Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 129

1 8 March 1996

2 [Ruling]

3 [Open session]

4 --- Upon commencing at ^

5 JUDGE JORDA: [Interpretation] Mr. Marrow ^, will you call the case

6 which is the one before us today.

7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Case IT-95-11-R61, the Prosecutor

8 against Milan Martic.

9 JUDGE JORDA: [Interpretation] Thank you. The Trial Chamber I --

10 sir, do you have something you'd like to say?

11 The Trial Chamber I, composed of Judge Jorda, Presiding Judge;

12 Judge Odio-Benito; and Judge Fouad Riad; assisted by Mr. Dominik Marrow ^,

13 registrar; from the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Erik Ostberg; will

14 deliver the following decision for the case of the Prosecutor versus Milan

15 Martic as part of Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

16 The indictment presented to this Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 61

17 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ("Rules") was initially confirmed

18 on 25 July 1995 by Judge Jorda who, on the same day, also issued several

19 warrants of arrest. Since the warrants have not yet been executed, the

20 accused does not fall under the authority of the Tribunal. In a decision

21 of 13 decision of 13 February 1996, pursuant to Sub-rule 61(A) of the

22 Rules, Judge Jorda determined that, given the circumstances of the case,

23 the reasonable period of time after which the Prosecutor shall report to

24 the Judge on his attempts to transmit the warrants and to effect service

25 of the indictment had long since elapsed. After having heard the

Page 130

1 Prosecutor and after having determined that the measures taken to transmit

2 the warrant of arrest and to serve the indictment were reasonable, in

3 accordance with Sub-rule 61(A) of the Rules, the Confirming Judge ordered

4 him to request that the Trial Chamber again review the indictment against

5 Milan Martic.

6 When reviewing the indictment, the Chamber must, as the initial

7 Confirming Judge did, establish that there are reasonable grounds for

8 believing that the accused has committed one or all of the crimes charged

9 in the indictment. The Chamber has now reviewed the relevant parts of the

10 file transmitted by the Prosecutor to the Confirming Judge, as well as

11 additional evidence presented by the Prosecutor. It also heard witnesses

12 summoned to appear by the Prosecutor during a public hearing held on 27

13 February 1996. The Trial Chamber must also review the legal

14 characterisation of the facts presented by the Prosecutor in order to

15 determine whether its competence at this stage has been established.

16 As this Trial Chamber affirmed in its decision of 20 October 1995,

17 Nikolic proceedings under Rule 61 of the Rules ensure that the Tribunal,

18 which does not have any direct enforcement powers, is not rendered

19 ineffective by the non-appearance of the accused and may proceed

20 nevertheless. To this end, if the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the

21 charges are reasonable, after it has again confirmed the indictment, it

22 shall issue an international warrant of arrest against the accused.

23 Furthermore, should the Chamber be satisfied that failure to execute the

24 warrants of arrest is due in whole or in part to the refusal of a State to

25 cooperate, the president of the Tribunal shall notify the Security Council

Page 131

1 of the United Nations. The review of the indictment by a panel of Judges

2 sitting in a public hearing reinforces the confirmation decision and, when

3 they are summoned to appear, provides the victims with the opportunity to

4 have their voices heard and to become part of history.

5 We will now review the indictment. First, the charges.

6 Milan Martic is accused of the having knowingly and wilfully

7 ordered the shelling of Zagreb with Orkan rockets on 2 and 3 May 1995

8 (Counts 1 and 3). The attacks allegedly killed and wounded civilians in

9 the city. Milan Martic, pursuant to Rule 61(A) of the Rules, is also

10 accused of being responsible for the shelling because of his position of

11 authority and his alleged failure to prevent the attack or to punish the

12 perpetrators (Counts 2 and 4). During the hearing, the Prosecutor stated

13 that he was presenting the latter two counts in the alternative. The

14 shelling false within the jurisdiction of the of the Tribunal pursuant to

15 Article 3 and Article 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

16 The competence of the Tribunal under Article 3 of the Statute will

17 now be reviewed.

