



EastWest Institute

Forum on Early Warning  
and Early Response

# Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus: **Actors, Response Capacities and Planning Processes**



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## FOREWORD

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## Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus



EWI/FEWER Survey

# Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus

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## Foreword

*Glenys Kinnock, Márton Krasznai, John Edwin Mroz*

CONFLICTS TODAY ARE COMPLEX, dynamic and often internal. This makes the challenge of responding appropriately to early warnings of violent conflicts all the greater. Some progress is now being made in addressing problems such as institutional overload, differing perceptions of threats and a lack of specific operational tools for rapid reaction to unexpected developments. In the 1990s the most salient type of conflict, both between and within states, was over ethnic and national identity.

To deal with this situation, and to reduce the need for crisis management after the event, resources are needed to strengthen the capacity for early warning of conflicts, for sustained peace consolidation and for peace-building.

Early warning of potential crises is often available, but the problem is to define and prompt the response. International crisis management requires information gathering from diverse sources. It involves furnishing decision makers who have the will and competence to act with timely and full information. Linking early warning to an appropriate response is a daunting task, so much so that some may consider it a lost cause. In fact, the lack of political will, which is often identified, is due to a number of factors, including:

- a lack of appropriate organisational structures for planning and implementation, bringing together the full range of actors and stakeholders with the methodology needed to engage in integrated action;
- a lack of knowledge about what can be done, what others are doing, or what instruments are available to promote peace;
- a lack of evaluation of which peace-building techniques will work, even if there is an understanding about what can be done; and
- a lack of accountability among policy makers — early warning information and responses to this information are not normally made publicly available.

The challenge of linking warning to response is even greater when considering what “appropriate responses” actually entail. An increasing body of research is emphasising that *appropriate responses*:

- involve concerted and integrated action: NGOs, governments and inter-governmental organisations have to work together at different levels (local, regional, international) and in different sectors (e.g. diplomatic,

development, trade and security) exploiting their comparative advantage; and

- mean ensuring sustainable peace, that is, ensuring that the objectives defined are owned by conflict-affected or conflict-prone communities.

It is in this context that the FEWER network joined with the East-West Institute in a pilot project for linking “Early Responses to Early Conflict Warnings in the Caucasus”. This initiative also aims to reverse the trend of the absence of a common global culture of prevention.

**Objectives** The pilot had three primary objectives:

- to address the question of “who can do what” in the Caucasus by surveying the regional conflict prevention instruments of the Russian and US government, the European Institutions, and of local Caucasian NGOs;
- to develop a methodology for planning and implementing integrated responses to potential and actual conflicts, thus putting in place a basis for linking warning to response; and
- to apply the methodology developed to cases where an “early warning” had been issued.

The results of this highly successful and replicable pilot project are presented in this report. This publication includes the findings of the surveys of governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations in the Caucasus. The focus of the authors is on the countries of the South Caucasus, but its links with the North Caucasus are acknowledged. The aim in publishing these surveys is two-fold:

- to examine existing capacities for conflict prevention and help inform future recommendations about preventive actions in the Caucasus; and
- to provide a reference guide of persons and organisations working in the region.

The funding agencies and organisations surveyed use a broad range of tools for responding to conflict. These include emergency assistance for humanitarian provision to victims in war; development assistance, institutional and socio-economic measures to address the underlying causes of conflict; diplomatic and political interventions to bringing warring parties to agreement; and preventive diplomacy to reduce the likelihood of escalation to violent conflict. However, there is a lack of tools for immediate and rapid reaction in part due to time-consuming decision-making processes and complex command structures.

The pilot phase for this project was funded by the Ploughshares Foundation, the United Nations Development Program, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden, and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The assessment work and implementation was done by four FEWER members (*Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development*, Tbilisi; *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Washington DC; *International Alert*, London; and the *Russian Academy of Sciences/ Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology*, Moscow), by an independent consultant on the Caucasus and the EastWest Institute, New York. A Steering Group of eminent persons, chaired by the Conflict

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Prevention Centre of the *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, has overseen the implementation of this project.

The process leading to the outputs described included three roundtables in Tbilisi (October 1999 and May 2000) and Brussels (January 2000). A preventive agenda, consisting of peace objectives and available tools for response is being applied to the Javakheti region in the South of Georgia. Currently, the methodology developed in this pilot project is being implemented in a similar process in West Africa, and will be developed for the other regions where FEWER members operate early warning systems.

We extend our thanks to the agencies funding this project and the institutions participating in this effort. In addition to the groups mentioned above, our appreciation goes to the Council of Europe, the Conflict Prevention Network of the European Commission, the governments of Germany, UK (Department for International Development and the Know How Fund), Turkey and the US (United States Agency for International Development), as well as Caucasian and international NGOs who contributed to different aspects of this work.



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Responsibility in FEWER for the editing and publication of the book was with Manisha Marwaha-Diedrich. Special thanks go to David Holland for editorial support and to Michael Nobleza for additional research assistance. We would like to extend our appreciation to Ermina Van Hoyer, former Project Manager for the “Early Responses to Early Conflict Warnings in the Caucasus” project at the EastWest Institute for editorial support, and for helping to oversee and develop this project.

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# Abbreviations

ACF	Action contre la Faim
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AED	Academy for Educational Development
AID	Agency for International Development (US)
BIF	Benevolence International Foundation
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CARITAS	The Catholic Agency for Overseas Aid and Development
CE	Compulsory expenses (EU)
CEELI	Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (American Bar Association)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)
CIPDD	Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIVCOM	Civilian Crisis Management Committee (EU)
CMRP	Comprehensive Market Reform Programme (US)
COM	Commission of the European Communities
CPCD	Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction (US Nunn-Lugar Programme)
DCA	Danish Church Aid
DDG	Danish De-mining Group
DG	Directorate-General (European Commission)
DOD	Department of Defense (US)
DOS	Department of State (US)
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECHO	EC Humanitarian Office (European Humanitarian Aid Office)
EHRF	European Human Rights Foundation
EU	European Union
EUCM	European Union Military Committee
EWI	EastWest Institute
EXIM	Export-Import Bank
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FINCA	Foundation for International Community Assistance
FMF	Foreign Military Financing programme (US)
FSB	Federal Security Service (Russian Federation)
FY	Financial Year
GOA	Government of Armenia
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HI	Helsinki Initiative
ICCN	International Center on Conflict and Negotiation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IEA	Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMET	International Military Education and Training Programme (US)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INOGATE	Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe programme (EU)

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IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISAR	Initiative for Social Action and Renewal
ISFED	International Society for Free Elections
ISTC	International Science and Technology Center
JCT	Joint Contact Team Programme (US)
LINKS	London Information Network on Conflicts and State-building
MDM	Medécins du Monde
MOFE	Ministry of Finance and Economy (Armenia)
MP	Member of Parliament
MSF	Medécins Sans Frontières
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russian Federation)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCE	Non-compulsory expenses (EU)
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIS	Newly Independent States
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OJ	Official Journal of the European Communities
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (EU)
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance to the Reconstruction of the Economy (EU), extended to Central Eastern Europe
PHO	Polish Humanitarian Organization
PINF	People in Need Foundation
PPEWU	Policy Planning Early Warning Unit (EU)
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
PTDP	PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme (EU)
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
RAS	Russian Academy of Sciences
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (OSCE)
RF	Russian Federation
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force (EU)
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism (EU)
SC	Security Council (Russian Federation)
SCR	Common Service for External Relations (replaced by Europe Aid)
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (EU)
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia programme (EU)
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UK	United Kingdom
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VERTIC	Verification Technology Information Centre
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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## Introduction

**T**HE COLLAPSE OF THE Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has catalysed the outbreak of several violent conflicts in the Caucasus. The Caucasus region consists of two entities: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia exist as new independent states in the South Caucasus, whereas the North Caucasus is part of the Russian Federation. This layout reflects centuries of political, socio-cultural and ethnic connection that these regions have had with the federal centre. In the decade since the breakdown of the USSR, several major conflicts have led to mass violence: Nagorno-Karabakh; Abkhazia; South Ossetia; and Chechnya. These conflicts have turned violent due to worsening socio-economic conditions, political marginalisation, and a lack of recognition of national identities.

The papers in this book combine a methodology for early warning intervention in a conflict situation with its practical implementation in the Caucasus region. In this sense, it is a unique attempt to combine early warning work with effective responses. The material will be of special interest to academic institutions, policy makers and practitioners working in the Caucasus and other conflict zones. These include persons in communities affected by conflict, civil society organisations, the humanitarian/development and diplomatic field, security experts, multilateral organisations, central and local government, business/private sector and others involved in peace and conflict work.

The work reflected in these papers has been on-going since June 1999 when the EastWest Institute (EWI), together with the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), embarked on a new project aimed at examining areas of improvement for conflict prevention capacities in the Caucasus. The project entitled “Early Responses to Early Conflict Warnings in the Caucasus” had a broad remit. FEWER and EWI co-operated specifically on the development of a methodology for linking warning to response, and the application of this methodology to specific potential conflicts (including Javakheti) in the region.

As part of the project’s activities, roundtables were held in Tbilisi in October 1999, Brussels in January 2000 and Tbilisi in May 2000. Participants in the roundtable meetings included local and international NGOs, inter-governmental organisations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, European Union and the Council of Europe. The Tbilisi meeting also included government officials from Georgia, Armenia, the Russian Federation and the United States.

**A Regional Toolbox** The regional toolbox was a first step in this process. FEWER members prepared a regional toolbox, or survey of conflict prevention measures/resources that four influential actors in the region – the Russian government, the US government, the European Union and local NGOs – might bring to bear in a prospective early response programme. These surveys are included in the chapters which follow. The following approach was taken in developing the toolbox:

- the project partners identified key local, regional and international actors who impact on the conflicts in their regions;
- local analysts, in co-operation with the project partners, identified the most relevant “tool categories” (such as development or security) which needed to be surveyed; and
- FEWER members or other organisations were selected to survey the actors they knew best and could contact most efficiently.

Information on relevant actors’ interests and capacities was disseminated to other actors working in the region, as well as to interested parties. However, the toolbox is not an end in itself. It is a means for pooling the resources of interested governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations and part of an overall strategy to consolidate activities that contribute to sustainable peace.

**Actors** This project focused specifically on those international and local actors that have projects and/or policies which have a direct impact on the socio-economic and political environment in the Caucasus.

One of the most influential actors in the region is the Russian federal government, as discussed by Valery Tishkov in Chapter 1. Its policies shape the daily lives of ordinary citizens throughout the Caucasus and conflicts in this region have an immediate effect on its national security. Hence, the Russian government has striven to build co-operative structures in order to ensure that its territorial integrity – the underlying principle for its policies towards the region – remains intact.

The US government has not traditionally been as involved as its Russian counterpart in this particular region of the world, as pointed out by Michael Lund in Chapter 2. However, recent events in the Caucasus, specifically the situation in Chechnya and the emergence of Islamic extremism in the region, have generated interest among US policy makers. Moreover, plans to build a pipeline that would tap into the vast oil reserves of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia have become an important priority for the United States, as it continues to look for alternative sources of energy.

The European institutions, particularly the European Union in the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, have grown increasingly involved in the region, as discussed by Christine Tiberghien-Declerck in Chapter 3. The EU continues to extend the boundaries of its community to the edges of Central/Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. In order to secure a more stable periphery for the Union, the EU has engaged in various assistance programmes aimed at strengthening the region’s fragile socio-economic and political conditions.

Activities by local NGOs and civil society have a critical impact in the region as explored by Anna Matveeva in Chapter 4. The success of any peace-building plan hinges upon the ability of local actors to shape the future of their own region. Thus, no regional toolbox is complete without consideration of local conflict prevention capacities.

**Integrated Peace-building Plans** The toolbox helped in delineating the boundaries of feasible actions and securing an integrated peace-building process for the Caucasus, which were considered at subsequent strategic roundtables held in Tbilisi (October 1999) and Brussels (January 2000).

A macro-level plan was formulated at this roundtable meeting which indicates the broad areas for action and key actors who need to be involved in the following ways:

- 1 Carry out a needs assessment and feasibility study in the conflict prone, affected region to validate and elaborate on the plan (identification of micro-projects). This study also involves extensive consultation with local stakeholders, in addition to those who part-took in the roundtable.
- 2 Develop project proposals for micro-level activities and compile these into an appeal. Organise a donor meeting.
- 3 Establish a Steering Group, and sub-groups on different issue areas of implementers and donors to oversee the implementation process. Identify an agency that will put in place a communication strategy for ensuring information flows between implementing organisations.

A valuable lesson learnt from the toolbox and planning process is that careful consideration must be given to the way in which specific actors/stakeholders intersect the planning process. The chapters in this volume demonstrate how these surveys of key capacities for conflict prevention are a crucial component in efforts to secure a comprehensive and integrated peace-building process in the Caucasus.

*Michael D. Nobleza for FEWER*





# The Conflict Prevention Capacities of the Russian Government in the Caucasus

*Valery Tishkov*

## I

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### Introduction

**A**FTER THE BREAK-UP OF the USSR in 1991, the territory of the Caucasus was divided between four states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Russian Federation, along the former administrative borders between republics. Since then, Russia's policy towards the Caucasus has focused on foreign policy in the Transcaucasian states in the South and on domestic policy in the North Caucasus. As a result, there is a large difference between the goals, interests and mechanisms of Russian policy towards the independent states in the South Caucasus and to the members of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus. Meanwhile, the policy of the Russian government towards these regions contains some common elements and general criteria.

I.S. Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, defined a number of principles of Russian policy towards the Caucasus during his visit to the South Caucasus in September 1999. For instance, Ivanov was reported to have said that "Russia was, is now, and will continue to be a Caucasian power" and that "the Caucasus is our common home." He stressed that security in the Caucasus would be addressed only in terms of the common security of all countries of the region, "We need a stable Caucasus. Without it, we will be unable to ensure the security of the southern borders of Russia and halt the incursions of terrorists and religious extremists throughout the territory."<sup>1</sup>

No policy or programme exists where such an approach is identified as part of a common security agenda. The Russian federal government tends to disregard aspirations in the South Caucasus to a 'common Caucasian home' as appearing to signal a move towards a "Caucasus without Russia." This anxiety arises from a number of perceived threats to Russia's national interests and political influence in the region. These perceived threats include the growing influence of the NATO countries in the South Caucasus, rising ethno-nationalisms and corresponding political constructs in the South Caucasus that em-

<sup>1</sup> From statements of the foreign minister on Russian central television channels and in the press.

phasise independence from Russian economic, cultural and political influence. The most disturbing factor for Russian politics until recently was sympathy and indirect support to the insurgent Chechen radicals in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The pan-Caucasian repercussions of the war in Chechnya in particular have given rise to suspicions at the Russian federal level, that the aim of the main South Caucasus actors is to work towards an unrealised 'self-determination' in the Caucasus, at the expense of further Russian disintegration.

## **Conflict Management Approach**

Russian policy toward the states of the South Caucasus has become more fully articulated under Putin's presidency. One of the main priorities defined by Russia in a Foreign Policy Concept Paper of May 2000 is the "formation of a good neighbour belt along Russia's borders, together with working towards eliminating existing, and preventing potential, tensions and conflicts in the regions adjacent to Russia." A critical feature is to achieve a "stable and just resolution" of the three major conflicts, together with undertaking joint efforts with regional states, including Russia, Iran and other adjacent states, to build a "pan-Caucasian security system."

Russia follows a unilateral conflict management approach towards domestic crisis zones in the North Caucasus. Examples include Russia's handling of crisis situations in Daghestan and the Karachay-Cherkess Republic as well as the new Chechen war since the Autumn of 1999. The 1994–96 war in Chechnya was exceptional in that an Assistance Group to Chechnya by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was present, which played an important role in achieving the cease-fire and in organising the subsequent elections. Russia has adopted a multilateral approach towards conflicts in the South Caucasus, aspiring to play a central role in the regional conflict resolution processes, based on substantial experience accumulated among mainly Russian-staffed peacekeeping missions in two of Georgia's breakaway regions — South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Bilateral agreements reached between Georgia and Russia in June and July 1992 led to the creation of a joint Georgian-Ossetian-Russian peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping forces were deployed in Georgia in June 1994 before the official decision of the October 1994 CIS conference (Commonwealth of Independent States), which provided for deployment a month later. The Abkhazian mission was established after a long period of Russian military presence following the 1992–93 war and the spelling out of a number of principles of Russian policy towards the Caucasus.

After almost eight years of Russian experience in the Caucasus since 1992, there are sufficient grounds to reorient the guidelines and mechanisms of conflict management towards a more pro-active approach. Though not entirely positive, a variety of experiences have been gained from the implementation of the "Policy on the prevention and management of conflicts on the territories of CIS states" (19 January 1996) and the "Statute on collective forces for supporting peace in CIS countries." Both documents were approved at the summit of CIS heads of state, but rapidly led to great disillusion, as they were criticised

## 2

## Caucasian Conflict Prevention Policy Framework

<sup>2</sup> See *The Ways to Peace in the North Caucasus. An Independent Expert Report*, Valery Tishkov (ed.), Moscow: Center for the Study and Management of Conflict, IEA-RAS, 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Vladimir Putin. *Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly*. Moscow, 2000, pp. 26–27.

by politicians and others, especially observers in the West and South Caucasus. At the same time, a major contribution made by Russia's peace-making efforts in Georgia was in localising the conflicts and keeping them basically non-violent. Other CIS countries failed, at a practical level, to provide proper resources and military forces. Russia sustained a serious financial burden from its limited resources and lost about 100 personnel in its peace-keeping operations in Abkhazia.

The majority of Russian policymakers and analysts believe it is time to articulate and pursue a consistent policy to deal with scenarios involving militant separatists and religious extremists across the region. The following three principles are proposed.

First, avoid a second round of disintegration of the territory of the former Soviet Union and strengthen the governance of the existing new states. Secondly, extend efforts to safeguard the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the CIS states. Thirdly, a high level of self-government for regions seeking autonomy should be ensured by the states involved. The last ones to join should extend joint guarantees to respect and defend the self-governing autonomous state formations within the boundaries of larger states.<sup>2</sup>

Putin's presidency has brought a new turn in the definition of Russia's policy in the Caucasus. The war in Chechnya is explicitly defined as a problem of a weak state, a non-operational federalism, and the "expansion of international terrorism into Russia." Proposed solutions include the strengthening of the federal state and a "counter-terrorist operation to prevent the threat of Russia's disintegration."<sup>3</sup> An innovative element in the policy of the Putin administration is a proposal to link conflict resolution efforts in Karabakh and Abkhazia by building a system of regional security for the Caucasus, which embraces the 'Caucasus Four' (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia).

Diplomatic steps in this direction have taken place at the two CIS summits in Moscow in January and July 2000 where the leaders of the four states met to discuss regional security issues. Neither meeting resulted in any significant decisions. However, a move was made towards institutionalising the "Caucasus Four" consultation mechanism. This was further developed in the January 2000 summit by establishing the CIS Anti-terrorist Centre and a working programme for combating international terrorism. The subsequent meetings of the four heads of state are likely to concentrate on further planning and discussing issues of peace and development in the Caucasus through the radical improvement (or restoration) of multidimensional relations, from the economy to humanitarian links, and through working out 'indigenous' scenarios for conflict resolution in accord with international law.

Despite growing anxiety and a number of administrative reshuffles within the federal government aimed at ensuring more effective peace enforcement and counter-terrorist activities, the Russian policy towards the Caucasus suffers from serious deficiencies. The policy suffers from the apparent lack of co-ordination between the key agencies,

long response times (to dynamic factors generating conflict) and a lack of resources to deal with the structural causes of conflicts in the region. At the same time, the Russian government appears to have a number of tools to deal with existing conflicts in the Caucasus so as to prevent their escalation or the emergence of new ones.

The following key elements relevant to analysis of the general conflict prevention capacities of Russian federal structures can currently be identified in Russian Caucasian policy:

- the general security framework for dealing with major threats in the Caucasus;
- the mandates and capacities of the main actors designated at the federal level to formulate, implement and evaluate policy in the Caucasus; and
- co-operation with external actors.

## 2.1

### General Security Framework and Major Threats

New and flexible mechanisms for managing conflicts in the Caucasus are needed because of their serious consequences for Russia. Russia thus finds itself at the epicentre of peacemaking activity in the territory of the former USSR. Russia's own basic efforts are understandably directed at managing crisis situations and armed conflicts in areas immediately adjacent to its borders. Stability in these territories is vital to the Russian state and to its Russian-speaking 'compatriots,' 25 million of whom live in this 'near abroad' region.<sup>4</sup>

A number of additional factors have emerged which threaten the security of individuals, society and the nation in the present development of the Russian Federation. Among these threats is economic instability, a crisis in centre-periphery relations under a malfunctioning federal system and a significant increase in the crime rate. An added danger is posed by poorly regulated migration flows, illegal entrepreneurial activities and cross-border trafficking, with borders that are practically open between the four Caucasian states.

However, the most salient threat to the Russian Federation, as far as armed conflicts and the use of military force are concerned, is that posed by ethno-nationalistic strife in its violent form of armed separatism. The primary internal sources of threats to security, against which military force could be employed, in summary are as follows:

- unlawful, armed, violent activity on the part of nationalist, separatist and other organisations aimed at destabilising the internal situation in the Russian Federation and violating its territorial integrity;
- attempts at the violent overthrow of constitutional order and at disruption of the working of the organs of state power;
- attacks on nuclear energy facilities and chemical production facilities;
- the presence of illegal armed groups;
- organised crime and contraband activity on a scale that threatens the security of citizens and society;
- attacks on arsenals and armament manufacturing facilities, military and special equipment;
- attacks on organisations, institutions and buildings storing state armaments with the aim of seizing these weapons; and

4 AF Arinakhin, "Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Experience in the Use of Russian Peacekeeping Forces for Peacekeeping Operations in the CIS," text of an oral presentation at a TRADOC Peacekeeping Conference.

- the illegal spread on Russian territory of weapons, ammunition and explosives for use in attacks and acts of terrorism, and also the unlawful sale of drugs.

For the Russian government, it is clear that the territorial integrity and internal security of the Russian Federation depends primarily on the rapid resolution of major economic, political and social problems. In addition to political solutions however, it is accepted that force will be required to maintain stability, and that some situations will require decisive action by organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and by Internal Troops.<sup>5</sup>

Russian security priorities extend beyond the Federation, to states within the CIS and to those states which did not join the Commonwealth but which were part of the territory of the former USSR. It is felt that antagonisms within the states of the Commonwealth and, to some extent, between them, should be dealt with through the creation of a Collective Peacekeeping Force for stabilisation and for peacekeeping in the CIS member states.

<sup>5</sup> AS Kulikov, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Commander-in-Chief of Russian Internal Troops, from an oral presentation.

## 2.2

### Federal Actors with Conflict Prevention Capacities

The government of the Russian Federation operates as a system of ministries, committees, commissions and task force groups, none of which have a primary mandate for conflict prevention and resolution. On the other hand, almost all the key ministries participate in inter-agency co-operation frameworks that include a range of issues related to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. [See Chart 1.1.]


### The Presidential Administration

The Administrative department of the President of the Russian Federation is currently a key policy formulation unit within the system of power in Russia. Despite its tremendous influence on decision making, the Administration is not accountable to the parliament or the government and is the key institutional tool of presidential power. The Administration holds weekly working meetings, chaired by the Head of the Administration with the participation of the Secretary of the Security Council. The decisions made during these meetings concern operational issues and are executed by one of the deputy heads of the Presidential Administration and the head of the Territorial Department. The Territorial Department has a unit in the North Caucasus. Individual issues are discussed at the working meetings held jointly with representatives from the ministries and the staff of the Security Council. As to the foreign issues concerned, a Department on Foreign Relations exists, with a special presidential adviser on foreign policy, as a separate division of the Presidential Administration.

There are no crisis or conflict prevention units and services within the Presidential Administration. Nevertheless, the remodelled Kremlin premises include a 'white room' — a crisis management centre equipped with the latest computer and communication facilities. However, neither the Daghestan-Chechnya war, nor the recent Karachay-Cherkess crisis were managed with the use of modern methodologies of expert analysis or a more sophisticated decision-making process. A substantial part of this process is confidential and is not open to public

**Chart 1.1**

*Key executive and legislative bodies with conflict prevention capacities in the Russian Federation (as of 30 August 2001)*



scrutiny. This creates conditions in which there is a relatively high probability of making mistakes in choosing between different options.

## Defence and Security

There was also a tendency to delegate more authority, responsibility and resources to the Ministry of Defence and the General Chief of Staff to execute military operations in conflict zones of the North Caucasus. The then Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, stated on 1 October 1999, after federal troops occupied positions on the territory of Chechnya, "It is not my concern to follow where and how the military moves there. It is all the territory of the Russian Federation. There is no need to pass any federal laws." Since August 1999, the Ministry of Defence received an additional 2.5 billion roubles from the budget for military operations in the North Caucasus. After achieving some results in defeating the main armed groups in Chechnya, the President's decision was to make the Federal Security Service (FSB), the principal force and operational institution in countering armed resistance and terrorism in Chechnya. It was announced that the army was being gradually withdrawn, but this process was halted in May 2001, after 10,000 military personnel had been withdrawn and following an intensification of attacks on federal military and civil servants co-operating with the federal authorities and on the acting Chechen administration.

## The Security Council

Officially, the Security Council (sc), headed by the President of the Russian Federation, is the main governmental structure responsible for formulating policy towards the Caucasus and focusing on the crisis in the region. The decisions of the sc serve as the basis for the preparation of the corresponding presidential decrees. The sc itself can only adopt policy directives, as its status is not defined in the country's constitution. The sc includes the heads of the so called "power agencies" (such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Defence) and the chairmen of both the lower and upper chambers of the Russian Parliament (the State Duma and the Council of the Federation) as well as other governmental agencies.

The Security Council is also responsible for the preparation of policy documents which serve as the basis of presidential decrees. It includes the policy directive adopted in April 1999, "The basis for the state nationalities policy in the North Caucasus" which has been endorsed by a Presidential decree. This document is confidential due to a number of military issues dealt within it. The Security Council is rarely convened with a 'full complement' (for example, chaired by the President with the speakers of both the State Duma and the Federation Council present). Normally, sessions of the Security Council are held involving only a restricted circle, for example, without the President and the Chairman of a chamber of Parliament.

The decisions and policy directives adopted during these meetings provide the basis for binding government policy decisions issued by the President. These decisions are executed, controlled and co-ordinated by the Security Council's staff. One of the deputy secretaries of the Security Council supervises issues related to the North Caucasus, with the following roles:

- to define agenda items and the timing of discussions on crises;
- to prepare Security Council meetings, including the provision of background information and draft documentation; and
- to monitor the implementation of the Security Council's decisions (overseeing the Security Council's staff) and the co-ordination of other key actors' activities in conflict management.

The State Commission on the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, is a senior body functioning on an inter-agency basis and engaged in the formulation and implementation of policy towards the North Caucasus. This Commission was expected to receive a wider mandate, which would have allowed it to control the whole range of issues connected with the North Caucasus. However, this plan was abandoned due to the present crisis and the difficulties associated with restructuring the Commission to make it fully effective.

At present, the Department on security problems in the Northern Caucasus appears to be the main structural part of the Security Council apparatus responsible for the co-ordination of the policy formulation process towards the North Caucasus, so far as conflict prevention and resolution are concerned. It interacts closely with the relevant depart-



ments of the Presidential Administration and the inter-agency commissions of the Security Council.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the foreign minister a permanent member of the Security Council, is responsible for the co-ordination and supervision of the foreign policy implications of the situation in the North Caucasus. The range of issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is tackled by the Department dealing with the external activities of Federation units. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly, and through its embassies in Tbilisi and Baku, carried out a number of diplomatic actions in relation to the South Caucasus countries. These actions were in connection with the continuing transit of military resources through Georgia and Azerbaijan to Chechnya. Recently, more effective co-ordination has been introduced between the ministries of internal affairs, the judicial institutions and the state border services of the three states, to counter terrorism and criminal activities, including trafficking of arms and the movement of mercenaries into conflict zones. A possibility of joint military operations against Chechen combatants, concentrated in the adjacent Georgian mountain area is on the agenda of each state.

## **Federal Assembly — Russian Parliament**

The Federal Assembly includes representatives of the North Caucasus both at the level of Deputies in the State Duma (lower chamber) and at the level of the Heads of Republics, *krai* (regions) and *oblast* (smaller territorial units) in the Federation Council (Upper Chamber). In the Federation Council, one of the Deputy Speakers is also a representative of the North Caucasus and the president of the Kabardin-Balkar Republic. In the State Duma one of the Deputy Speakers is responsible for interaction with the state structures and security forces dealing with the problems of the North Caucasus. The Federal Assembly has neither a special committee on the North Caucasus (although a proposal to create such a committee has been made), nor a committee dealing with the issue of conflicts. The only structure within the parliament dealing with North Caucasus issues is the Committee on the Affairs of the Nationalities. In 2000, the State Duma established a special Commission on the Observation of Legal Order and Human Rights in Chechnya, comprised of representatives of different parliamentary groups and public institutions. A number of draft laws concerning conflict prevention and combating terrorism are under preparation, but none has yet been passed by the Parliament.

## **3**

### **Institutions and Regional Structures**

#### **3.1**

#### **Government Institutions**

A number of government and pan-regional structures and institutions are responsible for political and economic administration in the Caucasus.

The Central Staff of the government includes a Department on Regional Development, which in turn, has a Territorial Unit for interaction with the federal structures in the North Caucasus. From a general overview of the structure of the Russian government, the Ministry on Federal

Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy — *Minfederatsii*, was one of the most significant state actors responsible for inter-ethnic relations in Russia's republics, including conflict prevention and resolution. It has since been disbanded.

The *Ministry of Finance*, jointly with the *Ministry for Economic Development and Trade*, are in charge of economic policy towards the North Caucasus. North Caucasus issues are supervised at deputy minister level. These ministries are also responsible for the funding of state programmes in the region. There are no special headings devoted to conflict prevention and resolution in the state budget of the Russian Federation, apart from the one on the resolution of economic problems in the Chechen Republic. The federal budget's 'Chechen budget-line' has been used mainly to support the subsistence of the civil population, through pensions, salaries for teachers and doctors and child benefits. Additional resources for post-conflict reconstruction in Chechnya have been raised through imposing increased electricity, railway transportation, telephone tariffs and transfers from the special government reserve fund. The overall expenditure from federal resources on reconstruction works in Chechnya comprised about 1.5 billion roubles in 2000.

