Counter-Force: An Introduction

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Countering the V-1 & V-2 1990: The Iraqi Scud Threat Counter-Force in Desert Storm Special Forces in Desert Storm Scud Hunting: An Assessment Post-1990 Developments Implications for the Future		Over the past five years there has been a major upturn in American and allied interest in developing Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) technologies and tactics. While much attention is being devoted to active defence systems, such as the Patriot Anti-Theatre Ballistic Missile (ATBM) system, to shoot down incoming enemy ballistic missiles, the issues associated with the development of counter-force strategies have received less study. During the 1991 Gulf War the Coalition effort to hunt down and destroy Saddam Hussein's Iraqi-modified Scud missiles in western Iraq was known as the "Great Scud Hunt". This element of the Gulf War air campaign is the most recent example of what would now be referred to as a counter-force operation, which aims to destroy enemy Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) before they can be launched at friendly forces.
Countering the V-1 & V-2 1990: The Iraqi Scud Threat Counter-Force in Desert Storm Special Forces in Desert Storm Scud Hunting: An Assessment Post-1990 Developments Implications for the Future		However these Coalition counter-force operations against Iraq's mobile Scuds were slow to get started and hindered by poor preparation. They could not neutralise totally the Scud threat - only degrade Iraq's capabilities. Attacks on the Iraqi missile infrastructure were more effective and long lasting. Western military commanders claim that major advances have been made since 1991 to learn the lessons of the Gulf War, but they would still face major problems today in finding Scud-type launchers quickly. "This is a visible short coming" one senior US Army officer has observed. This sub-section examines the history of counter-force technologies and tactics during World War Two through to the 1991 Gulf War, highlighting issues that need to be addressed to develop effective counter-force capabilities. The perceived failure of the so-called "Great Scud Hunt" during the Gulf War demonstrated the problems associated with conducting effective counter-force operations. Those with experience of Allied air operations against the German V-2s during World War Two and US interdiction efforts against Communist supply lines in Laos during the Vietnam War would have quickly been able to predict the limited results of the "Great Scud Hunt". Those seeking instant solutions to shortcomings in current counter-force capabilities would seem to have unrealistic expectations of existing military technology. The analysis presented here is in general agreement with that made by Dennis Gormley and Scott McMahon in our Centre's recent Bailrigg Memorandum on weapons of mass destruction, The Devil's Brews I, that "the counter-force component of TMD [Theatre Missile Defence]... is the most neglected pillar of TMD, in spite of its potential military and political returns for a rather limited investment." The material in this sub-section has been adapted from the August 1996 CDISS Bailrigg Memorandum 18, Scud Hunting: Counter-Force Operations Against Theatre Ballistic Missiles, by CDISS Research Associate Tim Ripley. Copies of this paper are available from CDISS price Ł10.00.