18 During the public review of the indictment, the Trial Chamber must

19 verify that its competence has, at this stage, been established. In this

20 respect, the Prosecutor holds that the alleged acts fall within the

21 jurisdiction of the Tribunal pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, which

22 states that "the Tribunal shall have the powers to prosecute persons

23 violating the laws or customs of war."

24 Article 3 non-exhaustively enumerates some of those violations.

25 In its decision of 2 October 1995 in the Tadic case, stipulated that

Page 132

1 Article 3 refers to a broad category of offences, that is, all violations

2 of the laws or customs of war, and that the enumeration of some of the

3 violations provided in Article 3 are merely illustrative and not

4 exhaustive. Since the violation identified by the Prosecutor is not fully

5 covered by paragraphs (A) to (E) of Article 3, the Trial Chamber must

6 verify that it constitutes a violation of the laws or customs of war

7 referred to in the Article. Since the Appeals Chamber set a certain

8 number of conditions for establishing the jurisdiction of the Tribunal

9 pursuant to Article 3, the Chamber must therefore be satisfied that these

10 conditions appear to have been fulfilled at this stage.

11 The Trial Chamber will now move to identification of rules of

12 international humanitarian law applicable in this case.

13 According to the Appeals Chamber, the first requirement for a

14 violation to fall within the purview of Article 3 of the Statute is that

15 the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international

16 humanitarian law. The second requirement is that the rule must be

17 customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, that the treaty was

18 unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the alleged offence

19 and was not in conflict with or derogated from peremptory norms of

20 international law (paragraphs 94 and 143, Decision of the Appeals

21 Chamber).

22 This Trial Chamber must therefore identify those conventional and

23 customary norms which underline the charges against Milan Martic and

24 establish that violations of those rules are subject to prosecution under

25 Article 3 of the Statute.

Page 133

1 First, violations of the rules of conventional law which fall

2 within the purview of Article 3.

3 The Appeals Chamber has specified that this Article must be

4 interpreted to include violations of Additional Protocols I and II. All

5 the states which were part of the former Yugoslavia and parties to the

6 present conflict at the time the alleged offences were committed were

7 bound by Additional Protocols I and II, applicable to international and

8 non-international armed conflicts respectively. Under the terms of these

9 Additional Protocols, attacks against civilians are prohibited. Article

10 85(3)(a) of Additional Protocol I provides that making the civilian

11 population or individual civilians the object of attack constitutes a

12 grave breach when committed wilfully in violation of the relevant

13 provisions of the Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or

14 health. Grave breaches of Additional Protocol I constitute war crimes and

15 are subject to prosecution under Article 3 of the Statute. Furthermore,

16 violations of Article 51(2), stating that "The civilian population as

17 such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack"

18 and prohibiting "acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which

19 is to spread terror among the civilian population," fall within the

20 competence of the Tribunal under Article 3. Similarly, violations of

21 paragraph 6 of that same Article, which expressly prohibits "attacks

22 against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals," come

23 within the province of the Tribunal as defined in Article 3 of the

24 Statute. Last, in respect of Additional Protocol II, Article 13(2)

25 provides that the "civilian population as such, as well as individual

Page 134

1 civilians, shall not be the object of attack," paragraph 1 of that same

2 Article stipulates that this rule must be must be observed "in all

3 circumstances" so that "the civilian population and individual civilians

4 shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military

5 operations." Violations of the Additional Protocol II constitute

6 violations of the laws or customs of war and, as such, come under Article

7 3 of the Statute.

8 The unqualified character of the conventional rules prohibiting

9 attacks against civilians is also underpinned by Article 60(5) of the 1969

10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This provision excludes the

11 application of the principle of reciprocity in conventional matters, even

12 in cases of material breaches of provisions "relating to the protection of

13 the human person contained in treaties of humanitarian character."

14 As regards customary law, the rule that the civilian population as

15 such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack

16 is a fundamental rule of the international humanitarian law applicable to

17 all armed conflicts.

