kyoto School;
Marxist philosophy of science; Rosenzweig, F.; Russian Hegelianism;
Scandinavia, philosophy in; Western Marxism
ROBERT STERN
NICHOLAS WALKER

List of works

For reasons of space, some of the works cited in the text are not given
in the bibliography below, but are cited in the respective biographical
entries of the particular author.

1 Primary literature

Stern, R. (ed.) (1993) G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments, London:
Routledge, 4 vols.(The first two volumes contain a selection of the
main writings in Hegel¡¯s nineteenth- and twentieth-century
reception.)

2 Germany

Adorno, T.W. (1963) Drei Studien zu Hegel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp;
trans. S.W. Nicholsen and J.J. Shapiro, Hegel: Three Studies,
Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1993.(Adorno¡¯s most
explicit critique and appropriation of Hegel.)
Adorno, T.W. (1966) Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; trans.
E.B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge, 1973.
(Adorno¡¯s major engagement with Kant, Hegel and Heidegger,
informed throughout by his transformation of ¡®speculative¡¯ Hegelian
concepts into a critical and ¡®negative¡¯ dialectic.)
Adorno, T.W. (1970) Ästhetische Theory, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp; trans. C. Lenhardt, Aesthetic Theory, London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1984.
Apel, K.-O. (1973) Transformation der Philosophie, Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp; trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby, Towards a
Transformation of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1980.
(Extensive essay collection presenting Apel¡¯s attempt to mediate the
extremes in contemporary philosophy by recourse to the hermeneutic
and pragmatic traditions.)
Bauer, B. (1841) Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel
den Atheisten und Antichristen, Leipzig: Otto Wiegand; repr.
Aalen: Scientia, 1969; trans. L.S. Stepelevich, The Trumpet of the
Last Judgement Against Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist. An
Ultimatum, Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1989.(Argues for the
incompatibility of Hegelian philosophy with traditional Christian
belief.)
Baur, F.C. (1835) Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche
Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung
(Christian Gnosis, or the Christian Philosophy of Religion in its
Historical Development), Tübingen: Osiander.(Traces the evolution
of the Gnostic theological tradition up to and including Hegel and
German Idealism.)
Biedermann, A.E. (1849) Unsere junghegelianishe Weltanschauung
oder der sogennante neueste Pantheismus (Our Young Hegelian
Worldview, or the so-called latest Pantheism), Zurich: F.
Schultheiss.(A critical response to a theological polemic directed
against the ¡®Tübingen School¡¯ and Hegel¡¯s influence.)
Biedermann, A.E. (1868) Christliche Dogmatik (Christian
Dogmatics), Berlin: Georg Reimer; 2nd edn, 1884-5.(A late example
of a broadly Hegelian and reconstructive exposition of traditional
doctrines which questions the ¡®personality¡¯ of God.)
Cieszkowski, A. von (1838) Prolegomena zur Historiosophie
(Prolegomena to The Wisdom of History), Berlin: Viet.
(Cieszkowski¡¯s major study, revising Hegel¡¯s philosophy of history.)
Daub, K. (1833) Die dogmatische Theologie (The Dogmatic
Theology of Our Times), Heidelberg: J.B. Mohr.(A standard and
cautious early Hegelian interpretation of traditional theological
topics.)
Dilthey, W. (1905) Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels (The Young
Hegel), Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussiche Akademie der
Wissenchaften; repr. Wilhelm Diltheys gesammelte Schriften, vol.
4, Leipzig and Berlin: D.G. Teubner, 1921.(Led to an important
reassessment of Hegel¡¯s early writings.)
Engels, F. (1886) Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der
klassischen deutschen Philosophie, in Die neue Zeit; trans.
Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German
Philosophy, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works in One
Volume, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968, 596-632.(Traces the
development from Hegel to dialectical materialism.)
Erdmann, J.E. (1834-53) Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen
Darstellung der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Attempt at
a Scientific Presentation of the History of Modern Philosophy),
Leipzig: Riga & Dorpat, 6 vols.(One of the most comprehensive and
magisterial Hegelian accounts of philosophy from Descartes to
Hegel. Very incisively written.)
Erdmann, J.E. (1841) Grundri©¬ der Logik und Metaphysik (Outline
of Logic and Metaphysics), Halle: J.H. Lippert; 5th edn, 1875.
(Succinct and careful restatement of the essential categories of
Hegel¡¯s Logic.)
Erdmann, J.E. (1865-7) Grundri©¬ der Geschichte der Philosophie,
Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 2 vols; 4th edn, 1895-6; trans. W.S. Hough, A
History of Philosophy, London: Swan Sonnenschein, 3 vols, 1890.
(Influential classic history of philosophy, thoroughly and carefully
written from a Right Hegelian perspective.)
Feuerbach, L. (1839) ¡®Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie¡¯, in
Sämtliche Werke, Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1846-, vol. 2, 185-232;
trans. Z. Hanfi, ¡®Towards a Critique of Hegelian Philosophy¡¯, in Z.
Hanfi (ed.) The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig
Feuerbach, New York: Anchor Books, 1972; also in L.S.
Stepelevich (ed.) (1983) and R. Stern (ed.) (1993), I: 100-30. (This
work established Feuerbach¡¯s position as a spokesman for the
Hegelian Left.)
Feuerbach, L. (1841) Das Wesen des Christentums, in Sämtliche
