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The Eurasian Politician - Issue 2 (October 2000)
Author: Anssi Kristian Kullberg; University of Tartu, 29th Oct. 2000
"Kardukhs, they said, live high on the mountains, are bellicose and no subjects to king. They told that the king’s army of 120’000 men had once penetrated the Kardukh territory, but due to the dangerous landscape, none of the soldiers was known to have returned."
(Xenofon, "Kyyroksen sotaretki" a.k.a. Anabasis, 1960 Porvoo, p. 106.)
* * *
The Iraqi Kurds deserve analytical studying for several reasons. Prevalent image and media coverage of the Kurdish question in Western countries is highly distorted by certain political views and biased entirely on Turkish Kurds, although there are also Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Caucasia, and nowadays a very large Kurdish population in many Western countries. Besides, despite all the biased attention, Turkey has for a long time been the only one of the states dividing Kurdistan, which can be described as a Western and democratic state.
Because of the strong position of political and emotional disinformation and propaganda in the literature on Kurds, a student of the Kurdish question has to be very careful and critical in his or her choice of sources. Especially from the 1970s on, a huge part of the sources available are based on one single, originally Marxist and purposefully propagandistic, source; the one by Abdulrahman Qasimlu (leader of KDPI), published in Prague in 1965. For example the studies of Martin van Bruinessen, Elin Clason & Mahmut Baksi, Ferhad Ibrahim, and Gerard Chaliand, are based on this and the openly Marxist and anti-Turkish aims have been hardly hidden in the whole newer literature based on the original material. (Leitzinger, 1999, 113.)
Among Kurds themselves, the Turkish communist terrorist organisation PKK, with its countless satellite organisations, has unfortunately strongly dominated the Kurdish information in Europe. (Ibid. 113.) As the PKK represents an extremist and exceptional Kurdish view, the one-party monopoly in Kurdish information in the West has unfortunately distorted the whole view on both Kurds and their supposed enemy regimes.
Basically the Western leftist lobby and press have sealed this sad monopoly for the accident of all the moderate Kurds of Turkey, and of Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian Kurds - the situation has continued up to our days, although there has existed a de facto independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq for nine years. The closest representative of that "state" is in London. For some reason, the democratic Kurdish parties have not had the same resources and contacts to lobby their stand as the PKK. (Leitzinger, 1999, 114.)
While the Soviet and Marxist-inspired Kurd literature did and does concentrate in Turkey, situation of the Iraqi Kurds inspired a new wave of Kurd literature to appear in 1990s. According to Leitzinger, the most profound English book is the one by David McDowall, completed with his articles in Middle East International and his texts published by Minority Rights Group. Another example is Mehrdad Izady’s book, which unfortunately contains many minor errors (years, spelling). (Ibid. 113.)
Faik Nerweyi, a KDP activist (Iraqi Kurd) who has achieved Finnish citizenship, has written a relatively good general overview on Kurds, but also his work is for a great part dependent on Chaliand and others. (Ibid. 113.) For that reason, Antero Leitzinger’s complete study on Kurds can be found immensely important work on the issue in Finnish language, and I have used his work as my main authority.
The definition of Kurds differs depending on which groups are taken as Kurds, and if objective criteria (like language) are expected. For example, many activists of PKK speak Turkish as their mother language and together, and for PKK being a Kurd often seems to be a political (socialist) rather than ethnic choice. (Leitzinger in correspondence to me, 1998.)
Another problem is the sliding shift of dialects from Kurdic to Persian in Iran. Medium estimates, however, speak about 20-30 million Kurds, half of them living in Turkey and a fourth-part in Iran. Every fourth citizen of both Turkey and Iraq would then be Kurdish, every eighth in Iran, and every tenth in Syria. (Leitzinger 1999, 7, 133.)
The European conception of "nation" based on a language came to the area relatively late, by the reformation and modernisation of Turkey by Atatürk. Traditionally religion (or simply tradition) was often a more important definer of nation than language. The traditions have however faded. (Ibid. 9-10.)
Most Kurds are bilingual (ibid. 7.) and many speak Turkish, Persian or Arabic even as their mother language. Moreover, Kurdish is actually not one language but a bunch of Iranic languages/dialects, which are considered by the Iranian government as dialects of Persian. Among the Kurds the differences between dialects are big and all Kurds do not understand each other’s speech. (McDowall 1992, 3, 12.) [Same situation prevails in regard to the Caucasic languages; for example in Georgia the two main linguistic groups, Kartvelians and Megrelians actually do not speak ‘Georgian’ but two languages that are more distant to each other than German and Dutch.]