18 There exists, at present, a corpus of international, a corpus of

19 customary international law applicable to all armed conflicts irrespective

20 of their characterisation. This corpus includes general rules or

21 principles designed to protect the civilian population, as well as rules

22 governing means and methods of warfare. As the Appeals Chamber affirmed,

23 the general principle that the right of the parties to the conflict to

24 choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited and the prohibition

25 against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are both

Page 135

1 undoubtedly part of this corpus of customary law (paragraph 127, Decision

2 of the Appeals Chamber).

3 The applicability of these rules to all conflicts have been

4 corroborated by General Assembly Resolutions 2444 and 2675, both adopted

5 unanimously, in 1968 and 1970. These resolutions are considered as

6 declaratory of customary international law in this regard. The customary

7 prohibition on attacks against civilians in armed conflicts is supported

8 by its having been incorporated into both as both Additional Proceed

9 columns. Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I and Article 13 of the

10 Additional Protocol II, both mentioned above, prohibit attacks against the

11 civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians. Both

12 provisions explicitly state that this rule shall be observed in all

13 circumstances. In its decision of 2 October 1995, the Appeals Chamber

14 reaffirmed that both Articles constitute customary international law.

15 Furthermore, the prohibition against attacking the civilian

16 population as such, as well as individual civilians, and the general

17 principle limiting the means and methods of warfare also derive from the

18 "Martens clause." This clause has been incorporated into basic

19 humanitarian instruments and states that "in cases not covered by (the

20 relevant instruments), civilians and combatants remain under the

21 protection and authority of the principles of international law derived

22 from established custom, from the principles of humanity, and from the

23 dictates of public conscience." Moreover, these norms also emanate from

24 the elementary considerations of humanity which constitute the foundation

25 of the entire body of international humanitarian law applicable to all

Page 136

1 armed conflicts.

2 It is sufficient to recall at this point that the elementary

3 considerations of humanity are reflected in Article 3 Common to the Geneva

4 Conventions. This provision embodies those rules of customary

5 international law which should be observed "as a minimum" by all parties

6 "at any time and in anyplace whatsoever" irrespective of the

7 characterisation of the conflict. The prohibition against attacking

8 civilians must be derived from Common Article 3, which provides that

9 "persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall, in all

10 circumstances, be treated humanely" and which prohibits, in paragraph 1(A)

11 - I quote - "violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all

12 kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture." Attacks against the

13 civilian population as such, or individual civilians, would necessarily

14 lead to infringement of the mandatory minimum norms applicable to all

15 armed conflicts. Article 4 of Protocol II, if you recall developing and

16 elaborating Common as Common Article 3, reiterates these fundamental

17 guarantees.

18 Might there be circumstances which would exclude unlawfulness, in

19 only or in part? More specifically, does the fact that the attack was

20 carried out as a reprisal exclude the illegality of the attack? The

21 prohibition against attacking the given population as such, as well as

22 individual civilians, must be respected in all circumstances regardless of

23 the behaviour of the other party. The opinion of the great majority of

24 legal authorities permits the Trial Chamber to assert that no

25 circumstances would legitimise an attack against civilians, even if it

Page 137

1 were a response proportionate to a similar violation perpetrated by the

2 other party. The exclusion of the application of the principle of

3 reprisals in the case of such fundamental humanitarian norms is confirmed

4 by Article 1 common to all Geneva Conventions. Under this provision, the

5 High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for

6 the Conventions in all circumstances, even when the behaviour of the other

7 party might be considered wrongful. The International Court of Justice

8 considered that this obligation does not derive only from the Geneva

9 Conventions themselves but also from the general principles of

10 humanitarian law, as indicated in the case concerning Military and

11 Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua versus the

12 United States of America, merits, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paragraph

13 (Nicaragua versus the United States of America, merits, I.C.J. Reports

14 1986, paragraph 220).

15 The prohibition on reprisal against the civilian population or

16 individual civilians, which is applicable to all armed conflicts, is

17 reinforced by the text of various instruments. General Assembly

18 Resolution 2675, underscoring the need for measures to ensure that the

19 better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, posits

20 that "civilian populations, or individual members thereof, should not be

21 object of reprisals." Furthermore, Article 51(6) of Protocol I, already

22 discussed, establishes an unqualified prohibition because "in all

23 circumstances, attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way

24 of reprisals are prohibited." Although Protocol II does not specifically

25 refer to reprisals against civilians, a prohibition against such reprisals

Page 138












12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts. Pages 138 to 139.













