



In Democracy's Shadow

A comprehensive collaborative study on the National Security State was conducted by Marcus Raskin over seven years. The volume to emerge from it is edited and written by Raskin and Carl LeVan. The papers in the volume will analyze changes in the structure of the American government and the civil society since 1945. The study is of use as a document concerned with recent history. It is also intended to give insight into the present situation of the national security system in a period of conflict and turmoil internationally. The book will be published in 2005

Chapter 1: “The Policies and Pathologies of the National Security State” Marcus G. Raskin and A. Carl LeVan

American democracy is decaying because freedom has been mortgaged to bear the costs of empire. The present organization, assumptions, size, and character of the American State is a product of its emergence as a world power (now “superpower”) at the beginning of the 20th century and the end of the Spanish-American War. Throughout the century, with the possible exception of President Herbert Hoover and some administration officials in the New Deal, the leadership class has been surprisingly comfortable with this brew of national triumphalism. It accepted the idea that the American State could never be at rest. In its nature and imperial responsibility it was taken for granted throughout the 20th century that it is in continuous conflict with other nations whether for markets, resources, ideology, tutelage or national prestige. And geopolitically, it must never be second.

These activities are both expensive and difficult to maintain. Contrary to propaganda, modern wars are very expensive and dangerous for technologically dependent states. They can lead to wars without end, imprudent foreign and national security policies, which in their very fiber promote the idea of American invincibility as its infrastructure decays. As part of this system of invincibility the society cedes to the corporate economy the planning and regulatory function. While the state can, if it so chooses intervene directly the decision making system is a coordinated effort between the national security budget and the largest corporations. That is to

say, the dominant factors in American life are the largest corporate units and the national security establishment. Their power greatly circumscribes the issues that separate the two parties and while substantial differences were present in the first years of the cold war the distinctions have grown smaller as the colossi of American life have increased their power and reach without bothering to ensure their legitimacy. The unenviable task of politicians has been to ride these runaway horses.

The presumed end of the Cold War – the fall of the Berlin Wall – was surely a victory for the people of Eastern Europe, but this posed a problem for the one remaining world empire that was not resolved until the terrible tragedies of September 11, 2001. After twelve years of seeking purpose, the American government entered a new stage of rationalizing a greatly expanded National Security State. The attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania had a profound effect on the Bush presidency. Before 9-11, Bush faced a considerable crisis since the winner of the popular vote in the 2000 election came in second place. Discussions raising doubts about his legitimacy and intellectual capacities ended with the attacks. Similarly, discussion about re-examining the assumptions of the National Security State and cutting defense budgets ended. In other words the United States had entered a new stage in its Icarus-like political flight. It became acceptable for the state managers and the leader-president to expand the “needs” of the state. And both agreed that the state’s purpose would be best fulfilled through the instruments of continuous war. Thus, in fairness to George W. Bush it is not likely that Al Gore or the state apparatus would have reacted any differently to the horrendous attack on the US by zealots from Saudi Arabia. Vice President Gore had also promised the relevant corporations and state managers huge increases in defense expenditures.

In the face of the present crisis the American system of government continues to be

labeled a democracy or a republic whose practices are irreproachable. Ordinary citizens of all classes are expected to rally behind triumphal symbols and rituals. But in reality these are merely cover stories for the actual operations of political power in a state whose important decisions are secret and whose actions undermine individual and collective freedom.

The state employs a ladder of violence from economic and political destabilization to assassination to the first use of nuclear weapons. Its operations have included spying on U.S. citizens and using them as unwitting guinea pigs in so-called national security experiments. It includes ways to play on the insecurity of people and their willingness to suspend independent judgment. Indeed, President Bush has made clear that the Constitution is not a “suicide pact” and if what is required, as the Attorney General and other members of the administration believe is a curtailment of freedoms in a war which can last for a generation, or longer, then so be it. The American State must act for itself and for the world against those who we deem as terrorists.

Virtually all of these activities and assumptions are grounded in past identifiable laws, rules, secret regulations and bureaucratic structures that determine the present, and the future. In other words President George W. Bush did not have to start de novo. Republican and Democratic administrations alike operated a National Security State through countless regulations, secret memoranda, defense contracts, wiretaps, and hardware acquisitions, which laid the institution of predicate for the Bush II administration’s response. From FDR forward, American political, economic, and military elites shared in the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DoE), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and dozens of other bureaucracies. They collaborated in extending the power and reach of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This framework is woven into America’s social fabric including

its’ educational institutions, corporations, scientific enterprises and the media. It constrains the actions of American leaders and elites and serves as the means to ensure a stable distribution of power and authority according to the judgments of political and economic elites including national security managers who work within a grammar of power designed to ensure that the U.S. can operate as the paramount power in the world coming and going as it pleases with whatever weapons it chooses. What was once hidden is clear for all to see. President George W. Bush is the new steward to manage and use the state as a warrior instrument, whether at home or abroad. The national security state is the form, which protects, umpires and expands American economic interests. The Bush II administration took power as a coalition of religious and business forces that would craft a faith-based business civilization that would create and dominate markets under the guise of free enterprise and low tariffs. Bush II’s Republicans believed that resurrecting a traditional belief in God and patriarchy could be linked to an aggressive business civilization, which in turn stood on the ground of revolutionary technology, innovation and powerful forms of propaganda and self-congratulation. But the realities of American national life were such that the Bush II administration found that it was far easier and manageable to govern an expanding state which had powerful warrior and authoritarian aspects than a liberal, relatively free wheeling culture of individualism and experimentation of the kind that the Republican party claims to represent. The actual nature of the American State involves inertial forces, which have moved uninterrupted, either at a slower or faster pace under different administrations. But always forward. This has been the strength of the National Security State, which merely entered a new stage following September 2001.

The question is how to address the resiliency of the National Security State in the face of extraordinary international changes, criminal activity, and real and manufactured threats. For

those who questioned the NSS the journey has been difficult, fraught with failure. Through the espionage controversies of the 1990s, the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s and the congressional investigations of the 1970s, those who sought to rein in the secret agencies accomplished little. The 1975 investigative committees headed by Congressman Otis Pike and Senator Frank Church uncovered illegal domestic spying programs, assassination plots, and torture training but to little practical avail. Congress failed to curb the National Security State’s power. It was co-opted and simply failed to exercise its oversight responsibility. But why did Congress fail? One answer is that Congress through its committee structure is co-opted into the operations of the NSS. It does not review its fundamental missions, its assumptions, how it can be changed consonant with a free society.

In order to understand the operational modalities and principal features of the National Security State that account for this resiliency, it is first important to appreciate how they are rooted in important struggles of the Twentieth Century. The essays here also discuss more recent events and policies as evidence of continuity and a long-established trajectory. The conclusion to the introduction summarizes the problems at hand. The conclusions to the book will analyze the meaning of responsibility for the citizenry, including government officials and knowledge workers, in this dark time. We will also touch on why the radical shifts in the calculus of world power are not necessarily to the U.S.’s benefit. Being the “single superpower with world responsibilities” may prove to be a poisoned pill as American policymakers respond to direct assaults on American power and ideas with conventional National Security state nostrums. Democratic rhetoric could not mask the actual operations of state power, whether in explaining the American selection process for its president, a failed coup in Venezuela, or the arming of Iraq during its war with Iran.

THE EARLY ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

The transformation of the state did not occur over a few days or years. The continental powers and the British empire were the Americans’ teachers, each nation having its own brand of imperialism, but all believing in their cultural superiority, and their right to take what they wanted from the poor sectors and nations of the world. The imperial nations would compete with each other without concern for the colonized, who were objects but not subject actors except in certain struggles (Spain-Cuba), but then only as “associates” without voice or power to be heard in the disposition of their land, resources, or people. In the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine became widely accepted and by 1890 Americans chose to play the imperial game abroad in earnest much to the dismay of anti-imperialists such as Mark Twain, William James and Carl Schurz.

By the time the United States entered the First World War, it had occupied the Philippines and intervened in Central America and the Caribbean no less than forty-five times. Members of the Senate such as Albert Beveridge argued that God had given the United States a triumphal mission to civilize minorities around the world, undertake imperial ventures continuously, and protect the profit margins of American corporations through trade and investment outside of the United States. With such activism came questions about the nature and shape of the American government.

After the war against Spain the United States gave serious thought to reorganizing the government to accommodate the needs of its world wide economic, political and social interests. American leaders studied the British Council of Imperial Defense as a model for their state structure. In 1911 Congressman Richmond Pearson proposed the establishment of a council of national defense dominated by the military secretaries and six committee chairmen from

Congress. His bill excluded the president because Congress has the power under the Constitution to regulate the armed forces.¹ These proposals, it should be noted, occurred in the Age of Progressive reform, which sought to rationalize rules of the economic and corporate system. President Theodore Roosevelt considered military power to be an important quiver in the bow of progressive reform and world economic dominance.