Some of the resources referred to above did not reach the war-torn territory owing to poor management and corruption. The first *federal programme on the reconstruction of the Chechen Republic* was only approved in August 2000. About 20 federal ministries were involved in the implementation of the programme and all their activities are supervised by the Governmental Commission on the restoration of the social sphere and the economy of the Chechen Republic (established in August 2000 and chaired by the Deputy Head of the Government). In November 2000, a special cabinet position responsible for Chechnya was established. On 25 January 2001, the Russian government approved a new "Federal programme on restoration of the economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic in 2001." The programme budget allocated 15 billion roubles for large-scale reconstruction work, from the building of transport communications, housing construction and the organisation of health and education systems, to the restoration of cultural and information institutions.

The *Supreme Court* and the *Constitutional Court* of the Russian Federation are among other federal power structures which can sometimes play a significant role in dealing with conflict situations. For example, the Constitutional Court considered cases such as the conflict over disputed territories between Ossetians and the Ingush in 1993 and the case of the infringement of the election rights of the Ingush refugees, during the elections in North Ossetia in 1995. In 1993, the Constitutional Court managed to settle a conflict between the Supreme Soviet of the Kabardin-Balkar Republic and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation over the law on judges that was passed in the Kabardin-Balkar Republic.

In 1998, the *Ministry of Internal Affairs*, the *Federal Security Service* and the *Russian Tax Police* launched large scale co-ordinated operations

to clamp down on organised crime. A number of inter-agency task forces were created at the request of the regional and local authorities. For example, in Daghestan under the supervision of V. Kolesnikov, the former Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs, such groups were working actively in co-operation with the republican law enforcement bodies. These operations resulted in the filing of dozens of criminal law suits and the arrest for corruption of a number of highly placed officials.

### 3.2

#### Pan-regional Structures

6 The Soviet (Council) on People's Economy, an administrative and economic pan-regional administration.

During the Soviet and post-Soviet period, there were no administrative structures that were responsible for the whole geographical area of the North Caucasus. Exceptions to this are the short period of the "North Caucasian krai" administration (in the inter-war period) and the North Caucasian *Sovnarhoz*<sup>6</sup> (1950–60s). At present, the only surviving element of pan-regional administration is the principle of regionally based economic planning. According to this, the North Caucasus is regarded as a separate economic area. This sub-division, however, exists only for the purposes of strategic territorial development planning and for statistical purposes.

#### North Caucasus Association

In 1990, an association for socio-economic co-operation between the republics, *krais*, and *oblasts* of the North Caucasus was created. It is referred to as the North Caucasus Association and includes the region of Kalmykia. From the viewpoint of the federal centre, this Association performs the function of expressing the interests of the North Caucasian regions to the federal power structures, serving also as a channel to communicate federal interests in the North Caucasus. In its current state, however, it is unable to play an active role because of a lack of effective leverage and due to the contradictions between the heads of the local federal agencies, especially between what are termed the 'Russian' and 'non-Russian' or 'national' regions.

The Executive Director of the North Caucasus Association stated in an interview at the headquarters of the Association, in Rostov-on-Don on 7 September 1999, that a robust approach was needed, aiming at going "beyond economics" and including in its priorities "bringing peace to the North Caucasus through economic means." The Association developed a number of regional programmes on transportation, energy resources and food production, in which ways of generating employment and investment are viewed as the main strategies for preventing conflicts. Members of the North Caucasus Association participated, together with the Northern Caucasus Centre of Higher Education, in a State Programme on Socio-Economic Development in the North Caucasus. The Northern Caucasus Centre of Higher Education is also based in Rostov-on-Don. Both institutions were official government contractors for developing this programme. The draft Programme includes serious proposals, not only on economic, but also on socio-cultural and institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention in the region.

Pan-regional or supra-regional structures exist only at the federal level and exclusively within the 'coercive agencies.' The Defence Min-

istry, for example, includes a North Caucasian military *okrug* (military territorial division). The Ministry of Internal Affairs also has a North Caucasian *okrug*. The Attorney-General and the Prosecutor's Office also include a territorial unit that encompasses the whole of the North Caucasus. The Minfederatsii created a territorial unit for the North Caucasus in 1996. The office of the territorial unit is located in Rostov-on-Don and has four staff members.

### **Presidential Representatives**

The Representatives of the President of the Russian Federation are another supra-regional institution which is playing an increasingly important role in the North Caucasus. This is a network introduced from 1991 when presidential representatives were appointed in the Krasnodar and Stavropol *krais* and in the Rostov-on-Don *oblast*. During the crisis in the Kabardin-Balkar and Chechen-Ingush Republics in 1992, attempts were also made to appoint such representatives. However, the positions of the presidential representatives were abolished after the heads of these republics were elected and the situation became more stable.

### **Temporary Committee**

A similar federal conflict prevention instrument was identified after the settlement of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in autumn 1992. A temporary administration was created on the territory of the two republics where a state of emergency had been declared. This temporary power structure was transformed into the Temporary State Committee on the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict in 1995. This committee is part of the federal government and its chairman used to be a member of the government. In September 1996, the Temporary Committee was abolished and an office of the presidential representative in North Ossetia and Ingushetia was set up.

The most serious change for the system of governance in the region came with the administrative reform by (then) Prime Minister Putin, in which the country's territory was divided into seven federal districts. Ten administrative units in the North Caucasus, together with the Republic of Kalmykia, and the Astrakhan and Volgograd *oblasts* formed a new South Russian federal district (*okrug*). Strengthening federal rule and centre-periphery relations, observance of national law and peace-enforcement are among the principal responsibilities of this new institution. After one year of activity, in May 2001, President Putin evaluated its activities as 'positive in general' but the efficiency of this reform is still unclear.

## **3.3**

### **Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

According to a Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main body co-ordinating government policy towards the countries of the South Caucasus. As far as the North Caucasus is concerned, only one department — on relations with the members of the federation — has a mandate to deal with the foreign policy implications of internal issues. All other governmental bodies and regional authorities are obliged to liaise with this ministry on relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

**Relations with  
CIS countries**

The Deputy Foreign Minister oversees all the work on CIS countries. The four departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for relations with CIS countries are:

- First Department (general and multilateral co-operation);
- Second Department (Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine);
- Third Department (Central Asian states); and
- Fourth Department (South Caucasus states).

The Fourth CIS Department has a staff of 43 people, including special envoys assigned to specific conflicts. This Department also has a Regional Conflict Unit with four staff members, whose activities are covered by the general budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there is no research or analysis division within the department nor a budget available to commission such activities. A separate unit, the “Department of Foreign Policy Planning and Prognosis” is in charge of all analytical work.

The Fourth CIS Department has immediate responsibility for the implementation of foreign policy in the South Caucasus, including conflict resolution and prevention. For example, staff from the Department were actively involved in negotiations on the extension of the mandate, achieved in August 1999, for the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia. The Department played an important role in resolving the issues on border relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, namely the limitations on border crossings adopted four years ago and gradually lifted afterwards (with the exception of the Abkhaz part of the Russian-Georgian border along the Psou river). Before the current outbreak of war in Chechnya, Russia’s recent announcement that controls on part of the border would be relaxed caused dissatisfaction in Georgia, where people considered this to be a move to reward the separatists. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Russian Federation would observe the decisions reached at the CIS summit of 19 January 1996. This decision includes a ban on the supply of arms and munitions to Abkhazia as well as limiting trade and official contacts with Abkhazia.

**Specific Policies**

As far as Nagorno-Karabakh is concerned, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to support direct contact between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Ministry is prepared to mediate with the Minsk group on the basis of the results of the dialogue between the heads of the two states.

The position of the Ministry on the Caspian problem and the oil transportation routes include the following approaches:

- defining the status of the Caspian Sea in respect of international law and mutual interests;
- supporting environmentally sustainable development of the resources in the Caspian region to ensure that the ecological system is not irreversibly damaged;

## 4

## Conflict Prevention Capacities in the North Caucasus

- a more careful assessment of the Transcaspian gas pipeline project and the project of the Baku-Jeyhan oil pipeline (considering the seismically active zone); and
- multilateral approaches to the development of land transportation with a focus on unifying different projects (including TRACECA).

The government of the Russian Federation appears to acknowledge the special status of the North Caucasus, as a region with a difficult socio-economic situation and ongoing armed conflict. As mentioned above, the region is treated as a localised threat to the national interests of the country, including the threat to territorial integrity from Chechen separatism and international armed extremism. In 1998–1999, the Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy (*Minfederatsii*), elaborated a *Concept Paper on State Nationalities Policy in the North Caucasus*. This paper was discussed in a session of the Russian government and was endorsed by the President.

The aims of policy on the North Caucasus are as follows:

- the maintenance and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, its national security, constitutional rights and the freedoms of the citizens and peoples of the region;
- defining the main policy priorities and directions for the federal and local North Caucasian bodies of state power on managing the complex ethno-political situation in the region; and
- development of federal and ethnic relations in the region, taking into consideration local characteristics and ensuring that proper conditions are created for the social and cultural development of the North Caucasian peoples.

The Concept Paper describes the following principles for state policy in the North Caucasus:

- 1 maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;
- 2 improvement of federal relations with regard to the ethnic characteristics and traditions of the North Caucasian peoples;
- 3 defence of human rights, regardless of nationality and ethnicity, which will create conditions for the preservation of ethnic diversity within the North Caucasian population, and help free the ethno-cultural development of all the peoples living in the North Caucasus;
- 4 prevention of attempts to resolve inter-ethnic disputes by the use of force, as well as of propaganda fuelling such conflicts;
- 5 support for tolerance of religious, cultural and linguistic differences; development of dialogue between ethnic, religious and cultural groups and between individuals;
- 6 strengthening and development of ties between all administrative subjects in North Caucasus; and
- 7 implementing countervailing measures against any attempts by external state actors to use the ethnic diversity of the region to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation.

## **Problem Areas and Tasks for Conflict Management**

The Concept Paper highlights conflict situations in the region and suggests the following mechanisms for conflict management and prevention, linked to existing capacities based on past experience and a planned reallocation of resources:

### *1. Divided Peoples*

- Facilitate negotiations with Azerbaijan and Georgia on procedures for border crossings for ethnically related peoples;
- help determine the status of the border zones and border co-operation;
- develop mutual programmes in the field of education, culture, languages, publishing and information dissemination as well as protection of the rights of minorities.

### *2. Refugees, IDPs and Forced Migrants*

- Development of the federal programme on settlement and employment for refugees, IDPs and forced migrants in the North Caucasus, including the utilisation of sources not funded by the state, such as Russian and international non-governmental organisations;
- creation of legal and financial conditions for the realisation of entrepreneurial initiatives in developing the job market for refugees and migrants in accordance with prioritised spheres of activities; and
- creation of a legal framework to regulate the immigration of citizens of the CIS to Russia.

### *3. The Ethnic Russian Population*

- Implementation of a system to reduce the emigration of Russians from the regions, including arrangements to ensure representation in power-sharing structures, access to employment and higher education; and
- more rigorous observation of laws against ethnic discrimination.

### *4. 'Formerly Repressed' Peoples and the Cossacks*

- Implementation of the law on the rehabilitation of 'formerly repressed' peoples;
- special programme for the cultural revival of formerly repressed peoples, with particular attention to the revival of local languages;
- support for local students, educational establishments, and national intelligentsia, including the admission of members of repressed populations to institutions of higher education; and
- facilitation of the positive potential of the Cossacks; measures against Cossack ethnocentrism.

### *5. Overcoming the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict*

- Implementation of the Russian government's decisions (decree N274 of 6 March 1998) on state assistance to Russian citizens who lost their homes as a result of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict;
- ensuring refugees' rights to freedom of movement and residence; and
- implementation of the regulation and co-operation treaty of 4 September 1997 between the Republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, as

well as the joint programme of action for postconflict peace-building, adopted on 15 October 1997.

#### **6. Regulation of the Situation in the Chechen Republic**

- Implement confidence-building measures and develop realistic solutions for the resolution of the Chechen Republic's vitally important problems;
- implementation of agreements on the payment of pensions and benefits;
- restoration of the economic and social sphere;
- demilitarisation;
- strengthening of law enforcement;
- fighting crime and the protection of human rights and freedoms in the Chechen Republic;
- the freeing of illegally detained persons or hostages (both military and civilian); and
- involvement of representatives of other North Caucasian authorities, local political and religious leaders, ethnic and social movements, and the representatives of the Chechen diaspora in the negotiation process.

## **4.1**

### **Policy Directions**

The Concept Paper includes a number of objectives that are intended to strengthen and develop federal relations in the region. It focuses primarily on the importance of the efficient use of political and legal instruments on the basis of Russian law, the Constitution and the laws of the North Caucasian members of the Russian Federation. In order to realise this task, the Concept Paper includes suggestions for the following measures:

- 1** to correct and update federal and regional legal frameworks, and to regulate power-sharing between the federal centre and the North Caucasian states of the Russian Federation;
- 2** to arrange meetings between the federal authorities at the highest level and the authorities of the North Caucasian states; and
- 3** to conduct an analysis of the political and legal basis of the relations between the federal centre and the North Caucasian states of the Russian Federation.

Another important policy direction is support for small ethnic groups and minorities in accord with the law on national-cultural autonomy of 1996. The law states that social organisations created by ethnic minorities or small groups may represent these minorities in their interaction with the federal government and legislative bodies, particularly for the protection of their cultural rights and needs.

The Russian government and law enforcement bodies acknowledge the lack of a clearly defined and effectively functioning mechanism for decision-making and action in the present federal policy in the North Caucasian region. Existing federal structures often duplicate their responsibilities. Instruments for interaction with the regional authorities are also quite weak. Political parties and social organisations are clearly underestimated and underused as possible management resources, particularly in terms of conflict prevention and resolution.



The Concept Paper outlines the following measures for conflict resolution and prevention:

A more active and effective utilisation of conflict prevention and conflict resolution instruments such as people's diplomacy (meetings and councils of elders, women's and youth organisations, and ethnic, religious and other non-governmental organisations). Such meetings, in forms such as the North Caucasian Round Table, should be organised regularly.

The creation of a state system to monitor the ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus, which would work in close co-operation with academic and social organisations. Such a system, once provided with the necessary financial, informational and technical support, could perform the functions of early warning and forecast of possible conflicts, formulation and implementation of urgent response measures for conflict prevention, using all the resources available, including co-operation with the mass media. This system should function in close co-operation with power structures at all levels.

In the summer of 1999, serious aggravation of the situation in Daghestan and generally in the North Caucasus impeded the adoption of this new Russian federal policy in the North Caucasus. The character of the new violent conflict and the spread of terrorism beyond the territory of Chechnya have led to significant changes in federal and regional policy towards the region. The use of military force and tough political pressure has moved to the foreground of Russian federal policy in the North Caucasus.

## 5

### **Analysis of Conflict Prevention Capacities**

The activities of inter-agency commissions are based on the informational, organisational and financial support of the participating ministries and other governmental units. However, a number of agencies are not sufficiently resourced, both financially and in terms of ensuring access to high quality analytical information and organisational technologies.

The institutions with decision-making powers regarding the Caucasus region are the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in relation to the Transcaucasus region). As far as conflict prevention and conflict resolution are concerned, the Administration of the President (informally) and the Security Council (officially) play a key role in this process. However, their decisions only become binding if endorsed by the Presidential Decrees for which they provide the substance. It is critical, therefore, to identify where and how these federal bodies may draw from available external expertise to strengthen their capacities for a more pro-active approach to conflict prevention.

## 5.1

### Entry Points for Co-operation

Within the framework of available open sources of information for the study, the following issues were analysed to determine the potential for co-operation of external actors:

- models of early warning and prevention of conflict currently in place;
- decision-making systems and organisational principles;
- information processing technologies and telecomm background;
- possible opportunities and willingness for resource-sharing;
- predictive capacity and previous successes in early warning;
- failures in early warning;
- deficiencies of organisational structure and in information flows (possible impediments);
- characteristics of inter-organisational and inter-personal relations; and
- relations with external political actors and the media.

The potential for co-operation in the following new directions has also been analysed:

- public outreach strategies (consistency and contributions for television programmes, radio broadcasts, newspaper articles based on focused and profile interviews, newsletter dissemination among third-sector organisations, workshops, press-conferences, public hearings, etc.);
- conflict prevention projects organised jointly with local, national and international businesses (stake-holders in regional disputes of all kinds);
- development of educational programmes and curricula to positively influence the situation on a longer-term basis and create “multiplier” and “replication” effects, by means such as training of trainers;
- internet dissemination and “virtual diplomacy” (especially through the creation of resource packs and conflict-relevant databases available on-line, reflecting pro-active approaches to conflict resolution); and
- policy relevant academic research (basic and applied) and specially commissioned expert assessments and studies.

Despite the geopolitical rivalries and the struggle among state actors for influence in the Caucasus, the role of geopolitics should not, as such, be overestimated. It represents only one side of the complex interaction of the interests of numerous stakeholders, including internal actors and the corporate sector. The actions of some critical actors do not seem to be controlled by any states at all. Terrorism, trafficking in drugs and weapons, as well as other forms of dangerous criminal activity are becoming increasingly internationalised in the region.

### Inter-agency Co-operation

Different agencies at the Russian federal level are responding to these challenges by developing a coherent and co-ordinated inter-agency co-operation strategy. The main elements of this strategy are as follows:

- creation and provision of incentives for foreign capital investments in the North Caucasus in such areas as pipeline construction, oil refineries, Russian Caspian oil resource development, the reconstruction and development of Russian sea ports in the Black and Caspian seas, the elaboration of new mechanisms for state guarantees for investment;
- activation of Russia’s participation in TRACECA with maximum utilisation of the transit potential of the southern Russian territories; de-

velopment of the local transportation, communication and tourism infrastructure;

- promotion of projects additional to TRACECA, or as part of TRACECA, on the development of new transit routes on Russian territory; and
- inclusion of the southern Russian territories in development projects within the framework of the Black sea co-operation schemes.

## **Inter-state Relations**

The following aspects in inter-state relations are considered to be of major significance:

- revival of a close partnership with Georgia, avoiding any kind of interference in Georgia's internal affairs or economic pressure motivated by perceived political threats;
- re-activation of the efforts directed towards the final settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict;
- assistance to the Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue with one of the main interim goals being to reach an agreement on the re-opening of the North-South transportation routes through the territory of Abkhazia;
- regulation of the remaining border problems with Georgia and Azerbaijan, enforcement of effective borders and security co-operation with these countries (especially on their northern borders);
- further strengthening of Russian-Armenian ties, especially at the level of interaction with different political groups beyond the official political elites; and
- development of the dialogue with the South Caucasian countries on a non-governmental level.

An important priority of the Russian government is to institutionalise political dialogue with Turkey, creating a permanent consultation framework. The aim is to establish a mutual strategic understanding that would bring benefits for both countries. A prospective consultation framework is envisaged as a fairly inclusive inter-agency initiative with regular dialogue between the army general headquarters of the two countries. Simultaneously, a more regular political exchange is to be promoted with Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

These measures constitute a complex new policy direction, aimed at establishing peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation with the Islamic countries and overcoming past misunderstandings. An example is the exchange with the Islamic Conference.

## **5.2**

### **Synergy with External Non-governmental Actors**

By its very nature, conflict early warning and prevention is connected by a web of political interests, which may seriously affect the realisation of any initiatives in the field. Differing and at times antagonistic attitudes on the part of various regional actors to critical issues should be taken into account, as well as a number of sensitivities in dealing with the federal and local government.

More importantly, the Russian government is particularly sensitive to any exclusive alliance-building in the North Caucasus even in the non-governmental sphere. The initiative on pan-Caucasian dialogue and co-operation at the level of civil society institutions should include the NGOs from what are known as the 'Russian' and Cossack regions

(such as Stavropol, Rostov) that are considered part of the North Caucasus. It is important to facilitate bridge-building, in the case of existing inter-state, inter-ethnic and inter-group divisions, by widening the representation of different groups in policy formulation. This approach also relates to the co-operation projects in the South Caucasian region and throughout the Southern Tier.

In the North Caucasus, the Russian government has been co-operating with almost 40 local and international NGOs<sup>7</sup> working in the region providing assistance to the populations suffering from existing conflicts, primarily the war in Chechnya. This co-operation concerned the following sectors: food aid, shelter and relief, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education, psychological support, mine awareness and protection, housing and some others. The NGO co-operation scheme is regulated by agreements (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding on Humanitarian Action in the Northern Caucasus) signed by the Russian government through the Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, with the UN (under the general co-ordination of the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs from the UN side). Key federal agencies responsible for NGO co-operation are the Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and the Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters (lead agency), the Federal Security Service (responsible for ensuring the security of personnel), the Minister for Affairs relating to the Reconstruction of the Chechen Republic and other relevant ministries in the economic sector. Humanitarian co-operation in the North Caucasus has been funded through the UN Inter-Agency Appeals (over \$45m. in 1999–2000) and from other sources outside the UN Appeals (approximately \$39m.).<sup>8</sup> The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has received no funding during this period for its development activities in the North Caucasus, despite the fact that job-creation schemes, for example, have been identified by a number of NGOs as the key conflict prevention tool in the region.

The co-operation between the Russian government and international NGOs in the sphere of prevention is, however, very limited. A number of attempts by international NGOs to enter into a working partnership with relevant federal ministries on issues of dispute settlement, conflict early warning and prevention, and early response to crises have so far been rejected due to unwillingness to allow external actors to intervene in what has traditionally been seen as a prerogative of exclusively governmental structures and local authorities. In the past two years however, an increased interest was noted among key federal actors such as Minfederaltsii, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and some other agencies, in receiving independent situation analyses from the North Caucasus. These agencies are also prepared to engage in informal roundtable processes aimed at identifying tools and elaborating policy options for conflict prevention and increasing the validity of humanitarian preparedness scenarios.

At the level of the local and regional authorities, where the need for co-operation and external expertise is probably the greatest, the

<sup>7</sup> The most active International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations include: ACF, BIF, Care International, CARITAS, CPCD, DDG /DCA, DRC, Hammer Forum e.v., HCC, Help e.v., Hilfswerk Austria, ICRC, IMC, IRC, Islamic Relief, NRC, MDM, MSF, PHO, PINF, Salvation Army, World Vision and other organisations.

<sup>8</sup> Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit, Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation), March 2001, prepared by OCHA, Russian Federation.

potential for direct engagement on the part of international NGOs is virtually unexplored. Research findings show that, apart from UN agencies, only three international NGOs have successfully managed to enter into information sharing and co-operation schemes at this level.

An analysis of the existing web of political interests influencing government-NGO ties, appears to be a subject for a more in-depth assessment. However, the following operational methods and distinctive attitudinal features may be singled out as of particular importance to the non-governmental actors.

### **Catalysing Factors**

- Powerful interests to facilitate the utilisation of external sources of emergency relief, developmental assistance and humanitarian aid;
- a demand and interest among middle ranking officials at regional and federal level in receiving external assistance in early warning, conflict prevention and conflict resolution technologies;
- a willingness to accept representatives of the local ethnic groups, acting as independent experts affiliated with international organisations, with trust and acknowledgement of their ability to provide local knowledge about specific features of the situation on the ground; and
- existing openness to assimilating networking management techniques and transfer of expertise between the international and local level.

### **Impediments**

- The response measures are almost always limited to institution-building (the creation of new commissions and re-definition of the status of the existing ones). There is a lack of standard procedures for early action, based on previous experience and retrospective studies. Strategy development is not sufficiently systematic and well-informed and as a result there are a large number of erratic and inconsistent decisions made under pressure of time.
- The inter-agency commissions lack a mechanism for ensuring sufficient funding and access to budget-lines if a crisis situation unfolds quickly, but does not constitute a large scale disaster with implications for national security. In this event, the inter-agency commissions can only suggest that the appropriate expenditure is budgeted for the following financial year.
- A lack of efficiency in the information management system, aggravated by a strong hierarchical structure, a lack of bottom-up input and dependency on a decision-making procedure strongly affected by the personalities of decision makers.
- Low status for analysis and recommendations produced by experts commissioned by government bodies, coupled with low remuneration.
- Relatively protracted response times to warnings (over 6 months).

The following policy areas have been identified as having great potential for possible co-operation with external actors, such as international organisations, academic institutions and local NGOs.

### **Refugees, IDPs and Forced Migrants**

- Increasing preparedness for humanitarian disaster in the North Caucasus, which could be caused by the re-emergence of violent conflicts;

- tackling longer term and structural problems by such instruments as job-creation schemes and community development projects; and
- utilisation of non-state funding sources such as Russian and international non-governmental organisations; creation of the legal and financial conditions for entrepreneurial initiatives, which develop the job market for refugees.

#### **Promoting Tolerance**

- Development of dialogue between peoples, ethnic, religious and cultural groups and between individuals; and
- co-operation in developing a range of awareness raising measures.

#### **Promoting “People’s Diplomacy”**

- Meetings and councils of elders, women and youth organisations, ethnic, religious and other non-governmental organisations;
- regular organisation of such meetings in the form of the North Caucasian Round Table; transfer of expertise in facilitating meetings and implementing confidence building measures; and
- fund-raising for local NGOs engaged in post-settlement peace-building, conflict resolution, conflict prevention and early warning.

#### **Monitoring the Ethno-political Situation**

Creation of an integrated state system for monitoring the ethno-political situation.

- This requires working in close co-operation with academic and social organisations in the Caucasus;
- this system, provided with the necessary financial, informational and technical support, could provide early warning and prognoses of possible conflicts, formulation and implementation of urgent response measures for conflict prevention, using all the resources available to the state and civil society, including co-operation with the mass media; and
- this system should function in close co-operation with power structures at all levels; involve transfer of expertise in the development of early warning and monitoring systems, training of experts in networking technologies, reporting formats, models of conflict and peace indicators; quantitative methodologies (such as computer-based models), information exchange and corroboration assistance (such as access to the international news-wire analysis, www-based databases).

#### **Research Programmes on Conflict Factors**

- It is necessary to develop research programmes that would tackle structural conflict-generating factors and identify the longer term opportunities for sustainable peace;
- independent external expertise is required to complement the efforts of the experts commissioned by the government; and
- external fund-raising efforts should be undertaken to ensure that in-depth and adequately-resourced research is successfully carried out and reliable policy recommendations are elaborated.

## 6

## Policy Recommendations

The preceding analysis suggests a number of important policy recommendations.

- *The Russian government should consider the possibility of the creation of a permanent consultation framework.*

The overall objective of such a framework would be to utilise available external expertise and financial resources, particularly at the international level. This consultation framework would help to identify the mechanisms and instruments for a rapid response to humanitarian crisis and potential conflict situations in the Caucasus. A list of international and regional non-governmental organisations that can become part of such a consultation framework should be drawn up and working consultations initiated as part of the rapid response to possible new crises in the Caucasus.

- *The Russian government should co-operate in awareness-raising through press and television with local, regional and international non-governmental organisations and academic institutions.*

The range of critical issues that need to be made part of the awareness raising programme include: (a) inter-ethnic tolerance and respect; (b) stability and peace as pre-requisites to economic development and well-being; (c) the dividends of peaceful co-existence vs. the costs of conflict; and (d) ethno-cultural autonomy and cultural exchange as a peaceful alternative to aggressive separatism and extremism.

- *Russian foreign policy agencies should pay more attention to developing multi-level exchanges with Turkey.*

Such an exchange could take the form of building an inter-agency consultation framework with governmental, corporate and civil society actors in this country. The first step in this direction is to engage in 'Track One' initiatives on regional security and the Chechen crisis.

- *Russian governmental agencies should consider the widening of the border co-operation framework now in place.*

Border security issues currently under discussion with Georgia and Azerbaijan could be included in the overall border security agenda. This may be regarded as a first step for productive inter-state co-operation in the South Caucasus, including the Georgia-Abkhaz issue. In this context, it is also necessary to develop a co-operation and consultation process with the European Union and the Council of Europe.

- *An integrated North and South Caucasus early warning and early response system should be created, based on co-operation between non-governmental monitors and the local as well as the federal and regional state authorities.*

The creation of this network is already underway, but it may be optimised and accelerated if such agencies as UN OCHA, UNHCR, the Norwegian and Danish Refugee Councils, as well as other major interna-

tional organisations involved in the Caucasus, combine their resources, drawing on the existing local capacities for early warning and response. It is feasible that an integrated early warning and response system in the Caucasus would have direct access to national and local television channels, providing a permanent source of independent analytical information to a wide audience.



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**7**

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**Addresses for the  
Government of the  
Russian Federation*****Security Council of the Russian Federation***

Office of the Secretary: Ipatievsky Pereulok 4, Entrance 6, 101000 Moscow

***Administration of the President***

Office of the Head of Administration: Staraya Ploshad 4, 103132, Moscow

***Representative of the President in the North Caucasus  
Federal District***

Office of the Representative: Bolshaya Sadovaya 73, 344006 Rostov-on-Don

***Ministry of Foreign Affairs***

Office of the Minister: Smolenskaya Sennaya 32/34 121200, Moscow

***Federal Security Service/Center for Public Relations***

Office of the Director: Kuznetsky Most 22, 101000 Moscow

***Federal Assembly/Council of Federation***

Office of the Chairman: Bolshaya Dmitrovka 26a, 104246 Moscow

***Federal Assembly/State Duma***

Office of the Vice-Speaker: Okhotny Ryad 1, 103265 Moscow

***Government of the Russian Federation***

Office of the Chairman of the Government:  
Krasnopresenskaya Naberezhnaya 2, 103274 Moscow

***Ministry of Internal Affairs***

Office of the Minister: Zhitnaya 16, 117049 Moscow

***Ministry of Defence***

Office of the Minister: Myasnitskaya 37, 101000 Moscow

***Ministry for Economic Development and Trade***

Office of the Minister: GSP A-47 Tverskaya-Yamskaya 1/3, 125818 Moscow

# The Conflict Prevention Capacities of the United States Government in the Caucasus

*Michael Lund*

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## I

### Introduction

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#### I.1

##### Context

**W**HEN THE BREAK-UP OF the Soviet Union resulted in the sudden independence of many of the republics that had comprised it, many aspects of these new states' very essence were rapidly and simultaneously made highly uncertain and changing. These features included their basic forms of governance, political leaders, economic policies, trade links, territorial boundaries, and inter-state military and political alliances. As in several other regions, in the republics of the Caucasus, the suspicions, mistreatment, and competition for power among ethnic groups as well as among the republics – which formerly had been regulated if not resolved under Soviet and communist party rule – created a number of actual or potential violent intra-state and inter-state civil conflicts. In particular, three violent conflicts erupted over quests for self-determination in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Currently, the region faces new threats from these arrested but unresolved conflicts, as well as from other tensions within these new states and between them, including the spillover effects of the renewed war in Chechnya.