The oldest literary Kurdish language is Sorani, which is spoken in Iraq (Sulaymaniah region) and Iran. The majority of Kurds speaks Kurmandji - in Iraq it is called Badini and it is spoken in the regions of Zakho, Aqrah and Amadiyah. The national epic "Mem u Zin" was written in Kurmandji. (Leitzinger, 1999, 8.) Besides these, there are people speaking Zaza in Tunceli region (‘Zazakistan’; Vorhoff, 1995, 111.), and Gurani in Kermanshah. Sometimes also the Luris of Iran’s Luristan are included in the Kurdish group of Iranic languages. (McDowall, 1992, 8.)
As if the Kurds were not enough split by their language(s), they are also far from united in faith. Excluding the modern "Euro-Islam" and "ghetto Islam" (Bassam Tibi in Der Spiegel 31/27th July 1998) of many young Kurds in the Western cities, and recent converts to Christianity (in the West) and atheism (communists), I concentrate in the traditional religions of the Kurds.
The conventional Islam is represented among Kurds by the Sunnite school of Shâfi Muslims, who constitute the absolute majority of Kurds, including almost all speakers of Kurmandji. In Iraq, these people have no problems due to their religion. (In Shi’ite Iran they are discriminated.) (Leitzinger, 1999, 10.) However, the originally Iranian Feili Kurds are Shi’ites, and they migrated historically to South Iraqi cities. Especially in 1971 and 1980 Iraq has expelled the descendants of these people "back" to Iran (where most of them have never lived), and whom Iran has not welcomed warmly. Because of their Shi’ite faith, however, the Feilis have had less problems in Iran than other Kurds. (McDowall, 1996, 11.)
However, there are many exceptional Shi’ite sects influencing among Kurds. Many of these so-called Yazdanists (the name refers to cult of angels) have got influences from Zoroastrianism (Ceviz, 63-65.) and early Christianity: Some of them emphasise Ali’s meaning in a way that resembles the Trinity doctrine, and some include the idea of reincarnation and permission to drink wine in their religion. Many Muslims find these sects even non-Muslim. According to Leitzinger, as many as a third-part of all Kurds represent "Yazdanism". (Leitzinger, 1999, 10-11.)
The most potential religious group of Kurds for persecution and suspicion have been the Yesids. (McDowall 1992, 14.) Namely, they have been called ‘Satan worshippers’ because of their strange myth that there is no hell, because Satan (a fallen angel) has repelled his sin and helps now the believers to get saved. His symbol is a peacock.
In fact, the Yesids, who are all Kurds, have mixed up elements of different religions: Jewish norms of eating and permission to drink wine, circumcision, sacraments corresponding Christian baptism and communion, a three-day fast in the middle of winter, new year in early April, prayers towards sun, an autumnal pilgrimage to Sheikh Ali’s grave (he lived in the 1100s), and Manichaean calendar. The Yesids speak a dialect of Kurmandji, but hardly understand other Kurds. They isolate themselves from others due to their exclusive religion. (Leitzinger, 1999, 11.)
The most important Yesid communities are in Syria, Iraq and in Armenia, and their centre is near the town of Shaykhan in the de facto independent Kurdistan of North Iraq. However, most of the Yesids live on Mt. Jabal Sinjar in the Iraqi-controlled area. (NZZ, 28th Apr. 1993.)
Up until 1950s there were also lots of Jewish Kurds in Iraq, but they fled the Iraqi regime’s policy to Israel. Muslim Kurds helped them, which Israel later awarded by arming the Kurdish rebels in 1965-1975. (Nisan, 1991, 240-241; McDowall, 1996, 320, 331.) Some of the old Oriental Christian groups - Nestorians (Assyrians), Caldeans (Iraqi Uniates), Jacobites, Syrian Uniates and Armenian Monophysites - have been mixed with Kurds. The Nestorians are close to Islam. In Iran there are also some Kurdish Bahais, whose position is very oppressed. (Leitzinger, 1999, 14.)
The area where Kurds can be said to form a majority, concentrates in Southeast Turkey, North Iraq, and Northwest Iran. Besides, significant Kurdish areas are splintered around a larger area from Antioch (Hatay) to Meskheti region on Turkish-Georgian border (in Turkey the province of Ardahan), to Armenia and the now Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani stripe that used to separate Karabagh (occupied by Armenia) from Armenia proper. In Syria, the Kurd-majority areas are in the north, north from Aleppo (Halab) and Hasakah. (Leitzinger, 1999, 6.)