Werke, Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1846-, vol. 7; trans. M.A. Evans
(George Eliot), The Essence of Christianity, 1854; new edn, New
York: Harper & Row, 1957.(Feuerbach¡¯s most famous work, in
which he puts forward most clearly the Left Hegelian critique of
religion and metaphysics.)
Feuerbach, L. (1842) Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der
Philosophie (Provisional Theses Towards the Reform of
Philosophy), in Sämtliche Werke, Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1846-, vol.
2, 244-88.(Develops Feuerbach¡¯s humanistic materialism.)
Feuerbach, L. (1843) Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, in
Sämtliche Werke, Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1846-, vol. 2, 269-346;
trans. M.H. Vogel, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,
Indianapolis, IN, and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.(Develops
Feuerbach¡¯s materialist and humanistic critique of Hegel.)
Fischer, K. (1852) System der Logik und Metaphysik oder
Wissenschaftslehre (System of Logic and Metaphysics or
Doctrine of Science), Stuttgart: C.P. Scheitlin; 3rd edn, 1909.(Lucid
and brief exposition of Hegel¡¯s logical doctrines.)
Fischer, K. (1852-77; 1897-1904) Geschichte der neueren
Philosophie (History of Modern Philosophy), 10 vols in 11,
Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung.(A classic,
massively detailed history of philosophy from Descartes to
Schopenhauer, with the concluding two-volume monograph on
Hegel.)
Gabler, G.A. (1827) Kritik des Bewu©¬tseins (Critique of
Consciousness), Leiden: A.H. Adriani; 2nd edn, 1901.(One of the
very few early examinations of Hegel¡¯s Phenomenology, written by
Hegel¡¯s follower and successor in Berlin.)
Gadamer, H.-G. (1960) Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: J.C.B.
MMohr; trans. W. Glen-Doepel, Truth and Method, London: Sheed
& Ward, 1979.(Gadamer¡¯s hermeneutic reappropriation of Hegel¡¯s
concept of experience from a Heideggerian perspective.)
Gadamer, H.-G. (1971) Hegels Dialektik: Fünf hermeneutische
Studien, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr; trans. P. Christopher Smith,
Hegel¡¯s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, New Haven, CT,
and London: Yale University Press, 1976.(Perceptive examination of
key themes in Hegel in relation to the classical tradition and
Heidegger.)
Gans, E. (1824-35) Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwicklung
(The Law of Inheritance Considered in its World-Historical
Development), vols 1 and 2, Berlin: Maurische Buchhandlung; vols 3
and 4, Stuttgart and Tübingen: Cotta.(The major Hegelian
contribution to the history of law, written in conscious opposition to
the ¡®Historical School¡¯.)
Glockner, H. (1929-40) Hegel, Stuttgart: Frommann, 2 vols.(Typical
expression of vitalist neo-Hegelianism, emphasizing the cultural
concreteness and historical richness of Hegelian thought.)
Glockner, H. (1931) ¡®Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus¡¯ (The
Hegel Renaissance and Neo-Hegelianism), Logos 20; repr. with
other contributions in Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 2, Bonn: Bouvier.(A
historical account of the early twentieth-century Hegel revival in
Germany by one of the leading participants.)
Habermas, J. (1968) Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp;
trans. J.J. Shapiro, Knowledge and Human Interest, Oxford: Polity
Press, 1987.(Part 1 contrasts Hegel¡¯s critique of knowledge with that
of Kant and Marx.)
Habermas, J. (1971) Theorie und Praxis, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 4th
edn; trans. J. Viertel, Theory and Practice, Oxford: Polity Press,
1973.(Contains several influential essays on Hegel.)
Habermas, J. (1985) Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne,
Frankfurt: Surhkamp; trans. F. Lawrence, The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987.
(Traces the critique of modernity as it developed after Hegel.)
Haering, T. (1929-38) Hegel. Sein Wollen und sein Werk (Hegel: His
Life and his Works), Leipzig and Berlin, 2 vols; repr. Aalen:
Scientia, 1979.(Enormous genetic study of Hegel¡¯s thought from
1790-1807, stressing Hegel¡¯s practical and political concerns. Typical
of the organic ¡®communitarian¡¯ interpretation of conservative
neo-Hegelianism.)
Hartmann, N. (1923, 1929) Die Philosophie des deutschen
Idealismus (The Philosophy of German Idealism), Berlin and
Leipzig, 2 vols; 3rd edn, repr. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974.(An important
ontological and ¡®realist¡¯ reading of Hegel, emphasizing his systematic
ambitions and debt to the classical tradition.)
Haym, R. (1857) Hegel und seine Zeit (Hegel and his Times), Berlin:
Rudolph Gaertner.(Contains an influential attack on Hegel as an
apologist for the Prussian Restoration.)
Henning, L. von (1824) Prinzipien der Ethik in historischer
Entwicklung (Principles of Ethics in Historical Development),
Berlin: Friedrich August Herbig.(A lucid brief outline of the history of
ethics, dedicated to Hegel.)
Hess, M. (1837) Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit (The Sacred
History of Humanity), Stuttgart: Hallberg¡¯sche Verlagshandlung.
(Important document of the transformation of Hegel¡¯s philosophy of
history as a secularized eschatology.)
Jüngel, E. (1977) Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, Tübingen: J.C.B.
Mohr, trans. D.L. Guder, God as the Mystery of the World,
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1983.(A magisterial contribution to
philosophical theology, influenced by Barth and Heidegger, which
engages seriously and productively with Hegel and the Left Hegelian
tradition.)
Korsch, K. (1930) Marxismus und Philosophie, Leipzig:
C.L.Hirschfeld, trans. F. Halliday, Marxism and Philosophy,