During World War One, the Overman Act gave preference and “guidance” wherever necessary to ensure American military power and fighting capacity. The Act fell into disuse when the war ended in 1918 but its assumptions did not fade away. In 1919-20, the Palmer Raids expelled thousand of immigrants and radicals in the name of internal security. They were the “terrorists” of their time. The Attorney General under Woodrow Wilson, Mitchell Palmer, was the intellectual forebear to Attorney-General Ashcroft who also wishes for the expulsion of undesirables.²

In the 1920s, General _____ Drum proposed the creation of a council of national defense to manage military-political relations and develop plans for a nationwide transportation and mobilization infrastructure. He thought the council should have the power to recommend to the president reorganization of the executive branch in peacetime and its expansion in wartime. The proposal was shelved out of concerns raised in the War Department that Drum’s ideas would threaten the military’s autonomy, and it would be better to work with a president who was more cooperative.

The organization of other states was closely studied by elites who openly considered how the authoritarian model might inform solutions to the increasingly dire economic and social

¹ For information on these various proposals, see Marcus Raskin, *The Politics of National Security*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979, pages 34-38.

² An assassination attempt was made on Palmer’s life by anarchists.

situation in America. In 1931, Chicago’s mayor “Wild” Bill Thompson told Congress that if the federal relief net was not forthcoming, the government would have to send in troops. When the Bonus Army, consisting of thousands of veterans from the world war, marched on Washington in 1932 the federal government did just that. In response to their demands for advance payments on their pensions, General MacArthur’s troops tear gassed them and burned down their shantytown, outraging a sympathetic American public. “What does a democracy do in a war?” asked Roosevelt’s former political mentor, Al Smith in 1933. “It becomes a tyrant, a despot, a real monarch. In the World War, we took our Constitution, wrapped it up and laid it on the shelf and left it there until it was over.” The same year Walter Lippmann counseled the President, “The situation is critical, Franklin. You may have no alternative but to assume dictatorial power.”³

After these turbulent events, Roosevelt began to seriously consider how to organize the American bureaucracy for crisis and war. In 1934-35, he organized the Civilian Conservation Corps, which in addition to advancing conservation, removed young men from urban areas so they could be organized, and taught military discipline. The urban unemployed young men were transformed from revolutionary rabble to the pillars of a future army. In 1936, President Roosevelt asked Louis Brownlow, one of the administrative geniuses behind the New Deal, if he had the power to manage the economy. Brownlow told him that the Council of National Defense had never ceased to exist, meaning that the president could still commandeer the economy for a national purpose through an advisory committee on defense. In 1937, Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson began drafting what later became an Industrial Mobilization Plan. It was a brokered agreement between big business and the military. The Plan collapsed because it

³ Cited in David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945*, New

excluded farmers and unions, and President Roosevelt in 1938-40 became vulnerable to charges that he was surrendering the economy to military and big business.

Through the Second World War, the United States took for granted that as a superpower it had to reorganize itself for continuous conflict and economic stability even during peacetime. The Soviet Union had been an ally of expedience and served as a counterbalance against imperial Japan. It was recognized by the Roosevelt Administration but was held in bad odor by the Department of State. The Soviet Union became a threat because of what it stood for even before its actions hinted at any real danger. (The repressive actions of the Bolsheviks at home were an entirely different matter.) The Soviet Union’s propaganda gave the appearance that it championed economic and social justice and would solve the problem of widespread unemployment. During the Wilson administration, the International Labor Organization (ILO) was formed partly in response to this concern. As Steve Schlossberg, a former director of the Washington Office of the ILO, noted, “The slogan became poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere.” Indeed, poverty was thought to be the seedbed for communism and nationalist leaders who had their doubts about an international economy directed by the United States. By the 1990s, the end of the Cold War meant the West was finally off the hook on the question of economic justice because they no longer had to counter Soviet propaganda.

Throughout the Cold War (and before) the Soviet policy was a cautious one. Indeed, it was prepared to negotiate arrangements with the West at the expense of local communist parties although it was not prepared to give up its notions of secure borders, sovereignty, and socialism. In other words the Soviets stayed out of the American sphere of influence where American policy makers hoped to engage and develop a middle class which would be loyal to American

values and the supposed stability which came from capitalist enterprise. The Soviets had no illusions about their situation compared to American power. The U.S. had emerged from the War as “top dog,” in the words of Paul Nitze, and it intended to maintain that position without negotiating with either the Soviets or European Communist parties. Furthermore, Stalin had made clear that the Comintern was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, not vice versa.

The “Top Dog” Barks in Europe

Victory over Germany, Japan, Italy and fascist collaborators such as Rumania and Hungary reconfigured the balance of power in Europe. The US was the key player in redrawing the map in Europe, and Acheson suggested to Congress in 1947 that the Monroe Doctrine should be extended to any part of the world the US deemed worthy. A new map of the world was being drawn and American leaders wanted to be the principal mapmaker. But they knew that with isolationism’s popularity, the American people would have to be dragged into war “kicking and screaming,” as Dean Rusk later put it. FDR’s policies were aimed at confronting a dying colonialism through new rules. Thus, American policies did not favor the Dutch’s “right” to keep Indonesia as their colony. Similarly the US had no interest in restoring the British Empire to its early twentieth century grandeur. India, the jewel of the crown, was to be independent of British political control.

Under 18th century ideas borrowed from Newtonian physics the question during the cold war was whether if there was a power vacuum politically in these areas of the world it would be far better that they fell under American tutelage than struggle for neutrality and independence. For the United States, if these nations were to fall under the political and economic spell of the United States the U.S. would need an activist foreign and national security policy that could only emerge from new security institutions. As the economic depression changed the character of

American government so it was that American imperial responsibility brought stunning domestic changes to the character of the American government. Redrawing the world’s political map thus required the reorganization of the state and a new posture towards the Soviet Union, America’s only potential rival, whose presence in Europe was still substantial.

Yet the Soviet Union was not the threat the U.S. claimed it was. There was no evidence (then or now) that the Soviets intended to attack the Western countries or Germany following Hitler’s defeat. But the United States had resolved to “keep the Germans down, the Russians out and the Americans in,” as the diplomatic mantra of the day put it. Two key events proved crucial and led to a rethinking of the U.S. relationship with postwar Germany. One involved the recruitment of Reinhard Gehlen, who oversaw all of Hitler’s military-intelligence operations in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Once Gehlen believed the U.S.-Soviet alliance would collapse he surrendered himself to the U.S. and persuaded Allen Dulles and others that his hatred of Communism had always been above his commitment to the Nazis. “Washington was in a cold war mode sooner than most people realize,” says journalist Martin Lee. “The Gehlen gambit also belies the prevalent Western notion that aggressive Soviet policies were primarily to blame for triggering the Cold War.” A year before the CIA was officially created (1947), Gehlen recruited thousands of former Gestapo and SS officials who had been under his command as part of the Nazi armed forces. Gehlen was an important planner and intelligence officer for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union June 22, 1941. His intelligence network eventually supplied the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with two-thirds of its intelligence on the Warsaw Pact.⁴

⁴ Martin A. Lee, “The CIA’s Worst-Kept Secret,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies/Inter-Hemispheric Resource Center. See also Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War*.

The second event was the Berlin Airlift, one of the most celebrated Western narratives of the Cold War. With the blink of an eye, the status of Berlin had changed and so had America’s posture towards Moscow. In the popular culture a few years before the Germans were presented as ogres and the Soviets admired. Films such as *Mission to Moscow* praised the Soviets as America’s most important ally because it was on the frontline against Nazism. Like an Orwellian novel the picture had changed for the citizenry. A senior CIA analyst who designed the President’s daily intelligence brief summed up his 1949 analytic training: “Whatever you do, just remember one thing – the Soviet Union is up to no good!”⁵ George Kennan famously labeled this new strategy “containment,” and the self-deceptions it generated made the world a much more dangerous place, as did his support of covert operations in East Europe. This is not to take away from Kennan’s analysis that the internal contradictions within the Soviet Union would cause it to change if not collapse. It is important to remember that there were those in high places who wanted a preventive war against the Soviet Union virtually immediately after the war with the Germans ended. One such person was President Truman’s Secretary of the Navy, John Sullivan. Kennan’s views were subtler, urging instead a program of covert operations in East Europe and the Soviet Union.

Until mid – 1947 a significant number of politicians continued to believe that Germany was the primary enemy even though it lost the Second World War. The American military government in Germany believed that Germans had to be re-educated and de-nazified and so did the American people. This point of view was marginalized and considered heretical with the

⁵ Speech by John E. McLaughlin, Deputy DCI at Princeton University Conference on the CIA ’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, March 9, 2001.

reelection of Truman in 1948. It was already taken for granted that the use of the atomic bomb had won the war for the United States and the West in the Pacific. In Germany the United States was more likely to depend on former Nazis for advice on rebuilding the German army while ensuring that anti-Nazis who had a left wing past would be tolerated but not encouraged in any efforts that would impede German rearmament. For example, the Left’s movement in West Germany against nuclear armaments on the continent of Europe was thought to be either a Soviet plot or naïve. In either case the United States would have none of such thoughts as part of a dominant policy thrust whether in Germany or elsewhere, such as Great Britain.