However, the issue is much more complicated, because all the region has traditionally been multiethnic. For example, in many Kurdish areas all the cities have been inhabited by Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs and Turks, while the Kurds have been living on the mountains and in villages. (Ibid. 18.)
The massacres of the WW I changed the ethnic map radically - the Armenian, Greek and Kurdish genocides are well-known, correspondent genocide of Turks and especially the biggest genocide of the 1800s, the Circassian genocide committed by Russia, are much less known. (Leitzinger, 2000: ‘The Circassian Genocide’.) When speaking about the Kurdish genocide, people think about the newer events in Turkey, although the much larger-scale genocide wave against Muslims by Russia in the WW I has remained relatively unknown, although Kurds were among the main targets.
All the states of the region have forced deportations on Kurds: The Soviet Union deported Kurds from the Caucasus to Central Asia in 1937-1938. In 1930s Turkey deported Kurds to inner Anatolia, and in 1990s from border villages to Adana region. In the 1960s Syria prepared for deportations and many Syrian Kurds fled to Lebanon, where Syria has also infiltrated PKK supporters from Turkey. Iran has destroyed Kurdish villages of the border areas still in 1990s according to a plan originating in the shah’s time. (Leitzinger, 1999, 18.)
The worst, however, has happened most recently in Iraq. In late 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s regime destroyed Kurdish villages with chemical weapons. The persecution of Kurds in Iraq did not stop to the American intervention (which happened due to Kuwait, not due to the Kurds), and the Turkish protectorate over the de facto Kurdistan in the north has not protected all Iraq’s Kurds. In the recent years Iraq has been cleansing the cities of Kirkuk and Khanaqin of Kurds. (Ibid. 18)
Still in 1950s, the Kurds constituted a majority of the population in the Iraqi provinces of Sulaymaniah (100%), Arbil (91%) and Kirkuk (52%), and a significant minority (35%) in the province of Mosul. Also in the counties of Khanaqin and Mandal, bordering Iran, the Kurds were majority. However, the fighting against Kurds and genocide continuing 40 years without pause, and the Iraqi-Iranian war, have changed the situation. (Ibid. 19.)
Considering this, the North Iraqi Kurds were going to organise a census in summer 1999. The census was not organised, although it would have been a criterion for arranging elections in the areas controlled by KDP and PUK. According to Leitzinger’s estimations, there are at the moment about 4,5 million Kurds left in Iraq, and a small minority of them belong to Yesids and other religious minorities. (Ibid. 19.)
It can be said that the present Iraqi Kurdistan consists of the area within the UN protection zone, created in 1991. However, this excludes the important cities of Kirkuk and Khanaqin that Kurds have long demanded. As early as in 1943 the Kurds demanded the provinces of Kirkuk, Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaymaniah and Khanaqin to be annexed to their autonomous area. (Küchler, 1978, 198.) However, even though the provinces had Kurdish majority, the cities had traditionally an Arab majority. (Leitzinger 1999, 23.)
In 1970s, Iraq gave in autonomy to Kurds, but only in three provinces: Dahuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniah. Since the border made the region very hard to defend, it was later expanded with inclusion of Chamchamal and Kalar, which were split from Kirkuk. (Ibidem.)
When the UN took the Kurds into its protection, Iraq yielded to respect the autonomy law that it had issued itself, but still the protectorate only covers less than half of the area demanded by the Kurds. More than million Kurds still live in Iraqi-controlled area. (Ibidem.)
In the 1900s the construction of political Kurdistan began with the genocides of WW I that stroke all the peoples of Eastern Anatolia and Caucasia. In the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919, the Kurds demanded independent Kurdistan, first time defining the geographical borders for Kurdistan - this demand was relatively modest, but was challenged by competing Armenian and Assyrian demands to split from Turkish territory. (Leitzinger 1999, 28-29; McDowall 1992, 2; Wigram 1929, 221-222, 225-226, 236; Nisan 1991, 163.)