Moreover, because of the increasing importance of issues such as access to the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the region has become more vulnerable to geopolitical pressures and rivalries emanating from the more powerful states of Russia, the US, Iran, and Turkey. Thus, a major issue arising is whether these states can avoid making the Caucasus into even more of an arena of competition or instead, can work out an understanding which allows the new states of the Caucasus to flourish more independently.

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## I.2

### Purpose of this Report

The EastWest Institute (EWI), and the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), seek to provide sound assessments of situations of potential violent conflict in various regions and to offer recommendations about preventive actions that are likely to be effective. Offered recommendations for action need to be not only effective but also realistic in view of the interests and capacities of the actors being addressed. This report seeks to help inform the future recommendations of EWI, FEWER and other organisations with regard to possible conflicts in the South Caucasus through an examination of the concrete capacities for conflict prevention and resolution of one international actor whose policies are becoming increasingly important and can make a significant difference in that region, the United States (us) government. The specific geographic area that is the focus of this study is the South Caucasus region, comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. By providing information about many us government programmes, both explicitly or potentially relevant to conflict prevention, the report seeks to enable EWI and the FEWER network to recommend persuasive policy options that speak more directly to the interests and avowed goals of the us government in the region and also to enable local NGOs and governments in the region to engage more knowledgeably and effectively with specific us agencies.

In particular, this report identifies us operations and personnel that might be targeted for receiving EWI and FEWER assessments and recommendations in order to motivate them to take concrete steps to prevent possible conflicts. This report first outlines current us interests and policy goals in the Caucasus and the us government's overall decision-making structure affecting this region. It then describes major programmes and initiatives that the us Department of State (DOS), Agency for International Development (AID), and Department of Defense, operate toward the South Caucasus region as a whole and in the three countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Other major development donors to particular countries and major us non-profit or profit-making contracting organisations are also listed.

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## I.3

### Scope

Because of the us government's comparatively large size and the interests it maintains in virtually every region of the world, its activities in the South Caucasus are carried out by a large number of agencies, as well as by many non-governmental organisations that are funded by these agencies. The us agencies that may affect conflict prevention and resolution in the region include not only the three main Cabinet departments of the Department of State, Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense, but also the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Energy, and Agriculture, the us Information Agency (USIA), and the independent federal agencies known as the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The us Congress should also be listed, since it often shapes specific us policies and the budget resources directed to the region. One could also include non-federal us government activities in the

**Agencies and  
Activities**

Caucasus, such as those of individual us states. Although they are not part of the us Government, the us Government is also a major influence on international financial and other inter-governmental organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the UN Security Council, which have a vital impact on the region.

Despite these many manifestations of us governmental involvement in the South Caucasus, however, the limits on this study did not permit an exhaustive inventory and the report should not be considered as comprehensive. Instead, it concentrates on the three cabinet-level executive us agencies that are most active in the region, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense.

Even with respect to these three us agencies, the question remains as to which of their programmes should be included as conflict prevention capacities. To clarify this, the notion of conflict prevention guiding the report needs explanation. Broadly speaking, conflict prevention is usually defined as any activity that may help to prevent potentially new violent conflicts from erupting or escalating from low levels of violence, to keep waning violent conflicts from re-erupting, and to contain active conflicts from spreading to new sites. This includes the creation or strengthening of a society's capacities to address disputes in ways that result in their non-violent resolution.

The most obvious us activities that fit this definition are the official diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives that have been taken in direct response to the armed conflicts that have already escalated to the use of armed force, such as in Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. An example is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by the us, Russia and France, which conducts direct diplomatic intervention into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and thus contact with those who may have the power to control it. Many more non-official initiatives taken toward these conflicts, such as low-key political dialogues, are also carried out by various non-governmental organisations and frequently funded by one or more us or other government agency. Together, these explicit initiatives with respect to the manifestations of possible or actual violent conflicts are referred to as “direct,” “operational,” or “light” prevention.

However, both these types of activities comprise a relatively small proportion of the us government activity in the South Caucasus. In surveying us government policies and programmes in the Caucasus (and undoubtedly in other regions as well), it becomes immediately obvious that the vast bulk of us programmes make little or no reference specifically to preventing the emergence of violent conflicts. Most of these activities are not described in terms that are directly relevant to conflict prevention objectives – although they may refer to the broad purposes of maintaining security and preserving peace. Instead, programmes state their purposes as development, economic and political reform, good governance, humanitarian aid, trade, public health, education, and so on – an array of objectives that are familiar to ob-

servers of the post-Cold War policies of many Western governments in developing and transitional societies. These programmes are in their separate ways seeking to create or strengthen the elements needed to operate a modern democratic state and civil society. USAID, under its new leadership, has begun to address conflict prevention as a strategic goal and this is discussed further below in part 5 of this chapter.

Yet many of the pervasive conditions that these goals are addressed to, such as poverty and corruption, can result in violent conflicts if particular elements in a society or government are sufficiently mobilised to act on grievances arising from these conditions by engaging in violent or other coercive behaviour. Hence, the programmes with the objectives that deal with underlying sources of potential conflict can be considered as possible ways to prevent emerging violent conflicts and have been referred to as “structural” or “deep” prevention. Consequently, the report includes such programmes within its scope by including them as possible US capacities for conflict prevention.

## Policy Instruments

This inclusive notion of the means of conflict prevention is consistent with a widely-shared assumption regarding what particular policy instruments should be included under conflict prevention. That assumption holds that virtually all programmes, projects, and actions of a government in a locale that is vulnerable to conflict can have a direct or indirect effect on the level of conflict. Although a few international actors run programmes and projects that are explicitly and exclusively devoted to conflict prevention, such as the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities, the notion of conflict prevention that is now generally accepted by the European Union, the World Bank, and other international entities does not restrict it to such discrete programmes with organisational embodiments and staffs that are operationally distinct from programmes in policy sectors with other names and objectives. Instead, conflict prevention goals and criteria can and ought to be applied, at least in principle, to almost any activity of an actor that has significant consequences for a society and its economy and politics.

In sum, the report describes a wide variety of US programmes that operate in many policy sectors and which — depending on how, when and where they are implemented — may have positive or negative impacts on the prevention of violent conflicts. The ways in which these many differing programmes and sets of programmes, whether they are direct or structural prevention, specifically affect the dynamics and sources of conflicts are only beginning to be studied and documented. Expanding the knowledge of how particular kinds of preventive interventions can actually be effective is one of the most important next steps that EWI, FEWER and other organisations concerned with violent conflicts are beginning to take. Even though the development of such a knowledge base for the field is at this relatively early stage, it would be a mistake to exclude these many existing programmes from a survey of conflict prevention capacity simply because their exact intersections with the phenomenon of conflict are not yet very well understood.

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## 2

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### US Government Activities in the South Caucasus

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#### 2.1

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##### Interests and Policy Goals

In the dawning years of the post-Cold War era, the us government was pre-occupied with concerns in other regions such as the Middle East, the Gulf, and Russia itself. Its main concern with respect to the latter and the other nuclear states in the area were and continue to be to ensure the secure reduction and non-proliferation of the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and the peaceful disposition of the scientific expertise that was employed to develop and manage them. Consequently, the us did not take an active interest in the Caucasus region specifically and tended to regard it as lying within a Russian sphere of influence that implicitly accepted the Russian notion of the so-called “near-abroad.” As the 1990s unfolded, however, several factors led the us to increasingly develop a more explicit set of goals and policies toward the Caucasus and to build bilateral relations with each of the three independent governments there.

The outbreak of ethnic conflicts in the region in 1992 led to the humanitarian and diplomatic involvement of several international actors such as the United Nations (UN), the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and European governments, as well as Russia, which had played a role in supporting various sides in these conflicts. In part because of its membership and obligations to these organisations as well as its distinct diplomatic interests, the us was forced to take a greater interest in alleviating and resolving these conflicts, and to become more concerned about Russia’s intentions in the region. us domestic interest groups such as Armenian-Americans also took an active interest in their ethnic brethren in the region. More recently, growing evidence that the Caspian Sea and its environs may represent a huge potential alternative source of oil to the Middle East for Western energy needs has greatly increased us government attention to the Caucasus and the Central Asian states to the east, as spokesmen for us oil companies have lobbied to take advantage of these opportunities. Although a route through Iran is estimated to be the most economical way to transport oil from the Caspian reserves, the us favours a route that would begin at Baku, transit through Georgia and much of Turkey before exiting at the port of Ceyhan.

Thus, the main interests of the us in the region now include increasing regional stability and regional economic and political cooperation, preserving stable national political and economic climates for investment and diplomacy, maintaining a counterbalance in the region to the influence of Russia and Iran, promoting governments that are friendly to the West and the us in particular, and gaining some access to the region’s oil resources. By and large, the us has had the closest relations with Georgia and increasingly good relations with Azerbaijan,

while Armenia has continued to maintain relatively closer relations with Russia.

To pursue these overall interests, US policy goals in recent years have been to:

- achieve a more definitive resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, beyond the ceasefire signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1994, through negotiations that are being implemented by the OSCE;
- reduce poverty and unemployment, improve individual citizens' economic well-being, and advance general economic and social development, as well as create future markets for US goods and investment through promoting market-oriented economies, more open trade and increased foreign investment;
- avoid political instability by building more open, legitimate, democratic and effective governments; and
- achieve solutions to the inter-state rivalries and disputes that have emerged over the apportioning of the Caspian offshore oil reserves and over oil pipeline routes, in ways that provide US access and avoid a Russian monopoly of these resources.

## 2.2

### Decision Making

The articulation and implementation of these goals is supposed to be governed by a decision-making structure with the President and the National Security Council at its top. In principle, they are the leading decision makers with authority over the cabinet departments but have relatively little power over the independent agencies. In practice, however, except within the parameters determined by the US overall goals and the budget decided by Congress, the size of the US government and the variety of its many agencies and their sub-units defies the ability of any central decision maker to define a single set of coherent policy goals, establish clear priorities among them, and direct these many entities to follow a consistent and ordered strategy in the Caucasus region or its individual countries. Thus, contrasts between the influence exerted over Cabinet departments by the White House and the autonomy of an independent agency should not be exaggerated. US policy in the region is more aptly described as the combination of the particular agendas and programmes of the many US agencies and their contractors, as well as the private sector actors active in the region.

It follows that there is no explicit and integrated US policy toward conflict prevention and resolution in the Caucasus. Perhaps the closest thing to such a strategy is a set of implicit assumptions that underlie the array of US government activities. This is the theory that programmes such as economic reform to develop markets and economies and assistance for building democratic institutions and the rule of law are themselves the best antidotes against the emergence of violent conflicts. Although much research supports the presumption that in the long run, market economies and democracy enhance stability, it is not clear that simply promoting those goals is always effective in preventing the likelihood of violence to erupt, especially in national settings with weak states and highly divided societies. In such settings, peace and stability have not always followed from the introduction of such

programmes. In fact, the opposite result may occur from introduction of these programmes and actually has occurred. These links between market economies and democracy are widely and naively assumed to occur without question or close evaluation.

## 2.3

### Programmes


To pursue its goals, the US government mainly uses the policy tools of:

- foreign aid assistance and trade;
- diplomatic relations with individual countries and regional powers such as Russia and the Ukraine;
- US participation in two multilateral bodies in which it shares membership with states in and around the region—the United Nations and the OSCE; and
- military-to-military relations with some of the Caucasus countries in the region through bilateral programmes and NATO.

**Chart 2.1**

*US Department of State*

**Source:** [http://www.state.gov/www/dept/org\\_chart.html](http://www.state.gov/www/dept/org_chart.html)  
(as of 30 August 2001)





### 3

#### US State Department

In addition to the diplomatic relations it has with each government in the region, the US State Department carries out certain initiatives vis-à-vis the region as a whole. [See Chart 2.1.]

- *Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States (NIS).* This office is responsible for developing, co-ordinating and implementing US foreign policy in the twelve countries of Eurasia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Issues covered by the office in the New Independent States (NIS) are democracy, human rights, economic prosperity, environment, regional co-operation and conflict resolution, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and international crime.
- *Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Regional Conflicts in the NIS.* This negotiator acts as the US co-chair, along with Russia and France, in the OSCE Minsk Group which has been carrying out negotiations since 1994 concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- *Security programmes.* The State Department supports the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), in Moscow, which employs former Soviet weapons scientists in Armenia to prevent the spreading of their weapons-related expertise.

### 4

#### US Department of Defense

Directions for military operations emanate from the National Command Authority — a term used to collectively describe the President and the Secretary of Defense. The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, is the ultimate authority. The Office of the Secretary of Defense carries out the Secretary's policies by tasking the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands. The military departments train and equip their forces. The Chairman plans and co-ordinates deployments and operations. The unified commands conduct operations. [See Chart 2.2.]

- *US European Command.* The US European Command (USEUCOM), carries out several programmes in Eastern and Central European countries to promote democratic values among national militaries.
- *Joint Contact Team Programme.* The Joint Contact Team Programme (JCT), plans bilateral programmes that bring American ideals with respect to civil-military relations to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In-country military liaison teams help facilitate the assistance that host nations need to implement democratic reforms such as human rights guarantees, military legal codes to enforce the rights of the citizen soldier, and a governmental structure that makes the military subordinate to civilian democratic control.


- *International Military Education and Training Programme.* The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, promotes military-to-military relations and introduces military and civilian officials to democratic values.
- *George C. Marshall Center.* The George C. Marshall Center in Germany teaches courses, holds conferences, and sponsors research on defence procedures and organisation in democracies for mid-level to senior-level military and civilian officers.
- *NATO Partnership for Peace.* The NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) was started in 1994. It has created partnerships between NATO members and the militaries of almost all Eastern European states as a way to promote transparency in military planning and confidence building. It also conducts joint military exercises with individual countries' military forces and multilateral forces so as to promote mutual trust and confidence among former adversaries and to develop common military procedures, doctrines and standards.

### Chart 2.2

US Department of Defense

**Source:**

<http://www.defencelink.mil/pubs/dod101/organize.html>  
(as of 30 August 2001)



## 5

### US Agency for International Development

The US government is one of the major providers of official development assistance to the Caucasus region. US Agency for International Development (USAID), has an important role as Special Co-ordinator for the disbursement of aid. [See Chart 2.3.]

The change in the US administration and the appointment of Andrew S. Natsios as Administrator of USAID has prompted a rethink of the organisation's strategic direction, which has included more explicit reference to conflict prevention as a global goal.

As early as January 2001, USAID sponsored a conference on "The Role of Foreign Assistance in Conflict Prevention" with the Woodrow Wilson Center, which acknowledged both the salience of the issue and the failure hitherto of US policy to incorporate conflict prevention in the planning process. Since his confirmation in May 2001, Administrator Natsios has in various speeches and in his testimony to the Senate Appropriations Sub Committee on plans for Financial Year (FY) 2002, repeatedly referred to conflict prevention as a major strategic goal. It is

also clear, however, that thinking on such a new orientation is still at an early stage.

It is however one of the 'three pillars' spelt out as USAID's strategic focus in the coming period, together with the work of the Global Development Alliance, which is intended to draw private sector and independent organisations into a coherent US government strategy. Economic growth and agriculture and global health are the other 'pillars,' that join conflict prevention and developmental relief as USAID's core goals.

It must be regarded as a significant development that USAID has committed itself to a 'major new conflict prevention, management and resolution initiative,' drawing together existing 'democracy' programmes with 'new approaches to crisis and conflict analysis and new methodologies to assist conflicting parties resolve their issues peacefully.' The Conflict Prevention and Developmental Relief pillar incorporates \$2.193 billion in FY 2002 funds (including \$835 million requested for FY 2002 for Food and Peace programmes).


- *Special Co-ordinator of US Assistance to the NIS.* This position is tasked with overseeing and coordinating the programmes of development assistance to the NIS and compiling an annual report on their size and accomplishments.

Details on the country-specific activities of USAID are discussed in sections 5.1–5.3.

### Chart 2.3

US Agency for  
International Development

**Source:** USAID:  
<http://www.usaid.gov/about/usaidthart.htm>



## 5.1

### Armenia

Since 1995, US policy toward Armenia has sought to reduce the proportion of aid for humanitarian assistance and replace it with more development-oriented assistance, aimed at enabling Armenia to make as rapid a transition as possible to a market economy. In FY 1998, development aid totalling \$77 million, exceeded humanitarian aid (\$39 million) for the first time since 1992. That year, the US provided a total of about \$131 million in assistance, focused mainly on economic reform, energy reform, democracy and good governance, private sec-

tor development, education and training, humanitarian assistance and agriculture.

The FY 2001 planned spending totals \$89.14 million. As the political situation improves, AID also hopes to increase regional integration in various areas with Armenia's neighbours. Some AID-funded programmes are carried out by the US Departments of Justice, Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture and the US Information Agency, through a technical cooperation programme with Armenia.

The US Government is the largest provider of official development assistance to Armenia (52% of the total in FY 1997). The total amount of US Government assistance to Armenia from 1992–2001 is approximately \$1.3 billion. Other donors include the International Monetary Fund (the findings of missions to examine monetary policy are incorporated into AID technical assistance); UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Bank, the European Union, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme, France, the Netherlands, Japan and Switzerland.

Aid is provided under the following main headings.

### **Economic Restructuring**

The largest portion of planned spending in FY 2001, \$37.19 million, is in this area, including private sector development. Past priorities have included the creation of a capital market, banker training, support of a Central Bank, and loan programmes for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To achieve tax and fiscal reform and administrative efficiency, AID is supporting:

- automation of the Treasury department budget process and other modernisation measures for the municipal finance and of tax collection administrative systems in order to increase revenues;
- advice to the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), for revision of tax codes and of the customs code to encourage more trade;
- a review of taxes and fees to facilitate trade and investment and efficient tax collection; and
- advice to the executive branch and National Assembly in creating a more transparent and efficient budget process.

### **Private Enterprise Development**

To achieve more foreign and domestic investment, technology transfer, access to credit by domestic enterprises, access to export markets, accession to the WTO, and an improved legal and regulatory framework for economic activities, AID has been providing:

- firm-level assistance to create sustainable employment opportunities and reduce poverty;
- firm-level assistance and credit for SMEs, including agribusiness through loans and training programmes to develop growth strategies and improving products and services;
- creation of a land registration and titling system and real estate market;
- privatisation of state-owned enterprises through offering of shares in a new capital market being created;
- help to convert accounting standards;

- assistance to creation of an enterprise database development of firm associations;
- support of a local NGO providing technical assistance to the agricultural sector; and
- targeted technical assistance to leverage large loans from the World Bank.

Other donors include the Lincy Foundation, the World Bank, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the EBRD, and the EU TACIS programme. Contractors include the Eurasia Foundation, Shorebank (credit to SMEs), FINCA (micro-credit), IESC, RONCO (land titling and registration), Sibley International (accounting reform), IBTCI (privatisation) and the Academy for Educational Development (AED) (training).

### **Financial Sector Development**

Several AID programmes aim at greater technical proficiency in financial transactions, public confidence in banking sector, and wider availability of financial services through:

- creation of a strong central bank and commercial banks through training bank staff;
- an electronic payments system for collecting utilities payments and disbursing social payments;
- assistance in portfolio management; and
- support for a capital market.

Other donors in this area include: EU TACIS, GTZ, World Bank, Lincy Foundation, and Eurasia Foundation. Contractors include Shorebank, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Barents Group and AED.

### **Energy Restructuring**

Since 1995, policy has shifted from humanitarian assistance to reform of the energy sector, attainment of private sector participation in energy production and distribution, increased efficiency, and reduced environmental hazards due to the continued operation of a nuclear power plant. Support has been provided for:

- technical assistance in drafting a new energy law;
- an energy regulatory commission; and
- privatisation and restructuring of the power sector, improving financial viability of the sector, encouragement of commercialisation of power sector.

Other donors are the World Bank and the European Union. Contractors include Hagler Bailly, US Energy Association, US Geological Survey and AED.

### **Democratisation and Citizens' Participation**

Efforts to increase public participation and local initiative to energise local authorities included:

- support for organisations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and Internews to establish and strengthen democratic processes such as political parties and independent media;
- judicial and legislative reforms; and
- parliamentary training and support of indigenous NGOs working toward legal and social reforms.

AID has also sought to spread information more widely, increase confidence in citizens' ability to effect change and in political institutions, and foster the growth of civil society through:

- combating the recurrence of the recent election fraud;
- strengthening media coverage of public affairs;
- technical/ journalistic training of journalists and media production specialists;
- funding for making elections more transparent;
- civic education in schools; and
- expanding and maturing of the NGO sector and opposition parties through coalition building and advocacy of democratic reforms.

## Judicial Reform

Beginning in 1997, AID sought to strengthen the rule of law through improving the legal system's independence from the executive branch, the impartiality of adjudication and enforcement, and the reduction of bribery and political connections. These objectives were pursued through:

- aid for drafting the civil and criminal code;
- support for independent associations of judges and other legal professionals;
- support of a law library and law curriculum;
- support for judicial examinations for new judges; and
- advice for a constitutional amendment to reduce the judiciary's dependence on the executive branch.

AID is the leading and most comprehensive and ongoing donor in democratic development, but other donors such as the EU, Open Society Institute, and the United States Information Agency (USIA) provide some aid to NGOs and media. The OSCE and Council of Europe provide aid around elections to the Central Election Commission. AID co-ordinates with the World Bank in a broad legal reform programme, with EU TACIS with respect to the Judicial Training Institute, as well as GTZ and the Dutch Government.

Contractors include Internews, Eurasia Foundation, NDI, IFES Armenian Assembly of America's NGO Training and Resource Center, Junior Achievement of Armenia, the American Bar Association's Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI), AMEX International, Inc. and IRIS.

## Social Stabilisation

In 1993, considerable aid was devoted to the humanitarian needs of households and schools for food (bulk wheat), fuel (kerosene), and medicines in response to recent natural disasters and war. However, assistance has increasingly focused on longer-term institution-building efforts to create a self-sustaining social policy system, such as unemployment insurance, pension protection and community development programmes. Emphasis is on improving social policy making and administration, more effective targeting of assistance delivery to vulnerable and needy households, increased access to health care, food and shelter, creating civic social action groups, and reducing the social policy sector's dependence on international support. In 1999, the policy empha-

sis was on assisting the government's efforts to establish a sustainable social safety net, delivery mechanisms and pilot projects for efficient delivery of social services, including decentralised health care. Thus, AID supported:

- the establishment of a government monitoring system to track vulnerable groups;
- supported local responsibility for producing potable water and irrigation; and
- technical assistance to aid GOA to identify the most viable policy options for its social service system.

Other donors include the World Bank and the Armenian diaspora's charitable contributions for orphanages, schools, health clinics, etc. Contractors have included UNICEF, American International Health Alliance, Save the Children Federation and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

## 5.2

### Azerbaijan

In 1992, US aid to Azerbaijan was severely restricted by Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act, which prohibited aiding governments that blockade or use offensive force against Armenia. However, emergency humanitarian aid for refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was provided in the form of food, clothing, medicines, basic health services, shelter, and rehabilitation of water supply and sanitation systems through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and World Food Programme (WFP). Aid was given through NGOs, such as Relief International, American Red Cross, International Rescue Committee, CARE, Save the Children and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA).

Changes in the law made it possible to increase this aid somewhat and that for democracy building through NGOs, as well as for de-mining, resettlement and rehabilitation of areas occupied by Armenian forces. In 1997, some US-based, in-country training could be provided to selected Azeri private citizens and groups for business development and related leadership fields, and improving humanitarian assistance management and delivery. This could include aid to farmers and agribusiness entrepreneurs in agricultural marketing, small business and banking, private university faculty and administration in curriculum development in economics and business administration, and local NGOs in humanitarian aid programme management, civil society, election monitoring, environment, journalism and mass media communications. Azerbaijan began an economic reform programme in February 1996, including freeing bread and energy prices, and a programme aimed at privatising 75% of state-owned enterprises by 1998.

Nevertheless, USAID still feels unable to provide the kind of assistance it believes necessary to stimulate the economic and political reforms that are needed to assure development of its oil reserves and political stability. Thus, it awaits a more definitive resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through a peace settlement that goes be-

yond the ceasefire. If and when a peace settlement is reached, more aid is planned for economic restructuring and business development. The gap between Azerbaijan's potential ability from its oil revenues to support a transition to a market economy and pressing social needs, on the one hand, and its reluctance to liberalise its policies in order to do so, on the other, is also a source of major concern. The estimated FY 2000 budget was \$32.74 million and the FY 2001 request was \$54.56 million. USAID's current stated goals in Azerbaijan include:

- relief of remaining human suffering due to the earlier conflict through strengthening the capacity of local NGOs and community groups;
- more accountable and responsive government through greater citizen participation and promotion of the rule of law, and support for municipal elections, political party training, and independent media; and
- growth of the nascent private sector through small and medium business development and training, and commercial law reform.

### **Humanitarian and Social Programmes**

- Primary health care, basic shelter, rehabilitation of urban shelter, income generation projects, and resettlement projects that were provided to IDPs are funded by AID;
- food assistance is provided under the Department of Agriculture's Food for Progress programmes through us private voluntary organisations;
- medical equipment and supplies provided to Baku hospitals and medicines throughout Azerbaijan through State, Defence, AID, and NGOs through the sponsorship and co-ordination of the Office of the Co-ordinator to the NIS; and
- grants are provided by AID competitively for health, nutrition, shelter and economic opportunity through a new Azerbaijan Humanitarian Assistance Programme in 1998 that is funded by AID and implemented by Mercy Corps International.

Assistance for health and shelter needs goes to refugees, displaced persons, and needy civilians affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through service providers that now can include Azerbaijan government health facilities and health providers. An example is a hospital partnership between Baylor Hospital (Dallas, Texas) and two hospitals in Baku. Another aspect provides rehabilitation of shelters in the Goranboy region in order to attract IDPs' home and income-generating activities and health care to keep them at home. These projects are expected to be village-based and designed with the participation of communities and grassroots community groups.

### **Economic restructuring**

- Technical assistance and training are provided under the Small Business Lending and Microcredit Programmes through an AID grant to Shorebank in order to enhance the small-business lending capacity of banks that provide loans for small business development, especially in agriculture and agribusiness (loans are funded through International Finance Corporation loans and credit lines);
- support for village bank lending activity and small loans to micro-entrepreneurs not serviced by the commercial banking sector through the Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA);



## Democracy and Civil Society

- hands-on technical assistance in production, transformation, marketing and finance to for-profit agricultural and agro-processing sectors under the farmer-to-farmer programme; and
  - support to development of farmers associations and processing co-operatives in order to enhance the development and opportunities of agricultural enterprises and local organisations.
- 
- Voter education to the public about the electoral process and technical assistance and training for officials of the Central Electoral Commission about the new presidential election law, including a guide for poll-workers, provided by NDI and IFES;
  - technical assistance from NDI funded by AID to the six political parties and to a local NGO that observed the October 1998 Presidential election;
  - election observation by NDI and the International Republican Institute funded by AID;
  - grants from AID to Internews for seminars to assist independent television stations to produce and exchange programming and obtain broadcast licenses in the face of barriers posed by the government, and for a manual on how to conduct media election coverage;
  - grants for organisational development and training to local NGOs working in the environmental and social sectors and other fields implemented by the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal (ISAR);
  - promotion of professional and business development associations, such as a local press association, and training for print journalists through the Eurasia Foundation;
  - support for local NGOs to develop educational materials, conduct seminars and courses, create a technologically-equipped human rights centre and organise associations regarding democracy, human rights, and civic education, under the Democracy Fund Small Grants Programme administered by USIA;
  - computer training and access under the Internet Access and training programme to scholars, journalists, and others seeking information through Internet centres, administered by USIA;
  - exchange and visitor programmes for students, scholars, politicians, journalists, editors, businessmen, and lawyers in the skills and methods of democracy through USIA;
  - university partnership projects through USIA that created an MBA programme at Azerbaijan's Western University and overhauled Khazur University's library and information resource centre; and
  - training programmes funded by AID in business development, agro-business, democratisation, and community development for IDP and refugee leaders implemented through AED.

Other donors such as France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands, as well as the IMF and the World Bank, are providing a large amount of credit for restructuring the economy, stimulating small business development, and rehabilitating the power and water supply system. UNHCR is prominent in coordinating refugee assistance, and UNDP, UNICEF, the WFP, and the World Health Organisation (WHO), as well as the In-

ternational Federation of the Red Cross and the ICRC, provide direct humanitarian aid.

### 5.3

#### Georgia

In recent years, the overall goals of USAID programmes have been economic restructuring, democratic transition, social stabilisation and increased border control of illegal goods trafficking. The 2001 budget request for USAID programmes in Georgia was \$85.76m.

#### Security

- Basic support equipment, housing and barracks, and other needs provided under the Border Security and Law Enforcement Programme to border guards and the Customs Service to increase control over Georgia's borders;
- maritime equipment under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR, or Nunn-Lugar Programme) of the Department of Defence to strengthen border security and help prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other trafficking of illegal goods;
- financing of communications equipment under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Programme, to increase the ability of Georgia's military forces to participate in NATO PfP Programme;
- funding under the International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET), to send Georgian officers to ranger and infantry training, a command and general staff course, English language training, and education in civil-military relations;
- funding for tours to NATO for Georgian government officials and journalists in order to introduce them to NATO policy, the PfP, and European security and thus to increase understanding of NATO in Georgia; and
- funding for projects at universities and scientific institutes for former Soviet weapons scientists under the ISTC Programme.

#### Energy Delivery

- Funding from AID to the World Bank, Merrill Lynch and AES for providing assistance to municipal gas and electricity distribution enterprises to facilitate their privatisation and increase efficient delivery of energy;
- funding from AID for a pilot demonstration project in the collection of energy payments by incorporating management reform, public education, equipment repairs, and revised policies; and
- support to the National Electricity Regulatory Commission from AID for increasing energy payment rates and thus allowing cost recovery and re-investment in better service.

