Philological Quarterly, Wntr 1998 v77 i1 p15(1)

Lancelot Andrewes, Plagiarism, and Pedagogy at Hampton Court in 1606. KLEMP, P. J.

Abstract: Bishop John Buckeridge altered historical perception of minister Lancelot Andrewes by assuming control of Andrewes' works as his literary executor. Andrewes had gained a reputation as a skilled orator. Buckeridge plagiarized a sermon of Andrewes', and reconstructed Andrewes' canon to portray him as both a Jacobean preacher and an orthodox supporter of the crown.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT 1998 University of Iowa

The scheme was directed at some wayward Scottish Presbyterians. In 1606, King James I arranged to have four of his leading divines--William Barlow, Bishop of Rochester; John Buckeridge, Vicar of St. Giles; Lancelot Andrewes, Bishop of Chichester; and John King, Dean of Christ Church, Oxford--preach on an assigned theme before some Scottish ministers at Hampton Court. The divines would thus act in concert to advance the king's agenda: to bring Andrew and James Melville and their colleagues "to a right understanding of the church of England," in particular "the king's supremacy in causes ecclesiastical.(1) Extending back almost half a century, the debate about who held authority over the Kirk of Scotland--that is, who had not only the power to convene the church's General Assembly but supreme power in all matters spiritual and temporal--set the stage for a confrontation in the early seventeenth century. The Presbyterians established a General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in 1560, but an Act of Supremacy in 1572 "exacted from all clergy an oath acknowledging the king as 'supreme governor of the realm, as well in things temporal as in the conservation and purgation of religion.'"(2) After an act was passed in 1592 giving James the right to convene the General Assembly when and where he wished, he used that prerogative to postpone their meetings on a number of occasions. But when he delayed their 1604 meeting until the following year and then postponed it indefinitely, nineteen Scottish ministers showed their defiance by gathering at Aberdeen, formally constituting an Assembly, and adjourning.(3) James reacted decisively, summoning eight of the principal dissenting ministers to Hampton Court, where they were greeted by a pointed question: "What the king may doe in maters ecclesiasticall; and whether or not he had whollie the power of Conveenning and discharging Assembleis?"(4) To guide them to the appropriate response, they were seated as the captive audience for four sermons during the last week of September, 1606. Lancelot Andrewes spoke on the 28th, the final Sunday of the gathering, the invitation to preach on the week's holiest day reflecting more than his ecclesiastical position. The dominant theological voice of Jacobean England and the preacher King James "admired ... beyond all other Divines,"(5) Andrewes was widely praised by contemporaries for his oratorical skills. While the king enlisted the divines' preaching talents in his plot to rectify the Melvilles' thinking, John Buckeridge devised his own scheme within this scheme and directed it at Andrewes.


When John Buckeridge preached at Hampton Court on Tuesday the 23rd, he plagiarized significant parts of the sermon that Lancelot Andrewes had prepared to preach on Sunday. In a letter written on 5 October 1606, the court gossip John Chamberlain described the episode:

The fowre sermons at court passed with goode commendation, only Doctor Buckridge is somwhat toucht as a plagiarie, in that the bishop of Chichester [Andrewes] having communicated with him what he meant to do, he comming immediatly before him preoccupated much of his matter.(6)

Despite Chamberlain's silence about which preacher approached the other and initiated the discussion, his wording suggests that Andrewes, with no prompting, rehearsed the contents of his sermon. Yet this is inconsistent with the traditional portrait of Andrewes as a well-mannered, exceptionally private individual. Buckeridge, not Andrewes, had more reason to initiate such a discussion.

Nor does Chamberlain's accusation imply that his offense was minor. Rather, the description of being "somwhat toucht" was prompted by the nature of this literary theft. Buckeridge appropriated material from only one section of Andrewes's sermon, and he reproduced not the exact wording but some of the main ideas, along with the organization, evidence, and rhetoric used to convey them.(7) It is tempting to exonerate Buckeridge, viewing his action merely as over-zealous imitation in an age that did not always scrupulously respect the principle of authorial ownership of written work. According to this perspective, imitation functioned as a sign of flattery or as a stage in developing one's own writing style. Although Chamberlain provides the only surviving record of the charge, the fact that he even raised it in the arena of court gossip suggests that Buckeridge's action was highly improper, that the plagiarist had indeed violated the expected conduct of an author. In a lecture delivered at St. Paul's during the previous decade, Andrewes himself passed a harsh judgment on the act of plagiarism:

Now in that he [God] saith Opus suum quod fecerat [Genesis 2:2] Agustine [sic] noteth it, because there are some men which doe brag of opus suum, but they cannot boast of quod fecerant, because there are some which doe not only build upon another mans foundation (which St. Paul would not doe) but also upon another mans Timber and Stones too, as one having gotten St. Pauls Parchments or Epistles, should say and set them out as his own, but these cannot say, as God here doth opus suum quod fecerat.(8)

Andrewes's attitude toward plagiarism indicates that he would see no flattery or stylistic apprenticeship if another author took credit for key parts of his sermon.

It is one thing to defend St. Paul's integrity against a hypothetical plagiarist, but how would Andrewes respond in 1606 after hearing the substance of one section from his own sermon delivered by John Buckeridge? Not interested in political maneuverings that might bring the charge of plagiarism to the king's attention, Andrewes was also temperamentally unsuited to making public accusations or seeking revenge. He could rewrite the sermon to avoid the irony, and the potential embarrassment, of appearing to be the plagiarist when he preached on the following Sunday. Or he could ignore the whole issue. More consistent with Andrewes's intensely spiritual and intellectual character, and with his lifelong pastoral mission, is the prospect of offering the plagiarist some instruction. If Buckeridge plagiarized because he believed that the material he borrowed from another sermon provided a solid foundation for his own, Andrewes's mission is clear. He must add one more scheme to the series of schemes that is already in motion. To focus on the plagiarized material's problematic nature--his own text's supposed status as an originary authority--Andrewes uses his sermon to confront Buckeridge with paradoxes that convey a hermeneutic lesson. When Andrewes asserts his sermon's role as a model of the very originary authority that it simultaneously subverts, he appears to plagiarize the plagiarist. As he explicates a scriptural passage, however, its meanings multiply and grow contradictory and increasingly elusive. He thus creates a trap or lesson by exposing his sermon's paradoxical nature as both firm and indeterminate. By giving Buckeridge the opportunity to reflect on the issue of originary authority, Andrewes presents him with a clear choice about the matter. As David Quint indicates in his study of Origin and Originality in Renaissance Literature, this choice may be characterized in terms of

a debate over the extent to which an awareness of the literary text's human historicity may or may not be reconciled with the claims it makes to transcendent truth, over whether the text's source of meaning and locus of value lie in the literary originality of its author or in an extratextual, authorized origin that subtends its discourse.(9)

Buckeridge, embracing some form of textual idolatry, remains unreflective about these issues and oblivious to the lesson that Andrewes's sermon presents.


