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Research Report

Diversification in the Presence of Taxes

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Abstract

A common problem faced by taxable investors is that of how much to diversify either a low cost-basis single asset or concentrated portfolio. While tax-exempt theory is clear on the benefits of diversification and there are useful industry-standard methods for addressing this, in the presence of taxes there are no standard approaches to arriving at a considered choice.

In this paper we propose an analytic and intuitive framework for addressing the problem. We consider a very simple formulation with only two investment alternatives. By defining a *tax-deferred* equivalent of the taxable investor, we are able to adapt standard analytical methods and view the diversification decision in the presence of taxes as a conventional risk-return tradeoff without the tax complications, provided we use appropriate tax-deferred performance measures. In particular, we maximize the Sharpe Ratio to obtain a recommended degree of diversification. Using sensitivity analysis, we find that greater diversification is needed with greater initial asset volatility, with longer investment horizon, with lower expected return of the initial asset, and with higher cost basis. Less diversification is needed when the investor receives a step-up in basis at the horizon. Our results highlight the substantial risks incurred in concentrated holdings and often recommend high levels of diversification, even in the face of taxes.

1. Introduction

Taxes can have a considerable impact on portfolio value, and investment decisions should be made with a clear understanding of the tax-adjusted performance of the alternatives under consideration. The impact of taxes has received increased attention in recent years, including issues relating to portfolio performance (Stein [1998]), asset allocation (Jacob [1998]), manager selection (Jeffrey and Arnott [1993]), and tax efficiency (Dickson and Shoven [1993]).

One common – and key – problem faced by taxable investors is that of diversifying a low cost-basis single asset or concentrated portfolio. In the tax-exempt case, modern portfolio theory is very clear on the benefits of diversification and there have evolved

useful industry-standard methods for addressing this, for example the mean-variance approach to optimal portfolio diversification (Markowitz [1986]). When taxes are present, however, there are no standard approaches to arriving at a considered choice.

Taxes complicate the analysis because capital gains taxes are incurred at the time the asset is diversified. The immediate tax resulting from the sale of a portion of the initial asset reduces the possibility of future returns and may, or may not, outweigh any uncertain future benefit from diversification.

In proposing an approach to solving the taxable investor's diversification dilemma, we consider a very-much simplified problem in which there are just two possible assets: the initial holdings and a diversified benchmark portfolio. Our solution framework considers the investment decision *with* initial taxes, and shows how it can be viewed as an equivalent but much simpler investment decision *without* initial taxes. We do this by creating a *tax-deferred* investor (with different investment opportunities) who does not pay initial capital gains taxes, but whose final investment performance is identical to that of the actual investor¹. Identifying the best diversification decision available to the tax-deferred investor leads to a decision for the actual investor. The tax-deferred investor is in a sense a tax-deferred equivalent of the actual investor, facing an equivalent but simpler problem.

Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the subject of risk and diversification in more depth, using examples that focus on the final wealth of the investor. We provide an overview of our framework in Section 3, together with a description of the tax-deferred investor's diversification problem and its solution. In Section 4 we present results under specific numerical assumptions, and investigate the sensitivity of the results to the key parameters, namely the risk of the initial holding, the investment horizon, the cost basis, excess expected return, and riskless rate. Section 5 considers the case of diversifying a portfolio so as to reduce *tracking error* risk, giving an example that uses a mean-variance optimizer. The Appendix contains technical details of our formulation.

¹ The term "investment performance" is used here to refer to the after-tax end-of-horizon cash flow probability distribution.

2. Risks and Benefits of Diversification: An Example

To motivate our study of diversification in the presence of taxes we start with a concrete example of an investor with an initial high-risk holding who owns \$1 million concentrated in a risky stock with zero cost basis. We compare the distributions of uncertain end-of-horizon future values without and with diversification, and contrast these with the much simpler comparison (of yearly expected return and risk) that may be used to decide the level of diversification for a tax-deferred investor.