#### Economic Restructuring

- Technical assistance funded by AID under the Comprehensive Market Reform Programme (CMRP), to create and supply a Budget Analysis Office in the Parliament and a Fiscal Analysis Unit in the Ministry of Finance, in order to increase tax collection;
- tours to the US under USIA's International Visitor Programme for budget officers of the Ministry of Finance and Parliament to programmes on budget and fiscal management for training in procedures such as line itemisation and money transfer;

- technical assistance provided by AID through a contractor for creating a legal team in the Parliament to advise parliamentarians on land market issues so as to stimulate land privatisation;
- training funded by AID to accountants and auditors in market-oriented accounting principles, standards, and practices;
- support from AID for establishing pilot share registries and the drafting of a securities law and law on entrepreneurs, thus helping to establish a securities market and inaugurate futures trading;
- support from AID for the development of a legal and regulatory framework conducive to free trade and investment;
- support from the United States Information Agency (USIA), for translation of a college-level textbook on macro-economics, and for other curriculum development through the Soros Open Society Institute and the Eurasia Foundation;
- funding from AID for bank training through creating a local NGO that implements a train-the-trainers programme to train employees of commercial banks in finance;
- funding from AID for electronic payments through technical assistance in electronic payment systems for the National Bank;
- support from AID for small and medium-sized enterprises through financial and technical support for training loan officers and credit committee members in lending institutions that guided the disbursement of loans to private companies in and around Tbilisi, and supporting the use of voluntary senior executives to provide technical, managerial, and business planning assistance through a resource centre; and
- support from AID for enterprises to produce better quality seed and improved technical and financial management for seed production.

## Democracy

- *Public Information NGOs.* Grants that are awarded by the US Embassy's Democracy Commission provided to local NGOs through a small grants programme administered by USIA. A grant supported the information centre *Alternativa* for a conflict resolution project to create public information centres to promote the settlement of the Georgia-Ossetian conflict. Grants were given to a local association of information specialists for training in information retrieval, the Caucasus-American Bureau on Human Rights and the Rule of Law for monitoring and advocating human rights and the Youth League for civic education in the regions. Grants were also given to independent newspapers, including *Kavkazioni* for a Southern Caucasus Journalists Center devoted to conflict resolution and publication of a regional newspaper *Common Caucasus Newspaper* in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- *Election Assistance.* Technical assistance to the Central Election Commission for a poll-worker manual, training of election officials and poll-watchers, and voter education.
- *Judicial Reform.* AID support for clinical legal education, support for expanding lawyers associations, technical assistance for drafting codes and laws, and a judicial qualifying exam.
- *Parliamentary Assistance.* Support for a manual on legislative oversight and facilitation of better-focussed hearings, a weekly government Ques-

tion & Answer hour, reporting from committees to the full parliament, and improved information management services.

- *Citizen Participation.* Support for a local NGO, International Society for Free Elections (ISFED), to establish citizen advisory committees in Tbilisi and several regions. In some municipalities, for example, the latter obtained public hearings on the local budget.
- *Public Administration Education.* Support from USIA for a Masters programme in public administration at the Georgian Institute of Public Administration.
- *Research Centre.* Support from USIA for a Tbilisi information reference centre to assist Georgian officials to answer various technical questions relevant to the content of various laws.
- *Education Exchanges and Opportunities.* Under the Future Leaders Exchange Programme, USIA is supporting visits of Georgian and Abkhazian high school students to the US, and university studies in the US by Georgian students.
- *Professional Exchanges.* Under USIA's Community Connections Programme and International Visitor Programme, Georgian entrepreneurs and other professionals worked in US businesses similar to their own or visited the US to participate in training and seminars on their subjects. Areas of professional activity included wheat growing, agricultural lending, education, journalism, law, human rights, cultural preservation, and teaching of the disabled. American speakers on certain subjects such as international adoption were brought to Georgia to participate in a Georgian conference on the subject.
- *Georgian-Abkhazian Youth Camp.* AID also supported a summer camp for Georgian and Abkhazian children in which they learned conflict resolution skills and established friendships.

## Humanitarian and Social Sector

- *Food Assistance.* Food donated through the US Department of Agriculture's Food-for-Progress Programme, and wheat and vegetable oil was provided through the PL 480 Programme.
- *Humanitarian Goods.* Various basic commodities were funded by the Department of State's 'Operation Provide Hope' and distributed by US private voluntary organisations such as United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). Shelter, water and sanitation facilities, food and other basic needs were provided to IDPs by the UN World Food Programme and UN High Commissioner for Refugees and funded by AID.
- *Fuel Assistance.* Natural gas was purchased and delivered by AID to cover a shortfall in fuel needed at the Russian-Georgian border for generating electricity in late winter.
- *Youth Houses.* Funding from AID for youth houses in Sukhumi and Tbilisi for traumatised victims of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
- *Disease Prevention.* AID funding for UNICEF mass inoculations against measles for children, for immunisation of adults and children at risk of diphtheria, and for travel for health professionals to study HIV-AIDS and other infectious diseases.

Co-operating actors have included the World Food Programme, International Organisation for Migration, and the United Nations Inter-

national Children's Fund. Other actors include World Bank-Georgia, UNDP, and the Eurasia Foundation. Contractors include American Educational Development, ABA / CEELI, AMEX, NDI, and IRI.

## 6

### Entry Points for Engagement

A few broad observations made here may stimulate discussion and exploration of the most promising entry points for EWI and FEWER reports and activities in the Caucasus. The issues discussed below may provide the greatest leverage for EWI, FEWER and other international and local NGOs in preventing violent conflicts in the region.

- *Add impetus to resolve unresolved conflicts.*

This first issue involves promoting more intense support from the US and other influential actors behind balanced, impartial and cooperative efforts to advance the OSCE and other negotiations that are currently being conducted to definitively resolve the South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. They should not follow the course of the unresolved Chechnya conflict. This may include providing additional NGO-sponsored non-official dialogues or other services where needed in the area of people-to-people contacts in various sectors and levels in order to build up stronger cross-lines peace constituencies. However, it is imperative that any such efforts study what already has gone on of this type of activity so they can provide value-added support and enhance the synergy of such efforts. They should not simply add further confusion among the array of NGO-sponsored activities that have been launched.

- *Monitor and improve conflict prevention impacts of non-conflict sensitive programmes so they are effective as "structural prevention."*

The main emphasis of US policy in the region is on seemingly technical-economic and non-political concerns such as market-oriented reform of the economy and humanitarian aid. This emphasis involves programmes that operate through conventional aid sectors such as macro-economic policy in the central government and the social services. By and large, relatively less aid appears to be focused on promoting effective and accommodating political processes. But although these programmes are aimed at creating modern state and civil societies, the effects of such processes in a country can either contribute toward or prevent the emergence of potential violent conflicts.

- *Increase dialogue with personnel in different technical fields.*

These types of dominant US Caucasus programmes bring EWI and FEWER into a potential dialogue with a myriad of technical fields and related personnel such as government administrators, contractors, consultants, scientists, doctors, accountants, and other professionals. Such persons have the predominant expertise and legitimacy but do not generally see their work as related to the cause of conflict prevention. Consequently, EWI and FEWER face the interesting analytical challenge of showing how the many types of programmes in these sectors can have

impact in avoiding doing more harm through conflict exacerbation and doing greater good in conflict prevention, if they operated in specifically conflict-sensitive and targeted ways. Thus, its recommendations might speak to programmes such as the physical and procedural modernisation of government tax collection or budget making. However, to accomplish this type of specific programmatic advice, EWI and FEWER reports need to consider how the operations and impact of actual or potential programmes stack up in terms of specifically defined prevention and peace-building criteria. The analysis should, on the one hand, show the positive or negative links between various programmes and, on the other, the sources and dynamics of emerging conflicts and the societal capacities that preserve and strengthen non-violent means for addressing problems.

- *Develop criteria for peace/conflict impact assessment.*

Criteria for tracking the impact of programmes on peace or conflict are not well developed. Criteria that could be used are the allocation of benefits from programmes across major mobilised societal groups and regions, the timing of programmes in relation to events that may increase tensions, and their use in defusing the proximate sources of violence such as unemployed youth. More work needs to be done to elaborate a list of such criteria and see how they are reflected in differing ways to the design and implementation programmes in many policy sectors.

- *Address relatively ignored issues and areas.*

Despite the involvement of many US and other programmes in various parts and aspects of the life of the Caucasus, a number of sub-regions and policy issues present potential for increased tensions and instability that can become exploited politically. An example that was discussed at the EastWest Institute/FEWER Tbilisi workshop in October 1999 was the region of Javakheti, which is a mountainous and highly undeveloped area lying to the south of Tbilisi and adjacent to the border with Armenia. With its predominant population of ethnic Armenians, its social isolation from the mainstream Georgian economy and political system, its heavy dependence for income on the employment of inhabitants at a Russian military base, and the beginnings of political organisation around autonomy issues, the Javakheti area cannot be ignored. It needs to be better integrated into Georgia through specific projects that address its needs in low-key ways. Another such area which has avoided conflict so far but could generate increasing tensions is Adjara in Georgia.

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## 7

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John J. Maresca, "US Ban on Aid to Azerbaijan (Section 907): How it Started and Why it Should be Lifted," *Azerbaijan International*, Winter 1998.

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## 8

### Addresses: USAID

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#### 8.1

##### Armenia

USAID's Armenia programmes are managed from USAID /Caucasus, Yerevan, Armenia.

**Local address:** Yerevan (E), 18 Marshal Baghramyan Avenue.

**Washington staff:** Armenia, USAID /Yerevan Department of State Washington DC 20521-7020

**Email:** embgso@arminco.com

**Website:** <http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/armenia.html>

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#### 8.2

##### Azerbaijan

USAID affairs in Azerbaijan are managed from USAID /Caucasus, Yerevan, Armenia.

**Local address:** Baku (E), Azadliq Prospekt 83, Baku 370007, Azerbaijan.

**Washington staff:** Azerbaijan, USAID / Baku Department of State Washington, DC 20521 7050

**Website:** <http://www.usia.gov/posts/baku.html>

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#### 8.3

##### Georgia

USAID's Georgia programmes are managed from USAID /Caucasus, Yerevan, Armenia.

**Local address:** Tbilisi (E), 25 Atoneli Street

**Washington staff:** Georgia, USAID / Tbilisi Department of State Washington, DC 20521-7060

**Website:** <http://www.info.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/georgia.html>

## The Conflict Prevention Capacities of the European Union in the Caucasus

*Christine Tiberghien-Declerck*

### I

#### Introduction

THE PREVENTION OF CRISES is more pressing today than ever for the European Union (EU). The failure, in certain countries, of decades of development assistance has led the European Institutions to rethink their actions. From now on a targeted approach will be used, aimed at areas which are seen to be sensitive and liable to generate a climate of crisis.

This approach was affirmed under the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the EU. At the UN General Assembly Session of 21 September 1999, the then Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen, stressed the commitment of the EU to security and stability in the world. Halonen said, “This will be done, by deploying actions ranging from conflict prevention, through crisis management to rehabilitation and reconstruction.” She further stated that the prevention of conflicts depends essentially on the existence of stable democratic societies, and that civilians are able to play an important role in this area.

There are a number of open and latent conflicts in the Caucasus which affect the ability of the region to achieve sustainable growth and stability. A vicious circle is created by which violent conflicts block regional development and, in turn, create greater instability and discourage foreign investment. It is important to break this cycle by targeting assistance in a way that would address the causes of tension (as in the case of refugee flows) and, more broadly, strengthen the political and administrative structures that reinforce the basis for addressing this issue. This dual approach is complementary, as expressed in the Commission’s Communication on the Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. However, the idea of a conflict *continuum* – which it seems to contain – should be replaced with that of a *contiguum*. Indeed, actions should be taken in all three areas simultaneously.

The approach adopted for this study is grounded in a relatively broad concept of prevention. It is based on the notion that the result-



ing newly independent state could be fragile after emerging from a successful intervention, and hence exposed to new risks. That is why it is important to examine all the instruments which could enhance stability politically, socially or economically, both in the short-term and long-term.

However, the most actions have been taken by member states of the Union at the Community level. Some €880 million (\$800.8 million) were spent between 1992–1999 on the Caucasus region. The EU is concerned about the stability of this region as it has suffered territorial fragmentation and religious and ethnic strife. European Union member states are convinced of the need to support the newly independent states which have emerged from the former Soviet Union. These programmes are not generally described as part of a conflict prevention policy, but as “technical assistance” programmes, or as “support on the road to democracy.”

Member states generally accept that the external relations of the EU are not limited to the economic sphere. The failure of previous approaches to Kosovo is now convincing Member states that the European Union should exercise real clout in such situations. This is the reason why initiatives towards a common security and defence policy were discussed at the December 1999 Summit in Helsinki.

We will examine a wide range of instruments in this paper by first reviewing the EU instruments, and then the potential mechanisms emerging in the realm of conflict prevention. However, before doing so it will also be necessary to briefly examine the roles and functions of the institutions as a system of inter-related bodies.

## 2

### Structure of the European Union

The European Union is seen internationally as a single entity, composed of 15 member states (to increase to 23 in a few years with the accession of Estonia, Cyprus, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic; followed by Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, Turkey and Malta). The Union’s legal structure, however, is not simplistic and its powers are related to separate Treaties. It is therefore important to understand this structure in order to assess its scope for action.

Whichever treaty is invoked, the European Union is equipped with a single institutional framework, i.e. the institutions it consists of are the same, but they are given different powers according to the treaty they enforce.

It is customary to refer to the unified whole as either the European Union or the Community, and yet both these terms have a very precise meaning. The EU was created as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992),<sup>1</sup> which modified the previous three treaties of the European Communities and instituted the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The Union is thus founded, in conformity with Article 1 “on the European Communities completed by policies and forms of co-operation stated in the present Treaty.”<sup>2</sup>

This structure has been likened to three pillars crowned with a single institutional organisation. The first pillar is that of the Euro-

<sup>1</sup> The Treaty of Maastricht entered into force on 1 November 1993 after ratification by each Member State.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that the Amsterdam Treaty, in force since 1 May 1999, has altered the numbering of the previous TEU and EC Treaties. The references follow the new official numbering.

pean Communities, the second the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under Title V of the TEU and the third, co-operation on justice and home affairs under Title VI. Consequently, it is quite important to distinguish Communities' policies (which is part of the European Communities Treaties) from initiatives under the CFSP, which do not have the same objectives, nor are they part of the same decision-making process. However, both are of major interest for conflict prevention in the Caucasus countries.

Foreign policy, as well as judicial co-operation, belong to the realm of inter-governmental policy making. This means that it is an expression of the consensus of all the member states. However, the new Amsterdam Treaty brought some hope of strengthening the decision-making process by allowing for a system of *constructive abstention*. By this principle, if unanimity is still the main principle in decisionmaking in the framework of the CFSP, member states not wishing to follow a certain course of action can remain silent without blocking the adoption of an EU decision (Article 23§1 TEU).<sup>3</sup>

Another significant innovation under Article 23§2 of the TEU is that the Council is now obliged to vote by qualified majority when it adopts a joint action or takes a common position on the basis of a common strategy.<sup>4</sup> The same applies where it takes any decision implementing joint action or a common position which has been adopted previously. An exception is made in cases where a State is opposed to this decision for "important and stated reasons of national policy."<sup>5</sup>

The European Council (which brings together the Heads of States and Governments) defines the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP, decides on common strategies in areas where the Member states have significant interests. The strategies indicate the objectives, time frame and means which the EU and Member states must provide (Article 13 TEU). The Council (which brings together the Ministers of Foreign Affairs) can adopt one of the following strategies.

- *Common positions*: "shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions" (Article 15 TEU).
- *Joint actions*: "shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union and if necessary their duration and the condition for their implementation" (Article 14 TEU).
- Any other decision regarding the *implementation* of joint actions or common positions. In that case, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, a qualified majority is called for.
- Finally, *declarations*, though not mentioned in the Treaty, constitute until now the main expression of the foreign policy of the Union.

At the level of the European Communities however, a much greater use of qualified majority voting has been adopted in procedures, which allows for greater flexibility in the decision-making process. Overall, the European institutions have been granted some significant powers.

<sup>3</sup> However, if a state makes a formal declaration, the decision will not be adopted if the Member states abstaining represent more than one third of the weighted votes (Articles 23§2, TEU).

<sup>4</sup> A common strategy is adopted by the European Council (which brings together the Heads of States and Governments) as the means available to the Union and Member states to reach the objectives described as areas of common interest.

<sup>5</sup> In this case, there is no vote. The Council, on the basis of a qualified majority, can decide by simple majority (Article 23§2, 2nd item, TEU).

## 2.1

### European Union Institutions and Roles

Within the CFSP framework, the main powers have been granted to the Council. The Commission and European Parliament do intervene in a supportive capacity. In theory, the Commission is fully associated with the work of the CFSP (Article 27 TEU) and the European Parliament may be consulted on the main aspects and basic choices in policies of external relations (Article 21 TEU). Since the entry-into-force of the Treaty, these mechanisms as well as the right of initiative of the European Commission (Article 22 TEU), are relatively unused. The European Parliament alone has sought to fulfil its role by formulating recommendations and by presenting an annual report on progress in the implementation of the CFSP, as stipulated under Article 21 of the Treaty.

Though the consultation mechanisms have been defined, the Commission and the Parliament do not intervene directly in decision making, which creates a certain imbalance in favour of the Council, and hence of the member states.

The balance between institutions is quite different in the European Community framework. Under this framework all the institutions are associated in the elaboration, execution and monitoring of Community policies. The respective powers of these institutions are outlined below.

#### Box 3.1

##### European Union Budgetary Procedures

#### EU Budgetary procedure

- *The vote on the budget:* The European Commission presents a pre-budget draft to the Council members, who, on a qualified majority vote, define a draft budget, in turn submitted to the Parliament. After a first reading the Parliament forwards the second draft, with possible modifications, to the Council for amendment. The budget is then forwarded again to the Parliament for a second reading. At that stage the European Parliament cannot modify the compulsory expenses (CE) on which the Council will have the final word, but it can decide to alter the non-compulsory expenses (NCE).
- *CE / NCE:* Compulsory expenses are those which are specifically foreseen in the Treaty. The other expenses are treated as non-compulsory for which the Commission is asked to establish every year a maximum rate of increase, thus limiting the aspirations of the Parliament.
- *The financial prospects* are jointly decided by the member states, and they set the evolution over a five year period.
- *The financial transfers from one budget line to the next*, under the same title, can be implemented by the Commission without authorisation from the budget authority (Council or Parliament). On the other hand, the budget authority must be consulted whenever the budget lines belong to two distinct titles. In this way it is possible to use unallocated monies for activities for which funding has expired.
- *Commitment/ payment appropriations:* the funds are committed as soon as the Commission has adopted a decision which has financial implications (hence, they are set aside). However the payments for these activities are not necessarily disbursed in the same budget year, as certain programmes could cover a few years. In such cases, it is possible that, in the same budget year, the payments for a given budget line are not the same as the commitment appropriations.

**The Council** The Council represents the member states and consists of ministers from the 15 member countries. They are included in decisions on the basis of their line competence in thematic meetings. They have decision-making powers, and give the Commission the authority to implement the acts agreed upon. This decision making power may at times be shared with the European Parliament according to the procedure followed: co-decision or favourable opinion.

**The European Parliament** The European Parliament is the democratic voice of the Community. As it represents the interests of European citizens, it ensures its political control over the Community executive. Through the co-decision procedure, the European Parliament

has been given a particular authority over the budget, as it decides on its content (with the Council), and gives clearance to the Commission for implementing previous budgets (in consultation with the Court of Auditors). In this way, the European Parliament has come to play a particularly important role on budgetary issues.

On all unforeseen allocations in the Treaty (non-compulsory expenses), the European Parliament can decide, as a last resort, on the suppression or creation of a budget line and/ or modify the amounts granted. It is, however, limited in its power to determine overall budget amounts by financial prospects, which are adopted by the member states on a five-yearly basis and define the annual thresholds that must be respected. [See Box 3.1.]

### Chart 3.1 (page 68)

DG External Relations

**Source:** [http://europe.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/index.html](http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/index.html)  
(as of 30.08.2001)

**The Commission** The Commission defends the interests and the identity of the European Union. Twenty Commissioners nominated by the member states head the Commission but it is fully independent in its exercise of power and is not confined to any national interest. Each Commissioner is responsible for one or two Directorate-Generals (DGs) which are parallel to Ministries at the national level. The distribution of tasks reflects the way that issues are addressed in the Commission. Currently, Chris Patten heads the European Union's DG for External Relations, and Poul Nielson the DG for Development and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). Both DGs are of special interest to this study. [See Chart 3.1.]

**Other Institutions** Other European Institutions include the European Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors which, however, are only of limited interest to this paper. It should also be noted that the European Council, though officially recognised in the Treaty, is not a European Institution. It is made up of Heads of States and the President of the Commission, and meets twice a year. Its role, according to Article 4 of the TEU, is to provide a broad orientation to the European Union.

## 3


### Existing Prevention Mechanisms

Within the European Community framework, important mechanisms in favour of the Newly Independent States (NIS), now called partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, have been developed. However, a clear distinction should be made between Partnership and Co-operation Agreements which establish a global framework of co-operation (section 3.1), programmes of structural assistance which are designed to strengthen sustainable development (section 3.2) and *ad hoc* measures which are palliative responses to address urgent needs but contribute also to the stability of the country (section 3.3).

#### 3.1

### Partnership and Co-operation Agreements

In July 1999, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs), came into force between the European Union and the six countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. Each one of these accords has been established for a period of ten years, after which it will be tacitly



renewed on an annual basis, unless opposed by one of the parties. The main objective of the PCA is to reaffirm the common values shared by the parties, notably the principle of parliamentary democracy, pluralism and the rule of law. It covers the protection of human rights and the introduction of a market economy.

## Policy Areas

The areas covered by these agreements are defined in very general terms: energy, environment, education, agriculture, transport, consumer protection, the fight against drugs and money laundering, and tourism. Of particular interest are the provision on stimulating a political dialogue (Title II) and co-operation on democracy and human rights (Title VII). The entire agreement can be considered as an instrument contributing to stability in the region. The parties commit themselves to “co-operate in the areas concerning the strengthening of stability and security in Europe, respect for the principle of democracy and the respect for human rights, notably those of minorities, and to facilitate consultation on relevant issues” (Article 5 of the PCA). Another clause is that the “dialogue can take place on a regional basis, to contribute to the resolution of conflicts and of regional tensions.”

## Institutions

To facilitate this dialogue and to formalise the co-operation between states, a certain number of institutions have been created. The Co-operation Council has been established to supervise the implementation of the agreements. The Council convenes annually members of the government of the State concerned, members of the EU Council, and officials from the European Commission. Its role is to examine all the important issues relative to this agreement, as well as all other bilateral or international issues of common interest. Within this framework, it is allowed to formulate recommendations.

In accomplishing these tasks, this Council is supported by a Co-operation Committee, composed of senior civil servants representing the EU Council, the European Commission and the Government of the State involved. This Committee will be a central element in implementing the agreement as it ensures a continuity of dialogue in meetings of the Co-operation Council.<sup>6</sup>

The Agreement also foresees the creation of a Parliamentary Co-operation Committee,<sup>7</sup> in which members of the Parliament of a particular State and members of the European Parliament will meet to exchange points of views.

The first meeting of the Co-operation Council for Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan was held on 12 October 1999, and the second on 10 October 2000. It will be necessary to judge the effectiveness of this instrument with reference to the results achieved in the area of political dialogue and exchange. It now appears that the countries of the Caucasus should go beyond the level of assistance provided to becoming actors in their own development processes. Their will to overcome the threat of tensions will be significant in the future. Its quality will determine the outcome of the partnership.

<sup>6</sup> The first Co-operation Committee on Georgia was convened on 21 February 2000. Committee meetings on Armenia and Azerbaijan were held on 14 and 27 March 2001, followed by a second in June 2001.

<sup>7</sup> The first Parliamentary Co-operation Committee for Armenia was in December 1999 and the second in September 2000; for Azerbaijan in April 2000 and Georgia in May 2000.

8 Communication of the Commission of 7 June 1999 on relations between the EU and the South Caucasus in the framework of the Agreements for Partnership and Co-operation, COM (99) 272 final.

The final word belongs to the Commission. In a communication in June 1999, the Commission indicated that:<sup>8</sup>

“the best way of making progress in confidence building and economic acceleration is to support actions in regional co-operation and post-conflict reconstruction. These actions require the political support of CFSP, and more specifically that of the institutions created in the framework of the PCAs. Community assistance can be effective only if there is progress in the resolution of conflicts and the normalisation of political and economic life. The Presidential meeting of 22 June will allow the three republics the opportunity to confirm that they have the political will to move forward.”

### 3.2

#### Structural Assistance

The development programmes of structural assistance could have a great impact on conflict prevention. However, on-going tensions will remain, even if well-designed measures are taken at a critical moment and can defuse a crisis. In the long run, the subsequent fragility of the State will not allow for order and security to be sustained. As regards the NIS, national stability is closely linked with economic development and the building of an effective state.

For this reason, the European Community has instituted a number of programmes with the aim of helping these countries strengthen their independence. The programme of Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), is the main instrument which the Commission has at its disposal. Over the years, it has been complemented by other instruments which are related to specific needs.

The TACIS programme consists of a ‘National Action Programme’ and a ‘Regional Programme’. Regional Programmes form about 30% of the TACIS budget.

The National Action Programme is divided into the National Country Programme (55% of TACIS budget) and the Small Project programme (15% of TACIS budget).

The Small Project programmes are targeted and flexible projects which can be implemented relatively quickly and which are funded by individual country allocations from the National Action Programmes. They embrace five broad themes: policy advice, civil society, education and training, enterprise support and international standards and commitments. While individual projects may be relatively small, often less than €200,000 (\$182,000), the total amount allocated to the Small Project Programmes is nearly 15% of the TACIS budget.

#### TACIS

At the European Council meeting in Rome in December 1990, the European Union ministers reached a decision that the economic reforms undertaken by the former USSR were contributing to the promotion of peace in Europe. The first programme of Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), was introduced in July 1991 (Regulation No. 2157/ 91, OJ L 201/ 2 of 24.07.1991), later renewed

<sup>9</sup> TACIS is in operation in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

through two successive regulations (Regulation No. 2053/93 and 1279/96, respectively in *OJ L 187/1* of 29.07.1993 and *L 165/1* of 4.07.1996). The last regulation was in force until the end of December 1999 and replaced in 2000 by a new regulation (No. 99/2000 of 29 December 2000, *OJ L 12* of 18.01.2001), in force until the end of 2006.<sup>9</sup>

**Objectives of the Programme** The objectives of this programme are two-fold: (1) to support economic development, the establishment of a market economy and private investments; and (2) to strengthen the public administration in its efforts to establish the rule of law and democracy. The means used to this end are, above all, the transfer of know how, in particular the deployment of technical experts for the following:

- the restructuring of public enterprises and the development of the private sector;
- the creation of capacity to produce, process and distribute food products;
- the building of infrastructure for energy, telecommunications, and transport;
- nuclear safety and the environment; and
- the reform of public administration and social services.

The implementation of this programme is carried out in close co-operation with the local authorities and the European Commission. The Commission first establishes an indicative programme defining the objectives and strategies by country in collaboration with each of the countries concerned, the last one covering the period 2000–2006. An Action Programme is drawn up on this basis, covering a period of one or two years, and may include a National and a Regional Programme.

**Priorities** As regards the National Programmes, priority sectors in the three South Caucasus countries are: support for public and private sector enterprises, energy, human resources and administrative reforms. From 1991–1997, about 85% of all TACIS projects were well-targeted at meeting the needs of the selected partners or beneficiaries. A positive relation is identified between TACIS performance in the NIS and its track record in terms of market-oriented reforms.<sup>10</sup>

Countries in the Caucasus were subjected to seventy years of Communism. These countries now need to adjust their policies in order to facilitate their integration into the world economy. In this way, TACIS is considered to have a real impact, notably through training programmes. Management training is one of the most successful training areas. Other projects have assisted in economic development, such as providing loans at low interest rates to independent farmers and traders, and enabling them to become owners of their means of production.

**Procedures** The procedures for implementation of these programmes are as follows. An Action Programme is submitted to a management

<sup>10</sup> July 1997, TACIS interim evaluation. No authoritative conclusions could be drawn concerning the global impact of the TACIS programme in terms of its contribution to the content and pace of market-economy oriented reforms and the support of democracy. The programme is still evolving and it is too early to enable a full-scale ex-post evaluation.



<sup>11</sup> According to the new regulation proposed by the Commission, if a negative opinion is given, these measures are submitted to the EU Council which may take a different decision, acting by qualified majority, within one month.

committee — the TACIS Committee, made up of representatives from the Member states, usually from departments in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs dealing with TACIS. After the financing proposals have received a favourable opinion from the TACIS committee<sup>11</sup> and have been agreed by the Commission, the relevant funds associated with these proposals are said to have been “committed.” A public tender is then launched, at local and EC levels, to experts from specialised institutions who sign a contract with the EC. Contracts are generally tendered to the following organisations:

- public organisations (governments, national administrations, local or regional administrations);
- non-commercial organisations (NGOs, universities, foundations, technical and research institutes, training institutes, professional associations); and
- private sector organisations (such as consultancy firms).

The projects are managed and monitored by the relevant services of the Commission. Final payment is made over the period of each contract. As projects may take several years, payments are often spread. Therefore they often lag behind the committed amounts.

Unit E/3 in particular, part of Directorate E of DG External Relations, is in charge of the management of the programmes for the South Caucasus countries. However, the Delegations of the Commission also follow the programmes in the field and are responsible for relations with the national authorities. In the Caucasus region, there are two Delegations: Moscow and Tbilisi (delegation to both Georgia and Armenia). The Delegation, together with the Regional Co-ordination Units (see Annex) and the line Ministries, assists with elaborating the Indicative Programme, followed by the Action Programmes. The Delegation launches public tenders and monitors the projects. It reports back every six months on the different sectors of TACIS activity.

A Co-ordination Unit is set up at the national level, supervised by a National Co-ordinator, generally at ministerial level. This unit represents the government’s position and determines the strategies along with the European Commission. It is supported in the execution of its tasks by a small group of experts funded by the TACIS programme.