The Dawn of the Atomic Age

The immediate effect of the atomic bomb was to pacify (and devastate) Japan, but it was also central to the American policy in Germany. First of all, as Alperovitz and Bird point out, the bomb revolutionized American foreign policy by allowing for unilateral action and reducing the domestic political costs of troop deployment since with a nuclear umbrella, fewer American troops would be needed in Europe.

Second, the precedent of the bomb’s first use has not only scared others, it has served as an instrument for the transformation of the American state to a perpetual war status in the post-war period. The bomb itself has been more than a piece of ordinance tucked away in a military depot. Nuclear weapons brought a changed social system, as a result of their making, testing and execution. It required a huge network to protect the bomb and its secrets (from the public and most of Congress) and a military-scientific-industrial complex to maintain its viability. The nuclear bomb social system needed missiles, anti-missiles, and bombers to deliver nuclear weapons even though nuclear scientists knew, and said as much from the beginning of the nuclear age that some nuclear weapons could be carried in suitcases. Further, national leaders

came to believe that having nuclear weapons was not only prestigious, but also necessary to counteract the activities of other nations.

Ironically, in the United States, the buildup of nuclear weapons- eventually adding up to over 50,000 among the nuclear powers - stimulated a buildup of conventional forces as well. At first, military planners concentrated on ensuring that the Air Force, the Navy and the Army had the ability to use nuclear weapons in either a tactical or a strategic war. By the 1960s they decided that nuclear weapons alone were an insufficient guarantee of security. General Maxwell Taylor was concerned that over-reliance on nuclear weapons prevented the U.S. from protecting its interests throughout the world- only multiple levels of escalation with conventional weapons could accomplish this. Thus a doctrine of “flexible response” was required to make threats credible in ordinary military and diplomatic engagements. This policy was added to massive retaliation; a policy which had lovingly been referred to as a “wargasm.” That is to say, there would be no discrimination as to where the bombs and missiles would fall. That line was already crossed in the Second World War. What was new and indeterminate would be the effect nuclear weapons would have on diplomacy and the preparations underway for the National Security State.

Unresolved Debates

After the radioactive dust over Hiroshima and Nagasaki settled and the borders were redrawn in Europe, another set of issues awaited American leaders. Elites were arguing over what role the military should play in postwar society and how to deal with another potential economic crisis as millions of troops returned home. The depression still loomed in the nation’s consciousness. According to General William Y. Smith, a former Deputy Chief of Staff at NATO, the struggle for control over the economy had not been resolved during the Second

World War. “The military departments constantly pressured the President for more control over the economy,” claims Smith. “He met their demands by insuring them important positions in mobilization agencies.”⁶ In fact, after World War II (1945-1950), the military held all assistant secretary of state positions.

The ostensible purposes of the National Security Act of 1947 were to unify the military and address the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor but its larger purpose was to resolve the debate over the new “machinery” for controlling domestic and foreign policy. An important part of the Act’s solution involved articulating a new discourse on “national security” that created an ambiguous nexus between domestic civilian life in peacetime and a permanent military infrastructure. This nexus spawned a new kind of bureaucrat: the civilianized military official and the militarized civilian.

The National Security Act of 1947

The Act legitimated and articulated an overarching concept of national security, setting in concrete by legislation and executive order the state apparatus that is still in place. Of course concrete takes time to dry and this occurred in stages but the laying of the foundation was a seminal event in American history. “The United States has attained an unprecedented ascendancy among nations,” said one senator during the debates. “Willing or not, we have acquired new and awful obligations. A large part of the responsibility for the future of peace of the world rests with us. The world looks to us for our cooperation, but even more it depends upon our willingness and ability to back cooperation with the military power to preserve the peace.”⁷

⁶ Cited in Marcus Raskin, *The Politics of National Security*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979, p. 38.

⁷ This quote by Senator Lister Hill (AL) and the others that follow are from the *Congressional Record*, July 9 and July 7, 1947.

The first proposals for military unification began to take shape in 1944 and Truman addressed Congress on the idea in December 1945. His plan was largely based on the Army’s recommendations. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal objected to a single large department, and recruited his former business colleague Ferdinand Eberstadt to help formulate an alternative. They both favored something along the lines of the British Committee of Imperial Defense, where the secretary of defense would be the principal assistant related to national security. In May of 1946, Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal wrote to President Truman proposing the establishment of a Council of Common Defense, a National Security Resources Board, a Central Intelligence Agency and a statutory Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸ According to Anna Nelson, the National Security Council was a product of the controversy between the Truman and the Forrestal-Eberstadt camps: “Rather than the carefully conceived idea its later prominence would indicate, the NSC was a creation of compromise.”⁹

After the bill was introduced, most of the debate in Congress, the military establishment, and the Executive Branch was limited. It centered on unification and issues related to the controversial creation of a new Department of the Air Force, the status of the Marines, and the authority a secretary of defense would have over the services. Congress was not informed about the intelligence collection or the covert action functions of the CIA, aside from a few private conversations Truman had with individual members.¹⁰ Limiting referral of the bill to committees overseeing the armed services further distorted the fact that the bill would have far reaching ramifications throughout the executive branch. Congress as a whole had delegated its

⁸ Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966.

⁹ Anna Kasten Nelson, “President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” *The Journal of American History*, Volume 72, Issue 2 (Sept. 1985), 360-378.

¹⁰ Morton Halperin, Jerry J. Berman, Robert Borosage and Christine Marwick, *The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies*, Penguin Books, 1976.

authority to a congressional defense committee system which served as the champions and goads of the national security institutions to usurp more authority.

The bill went much further than military unification and the creation of a Council on Common Defense along the lines of the Patterson-Forrestal proposal. It set in place the permanent structures of war planning to “provide adequate security measures at all times, rather than only when hostile nations threaten,” in the words of Senator Hill. “If we are to be prepared at all to meet the speed of future attack, we must prepare in peacetime,” he told the Senate during the floor debates. This meant, as Senator Baldwin pointed out, “a need for wider civilian participation in the national security.” He reassured his colleagues that the National Security Council would serve as an advisory panel “on national security matters alone.” But even the act’s adherents were unable to clarify exactly what this meant. The original language of S. 758 sought to establish the National Security Council to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies.” Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) successfully insisted that the phrase “and their functions relating to the national security” be added on in order to clarify that the NSC would be prohibited from advising on questions not related to national security. Senator McMahon had the foresight to point out that his colleague’s second degree amendment would not remedy the problem: “I can think of no policy having to do with our national existence, our Government, or our national life that would not come within that language.” It was the conservatives who feared an overly broad definition of national security.

The Triumph of the McMahon Position

Invented terms as “the drug war” or “terrorism” offer fungibility to policy planners and hollow reassurances to the public that their interests are being served. These vagaries carry more political currency for the NSS than McMahon ever anticipated. A National Security Council

planning document published in 1997 identified ozone depletion, environmental disasters, organized crime in Russia, climate change and global diseases as threats to national security. According to one widely circulated intelligence estimate on the threat of disease, “Along with having a large civilian and military presence and wide-ranging interests overseas, the United States will remain at risk from global infectious disease outbreaks.” The military, the civilian population and U.S. “equities” abroad are all in danger. “In addition to their impact on the U.S. population,” the estimate states, “infectious diseases will add to the social, economic, and political strains in key regions and countries in which the United States has significant interests or may be called upon.” Several months later, the White House called AIDS a “security threat of the greatest magnitude.”¹¹ It is unlikely that any of these situations can be ameliorated better through lens of national security rather than being treated as public health threats (with the emphasis on “public”). Yet we see attempts made to stretch traditional ideas of national security through unproven and dangerous law enforcement assumptions and methods. It is important to note that concerns for infectious diseases, environmental disasters, and starvation are not primary, secondary or even tertiary concerns for national security managers. Their task as defined by the cold war and practice is to maintain American dominance as the “superpower.” AIDS, starvation and environmental disasters are *not* organizing instruments to change the behavior of American society. Thus, there may be an environmental disaster in the making as a result of flagrant use of resources but no national security manager claims that the mores and habits of Americans change.

Throughout the Cold War, framing an issue in national security terms afforded executive

¹¹ National Security Council, *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997. David Gordon, “The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States,” (NIE 99-17D) National Intelligence Council, January 2000. “U.S. Treating AIDS as a Threat to Global Security,” *USA Today*, May 1, 2000, A11.

agencies wide latitude, which resulted in special exemptions for the secret agencies. With this latitude government officials were able to package and repackage issues that, depending on the popular mood, or that of a new administration, might require a shift in bureaucratic categories on a program budget but without changing the original underlying purpose of the policy. This we could refer to as rhetorical manipulation of the public mood without shifting policies.