Page 140

1 must be inferred from its Article 4. Reprisals against civilians are

2 contrary to the absolute and non-derogable prohibitions enumerated in this

3 provision. Prohibited behaviour must remain so "at any time and in

4 anyplace whatsoever." The prohibition of reprisals against civilians in

5 non-international armed conflicts is strengthened by the inclusion of the

6 provision of "collective punishments" in paragraph 2(B) of Article 4 of

7 Protocol II.

8 Therefore, the rule which states that reprisals against the

9 civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in

10 all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the other

11 party, is an integral part of customary international law and must be

12 respected in all armed conflicts.

13 Last, even if an attack is directed against a legitimate military

14 target, the choice of weapon and its use are clearly delimited by the

15 rules of international humanitarian law. There exists no formal provision

16 forbidding the use of cluster bombs in armed conflicts. Article 35(2) of

17 Additional Protocol II, however, prohibits the employment of "weapons,

18 projectiles, and material and methods of a nature to cause superfluous

19 injury or unnecessary suffering." In addition, paragraph 4(b) of Article

20 51 of that same Protocol states that indiscriminate attacks are

21 prohibited. These include attacks "which employ a method or means of

22 combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective." Last,

23 under the terms of paragraph 5(b) of that same Article, the attacks must

24 not cause damage and harm to the civilian population disproportionate in

25 relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Page 141

1 The Trial Chamber will now review the other conditions posited by

2 the Appeals Chamber.

3 Article 1 of the Statute authorised the Tribunal "to prosecute

4 persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian

5 law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in

6 accordance with the provisions of the present Statute." The Appeals

7 Chamber considered that in order for a violation of international

8 humanitarian law to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal pursuant

9 to Article 2 of its Statute, it must, in fact, be serious. The Appeals

10 Chamber identified two criteria for evaluating "seriousness": the

11 violation must undermine important values, and it must have serious

12 consequences for the victim or victims. In this respect, the norm which

13 has been violated stems from elementary considerations of humanity and

14 protects the civilian population or individual civilians from attack. The

15 violation of the norm thus jeopardises the survival and safety of the

16 civilian population and, in so doing, infringes on an important value.

17 Furthermore, it has grave consequences for the victims.

18 The Appeals Chamber also clearly stated that for a violation of a

19 norm of humanitarian law to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,

20 it must involve the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator

21 of the violation. The prohibition against attacking the civilian

22 population as such or individual civilians during armed conflicts is clear

23 in this case, as is the resolve of all states to attach to it a principle

24 of individual responsibility. As the Appeals Chamber reaffirmed, citing

25 the judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg:

Page 142

1 "Crimes against international law are committed by men and not by

2 abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such

3 crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced" (paragraph

4 128, Decision of the Appeals Chamber). The principle of criminal

5 responsibility, restated in Article 7(1) of the Statute of this Tribunal,

6 covers the person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise

7 aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime.

8 International law thus permits the Prosecution of individuals who acted in

9 an official capacity, as stated in Article 7(2) of the Statute.

10 The Tribunal has particularly valid grounds for exercising its

11 jurisdiction over persons who, through their position of political or

12 military authority, are able to order the commission of crimes falling

13 within its competence ratione materiae or who knowingly refrain from

14 preventing or punishing the perpetrators of such crimes. In a decision of

15 16 May 1995, this Trial Chamber considered that such "more so than those

16 just carrying out orders ... Would thus undermine international public

17 order" (Karadzic, Mladic and Stanisic case). Since the criminal innocent

18 is formulated at a high level of the administrative hierarchy, the

19 violation of the norm of international humanitarian law is part of a

20 system of criminality specifically justifying the intervention of the

21 Tribunal.

22 The competence of the Tribunal, subject to a contrary

23 interpretation of the merits, in any subsequent trial, is thus

24 established.