Andrewes's sermon from 28 September 1606 is obsessed with originary authority, as is appropriate for the context in which it was preached. In his discussion of Origin and Authority in Seventeenth-Century England, Alvin Snider views this perspective as containing a distinct epistemology:

Philosophies of knowledge have long put forward arguments that banish doubt by referring to stabilizing moments of inauguration. Recuperating an origin constitutes a philosophical method, a way of knowing, a technique of analysis.(10)

Not only did King James want the Scottish Presbyterians to learn about the true and original authority of kings, but Andrewes wanted to instruct John Buckeridge about the originary authority of texts. The title page of the 1606 quarto announces the political perspective on this theme ("A SERMON ... Concerning the Right and Power of calling Assemblies"), and Andrewes generalizes it and ensures that it will remain his focal point by choosing Numbers 10:1-2 as the scriptural passage to be explicated:

1. Then God spake to Moses, saying,

2. Make thee two Trumpets of siluer, of one whole peece shalt thou make them. And thou shalt haue them (or they shalbe for thee) to assemble (or, to cal together) the Congregation, and to remooue the Campe. (1)(11)

To create a foundation for the lesson about plagiarism that he feels obliged to present--and for the argument about monarchal authority that he has been invited to present--Andrewes defines the nature of authority and its origins and recipients.

Andrewes uses the pedagogical strategy of enacting and interrogating one of Buckeridge's main assumptions: because a given source has the status of an originary text worthy of being appropriated, it offers a foundation for his own text. Unless a plagiarist accepts this assumption, it is difficult to see what he would plagiarize (for without this premise, Buckeridge would not view another preacher's sermon as possessing an authority that is stable and significant or even superior to that of his own text) or why he would bother to perform the act of plagiarism (if Andrewes's text has no status as originary or foundational, Buckeridge has nothing to gain by appropriating it). In his exploration of these issues, Andrewes uses his sermon to demonstrate that the foundation Buckeridge seeks always has receded, that textual (and monarchal) authority always has been provisional. Andrewes's sermon necessarily reflects and carefully highlights the elements that make Numbers 10:1-2 an originary text with a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, this scriptural text receives special status as the kind of document writers use to "invoke origins as if they uniquely defined the terms of a phenomenon's continued existence"; on the other hand, as Alvin Snider explains, during the seventeenth century "Situating truth in proximity to a primal source continues to motivate various methods for the acquisition of knowledge, but the process of recovery becomes increasingly problematic."(12) In the passage from Numbers, the commission that establishes the authority to call assemblies is seen as superior because of its scriptural location, age, and uniqueness, yet Andrewes complicates that special status. The authority's source and recipient, both of which are divine and human, engage in a transaction that gives and withholds that authority.

Andrewes initially describes the nature of the authority or power in Numbers 10:1-2 as originary and fixed due to its place in the Hebrew Scriptures and history. In his "search for the Original warrant," Andrewes notes that "the best ground for a Power" is to be "first founded" in the Law (4). He makes a more explicit connection between these two originary warrants, the authority to call assemblies and the Law:

At no other place, nor no other time deliuered, then euen the Law it selfe; when the two Tables were giuen, the two Trumpets were giuen: and Moses that was made keeper of both the Tables, made likewise keeper of both the Trumpets; both at Sinai: both at one time: As if there were some neere alliance between the Law and Assemblies. (3)

The authority's special status seems secure once Andrewes equates its uniqueness with that of the Law ("At no other place, nor no other time deliuered"), further aligning tables and trumpets because of the twinned status of each, Moses's role, and their geographical and temporal "neere alliance" or merging. While these connections assert the authority's superiority, they simultaneously complicate that privileged status.

For this authority's place in the Hebrew Scriptures, along with its originary status and uniqueness, also blurs and then withdraws its claim of superiority. Its relation to the Law, for example, is both one of "neere alliance"--perhaps even identity--and of supplement, as Andrewes goes on to explain:

As if there were some neere alliance betweene the Law and Assemblies. And so there is: Assemblies being euer a speciall meanes to reuiue the Law, (as occasions serue) and to keepe it in life; As, if the Law it selfe therefore lacked yet something, and were not perfect and full without them. (3-4)

Previously, the Law provided this argument's foundation. The authority of the warrant was derived from its being "by force of the Law written" (3), the Law acting as the perfect and full entity on which to base that authority--"the best ground for a Power." But Andrewes shows that this foundation is divided against itself. This solid grounding recedes, he notes, since the Law has a lack which the warrant completes by acting as a supplement, even to the point of bringing back to life something that has not expired ("to reuiue the Law ... and to keepe it in life"). While the warrant may now attempt to attain some form of temporarily self-authorizing status--that is, we may "find the Grant ful" (7)--it too has a lack, which it completes in the calling of assemblies to complete the circular act of memorializing the warrant itself:

There is yerely a solemne Feast holden in memory of it [the warrant], and that by Gods owne appoyntment, no lesse then of the Passeouer, or of the Law it selfe, Euen the Feast of the Trumpets.... (2)

Andrewes describes a cycle of indeterminacy, with endless regressions and repetitions, as an annual meeting memorializes a warrant about calling assemblies--a warrant that has not expired. A similar receding of the argument's foundations occurs when Andrewes expresses reservations about the scriptural story's qualifications as a grounding for our beliefs and actions. He summarizes the status of both the warrant and the Law as lacking the ability to act as foundations:

To entreat then of this power. The story of the Bible would serue our turne to shew vs, who haue had the exercise of it in their handes, from time to time, if that were enough. But that is not enough. (4)

The murky syntax in the middle sentence suggests that the occasional exercising of the power ("from time to time") and "The story of the Bible"--is Andrewes referring to Numbers 10? the whole Bible?--provide an insufficient basis for the authority to call assemblies. It is "not enough."