First consider the initial undiversified holding. Let us assume that the risk is 40%, measuring risk as the annual standard deviation (volatility) of rate of return. We focus on the investor's wealth after 20 years, at the end of the investment horizon. Let us further assume that the stock returns an expected 10% per year, of which 7% is price appreciation and 3% dividend yield. Each year, dividends are taxed at 39.6% and the after-tax dividend proceeds are reinvested in the portfolio. We also assume that the investor liquidates the holdings and incurs capital gains taxes of 20% at the horizon. The investor's final wealth is uncertain, and Figure 1 shows its distribution obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation in which the security prices follow a lognormal process. While the investor can expect \$1m to grow on average to \$4.5m after taxes, the distribution of final wealth is unattractively broad. The mode (most likely value) of the distribution is only \$0.5m, the probability of ending up with less than the initial \$1m is 43%, and the probability of not keeping up with inflation² is 60%.

Next, consider the consequences of a decision to diversify. Suppose that the investor liquidates the risky holding, paying taxes at the 20% rate, and invests the remaining \$800,000 in a diversified portfolio with an annual standard deviation of 15%, but with the same expected price and dividend returns as the risky stock. After 20 years, tax is paid at the 20% rate (reduced by a cost basis of \$800,000). Figure 2 shows the final wealth distribution. The investor can expect to have only \$3.8m, on average, after 20 years. While this expectation is lower than in Figure 1 because only 80% of the initial value is available for compounding, the probability distribution is nonetheless more attractive: the mode increases from \$0.5m to \$2.5m, the chance of ending up with less than the initial

² At an inflation rate of about 3.5% for 20 years, the initial \$1m value double to \$2m in 20 years.

\$1m reduces from 43% to just 2%, and the chance of not keeping up with inflation reduces from 60% to 21%.

The figures show that diversification boosts performance when taxes are incurred even though the asset expected returns are identical. How can this be? Diversification makes the expected return more readily achievable: in Figure 1, with a high volatility, the expected return is in the “tail” of the distribution and is not likely to be achieved; in Figure 2, with a lower volatility, the expected return is more likely to be achieved³.

Comparing Figures 1 and 2, we ask whether the initial tax is justified. How should the investor trade off risk (lessened by diversification) against anticipated future wealth (also lessened by initial taxes)? In particular, how much of the initial holding should be diversified and by what principle can this be justified? Our approach, outlined in the next section, provides a solution that is both analytical and intuitive.

Our approach is based on the fact that the tax-exempt diversification problem is simpler than that faced by an investor who must pay initial taxes in order to diversify. Figure 3 shows the well-known tax-exempt trade-off between risk and return⁴. The Sharpe Ratio Criterion is a common one for selecting a diversification level: the investor chooses the fraction of initial asset (Asset 2) to sell (purchasing shares of Asset 1) such that the resulting portfolio has the highest ratio of excess return (measured above the risk-free rate r_f) to standard deviation of excess return.

³ This phenomenon is due to the fact that the long-term *growth rate* (see, e.g., Fernholz and Shay [1982]) is *less* than the yearly *expected rate of return* due to a risk penalty (equal to half the variance in the case of a lognormal distribution). Some intuition into this paradox is provided by the simple example of gaining 20% or losing 20% with probability 1/2. The expected rate of return is zero, even over the long run. However, you would have to be very lucky not to lose money over the long run because the particular sequence “gain 20% then lose 20%” decreases wealth by 4% [computed as $(1+0.2)(1-0.2)-1$] or about 2% each time the example is played (when there are exactly equal numbers of ups and downs). This 2% reduction is indeed half the variance since $0.2^2/2=2\%$. Curiously, while the compounded expected rate of return is equal to the expected compounded rate of return, over the long run this rate becomes nearly impossible to attain due to the risk penalty.

⁴ Brunel [1998] emphasizes that taxable investors should use caution when using traditional efficient frontier tools directly.