25 The Trial Chamber, which has now identified the international

Page 143

1 norms which are applicable, has tried to see whether these apply to the

2 facts that the Prosecutor submitted to it.

3 Second part, the facts.

4 The Trial Chamber will now review the evidence submitted in

5 support of the indictment in order to determine whether there are

6 reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed one or all

7 of the crimes charged in the indictment. By that is meant all the

8 evidence presented during the confirmation of the indictment and any other

9 evidence produced by the Prosecutor after the initial confirmation or

10 during the hearing. In addition to the written evidence, the testimony of

11 four witnesses was heard. The testimony dealt inter alia with the

12 prevailing political and military situation at the time the city of Zagreb

13 was shelled on 2 and 3 May 1995, description of the attacks themselves,

14 and the consequences of the attacks. Three witnesses, one of whom is an

15 investigator in the Office of the Prosecutor, and two police officers from

16 the city of Zagreb were also heard. Finally, the features of the rocket

17 used, its including its striking force and potential for causing damage,

18 were described by a witness who is a military expert trained in the field

19 of weapons.

20 As regards the military and political situation prevailing at the

21 time of the attacks on Zagreb in May 1995, there can be no question that

22 the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia and the armed forces of the

23 self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina were engaged in an armed

24 conflict. It was also made clear that the armed forces of the Federal

25 Republic of Yugoslavia supported the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian

Page 144

1 Krajina at that time. The evidence submitted shows that on 1 May 1995,

2 the Croatian army launched a massive attack against the territory held by

3 the Serbs in Western Slavonia, a region located directly along the

4 Zagreb-Belgrade highway which is the main east-west artery in Croatia.

5 During the fighting in this region of Eastern Slavonia, the city of Zagreb

6 was shelled on 2 and 3 May 1995.

7 The relevant parts of the record and the testimony heard during

8 the hearing demonstrate that the shelling of Zagreb was ordered by Milan

9 Martic. At the time these acts occurred, Milan Martic was the President

10 of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. Pursuant to Rule 78,

11 paragraph 5, of the Constitution of that self-proclaimed entity, "The

12 President commands the armed forces in times of peace and war, commands

13 the national resistance in time of war, orders partial or general

14 mobilisation, and organisations military preparations in accordance with

15 the provisions of the law." After the shelling, in television and radio

16 interviews and in interviews with newspaper journalists, Milan Martic

17 admitted several times that he was the person who gave the order.

18 Furthermore, the facts submitted by the Prosecutor permit the

19 inference that the shelling of Zagreb was an operation which had been

20 planned or prepared. Admitting that he was under orders from Milan

21 Martic, General Celeketic announced to the press on 24 March 1995, more

22 than a month prior to the events on which the charges are based, that

23 should a Croatian offensive be launched, he expected to respond by

24 targeting the "weak points," that is, "the parks of the Croatian cities."

25 General Celeketic added: "We know who the people in the parks are;

Page 145

1 civilians."

2 Moreover, the attack on Zagreb itself does not seem to be an

3 isolated act, because on 3 May 1995, Milan Martic asserted that other

4 Croatian cities, Sisak and Karlovac, had also been targeted, apparently as

5 part of the same criminal population.

6 As regards the attacks themselves, the testimony of

7 Sergeant Curtis, a member of the Office of the Prosecutor, and of the two

8 police officers from Zagreb, shows that on the morning of 2 May 1995,

9 three rockets struck the centre of the city of Zagreb while three others

10 hit a site near the civilian airport. On 3 May 1995, during the

11 lunch-hour, two rockets again fell on the centre of the city and three

12 others on nearby neighbourhoods. Seven people died in the two attacks,

13 more than 100 were seriously wounded, and an equal number were slightly

14 wounded. All the testimony corroborates the assertion that none of these

15 people were, or could be presumed to have been, performing a military

16 duty.