London: New Left Books, 1970.(This work reopened the question of
Marx¡¯s debt to Hegelian idealism.)
Kroner, R. (1921-4) Von Kant bis Hegel (From Kant to Hegel),
Tübingen: Mohr Verlag, 2 vols; 3rd edn, repr. 1977.(The most
substantial single product of neo-Hegelianism, interpreting Hegel as
the fitting culmination of the entire tradition of classical and idealist
thought from a Christian perspective.)
Lasson, G. (1916) Was hei©¬t Hegelianismus? (What is
Hegelianism?), Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.(An uncritical and
enthusiastic neo-Hegelian manifesto from a rather nationalistic
perspective.)
Litt, T. (1948) Denken und Sein (Thought and Being), Zurich: S.
Hirzel.(Attempts to apply reformed Hegelian categories to central
metaphysical and epistemological questions.)
Litt, T. (1948) Mensch und Welt (Man and World), Heidelberg:
Quelle & Meyer, 1961.(A quasi-Hegelian reinterpretation of
philosophical anthropology, strongly influenced by Dilthey.)
Litt, T. (1953) Hegel, Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer.(An appreciative
assessment and reconstruction of Hegel, but critical of allegedly
panlogistic and totalizing elements.)
Lüwith, K. (ed.) (1962) Die Hegelsche Linke (The Hegelian Left),
Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.(Selected texts by members of the
Left Hegelian school.)
LLübbe, H. (ed.) (1962) Die Hegelsche Rechte (The Hegelian Right),
Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.(Selected texts by members of the
Right Hegelian school.)
Lukács, G. (1923) Geschichte und Klassenbewu©¬tsein, Berlin: Der
Malik-Verlag; repr. in Werke, Berlin: Luchterhand, vol. 2, 1968;
trans. R. Livingstone, History and Class Consciousness, London:
Merlin, 1971.(Enormously influential statement of the Hegelian
dimension of Marxian thought which broke with the prevailing
mechanistic and deterministic approach.)
Lukács, G. (1948) Der junge Hegel, Zurich: Europa, 2 vols; trans. R.
Livingstone, The Young Hegel, London: Merlin, 1975.(Classical
Marxist account of Hegel¡¯s development, implicitly written to correct
vulgar Marxist readings of the idealist background.)
Lukács, G. (1963) Ästhetik (Aesthetics), Berlin: Luchterhand; repr. in
Werke, Berlin: Luchterhand, 1968, vols 11-12.(The most sustained
example of a Marxian appropriation of classical German Idealist
aesthetics and the concept of ¡®mimesis¡¯.)
Lukács, G. (1971-2) Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins,
Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand; trans. D. Fernbach, The
Ontology of Social Being, London: Merlin, 1978-80, 3 vols.(Part of
a projected larger work that was to present a systematic materialist
version of the Hegelian legacy.)
Marcuse, H. (1932) Hegels Ontologie, Frankfurt: Klostermann; 3rd
edn, repr. 1975; trans. S. Benhabib, Hegel¡¯s Ontology, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1987.(An interesting dynamic and ontological
interpretation of Hegel¡¯s Logic in the light of the Phenomenology
and the earlier writings.)
Marcuse, H. (1941) Reason and Revolution, London: Oxford
University Press.(Emphasizes the fundamental continuity between
Hegel and Marx and offers a qualified defence of Hegel¡¯s political
philosophy against its liberal critics.)
Marheinecke, P.K. (1819) Die Grundlehren der christlichen
Dogmatik als Wissenschaft (The Fundamental Doctrines of
Christian Dogmatics as Science), Berlin: F. Dummler; 2nd edn,
Duncker & Humblot, 1827.(One of the first thoroughgoing
applications of Hegel¡¯s thought to Christian theology as a whole.)
Marx, K. (1843) ¡®Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie¡¯,
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, issues 1 and 2; trans. R.
Livingstone and G. Benton, Critique of Hegel¡¯s Philosophy of
Right, in L. Colletti (ed.) Early Writings, Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1975, 57-198.(Offers a fundamental critique of Hegel from a Left
Hegelian perspective.)
Marx, K. (1975) Early Writings, trans. R. Livingstone and G. Benton,
Harmondsworth: Penguin.(A useful paperback edition, which
contains Marx¡¯s posthumously published ¡®Critique of Hegel¡¯s
Doctrine of the State¡¯ and ¡®Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts¡¯ and his (1844), as ¡®A Contribution to the Critique of
Hegel¡¯s Philosophy of Right¡¯.)
Michelet, K.L. (1837-8) Geschichte der letzten Systeme der
Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel (History of the
Most Recent Systems of Philosophy in Germany from Kant to
Hegel), Berlin: Dunker and Humblot, 2 vols.(A lucid history of
German idealism by a representative of the liberal Hegelian
¡®centre¡¯.)
Moltmann, J. (1965) Theologie der Hoffnung, Munich: Kaiser; trans.
J.W. Leitch, Theology of Hope, London: SCM Press, 1967.
(Indicative of reaction against existentialist dialectics and a renewed
theological interest in the social dimension of the German Idealist
tradition.)
Moltmann, J. (1972) Der gekreuzigte Gott, Munich: Chr Kaiser; trans.
R.A. Wilson and J. Bowden, The Crucified God, London: SCM
Press, 1974.(Approach to a liberation theology of the cross
influenced by Marxist-Christian dialogue.)
Pannenberg, W. (1967) Grundfragen systematischer Theologie
(Fundamental Questions of Systematic Theology), Göttingen:
Vandenhoek & Ruprecht.(Draws on Hegel and idealist thought to
articulate a rational philosophical theology and defend the concept of
progressive historical revelation.)
Rosenkranz, J.K.F. (1837) Psychologie, oder die Wissenschaft vom
subjektiven Geistes (Psychology, or the Science of Subjective
Spirit), Königsberg: Bornträger.(A succinct outline of the Hegelian
philosophy of mind.)
Rosenkranz, J.K.F. (1840a) Kritische Erläuterungen des
Hegelschen Systems (Critical Exposition of the Hegelian