According to the Sèvres Treaty, Turkey had to offer the Kurds autonomy and within a year, independence. However, Kurdistan was split by the Britons, who annexed Mosul to Iraq because of strategic reasons, and because the Iraqi king feared that otherwise the state could get Shi’ite majority. (Leitzinger 1999, 29; McDowall.) Britain lost interest to Kurdistan and in the Lausanne Treaty, the newly born Turkish Republic got better conditions. Treaties that Turkey consequently made with France and Soviet Russia, split the Kurds badly. (Leitzinger 1999, 29.)
In 1920s there were religiously inspired revolts, where Kurds participated on both sides, against the expelling of the Sultan (who was also the Sunnite Caliph). Some authors have later claimed that these revolts would have been ethnically or politically inspired Kurdish class-struggle. That was however too early for national feeling; the revolts were religious. (Leitzinger 1999, 29; Arfa 1966, 38.) Marxist-inspired movements arose in the 1930s.
During the Cold War, the Soviet-backed communism started quickly to replace religious rebellion, and the Soviet Union was quickly infiltrating both Armenian and Kurdish groupings with communist agitators, agents and terrorists. First it was quiet in Turkey, when the Soviet Union concentrated in Iran and Iraq (occupying Northern Iran). When USSR removed from Iran, the "Mahabad Republic" was declared by Kurdish communists (KDP, Kurdish Democratic Party) in 1946. KDP (and KDPI) had been founded in 1945. (Leitzinger 1999, 29-30.) The sudden influence of communism in the "ethnic" movement was shown, as in the theatre performance of the nationalist Kurds the audience was encouraged by the slogan: "Long live Stalin, liberator of small nations!" (McDowall 1996, 240.)
The end of Mahabad Republic came as early as in 1946 when Iran crushed the Kurdish state and hanged its President Qazi Mohammad. Kurdish resistance was inherited by an Iraqi Kurdish tribal chief Mulla Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979). (Leitzinger 1999, 30.) Barzani had applied for asylum from the U.S. but after negative results he defected to the Soviet side. (Küchler 1978, 216.)
Barzani’s escape journey to USSR made him a legend, and after some suspicion, Moscow started to train him and his gang into a communist commando. Barzani spent over ten years in the Soviet Union before he was sent to Iraq. (Kinnane 1964, 50; Sudoplatov 1994, 372-378; Arfa 1966, 101-102.)
The other side of Barzani’s incredible legend was that he really spent more than ten years as Stalin’s guest - and yet he betrayed the expectations of the Soviet hosts as soon as he got to Iraq, and became the leader of KDP. When Barzani returned from Moscow in 1961, he was already distracted to the communists’ untrustworthiness, as Moscow was already negotiating with the new regime of Iraq. Barzani washed away communism from KDP in early 1960s, and by 1966 he had cut all ties to Moscow. Those Kurds who wanted to keep on communism, later founded PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). (van Bruinessen 1992, 2; Leitzinger 1999, 30-31; Izady 1992, 212-213.)
In 1961-1975 the whole Kurdish resistance incarnated in Barzani who was leading a successful struggle against Iraqi government. He also made the Kurdish name for guerrillas, ‘peshmerga’ (against death) known in the West. The peshmergas were supported by Turkey, Iran’s Shah and the U.S., while the Soviet Union was ever more apparently supporting the socialist Baath regimes of Iraq and Syria. (Naamani 1966, 283, 285.)
In 1970 Iraq yielded to issue a law on Kurdish autonomy. The Kurds, however, were not satisfied with borders, so that in 1974 Iraq declared unilaterally nominal autonomy for Kurds in three provinces, made peace with the Shah, and crushed Barzani’s troops. Barzani died in the U.S. (Leitzinger 1999, 31.)
However, the Iranian-Iraqi War both offered a new chance for the Kurds to demand real autonomy, and cause major miseries to the Kurdish population both in Iraq and in Iran. (Ibidem.) When the Western media started to lose their interest to Iranian Kurds, the Turkish Kurds and PKK suddenly popped up into publicity. The Soviet Union had changed its strategy and was now playing the Kurdish card against the NATO country Turkey.
Although Turkish Kurds filled the pages of Western newspapers, the atrocities against Kurds were much worse in Iran and in Iraq - two countries that both have traditionally been Moscow’s allies. Most people did not even notice the news about Iraqi massacres against Kurds in the 1980s, except maybe the use of chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabya in 1988 - though it was not the first time. Within the same year, Iraq massacred 50’000-250’000 Kurds in the so-called Anfal attack! (Leitzinger 1999, 31-32; Kurdistan rapport 22/1996.)