For example, the U.S. historically believes that the Monroe Doctrine means that Latin America is its “backyard,” which from time to time must be policed. Thus the U.S. commitment to the drug war is recategorized as a fight against terrorism. This recategorization allows the U.S. to intervene with great zeal and moral force especially since the official claim is that terrorists of Colombia are involved with an international network of terrorists. The drug war and the supply and demand over drugs are grafted onto an expanded counterinsurgency program meant to assert dominance over the Andean nations. Of course, such policies are not without risk. Sometimes they stem from the fight over drugs and their use as an international currency. It is to be remembered that the American police and military engagement in Vietnam began as an attempt to stop the sale and export of drugs that may or may not have had a relationship with the Trotskyists of IndoChina after the Second World War.

From the early days of the CIA and its predecessor, the OSS drugs were used by secret agencies as an important means of enticing criminal gangs to support American government policies, especially those that began from the premise of patriotic anticommunism. Drug dealers received “get out of jail free” cards if they successfully claimed that they were involved in their activities either as assets for the CIA or direct agents. Through bitter experience it is clear that there are profound effects from anti-drug policies that are in fact based on the use of drugs for political purposes. The Indo-China war ended with thousands of American soldiers exposed to

life long physical damage because of their use of drugs while the CIA was implicated in the use of drugs as an instrument of control and strategy in the anticommunist war in Asia.

Immigration offers another example of how recategorization has reframed an issue in terms of national security. Today the military is playing an ever-increasing and dangerous role in border enforcement. The precedent for this was the use of the Union military after the Civil War (until 1877) as a means of confronting guerrilla war waged against freed slaves by former Confederate soldiers. The expanded involvement of the military and the intelligence agencies in law enforcement has stretched the limits of existing *posse comitatus* laws that date back to the Civil War, with serious implications for protection of individual rights and basic civil liberties.

OPERATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

The policies falling under the guise of national security have become as vast as Senator McMahon predicted. These policies have given rise to four mutually reinforcing characteristics, which form the template of the NSS: (1) organizing for war and limited war; (2) control of the public sphere; (3) limiting or undermining individual rights; and (4) the concentration of authority. These characteristics have a permanence that survived the occasional congressional scrutiny, numerous media scandals and most notably the end of the Cold War. One reason for this resiliency is the integration of domestic and foreign policy, rewarding an economic dependence on the war system. As shown below, organizing for war was part of maintaining the military-industrial complex, partnerships between unions and anti-Communists undermined the independence of civil society, and corporate America cooperated with a federal desire to invade consumer privacy. All of these efforts served the NSS by securing the economy for national security purposes and eroding the distinctions between peace and war.

(1) Organizing for war, Cold War, and limited war

Distinctions between war and peace in terms of planning and preparation for war and conflict disappeared in various ways. This multi-layered policy includes instructions for how to build, use and perpetuate nuclear weapons, fight limited wars, and maintain a permanent economic infrastructure for national security purposes. The military industrial complex created a system whose purpose for war and its preparation overwhelmed advocates for disarmament. In 1991 Greg Bischak wrote, “the forty-five year legacy of the Cold War leaves in place a formidable array of military institutions which block the way to disarmament and an alternative framework for international security,” not the least of which was President Reagan’s \$2.25 trillion defense build-up in the 1980s.¹² As a result of campaign promises made by GW Bush in his 2000 presidential campaign and 9-11, the national security and internal security budgets are virtually boundless, especially given the silence of the Democratic Party and many advocacy groups to challenge the assumptions and purposes of the budget. It is foolish to believe that unlimited defense and security expenditures do not have negative effects on the civilian economy.

However the relationship between the economy and national security is a complex one. Economic growth under President Clinton and budget constraints meant that military spending accounted for a diminishing share of the Gross Domestic Product and therefore had a decreasing share of the labor force. In 1987 U.S. defense spending was at a post-Vietnam war high of 7.2 percent of GDP. By 1996 this figure was only 4.6 percent, and in 1998 the Department of Labor

¹² Gregory A. Bischak, “The Political Economy of an Alternative Security and Disarmament Policy for the United States,” in *Towards a Peace Economy in the United States*, Gregory A. Bischak, Editor, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

estimated it would remain there until about 2006.¹³ Ironically, this situation enabled the military to protect its budgets remarkably well and ask for larger defense budgets unrelated to strategic needs. This shadow economy continues to impose its costs on social programs whose budgets are squeezed by military expenditures.

Nuclear weapons were one of the less visible and more costly components of the shadow economy. Stephen Schwartz’s Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project determined that nuclear weapons have cost 5.5 trillion dollars since 1940. His committee’s calculations include costs of developing, fielding, and maintaining the nuclear arsenal and defend against attack. At one point the Federal Reserve maintained over \$2 trillion in currency to be used after a nuclear war. Literally hundreds of millions of pages pertaining to the nuclear network are still classified.¹⁴ These costs seem reasonable if one believes nuclear weapons prevented World War III. This dubious assertion has proved to be less than compelling. As former SAC Commander General George Lee Butler has stated on a number of public occasions, deterrence does not deserve credit for preventing world war. “We were faced with an array of circumstances that were left over from a forty-year buildup of systems and beliefs that, in many respects, had been just as murderous as a real war.” War was not avoided, says General Butler. “In a sense, the Cold War was a war in all its aspects.”¹⁵ The total destructive capability of nuclear weapons rendered them impractical for intervention and small conflicts but intermediate forms of violence were widely employed as a substitute.

Limited war meant paramilitary wars, low-intensity conflicts and covert activities. Many of these were carried out under the CIA’s so-called “fifth function” outlined in the National

¹³ Allison Thomson, “Defense-Related Employment and Spending, 1996-2006,” *Monthly Labor Review* (Bureau of Labor Statistics), July 1998.

¹⁴ See *Atomic audit: the costs and consequences of U.S. nuclear weapons since 1940*. Stephen I. Schwartz, editor.

Security Act, authorizing it to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.” Clark Clifford, the Act’s principal drafter, made the language to authorize covert operations deliberately vague. “We did not mention them by name because we felt it would be injurious to our national interest to advertise the fact that we might engage in such activities,” which were supposed to be unusual but limited in scope. In retrospect, he admits that this was clearly a bad idea. “Over the years, covert activities became so numerous and widespread that, in effect, they became a *self-sustaining* part of American foreign operations. The CIA became a government within a government, which could evade oversight of its activities by drawing the cloak of secrecy around itself.”¹⁶

The lawlessness of the covert apparatus involved bombing Cambodia in 1969 and mining Nicaraguan harbors in 1984 when the US was officially at peace with those countries, supporting death squad governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, and financing religious extremists in Afghanistan simply because they professed a hatred for the Soviet Union. We are far from escaping the terrible legacy of these interventions. The Afghan rebels’ hatred for Moscow, for example, was not commensurate with a love for democracy in any sense. The most stridently anti-American rebels ironically received approximately half of the weapons provided by the CIA. Two things about this aid must be mentioned: First that it began not with the Soviet invasion but a full six months beforehand when President Carter signed a directive to subvert the regime in Kabul. His National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, quickly drafted a memo explaining that this covert operation would provoke Soviet intervention- and that this was in fact

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998.

¹⁵ Interview in *The Nation*, February 2/9, 1998.

¹⁶ Clark Clifford (with Richard Holbrooke), *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*, New York: Random House, 1999.

a desirable idea.¹⁷ Second, the aid ended not when the Communist government collapsed but when the U.S. decided it was no longer necessary to punish the Soviets. In dollar terms, the entire operation cost American taxpayers an astounding \$3 billion through the course of the 1980s. The extent of the “blowback” (when a covert operation or an intelligence asset turns against its initiator) first became evident not on 9-11, but when Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, the architect of the first World Trade Center bombing, entered the U.S. in 1990 on a visa obtained from an undercover CIA agent.¹⁸

The present Bush administration’s war against terrorists, zealots or those who are thought to be enemies of the United States combines several components from the past. Whereas before they were kept separate from the American population, under the new regime this is not thought to be necessary. Thus, covert operations during the cold war were kept out of sight. Under the Bush II administration they are combined with military assistance and military police intervention. In fact, the activity is trumpeted. During the Cold War no administration cared to speak to the public as if American policies were predicated on wars without end. In the Bush II administration they are articulated, applauded and used as an instrument of manipulation of the public in order to obtain legitimacy and support from the populace that had acquiesced to Bush II’s selection.

(2) Control of the public sphere

A second trait of the national security apparatus is that its managers seek to fill public space and undermine the autonomy and therefore the critical judgment of the independent citizen – especially where they might join together with other citizens. Mobilization of this nature was

Emphasis added.

¹⁷ Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France), January 15-21, 1998, p. 76.

¹⁸ Mary Anne Weaver, “Blowback,” *New Yorker*, May 1996.

to be kept in the hands of governments with the media playing a supporting role. The means of mobilizing the public for a stated threat of Soviet invasion, an imagined threat of domestic subversion, or an actual threat of terrorism are the same. The public can also be mobilized for passivity. This has been accomplished through the co-optation of labor unions, universities, and the media. Both strategies construct a false consensus and remain in use as tools for deceiving those on the outside and maintaining loyalty on the inside whether the threats are real or imagined.