**Budget** From 1991–1997, a total of €3.3 billion (\$3 billion) was allocated to TACIS. [See Box 3.2 on TACIS budgetary lines.] In the same period, the South Caucasus countries received the following allocations: Armenia (€49 million/\$44.6 million), Azerbaijan (€51 million/\$46.4 million) and Georgia (€50 million/\$45.5 million) which puts them in the sixth, seventh and eighth place among the 13 beneficiary countries of TACIS. They are far behind Russia and Ukraine, which received €1,061 million (\$965.5 million) and €378 million (\$344 million) respectively, which amounts to a total of 44% of the TACIS budget. In comparison, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia received an equivalent of 1.5% of the budget each.

Under the new TACIS Regulation, the EU will allocate €3.138 billion (\$2.856 billion) to the partner States in Eastern Europe and Central

12 The areas of co-operation are (1) support for institutional, legal and administrative reform; (2) support to the private sector and assistance for economic development; (3) support in addressing the social consequences of transition; (4) development of infrastructure networks; (5) promotion of environmental protection and management of natural resources, and (6) development of the rural economy (Annex II of the Regulation No. 99/2000).

### Box 3.2

#### TACIS

#### Budgetary Lines

Asia over 2000–2006. Nevertheless, this Regulation proposes to focus on less but larger and better projects in key sectors and restricting each country programme to a maximum of three areas of co-operation.<sup>12</sup> Such a restriction is made in response to criticisms in the past that the Commission was scattering its scarce resources on too many small projects. This Regulation takes into consideration the principles and objectives defined within the framework of the PCAs and places great emphasis on regional co-operation and inter-state co-operation, which constitute an important factor for stability.

#### TACIS Budgetary Lines: Chapter B7-52 — Co-operation with the Newly Independent States and Mongolia

##### Budget Line B7-520 — Assistance to partner countries in eastern Europe and central Asia

"This appropriation is intended to cover the financing or part-financing of assistance measures designed to support the transition to a market economy and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the partner States."

"The above measures cover, *inter alia*, support for institutional, legal and administrative reform, support to private sector and assistance for economic development, support in addressing the social consequences of transition, the development of infrastructure network, the promotion of environmental protection and management of natural resources and development of the rural

economy."

With a provision of €382.28 million (\$347.88 million) in commitments and €380 million (\$345.8 million) in credits of payment for the year 2001.

##### Line B7-521 — Cross-border co-operation Article B7-5210

"This appropriation is intended to cover the financing of cross-border cooperation between the partner States and the European Union and between the partner States and central and eastern Europe."

With a provision of €23 million (\$20.93 million) in commitments and €9 million Euros (\$8.19 million) in credits of payment for 2001.

Source: Budget 2001 - OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001.

**Economic and Political Interests** There is no doubt that the Commission's interest in supporting these countries is, above all, economic. Their development offers commercial opportunities, and the European Community considers itself one of the most important trading partners of the NIS: EC imports from NIS are increasing by 33% since 1989 (in 1996, NIS exports to the EU amounted to €26 billion), and Community exports to the NIS have grown by 25% over the same period.

Transition to democracy and free market, while ensuring the sustainability of the rule of law in the NIS countries, is essential for stability in the region. Countries in the region have identified the development of their economies as their main focus of interest. Stability is indeed closely linked with peoples' well-being, which notably depends on better economic living standards. Thus, helping the development of small and medium sized enterprises or farmers to obtain property rights for their lands, helps the establishment of a middle class and contributes to democracy. In this way, the development of a legal framework is of real importance, as it encourages foreign investment and strengthens contractual relations.

Apart from economic interests, the geopolitical position of NIS states also makes it sensitively situated in regional conflicts, especially in view of the gradual extension of the EU to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In due course, the external borders of the EU will extend to the TACIS beneficiary countries (first Belarus and Ukraine, followed by Moldova, Georgia and Armenia with Turkey's annexation to the EU). However, the natural wealth, particularly oil, has turned the

region into an area of strategic importance for Europe, as well as for Russia, the US and Iran.

The existing situation helps explain the vigilance of the Commission in relation to conflict prevention in the region, and the special interest given to regional co-operation.

### **TACIS Regional Programmes**

Regional Programmes are not country-specific and exist alongside the national programmes. Such programmes include the Inter-State and Cross-Border Co-operation Programme, as well as the Nuclear Safety Programme.

- *Inter-State Programme.* The Inter-State Programme addresses problems which require similar solutions and aims to establish working relations between the selected countries. TRACECA and INOGATE are currently the two main programmes. The TRACECA—Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia programme, helps develop a trade corridor on an East-West axis from Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, through the Caucasus, and across the Black Sea to Europe. The INOGATE—Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe programme, supports efforts in rehabilitating and modernising the regional gas and oil transmission systems and supply systems for refined oil products.
- *Cross-Border Programme.* The Cross-Border Programme reflects the importance attached to stable relations across borders, but it is only concerned with the territorial boundaries between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and the EU and the Central East European Countries, as well as the maritime boundaries of the Baltic. Such a programme could be extended to the Caucasus region, in order to facilitate communication and trade between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Environmental conservation is also a matter of real concern as air or water pollution transcends boundaries and leads to co-operation between states.
- *Nuclear Safety Programme.* The Nuclear Safety Programme reflects the continuing concern about nuclear safety posed by deficiencies in the design, condition, management, operation and maintenance of nuclear installations in the NIS. This programme also partly concerns Armenia and its commitment to close the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant by 2004.
- *Effectiveness of Programmes.* TACIS is considered to have been particularly successful in the promotion of regional co-operation through assistance to inter-state and cross-border projects. Support for actions such as the TRACECA project, the INOGATE oil and pipeline initiative and regional environment projects has played an important role in promoting inter-governmental co-operation among the NIS. The best example is the signing of a Multilateral Transport Agreement in September 1998 at the Baku summit. The political dimension of that summit was very important as it was attended by senior government figures, such as

Armenian Prime Minister Darbinian. This was the first visit of such a high-level Armenian government official to Azerbaijan since the outbreak of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Similarly, in June 1998 the ceremonial opening of the new crossing on the Georgia-Azerbaijan border marked the completion of a project of mutual interest which brought together senior representatives from both sides of the border.

EU officials regard these programmes as fundamental instruments for promoting stability and sustainable economic relations among the NIS countries, and contributing to conflict resolution in the former Soviet Union. However, it is increasingly recognised that although economic growth and political development are important to stability, civil society is a key element as well. The entire TACIS programme has made a significant contribution in this area but a specific instrument – the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme – has been introduced by the Commission to enhance the visibility of democratic values.

### The PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme

<sup>13</sup> For more information, visit the following websites: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/index.htm), <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/europeaid/index.htm>.

At the initiative of the European Parliament, the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme (PTDP), began in 1992 in the countries covered by the PHARE programme and extended in 1993 to include the beneficiaries of the TACIS programme.<sup>13</sup> The objective is to promote the knowledge and techniques relevant to democratisation and the rule of law. It seeks to do this by strengthening associations and local institutions. This programme appears to have contributed to the growth of the non-governmental sector, which has been an essential actor in the reform process. It has achieved that role by exercising pressure on the authorities, and allowed for the emergence of a democratic political culture.

**Types of Projects** Unlike the TACIS programme, the PTDP are being developed directly with the NGOs and not with the national governments. It covers three types of projects:

- macro-level projects, which aim to establish a partnership between European and local NGOs;
- micro-projects, approved by the Delegation, favouring small local NGOs; and
- *ad hoc* projects, decided by the Commission in response to an urgent and specific need. In contrast with the preceding types, such projects are not limited to NGO-led projects.

**Areas of Intervention** The areas of intervention are the following:

- parliamentary practices;
- transparency in the management of public administration;
- development of the governmental sector and of representative structures;
- independence of the media;
- awareness-building and civic education;
- promotion and monitoring of human rights;
- civilian oversight of the security services; and
- rights of minorities, non-discrimination and equality of opportunities.

In the countries covered by the TACIS programme, emphasis has been put on the development of NGOs (46%), awareness building (14%), independence of the media (10%) and human rights monitoring (10%). An evaluation of the contribution made by these projects towards the prevention or resolution of conflicts cannot be restricted to these four typologies. Certain projects in Georgia substantiate this claim (see below). Though projects may fall in the category of NGO capacity building or creation of an independent media, intervention by certain organisations can contribute directly to communication between the parties to a conflict.

Macro-level projects represent nearly two-thirds of the funding received. The NGOs selected from expressions of interest received twice a year, can receive financing of up to €200,000 (\$182,000). The assistance provided cannot be for more than 80% of the budget, with the NGO contributing the remainder, half of which may be in kind.

**Examples of Projects** The PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme (1992–1997) provides an example of contributions to the resolution of conflict in Georgia. The British organisation VERTIC (*Verification Technology Information Centre*) has carried out different projects, one of which is in collaboration with the *Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development*. The project's aim is to ensure the development of NGOs in the conflict zone (South Ossetia), or the training of journalists. These programmes have provided the opportunity for contacts between the Ossetian Parliament and the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and to strengthen economic co-operation between Ossetia and Georgia. Similarly, the *Helsinki Citizens' Assembly* has received financing for a project for transnational civil society building in conflict zones. The pressure exercised by this organisation in particular, facilitated the liberation of prisoners of war and addressing the problems of the region as a whole. Finally, the *International Center on Conflict and Negotiation* has developed a conflict resolution project for conflicts in Abkhazia with *International Alert*.

**Management of Programmes** For the management of these programmes, the Commission had previously recourse to the European Human Rights Foundation (EHRF). The EHRF had to examine the projects and identify a list of those eligible for EC funding. This assessment was based on the quality of the project (55%), the partnership established (35%) and other specific aspects. This list was then submitted to the Commission, which selected a partner based on the recommendations from an Advisory Group (made up of representatives from the DG for Development, the European Parliament, the European Council and the EHRF). Once the projects were selected, it was the EHRF which developed and followed up on the contracts. It prepared a monthly progress report for the Commission and, every six months, a policy paper for the Advisory Group, discussing the medium-term options. From now on, the EHRF does not exist anymore and the management of these programmes belongs to the relevant services of the Commission.

The approach adopted for the micro-projects is quite different. The funding amounts do not exceed €10,000 (\$9100) and are managed at the local level by the Delegations. The areas of activity are identical to the macro-projects but they are directed more specifically to smaller NGOs to support growth in the non-governmental sector. These micro-projects are particularly prevalent in the PHARE countries, and have only made a very tentative beginning in Russia and the Ukraine, although they are also appearing in Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan.

It also helps explain the importance of *ad hoc* projects in the NIS, which receive 30% of the total financing. *Ad hoc* projects were put in place by the Commission in response to local needs identified, in particular these projects cover election monitoring and training of journalists in the media sector. The Commission conducts the implementation of these projects at times in conjunction with international institutions, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

The PTDP approach in the PHARE and TACIS countries is somehow different. If the PHARE projects emphasise an approach based on NGOs (a bottom-up approach) especially through macro-projects, the TACIS programme is characterised by 30% channelled through *ad hoc* projects (decided upon by the Commission). Until quite recently there was also a relative lack of micro-projects, developed and financed at the local level. It should be noted that, just as for the general TACIS programmes, Russia and Ukraine obtain most of the PTDP financing (nearly 70%), while Belarus and Georgia follow with some 7% each.

Therefore, these programmes remain an important component of conflict prevention activities in this area, but they only concern the South Caucasus in a marginal way, and should be further developed to ensure real co-operation among these States.

### 3.3

#### Specific Forms of Assistance

Specific interventions, outside the 'normal' framework described in the Box 3.3, often have a significant impact on conflict prevention. We must first point out that even within the framework of TACIS, exceptional aid can be provided. This has been explicitly stated in the new TACIS regulation.

#### TACIS Exceptional Assistance

In 1997, the TACIS regulation enabled a decision to mitigate the effects of the Russian crisis on the countries of the South Caucasus. By examining the economic repercussions of the recession in Russia on the development of the NIS, the European Commission concluded that the countries could face considerable social pressure, and that investors could be deterred. It could have a significant effect on the overall political stability. Following a Council decision an additional €13 million (\$11.83 million) was allocated to allow, among other things, more funding for the countries from the international financial institutions. [See Box 3.4.]

In January 1999, the Commission adopted a Communication stating its concern about the economic outlook in the NIS. It indicated its willingness to take some appropriate measures, such as an exceptional aid package of €20 million (\$18.2 million) financed from the TACIS pro-

### Box 3.3: Budget Lines for Democracy and Human Rights

#### Chapter B7-70 European initiative for democracy and human rights

##### Line B7-701 — Promotion and defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms

NB: Budget line B 7-701 was formerly dedicated to the "Support for democracy in the Newly Independent States and Mongolia" and other lines were dedicated to other areas; from now on, no geographical distinction is made for this new budget line.

"This appropriation is intended to cover in the region of the central and east European countries (€4,900,000/US\$4,459,000), Central Asia (€2,900,000/\$2,639,000), the ACP countries (...) projects designed to achieve the following objectives in the promotion and defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments concerning the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, in particular:

- the promotion and protection of civil and political rights;

- the promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights;
- the promotion and protection of the fundamental rights of those discriminated against or suffering from poverty or disadvantage, which will contribute to reducing poverty and social exclusion;
- support for minorities, ethnic groups and indigenous people;
- support for local, national, regional or international institutions, including NGOs, involved in the protection, promotion or defence of human rights;
- support for rehabilitation centres for torture victims and for organisations offering concrete help to victims of human rights abuses or help to improve conditions in places where people are deprived of their liberty in order to pre-

- vent torture or ill-treatments;
- support for education, training and consciousness-raising in the area of human rights;
- support for actions to monitor human rights, including the training of observers;
- the promotion of equality of opportunity and non-discriminatory practices, including measures to combat racism and xenophobia; and
- the promotion and protection of the fundamental freedoms mentioned in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular the freedom of opinion, expression and conscience and the right to use one's own language." (...)

With a provision of €35.01 million (\$31.86 million) in commitments and €28.01 million (\$25.49 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

#### Budget Lines for Democracy and Human Rights: Chapter B7-70 European initiative for democracy and human rights

##### Line B7-702 — Support for the democratisation process and strengthening of the rule of law

"This appropriation is intended to cover, in the regions of central and east European countries (€4,900,000/US\$4,459,000), Central Asia (€2.3 million, \$2.1 million), (...) projects designed to achieve the following objectives in the promotion of democratisation, in particular:

- the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law, in particular support for the independence of the judiciary and strengthening it, and support for a humane prison system; support for constitutional and legislative reform; support for initiatives in favour of the abolition of the death penalty;
- the promotion of the separation of powers, in particular the independence of the judiciary and the legislature from the executive, and support for institutional reforms;

- the promotion of pluralism both at political level and at the level of civil society by strengthening the institutions needed to maintain the pluralistic nature of that society, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and by promoting independent and responsible media and supporting a free press and respect for the rights of freedom of association and assembly;
- the promotion of good governance, particularly by supporting administrative accountability and the prevention and combating of corruption;
- promoting the participation of the people in the decision-making process at national, regional and local level, in particular by promoting the equal participation of men and women in civil society, in economic life and in politics;

- support for electoral processes, in particular by supporting independent electoral commissions, granting material, technical and legal assistance in preparing for elections, including electoral censuses, taking measures to promote the participation of specific groups, particularly women, in the electoral process, and by training observers; and
- supporting national efforts to separate civilian and military functions, training civilian and military personnel and raising their awareness of human rights." (...)

With a total of €35.01 million (\$31.86 million) in commitment appropriations and €28.01 million (\$25.49 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

#### Budget Lines for Democracy and Human Rights: Chapter B7-70 European initiative for democracy and human rights

##### Line B7-703 — Promotion of respect for human rights and democratisation by preventing conflicts and restoring civil peace

"This appropriation is intended to cover, in the regions of central and east European countries (€42,200,000/US\$38,402,000), Central Asia (€1,800,000/\$1,638,000), (...) projects designed to achieve the following objectives in promoting respect for human rights and democratisation by preventing conflicts and dealing with its consequences, in close collaboration with the relevant competent bodies, in particular:

- supporting capacity-building, including the establishment of local early warning systems;
- supporting measures aimed at ensuring equal

opportunities and bridging existing dividing lines among different identity group;

- supporting measures facilitating the peaceful conciliation of group interests, including support to confidence-building measures relating to human rights and democratisation, in order to prevent conflicts and to restore civil peace;
- supporting inter-ethnic and cross-national joint programmes with the purpose of building a strong basis for mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence between the parties in conflict;
- promoting international humanitarian law and

- its observance by all parties to a conflict; and
- supporting international, regional or local organizations, including NGOs, involved in preventing, resolving and dealing with the consequences of conflict, including support in establishing ad hoc international criminal tribunals and setting up a permanent international criminal court, together with support and assistance for victims of human rights violations." (...)

With a total of €19.01 million (\$17,299,100) in commitment appropriations and €14.01 million (\$12,749,100) in payment appropriations for 2001.

#### Budget Lines for Democracy and Human Rights: Chapter B7-70 European initiative for democracy and human rights

##### Line B7-709 — Support for democratic transition and the supervision of electoral process

"This appropriation is intended to finance activities in support of democratic transition and the electoral process in non-member countries. It may be used in particular:

- for measures to build up a capacity to carry out effective election observation operations. This include capacity-building in relation to the training of personnel, including the estab-

lishment of a pool of specialist professionals, the monitoring of media access during election campaigns, the evaluation of the European Union's participation in international election observation missions, and the continued monitoring of the post-electoral situation; and

- to heighten the visibility of the role of the Eu-

ropean Union and the European Parliament in such operations."(...)

With a total of €5 million (\$4.55 million) in commitment appropriations and €3.8 million (\$3.46 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

Source: Budget 2001 - OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001.

gramme, but to be used for humanitarian aid in the NIS (\$18.2 million) — for example, for food aid and medical supplies for vulnerable groups. This decision is administered by ECHO, highlighting the direct link between Community emergency assistance, structural programmes, and conflict prevention.

### Box 3.4

Budget Line for  
Exceptional Assistance

**Budget Line for exceptional assistance in favour of the South Caucasus**  
**Chapter B7-53 — Other Community Measures in favour of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States**

Line B 7-531 — Exceptional financial assistance to countries of Caucasus and Central Asia.

Article B 7-5310 — Exceptional financial assistance to Armenia, Georgia and, if appropriate, Tajikistan. *Former Article B 7-531* “Council Decision 97/787/CE of 17 November 1997, providing exceptional financial assistance for Armenia and Georgia”

(OJ L 322 of 25.11.1997, p. 37).

“This exceptional financial assistance, in the form of grants and long-term loans, is aimed at supporting the reform efforts of the governments in the countries concerned and alleviating the social hardship of the accompanying austerity measures.” Allocation: €13 million (\$11.8 million).

Source: Budget 1999 -OJ L 39 of 12.02.1999.

## Humanitarian Aid

It may seem paradoxical to include humanitarian aid as a form of conflict prevention. This form of assistance is used for intervention in situations of acute crisis, rather than before the outbreak of a crisis. It is however clear that the immediate provision of emergency assistance will cover certain essential needs and reduce instability. In this way, humanitarian aid should be considered as one of the tools available to the Commission for the prevention of future risks.

It is not necessary to go so far as to see humanitarian aid as a preventive measure, especially when one looks at European Community Humanitarian Office's heavy mandate world-wide. On top of emergency aid in a strict sense, the regulation for humanitarian assistance (regulation 1257/ 96 of 20 June 1996, OJ L 163 of 2.07.96) foresees that this assistance “may be a prerequisite for development or reconstruction work and must therefore cover the full duration of a crisis and its aftermath” and “in this context it may include an element of short term rehabilitation ....” The regulation also declares that “there is a particular need for preventive action to ensure preparedness for disaster risks and, as a consequence, for the establishment of an appropriate early warning and intervention system.”

The stabilising element is thus comparable to the development operations for which they are preparing the groundwork. Humanitarian assistance is a way of avoiding discontinuity in the flow of intervention.

**Examples from the Region** In Armenia, even if ECHO has been phasing out its operations in the three countries of the South Caucasus, it still undertakes health care services and facilities to help the most vulnerable individuals such as the elderly, handicapped or those with large families. The Special Assistance Programme also intends to assist vulnerable groups going through a difficult phase of socio-economic reforms.

In Azerbaijan, ECHO provided assistance to the victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but began to phase out the assistance in 1996 because the worst humanitarian crisis was deemed to be over. Thus, assistance now focuses essentially on supporting local health care structures



and on activities aimed at decreasing dependency on humanitarian aid. Such activities include agricultural self-sufficiency projects. Nevertheless, traditional relief assistance continues, particularly for Internally Displaced Persons – IDPs and refugees in collective centres and camps.

Indeed, the issue of refugees remains a sensitive one. A specific regulation for refugees and displaced persons in Asia and Latin America (regulation No. 443/ 97, *Of L 68* of 8.03.1997), does not apply to the countries of the South Caucasus. As a consequence, ECHO constitutes the main source of assistance when a disaster occurs in the Caucasus. The regulation foresees that the assistance can be extended to cover repatriation and reintegration, as has occurred in some of the Caucasus countries.

Finally, the assistance provided in Georgia focuses on IDPs. Abkhazia still struggles with the problem of refugees and disabled people affected by ethnic conflicts. Food and medical aid were priorities for emergency assistance, as well as drinking water and the rehabilitation of sanitation facilities and schools.

**Table 3.1**

*ECHO Budget*

**ECHO Budget: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**  
**Period 1993–2000 (in million €)**

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Armenia	10.39	19.09	25.90	5.07	2.10	1.60	2.10	0.60
Azerbaijan	12.24	18.85	28.82	7.70	6.10	4.10	3.36	1.50
Georgia	11.77	17.81	27.47	10.17	5.80	3.96	3.00	3.25

**Focus on Natural Disasters** It emerges clearly that ECHO understands the term ‘prevention’ mainly from the point-of-view of natural disasters. ECHO appears reluctant even now to become involved in the prevention of conflicts, which it sees as being too political an area. A recent global evaluation of ECHO<sup>14</sup> has indicated that the service is quite happy to see the positive impact of its assistance in contributing to the positive resolution of wider peace processes (Palestine, Niger, Colombia being the cases quoted). A recent reduction in the availability of funds globally – because of the crisis in Kosovo – could mean that this conservative preference will be further accentuated with ECHO concentrating on its basic mandate. [See Table 3.1. for details on the ECHO budget 1993–2000.]

**Co-operation with NGOs and INGOs** To carry out its humanitarian mandate, the Commission works with some 150 European NGOs and a handful of international organisations (including the Red Cross movement). The NGOs are invited to sign a partnership framework agreement. A new framework has come into force in January 1999, and is being endorsed by NGOs and international organisations. For the South Caucasus, the relevant ECHO unit, ECHO 3, has been signing contracts on the basis of proposals. A Global Plan,<sup>15</sup> which includes considerations of support to stability, was signed with Médecins Sans Frontières

<sup>14</sup> Evaluation of EC Humanitarian Assistance according to Article 20 of Regulation 1257/ 96, ECHO 5.

<sup>15</sup> The 1999 Global Plan amounts to €535,000 (\$486,850) for Armenia, €3,360,000 (\$3,057,600) for Azerbaijan and €3,005,000 (\$2,734,550) for Georgia. In addition, €1,500,000 (\$1,365,000) is allocated to Armenia and Azerbaijan and €3,925,000 (\$3,571,750) to Georgia in the framework of the €20 million (\$18,200,000) special assistance programme.

(B/F), Save the Children, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam (UK), Swiss Peace Foundation, CARE, Acción contra el Hambre (E), Finnish and Netherlands Red Cross, International Federation of the Red Cross, World Food Program and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

**Budgetary Procedures** The financing proposals are submitted to the financial service (see Box 3.5 for the budget lines). Different procedures are in place to reflect the urgency of the situation and the amount requested (the thresholds are fixed at €2 million – \$1.8 million and €10 million – \$9.1 million). The higher requests are presented to the Committee of Member states (the Humanitarian Committee). If the proposal is accepted, a contract is drawn up, and the organisations are given a great degree of liberty in the execution of the project, if not in the financial accounting. A first tranche is disbursed at the beginning of the operation, which allows for a rapid start-up of the operation.

### Box 3.5

*Budget Line for  
Humanitarian Assistance*

**Budget Line for Humanitarian Assistance which can be used in the South Caucasus**  
**Chapter B7-21 — Humanitarian Aid**

**Line B7-210 — Aid, including emergency food aid, to help the population of developing countries and other third countries hit by disasters or serious crises**

“This appropriation is intended to cover the financing of assistance, relief, protection and emergency food aid operations to help people in the developing countries, including African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, countries in Asia and Latin America and other third countries hit by natural disasters, man-made crises (war, outbreaks of fighting, etc.) or comparable emergencies for as long as is necessary to meet the humanitarian needs that such situation give rise to.”

With an allocation of €456 million (\$415 million) in commitment appropriations and €456 million (\$415 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

Budget line B 7-215 was formerly dedicated to “Humanitarian aid to people of the Newly Independent States and Mongolia”; several other budget lines were dedicated to other areas or thematic assistance (e.g. former line B 7-217 - Operations to help refugees, displaced persons and returnees). Presently, no geographical or thematic distinction is made for humanitarian aid.

The Commission can, when required, ask for a mobilisation of reserve funds for emergency aid (line B 7-910), so as to address a disaster which cannot be covered by funds available under B 7-20. For the year 2001, the emergency reserve amounts to €208 million (\$189.3 million).

Source: Budget 2001 - OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001.

### Food Aid

The stabilising effect of food aid is unquestionable, considering the vital role of food in society. The absence or shortage of food in the market or a loss of purchasing power can result in riots and a disintegration of law and order. This is the reason for including food aid under the label of conflict prevention. The Commission has often stressed the way in which its food security plans will allow for self-sufficiency by targeting key bottlenecks in the even distribution of a balanced bread-basket. The Commission no longer calls its programme ‘food aid’, but prefers the term ‘food security assistance.’ The regulation on food security states that “the food-aid instrument is a key component of the Community’s policy of preventing or helping in crisis situations...” (Regulation No. 1292/96, OJ L 166 of 5.7.1996).

The Commission has thus put in place food security programmes in the Caucasus, which have taken over from direct food aid allowances provided between 1994 and 1996 by combined action by DG-1 A (TACIS), DG-6 (Agriculture), DG-8 (intra-EU food aid) and ECHO. From now on, the financial assistance given in this area will only be used for financial inputs in agriculture and food assistance for serious and sudden deficits.

### Box 3.6

#### Budget Lines for Food Security

#### Budget Lines for Food Security applicable to the South Caucasus Chapter B7-20 — Food aid and support operation

Line B 7-201 — Other aid in the form of products, support operations, early-warning systems and storage

"This appropriation is to cover the cost of purchasing food products for developing countries and of operations in support of food security (Title II of Council Regulation (EC) no 1292/96), early-warning systems and storage programmes (Title III of the same Regulation)..."

Source: Budget 2001 - OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001.

<sup>16</sup> Created on 1 January 2001, Europe Aid replaced the former SCR (Common Service for External Relations) in implementing all external aid instruments of the Commission funded by the EC budget and the European Development Fund.

When the aid foreseen exceeds two million Euros (\$1.8 million), the Food Security Committee is notified. Tenders are then invited for the project, or a contract is signed directly with a non-governmental organisation or a UN agency (though this practice is decreasing). The procurement is carried out according to public purchase procedures. This aid is managed by the Unit F /5 which is part of the new Europe Aid Co-operation Office within the Commission.<sup>16</sup>

ECHO also has responsibility for emergency food aid, usually supplementary feeding for vulnerable groups, and acts according to its own regulation. The dividing line between the two types of assistance was, however, unclear and a certain amount of overlap exists.

### Rehabilitation Assistance

The regulation concerning the 'Action for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Favour of Countries in Development' is very similar to the regulation for refugees and displaced persons in Asia (Regulation No. 2258/ 96, OJ L 306 of 28.11.96).

### Box 3.7

#### Budget Lines for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

#### Budget Lines for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

#### Chapter B7-52 — Co-operation with the Newly Independent States and Mongolia

Line B 7-522 — Rehabilitation and Reconstruction operations in the partner countries of eastern Europe and Central Asia

Former Article B 7-641 (in part)

"This appropriation is intended to cover measures to initiate the return to a normal life of people in the partner countries in the aftermath of critical situations arising out of war, civil conflict or natural disasters."

"Operations covered will include:

- the re-launch of production on a lasting basis;
- the physical and operational rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, including mine clearance;
- social reintegration, in particular of refugees, displaced persons and demobilised troops; and
- the restoration of the institutional capacities needed in the rehabilitation period, especially at

the local level."

With a provision of €10 million (\$9.1 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

The legal basis for this budget line is not the TACIS regulation, but Regulation No 2258/ 96 of the Council of 22 November 1996, regarding the rehabilitation actions in favour of countries in development. Hence, it is a global allocation.

#### Other budget lines which do not exclude the South Caucasus

Budget Line B 7-641 — Rehabilitation and reconstruction measures for the developing countries, particularly ACP states

This budget line has an allocation of €21 million (\$19.1 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

Source: Budget 2001 - OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001.

**Aims of the Regulation** The Regulation is designed for medium-term actions, which, rather than being palliative like humanitarian aid, are adaptive. These actions aim to assist the population to adapt to the changed conditions which occur in a protracted crisis or its aftermath. These actions are specific, and experience has shown that they are particularly useful for immediate impact at the community level, particularly when the Commission succeeds in mobilising the funds rapidly. [See Box 3.7.]

In this way, the rehabilitation actions contribute to the stabilisation of a country, as described in the regulation. The actions help re-

establish and adapt: “a working economy and the institutional capacities necessary to restore social and political stability to the countries concerned and to meet the needs of the people affected as a whole” (Article 1§1).

**Recipients and Procedures** The institutions which are entitled to such financing include NGOs, but also regional and international organisations, and companies. In this sense, it is a relatively flexible instrument. Local and community organisations can be financed, although seed funding or a joint funding solution is preferred in those cases.

After a brief review of the proposals which are sent to the relevant Unit, the procedures followed vary according to the amount and the speed necessary for the decision and, apparently, according to the degree of support given to the project by the geographical Committee (in this case, TACIS).