System), Königsberg: Bornträger.(Interesting collection of
sympathetic essays on various aspects of Hegel, reflecting many of
the debates within the school in the 1830-40 period.)
Rosenkranz, J.K.F. (1840b) Geschichte der Kantischen Philosophie
(History of Kantian Philosophy), Leipzig: Leopold Voss; repr. in
J.K.F. Rosenkranz and F.W. Schubert (eds) Immanuel Kants
sämmtliche Werke, vol. 12.(A supplement to Rosenkranz¡¯s edition
of Kant¡¯s works indicating the ¡®completion¡¯ of Critical Philosophy in
Hegelian idealism.)
Rosenkranz, J.K.F. (1844) Hegels Leben (Hegel¡¯s Life), Berlin; repr.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988.
(Rosenkranz¡¯s official biography of Hegel.)
Rosenkranz, J.K.F. (1858-9) Wissenschaft der logischen Idee
(Science of the Logical Idea), Köningsberg: Borntrager, 2 vols;
repr. Osnabruck: Zeller, 1972.(A major critical reworking of
Hegel¡¯s Logic.)
Rosenkranz, J.K.F. (1870) Hegel als deutscher Nationalphilosoph
(Hegel as German National Philosopher), Leipzig: Duncker
& Humblot; extracts translated in Stern (ed.) 1993, vol. 1,
256-297.(A contemporary study of Hegel¡¯s thought and influence.)
Ruge, A. (1842) ¡®Hegels Rechtsphilosophie und die Politik unserer Zeit¡¯,
Deutscher Jahrbücher 189, 190; trans. J.A. Massey, ¡®Hegel¡¯s
Philosophy of Right and the Politics of Our Times¡¯, in L.S.
Stepelevich (ed.), The Young Hegelians, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 211-36.(Offers a critique of Hegel from a Young
Hegelian standpoint.)
Schelling, F.W.J. (1833-4) Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,
in Sämtliche Werke, ed K.F.A. Schelling, 14 vols, Stuttgart: Cotta,
1856-91, vol. 10: 1-200; trans. A. Bowie, On the History of Modern
Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
(Contains the text of Schelling¡¯s important critical lectures on Hegel
given in Munich and later in Berlin, from the perspective of
Schelling¡¯s own ¡®positive philosophy¡¯.)
Stepelevich, L.S. (ed.) (1983) The Young Hegelians, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.(An anthology of writings by Strauss,
Cieszkowski, Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Ruge, Edgar Bauer, Engels,
Marx, Stirner, Hess and Schmidt.)
Stirner, M. (1845) Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, Leipzig: Otto
Wigand; 2nd edn, 1882; trans. D. Leopold, The Ego and Its Own,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.(Takes Hegel¡¯s
concept of the modern subject to an individualist extreme.)
Strauss, D.F. (1835-6) Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, Tübingen:
Osiander; trans. M.A. Evans (George Eliot), The Life of Jesus,
London: Chapman Brothers, 1846; repr. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972.
(A seminal work of nineteenth-theology which undermined traditional
conceptions of scripture and profoundly influenced theological
¡®modernism¡¯.)
Strauss, D.F. (1837-8) Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner
Schrift (Polemical Writings in Defence of My Work), Tübingen:
Osiander.(Spirited defence of the Life of Jesus which gives a good
sense of the theological polemics of the period.)
Theunissen, M. (1970) Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als
theologisch-politischer Traktat (Hegel¡¯s Doctrine of Absolute
Spirit as Theological-Political Treatise), Berlin: de Gruyter.(Major
sympathetic exposition of Hegel¡¯s religious philosophy which
attempts to undercut standard Left and Right interpretations.)
Theunissen, M. (1980) Sein und Schein (Being and Appearance),
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.(Pursues an ¡®intersubjective¡¯ approach to the
claims of Hegel¡¯s Logic as a potential theory of communicative
freedom.)
Trendelenburg, F.A. (1840) Logische Untersuchungen (Logical
Investigations), Leipzig: S. Hirzel; 2nd edn, 1862.(An influential
critique of Hegel¡¯s Logic.)
Trendelenburg, F.A. (1843) Die logische Frage in Hegels System
(The Logical Question in Hegel¡¯s System), Leipzig: F.A.
Brockhaus.(Further develops his critique of Hegel¡¯s Logic.)
Vatke, W. (1835) Die Religion des alten Testaments (The Religion of
the Old Testament), Berlin: G. Bethge.(Important early treatment of
the then-neglected area of Judaism from a Hegelian perspective.)
Vatke, W. (1841) Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur
Sünde und zur göttlichen Gnade (Human Freedom in its
Relation to Sin and Divine Forgiveness), Berlin: Bethge.(Applies
Hegel¡¯s philosophy of spirit to elucidate classical theological
questions concerning guilt and forgiveness.)
Vischer, F.T. (1837) Über das Erhabene und Komische (On the
Sublime and the Comic), ed. W. Oelmüller, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1967.(Reprinted with other essays, this essay gives a thoroughly
humanistic Left-Hegelian approach to an area rather neglected by
Hegel.)
Vischer, F.T. (1846-54) Ästhetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen
(Aesthetics or the Science of Beauty), Reutlingen & Leipzig: Carl
Mäckens, 6 vols.(The largest Hegelian contribution to aesthetics
which supplements Hegel by examining the question of natural
beauty and the psychology of imagination.)
Windelband, W. (1910) ¡®Die Erneuerung der Hegelianismus¡¯ (The
renewal of Hegelianism), Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger
Akademie der Wissenschaften 1 (10); repr. in W. Windelband,
Präludien, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 6th edn, 1919, 273-89. (An
important expression of the German resurgence of interest in Hegel
at the beginning of the twentieth century.)
Zeller, E. (1844-52) Die Philosophie der Griechen (Philosophy of
the Greeks), 3 vols in 2, Tübingen: Friedrich Fues.(Very influential
standard history of ancient philosophy from a Hegelian perspective
which was widely studied and translated.)