In 1986, Teheran negotiated a peace between Iraqi Kurd parties and a united Iraq’s Kurdistani Front (IKF) was formed. The co-operation lasted five years. (Leitzinger 1999, 32.)
The Gulf War offered yet another chance for Iraqi Kurds. The Kurdish uprising in spring 1991 was first successful, but surprisingly quickly Iraq conquered back Kirkuk and other areas. Dozens of thousands of Kurds fled to the Turkish borders, before the UN stopped the attack of Iraqi troops and ordered a protectorate zone for Kurds north of the 36th latitude (Operation Provide Comfort). In autumn 1991 the Iraqi army removed. A de facto Kurdistan was born, but due to the present policy of preserving the status quo with any price (Kosova, Chechnya, Kashmir...) also the Kurds are very unlikely to have any hope of recognition for a state. Unlike Kosovars, Chechens and Kashmiris, they have not even formally demanded recognition. (Leitzinger 1999, 32.)
First KDP and PUK participated jointly in Kurdistan’s administration, but after the result of 50-50 support for the two parties in the first parliament election, the parliament was paralysed and a civil war between Kurds broke in May 1994. Kurdistan was divided into North controlled by KDP and South controlled by PUK. KDP co-operated with Turkey and earned from Turkish traffic and trade, while PUK was economically in troubles and finally agreed on co-operation with Iran. (Ibid. 32.)
In July 1996 PUK invited Iran to attack KDPI bases in Iraq. KDP revenged by letting Iraq attack in late August. The Iraqi army conquered Arbil and other cities that had been in PUK’s control. It seemed that KDP, assisted by Iraq, was driving out the whole PUK, with its supporters, to Iran, but after Iraq’s removal, PUK, backed by Iran, managed to conquer Sulaymaniah back. (Ibid. 33.)
Also the anti-Turkish Kurdish communist party PKK has its bases in Iraq, and Turkey has been making raids against PKK, sometimes in agreement with KDP and/or PUK, sometimes without. The PKK guerrilla commander Semdin Sakik defected to KDP in March 1998, and soon surrendered to Turkey, exposing a terror plan of PKK and claiming first that PKK had organised the murder of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme 12 years earlier - these claims Sakik, however, later cancelled. (AFP 28th Apr. 1998; HS 29th Apr. 1998; HBL 9th May 1998.)
Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest in 1999 and also otherwise PKK’s degeneration into a bunch of quarrelsome thugs may give Turkey a chance to get normalised in the Kurdish affairs maybe already within this year. That means the focus of Kurdish affairs may return to Iraq, where KDP and PUK are continuing their struggle for power of a non-recognised de facto state.
Like in Yugoslavia, also in Iraq the US policy has been clearly inconsistent. On one hand the intervention has been done and it is being continued. On the other hand Saddam is still in power, and Iraq is not allowed to disintegrate, in which case there could finally be an independent Kurdistan connecting Iraq’s large Kurdish and Turcoman (Turkish) minorities. Also Turkey bombed Iraq in mid-August and dozens of people got killed - most of them were not the targeted PKK guerrillas. (NZZ, 24th Aug.)
In Iraq, all the minorities - Kurds, Turcomans and Christian Assyrians - regularly face oppression by the Iraqi government, but the Turcomans and Assyrians have recently complained of the Kurdish KDP attacking them as well in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern Iraq. (Turkistan Newsletter, 16th July; RFE Iraq Report, 14th and 21st July.) The Iraqi Kurdish Party KDP has been fighting against the Turkish communist terrorist organisation PKK for a long time. In July, the KDP reported that it had conquered all the PKK camps in its area. At least 40 Kurds were reported to have been killed in the fighting. (RFE Iraq Report, 14th July.)
In the city of Rumad, 400 Kakai families have got an order from the Iraqi authorities to move to the Kurdish autonomous area: "Families in all districts of Kirkuk received forms they had to fill out concerning becoming Arab, family location during the 1947 and 1957 population censuses, number of the family living abroad or in Kurdish-controlled areas, number of family members arrested on political charges, religious belief, location during the 1991 uprising, and affiliation to parties of the ‘Kurdistan Front’. Every family had to provide the deeds to its house to the authorities. The deed is returned after it changes its ethnic affiliation to Arab. Families providing inaccurate information will have their house deeds confiscated and a family member will be detained until the rest of the family is deported." (RFE Iraq Report, 26th May.)
