|
|
Home
>>
Opinion
>> Columnist
At a Glance |
Breaking News |
Nation |
Editorial & Opinion |
Lifestyle |
Entertainment |
INQ7Money |
Metro |
Regions |
World News |
Sports |
Infotech |
Global Nation
|
|
Too many generals
By Plaridel C. Garcia
IT is not a pleasant task for me to question the number of generals, many of whom I have marched with in uniform and in mufti. To paraphrase an African-American spiritual, we were not saints marching in, but Lord I still want to be in that number.
Alas, the numbers game seems to be a national curse, be they election returns, tax returns, etc. Even Edsa was not the Epiphany of the Saints Avenue. It used to be called Highway 54, where highwaymen outnumbered saints.
The number of generals was a fighting 69 during the time of President Ferdinand Marcos, according to a recent martial law TV documentary citing Fidel V. Ramos as its source. During the time of President Ramos it became a revolutionary 86 (1886, 1986). But now the number is about to soar to a cosmic 172. There is reportedly a proposed legislation increasing the present ratio of generals to the whole corps of officers to 1.75 percent from 0.75 percent. Conceived in 2001, it was submitted by a poet-general who, during his installation as chief of staff, intoned: "Let a thousand stars shine."
Not quite! His four stars shone for about two moons only. And taken literally, a total of 172 generals would have about 200 stars only.
But the military has no monopoly of the star syndrome. We have too many wars, shooting and verbal, for a nation with a Constitution that renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Because war is too complicated to be left to military generals, we have a lot of civilian generals. Too much politics! Because our politics is too uncomplicated for general participation we also have political generals. Too many internal security threats! Because they are too complicated for police directors and superintendents to handle, we have a lot of police generals. Since Marcos, even the president and commander in chief, the symbol of civilian authority over the military, salutes like a general. It is obvious we have here a general problem.
The Armed Forces cannot afford to fully pay its one-star flag officers as much as the top PNP sergeant. The AFP modernization, which we cannot afford, envisions a "lean and mean" military. What we need are more ships, not more admirals; more aircraft, not more Air Force generals; and rapid deployment forces, not more ground generals. In the military, it has been said that if the boys cannot be given the toys of war they should be promoted. But 172 generals with about 200 stars are just too much.
Perhaps we should let "a thousand suns shine." We have them already: colonel (three suns), lieutenant colonel (two suns) and major (one sun). Then there would not be a major problem.
In the first place, how did we arrive at the present 86 flag officers? The ratio of generals to officers' strength in 1935 (National Defense Act) must have been 0.5 percent, following the current ratio in the US military of less than 0.5 percent. When we were plebes about 50 years ago, the AFP chief of staff was a major general. A solitary commodore commanded the Navy, which had better and more ships then. Perhaps it was Marcos who raised the 0.5-percent rule to 0.75 percent.
But we had only 69 generals then, so why do we have 86 now? The present AFP without the PNP and the Navy without the Coast Guard could not possibly have more troops and officers than the Marcos AFP.
Last year, I asked GHQ, AFP for some clarification, but nobody returned my call. Perhaps this is a state secret. For all I know my assumptions may not be correct, but what is correct?
Perhaps it will take a revolution to reduce the "revolutionary" number of 86 generals. In 1986, I recommended to the President, in writing and through channels, that the three top generals of the new AFP be retired as soon as possible-Gen. Fidel Ramos (AFP chief of staff), Lt. Gen Salvador Mison (AFP vice chief of staff) and Maj. Gen. Rodolfo Canieso (commander of the Philippine Army)-otherwise, the general roster would expand. They were not retired, and I was promoted together with many others.
After the failed coup in 1987, I warned about the upgrading of one-star generals to two or three stars without a proper, long-term, impact study. Gen. Rodolfo Biazon agreed. But the Senate passed a law upgrading certain generals.
At a 1993 gathering of generals, those who were about to retire were given the floor. I warned about a star syndrome in the AFP that was inconsistent with its modernization. President Ramos and Defense Secretary Renato de Villa agreed. A few months after I retired, I was no longer sure what they had agreed to.
The Rizal Day paradigm shift occasioned by the President Macapagal-Arroyo's announcement that she will not run in 2004 may yet usher in a new strategos (Greek for "the art of the general"). It is reputation and self-esteem, not numbers, that make for a strong Armed Forces. On an earlier occasion, the President stated a new paradigm in civil-military relations that stresses doctrines, not ranks and personalities. Certainly, the President and the past, present and incoming chief of staff can play a good game of the generals. The republic will not be stronger and brighter by having too many stars.
-------------------
Plaridel C. Garcia is a retired Navy commodore and former assistant secretary of national defense.
|
|
|
|
|
|