When he appeals to beginnings, Andrewes uses the same strategy of presenting a secure grounding and then watching it recede. The authority to call assemblies is superior not only because of its placement in the Torah but, by extension, because it is "as ancient as the Law" (3). Just how ancient is made clear when Andrewes chastises people who "looke not backe enough," so they can see "how it was in the beginning, by the very Law of GOD" (4). Logically, the search for origins cannot proceed beyond the foundation of this in principio. Despite this apparent stability, the originary status of the authority to call assemblies is redefined and deferred again and again. A redefined, concrete in principio emerges when Andrewes locates the origin of this authority at a clear point in Hebrew history ("euer since they came out of Egypt"), which is immediately followed by a possible deferral into eternity--"and that God adopted them for his people" (2). Like the adopting of "Gods people" (1), the deity's act of granting this authority always was in effect.(13) Before granting this authority to the Israelites--before the beginning--"God kept [it] in his owne hands" (2). That humans choose to ignore the repeated deferral of this beginning testifies to limitations in our vision: we "haue not an eye to this, how it was in the beginning" (4), because we persist in resting in the false security of a rigidly defined in principio. Unable or unwilling to let our minds investigate the realm of paradox and deferral, we do not "thinke that which God thinketh" (21). But the endless redefining and deferring of origins does require our participation, however reluctant and stumbling, as Andrewes indicates when his "search for the Original warrant" takes him back to the day's scriptural passage: "this place of Numbers is generally agreed to be it" (4). Originary moments are thus abruptly defined less by their location "in the beginning" than by a fluctuating, perhaps arbitrary, human consensus.

The warrant's quality of uniqueness, another apparently stable ground for exploring the authority to call assemblies, is shown to be paradoxical. The warrant is unique because it was "At no other place, nor no other time deliuered." Yet after quoting Numbers 10:1-2, Andrewes begins his sermon by indicating that the warrant is anything but unique:

Among diuers and sundry Commissions granted in the Lawe, for the benefite and better order of Gods people; this (which I haue read) is one. (1)

Even the warrant's supposedly unique purpose, to confer the power to call assemblies, is diluted, as Andrewes demonstrates by showing that such meetings did not begin with this power. The event is both unique and a repetition of a previous one:

For vnto this very day [when the chosen people left Egypt and received the warrant], and place [Sinai], the people of God, as they had assembled many times and oft: so it was euer (they be the very last words of the last Chapter....) (2)

Uniqueness is deferred because the period when the warrant was in effect recedes and blurs into the prior period, just as Numbers 10 recedes and blends into the previous chapter. Andrewes's special pleading that earlier meetings are somehow different because they "were, by immediate warrant from God himselfe" (2) further confounds matters, for the scriptural verse he refers to makes an unclear distinction, perhaps no distinction, between holding and exercising authority: the Israelites "kept the charge of the LORD, at the commandement of the LORD by the hand of Moses" (Numbers 9:23). The kinds of actions that God and Moses perform before the granting of the authority (Numbers 9) become indistinguishable from those that occur after (Numbers 10). Finally, the linking of twinned trumpets (or warrant) and twinned tables (or Law), which offers the stability of a shared uniqueness--and if it is shared, this concept is blurred from the start--also argues against that stability. Andrewes remarks that "both [were given] at Sinai: both at one time: As if there were some neere alliance betweene the Law and Assemblies." That God gives Moses the tables not once but twice, in Exodus 31:18 and 34:1-4, maintains the "alliance" while neatly severing it and, when considered with the "many times" the Israelites assembled previously, rendering the events both unique and repeated.

Andrewes's extensive discussion of the original warrant's nature--its location in the Bible, status as an ancient commission, and uniqueness--provides a clear hermeneutic lesson for John Buckeridge. By interrogating God's warrant for Moses, Andrewes interrogates the nature of texts, including Numbers 10:1-2, his own sermon, and Buckeridge's plagiarized sermon. In particular, he complicates the status of any text as a self-sufficient entity that provides a solid grounding, assumptions that Buckeridge holds because his act of plagiarism attempts to transform Andrewes's sermon into an originary, authoritative, foundational text. Again and again, Andrewes's sermon discusses and models the only kind of authority that texts offer--provisional authority that recedes. When Andrewes emphasizes the commissioning of one person or text by another, examples multiply: God authorizes Moses; the text of Numbers 10:1-2 authorizes Andrewes's sermon; Andrewes's many learned sources authorize his views; and Andrewes's sermon authorizes Buckeridge's sermon. Yet, as I have described it, this granting of authority is never final. Paralleling the example of God's commissioning Moses, Andrewes's plagiarized sermon can confer only a provisional authority on Buckeridge's sermon. If the plagiarist regards this as a defeat because his sermon is exposed as lacking a solid foundation, it always has lacked that foundation. And Andrewes, who reveals that his sermon necessarily has the same provisional, receding foundation in Numbers 10:1-2, expresses no dismay.

Rather, he offers Buckeridge the compensatory insight that auditors or readers have a responsibility, not merely to acknowledge the provisionality of authority and meaning, but to use that knowledge as a hermeneutic tool. Here, too, Buckeridge the plagiarist misunderstands his role. Andrewes outlines the faulty interpretive principle that leads readers to assume that texts have inherent and final authority. Perhaps "The story of the Bible would serue our turne to shew vs" the nature of the warrant, Andrewes suggests, only to caution, "But that is not enough":

For the errors first & last, about this point, from hence they seeme to grow, that men looke not backe enough; haue not an eye to this, how it was in the beginning, by the very Law of GOD. (4)

Buckeridge errs by assuming that he knows how far back is "backe enough," that he can find the single moment of in principio, and that each has a precise location. Believing that he locates both in Andrewes's sermon, Buckeridge commits the act of plagiarism. When he confers authority on Andrewes's sermon, even while deriving authority from it, Buckeridge takes an effortless interpretive path. He evades responsibility and becomes passive, avoiding both a confrontation with provisionality and an active role in the process of interpretation. He becomes not just a bad writer but also a bad reader.

Good readers, Andrewes implies, take a participatory role in the interpretive process, with its provisionality and "errors first & last." To amend his example of the bad interpreter, I would suggest that other readers will "looke ... backe enough" and "haue ... an eye to this, how it was in the beginning, by the very Law of GOD." But they will do so with assumptions that differ dramatically from Buckeridge's: they will see that meaning or authority is provisional and deferred, and that therein lies its value. Completing texts by describing their provisional meaning, these readers participate in that meaning. In Andrewes's view, that participation requires a group effort, a perspective that conveys an important lesson to Buckeridge, who turns to one person and one text for meaning and authority. When Andrewes searches for "the Original warrant," he does not locate it on his own authority or on the authority of some isolated commentator. Instead, "this place of Numbers is generally agreed to be it," and his sermon's margins are filled with the authorities who contribute to that general agreement. Based on the participation of a series of interpreters--a consensus formed over centuries--valid interpretation, as Andrewes describes it, does not hesitate to face the indeterminacy of fluctuating, possibly arbitrary and erroneous, human opinion.