In Section 3.2, we have provided a brief outline of the instruments which are available to the European Community to contribute to conflict prevention in risk-prone areas. It is important to note that the procedures applied, and the implementing body, vary at least as much as the general objectives of the assistance. The legal basis for the different instruments is very important. Each basis can be constraining to a larger or lesser extent. We add the all-important human factor which influences the Commission’s performance at least as much as the nature of the instrument itself.

Above all, these actions remain EC actions, and are consequently part of the Commission’s initiatives. The programmes and actions described have been in existence for a few years, but their effectiveness can only be gauged over time. It would be useful, at this stage, to review the more innovative mechanisms available to the Commission under the second pillar of the European Union.

## 4

### Potential Mechanisms

There are a number of European actions which are still developing, and which could contribute in the future to the improvement of conflict prevention capacities of the EU. The information tools for conflict early warning (see section 4.1) as well as a stronger foreign policy (see section 4.2) should help to address the conflict prevention priorities.

#### 4.1

### Information Tools and Early Warning

#### Conflict Prevention Network

The *Conflict Prevention Network* (CPN) was founded in 1997 after an EC public tender, and hosted by the German Foundation *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, as an information tool for the European Community. The CPN was officially the ‘European Centre for Analysis and Evaluation’ in EU project listings. As an initiative of the European Parliament, the CPN was used for analytical support in defining Community policies. CPN hosted a database of experts who could provide rapid and well-targeted information to a given question, either upon request from

the Commission or the Parliament. CPN was funded from a variety of budget lines, but remained administered by a Policy Unit situated in the DG for External Relations.

The outputs of this network were directed by a steering group of experts, academics and Commission officials, and by eight Members of the European Parliament. A working group was established according to the issue selected, with specialists from the relevant sector (usually defined in geographic terms). The quality of the information was dependent on the experts selected. For this reason, standard operating methods had been drawn up to create relations of trust between the geographical units, which often have access to significant information, and the CPN.

The confidentiality and ownership of the findings were gradually defined over the years. This led to difficulties in the implementation of the network concept, as many complained that it was more an index of experts than a network. In spite of the gap between the database and network concepts, the CPN had developed a niche and *raison d'être* as the advisory instrument for the European Parliament and for the Commission. The analysis carried out by the experts could notably help the Commission in arguing its positions vis-à-vis the Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.

The Network closed down in December 2001.

## PPEWU

In a joint Declaration of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Member states have agreed to create a *Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit* (PPEWU) or Policy Unit under the second pillar, placed under the authority of the High Representative for CFSP. It is however stipulated that adequate co-operation with the Commission will be established so as to ensure the coherence of policies under Pillar I and Pillar II.

This unit will monitor and analyse patterns in areas belonging to the CFSP. It will provide assessments and advise the Union on strategies to be adopted within the framework of foreign policy. It has also been given the task of providing advance warning of potential crises and their repercussions on the EU.

PPEWU's role is similar to that of the CPN, but the contact with the Secretary-General is fairly direct.<sup>17</sup> It should be possible, in this case, to get Cabinet-level information, and the analysis should be brought to the attention of the political decision-making echelons. The Treaty stipulates that "the Member states will support the policy planning process by providing, in the greatest measure possible, relevant information, including confidential information."

This unit is unusual in that it is made up of personnel drawn from foreign policy circles, mainly diplomats. It includes one Commission official, one representative from the Western European Union, three from the Council, and one representative of each Member State. The assumption is that technical analysis will prevail over national perspectives. Consequently, the choice of the seconded staff is of the utmost importance, and its effectiveness will depend on the role it will be given by the Secretary-General.

<sup>17</sup> The real question to ask is whether this unit should be placed under the Council in charge of External Relations (Relex), or directly under the responsibility of Javier Solana. The latter solution has the disadvantage of relegating the unit far from the decision-making centres and, therefore, far from the channels of information.

From the point of view of conflict prevention, this unit is of obvious interest because it would allow the EU to focus on specific geographical areas, even prior to the outbreak of crises. There is a greater likelihood of more coherent and effective analytical approaches to issues sensitive to the Union. The question of the type of the convergence between the CFSP and conflict prevention should also be examined, as it does not automatically mean that EU policy will be strengthened in its focus on conflict prevention. This leads us to the issue of common strategies, one of the ambitions of the new TEU.

## 4.2

### A Stronger Foreign Policy

#### The Elaboration of Common Strategies

The elaboration of common strategies is recognised as a prerogative of the European Council (Heads of States and Governments), and hence situated at a more political level in the EU. It contains the seeds of a new coherence in the external relations of the Union.

Article 13 of the TEU states that “common strategies will refine the objectives, the duration and the means which the Union and the Member states must provide.” Consequently, they constitute the framework upon which all the Member states, at the highest political level, agree. Of particular interest is not so much the nature of the agreement, as the modalities of its implementation. We have already seen that common actions and positions applying to a common strategy will escape the rule of unanimity. Qualified majority should now provide much greater flexibility in the implementation of the CFSP.

In addition, these orientations will be carried out in the long term, which ensures a minimum level of coherence. It is revealing that the first common strategy adopted by the Council on 4 June 1999 was on Russia.<sup>18</sup> Based on the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Russia, the European Council defined the main objectives, instruments, means and sectors of intervention of the partnership, over a four-year period. The value of such an initiative is to stimulate long-term management, and hence to be proactive, and not simply reactive as was the case until recently.

The choice made in favour of Russia is not surprising if one looks at the importance of this state. By seeking to stabilise its relations with Russia, the Union is enhancing its political influence in peripheral conflicts, especially those resulting from the fragmentation of the Former Soviet Union. This common strategy redefines the commitment of the EU to this region of the world.

<sup>18</sup> Two other Common strategies have been adopted since then: one dealing with the Ukraine (1999/877/PESC of 11 December 1999), and the latter with the Mediterranean region (2000/458/PESC of 19 June 2000).

#### Emerging Trends in Foreign Policy

**EU Declarations** We provide here a quick overview of the decisions adopted within the framework of the second pillar for the South Caucasus, since the entry-into-force of the TEU shows that several declarations were adopted. The declarations were on elections in Azerbaijan (21.12.1995), Abkhazia (21.11.1996 and 2.06.1998), the abolition of the death penalty in Georgia (24.11.1997) and in Azerbaijan (19.02.1998), the meeting in Geneva of the Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and

Georgia (22.07.1999) and the elections in Georgia (06.10.1999 and 20.04.2000). Beyond expressions of concern or of encouragement about the situation referred to, none of these declarations were followed by actions. Hence, it is mainly in the community area that one finds specific measures susceptible to an impact greater than purely diplomatic undertakings.

One exception concerns Georgia, as a joint action has been decided for the reinforcement of capacity of Georgian border guards to protect and support the OSCE border monitoring mission (19.07.2000).

However, the definition of a real foreign policy could confer a much greater impact to EU measures in the CFSP. Though rarely used to date, some of the mechanisms instituted in the Treaty of Amsterdam offer new possibilities. [See Box 3.8.]

**Visibility of CFSP** An innovation in the Amsterdam Treaty was to give a public face to the CFSP. Up until now, the external representative function was given to the six-month rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union. At times this was given to a Troika which included the current President and his/her predecessor and successor, so as to provide continuity and diplomatic backup if the Presidency is occupied by a small country. The Troika is still in existence, although it has been modified.

### Box 3.8

#### Budget Lines for CFSP

#### Budget Lines for the Implementation of CFSP and possibly relevant to the South Caucasus Chapter B7-8-01 — Common Foreign and Security Policy

##### Budget Line B8-010 — Conflict prevention and crisis management

- Article B 8-0100 — Conflict prevention and crisis management — Existing measures  
With an allocation of €2.5 million (\$2.3 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.
- Article B 8-0101 — Conflict prevention and crisis management — New measures  
With an allocation of €10.6 million (\$9.65 million) in commitment appropriations and €5.5 million (\$5 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

##### Line B8-012 — Conflict resolution, verification, support for the peace process and stabilisation

- Article B 8-0120 - Conflict resolution, verification, support for the peace process and stabilisation — Existing measures  
With an allocation of €5 million (\$4.5 million) in commitment appropriations and €1.5 million

(\$1.37 million) in payment appropriations for 2001.

- Article B 8-0121 - Conflict resolution, verification, support for the peace process and stabilisation — New Measures  
With an allocation of €5 million (\$4.5 million) in commitment appropriations and €6 million in payment appropriations for 2001.

##### Line B8-014 — Emergency measures

"This appropriation is intended to cover the financing of any unforeseen measures decided on in the course of the financial year which have to be implemented urgently."

- Article B8-0141 — Emergency measures — New measures  
With an allocation of €5 million (\$4.5 million) in commitment appropriations and €4 (\$3.6 million) million in payment appropriations for 2001.

Source: Budget 2001 - OJ L 56 of 26.02.2001

Dr Javier Solana has been appointed to the new post of High Representative of the CFSP, who is also the Secretary-General of the Council. It should be noted that this new post is not an extension of the former post of Secretary-General of the Council, which is now that of Deputy Secretary-General, held by Mr de Boissieu.

"Mr CFSP", as he is called, supports the Council on foreign policy "by contributing to the formulation, elaboration and implementation of political decisions, and, when required, acting in the name of the Council upon the request of the Presidency, so conducting a dialogue with third parties" (Article 26 TEU).

The real scope of this position will only emerge through practice. However, the nomination of the former Secretary-General of NATO to this strategic post leads one to believe that the Union is acquiring a new visibility in its foreign policy and diplomacy. Such a position will, for the first time, not be subordinate to rotating country membership. The effectiveness of the new position will depend in particular on the instruments which this new office is given. In this respect, apart from the Policy Unit evoked before – some other instruments have been or are being created. They are not yet relevant to the very situation of South Caucasus countries but are worth mentioning as an illustration of the overall reflection and recent progress made by the EU in the conflict prevention field.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Source: International Crisis Group, EU Crisis response Capability Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, 26 June 2001.

<sup>20</sup> OJ L 27 of 30.01.01, pp. 1–3.

- *Political and Security Committee.* The Political and Security Committee (PSC), was established by a Council Decision of 22 January 2001<sup>20</sup> to supervise the implementation of EU decisions in response to crisis situations. As soon as the new Treaty of Nice is in force, the Committee will take on the responsibility of crisis management under the direction of the Council. Made up of ambassadorial rank from each Member State, the PSC will propose to the Council the overall EU strategy in a given crisis and send guidelines to and receive advice from the Military Committee and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.
- *Military Committee.* The Military Committee was established on 22 January 2001 as a Council Group to provide military advice to the PSC and to direct the work of the EU Military Staff. Officially named European Union Military Committee (EUCM), it is composed of military representatives of Member States' Chiefs of Defence.
- *Civilian Crisis Management Committee.* (CIVCOM). The Civilian Crisis Management Committee was created by a Council Decision of 22 May 2000. CIVCOM receives guidance from and provides information to the PSC in four priority areas: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening of civilian administration and civil protection. The Committee is drawing an inventory of resources required for non-military crisis response and conflict prevention in these areas.
- *Rapid Reaction Mechanism.* The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), created by a Council Decision of 26.02.01, is intended to enhance the EU's civilian capacity to intervene in crisis situations outside EU borders. The RRM draws on existing Community instruments, including election monitoring, human rights initiatives, media support, institution-building, border management, police training and the provision of police equipment, to deliver these instruments under the umbrella of a single intervention as short-term stabilisers.
- *Rapid Reaction Force.* Finally, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) forms the military component of EU crisis response capability with a military force of 50,000 to 60,000 people able to be deployed within 60 days. A decision about its activation would be taken no later than the European Council meeting under the Belgian Presidency in December 2001.



## 5

**Conclusion**

<sup>21</sup> Joint Declaration of the European Union and the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in Luxembourg, 22 June 1999; Europe Documents No. 82146 of 25 June 1999.

A Joint Declaration was issued during the first meeting in Luxembourg, between the EU and the Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on 22 June 1999. It reaffirmed their will to strengthen their mutual co-operation through the newly ratified Partnership and Co-operation Agreements. The EU however stated that:<sup>21</sup>

the effectiveness of the assistance provided is tied to the evolution of the peace process in the region. The EU is ready to use the instruments at its disposal to support concrete progress. Great importance will be given to regional co-operation, rehabilitation and post-conflict reconstruction, and the need to attract investments into areas which have been affected by conflict.”

The Declaration also underlines that the strengthening of ties is dependent on the will of the Republics to resolve their conflicts and co-operate mutually. In so doing, the Declaration points to the limits of the preventive approaches deployed by the Union, if unsupported by the sincere intention of the parties to overcome the tensions.

Whatever the aims of the Union, its policies may be withdrawn if the necessary financial means are not allocated. At the time that the budget for the year 2000 was voted for, a preliminary debate took place between the Parliament and the Council on the subject of additional funding for Kosovo. The funding was proposed without any increase in the overall budget. This step implied that the funding would be drawn from existing programmes, to the detriment of overall coherence in external relations. Hence, it meant that TACIS would not have received the level of support necessary for effective prevention of emerging conflicts in the region.

Such a conflict of interests reinforces the challenge of determining the order of priorities for intervention, and of convincing all those involved that there is a need for intervention even in a pre-conflict situation. The reconstruction of Kosovo was a very real need, but there is no doubt that it was also politically more popular than initiating actions in more remote areas.

It also underlines the power of the member states who continue to determine their political priorities, at times without giving themselves the additional means this would require. Even though the struggle between the two arms of the financial decision-making process is not yet over, the financial implications for conflict prevention are clear. This is particularly the case for regions which are situated beyond the reach of media coverage. It is necessary for member states to understand that the absence of any support in the area of conflict prevention could have a much greater human and financial cost than what is seen today.

Conflict prevention appears to be taken into consideration far more at the *Commission* and *Council* level. Apart from the new steps taken within the CFSP area, the European Community (first pillar) is

22 COM (2001) 211 final of 14 April 2001.

also showing a growing interest as regards conflict prevention. A communication issued on the subject in April 2001 reveals the Commission's willingness to 'mainstream' conflict prevention into all of its external policies and programmes.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, a new Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit has been created under Directorate A of DG Relex, which is responsible for the co-ordination of the Commission's work with CFSP and has a central role to play in promoting conflict prevention within the work of the Commission.

The European Union thus has a large selection of instruments at its disposal to address conflict prevention issues. However, the success or failure of this policy will now wholly depend on the political agenda and the ability of the member states to define a coherent European strategy, for the Caucasus as for any other region.

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# The Conflict Prevention Capacities of Local NGOs in the Caucasus

*Anna Matveeva*

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## I

### Introduction

**I**N SOCIETIES AFFECTED BY violent conflict, independent initiatives and activities by Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) often proliferate more rapidly than in more tranquil places. The Caucasus serves as a vivid confirmation of this. In the 1990s, local capacities to cope with conflicts improved, but the issue remains whether these capacities can play a significant role in promoting resolution of existing conflicts, or act as mechanisms to prevent further escalation.

The paper maps out the conflict resolution and conflict prevention activities undertaken by local actors and institutions in the Caucasus, and their relative impact in achieving settlement of the crises. An aim of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the experiences of such actors and organisations and instruments available to them, and to identify areas of complementarity and synergy with international actors. The paper is structured as follows. The first part outlines the political and operational context under which the local actors operate and the constraints they experience. The second part analyses the types of activities South Caucasian NGOs undertake on their own. This part seeks to interpret their experiences, find where they see the need for more work, identify clear gaps and consider the extent to which it is feasible to fill them. The third section considers the activities of the local NGOs in partnership with international actors and the lessons that can be learnt. The paper does not attempt to provide a complete list of peace-building/ conflict prevention instruments as implemented by the actors. Rather, it presents the reader with a representative sample of what is available on the ground. It concludes with some policy and practical recommendations for local and international actors.

The profile of actors and organisations in the Caucasus appended to the paper is by no means exclusive. The majority of these organisations and individuals are members of the Caucasus Forum – a network on resolution and prevention of conflicts uniting local peacemakers

and NGOs active in the field. The Forum was founded in 1998 and is facilitated by *International Alert*, a London-based NGO working towards conflict resolution. However, the paper covers other actors who are not formal members of the Forum, but in the author's view are worth including in the survey.

In conflict situations, terminology and toponymics can play an extremely divisive role, which is why an explanation of the use of certain words is needed. A view on the political settlement of the conflict is not held in this paper. Hence, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are referred to as 'recognised states' while South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh are referred to as 'unrecognised' states.

## 2

### Political and Operational Context

Non-governmental organisations in the Caucasus, as elsewhere in the world, do not operate in a vacuum, but are affected by a number of internal and external factors which shape their emergence and development. For outside actors it is important to bear in mind this political and operational context. This helps to develop realistic expectations of what the local organisations can or cannot undertake, and to understand the constraints on their activities and vision.

The countries of the Caucasus have been greatly affected by projects to mobilise the local population with the aim of realising national goals, which were often followed by ethno-political conflicts. The development of the third sector was greatly influenced by the conflicts and by the efforts to cope with the consequences of violence. Thus, NGOs working in emergency relief provision or in conflict mitigation emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, earlier than other types of NGOs, and often occupy the dominant position in the NGO sector.

In all conflict areas — in both the recognised states and unrecognised entities — NGOs are related to their respective states, although the parameters set by the states in different areas vary greatly. First, all operate in the legal framework provided by the state. The state can restrict their activities by crude measures, such as the harassment of activists and by threats of closure, or by more subtle means, such as increased taxation or quiet arm-twisting. Secondly, in order to be effective, NGOs working in conflict prevention/resolution need to have access to those in power and to enjoy a certain respect among the political elite of their own countries. If they totally oppose the policies of their respective governments, they run the major risk of becoming marginalised from mainstream politics and society. However, this is not to say that they should or do agree with every undertaking of their governments. For instance, the *Centre for Humanitarian Programmes* (Abkhazia) disagrees with the unilateral initiative of the Abkhaz government on the return of Internally Displaced Persons — IDPs, to the Gali region. The Abkhaz side announced the right to return to Gali from 1 March 1999, but no effective security guarantees for the returnees have been put in place and they may well find themselves in a worse situation than before. The NGO maintains that the return and security measures should go hand in hand. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to expect the

Abkhaz (or any other) NGO to oppose the core positions their political leadership holds regarding future settlements.

NGOs working towards conflict prevention/resolution are also the products of their own societies and carry the same societal grievances, concerns and cultural sensitivities. They are, to a varying extent, affected by the dominant ideologies promoted by their leadership. Again, NGOs often can and do go against the prevailing trends. However, it is far easier for them to be critical of the internal policies of their own governments, since societies in the Caucasus are fairly critical of their leaderships, rather than of popular sentiments regarding settlement of conflicts. Moreover, people in local NGOs are often directly affected by the conflict, which explains why they got involved in such activities in the first place. They carry a responsibility for both conflict resolution and reconciliation, and hold strong views on justice and on the obligations of the other side.

**NGOs and International Organisations** The emergence of NGOs promoting conflict resolution is closely related to the activities of international organisations and international NGOs in the region. Indeed, the growth of NGOs often occurred due to the presence of international organisations and aid in a given area. This phenomenon has produced positive and negative results. On the positive side, local NGOs have been able to consolidate their capacities, in terms of access to both money and skills. Their efforts were directed towards fields that the international community regarded as good causes, and certain values, which the global (in reality Western) community sees as positive, were implanted. On the negative side, local NGOs have an incentive to create projects which they think international organisations and donors would like and which they would fund. Such projects may or may not coincide with what the NGOs themselves regard as useful and this runs the risk of having an externally-imposed agenda. Sometimes too close an association with international players (especially in the unrecognised states) makes the local NGOs vulnerable to accusations of losing touch with their own societies or even siding with the enemy, since international players have an established presence in the recognised states and enjoy good contacts with the governments.

The credibility NGOs enjoy in their own societies varies greatly. On the one hand, NGOs at the grassroots level act on an agenda which affects large groups in society. One example is the national army service to which many young men are conscripted and families face the real possibility of losing their sons in ethnic wars. In this respect, organisations like the *Committees of Soldiers' Mothers* enjoy a high standing and widespread popular appeal. On the other hand, NGOs can operate in a fairly elitist world of providing policy advice and lobbying decision makers. Most of these NGOs are not widely recognised by the population at large, but nevertheless play a significant role in promoting conflict resolution. However, it is naïve to believe that NGOs alone can have a decisive impact on the resolution of conflicts, especially as the third sector in post-Soviet societies is newly emerging. Often, working

through NGOs is the only open channel of communication in conditions of outright hostility between parties to a conflict.

### 3

#### Local Instruments and Actors

One positive feature of the independence period in the Caucasus is the growth of NGOs. At the same time, it is pointless to look for Western-style, institutionalised NGOs with clear structures, mandates and solid financial bases. Nevertheless, there are a wealth of organisations, groups and individuals involved in the third sector. Generally, each recognised or unrecognised state contains one or two exemplary NGOs with full-time staff and experience of working in the third sector. Most of the other individuals and organisations are loosely-structured and flexible in their activities.

There are a number of reasons for this trend. First, very few NGOs can provide full-time salaries for their staff and, typically, staff members have more than one job. Secondly, divisions between the state/non-state sector are blurred. Individuals in NGOs could be employed in state institutions, but cherish an opportunity to work with the NGO sector because often they are then able to do or say things which are impossible in their official capacity. Some NGOs were founded by former politicians who still retain strong albeit informal ties with those in power. This includes Natella Akaba, formerly a prominent member of the Abkhaz Parliament and presently the Director of the *Centre for Human Rights and Support for Democracy*. There are young people who started their career in an NGO and were co-opted into the government, but continue to work part-time in the third sector. There are also independent intellectuals often associated with universities and research centres engaged in peace activities, but who cannot adhere to any organisational structure. Thirdly, in the Caucasus and other parts of the former Soviet Union, a substantial number of people, especially in the large cities, were involved in intellectual professions which collapsed with the dissolution of the USSR. The NGO sector was one of the very few avenues where the intelligentsia could survive. Issues of conflict analysis and resolution became a safe haven for many dispossessed intellectuals.

This does not in the least mean that their activities are not worthwhile. On the contrary, many are pioneers who show determination and often courage to confront prevailing moods and trends among the political elites and society at large. External actors should, however, understand how local actors survive and relate to the outside world. The most effective activities local actors can implement are within their own societies. Such activities are described below.

#### 3.1

##### Working with the Displaced

The worst consequences of displacement are currently felt in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Service-providing NGOs assisting international organisations and NGOs in relief provision have been more active in Georgia than in Azerbaijan. They also do important work in improving morale, such as taking children from the displaced families out to summer camps, working with the most vulnerable groups, such as widows and

orphans, and increasing awareness of the existing opportunities for help and empowerment. For example, *Assist Yourself* in Georgia has recently compiled a resource pack for IDPs containing information on the rights of IDPs, as well as on governmental structures and aid agencies, to help make them aware of employment and training opportunities. In Azerbaijan an NGO, *Hayat* is involved in similar activities with IDPs.

However, since the organisation is more institutionally developed and the scope of its activities is much larger as it deals with various other vulnerable groups, conflict is only one of the issues it handles.

### 3.2

#### Reintegration of Displaced Populations

In societies affected by large-scale displacement, there exists a danger of the displaced becoming explosive material—a recruitment ground for those who seek to achieve a settlement through force by the use of arms. Moreover, many of the displaced are confused about their future, whether their best option is to adapt to the new environment or to await their return home. One aspect of conflict prevention is to consolidate efforts to reintegrate IDPs into the mainstream social and political debates and to reduce the appeal of radical groups. The *International Center on Conflict and Negotiation* (ICCN) in Georgia has been undertaking a Programme of Training in Conflict Resolution Skills and Methods, sponsored by the Norwegian Refugee Council. It runs seminars and conflict resolution workshops in Tbilisi and has expanded its programme to the Zugdidi region of Western Georgia, where there is a high concentration of IDPs. While this work is important in reducing tensions and improving the atmosphere in the community, it is yet to impact the radical and vocal IDP political structures, such as the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia-in-Exile, headed by Tamaz Nadareishvili.

A future aspect of working with the displaced may be a shift in focus from service provision to contributing to a new political orientation of the people. Joint efforts by international and local NGOs could be useful for this work. The work could include a series of consultations to draw up a strategy of how the problem could be tackled at different levels, such as with the IDP community itself, international NGOs working in aid provision, the local media and intellectuals, and the state authorities.

### 3.3

#### Initiatives Among Young People

In the Caucasus, contacts and trust are more easily established between young people than among the older generations, despite the fact that many young men took part in military activities during the conflicts. People often point to a generation gap between those whose outlook was formed predominantly in the Soviet times, and the next generation. Due to the conflicts, younger people were promoted to positions of power and responsibility, both as political leaders and as military commanders. To a certain extent, the traditional Caucasian respect for older people's opinions has diminished. In many ways, it is easier for young people to overcome stereotypes and enter into dialogue as individuals rather than as representatives of any political side. Moreover, in societies suffering isolation, such as Abkhazia, the lack of exchange and



communication and exclusion from the wider world is especially hard for young people. Georgian NGOs, such as *Multinational Georgia* and individuals have joined with international actors to promote contacts among young people. This includes training seminars for young leaders of the state and NGO sectors and meetings of young journalists. One proposal is to create young people's peace centres in different areas of the Caucasus, but it is often difficult for young people in the separatist states to overcome political pressure.

### 3.4

#### **Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants**

In separatist states there is perhaps a greater need for demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants into civilian life or into the proper armed forces. The example of Chechnya sends a warning signal of what can happen if this does not occur. The recognised states tend to cope better with this problem, since the number of ex-combatants is relatively small compared to the population at large. Hence, there are more job opportunities and the general political atmosphere is less focused on the conflict and its consequences. However, in both recognised and unrecognised states the authorities may and sometimes do use ex-combatants for political purposes, such as putting pressure on the other side. For the separatist states, ex-combatants may present a two-fold challenge. On the one hand, many are handicapped, wounded and psychologically traumatised, and the resources to help such vulnerable groups are extremely limited. On the other hand, many never surrendered their weapons, do not hold proper jobs and fall prey to crime and drugs. In Abkhazia, the *Centre for Humanitarian Programmes* has been rendering medical and psychological assistance to the ex-combatants, as well as helping the veterans' organisations to get off the ground and build their potential. The Centre also has a rapid response capacity to problems as they arise and organises social events for veterans. In Nagorno-Karabakh, a stricter policy on weapons control reduced the problems related to ex-combatants.

### 3.5

#### **Lobbying**

Despite its best efforts, the third sector has not as yet developed effective lobbying groups and strategies. This is so even in those places where the general political situation is more favourable for democratic initiatives, such as in Georgia. There is a sense that Georgian NGOs have not so far exploited to the full their potential for effectively lobbying their own authorities. For instance, they could make use of Georgia's recent accession to the Council of Europe in their lobbying tactics. Georgia has an NGO Consultation Board within the State Chancellery through which most developed and institutionalised NGOs could attend meetings of the Council and project their views. However, the main focus of many NGOs participating in the meetings is not conflict resolution, but a range of political and civil issues of which conflicts occupy only a part. The Council comprises twelve NGOs and three representatives of the State Chancellery, but its lobbying capacity is low because the focus and needs of the organisations are so diverse. The Council helps the government to draft the text of new initiatives and monitor the social atmosphere rather than focusing on conflict resolution strategies.

In the separatist states, public lobbying and debate is very difficult due to a perceived need to project an image of strength through an atmosphere of internal unity and consolidation. However, these societies are much smaller than recognised states and the leading actors in NGOs / civil society are part of the tightly knit political and intellectual elite. Their direct access to those in power is often easier rather than in the recognised (and much larger) states. For instance, Karen Ohanjanyan of HI-92 enjoyed the respect of Robert Kocharian during the latter's time as President of Nagorno-Karabakh and was able to use his influence to facilitate the visit of Azerbaijani NGO representatives to Karabakh. However, such NGO representatives have to be cautious since tolerance of dissident views is limited, as suggested by the emigration of members of the political elite from unrecognised regimes.

### 3.6

#### Constitutional Change

As some of the conflicts in the Caucasus initially revolved around issues of status, power, devolution and autonomy, it is important to address such issues at an early stage of the conflict resolution process. Given Azerbaijan's constitutional commitment to a unitary state it is unclear how the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh can fit in with the overall spirit of the Constitution of Azerbaijan. This partially explains the absence of thinking and public debate in Azerbaijan on the framework and options for legal relations between Azerbaijan and Karabakh. In contrast, Georgia's constitutional and political arrangements contain a commitment to federalism and devolution of power, though these are as yet unspecified. As has been noted by Malkhaz Chemia, a Georgian NGO activist, it is impossible to hold talks with the Abkhaz about federal arrangements as long as the constitution prescribes a unitary state.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, scope exists for intellectual debate and activities by NGOs on the issue of changing the constitutional set-up. Georgian NGOs have taken up the challenge by drafting proposals and lobbying the Georgian parliament to discuss new legislative initiatives.

<sup>1</sup> Author's interview with Malkhaz Chemia, Tbilisi, July 1999.

Georgian IDP organisations also lobbied actively for changes to the law on IDPs which they claim failed to take into account the views and needs of the community. The latest episode to galvanise the Georgian NGO community into action was the surprise introduction of a new passport design which abolished the registration of ethnicity in passports. This initiative created controversy in society and the move was opposed by members of the majority community. Georgian NGOs and intellectuals were quick to respond, raising the issue with the authorities and in the media.

### 3.7

#### Research and Public Debate

Since a number of individuals who work with NGOs have an academic background, research and analysis figure prominently in the activities of many NGOs. Many of them publish research papers on issues of conflict, but they are sometimes more focused on the history of the conflict and provide a historical justification for claims and actions of different sides. An example of such a paper is by Edisher Khoshtaria-Brosset, 'History and Today: the Abkhazian Problem in the Light of Conflict Studies', ICCN, Tbilisi, 1997. The other, perhaps more practical field of

### 3.8

#### Mass Media and Information Exchange

research, is that of opinion polls and population surveys. In Abkhazia, for instance, a sociological research group of the *Civic Initiative Foundation* conducts population surveys to learn about demography and migration. One such survey sought the views of residents of the Gali region on the resolution and final settlement of the conflict. However, a persistent problem is that when the results of the polls do not suit the political needs of the ruling regimes, it becomes very difficult to publish them. Despite the impressive research and intellectual capacities that the Caucasian societies possess, there is still a shortage of forward-looking studies to start tackling more policy-related questions.