In order to place the 40% standard deviation example of Figure 1 in context, Table 1 shows recent standard deviation risks of some well-known stocks. The 40% volatility of Figure 1, while larger than that of many large-cap securities, is not particularly high for a technology or small company. Our base benchmark volatility of 15% is similar to the volatility of the S&P500 index over a recent five-year period.

S&P500	14%
Exxon	16%
GE	21%
IBM	30%
Microsoft	35%
Micron Technologies	72%
AOL*	84%
Amazon.com*	124%

Table 1: Risk (as measured by annualized standard deviation) of the return of selected stocks over the 1994-1999 period. The risk for stocks marked with an asterisk is based on the 1997-1999 period.

3. Our Approach

In this section we specify an analytical framework for the opportunities and choices of the actual investor and of the tax-deferred investor, and we indicate how to match them so as to have very nearly the same future cash flows. This matching allows us to view the diversification decision in the presence of taxes (faced by the actual investor) as a conventional risk-return tradeoff without initial tax complications (faced by the tax-deferred investor). In particular, we use the maximum Sharpe Ratio as the decision criterion for making the optimal diversification choice of the tax-deferred investor. If this is the best choice for the tax-deferred investor, and the actual investor's future cash flows closely match, it follows that we have also identified an optimal choice for the actual investor.

In our simplified problem, the investor holds an initial portfolio, A , with market value W_0 , which may be sold in whole or in part to purchase shares in a fully diversified benchmark portfolio, B . The investor's goal is to select the best fraction x (between 0 and 1) of the initial portfolio to be sold, with the after-tax proceeds being used to invest in B . The resulting position is then held for the preset investment horizon of n years, during

which time uncertain rates of return for the initial asset and the benchmark are observed and compounded. At the end of the investment horizon, the position is liquidated and taxes are paid. This defines a probability distribution of final after-tax values for the actual investor to which we will match a tax-deferred investor⁵.

Imagine, now, a tax-deferred investor who can diversify without initially paying capital gains taxes, but who pays taxes on liquidation and whose after-tax horizon investment performance matches that of the actual investor very closely. The tax-deferred investor must face different investment opportunities; in particular, the tax-deferred assets must pay a lower expected rate of return to compensate for taxes paid by the actual investor. The tax-deferred investor holds an initial portfolio A^* (with market value W_0), sells a fraction x^* , and (without paying initial taxes or changing the cost basis) uses the proceeds to purchase shares of the benchmark B^* . The resulting portfolio is held for n years, and the position is then liquidated and taxes are paid⁶. This defines a probability distribution of final after-tax values for the tax-deferred investor.

Inputs to the model are as follows. The expected rates of return for A and B are μ_A and μ_B respectively. Their annual standard deviations of return are σ_A and σ_B , and the beta of A with respect to the benchmark B is β . The horizon is fixed at n years, after which the investment position is liquidated. The tax rate on long-term capital gains is τ , there are no dividends, and the risk-free rate is r_f .

Our mathematical formulation and its solution are in the Appendix, where we derive the tax-deferred investor's rate of return μ_x and standard deviation σ_x analytically in terms of our inputs for each value of the diversification fraction x under the assumption of joint lognormal asset returns. To match the final cash-flow distributions of the actual and tax-deferred investors, we choose x^* to match diversification exposure, and set the joint performance of A^* and B^* to compensate for taxes paid by the actual investor.

⁵ For simplicity, we assume no transaction costs. This assumption is reasonable when transaction costs are small relative to tax costs

⁶ The analysis is also generalized to the case of an investor who does not liquidate, but who receives a step-up in cost basis at death.

4. The Diversification Solution: Example

We now use an example to study the actual investor's diversification decision, as chosen by applying the maximum Sharpe Ratio criterion to the tax-deferred investor. We then use sensitivity analysis to show that greater diversification is associated with greater initial asset volatility, with longer investment horizon, with higher cost basis, with lower expected return of the initial asset, and with lower risk-free rate. Less diversification is needed when the investor receives a step-up in basis at the horizon.