In addition to surveying this interpretive tradition, Andrewes enacts the participation needed to form a consensus when he presents a large body of authorities who assist in his quest for the original warrant and its significance. Buckeridge receives criticism because he follows a misguided hermeneutic strategy. By passively accepting Andrewes's sermon as an originary, foundational source, Buckeridge stands alone--or, more accurately, stands behind Andrewes, whom Buckeridge believes stands alone--and avoids participating in any consensus, which would mean helping to shape that consensus. By plagiarizing, Buckeridge casts the equivalent of a vote to abstain. A plagiarist may crave the security offered by another individual or text, as well as other forms of authority. But the need for security, which manifests itself as a fear of provisionality and a desire for a rigidly defined beginning and final meaning, testifies to his cowardice and limited vision. Andrewes indicates that Buckeridge finds only false security; in its place, Andrewes's sermon endorses and models the relative security of an insecurity grounded in contingency and contradiction. Andrewes flaunts his clearly idealistic lessons for Buckeridge: to "thinke that which God thinketh" (21) and "say as God saith" (55). To conceive of authority, texts, and hermeneutics from such a perspective implies embracing provisionality, paradox, and deferral.

Although Buckeridge seeks the security of linear, unequivocal views, the repeatable nature of the granting, using, and delegating of authority clarifies and complicates the search for its true source and recipients. In the opening pages of his sermon, Andrewes establishes the warrant's source. After the Israelites came out of Egypt, "God kept [the power to call assemblies] in his owne hands, as to him alone of right properly belonging" (2). His "right" to do so is apparently based, not on the laws of nature, nations, or custom, but on "the Law of God" (24), a law that is subject to perpetual revision. Later in the sermon, when Andrewes revisits the carefully defined moment at which the power is granted, he disrupts the sharp focus by explaining that "at the first he [God] tooke this Power into his owne handes" (14-15). Besides revising and deferring the in principio yet again, this assertion raises the difficult questions of where the power had been located when God "tooke" it and whether this is another repetitious cycle, as God, by assigning or assuming the power to himself, becomes the source of the source. When he is portrayed as a self-authorizing figure, the concepts of giving and receiving become tangled.

As source and recipient, God next decides "to set ouer this power" (3), this time to Moses. But the terms used to relate this momentous event ("the primary passing" that occurred "once for all" [3]), when applied to the deity who has already taken "this Power into his owne handes" and who elsewhere displays his repetition compulsion by performing multiple acts of originary creation in Genesis 1-2 and by twice inscribing the tables for Moses, convey the paradoxical indeterminacy and stability that Andrewes's sermon describes and enacts. Continuing his discussion of "the primary passing" that occurred "once for all," Andrewes observes that "The very same case fell out againe" (47; emphasis added). It is true that "Gods Order ceaseth" (50) during "the captiuity of Babylon" and "the persecution vnder Antiochus" (47-48), yet it was later returned, first to "Nehemias" and then to "Simeon Maccabeus" (48). As rulers whose authority extended over the Jewish church, Moses, Nehemiah, and Simon Maccabeus "are all the paternes we haue in the old Testament" (48), but in later ages "Gods former positiue order returneth" to civil rulers such as Constantine (50). Following the fall of the Roman Empire in the West and the period when this authority was "gotten away and caried to Rome" (52), the Reformation restored it to Protestant princes (53). When this highly portable warrant moves from God to Moses in Numbers, the meaning of its transfer is as fluid as the vocabulary used to describe it. The power is "conueighed" to Moses (47), which, like "set[ting] ouer" and "passing" it, implies a relinquishing; God decides "to translate this Power" to Moses (47), which means a metamorphosis into a different but equivalent form; and God is described as "deriuing it to Moses" (3), which paradoxically suggests both a source and a flowing away from that source, as in the act of passing down by descent (see OED 4). Just as these descriptions of how the commission changes hands suspend the relationship of present and future between being a continuum and a division, a similar fluidity appears when Andrewes uses the nature of what God gives to Moses to define the transaction and each party's role in it.

As authority changes hands, this transaction defines the link as well as the split between source and recipient. Countering Andrewes's confident assertion that "Wee haue beside, plaine wordes, to lead their [the trumpets'] possession; and those wordes operatiue, Erunt tibi" (17), the sermon presents at least two versions of this transaction. In one, God gives Moses the power to make the trumpets; in the other, God gives him the trumpets that contain the authority to call assemblies. Andrewes suggests the blurring of this originary moment by multiplying the "plaine wordes" and presenting various linguistic versions of its source in Numbers 10:2. A few words from the Hebrew text appear in the margin next to the opening scriptural citation from Numbers, the first time in Andrewes's career that he provides such a gloss and the only time that he provides one in Hebrew. Once he has presented this originary linguistic evidence, Andrewes offers destabilizing, alternative translations within the opening scriptural citation: the divine commands "Make thee two Trumpets" and "shalt thou make them" quietly elide into the ambiguous statement "thou shalt haue them," the original Hebrew appearing in the marginal gloss, which then receives an even more indeterminate additional translation--"or they shalbe for thee." Consistent with presenting the alternatives of Moses's making or receiving the trumpets, these linguistic options define an originary moment even as they equivocate and thus defer a firm grasp of it. The passage in Numbers begins by describing God as commanding Moses to "Make thee two Trumpets," and Andrewes comments on the uniqueness of Moses's role: "None to make any Trumpet but he" (7). In this version of the originary moment, the power is the continuous force that changes hands; the trumpets, physical representations that are unnecessary until humans receive the power, point to a discontinuity between God and Moses, heaven and earth. The instructions to make the trumpets authorize Moses only to repeat the action of self-authorizing, which God performed when "at the first he tooke this Power into his owne handes." Moses seems to have been given a small role with little power. But he is cast as a maker or creator who can authorize himself and others, and who continues the cycles--that is, he repeats God's repetition compulsion--by delegating his power to himself or others. To hold power, in this model, is to have delegated it. God's simultaneous giving and holding, perhaps even withholding (for he can delegate it to himself), of power in this version is quite different from the transaction that occurs in the other version.

In other parts of the sermon, Andrewes further destabilizes the episode in Numbers 10 by stating that God conveys both the power and the trumpets to Moses. Thus he refers to the originary moment "when God gaue him [Moses] the Trumpets" (22) and "when Moses arose, authorized by God, & had the Trumpets here, by God deliuered him; he might take them, keepe them, and vse them" (47). This version emphasizes the presence of the trumpets and a lack within the authority. Now placed in a position of submission and deferral, the authority requires the trumpets as supplements that complete or compensate for its lack of presence. The authority is contained in and by the trumpets, though they were made by a God who does not need them to exercise this power. To hold power, in this model, is to anticipate its fullness because one knows its lack. As in the other version of this originary moment, God gives and withholds authority, but here it is inadequate and, as its containers signify, anticipated.(14)

As the power in or of the trumpets travels from individual to individual, Andrewes exposes the provisional nature of the recipient's identity. With the trumpets as its manifestation, authority is anticipated by and then delegated to and deferred from one individual by God to God himself and again to one individual ("for Tibi implieth one" [15]), Moses--and again and again, until it reaches King James I and his descendants. And the identity of that "one" is clear. This authority "must descend to those that hold Moses place," which is not that of "high Priest" (Aaron's place) but that of "chiefe Magistrate" (18). Proceeding from God and Moses to Nehemiah, Simon Maccabeus, Constantine, and their successors, the repetitive cycle of anticipated, delegated, and deferred authority continues. Yet a destabilizing of each recipient's identity or place occurs early and forms a crucial part of this process of transmission.