Many NGO activists who have taken part in bilateral or multilateral meetings note that these meetings attract little, if any, press coverage. Publicity is very limited and the participants themselves act very cautiously. As a result, a multiplier effect is not achieved and people often wonder how meetings with just 20–30 participants can move the issue of conflict resolution much further. In the Georgian/Abkhaz dialogue, such caution is explained by the complications following the first meeting of Georgian and Abkhaz NGOs in Moscow in June 1996. After the meeting, representatives of the Georgian side, seeking to gain publicity, made statements at press conferences and gave interviews which were misinterpreted on the Abkhaz side. The Abkhaz reaction was one of alarm and distrust of the Georgians. While the matter was eventually resolved and misunderstandings cleared up, the incident sent a message to the Georgian NGOs that publicity could easily turn against them and complicate their relations with the Abkhaz. While such attitudes may be understandable, after three years of contact and the restoration of telephone links, both Georgian and Abkhaz NGOs could rethink the situation and move forward.<sup>2</sup>

The exchange of information between Azerbaijani and Armenian news agencies was maintained even when political relations were at their worst. South Ossetia has never been cut off from the outside world and information channels both with Russia (via North Ossetia) and with Georgia have always been maintained to a varying degree. Contact between Georgian and Ossetian journalists continued. The recent halting of the transmission of Georgian television in South Ossetia was an exception and the reasons for this remain unclear. In the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, it proved difficult to open channels for the exchange of information. Such initiatives were initially facilitated by third parties, but have begun to stand on their own. They were given a boost in 1997, when telephone lines between Georgia and Abkhazia were re-opened. The first contacts among NGOs also enabled the selection of journalists from either side who trusted one other and were prepared to exchange information. For instance, there is a regular exchange of information between *ApsnyPress* (Abkhazia) and the *Black Sea Press* and the *Kavkaz Press* in Tbilisi.

<sup>2</sup> As noted by Liana Kvarchelia, “we should trust more the common sense of the society where we live”, Liana Kvarchelia, ‘NGOs and Unofficial Diplomacy: Abkhaz/Georgian case’, to be published within the framework of the project on *Testing Assumptions about Unofficial Diplomacy: The Georgian Abkhaz Case* sponsored by the Hewlett Foundation.

### 3.9

#### Capacity Building Among Local NGOs

The main activities for capacity building include training seminars and workshops. These are normally initiated by international organisations or NGOs which conduct the first training sessions. Follow-up includes support for sending local NGO activists to attend conflict resolution courses abroad (held by organisations such as *Responding to Conflict*). At present, the *Centre for Humanitarian Programmes* (Abkhazia) functions as a resource centre for other NGOs. Another part of this remit is the creation of umbrella organisations for information exchange and lobbying. However, a key obstacle to better interaction between local and international actors is the lack of proficiency in English by local actors and in local languages by international actors.

### 3.10

#### Enhancing Citizens' Security

Activities for enhancing the security of citizens are mainly taken up by international organisations together with the respective governments and local actors. At present, such activities are: creating awareness of land mines, repairing schools and other public buildings damaged by war and monitoring human rights.

### 3.11

#### Pan-Caucasus Initiatives

Projects with other groups in the Caucasus initiated by local actors themselves normally have a certain political undertone, however subtle, or are often perceived as such. For instance, South Ossetian and Circassian organisations seek and maintain contacts with Abkhaz NGOs for activities such as citizens' education or sporting exchanges, but this is greatly facilitated by their common political agenda. A similar process can be seen in the links between Georgian, Chechen and Azerbaijani NGOs. This is not to say that such initiatives are unworthy. To the contrary, such initiatives can be very appropriate. For instance, in summer 1999, an Abkhaz NGO representative spoke to activists from the Cherkess community in Karachay-Cherkess to alert them to the lessons of the run-up to the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, in order to help prevent escalation of the conflict. However, it is important to be sensitive and bear in mind how such contacts and initiatives could be regarded by the other side.

## 4

#### Activities Facilitated by External Actors

A number of high profile multilateral and bilateral initiatives, sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, fall outside the remit of this paper. This part will concentrate on the interventions by international NGOs to bring together parties to conflict in bilateral or multilateral fora.

It is impossible to do justice to all international NGOs doing good work in conflict resolution in the Caucasus. Some of them are mentioned in the text as examples. For a full description of the NGOs dealing with the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, see *Accord 7: A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process*, Conciliation Resources, 1999. However, the individual who deserves a special mention is Martin Schummer (UNV). His dedicated efforts in building bridges between the Georgians and the Abkhaz stand out as a service to humanity.

## 4.1

### Bilateral Dialogue Intervention

International NGOs played a significant role in opening up channels for dialogue between parties to conflicts after having facilitated and sponsored a number of direct contacts between the opponents. Such contacts differ a great deal in the three South Caucasian conflicts. In Nagorno-Karabakh, these contacts are not extensive but it is important to note that they were initiated by the Karabakh side which saw the need for reconciliation and the value of holding a dialogue with Azerbaijanis. At present, the South Ossetians have established a working interaction with the Georgian partners and deal directly with them on issues as they arise.

In Abkhazia, contacts are promoted by international organisations and NGOs, working with Georgian partners. The Abkhaz regard such contacts as yet another way to incorporate Abkhazia back into Georgia. These efforts are sometimes dubbed as 'peace enforcement' for civil society.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the Abkhaz are suspicious that participation by Georgian NGOs in joint projects is mainly due to pragmatic reasons, such as improving their chances of securing funding. Many in Abkhazia ask why they should meet and talk to the Georgians as long as they refuse to recognise the Abkhaz right to independence. Abkhaz NGOs have come under attack in their own society more than once for meeting with Georgians. However, they believe that since the conflict happened with the Georgians, relationships should be restored first and foremost with them.

In three years of bilateral interaction the main achievement remains the same, i.e. the establishment of channels of communication. Remarkably, these channels withstood the impact of the spring 1999 armed clashes in the Gali region. It seems that for the moment the external players have to rethink whether they should persevere with bilateral confidence-building measures, or pause to see whether the Abkhaz side would come up with new initiatives. However, a positive outcome of the dialogue interventions is that relations between individual people have been restored. As one respondent put it, 'each society now has a small number of people who do not suffer from stress when meeting people from the other side'. However, even NGO representatives from the separatist states who co-operate easily with their counterparts from the opposite side, do not give up their political positions, such as the commitment to independence.<sup>4</sup>

It remains uncertain whether bilateral contacts between NGOs play a significant role in conflict prevention. Since the relationship between Georgia and South Ossetia is beyond the point where either side is likely to revert to violence, and the Armenian Karabakh armed forces enjoy overwhelming military superiority over the Azerbaijani army, Abkhazia is the only place where the resumption of hostilities remains a possibility. In spring 1998, Georgian and Abkhaz NGOs were unable to put pressure on their authorities and guerrilla groups to prevent violence in the Gali region despite numerous early warning signals.<sup>5</sup> The way the situation is unfolding, a repetition of the Gali events cannot be ex-

<sup>3</sup> Liana Kvachelia, *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Author's interviews with Dina Alborova, Tskhinvali, and numerous interviews with Abkhaz NGOs in Sukhumi, June 1999.

<sup>5</sup> To be fair to the local NGOs, international actors were not able to prevent the outbreak of violence either.

## 4.2

### Multilateral Dialogue Intervention

cluded. It appears that most Abkhaz NGO representatives do not regard bilateral meetings as a conflict prevention tool.

There is no shortage of multilateral or integrationist projects in the Caucasus. The majority of the projects are externally generated and are designed to promote co-operation between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Other projects seek to incorporate people from unrecognised states as well, but often questions of neutrality, logistics, and the fact that the recognised states have greater capacity to deliver make an ongoing dialogue unworkable. In this regard the Caucasus Forum is fortunate since it reflects a more genuine desire for closer contact and does not have an overloaded political agenda. The strength of the Caucasus Forum includes its freer atmosphere for debate and human interaction and the opportunity to take into account the broader Caucasian context, its interrelated conflicts, linkages and alliances. For instance, the Forum enabled a dialogue between Georgians on the one hand, and Circassians and Chechens on the other who supported the Abkhaz during the conflict, and helped to build bridges between them.

However, there are issues to bear in mind to ensure the Forum's future successful development. The idea to set up the Caucasus Forum originated with Abkhaz organisations. The Abkhaz organisations reasoned that bilateral meetings with Georgian partners are regarded in their society as aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia. The Georgians are in a stronger position, as citizens of a recognised state they enjoy the backing of international organisations. Moreover, direct meetings with the Georgian side led to controversy in Abkhazia and a great deal of misperception. Following this line of argument, multilateral meetings will help remove some pressure from the Georgian/Abkhaz sovereignty dispute, where the positions of the two sides remain wide apart. Such a forum will also provide additional support to the Abkhaz by including representatives from the North Caucasus. The immediate risk was that the Forum could be dominated by the Abkhaz/North Caucasian alliance, but this did not occur and equal and free debate was secured. However, there are other potential dangers. The first is to ensure inclusion and access from all relevant Caucasian organisations dealing with conflict prevention and resolution while keeping the Forum operational. The second is not to lose sight of the Forum's overall purpose and direction, since many participants have their own agendas. A very targeted approach must be maintained as to what conflict prevention can realistically achieve in such a multilateral forum.

### Visits to 'Enemy Territory'

South Ossetia is an exception to the norm, as there is open and mutual bilateral access with Georgia. Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia remain off-limits for the opposite side. Visits to the 'enemy territory' have been facilitated by international organisations, most notably by Martin Schummer (UNV), to raise awareness of the changing reality on the other side and to provide an informed assessment of the willingness to reach a settlement. Batal Kobakhia from Abkhazia and Paata Za-

kareishvili from Tbilisi were the first to achieve this breakthrough. However, such visits sometimes subject individuals to danger upon their return. The 'visitors' are faced with the dilemma of whether to make their experience public and, thereby, risk being alienated from some of their previous supporters, or to keep the message to themselves, thus limiting the impact of their journey. For instance, Batal Kobakhia, came under criticism from a more radical segment of the Abkhaz community upon his return and de-briefing.

In July 1999, the visit of five Armenian journalists to Azerbaijan organised by Vicken Cheterian and the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland was more successful. The visit was high-profile and even Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev met the visiting journalists. The Armenians could walk relatively freely in Baku and meet and talk with ordinary people. They were also able to visit an Azerbaijani NGO and establish contacts with members of the Armenian community in Azerbaijan. Mark Grigoryan, one of the visiting journalists, published a series of articles on his return to Armenia sharing his experiences and insights. The articles were reprinted in the Azeri press without a problem.

## Joint Projects

Joint projects appear to work best when undertaken under with the facilitation of external actors who can co-ordinate the implementation process and resolve any problems and misunderstandings that might arise. At negotiations, certain issues may appear as benign to one side or, indeed, as a gesture favouring the other. The other side can and often does interpret things differently, since it has fears and concerns not apparent to the first side. As there are a number of obstacles for people of different sides to meet and discuss a project and its implementation, a great deal of misunderstanding and misperception can arise. However, when a third party accompanies the process, it can mitigate tensions and reduce such dangers. To a certain extent, this is what happened when Marina Pagava edited her book, *Restoring the Culture of Peace in the Caucasus: a Human Solidarity Document* (ICCN, 1999) with contributions from Abkhaz, South Ossetian, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani partners. The book highlighted cases of individuals assisting members of the hostile community during conflict, sometimes involving examples of real heroism, and was driven by a desire to promote a culture of peace. However, some cases were interpreted by the Abkhaz side as representing their community in a negative light and gave rise to resentment.

## 5

### Support Needs and Recommendations

One clearly identifiable gap in the capacity of local actors towards conflict prevention is the ineffectiveness of their lobbying. Here, synergy with international actors may be helpful. Lobbying can take two forms: first, raising public awareness and expanding existing peace constituencies and secondly, informal communication with those involved in political decision making. Both tasks are very delicate, since they deal with painful issues which societies often do not wish to confront. In the first task, local actors need skills in how to work with the media

to put their message across without alienating the other side. In the second task, it is very useful to have a mediated link with the opposite community to keep them informed on what is being said and how to be aware of suggestions and comments from the opposite community on how the issues of conflict resolution are going to be presented. Local actors also need the solidarity of international actors who can act as 'sounding boards' from whom they can seek informal opinions.

### **Lobbying Governments and Widening the Peace Basis**

Lobbying governments requires, firstly, access to decision makers which could be facilitated by international actors. Secondly, strategies have to be planned carefully to ensure complementarity on different levels. In the case of separatist regimes, lobbying is even more complicated. In such cases, one helpful way forward might be a quiet discussion with local actors on what could realistically be done without placing too much pressure on them.

There is a perceived need to expand the circle of those who participate in meetings with the other side. At the same time, it is not always possible to involve the right people because of their indirect opposition to the authorities, especially in the separatist states. It would be helpful if international organisations could create more synergy with the local NGOs on how to expand the peace constituency and, if needed, appeal to the authorities to facilitate the participation of individuals selected for the meetings.

There is also a feeling, especially in areas where the NGO sector is well developed and competition for funding is acute, that international organisations and donors are not always accessible for more ordinary, 'rank-and-file' NGOs. Following this line of argument, it is sometimes alleged that those individuals who used to work in the local offices of international organisations, or those who speak good English and have travelled abroad, enjoy privileged access to funding. It is seen as difficult to break through this inner circle as international organisations and donors allocate funds more readily to those with whom they have already worked, and who therefore enjoy more trust. Whether or not such perceptions reflect reality, they are felt fairly strongly. It would be helpful if international actors could make more efforts in terms of outreach and accessibility, and explore new avenues of engagement with the local NGOs.

One danger is that some of the well-established local actors could become so involved in various international projects which often take them away from their own countries that others begin to regard them as having lost touch with their own societies. Individuals may well decide that such international engagement is in their best interests. However, those who plan interventions have to bear in mind the risk of important actors becoming marginalised within their own communities. It is unrealistic to expect that those who are seen as having no stake in their countries could be effective as 'concerned citizens'.

A concern articulated by all NGOs is the uncertainty of their funding base. This is a common problem shared with local and international NGOs, but local actors normally perceive it as affecting only them. It is



commonly assumed that international NGOs have a solid financial base and have no problems in raising funds, which may not be the case. In this context, it is important to have realistic expectations on both sides and to put the message across that both international and local NGOs are affected by the same financial uncertainties.

## 6

### Actors and Organisations: A Profile

#### 6.1

#### Russian Federation

##### Stavropol Krai

**Stavropol Cultural Centre of Vainakh** The Centre is known in Russian as *Kulturnyi Tsentr Vainakhov Stavropol'ya*.

- **HEAD** Deputy Director: Dr Kharon Deniev, leader of the Chechen and Ingush community in Stavropol Krai and human rights activist in Southern Russia/ North Caucasus. Deniev has an MA from Columbia University (USA).
- **ACTIVITIES** The main activity includes monitoring of human rights violations of the North Caucasian diasporas, especially the Chechens and Ingush in Stavropol Krai. Other activities include putting pressure on regional authorities to investigate cases of human rights violations and, if needed, going to court on behalf of those who suffered discrimination and abuse. It also works together with the regional authorities (mainly the department of nationalities' policies) to monitor the situation in the *krai* and especially on the border between Stavropol Krai and Chechnya. It was involved in delivering humanitarian aid to the vulnerable groups in Chechnya, both Chechens and Russians. Individuals based in Universities, for example, also play a role in conflict resolution, but the Centre is working consistently in raising public awareness on inter-ethnic peace. Given the general nationalistic mood in the Krai which shares a border with Chechnya, it is not an easy task.
- **PUBLICATIONS** *Human Rights* bulletin.
- **CONTACT** Email: [vniiok@minas.rosmail.com](mailto:vniiok@minas.rosmail.com) or [Deniev@s-service.ru](mailto:Deniev@s-service.ru)  
Website: <http://thor.prohosting.com/~vint/kharon>
- **FUNDING** The Centre has received funds from the Open Society Institute (Soros Foundation).
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Development of a culture of inter-ethnic peace.

**Sergei Popov** Sergei Popov works for the Stavropol regional administration and was involved in negotiations on the release of prisoners of war and hostages during the Russian-Chechen war of 1994–1996.

- **ACTIVITIES** He is part of the peacemaking mission in the North Caucasus, initiated and headed by the Governor of Krasnoyarsk, Alexander Lebed. He helped set up the *Foundation on Forced Migration*
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Work with mass media.

## Kabardino-Balkaria

**Zaur Borov** Zaur Borov is an active member of *Adyge Khase*, the national organisation of the Circassian People (Adyge, Cherkess and Kabardins) set up in 1985.

- **ACTIVITIES** The organisation's activities are targeted towards promotion of interests of the Circassians, raising awareness of their national identity, history and culture, and improving their political standing vis-à-vis other groups in the Caucasus. The Georgian/Abkhaz conflict raised the political profile of the organisation. During the war it played an active role in rendering military support to the Abkhaz side.
- **CONTACT** Email: Bora\_zaur@hotmail.com
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Reintegration of ex-combatants.

**Svetlana Akkueva** Svetlana Akkueva is an expert on political developments and inter-ethnic relations in Kabardino-Balkaria. She is also a member of the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Science, and Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, USA). She is Head of Department of Social and Political Research, Institute of Humanitarian Research of the Government of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and Kabardino-Balkar Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences

- **ACTIVITIES** She has been involved with the Balkar National Congress since the early 1990s, and keeps up an interest in the Balkar public organisations.
- **CONTACT** Email: asveta@kbsu.ru
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Research on issues of inter-ethnic conflict.

## North Ossetia

**Alexander Dzadziev** Alexander Dzadziev is a member of the Network for Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Science, and Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, USA). He is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre of Social and Humanitarian Research of the Vladikavkaz Institute of Management.

- **ACTIVITIES** He was also an adviser to the Office of the Permanent Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the zone of the Ossetian/Ingush conflict.
- **CONTACT** Email: viu@osetia.ru or sandro@osetia.ru
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Research and public debate, bilateral and multilateral dialogue interventions.

## 6.2

### Georgia

**Assist Yourself** *Assist Yourself (Pomogi Sebe Sam)* was established in 1994 and officially registered in 1997.

- **HEAD** Marina Pagava, a medical doctor in her previous career in Abkhazia, is half Georgian and half Abkhaz.
- **ACTIVITIES** *Assist Yourself* deals primarily with the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict, an issue which is personal to its Head. *Assist Yourself* is a com-

munity-based organisation of internally displaced women from Abkhazia. It operates mainly in Tbilisi and its suburbs. The NGO has a core group of key activists (between 12 and 15 people), and other women associated with the organisation who work as volunteers on concrete undertakings or sometimes as paid staff when there is funding for projects. It works in two main fields: (i) Research into the social situation of the IDP community in Tbilisi and its suburbs (where many IDPs are concentrated), identification of the priority problems and lobbying the government on these issues. The organisation provides aid, both material and psychological. The programmes target individual people rather than communities in general. (ii) Work towards resolution of conflict between the Georgians and Abkhaz through initiatives generated by international organisations and international NGOs.

- **PUBLICATION** “Restoring the Culture of Peace in the Caucasus: a Human Solidarity Document” (ICCN, 1999) edited by Pagava with contributions from Abkhaz, South Ossetian, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azeri partners. Focus on cases of mutual help between members of the hostile communities during conflicts.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** 4, Corpus 25, Plato Nutsubidze, Tbilisi, Georgia. **Tel:** + 995 32 32 06 56 **Email:** ay@ip.osgf.ge
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Bilateral and multilateral dialogue interventions and research.

#### ***International Center on Conflict and Negotiation***

- **HEAD** Professor Georgii Khutsishvili. Khutsishvili has a background in philosophy, was awarded visiting fellowships and has participated in seminars on conflict resolution at Stanford University (USA) and other Western institutions.
- **ACTIVITIES** The Center is based in Tbilisi and is an independent and non-partisan research and training organisation. The Center is one of the oldest and most institutionally developed NGOs in the Caucasus which deals with conflict resolution. It was set up at the end of 1992 and was formally registered as an NGO in August 1994. The Center pursues activities in four main fields (i) Resolution of conflict in Abkhazia in co-operation with *International Alert* (London). (ii) Rehabilitation and training in conflict resolution among IDPs. The rationale for this is to prevent the IDP community to turn into a violent destabilising force which can negatively affect the prospects for a political settlement. (iii) Resolution of conflict in South Ossetia undertaken with international actors, such as the Conflict Management Group (Cambridge, USA) and Norwegian Refugee Council. (iv) Early warning, promotion of public debate and dissemination of information regarding potential tensions in Georgia (for example, in Ajara).

Current projects include: Project on ‘Prospects for Integration between the states of the Caucasus’ (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan); series of training seminars in conflict resolution targeted mainly at members of the IDP community, and an initiative on early warning. It convenes meetings of the *Dialogue Club* as the Centre serves as a venue for intellectual debate on the political situation and policies towards conflict res-

olution. Prospective projects are an initiative on 'Women and Conflict in the Caucasus' which will consist of meetings and training seminars and preparing for a Peace Festival (autumn 2000) in partnership with the *National Peace Foundation* (USA).

- **PUBLICATIONS** *Conflicts and Negotiations* bulletin and occasional short books.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** P.O Box 38, 380079 Tbilisi, Georgia (mailing); 5 Machabeli Street, Tbilisi.  
**Tel:** + 995 32 99 99 87 **Fax:** + 995 32 93 91 78.  
**Email:** iccn@access.sanet.ge or confpro@access.sanet.ge  
**Website:** <http://members.tripod.com/~iccn> or <http://www.chat.ru/~icn>
- **FUNDING** The Centre attracts substantial financial resources from a wide range of international donors which include the Norwegian Refugee Council, MacArthur Foundation, EU TACIS Programme.
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Reintegration of displaced populations and conflict prevention

**Kakhaber Dzebisashvili** Kakhaber Dzebisashvili works in the Georgian civil service and is Vice-President of *Multinational Georgia* ('Mnogonatsionalnaya Gruzia'), an NGO which deals with inter-ethnic relations and conflicts in Georgia and member of the Eurasian Union of Young People (*Evrasiiskii Soyuz Molodezhi*), an NGO umbrella organisation coordinating the work of the local young people's organisations. Dzebisashvili has participated in contacts with the Abkhaz side facilitated by international NGOs.

- **ACTIVITIES** *The Eurasian Union of Young People* has set up teams of experts to undertake mini-projects, such as publications on conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a winter school for IDPs. *Multinational Georgia* aims to highlight the fact that a military solution to the conflict in Georgia is impossible and that action by the civil society is needed to bring people together. The organisation consists mainly of young people from Tbilisi and maintains contacts with similar youth groups in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ajara, Javakheti. Members organise multi-ethnic meetings in Georgia (e.g., a meeting of journalists in the mass media in Batumi) but claim it is next to impossible to involve the Abkhaz. However, contacts are much easier with young people from South Ossetia. The organisation was also involved in a training seminar on conflict resolution and culture of inter-ethnic relations for young leaders from the state sector and NGOs.
- **CONTACT** **Email:** kakhaz1@hotmail.com
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Young people's initiatives.

**Malkhaz Chemia** Malkhaz Chemia is primarily interested in reassessing the legal framework of the federal structure of Georgia. He has a background in Physics and Economics, and has been involved in political activity in Georgia since Soviet times coming from the centre-right political spectrum. He took part in the fighting in Abkhazia (and participated in the ex-combatants' meeting organised by *International Alert* in 1999). He was Executive Director of *Domus Mobilis*, an organisa-

tion which won the UNHCR tender for the best design for IDP houses. The organisation was also an implementation agency, and attracted a number of volunteers for this work.

- **ACTIVITIES** Malkhaz Chemia is involved in designing a package of legal initiatives (sponsored by the Danish Refugee Council and UNHCR) to reduce the existing constitutional confusion. Chemia is also an adviser on economic and technological matters to the State Commission on Resolution of the Georgian/ South Ossetian conflict. Malkhaz Chemia, Paata Zakareishvili and Ghia Tarkhan-Muravi are founding a new NGO, *The Institute of Problems of Refugees and Minorities* or *Institut po voprosam bezhentsv i menshinstv* (in Russian).
- **CONTACT** Fax: + 995 32 92 33 62.
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Change of legislature.

**Paata Zakareishvili** Paata Zakareishvili has engaged in pioneering work on conflict resolution in Abkhazia and has close contacts with Abkhaz counterparts. Zakareishvili works in the Parliament of Georgia and is involved in a number of NGO activities. During the 1992–93 conflict he was responsible for prisoners' exchange and evacuation of civilians from Abkhazia. He was involved in a number of bilateral and multilateral workshops with Abkhaz partners, as well as visited Abkhazia under international facilitation.

- **ACTIVITIES** Promotion of peace and reconciliation with the Abkhaz in the Georgian mass media and lobbying the Georgian government for change in policies towards the conflict.
- **CONTACT** Email: paatazak@access.sanet.ge
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Bilateral dialogue interventions.

### ***Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development***

(CIPDD). The Institute was founded in 1992 and employs five people full-time and up to thirty on a part-time or project-related basis. The Institute issues a number of publications, such as the *Georgian Press Review* and the *Georgian Chronicle*, and publishes the work of its researchers. CIPDD also organises conferences and seminars, for instance, the international conference on 'Developing a Security Concept for Georgia'.

- **HEAD** Dr Ghia Nodia (Chair).
- **ACTIVITIES** The Institute is an academic body which pursues various research programmes concerning politics and security in Georgia. Their contribution to the peace process is mainly analytical. It includes monitoring of ethnic tensions and the overall political development of Georgia, participation in a number of third-party sponsored projects, such as an academic project with the Free University of Brussels (Dr Bruno Coppieters) and with the Abkhaz side on 'Shared Sovereignty and Institutional Design' which resulted in a joint publication.
- **CONTACT** Address: Floor 6, 89/24 Davit Agmashenebeli Ave, Tbilisi 380002, Georgia  
Tel: + 995 32 33 40 81 Fax: + 995 32 95 44 97  
Email: cipdd@access.sanet.ge Website: <http://www.cipdd.org>

- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Research and public debate.

**State Chancellery of Georgia NGO Consultation Board** The State Chancellery of Georgia NGO Consultation Board was set up in 1998 with the aim of providing a link between the government and the presidential office, and the NGO community.

- **HEAD** Petre Mamradze, the Head of the State Chancellery and the First Deputy State Minister. Coordinator: Manana Tlashadze.
- **ACTIVITIES** The Board holds regular meetings between selected NGOs and the Board coordinator, and sporadic meetings with the Head of the State Chancellery. The advantage is that these meetings provide an opportunity to discuss issues important both to the government and the NGOs. Moreover, since its headquarters are in the Georgian Parliament, the NGO representatives can also meet with MPs. Such an undertaking also projects the message that the state takes the NGO community seriously and is prepared to provide them with legitimate space. The Board, however, has a very wide scope, and does not provide for a relationship between government officials who are involved in official negotiations/conflict resolution process, and NGOs engaged in confidence-building initiatives.
- **CONTACT** Tel: + 995 32 93 52 88 Fax: + 995 32 93 15 99  
Email: board@access.sanet.ge
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Lobbying body.

### 6.3

#### South Ossetia

**Dina Alborova** Dina Alborova has a degree in political science with specialisation in conflict studies (from Minsk University) and is working with a number of international organisations involved in humanitarian relief and post-conflict rehabilitation in South Ossetia. Alborova was the South Ossetian partner in a joint project with ICCN and helped to conduct two conflict resolution seminars in South Ossetia with the Georgian side.

- **ACTIVITIES** Alborova was first involved in projects sponsored by the Norwegian Refugee Council and the initiatives facilitated by UNHCR and the Conflict Management Group (Cambridge, USA). These included conflict resolution meetings and confidence-building measures with the Georgian side. At the moment Alborova is setting up her own organisation, *Agency for Social-Economic and Cultural Development* or *Agentstvo sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo i kulturnogo razvitiya* (in Russian). The organisation's aims are to organise and participate in conflict resolution seminars and conferences, promote human rights education and initiate a project on psychological rehabilitation.
- **CONTACT** Fax: +995 44 4 21 93 Email: nrctskh@access.sanet.ge
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Working with the displaced, dialogue interventions.

#### **South Ossetian Center on Humanitarian Initiatives and Research**

- **HEAD** Alan Parastaev (Director)
- **CONTACT** Address: 7 Pushkin Street, Tskhinval, South Ossetia.  
Tel: + 995 44 4 20 03 or 4 23 81.

## 6.4

### Abkhazia

**Centre for Humanitarian Programmes** The Centre (*Tsentr Gumanitarnykh Programm*) is the oldest and the most institutionally developed NGO in Abkhazia employing salaried full-time and part-time staff. They help provide emergency aid to the victims of armed conflict in Abkhazia, psychological rehabilitation for war-affected women and maintain audio-visual archives to document the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict.

- **ACTIVITIES** (i) The Centre has established a resource centre for Abkhaz NGOs which has a library with relevant materials, and runs capacity-building sessions in-house and in all regions of Abkhazia. It recently undertook a small grants competition in mini-projects for organisations in the voluntary sector. (ii) The Centre has conducted training in conflict resolution seminars and workshops both independently and in partnership with international NGOs. This is possible as the Centre has trained facilitators among its staff. In 1995 in parallel with the Georgian side, the Centre was engaged in sending women from both sides for medical treatment to Yerevan (Armenia). The project involved two workshops in order to prepare women and staff for interaction with the other side. A similar project on reducing tensions between communities was implemented with children. Abkhaz, South Ossetian and Georgian IDP children were sent together to a summer camp. The Centre was responsible for the first academic conference on conflict resolution and the political future of Abkhazia, undertaken with a number of US academic partners. Members of the Centre took part in a number of bilateral and multilateral contacts with the Georgian side, and were engaged in parallel projects, such as surveying popular reaction to issues of conflict and prospects for its settlement. Work on missing persons from both sides has been initiated.
- **CONTACT** Address: 36 Gogol Street, Sukhumi, 384 900, Abkhazia. Tel: + 995 122 2 55 98 Fax: 871 761 909 181 Moscow contact: + 7 095 338 43 04 Email: michael@sochi.ru
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Capacity building among local NGOs, reintegration of ex-combatants, visits to the 'enemy territory', multilateral dialogue interventions.