As our base-case example, we set numerical values for the initial asset A and the benchmark B as follows:

Expected Returns:	$\mu_A = \mu_B = 10\%$
Volatilities:	$\sigma_A = 25\%, \sigma_B = 15\%$
Horizon:	$n = 20$ years
Tax rate:	$\tau = 20\%$ on long-term capital gains
Risk free rate:	$r_f = 6\%$
Initial cost basis	$C_0 = 0$

With these values, Figure 4 shows the after-tax annual expected return and risk tradeoff faced by the tax-deferred investor analogously to Figure 3. In this case, the maximum Sharpe Ratio criterion recommends that 86% of the initial holding be sold. Greater diversification corresponds to a lower expected rate of return for the tax-deferred investor because it requires that higher taxes be paid initially. The tax-deferred investor must earn a lower annual rate of return in order to experience the same end-of-period performance as the actual investor.

What now is the sensitivity of this solution to changes in the base numerical parameters?

- Of key importance is the *risk of the initial holding*, σ_A . Figure 5 shows the risk-return tradeoff and optimal diversification x for a range of risk levels. The more risky the stock A , the more it should be diversified. Many securities, e.g., those with volatility more than 30%, should be almost completely diversified. There is less need to diversify low-volatility initial assets.

- The *horizon* is also important to the diversification decision, as shown in Figure 6. The longer the horizon, the more important risk becomes, and the more it should be diversified. For high volatility initial holdings, the decision is not very sensitive to the horizon and we recommend diversifying most of the asset. For low volatility initial holdings the horizon is more important.
- While the *cost basis* C_0 is important, too, its effect is straightforward. If the initial asset has a cost basis higher than zero, then diversification is cheaper. Thus, the diversification x increases with the cost basis, as shown in Figure 7. The relationship between cost basis and degree of diversification is close to linear.
- When the initial asset has a higher *expected return*, i.e., $\mu_A = \mu_B + \alpha$ with $\alpha > 0$, we would expect that the recommended diversification x decrease with the excess return α because a higher expected return makes the initial asset more valuable as compared to the benchmark. Figure 8 shows this. For example, if $\sigma_A = 25\%$ and $\alpha > 3.5\%$ for 20 years, no diversification would be recommended. If $\sigma_A = 30\%$ and $\alpha = 2\%$ per year for 20 years, the model would recommend diversifying about 70% of the holding.
- The effect of a lower *risk-free rate* r_f is to increase the level of diversification, as is clear from the convexity of the curve in Figure 4.
- We have assumed liquidation and the payment of capital gains taxes at the horizon point. If the investor receives a step-up in basis at this time, diversification is more costly: the investor can avoid paying capital gains taxes by retaining the single stock, but is taxed for diversifying. It is interesting to compare the model's recommended level of diversification in the step-up case with the liquidation case. As expected, for any given set of parameters our model always suggests less diversification in the step-up case. Differences are most pronounced for short horizons, as shown in Figure 9. The intuition is simple: if the horizon is short, the risk in holding the stock is relatively low while the tax impact of selling it is relatively high. We find that for horizons greater than 20 years, differences are not very large, and the risk of holding the single stock quickly overwhelms the tax benefit of retention. Thus, over long investment horizons, it is particularly unwise to incur the risk of concentration, even in the step-up case.

5. A Related Problem: Reducing Tracking Error

Having addressed the problem of diversifying risk as measured by total standard deviation, we turn our attention to a related problem. Consider an investor who holds a low cost-basis initial portfolio that is only partially diversified, and who is concerned with how it tracks a specified benchmark. The suitable measure of risk in this case is *tracking error*⁷, rather than total standard deviation.

The investor reduces tracking error by selling first the tax lots that realize few taxes but that also provide the best opportunity for diversification. In general, the tax cost increases as the portfolio is squeezed down to track the benchmark. Mean-variance optimization can be used to minimize the tax cost and to provide a tradeoff between tax cost and tracking error.