When God "tooke this Power into his owne handes," his place as magistrate or king is only metaphorical.(15) Similarly, an explanation of Moses's place requires Andrewes to demonstrate more of the linguistic indeterminacy that he paraded in the opening scriptural citation and its Hebrew gloss:

Moses had in him now, no other Right, but that of the chiefe Magistrate. Therefore, as in that Right, and no other, he receiued and held them [the trumpets]: So he was made Custos vtriusque Tabulae:(16) So, he is made Custos vtriusque Tubae. But who can tell vs better then he himselfe, in what right he held them? He doth it in the 5. verse of Deut. 33. (reade it which way you wil:) Erat in Iishrune Rex, or, in rectissimo Rex, or, in rectitudine Rex, or, in Recto Regis, dum congregaret Principes populi, & Tribus Israel.... (18)

However, after Andrewes moves through this string of equivalences for the Hebrew "Jeshurun" or "the Upright One,"(17) he reaches the astounding conclusion that Moses was in fact not a king:

al come to this; that, though in strict propertie of Speech, Moses were no King; yet, in this, he was in rectitudine Rex, or, in Recto Regis, (that is,) in this, had (as we say) Ius Regale, that he might and did assemble the Tribes, and chiefe men of the Tribes, at his pleasure. (18-19)

Contingency is heaped upon contingency, as "no other Right, but that of the chiefe Magistrate" is qualified by "that is" and "as we say," negated by "Moses were no King," and finally left to our decision--"reade it which way you wil." This imperative simultaneously insists on closure (for it implies that the meaning is obvious, that any "way" we read will produce univocal meaning) and reinforces this passage's and the event's provisionality (for Andrewes produces a sense of indeterminacy by multiplying Latin renderings of the original Hebrew). Cycles spin within cycles, as he enlists a circular argument--Moses received the power because he was "in the Right of chiefe Magistrate" or king (19) and Moses was "in the Right of chiefe Magistrate" or king because he received the power--to ground his discussion of the endlessly repeating cycle of anticipated, delegated, and deferred authority. Andrewes flaunts Moses's destabilized and negotiable monarchal role as the foundation of the repetitive cycle that proceeds through the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, into early church history, and eventually to King James I and beyond.(18) Like this indeterminate beginning, the various exchanges of authority that spring from Numbers 10 rest on an uncertain foundation because of the recipients' status. Just as Moses's place is provisional and negotiable, so his successors enjoy no greater security:

If Moses as in the Right of chiefe Magistrate held this Power, it was from him to descend to the chiefe Magistrates after him ouer the people of God; and they to succeed him, as in his place, so in this right, it being by God himselfe settled in Moses and annexed to his place, lege perpetua, by an estate indefeizible, by a perpetuall Law, throughout all their generations. (19-20)

Though the place that Moses and his successors occupy rests on an uncertain foundation, the power is "annexed" or established as its supplement.

Even as this supplement completes the foundation's lack, however, the paradoxical distribution of authority between the magistrate and those he calls to assembly points to a gap in the authority or supplement itself. As the generations proceed, the repetition compulsion insists on the singular nature of both the giver and, as Andrewes argues, the recipient. When Andrewes inquires about how many will receive this authority--"Shal it be one, or more?" (14)--and ponders "Whether the Power were in the whole body [the community of Israelites] originally" (15), he presents a clear response:

Nay, but one, (saith God) in saying, Tibi.... So here he deriveth this Power immediatly from himselfe, vnto one ... for Tibi implieth one. (14-15)

Andrewes goes to great lengths to show that God gave this authority to one person, "without first setling it, in any body collectiue at all" (15). An extension of the argument that a single magistrate should hold this power, the fear of popular control of authority is an important theme in the sermon. Repeatedly citing Demetrius's gathering as the archetypal example of unauthorized assembly and mob rule (14; see 24, 28, 54, and Acts 19:23-41), Andrewes finds practical reasons that militate against the distribution of power. If the trumpets need to be blown quickly, a group may have trouble reaching a prompt decision; a group's diverse views may lead to blowing the two trumpets in "two diuerse wayes"; and the diversity may be so extreme that "we haue Assembly against Assembly" (15).(19) As Andrewes's argument asserts the right of the magistrate, emperor, or king in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, early church records, and modern history, a counterargument becomes increasingly apparent. God "nominate[s]" the magistrate Moses to hold the power (15) because "some must haue this Power, for, and in the name of the rest" (14). As suggested by the etymological echo of "nominate" and "in the name of," this version of the delegation of power reveals that, just as Moses holds authority "in the name of the rest," so God holds authority in Moses's name by "nominat[ing]" him as a figurehead. The recipient (Moses) and his followers ("the rest") participate in this authority by acknowledging that it always exists; without the power contained in the acknowledgment, the right to call assemblies would cease to exist. The acknowledgment of authority creates the conditions that call it into being, proves its existence, and allows it to be named and exercised.

Andrewes's description of the authority's source and recipient has profound implications for John Buckeridge. Although a plagiarist may view these as opposing concepts that are distinct and sharply defined--as the source of authority, Andrewes provides the sermon that Buckeridge the recipient takes--they are in fact blurred and inverted. By plagiarizing from Andrewes's sermon, Buckeridge simultaneously becomes a source of that sermon when Andrewes redefines its agenda to create a trap and flaunt its self-divided, indeterminate nature. Andrewes becomes the recipient of the provisional authority that he derives from Buckeridge's sermon. Like God when he "tooke this Power into his owne handes," Andrewes becomes the source of the source. As in Numbers 10 and in his sermon, where cycles spin within cycles, he suddenly displays his status as another maker or creator who has the power to authorize himself and others. The concepts of giving and receiving become explicitly tangled in ways that are conducive to helping Buckeridge understand the indeterminate roles of source and recipient.