3 France

Althusser, L. (1970) ¡®Sur le Rapport de Marx à Hegel¡¯, in J. D¡¯Hondt
(ed.) Hegel et la pensée moderne, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France; trans. B. Brewster, ¡®Marx¡¯s Relation to Hegel¡¯, in Politics
and History, London and New York: Verso, New Left Books, 1972;
repr. in Stern (ed.) (1993) vol. 2, 511-28.(Argues that Marx
understood Hegel¡¯s dialectic in terms of process.)
Bataille, G. (1955) ¡®Hegel, le mort et le sacrifice¡¯ (Hegel, Death and
Sacrifice), Deucalion 5: 21-43; trans. J. Strauss, in A. Stoekl (ed.)
On Bataille, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.(A
response to Kojève¡¯s reading of Hegel.)
Bertholet, R. (1907) ¡®Thèse: Sur la nécessité, la finalité et la liberté
chez Hegel¡¯ (Thesis: On Necessity, Finality and Liberty in Hegel),
Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie 115-140; repr. in
R. Bertholet, Evolutionisme et platonisme, Paris: Alcan, 1908.
(Defends Hegel against the accusation of absolute determinism,
integral optimism and panlogicism, and discusses Hegel¡¯s influence
on Marx.)
Cousin, V. (1828-9) Cours de l¡¯histoire de la philosophie (Lecture
on the History of Philosophy), Paris: Pichon & Didier, 3 vols.(The
text of Cousin¡¯s lectures given in the academic year 1828-9, which
drew heavily on Hegelian ideas.)
Derrida, J. (1967) ¡®De l¡¯économie restreinte à l¡¯économie générale: un
hégélianisme sans réserve¡¯ (From Restricted to General Economy: A
Hegelianism Without Reserve), in L¡¯Écriture et la différance,
Paris: Éditions du Seuil; trans. A. Bass, Writing and Difference,
London: Routledge, 1978, 251-77.(Examines Georges Bataille¡¯s
response to Kojève¡¯s reading of Hegel.)
Derrida, J. (1972) ¡®Le puits et la pyramide: Introduction à la
sémiologie de Hegel¡¯ (The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to
Hegel¡¯s Semiology), in Marges de la philosophie, Paris: Minuit,
79-127; trans. A. Bass, Margins of Philosophy, Brighton:
Harvester, 1982.(Discusses Hegel¡¯s theory of signs.)
Derrida, J. (1974) Glas, Paris: Éditions Galilée; trans. J.P. Leavey, Jr
and R. Rand, Glas, Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press,
1986.(Complex and ambitious reading of various Hegel texts.)
Herr, L. (1894) ¡®Hegel¡¯, La Grande Encyclopédie 19: 997-1003; repr.
in L. Herr, Choix d¡¯Écrits, Paris: Les Éditions Ridier, 1932, vol. 2,
109-40.(Contains a lengthy summary of the Hegelian system, which
revived interest in his philosophy in this period.)
Hyppolite, J. (1946) Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de
l¡¯esprit de Hegel, Paris: Aubier, 2 vols; trans. S. Cherniak and J.
Heckman, Genesis and Structure of Hegel¡¯s Phenomenology of
Spirit, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
(Hyppolite¡¯s magisterial and influential commentary.)
Hyppolite, J. (1948) Introduction à la philosophie de l¡¯histoire de
Hegel (Introduction to Hegel¡¯s Philosophy of History), Paris:
Rivère; Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1983.(A collection of short studies
stressing the relation between the early and later Hegel.)
Hyppolite, J. (1953) Logique et existence, essai sur la Logique de
Hegel (Logic and Existence: Essays on Hegel¡¯s Logic), Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France. (Explores the contested issue of
the relation of Hegel¡¯s Logic to the ¡®existential¡¯ dimension of the
Phenomenology.)
Hyppolite, J. (1955) Études sur Marx et Hegel, Paris: Rivière; trans.
J.O. Neill, Studies on Marx and Hegel, London: Heinemann, 1969.
(Stresses the place of Hegelian themes in Marx¡¯s early writings.)
Hyppolite, J. (1971) Figures de la Pensée Philosophiques, Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2 vols.(Contains all of
Hyppolite¡¯s articles on Hegel.)
Kojève, A. (1946) ¡®Hegel, Marx et le christianisme¡¯, Critique 1:
339-66; trans. H. Gildin, ¡®Hegel, Marx and Christianity¡¯,
Interpretation (1970) 1: 21-42; repr. in Stern (ed.), vol. 2:
359-82.(Argues for what he describes as an atheistic reading of
Hegel.)
Kojève, A. (1947) Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, Paris:
Gallimard; partially trans. J.H.Nichols in A. Bloom (ed.)
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Ithaca, NY, and London:
Cornell University Press, 1969.(Text of Kojève¡¯s influential lectures
at l¡¯École des Hautes-Études from 1933 to 1939.)
Koyré, A. (1970) Etudes d¡¯histoire de la pensée philosophique
(Historical Studies of Philosophical Thought), Paris: Gallimard.
(Contains the three most important essays by Koyré on Hegel:
¡®Note sur la langue et la terminologie hégélienne¡¯ (¡®Note on
Hegelian Language and Terminology¡¯) (1931) ¡®Rapport sur l¡¯état
des études hégéliennes en France¡¯ (¡®Report on the State of
Hegelian Studies in France¡¯) (1931) and ¡®Hegel à Iéna¡¯ (¡®Hegel in
Jena¡¯) (1934).)
Levinas, E. (1961) Totalité et Infini, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff;
trans. A. Lingis, Totality and Infinity, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1969.(An ethical critique of the alleged totalizing ambitions of the
metaphysical tradition in general and Hegel in particular.)
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1946) ¡®L¡¯existentialisme chez Hegel¡¯
(Existentialism in Hegel), Les Temps modernes 1: 1311-19; repr. in
M. Merleau-Ponty, Sens et non-sens, Paris: Nagel, 1948; trans.
H.L. Dreyfus and P.A. Dreyfus, Sense and Non-Sense, Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 63-70.(Discusses the
existentialist themes in Hegel¡¯s thought.)
Nöel, G. (1897) La Logique de Hegel (Hegel¡¯s Logic), Paris: Alcan;
repr. Paris: Vrin, 1933, 1938 and 1967.(A careful and sympathetic
analysis of Hegel¡¯s Logic, which first appeared in instalments in the
Revue de métaphysique et de morale from 1894 to 1896.)
Renan, E. (1876) Dialogues et fragments philosophiques (Dialogues
and Philosophical Fragments), Paris: Calman Lévy.(Written
between 1860 and 1871, Renan here attempts to combine Comtean
positivism with religion, via an evolutionary reading of Hegel.)
Scherer, E. (1861) ¡®Hegel et l¡¯hégélianisme¡¯ (Hegel and Hegelianism),
Revue des deux mondes 31: 812-56.(Gives a reasonably
sympathetic overview of the attitude to Hegel in this period.)
Sartre, J-P. (1943) L¡¯Être et le néant, Paris: Gallimard; trans. H.E.
Barnes, Being and Nothingness, London: Methuen, 1958.(Follows
Kojève¡¯s reading of the master-slave dialectic in his account of
being-for-others.)
Taine, H.-A. (1857) Les Philosophes français du XIXe siècle
(Nineteenth-Century French Philosophy), Paris: Hachette; 3rd
edn, 1868, under the title Les Philosophes classiques du XIXe
siècle en France, Paris: Hachette.(Clearly expresses Taine¡¯s
admiration for Hegel.)
Vera, A. (1855) Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel
(Introduction to Hegel¡¯s Philosophy), Paris: A. Franck.(A popular
introduction to Hegel¡¯s thought.)
Vera, A. (1864) Essais de philosophie hégélienne (Essays on
Hegelian Philosophy), Paris: G. Ballère.(The three essays are ¡®La
peine de mort¡¯, ¡®Amour et philosophie¡¯, and ¡®Introduction à la
philosophie d¡¯histoire¡¯.)
Wahl, J. (1929) Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de
Hegel (The Unhappy Consciousness in the Hegel¡¯s Philosophy),
Paris: Rieder, 2nd edn, 1951; repr. New York and London: Garland,
1984; 119-147 trans. R. Northey in Stern (ed.) (1993) vol. 2:
284-310.(An influential study, which treats Hegel¡¯s notion of the
Unhappy Consciousness as a key to the reading of his work.)
Wahl, J. (1938) Études kierkegaardiennes (Kierkegaardian
Studies), Paris: Éditions Montaigne; 2nd edn, Paris: Vrin, 1949,
159-171.(A collection of articles, including ¡®Hegel et
Kierkegaard¡¯ and ¡®La lutte contre l¡¯hégélianisme¡¯.)
Weil, E. (1950a) Logique de la philosophie (Logic of Philosophy).
Paris: Vrin.(A major systematic appropriation of Hegel¡¯s thought as
a comprehensive theory of categories.)
Weil, E. (1950b) Hegel et l¡¯état (Hegel and the State) Paris: Vrin.(An
important defence of Hegel¡¯s political thought against accusations of
conservatism.)