Loyalty and security oaths are one form of mobilizing for passivity. Throughout American society during the Cold War, university professors, schoolteachers, union officials and boy scouts were all required to sign a loyalty oath. Such oaths were enforced administratively and through the courts. These practices were inspired by and related to loyalty programs throughout the federal government that sought to fend off dissenting voices and keep public officials in line. “The concept of loyalty necessarily involved the notion of secrecy,” writes Daniel Patrick Moynihan. “Disloyal employees revealed secrets; loyal employees would not. In such a setting apprehension rose, and so did the dimension of secrecy.”¹⁹ President Truman’s Executive Order 9835 established the Federal Employee Loyalty Program in March 1947, creating a process and an organization for reviewing the “loyalty” of civil servants in all sectors of the government. In April 1953, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450, detailing more elaborate security requirements for government employment, stating:

The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interest of national security.

As Senator Moynihan pointed out, this personnel security is basically still in place today and was

¹⁹ *Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy*, Appendix A by Daniel

extended under Clinton. And as Congressman Conyers (D-MI) argues, oaths remain an important mechanism of control in Congress. Half a century after the McCarthy witch-hunts, Members fear both criminal punishments under national security laws and political isolation through ethics rules protective of secrecy.

A second form of mobilization occurs through the co-optation of key elements of civil society such as universities and labor unions. Reinhold Niebuhr, the theologian of American engagement in the Cold War, claimed that a partnership between labor and capital was possible if labor had a role in the national security system. With millions of soldiers re-entering the work force and a subsequent series of strikes from 1945 to 1947, keeping this sector pacified was essential. According to Steve Schlossberg, the former general counsel for the United Auto Workers, unions cut a series of deals with the federal government in exchange for their unswerving criticism of Communism and their support for, as well as junior associate decision power in, international activities.

Congress filled in the details of this compromise through several important pieces of legislation, starting with the Employment Act of 1946. This law that was first introduced as a full employment bill was changed to a “maximum employment” proposal. “In a word, the Employment Act was to be consistent with the needs of an economic system that required unemployment.”²⁰ The real operators of the Employment Act can best be understood in the context of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which had several important consequences. It placed explicit limits on organizing and collective bargaining. It prohibited communists from holding officer positions in unions, universities or schools. It formalized the right of workers to not

Patrick Moynihan, “Secrecy: A Brief Account of the American Experience,” 1997.

²⁰ Marcus G. Raskin, *Essays of a Citizen: From National Security State to Democracy*, Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991.

participate in union activity, outlawed the closed shop and subjected the union shop to strict limitations. Finally, it prohibited various unfair labor practices such as secondary strikes and jurisdictional boycotts. In return, unionized workers, for example in the electric, communications, steel and machinist sectors, enjoyed financial stability in the military-industrial complex.

The unions’ arrangement with the government lasted for some time, but in the war on terrorism the government has had the upper hand. After 9-11, Bush II undermined labor as an element of civil society and to advance his own version of government interventionism in the economy. In the name of national security, Bush issued an executive order limiting the rights of Northwest Airline employee’s rights to strike. In another action, United Airlines’ mechanics were told that unless they agreed to the company’s concessions – rather than launch the strike they had overwhelmingly voted for – the administration would withhold a \$1.8 billion bailout. In another instance, union officials from the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) claim that the Bush Administration threatened to invoke the rarely used Taft-Hartly Act when the union was considering a strike in 2002; the action would have ordered the longshoremen back to work for 90 days. The administration even considered using Navy personnel to replace striking longshoremen.²¹ In each case, any disruption to the economy, even if it served the interests of workers, was deemed a threat to national security. Control over the economy, foreign policy, and social control fused into one overarching notion of national security.

Strategies of legal and social control coincided with the use of lying and deception as an acceptable governing strategy. Then as now, the government proceeds in several stages. The

²¹ “In the Name of National Security: Bush Declares War on Unions.” *The American Prospect*, Vol. 13, No. 19,

first stage involves setting policy goals, which may or may not be related to the justification offered to the public, although it may serve the interests of a particular class. The second stage involves manufacturing a pretext for pursuing those goals. The pretext may be based on the reality of an external event or indeed may be totally falsified, or it may be somewhere in between. The final stage involves legitimation through the standard structures of constitutional government, which forms part of the appeal to the public for support. Beyond that mode of appeal is direct manipulation of the public through propaganda, predicated on the acceptance of government officials as superior authorities on matters of fact whose task is thought to be the common welfare of society. Such notions, internalized in people’s understanding through ritual and propaganda, have rendered the process of declaring war irrelevant. The citizenry is taught that since there is a state of continuous war the executive does not require a declaration of war. It would be illogical.

The paradox of the system is the capacity for self-deception both within the bureaucracy and among the citizens. The process congeals into a conventional myth taught and re-taught as the truth matters less and less. In the process Congress relinquishes power to the national security managers and the executive, allowing the bureaucracy to fight small wars for ambiguous reasons; the role of Congress becomes ornamental.

(3) Limiting or undermining individual rights

A third common thread in the National Security State’s practices is the subordination of civil liberties to state objectives. Through the NSS, the wishes of its managers have become routinized by the courts and formalized by Congress and administrative regulations. The war on immigrants today (in the name of fighting terrorism) resembles the war on Communism. In the

name of fighting Communism, the federal government conducted dangerous experiments on human subjects and intelligence agencies undertook extraordinary domestic spying programs on citizens engaged in First Amendment activities.

Domestic spying programs included surveillance of Vietnam War protestors, activists on Central American policy, key Civil Rights figures, and AIDS awareness leaders. During the Cold War, the CIA spied on the Vietnam anti-war movement with Operation CHAOS, the FBI sabotaged various political organizations with COINTELPRO, and the NSA indulged in Operation MINARET. Besides spying on U.S. citizens by the armed forces and local police departments, CHAOS alone produced files on over 300,000 individuals. More recent intelligence collection activities have been rooted in immigration laws permitting the use of secret evidence against detainees who are unable to fairly counter the charges against themselves. This is based on an expansion of “sources and methods” as a means of avoiding public examination of the facts. The ambiguous but seemingly hallowed phrase found in national security laws becomes a convenient dodge which masks how information is found, what is paid for the information, what information has to be given up and how the source is to be repaid. Technical intelligence affords another problem and possibility for it is reflective of the power of the National Security State to organize scientific and engineering elites to undertake closed studies of the earth.

Contrary to popular belief, the establishment of new oversight committees in Congress in the 1970s did little to curb domestic spying. In the 1980s the federal government continued to target organizations engaged in First Amendment activities such as the Center for Defense Information, Medical Aid for El Salvador, Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, the Washington Office on Latin America, and numerous other organizations critical of President

Reagan’s policies in Latin America. The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) was one such target. CISPES’ activities included “fundraising and legislative campaigns, educational and outreach programs, and mass mobilizations.” One declassified document issued in New Orleans declared: “It is imperative at this time to formulate some plan of attack against CISPES and specifically, against individuals...who defiantly display their contempt for the U.S. Government by making speeches and propagandizing their cause.”²² Then in the early 1990s, the spying continued when the FBI opened an active file on the AIDS-awareness organization, ACT-UP. The Bureau claimed it was concerned that the group would commit violent acts, even though it never had. Activists in the organization insist the FBI attempted to infiltrate the organization.²³

Even before 9-11 and the Patriot Act, the federal government sought an expansion of its powers, with the law often following enforcement practices already in use. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 required telecommunications companies to keep their lines wiretap-friendly. This law allowed one out of every 100 phones in “high crime areas” to be monitored. The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1999 enabled prosecutors to target persons instead of locations. The Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995 generated nine entirely new categories of offenses for which electronic surveillance is permitted. Then even if the federal government did not obtain evidence legally, the so-called Effective Death Penalty and Antiterrorism Act of 1995 permitted illegally obtained evidence to be used in court in various circumstances. These and other capital punishment statutes were signed into law by a Democratic president who had been elected with substantial support from

²² Angus Mackenzie, *Secrets: The CIA’s War at Home*, University of California Press, 1997. Hearing of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, “CISPES and FBI Counter-terrorism Investigations,” June 13 and September 16, 1988 (Serial No. 122).

the Civil Rights community.²⁴

The Patriot Act set up a narrow framework for civil liberties and an infinitely expansive framework for security and when necessary the disappearance of civil liberties. Individuals invariably are held to be a frisson compared to the needs of the state. The provisions of the Patriot Act from presidential authority to use military tribunals against aliens and immigrants, holding detainees incommunicado without benefit of legal counsel, (in other words they can easily become the “disappeared,” a situation which occurred in Argentina in the 1980’s), to wiretapping, secret judicial proceedings, freezing of corporate and non-profit funds, increased surveillance on American citizens, encouragement of informing and spying on neighbors and riffling through the records of student and faculty staffs without cause, is a recipe for a poisonous political stew that will be hard to swallow, but harder to pass from the body of our nation. It is important to reiterate that the predicate for the Patriot Act was laid before 9-11. Now that the Act is in place, its purposes are being mimicked in local regulations throughout the country: New York City loosened restrictions on surveillance of political groups, and peace activists in Denver and Washington, DC filed suits against police departments for spying on them. In response, the Justice Department advanced legislation that would support loosening restrictions on spying by local police.²⁵

Electronic surveillance is even more prevalent and more difficult to detect. Federal surveillance of Internet traffic today is sweeping and was in place well before the attacks on the World Trade Center. This form of domestic spying poses one of the most significant threats to

²³ “AIDS Groups Aware of FBI Spies,” *Associated Press*, May 15, 1995. Thomas Pierre, “FBI Accused of Spying on AIDS Activists” *Washington Post*, May 16, 1995, page A6.