The transaction these parties engage in is far more complex than the giving and receiving that Buckeridge perceives--or the textual theft that he performs--and this provides additional material for Andrewes's lesson. Mimicking Moses's repeating of God's repetition compulsion, Andrewes continues the cycles of repetition by delegating his power to himself or others. The exchange of authority between Andrewes and Buckeridge also begins an endlessly repeated cycle of anticipation, delegation, and deferral. Andrewes reveals that his sermon anticipates completion or a fully authoritative status because it requires the supplement of Buckeridge's plagiarized sermon. While Buckeridge believes that he is taking from a completed text, his plagiarism is the act that completes the text. When one recognizes an analogy between the granting of the commission in Numbers 10 and the transaction between Andrewes and Buckeridge, greater significance accompanies the question of exactly what God gives Moses at the originary moment. If the transaction grants special status to the power itself, then Moses receives the authority to make the trumpets and Buckeridge the authority to write a sermon. That God does not require the trumpets, just as Andrewes does not require a sermon, to demonstrate his authority points to the discontinuity between source and recipient, but the enacting of the repetition compulsion paradoxically points to their continuity. For Moses repeats God's action of self-authorizing and Buckeridge repeats Andrewes's action of authoring a sermon. Power or authority, from this perspective, is delegated even as it is withheld. If, however, the transaction grants special status to the presence of Moses's trumpets and Buckeridge's sermon, then authority is placed in an inferior position of deferral and requires the containers that the sources, God and Andrewes, do not require. The trumpets and sermon act as supplements that complete or compensate for the authority's lack of presence. Andrewes uses this model to show Buckeridge that possessing the plagiarized sermon implies anticipating its fullness because one knows its lack. Buckeridge has seized the authority even as Andrewes has withheld it, but from this perspective it is inadequate and, as its containers signify, anticipated.

Andrewes explores the implications of this paradoxical distribution of authority between source and recipient because at its core is the act of acknowledgment, an act that a plagiarist attempts to avoid. The hierarchy described in Andrewes's sermon asserts the superior status of one individual who is the source of authority (God); this individual "nominate[s]" someone (God himself, Moses, and Moses's successors) to hold authority "in the name of the rest" (such as the community of Israelites). That Buckeridge's plagiarism avoids any form of nominating is not Andrewes's main point. Rather, by reminding Buckeridge that he is in some sense Andrewes's successor, the sermon performs that act of nominating. Becoming provisional and inverted, however, Andrewes's hierarchy of authority is based on the participation of the recipient and followers, who acknowledge that this authority always exists. Andrewes thus informs Buckeridge that the appropriation of a text, even in a covert fashion, acknowledges its authority (though, as I noted earlier, Buckeridge needed to learn the provisional nature of that authority). In his sermon, Andrewes again shows that the acknowledgment of authority creates the conditions that call it into being, proves its existence, and allows it to be named and exercised. The lesson for Buckeridge is that his act of plagiarism contains an acknowledgment that confers a special status on Andrewes and his sermon.


Although the Scottish Presbyterians who visited Hampton Court in September, 1606, disagreed with the lesson that King James's four preachers presented about authority, at least Andrew Melville and his colleagues heard it. They recognized that, as a group, the sermons advanced two arguments. First, James's preachers attacked the Presbyterian view that consistories of ministers should have "full and absolute Spiritual Jurisdiction over Princes"(20) or, as James Melville wrote, echoing his brother's theory of the two kingdoms, "howbeit the king be head of the commoun weale, yitt he is but a subject to Christ, and a member of his kirk."(21) Next, they advanced the view of English Protestants, who believed that the Christian sovereign's divine authority was based on "the divine pattern of royal supremacy embodied in the Kings of Israel and Judah."(22) Since these arguments were directed not just at the Scottish representatives' ideas about the authority to call assemblies but at the nature of all authority in matters spiritual and temporal, it is not surprising that the visiting ministers had a negative reaction to the sermons. They remarked that Barlow dealt "naughtilie" with them, Buckeridge "joyned Pope and presbyterie together ... whether of ignorance or malice it is uncertane," and "Doctor King made a most virulent invective against the presbytereis, crying to the king, `Doun, doun with them.!'"(23) Only Andrewes's sermon received a guarded response, though one key phrase suggests that the Scots detected his argument's provisional foundation--or lack of one:

Dr. Andrewes, Bishop of Excester [sic], preached upon the tenth of Numbers. He discoursed upon the two trumpets, and proved as he could, at large, the conveening and discharging of councels and assembleis to belong to Christian kings and emperours.(24)

John Buckeridge was less alert. Oblivious to the unsettling message in Andrewes's sermon, which explored the notion of "the constructedness of every origin" now associated with post-structuralism,(25) Buckeridge missed the point about the destabilized nature of originary authority, particularly textual authority.

This missed opportunity almost ensured that Buckeridge would not take the related step of reflecting on the many significant actions that connected his life and Andrewes's. Not only did Buckeridge publish the plagiarized sermon--using the same printer, Robert Barker, who published Andrewes's sermon--but the main events of his life (15627-1631) parallel those of Andrewes's life (1555-1626) in ways that suggest another, rather more eerie form of plagiarism.(26) Each attended Merchant Taylors' School and, in the first of several appointments that placed their ecclesiastical careers on similar paths, each went on to be named one of Archbishop Whitgift's chaplains. In 1605, Buckeridge succeeded Andrewes as Vicar of St. Giles, Cripplegate, ending his life as Bishop of Ely, which had been Andrewes's see from 1609-19. Extending beyond the ecclesiastical context, the convergence of these men's lives also occurred in the legal and political arena. In the controversy surrounding the Essex divorce case in 1613, Buckeridge opposed Archbishop Abbot and his followers, voting with Andrewes and his group to annul the marriage between Robert Devereaux and Frances Howard. Whether Buckeridge followed Andrewes in the ecclesiastical positions that he accepted or took his side in a notorious legal decision, the relationship between the two men remained consistent. They were friends, to be sure, yet Buckeridge moved in Andrewes's shadow, perhaps taking the role of the student who replicated the teacher's accomplishments or perhaps idolizing Andrewes, whose very life Buckeridge plagiarized in some significant ways.

The revealing biographical evidence concludes with two important acts of textual idolatry, which is, finally, the appropriate term for Buckeridge's plagiarism at Hampton Court in 1606. After Andrewes's death in 1626, King Charles initiated the formation of his canon, and thus of an approved perspective on the preacher, by requesting that Bishops John Buckeridge and William Laud edit his writings. "Your Majesty gave us a strict charge," they wrote in their Epistle Dedicatorie to the posthumous volume,

that we should overlooke the Papers (as well Sermons as other Tractates) of that Reverend and Worthie Prelate, and print all that we found perfect. There came to our hands a world of Sermon notes, but these came perfect.... as the Sermons were preached, so are they published.(27)