4 Northern Europe

Heiberg, J.L. (1824) Om den menneskelige Frihed (On Human
Freedom), Kiel: Universitets Boghandlingen.(An early contribution
by one of Hegel¡¯s students to the theory of the will.)
Kierkegaard, S.A. (1846) Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, in
A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg and H.O. Lange (eds) Samlede
Vaerker, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1962-4, vol. 7 of
20; trans. D.F. Swenson and W. Lowrie, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941.
(Contains Kierkegaard¡¯s most developed critique of Hegel and
Hegelianism.)
Martensen, H.L. (1850) Den Christlige Dogmatik, trans. W. Urwick
Christian Dogmatics, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1866.
(Martensen¡¯s major work.)
Nielsen, R. (1864-6) Grundidéernes Logik (The Logic of
Fundamental Ideas), Copenhagen.(An application of Hegel¡¯s
Logic.)

5 Italy

Croce, B. (1907) Ciò che è vivo e ciò cheè morto nella filosofia di
Hegel, Bari: Laterza; repr. in Saggio Sullo Hegel, Bari: Laterza,
1913; trans. D. Ainslie, What is Living and What is Dead of the
Philosophy of Hegel, London: Macmillan, 1915.(Croce¡¯s influential
critical study. Saggio Sullo Hegel also contains other studies in
Hegel and German philosophy.)
Croce, B. (1902) Estetica, Bari: Laterza, 4th edn, 1912; Part 1 trans. C.
Lyas, The Aesthetic as the Science of Pure Expression of the
Linguistic in General, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992.(Draws on the German Idealist tradition, but emphasizes the
formal autonomy of the art work.)
Croce, B. (1938) Storia come pensiero e azione, Bari: Laterza, 2nd
edn; trans. S. Sprigge, History as the Story of Liberty, London:
Allen & Unwin, 1941.(A liberal version of humanist historicism
which de-theologizes the Hegelian idea of history, treating it as the
progress of the consciousness of freedom.)
Gentile, G. (1913) La riforma della dialettica Hegeliana e B.
Spaventa, Messina: Giuseppe Principato; 2nd edn, 1923; Part 1
trans. A.M. Armstrong, ¡®The Reform of Hegelian Dialectic¡¯,
Idealistic Studies (1981) 11: 187-213.(Gentile¡¯s attempt at a critical
reconstruction of Hegel¡¯s dialectical method as a ¡®method of
immanence¡¯.)
Sanctis, F. de (1870-1) La storia della letteraria italiana, Naples:
Domenico & Antonio Morano, 2 vols; trans. J. Redfern, History of
Italian Literature, London: Oxford University Press, 2 vols, 1932.
(Important document in the influence of Hegel¡¯s ideas in Italy,
strongly influenced by Hegel¡¯s approach to aesthetics.)
Spaventa, B. (1869) Studi sull¡¯etica hegeliana (Studies in Hegelian
Ethics), Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Moral and
Political Sciences of Naples, vol. 4; repr. in Opere, ed. G. Gentile,
Florence: Sansoni, 1972, vol. 1, 611-801.(An important and influential
early study.)