Figure 10 shows an empirical plot of the tax cost versus tracking error for an example portfolio with an initial tracking error of 6.8%. In the case shown, a few initial tax lots have unrealized losses, and these allow the tracking error of the portfolio to be reduced to 4.2% before any net taxes are realized. Thereafter, the tax cost increases as tracking error decreases.

For this example, which point on the curve is best? Once again, by defining a tax-deferred equivalent investor, we can develop a solution. In this case, the similar tax-deferred problem is that faced by an investor who is seeking an active portfolio manager, trading off tracking error σ for excess return α . Such an investor typically seeks either an information ratio that is “large enough” (where the information ratio is measured by the slope α/σ) or to maximize utility $\alpha - \lambda\sigma^2$ for some given λ , the investor’s risk preference.

Our analogous approach works for the tax-management decision described here. The choice of λ is somewhat different than that described for example by Grinold and Kahn [1995] because when we compare α values at different diversification levels, the differences are not due to *uncertain* estimated portfolio performance, but instead come from *known* initial taxes paid. By reviewing the choices made by large numbers of

⁷ Tracking error is the standard deviation of the annual difference between the return of the portfolio and that of the benchmark.

investors, it would be possible to identify values of λ that are implicitly revealed by their preferences.

6. Summary and Conclusions

We have introduced a framework for trading off risk and return when diversifying low basis taxable holdings. In the case of a risky *single asset*, we aim to reduce the total risk (standard deviation) of the asset. In the case of an initial *portfolio* that seeks to track a specified benchmark, we aim to reduce tracking error to an optimal level. In each case, we weigh the risk improvement against its tax cost.

When the initial asset has substantially more risk than the benchmark, our results recommend near complete diversification despite a high initial tax cost. On the other hand, if the initial asset's total risk is not much higher than that of the benchmark, the approach recommends less diversification because the benefits do not cover the marginal tax cost. Sensitivity analysis reveals that greater diversification is needed with greater initial asset volatility, with longer investment horizon, with lower expected return of the initial asset, with higher cost basis, and with lower risk-free rate. Less diversification is needed when the investor receives a step-up in basis at the horizon.

Our approach has been to formulate a particularly simple decision problem. We have considered a single fixed-horizon investment, with only two possible extreme choices for portfolio formation. The formulation can be generalized in many pragmatically useful directions, e.g.:

- Include dividend yields, which affects the analysis because of the high rate of dividend taxation.
- Consider how an uncertain horizon affects decision-making.

Investors with large low-basis concentrated holdings are often reluctant to embrace our model's high diversification recommendations. For such investors, other pragmatic extensions are interesting, e.g.:

- Seek to compromise by staging the diversification over time. Exploit tax-managed methods as in Stein and Narasimhan [1999] in managing the diversified slice to reduce the tax burden.
- Instead of investing in a diversified benchmark index, invest the liquidated asset in a portfolio that will “complete” the remaining undiversified holdings. That is, seek a portfolio that will have low (or ideally negative) correlation with the initial holdings.

In practice, investors may also be able to obtain additional flexibility with derivative securities, exchange funds or other investment vehicles.

While we have focused here on a particular and simplified analytical problem, our solution method can be quite generally applied to other portfolio decisions in the presence of taxes. In essence, our method translates a taxable problem into a tax-deferred equivalent problem based on annual mean and standard deviation. Instead of maximizing the Sharpe Ratio or tracking error utility, one could choose the portfolio with maximum tax-deferred growth rate ($\mu - \sigma^2/2$), or use any other criterion for portfolio choice based on yearly mean and standard deviation. It is our belief and hope that use of the concept of a matched tax-deferred investor can and will be extended to provide analytic intuitive solutions to a wide range of more complex situations.

Appendix

In this section we outline the assumptions used in defining the tax-deferred investor. We then identify the future cash flows for both the taxable and the tax-deferred investor. Using these, we derive closed-form expressions for the tax-adjusted yearly expected rate of return and standard deviation of return. Finally, we show how these expressions must be modified for the case in which the investor receives a step-up in basis at maturity.