Acting as Andrewes's literary executors, Buckeridge and Laud became the guardians of his textual authority. In the ultimate act of usurping and privileging that authority, they alone held the power to reconstruct Andrewes's canon, and with it his reputation.(28) The canon transmitted to posterity in 1629 by XCVI Sermons--that is, by Buckeridge and Laud's redaction of Andrewes's career--besides giving a disproportionate view of Andrewes as a mature Jacobean court preacher,(29) also presented him as a model of orthodoxy and deference to monarchal authority. The notion of Buckeridge acting as the posthumous co-editor of the very sermon about authority that he plagiarized twenty years earlier strains belief and resembles a modern metafiction constructed by Borges or Calvino. But in his role as co-editor, Buckeridge unwittingly continued the cycles of holding and delegating authority that were central to Andrewes's 1606 sermon. As the bishops' praise for Andrewes indicates, Buckeridge remained unaware of the issues in which he further tangled himself:

None more exact, more judicious then he, where he was to instruct and informe others. And that, as they knew, which often heard him preach, so they may learne, which will reade this which he hath left behinde him. (sig. A3r)

Some people may be "instruct[ed] and informe[d]" by hearing or reading Andrewes's sermons, but Buckeridge was not among them. Indeed, he even missed the irony of the disclaimer that he and Laud offered:

Wee have beene only Servants, as we are many waies bound to be, to Your Majestie's Commaund, in making them [Andrewes's sermons] ready for the Presse, but Authors of nothing in them. (sig. A4r)

As surrogate author and co-editor, as textual idolater and plagiarizer, Buckeridge had another opportunity to define his relationship with Andrewes. Preaching at Andrewes's funeral on 11 November 1626, Buckeridge explicitly connected the realms of text and biography when he created the following transition between his sermon's exposition and application:

I have now done with my Text [Hebrews 13:16]: and now I apply my selfe and my Text to the present Text, that lies before us: Vir nec silendus, nec dicendus sine cura, A man whose worth may not be passed over in silence.(30)

Without pausing to reflect on the nature of textual and biographical idolatry, Buckeridge assessed Andrewes's worth in terms of the effect his predecessor's talents would have on others:

There was none before him, whom he did imitate, nor none will come after him, that will easily overtake him: Insomuch that his great gifts may well be taken, a little to cloud and over-shadow and obscure all men of his Age and Order. (19)

Applied to Buckeridge, this role of humble follower amounted to self-erasure, but his customary obliviousness emerged when he concluded the funeral sermon by commenting on Andrewes's "workes." After paraphrasing Revelation 14:13--"their workes follow them; Opera sequuntur, & opera praecedunt; their works go before them" -- Buckeridge praised the inspirational value of Andrewes's works: "the fame of them shall stirr up many to follow his example" (22). Buckeridge, again blind to the reality of his relationship with Andrewes, further described it in these revealing terms:

He is the great Actor and performer, I but the poore cryer, Vox clamantis, He was the Vox clamans: he was the loud and great crying Voice, I am but the poore Eccho.... (16)

Buckeridge's inability to act on the distinction between an example and an idol or a voice and an echo appears in his repeated acts of textual and biographical plagiarism. When he tries to summon up inspiration in the funeral sermon, there is a supreme irony when Buckeridge dismisses one voice--"Heere I desire neither the tongue of man, not Angells" -- and tantalizingly suggests that he would like to communicate through Andrewes: "if it were lawfull, I should wish no other but his owne tongue and pen" (16). By failing to see that neither an example nor an idol, neither Andrewes's life nor his sermon, could convey the stability and certitude that he so desperately wanted, Buckeridge revealed his profound inability to reflect on his actions and to comprehend the lesson about originary authority that Andrewes articulated for his benefit in September, 1606.(31)

University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh


(1) Anthony Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, 3rd ed. (London, 1813-20), vol. 2: col. 507. On Andrew Melville s view of the divine right of kings, see David Calderwood, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, 8 vols. (Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 1842-49), 4:10, 5:438, and 6:185. King James's views on this subject are documented in Charles Howard McIlwain, ed., The Political Works of James I (Harvard U. Press, 1918): see The Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1598), 54-55, 57, 59, and 61; Basilikon Doron (1599), 12, 18, 22, and 39; Triplici Nodo, Triplex Cuneus (1609), 86, 93, and 95; and A Speach to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall (21 March 1609), 307-8. J. P. Sommerville provides a clear discussion of this issue in two essays: "The Royal Supremacy and Episcopacy Jure Divino, 1603-1640," Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 34 (1983): 548-58; "James I and the Divine Right of Kings: English Politics and Continental Theory," in Linda Levy Peck, ed., The Mental World of the Jacobean Court (Cambridge U. Press, 1991), 55-70, 283-89.

(2) Gordon Donaldson, "The Scottish Church, 1567-1625," in Alan G. R. Smith, ed., The Reign of James VI and I (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 42.

(3) Gordon Donaldson, "The Scottish Church," 52; Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes, 1555-1626 (London: S.P.C.K., 1958), 212.

(4) David Calderwood, History, 6:578.

(5) Henry Isaacson, An Exact Narration of the Life and Death of the Late Reverend and Learned Prelate, and Painfull Divine, Lancelot Andrewes, Late Bishop of Winchester (London, 1650), sig. [*2v].

(6) John Chamberlain's letter to Dudley Carleton (5 October 1606), in Norman Egbert McClure, ed., The Letters of John Chamberlain, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939): 1:232-33. Chamberlain's evidence, particularly the phrase "having communicated with him," does not specify whether Buckeridge read the sermon, listened while Andrewes read it (or summarized it), or had the opportunity, to do both. In "Originality and Plagiarism in Areopagitica and Eikonoklastes, English Literary Renaissance 21 (1991): 87-88, Elisabeth M. Magnus discusses the first documented appearance of the word "plagiary in England and the changing views of artistic originality in the seventeenth century.

(7) Given the commonplace nature of the subject of monarchal authority, it is hardly surprising that the powers and responsibilities of the king in Buckeridge's sermon resemble those of Andrewes's king and portrait of Moses, but in other respects, too, their sermons have much in common. Buckeridge plagiarized Andrewes's discussions of the king's power over priests and the king's power to call councils, in each instance duplicating not words but organization, evidence (including the general church councils and figures from the Hebrew Scriptures), and rhetorical touches (such as the convention of apologizing for speaking for too long and burdening the audience with excessive amounts of information). By following Andrewes's organization and agenda, Buckeridge committed his most blatant act of plagiarism when he borrowed the gratuitous attack on Cardinal Roberto Bellarmine, Andrewes's future political foe.

(8) Sermon preached on 24 April 1591, in A[Pi]O[Sigma][Pi]A[Sigma]MATA SACRA; or, A Collection of Posthumous and Orphan Lectures: Delivered at St. Pauls and St. Giles His Church (London, 1657), 124.

(9) David Quint, Origin and Originality in Renaissance Literature.' Versions of the Source (Yale U. Press, 1983), 23.

(10) Alvin Snider, Origin and Authority in Seventeenth-Century England: Bacon, Milton, Butler (U. of Toronto Press, 1994), 5.