6 America

Dewey, J. (1884) ¡®Kant and Philosophic Method¡¯, Journal of
Speculative Philosophy 18: 162-74; repr. in Stern (ed.) (1993) vol.
2, 151-61.(Presents a reading of Kant from a Hegelian perspective.)
Dewey, J. (1930) ¡®From Absolutism to Experimentalism¡¯, in G.P.
Adams and W.P. Montague (eds) Contemporary American
Philosophy, New York, 1930, vol. 2, 13-27; repr. in R.J. Bernstein
(ed.) John Dewey, On Experience, Nature and Freedom, New
York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1960.(An autobiographical essay, in
which Dewey expresses his attraction towards Hegelianism when a
young man.)
Goetzmann, W. (ed.) (1973) The American Hegelians: An Intellectual
Episode in the History of Western America, New York: Alfred A.
Knopf.(Contains excerpts from the major works of main
nineteenth-century American Hegelians, including Brokmeyer, Harris
and Stallo.)
Harris, W.T. (1890) Hegel¡¯s Logic, A Book on the Genesis of the
Categories of the Mind: A Critical Exposition, Chicago, IL: S.C.
Griggs; New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970.(The major work on
Hegel by one of the most significant nineteenth-century Hegelians.)
James, W. (1882) ¡®On Some Hegelisms¡¯, Mind old series 7: 186-208.
(An exuberant attack on Hegel¡¯s metaphysics and method, as
interpreted by James.)
James, W. (1909) A Pluralistic Universe, London: Longman, Green.
(Contains James¡¯s most sustained critique of Hegel¡¯s thought.)
Peirce, C.S. (1868) ¡®Nominalism versus Realism¡¯ and ¡®What is meant
by determined¡¯, Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2: 57-61,
190-1; repr. in Stern (ed.) (1993) vol. 2: 140-50.(A critical exchange
on Hegel with W.T. Harris.)
Peirce, C.S. (1903) Lectures on Pragmatism, in C. Hartshorne, P.
Weiss and A.W. Burcks (ed.) Collected Papers of Charles
Sanders Peirce, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, vol. 5 of 8,
1-131.(Peirce discusses his relation to Hegel in Lecture 1.)
Royce, J. (1892) Spirit of Modern Philosophy, Boston, MA, and New
York: Houghton Mifflin. (Contains a vivid and sympathetic account
of Hegel¡¯s position.)
Royce, J. (1919) Lectures on Modern Idealism, ed J. Loewenberg,
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.(Text of Royce¡¯s lectures
of 1906.)

7 Britain

Bosanquet, B. (1888) Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.(Bosanquet¡¯s main account of his idealist
logic and metaphysics, with clear affinities to Hegel.)
Bosanquet, B. (1899) The Philosophical Theory of the State, London
and New York: Macmillan; 4th edn, 1923.(Presents Bosanquet¡¯s
broadly Hegelian account of the State and its relation to the
individual.)
Bosanquet, B. (1892) A History of Aesthetics, London: Macmillan; 2nd
edn, 1904.(Contains chapter on Hegel.)
Bradley, F.H. (1876) Ethical Studies, Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2nd
edn, 1927.(Shows the impact of Hegel¡¯s critique of Kant on
Bradley¡¯s ethical thinking.)
Bradley, F.H. (1883) Principles of Logic, Oxford: Clarendon Press;
2nd edn, 1922.(Reveals Bradley¡¯s equivocal relation to Hegel¡¯s
idealistic logic.)
Bradley, F.H. (1893) Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon
Press; 2nd edn, 1897; ninth impression, corrected, 1930.(Bradley¡¯s
main work, which in some respects has affinities to Hegel¡¯s
metaphysics.)
Caird, E. (1883) Hegel, Edinburgh and London: Blackwood.(A short but
well-respected study.)
Caird, E. (1892) Essays on Literature and Philosophy, Glasgow:
James Maclehose, 2 vols. (Contains several essays with comments
on Hegel, informed throughout by Hegelian ideas.)
Collingwood, R.G. (1924) Speculum Mentis, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(An attempt to write a phenomenology of forms of experience,
influenced by the Italian neo-Hegelians.)
Collingwood, R.G. (1945) The Idea of Nature, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.(Contains an unusually sympathetic account of Hegel¡¯s
philosophy of nature.)
Collingwood, R.G. (1946) The Idea of History, Oxford: Clarendon
Press; revised edn, ed. J. van Dussen, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993.(Contains a sympathetic discussion of Hegel¡¯s philosophy of
history.)
McTaggart, J.M.E. (1896) Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2nd edn, 1922.(A detailed
and sympathetic study of Hegel¡¯s dialectical method and its place in
his metaphysics.)
McTaggart, J.M.E. (1901) Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2nd edn, 1918.(Contains a
discussion of a range of issues, mostly concentrating on Hegel¡¯s
metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of
religion.)
McTaggart, J.M.E. (1910) A Commentary on Hegel¡¯s Logic,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(A detailed commentary.)
Ritchie, D.G. (1890-1) ¡®Darwin and Hegel¡¯, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 1: 55-74; repr. in Stern (ed.) (1993) vol. 2:
41-59.(Attempts to defend Hegel against Seth¡¯s critique.)
Seth, A. (1887) Hegelianism and Personality, London: Blackwood.
(Contains Seth¡¯s most developed and influential critique of Hegel.)
Stirling, J.H. (1865) The Secret of Hegel, London: Longman, Roberts
& Green, 2 vols; 2nd edn, Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1898; repr.
Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990.(The first major study on Hegel to appear
in Britain.)
Wallace, W. (1874) Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel¡¯s
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.(Wide-ranging,
sympathetic essays, trying to illuminate the background and content
of Hegel¡¯s Logic.)