²⁴ See the dissenting views in the House Judiciary Committee’s report on H.R. 729, the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995 in House Report 104-23 (104th Congress), February 8, 1995.

²⁵ “U.S. Police Surveillance Questioned.” CBS News.com. April 6, 2003.

privacy and individual rights today. By installing surveillance tools such as Carnivore at Internet Service Providers, the FBI has broad access to subscriber emails, not just those who are the target of a particular criminal investigation. These activities were already routine even in the absence of guidelines under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and other statutes.

Between 1990 and 2000, the number of intercept applications increased 36 percent. The most common target was a portable electronic device, such as a cell phone. In the small minority of cases where the government encountered encryption, they were always able to circumvent it. A vast majority of these wiretaps were justified for drug-related investigations.²⁶ According to the U.S. Department of Justice and organizations such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center, there was a more than fourfold increase in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders between 1979 and 1999. Most astounding is that for each federal or state electronic intercept an average of 1,775 innocent conversations are overheard. For example, a total of 2.2 million conversations were intercepted in 1996 and 1.7 million of those were later determined to involve innocent conversations not related to the investigation. Hardly any of this eavesdropping is carried out to investigate acts of terrorism, bombings or the categories of activities that are used to justify the expansion of wiretap and surveillance authority to the public. The expanding use of video spying further tears at the cloak of privacy.

The invasion on individual rights has also involved government scientists conducting radiation experiments on unwitting subjects in the name of nuclear technology. During the Cold War, citizens were used as involuntary guinea pigs for national security research. In a display of courage rare for a cabinet official, Secretary Hazel O’Leary instructed the Department of

²⁶ Annual Wiretap Report for the Year 2000, issued by the Administrative Office of the US Courts.

Energy’s Office of Human Radiation Experiments to make public over 300 experiments involving radiation testing on humans during the Cold War. Many of the experiments were not conducted in a clinical setting and some deliberately released radioactive matter into the environment or the food chain. One experiment at Vanderbilt University, for example, injected 86 newborn babies with chromium-50 to measure the reaction of their blood to the radioactive material. For declining to play by the rules of the National Security State’s game, Secretary O’Leary was marginalized by senior defense officials, and high ranking career DOE officials who shared her vision were stripped of their security clearances. “Those in the hierarchy looked down on people who deserved the truth,” she said later. “I tried to change a culture that had become part of DOE.” Eventually she was pushed out of the Clinton administration and investigated by Congress for overspending her travel budget. In the end, the Special Counselor appointed to the investigation exonerated her.

In 1994 Congressman John Conyers (D-MI) chaired hearings that revealed that the radiation experiments disclosed by the DOE were only half the story. The Army and Navy used blistering agents on 60,000 subjects, the Naval Research Laboratory exposed 3000 subjects to mustard gas, and Army Chemical Corps tests with nerve agents and psychochemicals on 7,120 subjects continued in the 1970s. The Army carried out biological warfare tests with radioactive compounds on 239 American cities between 1949 and 1969; Conyers’ hometown of Detroit had been doused with zinc cadmium sulfide by airplanes in 1958.²⁷

The terrible illnesses suffered by Gulf War veterans point to continuing experimentation, albeit through the prosecution of war. The cause of terrible illnesses suffered by Gulf War veterans has yet to be determined but it is now clear that depleted uranium and other dangerous

²⁷ “Secret Cold War Experiments,” hearing of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and

substances were used liberally, whose hazards were unknown to tens of thousands of exposed American troops in Iraq in 1991. The most recent estimates indicate that more than a quarter of all of those who served in the Gulf War have been ill – a postwar illness ratio far in excess of the Vietnam War, the Korean War, or even World War Two.²⁸

Neither Congress nor the courts have been very successful in limiting encroachments on individual rights or holding the National Security State accountable.²⁹ By failing to curb the excesses of the National Security State, the courts re-validated an undemocratic judicial and executive architecture. This helped build a government obsessed with secrecy and judges fearful of holding government agencies to account because of national security and reasons of state. Courts have malfunctioned in key cases when misconduct was discovered. This occurred when Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms was tried for perjury and in the investigations into the Letelier-Moffitt assassination in Washington, D.C. The courts’ use of secret proceedings in deportation cases and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) makes a mockery of the adversarial process supposedly enshrined in our judicial system. After passage of the PATRIOT Act, the FBI gave false information to judges on dozens of occasions in order to obtain wiretap authority.³⁰ These constitutional perversions—recent by historical standards—raise an important question about whether the courts have engaged in the project of undercutting *Marbury v. Madison*, shortchanging their role in our legal system by allowing too many people and too many cases to slip out the national security window.

National Security, September 28, 1994.

²⁸ Richard Leiby, “The Fallout of War,” *Washington Post*, December 30, 2002, p. C1.

²⁹ One important exception was the civil suit awarding nearly one million dollars to Americans and Canadians who were subjected to brainwashing experiments by the CIA. See James Turner and Joseph Rauh, “Anatomy of a Public Interest Case Against the CIA,” *Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy* (Fall 1990), vol. 11, no. 2.

³⁰ “The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process.” Senate Judiciary Full Committee Hearing, September 10, 2002.

(4) Concentration of authority

Many activities, including human experimentation and domestic spying programs, are possible because of a system of secrecy that is far more prevalent than people realize. The total of all classification actions reported for fiscal year 1999 increased by 10 percent, to 8,038,592, that is before 9-11 when the Cold War had been over for a decade. The CIA accounted for 44 percent of all classification decisions but they were spread across other agencies: DOD accounted for 27 percent, the NRO 24 percent, the Department of Justice 2 percent, the Department of State 2 percent, and all others 1 percent.³¹ This system of secrecy complements and makes possible decision-making procedures that tend to be centralized rather than shared. Resources for implementing these decisions are fenced off from scrutiny in secret budgets. As we have said, the American citizenry, which is constantly told that it is simultaneously victim and unbeatable warrior may even require that immoral and illegal acts be kept from them. Indeed, congressional representatives often assiduously avoid finding out what the CIA and other intelligence agencies are doing. That is to say, they are prepared to vote secret budgets but not know what is in the budgets on the grounds that they might leak the secrets, have to exercise qualms on moral grounds, or fear thinking they might be in violation of the Nuremberg tribunal standards.

In the post 9-11 period it is taken for granted that the national security bureaucracies must intertwine themselves with the most nefarious elements as American administrations curry favor with violators of basic human rights. During the Cold War period, and especially as a result of President Carter’s concern with human rights, the U.S. learned to lecture leaders of other nations about human rights. Such lectures did help some victims but the net effect has

³¹ Information Security Oversight Office's 1999 Report to the President.

been marginal. Why?

National security budgets were rationalized in terms of threats but actually had more to do with propping up corrupt dictators, buying off pro-American leaders through foreign aid, and military assistance. But why would the government bother executing such a foreign and national security policy? We find four reasons: (a) Security and foreign policy activities have little scrutiny of the kind that shifts policy; (b) bureaucracies replicate and expand on the basis of what the dominant trends are in the executive; (c) foreign and security policy- if it were to be otherwise- would have to reflect different social forces than are now dominant; (d) finally, the corrupt may be more reliable than the “virtuous government.” These four reasons fit well with the interests of private corporations. For example, in the pursuit of oil in the Middle East there is a direct and continuing linkage between stable profits and what national security managers and politicians conclude is the national interest. The shroud of secrecy around these budgets keeps the public in the dark and encourages Congress to accept the premise that the executive branch knows best and no significant changes should occur in the purpose of the national security apparatus and its linkages to big business. The CIA established its own businesses (proprietary) but also made available secret information to certain privileged corporations especially in the energy industry.³²

Secrecy also allows rogue bureaucrats at the middle level to operate in complex and contradictory ways. They may believe they are acting within an acceptable framework of policy. This was certainly the case in Iran-Contra. Regardless, secrecy facilitates the centralization of authority at high levels. As Peter Raven-Hansen shows in this book, much of the NSS’s

³² See “The Secret’s Out: Covert E-Systems Inc. Covets Commercial Sales” by John Mintz, Washington Post, October 24, 1994, p. A1, and John Marks, “The CIA’s Corporate Shell Game” in *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978. For a discussion of how the CIA

expanded authority comes from executive orders, presidential decision directives, and far-reaching administrative regulations instead of through public laws. These procedures build a bureaucracy protected from public and serious congressional supervision. Criminal behavior under the color of executive orders is increased domestically and abroad.