(11) In this essay, all quotations from Andrewes's sermon on 28 September 1606 are taken from the first quarto edition: A Sermon Preached before the Kings Maiestie, at Hampton Court, Concerning the Right and Power of Calling Assemblies (London, 1606). Other editions introduce complications or corruptions: the 1629 text of Andrewes's sermon in XCVI Sermons was edited by John Buckeridge and William. Laud and it contains, variants from the quarto, and the text in the Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology (J. P. Wilson and James Bliss, eds., The Works of Lancelot Andrewes, 11 vols. [Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1841-54]) is based on the inferior second edition of 1631.

(12) Alvin Snider, Origin and Authority, 3-4.

(13) The Bible offers a number of statements about when the adopting of "Gods people" occurred: "God hath from the beginning chosen you to saluation, through sanctification of the spirit, and beleefe of the trueth" (2 Thessalonians 2:13); "According as he [God] hath chosen vs in him, before the foundation of the world" (Ephesians 1:4).

(14) Andrewes's two other remarks about the creation of the trumpets destabilize and blur the episode almost beyond recognition. By noting "the deliuery of them to Moses to make," Andrewes places Moses in the position of making something that is already made and-thus transforms the notion of making into "a kinde of seizin, or a Ceremony inuesting him with the right of them" (17). But Andrewes also comments that "meete it is, the Trumpets be put to making" (11). While this statement uses a colloquialism to convey the point that someone made them, its syntax and passive construction hint at the trumpets' self-generating quality.

(15) Because the Hebrew Scriptures present a number of arguments against having a king (see, for example, 1 Samuel 8-11), God's role as only a metaphorical monarch is significant.

(16) In his Basilikon Doron (1599), James offered the following advice to his son, Prince Henry:

   study to be well seene in the Scriptures ... as well for the knowledge of
   your owne saluation, as that ye may be able to containe your Church in
   their calling, as Custos vtriusque Tabulae. (Charles Howard McIlwain, ed.,
   Political Works, 39)

(17) Bruce M. Metzger and Roland E. Murphy, eds., The New Oxford Annotated Bible (Oxford U. Press, 1991), Deuteronomy 32:15n. "Jeshurun" is a poetic name for Israel (Isaiah 44:1-2n).

(18) The destabilized nature of the trumpet-bearer's role as chief magistrate or king is also made clear by the only time the trumpets are sounded in Numbers: "And Moses sent them to the warre, a thousand of euery tribe, them and Phinehas the sonne of Eleazar the Priest, to the warre, with the holy instruments, and the trumpets to blow, in his hand" (31:6)." Despite Andrewes's assertions of the king's prerogative, in the Hebrew Scriptures the priests almost always have the responsibility of sounding the trumpets (see Joshua 6:4-20; 1 Chronicles 15:24, 28; 2 Chronicles 5:12-13, 7:6, 13:12-14, 29:26-27; Ezra 3:10; Nehemiah 12:35-36, 41).

(19) If the priests' use of the trumpets destabilizes the king's supposedly exclusive authority by placing it in the hands of a different leader, the shift away from "tibi" and individual possession becomes a problematic issue not only when there are at least seven of the Levitical priests (see n.18 above) but also when each of Gideon's three-hundred troops sounds a trumpet (Judges 7:8-22).

(20) Robert Sanderson, Episcopacy Not Prejudicial to Royal Power (1637); the 1673 edition is quoted in Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes, 200.

(21) David Calderwood, History, 6:185.

(22) Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes, 200; see J. P. Sommerville, "The Royal Supremacy," 549.

(23) David Calderwood, History, 6:571,582.

(24) David Calderwood, History 6: 579; emphasis added. See also the DNB entry on Andrew Melville (13:234) and Melville's remark about Andrewes's sermon: "Sunday, the 28 of September ... we come to Court, quhair was prepairit for us a Royall Service, with quhilk the haill solemnitie of ceremonies in the Kingis Chappel, and Doctor Andrews, then Bischoppe of Exchester [sic], maid the sermone on the tenth of Numberes, of the tuo trumpettis, thairon a long discourse; proveing, that the conveineing of Assemblies and Counseles, and dischairgeing of the samyn, perteinit to Christiane Kingis and Emperoures, directly against his text, quhilk sayis, that the sones of Aaron should blow the trumpets" (Robert Pitcairn, ed., The Autobiography and Diary of Mr. James Melvill [Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 1842], 663; emphasis added).

(25) Alvin Snider, Origin and Authority 6.

(26) The biographical information in this paragraph is taken from the DNB entry on Buckeridge (3:200-1), which should be read with caution because it contains numerous errors, and from the most authoritative recent studies of Andrewes: Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes; Trevor A. Owen, Lancelot Andrewes (Boston: Twayne, 1981); and Nicholas Lossky, Lancelot Andrewes, the Preacher (1555-1626): The Origins of the Mystical Theology of the Church of England, trans. Andrew Louth (Clarendon Press, 1991). The only detailed study that links Andrewes and Buckeridge points to the congruence of their theological views (Peter Lake, "Lancelot Andrewes, John Buckeridge, and Avant-Garde Conformity at the Court of James I," in Linda Levy Peck, ed., The Mental Worm of the Jacobean Court, 113-33, 303-8).

(27) Lancelot Andrewes, XCVI Sermons (London, 1629), sig. A2r.

(28) Of the many hundreds of works that Andrewes wrote--including letters, speeches, tractates, polemical works, prayers, private devotions, and lectures (Buckeridge and Laud edited some of his Latin sermons and published them separately in 1629 in Reverendi in Christo Patris, Lanceloti, Episcopi Wintoniensis, Opuscula Quaedam Posthuma)--almost three hundred are extant. Yet, the bishops constructed the text of Andrewes that we read by using highly selective editorial principles to present only English sermons and only ninety-six of those. For a discussion of Buckeridge and Laud's use of XCVI Sermons to shape Andrewes's career, see P. J. Klemp, "Editing Jacobean Sermons: The Construction of Lancelot Andrewes's Texts," Review 20 (1998): 17-38

(29) Trevor A. Owen states that 92 of the 96 sermons were preached at court (Lancelot Andrewes 74); this number is not quite accurate, but it gives a good indication of the narrow range of Buckeridge and Laud's selections, as does the fact that at least 80 of the 96 sermons were delivered before Queen Elizabeth or King James.

(30) A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of the ... Late Lord Bishop of Winchester (London, 1629), 16, at the end of Andrewes's XCVI Sermons.

(31) In March, 1996, I had the opportunity to present part of this essay's argument at the Tenth Biennial New College Conference on Medieval-Renaissance Studies. I would like to thank Professor Edward Jones and Professor Elizabeth McCutcheon for their insightful comments about earlier versions of this essay and Professor William Kupersmith for his careful editorial guidance.