**Civic Initiative — Man of Future Foundation** The Civic Initiative (*Grazhdanskaya Initsiativa — Chelovek Budushchego*) was established in 1994. The Foundation undertakes fundamental and applied research programmes, and hence one of its goals is to identify and assist young gifted researchers in Abkhazia. The Foundation has no permanent staff. The majority of staff are students and professionals working on a voluntary basis with some project-based staff.

- **HEAD** Manana Gurgulia (also the Deputy Director of *AbkhazPress*) and Tamaz Ketsba (member of the Abkhaz parliament and a human rights lawyer).
- **ACTIVITIES** The Foundation has also developed a number of operational programmes in such areas as Georgian/Abkhaz conflict resolution, human rights education and monitoring, enhancement of democracy and projection of influence upon the state structures towards

more democratic values and processes, support for independent mass media and policies towards young people. The Foundation is engaged in the protection of human rights and runs a free legal advice service on human rights. It is presently undertaking a pilot project in developing a curriculum and teaching human rights in secondary schools. The Foundation organises regular seminars and issues a bulletin *Perspectives* which is committed to giving space to independent analytical debate on the situation in Abkhazia and the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict resolution. Other activities include training seminars in conflict resolution.

- **CONTACT** **Address:** 9 Zvanba Street, Sukhumi, Abkhazia.  
**Tel:** + 995 122 2 41 37 or 2 51 02
- **FUNDING** Some of the projects are financed by international donors. Grants from *International Alert*, ICCN and EU TACIS.
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Lobbying, dialogue interventions.

**Centre for Human Rights and Support for Democracy** The Centre was established in 1997 to promote strengthening of democracy and civil society.

- **HEAD** Natella Akaba, an ex-Member of the Abkhaz parliament and member of the Abkhaz delegation to the official negotiations with the Georgian side. Natella Akaba has attended conflict resolution courses at the Carter Center (Emory University, Atlanta) and a summer school at the Peace-Building Institute (Eastern Mennonite University, Virginia).
- **ACTIVITIES** The Centre provides legal assistance in human rights protection, monitoring of minority rights, women in conflict issues, dissemination of information and legal counselling. It also pursues research in the sphere of ethnic studies and conflict resolution. It is concerned with women's rights and supports women's initiatives for peace. Natella Akaba has taken part in a number of bilateral and multilateral meetings with the Georgian side, such as the 'Shared Sovereignty and Institutional Design', organised by the Free University of Brussels.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** 20 Aidgylara (formerly Frunze) Street Sukhum, Abkhazia. **Tel:** + 995 122 2 42 64 or 2 18 03 **Fax:** + 995 122 2 41 37.
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** 'Women in conflict' issues.

**Apsny Press (formerly Abkhaz Press)** *ApsnyPress* is the state-run information agency of Abkhazia and its main goal is to provide information and ideas as understood by the leadership of Abkhazia. However, individual journalists from the Agency are also working towards enhancing more independent coverage and promotion of peace and reconciliation.

- **ACTIVITIES** Individual journalists have taken part in a number of bilateral meetings with the Georgian side, training seminars on conflict resolution in Abkhazia and multilateral undertakings, such as the Caucasus Forum.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** 9 Zvanba Street, Sukhum, Abkhazia.  
**Tel:** + 995 122 2 41 37 or 2 51 02.



## 6.5

## Armenia

- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Working with mass media, young people's initiatives.

NGOs in Armenia are not directly engaged in conflict resolution activities, since there is an unspoken consensus within the society that the conflict is resolved and that the international community will recognise that Nagorno-Karabakh is, de-facto, Armenian.

**Co-operation and Democracy** The main focus of *Co-operation and Democracy* is the promotion of independent political analysis and the role of mass media in civil society building. The organisation is concerned with issues such as fair coverage of elections and strengthening of democratic institutions through mass media.

- **HEAD** Dr Mark Grigoryan.
- **ACTIVITIES** (i) Monitoring of mass media since 1996 in order to assess the trends and assist in building up its independence. *Co-operation and Democracy* participated actively in ensuring free and fair coverage of the parliamentary elections in Armenia in 1999. (ii) Projects currently initiated include a project on 'Media and Conflicts in the Caucasus', a publication on *Elections in Armenia and Their Coverage*, the 'Minority Coverage Project' which will include regular training seminars for journalists and content analysis of mass media publications concerning minorities.<sup>6</sup> The organisation plans to publish a Yearbook on the *Mass Media in Armenia* to provide analysis alongside factual information. (iii) The organisation is involved in a number of regional projects dealing with conflicts in the Caucasus. This includes *Media Caucasica* by the *Institute for War and Peace Reporting* (London).
- **PUBLICATION** The organisation has compiled an English-language *Elections Guide for Journalists* (and an elections website) which contains an outline of the background, important pieces of legislature and a profile of political parties and influential news agencies. The Guide was funded by the Eurasia Foundation.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** 7 Saryan Street, Yerevan 375002, Armenia  
**Tel:** + 374 2 27 21 19, 58 11 65 or 58 75 36.  
**Email:** markos@media.internews.am
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Working with mass media and promotion of public debate, visits to the 'enemy territory'.

**Ara Nedolyan** Ara Nedolyan edits a philosophical journal, *Gnosis*, which will shortly expand its activities to include philosophers from across the Caucasus region. He is a founding member of an expert group which researches and comments on foreign policy and current affairs. The group holds discussion sessions and publishes analytical articles in the mass media.

- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Research.

**Anoush Begoyan** Anoush Begoyan works as the Armenian coordinator for the Caucasus London Information Network on Conflicts and State-building (LINKS ) and also works in an advisory capacity for the

<sup>6</sup> Armenia is the largest mono-ethnic country of the Soviet Successor States where 96% of the population are ethnic Armenians.

Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia. Begoyan is involved in young people's initiatives on conflict resolution and in the promotion of civil society, and participated in a number of multilateral meetings sponsored by international NGOs.

- **CONTACT** Email: links\_am@acc.am
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Young people's initiatives.

**Noyan Tapan Information Agency** In the same way as ApsnyPress, Noyan Tapan is primarily a news agency rather than a conflict resolution organisation. However, individual journalists from the agency do play an important role in raising awareness on conflict issues and in efforts towards their resolution.

- **CONTACT** Contact person: David Petrosyan.  
Address: 3rd floor, 28 Issahakyan street Yerevan, Armenia.  
Tel: + 374 2 52 42 79 or 52 43 18 Email: dave@public.arminco.com
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Working with the mass media, promotion of public debate.

## 6.6

### Azerbaijan

**Hayat** Hayat deals primarily with delivering humanitarian and development assistance to vulnerable groups, most notably to the refugees (for instance, Meskhetian Turks who fled Central Asia) and IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh. The NGO was established and registered in 1994. Hayat runs five projects employing staff on a project-related basis, but has a core group of management and programme development staff.

- **CONTACT** Contact persons: Fariz Ismailzade or Vusal Rajably.  
Address: 8 Gugu Guluev Street 370007 Baku, Azerbaijan.  
Tel: + 994 12 97 30 52 or 97 30 53 Fax: + 994 12 95 80 66  
Email: fariz\_1998@yahoo.com or vusal@hayat.baku.az  
Website: <http://www.angelfire.com/ct/fariz>
- **ACTIVITIES** Hayat's main work is concentrated in Azerbaijan to help the victims of conflict. The regional initiatives include 'Migration Sector Development' project (funded by the International Organisation for Migration) which also involves Georgian, Armenian and North Caucasian NGOs. Hayat also conducts research into problems facing vulnerable groups, and provides training and capacity-building seminars for local NGOs dealing with migration issues. Its members have taken part in multilateral meetings with other Caucasian organisations.
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Reintegration of the displaced population, multilateral dialogue interventions.

**Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan** The Center is the oldest established organisation in Azerbaijan with three full-time staff members, and others involved on a project-related or voluntary basis.

- **HEAD** Director: Eldar Zeynalov, a long-standing human rights activist since Soviet times.
- **ACTIVITIES** The main activities of the Center are focused on the protection of human rights of minorities in Azerbaijan, but members also participate in wider networks and all-Caucasian peacemaking efforts. The Center collects and distributes information and provides early warn-

ing reports, as well as directly engaging in the protection of citizens' rights. The Center's activities include visiting prisons and attending trials wherever possible, liaising with political parties and putting pressure on the government to maintain human rights standards. Its main activity in terms of conflict prevention is concentrated on monitoring and information provision for external actors.

- **PUBLICATIONS** Reports on human rights and minority issues in Azerbaijan (in print and electronic format). *Lezgin News* contains summaries from the Azerbaijani press on the situation of the Lezgin community and a compilation of information from other electronic sources.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** 165-3 Bashir Safaroglu Street 370 000 Baku  
**Tel:** + 994 12 94 24 71 **Fax:** + 994 12 94 75 50  
**Email:** eldar@azeurotel.com
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Working with electronic media, enhancing security of citizens.

**Institute of Peace and Democracy** The Institute was originally drawn from the Caucasus Women's Dialogue for Peace and Democracy launched in 1994 by the US National Peace Foundation. The Institute's stated goals are to preserve peace in the region, establish a democratic and law-governed state and develop civil society in Azerbaijan.

- **HEAD** Director: Dr Leila Yunusova, former member of the Azerbaijani Popular Front and deputy Defence minister in the Popular Front government.
- **ACTIVITIES** The Institute's activities include the protection of human rights, conflict resolution and women's and young people's civil movements.
- **PUBLICATIONS** *Azerbaijani Press on Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms* (April 1999) which provides a summary of the mass media monitoring of human rights issues.
- **CONTACT** **Address:** 2-38 Samsi Badalbayli 370014 Baku, Azerbaijan  
**Telephone/fax:** + 994 12 94 14 58 **Email:** root@ipd.baku.az
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Research and public debate.

## Nagorno-Karabakh

**Helsinki Initiative-92** HI-92 (*Nagorno-Karabakhsky Komitet Helsinkoi Initsiativi-92*) is a long-standing NGO with wide-ranging experience in Nagorno-Karabakh.

- **HEAD** Karen Ohanjanian.
- **ACTIVITIES** The organisation was established in August 1992 following civil society's reaction to events in Khojaly, hence forming its original profile as an organisation for human rights protection. The organisation's focus later shifted towards democracy and civil-society building. Its present work includes issues of human rights, conflict resolution, release of prisoners of war, hostages and missing persons, problems of refugees, young people and women, as well as the environment. HI-92 is an organisation of volunteers based within the broader Helsinki Citizens' Assembly movement. Its main activities are focused on initiatives for lobbying. Since the NGO has a fairly long history (in relation to the post-Soviet period), many of its members participated in numerous

international conferences and training seminars in the field of conflict resolution and human rights. Members have conducted research on conceptual issues of conflict resolution and helped organise two meetings with representatives of Azerbaijani NGOs in 1994 and in 1995, which included bringing ethnic Azeris to Stepanakert.

- **CONTACT** **Address:** 28, Azatamartikneri street, Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh.  
**Tel:** + 374 28 55 01 or 28 29 10.  
**Email:** karandje@hca.nk.am
- **COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND EXPERTISE** Bilateral dialogue interventions, enhancement of citizen security.

## 7

### Questionnaire

Samples of questions asked during the interviews.

- 1 What is the profile of your organisation? When was it originally set up (not necessarily formally registered)? What were its initial goals and did they change?
- 2 Does it work as a closely knit structure, or is it rather a loosely organised group of people not related in a hierarchical way and each working on an individual project? Is their work for the NGO their main occupation, or do they have other jobs? Have they got any training in conflict resolution (training seminars, attended specialised courses)?
- 3 What is the main focus of your organisation: is it a particular conflict directly affecting your country, or do you concentrate more on all-Caucasian efforts?
- 4 What do you actually do (main activities): bilateral meetings with the representatives of the opposite side, informal multilateral meetings, training seminars, working with mass media, working with certain population groups (women, young people, ex-combatants etc.), lobbying, information provision or something else?
- 5 In your opinion, what are your strong and weak points? Is there anything you think you should be doing, but cannot undertake at the moment? Why does this happen: because of a lack of funds, skills, project partners or because of the political situation? Is there something you would consider not worthwhile as an activity in conflict resolution – a waste of time?
- 6 What is your view of the regional (all-Caucasian) efforts? Are they useful? Does 'Caucasian specifics' exist and if yes, how does it affect conflict resolution? Do you take it into account and how?
- 7 Whom do you consider as your partners (both formal and informal) in your state/region?
- 8 Do you measure the success of your work by any specific criteria apart from your own feelings? When you feel that you are doing everything you can, but cannot see any progress, what makes you carry on?
- 9 Anything else you think is important to take into account.



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# Outlook

## The Planning Process for Responses to Early Warnings in the Caucasus

*Michael D. Nobleza for FEWER*

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### I

#### Introduction

**D**IFFERENT PLANNING PROCESSES FOR early warning deal with the diversity of actors/stakeholders and potential converging interests. The planning process developed by FEWER and the EastWest Institute draws on these models and is based on a roundtable format. This chapter focuses on the methodology/framework for planning integrated responses to conflict warnings and includes a description of necessary preparations and planning agenda items to be covered in the roundtables.<sup>1</sup> Examples are drawn from an analysis of the pilot in Javakheti (Georgia). Although the concepts of early warning and early response are interdependent, they must be understood as having two very different dynamics. “Early warning is the collection and analysis of information about potential and actual conflict situations...”<sup>2</sup> The aim is to anticipate and prevent the potential eruption of violence. It should be a process independent of political interference.

Early response is the process of planning and implementing effective policies in order to reduce tensions and/or contribute to creating new modes for peacefully managing conflict. The early response process relies upon the critical and independent analysis produced by early warning systems in order to come up with an overall strategy for building peace in a target region.

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### 2

#### Planning Process for Early Responses

The planning process for Javakheti involved the preparation of a toolbox of surveys of key capacities for conflict prevention in the region, and the discussion of a situation analysis. These surveys, presented in earlier chapters, focus on the agendas, policies, programmes/projects, decision-making processes, and key persons in each institution. These surveys serve three main functions in the planning process:

- set the stage for enhanced co-ordination among key actors and understanding of the comparative advantages of each;
- generate interest among these key actors to participate in the planning events and assist in identifying participants; and

<sup>1</sup> Based on the work of the *Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development* (Tbilisi), *EastWest Institute* (New York), *Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology-Russian Academy of Sciences* (Moscow) and *International Alert* (London).

<sup>2</sup> *Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual*, Second edition, FEWER, 1999.

- help understand the possible responses feasible in a given region.

At the roundtable, a *situation analysis* or early warning report on the region is discussed with the following aims:

- set the stage for informed roundtable planning discussions;
- feed a local perspective to the planning process;
- provide an independent perspective on the situation, thus facilitating open discussions among participants in the planning process.

Planning integrated responses to early warnings needs to be an inclusive and strategic process. A sustainable implementation plan is one that is owned by all parties involved and that addresses the agendas/mandates of organisations operating in a given region. The initial elaboration of a response plan is by a ‘coalition of the willing’, including local organisations, inter-governmental organisations, international NGOs and governments with a peace agenda for the region. This blueprint is subsequently validated and further elaborated by international and local stakeholders/protagonists. Discussions at the roundtable help develop a broad response plan.

Key considerations in the sequencing of roundtable meetings:

- the current situation in the region, and whether local and opposing stakeholders will meet jointly and at a given time;
- whether the implementation of activities is urgent, and funding needs to be generated; and
- convening opportunities and availability of participants.

### 3

## Agenda

<sup>3</sup> Stakeholders are those individuals or entities that have an interest in the outcome of a project or programme. Stakeholders can be further categorised according to their degree of *participation* in policy planning, which is often times determined by whether a stakeholder is an external or internal actor; their *influence* over the implementation of policies; and their *importance* to the overall success of the programme. For more detailed definitions of a *primary*, *secondary* and *key* stakeholder, and *spoilers*, please see “Short Guidance Note on How to Do Stakeholder Analysis of Aid Projects and Programmes”, UK, ODA, May 1995.

Discussion at roundtables helps to generate critical validation of the response plan which enhances its legitimacy. Convening such meetings with local stakeholders/protagonists requires preparatory trust-building activities, strong chairing and good timing.<sup>3</sup> Roundtable meetings can be restricted by number to ideally, a small group of 15–20 persons, and by duration, ideally over two–three days. The planning agenda for the Javakheti roundtable was drawn from the concepts described below:

- 1 Problem definition:** Stakeholders have to agree on the causes of the conflict and share a common understanding of the conflict dynamics.
- 2 Stabilising factors:** In order to qualify the depth of problems, stabilising factors need to be identified which can mitigate problems, or are positive developments in the region studied.
- 3 Spoilers:** The identification of groups of spoilers that may benefit from violence is important as their motives can provide the basis for neutralising or checking them.
- 4 Shared vision:** Stakeholders should be able to agree on what constitutes “peace” for the conflict in question.
- 5 Capacity assessment:** A full inventory of the possible resources that can be brought to bear on participating stakeholders needs to be compiled to assess the breadth of any early response efforts.
- 6 Response selection:** With a refined perspective on the conflict and broad response directions, specific policies can be designed to address the conflict, which should be concretised into feasible actions.

- 7 *Response implementation*: Once a comprehensive set of responses has been determined, they can be implemented by an agreed-upon set of actors. These policies must be enacted at the most effective entry point (timing) and reinforce other efforts towards preventing conflict (co-ordination).
- 8 *Monitoring/co-ordination*: The plan of action needs to be disseminated broadly to groups implementing and funding preventive activities. An organisation needs to be tasked with systematically collecting information about on-going and new projects; regular co-ordination (or information sharing) meetings of implementing agencies and donors should be held.
- 9 *Evaluation/exit*: As these projects are established, it is necessary to assess the contributions that they are making towards the vision of peace articulated by the stakeholders. There should be a set of criteria that delineates the conditions for the withdrawal of external support from the response process.

Criteria for effective strategies include the following questions:

- is the response technically feasible?
- is the response politically acceptable by all the stakeholders?
- is the response congruent with the vision of peace articulated by the stakeholders? and
- does the response deal with overall strategic issues, i.e. the causes of conflict identified earlier?

There should also be a good understanding of the entry points for refining policies, which are discussed in the next section.<sup>4</sup>

4 Bryson, John M. "An Effective Strategic Planning Approach for Public and Non-Profit Organisations," in Costin (ed.) *Readings in Strategy and Strategic Planning* (USA: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1998), pp. 162–3.

## 4

### The Case of Javakheti

Javakheti is a predominantly ethnic Armenian province in southern Georgia. Its ethnic composition combined with poor socio-economic conditions provide for risk factors that may contribute to instability. The province is geographically isolated by mountains with poor infrastructure and economically underdeveloped. There have been no extremist separatist movements and any efforts to secure independence for the province would be a serious threat to the still-fragile Georgian state. The EWI /FEWER methodology for planning early responses focuses on five critical areas: analysis (of indicators and conflict dynamics); objectives (for early response); tools (available for use in an early response programme); decision on a time frame for activities; and identification of potential donors. The methodology developed for the Javakheti programme takes into account all aspects of the typical planning process:

- 1 Discuss conflict factors, their inter-connectedness and relative importance;
- 2 Define and agree on longer-term peace objectives for the region;
- 3 Identify key potential spoilers;
- 4 Identify key preventive instruments (such as, developmental, diplomatic, security, economic) that can address 1, 2 and 3;
- 5 Divide up roles and responsibilities among key actors (local, regional and international) who can play a role in building peace; and
- 6 Decide on the time-frame for activities and identify possible donors.



The first strategic roundtable in Tbilisi took the critical step of discussing the toolbox of surveys and developing a coherent and common understanding of the potential instability in Javakheti and a vision of peace for the region. Additionally, peace objectives for Javakheti, response tools and agents which might be used for reaching those objectives were explored. Among these, economic development, strengthening of civil society, overcoming social and geographic isolation, and improving dialogue between authorities and local communities were identified as important strategic directions for the programme.

Roundtable participants at a meeting in Brussels proceeded to review the situation in the region and develop the next steps in the planning process. The implementation of micro-level projects and the necessary administrative and financial support necessary for those projects were identified as the subsequent steps that needed to be included in the planning process.

In May 2000 the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (member of the FEWER network) based in Tbilisi and the UNDP reviewed a revised early warning report and facilitated a validation exercise with local stakeholders. A televised discussion among some members of the roundtable and those who were not able to participate was broadcast by Studio RE in Georgia. A number of proposals for micro-level projects in the region were identified for the Javakheti Stability Consolidation Plan (see Appendix). At the roundtable, a steering group responsible for monitoring and evaluation implementation of micro-level projects was established.

## 5

### **Lessons Learned: Planning Integrated Responses**

The overall methodology employed by FEWER members and the EWI for planning early responses has several notable strengths. First, responses designed by this planning process tend to be more realistic, taking into account risk indicators and the most probable threats to peace in order to define viable and sustainable early responses. In this sense, the methodology capitalises on contingency planning and the political environment in which responses are generated.

The Javakheti experience also sheds light on the need to determine the consequences of likely action or inaction by actors involved in early response projects. Since the roundtable is a form of coalition building, explicitly articulating these consequences is important to that process. By spelling out the consequences, there is a form of coalition “self-regulation” which had not existed before.

Unfortunately, it is these same concerns regarding stakeholder participation which pose serious challenges to the planning process. The roundtable involves a broad and influential set of actors. However, actors usually come of their own cognisance, and therefore, have a greater freedom to articulate their views than if they were acting in their official capacities. A second and related concern is co-ordinating stakeholder involvement in such a manner that their respective interests and political will intersect the planning process at the most productive entry point.

A third and important lesson learned from the Javakheti experience is the importance of pre-empting actual outbreak of violent conflict. The current situation in the region is such that (1) the conflict is not expressed in the form of violence; (2) protagonists in the conflict do not have set agendas; and (3) there is still access to relevant decision-making structures. Once a conflict has reached crisis proportions, it is very difficult to bring parties involved to the mediating table. This methodology is specific to circumstances where parties are willing to pursue peaceful modes of communication and their discussion can impact decision making towards peaceful approaches to the conflict.

Fourthly, as this methodology is refined the roundtable process will advance to the latter stages of the planning process, particularly to donor solicitation and involvement. Donors are partially involved at the start of this process through the specificity of responses developed in the course of the roundtable.

Finally, a special note is warranted on the issue of equity and the selection of Javakheti as the focus for an early response programme. At a superficial level, Javakheti does not have any features which make it outstanding from other parts of the region. Its poverty and political instability seem to be indicative of the overall level of human development in the state of Georgia. Its multi-ethnic nature does not automatically make it prone to violence.

An underlying question at the roundtables was the fairness of focusing on a specific region while ignoring other parts of Georgia. Divergent viewpoints were accepted but the meeting concluded that there were circumstances specific to Javakheti which both warranted attention and made it a particular case for early response. Future projects should, therefore, consider not only the issue of equity but also how the situation may adapt to early response activities.

## 6

### Conclusion

Just as early response has its own particular dynamic, the policy planning process arguably has a dynamic which differentiates it from policy implementation. The policy planning process is essentially a form of strategic planning. Thus, it is most concerned with assessing the planning environment; anticipating the future; and designing action plans to ensure that responses occur early enough to make a positive impact on a conflict situation. In contrast, policy implementation is more concerned with administration, monitoring and evaluation of responses. Difficulties arising from implementation usually occur at the operational level. Thus, future studies must look at ways to improve the management at the operational level of the planning process.

What must be ultimately recognised is that there is an incongruity which may not be reconciled: early warning needs to occur independent of political agendas, yet its ultimate objective is to shape and define the boundaries of a political planning process.

Generating the political means to prevent conflict is a significantly different process from anticipating the eruption of armed violence. Pursuing a successful planning process involves making the most ef-

fective use of early warning analyses and bringing together an array of actors in order to make a concerted effort to respond to indications of an escalating conflict. The most successful processes take into account the various interests of each stakeholder and build upon a common vision of peace articulated from that consideration. The experiences in Javakheti highlight important lessons that should be considered in future roundtables:

- 1** The principle of harmonisation should guide policy planning, ie policy responses should be planned and implemented such that their cumulative impact surpasses the influence that individual projects could have.
- 2** The planning process needs to more formally engage in analysing the agendas and interests of participating stakeholders. Doing so allows those initiating the planning process to take different approaches for different stakeholders. In particular, the grievances of stakeholders who are protagonists in a conflict must be addressed in a manner that encourages them to own the peace-building process.
- 3** The strategic roundtable is valuable for a planning process in the pre- or post-crisis stage of conflict, rather than in actual crisis situation.
- 4** The roundtable raises the level of accountability that stakeholders and/or donors have in the planning process by rendering information presented in early warning analyses more transparent, and thus, the responses taken by these actors more visible.
- 5** To ensure that the planning process is not politicised, the roundtable is most effective when it engages mid-level policy-makers rather than those at the highest level of government.
- 6** The planning process must pay close attention to issues of equity by focusing on those situations in a region that are most amenable to policy responses.
- 7** The effective utilisation of stakeholder resources is most likely when stakeholders are engaged at the earliest possible stage in the planning process and when their contribution to response efforts is clearly defined.

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## Biographical Notes on Authors

**Mrs Glenys Kinnock**, a teacher by profession, was elected to the European Parliament in 1994 and re-elected in 1999. She now represents Wales. Mrs Kinnock is a Member of the European Parliament Development Co-operation Committee and Vice-President of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific/ European Union Joint Assembly and in the course of her work is a regular visitor to Africa. In July 1998, Mrs Kinnock went to Cambodia as the EU Special Representative to the elections there. She is the President of One World Action, a Development NGO, a Patron of Saferworld, a Council Member of Voluntary Service Overseas and is the newly elected Chair of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response. Mrs Kinnock has written widely in the British press on development issues and has published books about Eritrea and Namibia. In 1993 her collection of interviews with British women, *By Faith and Daring*, was published. Glenys Kinnock graduated from University College, Cardiff.

**Ambassador Márton Krasznai** is Director, Conflict Prevention Centre, of the Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe since 1998. Ambassador Krasznai played a key role in deploying the Kosovo Verification Mission and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Ambassador Krasznai's previous appointments include: Director of the Department for Security Policy and European Cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE for implementation of the Agreement on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chairman of the Permanent Council of the OSCE, Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the OSCE, and Deputy Director for Security Policy in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Krasznai was Chief Negotiator of the Open Skies Agreement between Hungary and Romania concluded in May 1991. He has published articles on the "Open Skies" agreement in *Disarmament*, *Vertic Yearbook*, and on the Political Consultative Process, REACT, in the OSCE Yearbook. Márton Krasznai graduated from the Moscow Institute of International Relations in Chinese Language and Diplomacy.

**Dr Michael S. Lund** is Senior Associate at Management Systems International, Inc. and the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Professorial Lecturer in Conflict Management at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, all in Washington, DC. Dr Lund is one of the leading specialists in establishing the new field

of conflict prevention and has done policy research for US agencies, the United Nations, the European Union, and other international organisations. He is principal author of *Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries: A Practical Guide* (with Andreas Mehler, European Commission, 1999) and other books and articles. Michael Lund received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago.

**Mr John Edwin Mroz** is President of the EastWest Institute, which he founded in 1981. Mr Mroz has served as an advisor to European Heads of State, several G-7 Summits, as well as to the European Commission, the Council of Europe and numerous sub-regional organisations. Mr Mroz has received Germany's highest award to a non-citizen for his role in its reunification. He is the author of *Beyond Security: Private Perceptions of Arabs and Israelis* and numerous articles in *Foreign Affairs* and other European, Russian and North American journals and media. John Edwin Mroz received his MA and MALD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

**Dr Anna Matveeva**, an independent consultant, was formerly working with the Business Intelligence Services at Deloitte & Touche in London. Previously, Dr Matveeva was appointed as Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London, leading the project on "Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects". Prior to that, she was Head of the Former Soviet Union Programme at International Alert, focusing on conflict resolution in the Caucasus and, before that, Research Officer at the Department of International Relations, London School of Economics. Dr Matveeva has published extensively on the region and is frequently interviewed for print and broadcast media. Her monograph, *The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland* was published in August 1999 by RIIA. Dr Matveeva was born and educated in Moscow, and graduated from the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow University. Anna Matveeva received her PhD from the Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and is working in the UK since 1991.

**Dr Christine Tiberghien-Declerck** is working for Channel Research Ltd., Brussels. Dr Tiberghien-Declerck is trained in International and European Law, with specialisation in humanitarian instruments. As Assistant Desk Officer for the Middle East in the EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO), she gained extensive experience in project cycle management, financial controls and NGO relations. Dr Tiberghien-Declerck has since undertaken research and evaluation work for EC Food Aid, 1996–99, for the External Relations Services of the European Commission and an evaluation of EC Humanitarian Aid, 1992–96, for the European Council. Christine Tiberghien-Declerck received her PhD from the University of Lille.

**Professor Valery Tishkov** is Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences. Professor Tishkov has held faculty and research positions at the Magadan State Pedagogical

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Institute, the Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow; and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. From February-October 1992, Professor Tishkov was Chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities, Minister of the Russian Federation. He has held fellowships from the Canada Council, Eisenhower Foundation, Huntington Library, Maison des Sciences de L'Homme, Bellagio Collaborative Residence and Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. Professor Tishkov is President of the International Academy of Social and Education Sciences. He has published extensively on issues of ethnicity, nationality and pluralism in the Soviet Union. He is author of *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflicts in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame* (London: Sage, 1997). Valery Tishkov received his PhD in Historical Sciences from The Institute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.











EASTWEST INSTITUTE

The EastWest Institute is an independent European-American non-profit organisation founded in 1981 to challenge, bridge and transform the security, economic, political and social situation in the transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia.



The Center for Strategic and International Studies – csis – is a public policy research institution founded in 1962, dedicated to analysis and policy impact. csis maintains resident experts on all the world's major geographical regions. Located in Washington DC, the Center also covers key functional areas such as international finance, US trade and economic policy, national and international security issues, energy, and telecommunications. csis is a member of FEWER.

## INTERNATIONAL ALERT

International Alert is an independent non-governmental organisation which analyses the causes of conflict within countries, enables mediation and dialogue to take place, sets standards of conduct that avoid violence, helps to develop the skills necessary to resolve conflict non-violently. Located in London, International Alert conducts policy orientated research and advocacy aimed at promoting sustainable peace. International Alert is an associate member of FEWER.



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