17 As the photographs and the videotape produced during the hearing

18 show, there was significant physical damage which could have been much

19 more serious. It appears both from the documents produced and the

20 testimonies heard that a high school, a children's hospital, a retirement

21 home, and the National Academy were damaged. According to the witnesses,

22 there were no military targets in the immediate vicinity. It is noted,

23 however, that the administration building of the Ministry of the Interior

24 was allegedly hit during the attack of 2 May 1995. In addition, the

25 witnesses emphasised that there were no military targets near the places

Page 146

1 where the civilians were killed. All asserted that the number of deaths

2 might have been much higher. The fact that there were few civilians in

3 the streets of Zagreb during the second attack can be attributed to the

4 climate of terror generated by the attack of the previous day. The

5 frightened population chose to desert the streets during the lunch hour,

6 which certainly reduced the number of casualties this type of shelling

7 might have caused.

8 The weapons expert clearly elaborated the features of the Orkan

9 rockets and the bombs they release. From his testimony, it appears that

10 the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the JNA, developed the

11 rockets used during the attacks on Zagreb. The effects of these rockets

12 have been known for many years. The rockets in question were equipped

13 with 288 bomblets, each of which, on explosion, propels jagged bits of

14 metal and more than 400 small steel spheres in every direction. The

15 rockets have a range of about 50 kilometres, with a lethal radius of about

16 10 metres. Unlike missiles which can be guided towards the desired

17 target, these rockets are relatively inaccurate because the lateral error

18 factor can be as much as 600 metres on either side. The bombs released by

19 the rockets have a dual purpose: they can be used both as an

20 anti-personnel weapon and as a means of inflicting damage on light

21 artillery since they can penetrate more than 60 millimetres of steel. The

22 military expert believed that because they are inaccurate and have a low

23 striking force, the choice of the Orkan rockets for the attack on Zagreb

24 would not have been appropriate had the purpose been to damage military

25 targets. In respect of this, the expert referred to a set of photographs

Page 147

1 which show minor damage to buildings in Zagreb during the attacks of May

2 1995. In his opinion, it is therefore reasonable to believe that

3 attacking and terrorising the civilian population was the main reason for

4 using such rockets. Finally, the expert stated that the rockets were

5 launched from a region less than 50 kilometres from Zagreb controlled by

6 the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. The

7 region presents the type of geophysical conditions which lend themselves

8 to this type of operation.

9 Based on the evidence produced and the testimony heard, the Trial

10 Chamber is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that

11 on 2 and 3 May 1995, the civilian population of the city of Zagreb was

12 attacked with Orkan rockets on orders from Milan Martic, the then

13 President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. The attacks

14 killed and wounded many civilians. In respect of its accuracy and

15 striking force, the use of the Orkan rocket in this case was not designed

16 to hit military targets but to terrorise the civilians of Zagreb. These

17 attacks are therefore contrary to the rules of customary and conventional

18 international law already discussed above and fall within the scope of

19 Article 3 of the Statute.

20 The Chamber therefore is satisfied that there is reason to

21 reconfirm all four counts of the indictment against me against Milan

22 Martic and to issue an international arrest warrant against him which will

23 be sent to all states. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber considers that the

24 warrant of arrest must also be sent to the Multinational Military

25 Implementation Force, known as IFOR, deployed on the territory of Bosnia

Page 148

1 and Herzegovina pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreements signed in Paris on

2 14 December 1995.

3 The Chamber therefore rules that noting Rules 59 bis and 61 of the

4 Rules of Procedure and Evidence; noting the confirmation of the indictment

5 by Judge Jorda on 25 July 1995; noting the decision of 13 February 1996 in

6 which Judge Jorda ordered that the Prosecutor submits the case to the

7 Trial Chamber; the Trial Chamber, having held a public hearing on 27

8 February 1996 at the Seat of the Tribunal; having heard the submissions of

9 the Prosecutor; ruling unanimously, states that there are reasonable

10 grounds for believing that Milan Martic has committed the crimes charged

11 in the indictment confirmed on 25 July 1995; confirms all four counts of

12 the indictment as described; issues an international warrant of arrest for

13 Milan Martic; states that the warrant shall be transmitted to all states

14 and, if necessary, to the International Implementation Force known as

15 IFOR.

16 Done in French and English, the French version being

17 authoritative, dated this 8th day of March 1996 at The Hague, the

18 Netherlands.

19 Are the hearing is adjourned.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at ^