Secondary literature

Bellamy, R. (1987) Modern Italian Social Theory, Cambridge: Polity
Press.(Contains chapters on Labriola, Croce, Gentile and Gramsci,
and traces the roots of their thought back to the native idealist
tradition.)
Bowie, A. (1993) Schelling and Modern European Philosophy,
London: Routledge. (Chapter 6 provides a clear account of
Schelling¡¯s critique of Hegel.)
Bradley, J. (1979) ¡®Hegel in Britain: A Brief Survey of British
Commentary and Attitudes¡¯, Heythrop Journal 20: 1-24 and
163-82.(A useful survey of Hegel¡¯s reception in Britain.)
Brazill, W.J. (1970) The Young Hegelians, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press. (Discusses the origins and development of the
Young Hegelian school.)
Butler, J. (1987) Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in
Twentieth Century France, New York: Columbia University Press.
(A specialized treatment of the impact of Hegel on twentieth century
French thought.)
Cornehl, P. (1971) Die Zukunft der Versöhnung (The Future of
Reconciliation), Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht.(An
outstanding study of the immediate theological reception of Hegel,
focusing on the question of eschatology.)
Derbolav, J. (1969) ¡®Über die gegenwärtigen Tendenzen der
Hegelaneignung in Deutschland¡¯ (On the Current Trends in Hegel
Reception in Germany), Hegel-Studien 5: 267-91.(On the various
forms of German Hegel reception since 1945.)
Descombes, V. (1980) Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.(Traces the importance of Kojève¡¯s
Hegel reception and the eventual reaction to it for an entire
generation of contemporary French thinkers.)
Easton, L. (1966) Hegel¡¯s First American Followers: The Ohio
Hegelians, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.(A useful discussion
of Stallo, Kaufman, Conway and Willich, with extracts from their
works.)
Fisch, M.H. (1974) ¡®Hegel and Peirce¡¯, in J.J. O¡¯Malley, K.W. Algozin
and F.G. Weiss (eds) Hegel and the History of Philosophy, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 171-93.(Provides an account of Peirce¡¯s
view of Hegel.)
Flower, E. and Murphey, M.G. (1977) A History of Philosophy in
America, New York: Capricorn and Putnam, 2 vols.(Chapter 8 gives
a very useful account of the St Louis Hegelians.)
Gasché, R. (1986) The Tain of the Mirror. Derrida and the
Philosophy of Reflection, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.(A philosophical presentation of Derrida¡¯s thought against a
Hegelian background.)
Glockner, H. (1965) Beiträge zum Verständnis und zur Kritik
Hegels (Contributions towards the Understanding and Critique
of Hegel), Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 2, Bonn: Bouvier.(Contains
¡®Hegelrenaissance und Neuhegelianismus¡¯ and other relevant essays
on neo-Hegelianism.)
Hodgson, P.C. (1966) The Formation of Historical Theology: A
Study of F.C. Baur, New York: Harper & Row.(On F.C. Baur.)
Jacobitti, E.E. (1981) Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in
Modern Italy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.(A useful
account of Hegel¡¯s influence in Italy, including details of his
nineteenth-century reception.)
Jarvis, S. (1996) Adorno, Cambridge: Polity Press.(A comprehensive
reading of Adorno which strongly emphasizes the Hegelian
dimension.)
Jay, M. (1984) Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept
from Lukács to Habermas, Cambridge: Polity Press.(Traces the
legacy of the Hegelian emphasis upon totality in Western Marxism.)
Kelly, M. (1992) Hegel in France, Birmingham: Birmingham Modern
Languages Publications.(A thorough survey of Hegel¡¯s reception in
France from 1800 to the present, with a useful bibliography.)
Kortian, G. (1980) Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of
Jürgen Habermas, Cambridge: Polity Press.(Chapter 2 discusses
Habermas¡¯s reception and engagement with Hegel.)
Löwith, K. (1941) From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in
Nineteeth-Century Thought, trans. D.E. Green, London: Constable,
1965.(A classic study of the fate of the Hegelian system and the
subsequent polarization of right and left interpretations.)
Mader, J. (1993) Philosophie in der Revolte: das Ende des
Idealismus im 19 Jahrhundert (Philosophy in Revolt: The End of
Idealism in the Nineteenth Century), Vienna: Universitätsverlag.(A
recent account of the break-up of the Hegelian school in the
nineteenth century.)
Muirhead, J.H. (1931) The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon
Philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin, and New York: Macmillan.(A
classic and still useful study of the development of British Idealism.)
Oelmüller, W. (1959) F.Th.Vischer und das Problem der
nachhegelschen Ästhetik (Vischer and the Problem of
Posthegelian Aesthetics), Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. (Provides a
discussion of Vischer and the post-Hegelian legacy in aesthetics.)
Oldrini, G. (1973) La cultura filosofica napoletana
dell¡¯ottocentro (The Neapolitan Culture of the Nineteenth
Century), Bari: Laterza.(The main Italian study of the Neapolitan
Hegelians.)
Riedel, M. (1967) ¡®Hegel und Gans¡¯, in H. Braun and M. Riedel (eds)
Natur und Geschichte. Karl Löwith zum 70. Geburtstag,
Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 257-73.(On Eduard Gans¡¯ relation to Hegel
and Hegelianism.)
Roth, M. (1988) Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in
Twentieth Century France, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(A useful discussion of twentieth-century French Hegelianism.)
Sass, H.M. and Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) (1978) Feuerbach, Marx and
the Left Hegelians, The Philosophical Forum 8: 1, 2 and 3.(A
special issue on the Left Hegelians.)
Schmidt, A. (1962) Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx,
Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstatt; trans. B. Fowkes, The
Concept of Nature in Marx, London: New Left Books, 1971.
(Analyses Marx¡¯s complex philosophical relation to Hegel and the
Young Hegelians.)
Schmidt, A. (1962) Geschichte und Struktur, Munich: Carl Hanser;
trans. J. Herf, History and Structure, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1981.(Criticizes Althusser and the structuralist tendency to separate
an early ¡®Hegelian¡¯ from a mature ¡®scientific¡¯ phase in Marx¡¯s
thought.)
Stern, R. (1994) ¡®British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?¡¯,
European Journal of Philosophy 2: 293-321.(Examines the impact
of Schelling on the readings of Hegel offered by the British
Idealists.)
Thulstrup, N. (1967) Kierkegaard¡¯s Relation to Hegel, trans. G.L.
Stengren, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.(A
thorough account of Kierkegaard¡¯s acquaintance with Hegel¡¯s
writings and those of his followers in Denmark.)
Toews, J. (1980) Hegelianism: The Path Towards Dialectical
Humanism, 1805-1841, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(A
study of the Hegelian movement before and after Hegel¡¯s death.)
Wartofsky, M.W. (1977) Feuerbach, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. (Contains a thorough discussion of Hegel¡¯s place in
Feuerbach¡¯s intellectual development.)

1