Equipped with this type of authority, national security managers can designate what constitutes a threat (a small Central American country of 2.5 million people, or perhaps an outbreak of disease in Africa) without much controversy. They also construct new forms of war that blur the distinction between acts of war and total war. Often this is accomplished by attaching an unequivocal sense of urgency to its actions, as was the case with the passage of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996 and the PATRIOT Act in 2001. “The bulk of Congress accepts the principle of ‘emergency’,” writes Raskin, “because its members have come to believe that they are constituted authority, holding legitimacy not through the people or an eighteenth-century Constitution, but through their identification with established institutions of which the President is the recognized leader and arbiter.”³³ This was part of the strategy for laying out *post-hoc* pretexts in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf in 1990 and Sudan in 1998.

The concentration of authority works at odds with the basic principles of checks and balances and this would not be possible without pretexts and propaganda that undermine Congress and other constitutional checks. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraq War of 2003, and the bombing of Sudan in 1998 all illustrate how Congress has shortchanged its role on key Constitutional questions. These events also show how the Executive Branch feels it is empowered to act on its own authority and is able to do so through

used journalists as spies see John M. Crewdson’s three part series in *The New York Times* December 25-27, 1977.

³³ Marcus Raskin, *Notes on the Old System: To Transform American Politics*. New York: David McKay Company, 1974, page 83.

deception. In such events (both before and after passage of the War Powers Act), the public sphere was not a place where the decision to go to war was debated. Instead, it was a space that government officials filled with propaganda in order to build support for grave decisions that had already been made and policies already being implemented.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident took place in 1964, when a U.S. Navy spy ship cruised into North Vietnamese waters shortly after South Vietnamese raid on their shores on July 30 and 31. The first mission generated no response but a second one provoked a torpedo attack on August 2. A report of the incident was prepared in Washington but it was released in Hawaii in order to give the impression of spontaneity.³⁴ During a massive storm, yet another patrol was sent into the Gulf and radioed back that they had been attacked on August 4. In the days that followed, Johnson’s team persuaded Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which mirrored language used to justify military adventures in Formosa in 1955, the Middle East in 1957, and Cuba in 1962. The resolution expressed support for the President to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” Metaphorically, this resolution was carried in President Johnson’s back pocket for at least six months prior to the Tonkin events.

Congress was told not even half the story about U.S. incursions in Southeast Asia. As it had done in the early sixties and later, the Pentagon had long been planning and carrying out covert actions involving sabotage and psychological operations to provide “maximum pressure with minimum risk.”³⁵ The July 30-31 raid by the South Vietnamese had really been part of a CIA directed “34A” destabilization campaign. Nor was Congress informed that the commander

³⁴ Joseph A. Amter, *Vietnam Verdict: A Citizen’s History*. New York: Continuum, 1982, page 58.

³⁵ Memorandum, “Vietnam Situation,” from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, December 21, 1963, cited in *The Pentagon Papers*, New York: Bantam Books, 1971.

of the August 4 mission had cabled the Pentagon explaining that they were probably never attacked. Moreover, Senator William Fulbright, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, was misled by Dean Rusk (and probably by the President himself) to believe that the President would not use the vast power implied in the resolution without consultation.³⁶ How the Senate did not think Johnson would have acted without consultation was a total misreading of Johnson as a leader. Furthermore, he was merely doing what previous presidents had done!

The ritual already established a generation earlier, it took little effort for the Bush Administration to drum up support in 1990 for war in the Persian Gulf. There was one irony. Saddam Hussein was supported by the U.S. against Iran for over a decade. The new self-deception centered on convincing the American public that the military option was the only option, and persuading Saudi Arabia that it was threatened with invasion by Iraq. Saudi officials considered Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s assessment of the threat to their country dubious but eventually agreed to let hundreds of thousands of US troops set up camp. A Soviet Resource satellite took high-resolution reconnaissance photos on September 11, 1990 but it wasn’t until months later that military analysts admitted that the Pentagon exaggerated Iraq’s numbers, a fact re-confirmed by later U.S. Landsat photos.³⁷ Americans were easily sold on the virtue of defending its client state but pleas to defend the “American way of life” and the comparison of Saddam Hussein to Hitler were insufficient to mobilize them in support of an offensive war against Iraq.

A briefing organized by the Congressional Human Rights Caucus helped to escalate war hysteria by inviting witnesses who described Iraqis removing babies from incubators in hospitals

³⁶ Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*. Random House, 1995.

³⁷ Peter D. Zimmerman, “Experts Look Again at Wartime Satellite Photos,” *St. Petersburg Times*, September 15, 1991, A1.

in Kuwait. The media swarmed on the story and President Bush repeated the horrors for the public six times in a period of five weeks. The story turned out to be entirely fabricated but the lies went unpunished because the witnesses were not under oath and the media was too embarrassed; the *New York Times* did not retract the story until February 28, 1991 (after the end of the Iraqi occupation). The witnesses included the daughter of the Kuwaiti Ambassador and a vice president of the World Bank, who were coached by Hill & Knowlton, one of the top public relations firms.³⁸ It wasn't until the nuclear issue was put on the agenda (representing a retreat from Secretary of State Baker's inadvertently honest statement: "We seek a region....in which energy supplies flow freely") that the administration actually felt it had sufficient popular backing to proceed with the military option.³⁹

Once the war was underway, the Bush Administration churned out more fabulous stories in which every part of the national security apparatus was complicit. President Bush claimed the Patriot Missile had shot down 41 out of the 42 Scud missiles fired by Iraq, and television reporters were fed arcade game-style footage of bombs serving up direct hits on their targets. Congressional investigations after the war revealed the Patriot may not have accomplished more than one decisive interception. Further, the efficiency of high-tech bombers had been exaggerated as well. The F-117 Stealth fighter jet, for example, succeeded in only 40% of its missions- not the 80% claimed by DoD.⁴⁰ The deception about the troop buildup was needed to win Arab support, the fabrications about Iraqi atrocities helped mobilize Americans in favor of expanding the mission, and the disinformation on "smart weapons" reassured the country that

³⁸ John R. MacArthur, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1992.

³⁹ See Steve Niva, "The Battle is Joined," in *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*, Eds. Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991.

⁴⁰ Tim Weiner, "Smart Weapons were Overrated, Study Concludes," *New York Times*, July 9, 1996, A1. See also the hearings held by the Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, US House of

technology was able to minimize the risk to American soldiers and the possibility of “collateral damage” to civilians.

The war against Iraq in 2003 rested on equally appalling deceptions and slender foundations of untruths that propped up preordained policy objectives. We know they were preordained because the president made the decision to go to war and directed the Pentagon to begin planning for it, at about the same time in the fall of 2002 that he conceded “I don’t have the evidence at this point” to attack Iraq.⁴¹ Bush II claimed to have evidence of a clear link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. He insisted a centrifuge found by inspectors was part of a nuclear program – a claim that his own intelligence agencies were deeply divided over.⁴² He also infamously informed the public during his State of the Union that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium from Niger even though a US Government inquiry led by Ambassador Joseph Wilson had previously concluded the evidence was phony. The administration in fact sought to conceal information about the 31 countries where Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction had really come from. It sought redactions from Iraq’s weapons inspection document submitted to the United Nations, which named 31 countries including the US. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld claimed on CNN that he cautioned Saddam Hussein about Chemical Weapons during a meeting with him in 1983. State Department transcripts of the meeting and other declassified documents reveal however that he had never taken the moral high ground on WMD in Iraq.⁴³ Finally, the American people had been reassured that troops would be welcomed by jubilant crowds but after

Representatives.

⁴¹ See “On the West Wing,” Anthony Lewis, *New York Review of Books*, February 13, 2003.

⁴² “Threats and Responses: Nuclear Technology; Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited by Bush” Michael Gordon, *New York Times*, January 10, 2003, p. A10.

⁴³ “Iraq Chemical Arms Condemned, but West Once Looked the Other Way” Elaine Sciolino, *New York Times*, February 13, 2003, p. A16. The CNN interview was on September 21, 2002. The National Security Archives deserve credit for documenting Rumsfeld’s misstatement.

the invasion disgruntled Iraqis began waging a daily war of attrition against troops they deemed as an outside occupying force, addressing few of their daily needs and “installing” democracy far too slowly. Evidence later emerged challenging virtually all of the administration’s justifications for going to war.

In both Iraq and Vietnam, the Executive Branch felt compelled to use propaganda and deception to mobilize public opinion after the decision to intervene had already been made. The narrow sets of military facts by themselves were insufficient to generate public support. A cycle of deception, self-deception, and very poor information resulted in a policy fog. In both cases, the Executive Branch attempted to validate its actions through a fig leaf of constitutional legitimacy with the cooperation of a passive Congress.