Iraq is said to hold secret negotiations with Israel concerning the deportation of more than 300’000 (that is: all!) Lebanese Palestinians to Iraq in response to breaking the international blockade. (RFE Iraq Report, 26th May.) Iraq, PLO and Israel have all denied the rumours, whereas the representatives of Northern Iraq’s minority peoples (Kurds, Turks, Assyrians) have all been telling about deportations of people from the Kirkuk area, preparing settlement of Palestinians into their homes. According to the Assyrians, Iraq aims at settlement of as many as half million Palestinians in the region of Kirkuk. (RFE Iraq Report, 19th May.) Later, Iraqi sources claimed that Iraq has abandoned the plan to settle Palestinians in Kirkuk area. At the same time, Colombian army sources have claimed that the Colombian drug dealers are buying land from the demilitarised zones in Iraq in response for the cocaine they have sold. (RFE Iraq Report, 9th June.)
The notorious terrorist Sabri al-Banna (‘Abu Nidal’), who was believed to be dying in a Cairo hospital, was claimed to have returned to Baghdad by London-based Arab newspapers. He is said to have kidnapped three Palestinian youths and executed two of them for that they had quit his party. (RFE, Iraq Report, 18th Aug.) If Abu Nidal is still active, he can be expected to recruit more members among the Palestinians settled to Iraq.
‘Kurdistani Nüwe’, published by the PUK, told on 1st July about the Palestinians settled in Kirkuk. According to the newspaper, the Revolutionary Council of Iraq decided (17th May) to confiscate houses of Kurds in the provinces of Kirkuk and Diyala and to hand them over to Palestinians. During the three first weeks of June, 270 Palestinian families were settled in Kirkuk. By an order of the presidential office on 11th June, the Kurdish and Turkish families of Duz, Daquq, Haweja and Khanaqin were ordered to be registered as Arabs, or else expelled. (Press Review of the Washington Kurdish Institute.) A Sorani newspaper told that in the county of Shaykhan, Iraqi authorities handed over houses confiscated from Kurds to members of the Baath Party. (RFE Iraq Report, 25th Aug.)
* * *
Arfa, Hassan: "The Kurds - An Historical and Political Study", London 1966.
Ceviz, Süleyman: "Einführung in die kurdische Bevölkerungsgeschichte - Fallbeispiel Dersim", year ?.
Chaliand, Gerard: "A People without a Country", USA 1993. (New edition?)
Clason, Elin & Baksi, Mahmut: "Kurdistan - om förtryck och befrielsekamp, Stockholm 1979.
Ibrahim, Ferhad: "Die kurdische Nationalbewegung im Irak", Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 88, Bamberg 1983.
Izady, Mehrdad: "The Kurds - A Concise Handbook", Washington 1992.
Kinnane, Derk: "The Kurds and Kurdistan", Chichester 1964.
Küchler, Hannelore: "Öffentliche Meinung - Eine theoretisch-methodologische Betrachtung und eine exemplarische Untersuchung zum Selbstverständnis der Kurden", Berlin 1978.
Leitzinger, Antero: "Kurdistan", Ulkomaalaisviraston julkaisuja 1, UVI, Helsinki 1999.
Leitzinger, Antero: "The Circassian Genocide", The Eurasian Politician, October 2000: http://www.the-politician.com
McDowall, David: "A Modern History of the Kurds", Bridgend 1996.
McDowall, David: "The Kurds - a Nation Denied", London 1992.
Naamani, Israel: "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination", The Middle East Journal 20/1966, pp. 279-295.
Nerweyi, Faik: "Kurdit", Helsinki 1991.
Nisan, Mordechai: "Minorities in the Middle East", Jefferson 1991.
Rich, Claudius James: "Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan" I-II, London 1856.
Sudoplatov, Pavel: "Stalinin erikoistehtävissä", Juva 1994.
van Bruinessen, Martin: "Agha, Shaikh and State", Guildford and King’s Lynn 1992.
Vorhoff, Karin: "Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft", Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 184, Berlin 1995.
Wigram, W. A: "The Assyrians and Their Neighbours", London 1929
AFP = Agence France Presse (French News Service)
Der Spiegel (German newspaper)
HBL = Hufvudstadsbladet (Swedish-speaking Finnish daily)
HS = Helsingin Sanomat (Finnish daily)
Kurdistan rapport (Publication of Swedish PKK-related office)
NZZ = Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Swiss daily)
RFE = Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Iraq Report
Turkistan Newsletter (published by SOTA; email@example.com)
Revised Dec 1th, 2000
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