A particularly small fig leaf was used in the US cruise missile strikes against Sudan on August 20, 1998, striking the Shifa Pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger explained at a White House press conference that day that the attacks were ordered in retaliation for the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and to respond to “imminent” terrorist threats. “The United States will act unilaterally when we are doing something in the defense of our national interests,” declared Albright, “and this was done in self-defense.” Like the Iraq interventions, the attacks were justified to protect against Weapons of Mass Destruction (in this case, chemical weapons).

The decision to attack was made by the “Principals Committee,” a tightly knit group in the White House including Albright, Berger, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton, the President and the Vice President. “One of the things that was indispensable to this operation was secrecy,” said Berger. The four top members of the congressional leadership (or in some cases

their staff) were notified *after* the attack had been ordered which the White House justified by noting that the President retained the logistical capacity to stop the reprisal attack for several hours. But once a reprisal, preventive war, or incursion is underway few will challenge the executive decision and action.

Administration officials repeatedly claimed the Sudan facility was producing key precursor chemicals for VX nerve gas and described it as a secretive military-industrial site with close ties to Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi exile who had yet to reach world-wide celebrity. “This facility is located within a secured chemical plant,” said a fact sheet distributed to the House of Representatives by the White House. “Bin Laden has extensive ties to the Sudanese Government and its industrial sector. And we are confident this Sudanese Government-controlled facility is involved in the production of chemical weapons agents.” “Most of the intelligence people I have talked to in the last week,” said Berger, “have indicated that they have never seen anything quite like this, in the sense of the amount of information that mutually corroborated itself and pointed in this direction.” Shelton backed up this view in a press briefing at the Pentagon: “The intelligence community is confident that this facility is involved in the production of chemical weapons agents, including precursor chemicals for the deadly V-series of nerve agents like, for example, VX. We also know that bin Laden has extensive ties to the Sudanese Government, which controls this facility.”

In the weeks that followed the attack, the administration’s key assertions about Shifa were contradicted. The DCI had been involved in the planning but apparently either discounted or ignored the findings of the CIA’s own analysts, who had concluded that the alleged links between the Sudanese Government and terrorism were fabricated by unreliable sources. The facility was not heavily guarded and was manufacturing a large share – perhaps as much as 50

percent – of Sudan’s medicine, a fact the CIA failed to mention to senior Pentagon officials. The precursor chemical, Empta, cited as a justification for the attack, was even being manufactured and sold at the time by a company in Milwaukee, Aldrich Chemical.⁴⁴ The U.S. eventually had to cave in to a lawsuit, which was ironically brought by a former Clinton appointee, on behalf of the owner of the Shifa factory to unfreeze his assets and clear his name of any association with terrorists. Although the Clinton Administration claimed the suit would jeopardize “sources and methods” of the intelligence agencies in court, attorneys refuted the government’s key evidence, including the claim that soil samples near the factory showed residue of substances used in chemical weapons.⁴⁵ Sources and methods were used once again to avoid cross-examination and public discussion of evidence.

After the attack, Sudan’s ambassador wrote to Congress: “To use an act of terrorism against unsuspecting and innocent people in the name of combating terrorism is highly contradictory. To precipitate sovereign action, moreover, military action, based on supposition or allegation, violates the most basic principles of American law, the United Nations treatise, and a humane sense of fairness.”⁴⁶ The secretive and elitist nature of the decision-making process, concentrating authority in the Principals Committee, excluded officials better informed about the quality of the evidence. But the important fact is that the mode of decision-making was permissible in the first place, encouraged by the National Security State’s secrecy system, and constrained only by the political judgments of those involved. In the Shifa attack, those judgments were influenced by two important factors: One was the propaganda against Sudan and

⁴⁴ Editorial, “Dubious Decisions on the Sudan,” *New York Times*, September 23, 1998. Tim Weiner and Steven Lee Myers, “Flaws in U.S. Account Raise Questions on Strike in Sudan,” *New York Times*, August 29, 1998, A1. Steven Lee Myers and Tim Weiner, “Possible Benign Use is Seen for Chemical at Factory in Sudan,” *New York Times*, August 27, 1998, A1.

⁴⁵ Jerry Seper, “U.S. OKs Payout for Sudan Bombing ‘Mistake’,” *Washington Times*, May 5, 1999.

⁴⁶ Letter from Mahdi Ibrahim Mohamed, Ambassador of the Republic of Sudan to Senator Trent Lott, Senator Tom

Muslims in general that preceded the attacks and the second was the ability of technology, as in the Gulf War, to mitigate the risk to US troops. The first builds a domestic consensus and the other marginalizes the need for it but both ensure that the democratic process is merely a footnote to war operations. Whether Bill Clinton would have followed a different course had he not been overwhelmed with his impeachment problem is not clear. The second was the bureaucratic impulse to use the military in combat or quasi-combat situations as a means of justifying their expense.

The Sudan episode, like the 2003 war on Iraq, suggests that American intelligence is very poor, since essential details about the Shifa Plant and information about Osama bin Laden’s links to it were apparently incorrect. Alternatively, intelligence agencies did have vital information correct but policy makers ignored it for their own purposes. Either way there is little reason to believe that expanding covert operations will improve with greatly increased budgets for covert operations, even if the U.S. cooperates more with the Israeli, British, or Pakistani intelligence agencies. And most importantly, such operations will do little in the end to prevent attacks like 9-11 as the CIA itself conceded before the invasion of Iraq.⁴⁷

The attack on 9-11 meant that American policy-makers and leaders faced a new and extraordinary challenge: No government, whatever its composition, could do “nothing.” The attacks required a new answer but the “natural” answer flowed from the assumptions of the National Security State. This meant organizing the foreign policy of the United States so that other nations will accept or join a new crusade, with the stirring call to arms of “either you are with us, or you are against us,” but such simplistic notions do not fit with modern international

Daschle, Congressman Newt Gingrich and Congressman Richard Gephardt, September 8, 1998.

⁴⁷ See “CIA Warns that a US Attack May Ignite Terror” by Alison Mitchell and Carl Hulse. *New York Times*, October 9, 2002.

politics. This approach meant greatly increasing the defense and national security by 13 percent a year every year for the foreseeable future. The zealot attack on the U.S. could have been presented as the work of madmen who must be captured. The war could thus have stayed in the legal category of invasion of Panama where one man, Noriega, was designated the enemy. However, the response to the 9-11 attacks also meant finding an enemy horrific enough to justify the curtailment of civil liberties and increases in the national security budget. Paradoxically, the state did not declare war on Afghanistan. Indeed it assiduously refused to bring such a declaration to Congress, for this would have meant having an enemy worthy of American antagonism and being bound by the rules of war rather than conveniently categorizing detainees as “unlawful enemy combatants.”

If there is a parallel to be made it is to the Oklahoma bombing where almost 200 people were killed. However, the defendant was charged in the judicial system and war was not declared against the entire population of Oklahoma. This legal route, conforming to the most obvious standards of the rule of law, was never seriously discussed. Whether or not it was discussed within the narrow confines of the national security apparatus is not presently known. The use of the UN as a legal instrument and authority would have required the U.S. to change its position vis-à-vis the international law of terror given that the U.S. refused to accept definitions of terrorism which most of the world accepted.

The abridging of civil liberties, the absence of a declaration of war, and the circumvention of international judicial instruments has relegated the legislative branch to the sidelines. But these actions flow from a pattern long established in the National Security State. “When Congress itself is reduced to nothing but an applauding section of an Executive that has already acted,” writes Raskin, “then the entire process of separated powers and balanced

government becomes farcical. In such a situation, the Congress is reduced to a bunch of lobbyists and cheerleaders begging for the Executive’s favors- and the citizen had better learn to fend for himself.”

CONCLUSION

The pragmatist philosopher John Dewey argued that the reduction of intelligence to a private commodity or an individually exercised right is the *status quo*’s principal means of defense. Writing only a few years before the outbreak of World War II, he pointed out that this organization of intelligence is linked to the habitualization of force in society by treating free inquiry as acceptable in science but not social organization. Ideas should be organized, but for the ends of human enrichment, cooperation, and social action. “Intelligence is a social asset and is clothed with a function as public as its origin, in the concrete, in social cooperation.”⁴⁸ This is a different idea of citizenship, one unbound by an organization of knowledge predicated on ownership. It is also closer to a democracy rooted in the liberal tradition, one based on openness and participation rather than secret war making bureaucratic structures operating according to their own rules.

At the dawn of a new century, democrats have a responsibility to construct a better framework for accountable public policy liberated from social pathologies and outdated institutions. “Lag in mental and moral patterns provides the bulwark of the older institutions,” says Dewey. “In expressing the past they still express present beliefs, outlooks and purposes.” It is time to inquire into how to make knowledge a cooperative endeavor that defines and approaches the common good. Then it will be possible to discover our past and as painful as it may be, identify the many problems that must now be understood and transcended. Then we may

⁴⁸ John Dewey, “Socializing Intelligence” and “The Meaning of Office in Liberalism” in *Intelligence in the Modern*

be able to replace social and political agencies that perpetuate international colonization with those that propagate the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.