We assume that the actual investor initially holds a portfolio with initial market value W_0 and initial cost basis C_0W_0 so that C_0 represents the initial cost basis as a fraction from 0 to 1. This portfolio is assumed to grow at a random realized rate of return $A_i - 1$ in year i , so that the total horizon before-tax rate of return over n years is

$\prod_{i=1}^n A_i - 1$. This investor is considering selling a fraction x (from 0 to 1) of the initial portfolio and paying taxes of $\tau x W_0 (1 - C_x)$ at rate τ on the proceeds $x W_0$ less the cost basis $x C_x W_0$ on shares sold. (Note that this formulation allows high cost-basis shares to be chosen for sale). The after-tax proceeds, $x W_0 [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)]$ are used to purchase shares of a benchmark portfolio with random realized rate of return $B_i - 1$ in year i . The resulting partially diversified portfolio now has cost basis $(C_0 - x C_x) W_0$ in the initial assets and full cost basis $x W_0 [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)]$ in the newly purchased benchmark portfolio.

When the portfolio is liquidated after n years, the investor receives the compounded amount

$$(1 - x) W_0 \prod_{i=1}^n A_i + x W_0 [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)] \prod_{i=1}^n B_i \quad (1)$$

and pays tax of

$$\tau W_0 \left[(1 - x) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i - (C_0 - x C_x) \right] + \tau x W_0 [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)] \left(\prod_{i=1}^n B_i - 1 \right) \quad (2)$$

resulting in a total after-tax compounded horizon rate of return equal to

$$r_x = (1 - \tau)(1 - x) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i + x(1 - \tau) [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)] \prod_{i=1}^n B_i + \tau C_0 + x \tau (1 - \tau)(1 - C_x) - 1 \quad (3)$$

In order to replicate the investment performance of this actual investor, we seek to construct a tax-deferred investor (who does not pay tax initially, but whose after-tax end-of-horizon investment performance is identical to that of the actual investor) for each choice of x . Such a tax-deferred investor initially holds a portfolio with the same initial market value W_0 and initial cost basis $C_0 W_0$ as the actual investor, but which returns $A_i^* - 1$ in year i . The tax-deferred investor will sell a fraction x^* of the initial portfolio given by

$$x^* = x [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)] / [1 - \tau x (1 - C_x)] \quad (4)$$

where x^* is chosen so that the risk-return exposures of the actual and tax-deferred investors are equal (that is, x^* is set equal to the ratio, for the actual investor, of the after-tax dollar amount in B divided by total post-diversification portfolio value). The choice

of x^* adjusts for the fact that the tax-deferred investor can invest the entire proceeds, x^*W_0 , in the tax-deferred benchmark, which returns $B_i^* - 1$ in year i . Note that the probability distribution of (A^*, B^*) may depend on x . The tax-deferred investor retains the initial cost basis of C_0W_0 .

When the tax-deferred portfolio is liquidated after n years, the tax-deferred investor receives the compounded amount

$$W_0 \left[(1 - x^*) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i^* + x^* \prod_{i=1}^n B_i^* \right] \quad (5)$$

and pays tax at the end of the time horizon in the amount of

$$\tau W_0 \left[(1 - x^*) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i^* + x^* \prod_{i=1}^n B_i^* - C_0 \right] \quad (6)$$

resulting in a total after-tax compounded horizon rate of return equal to

$$r_x^* = (1 - \tau)(1 - x^*) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i^* + (1 - \tau)x^* \prod_{i=1}^n B_i^* + \tau C_0 - 1 \quad (7)$$

In the fully diversified case ($x = x^* = 1$) we have total rates of return r_B and r_B^* for the actual and tax-deferred investors:

$$\begin{aligned} r_B &= (1 - \tau) \left[1 - \tau(1 - C_0) \right] \prod_{i=1}^n B_i + \tau(1 - \tau) + \tau^2 C_0 - 1 \\ r_B^* &= (1 - \tau) \prod_{i=1}^n B_i^* + \tau C_0 - 1 \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Uncertainty is specified as follows. The distribution of (A_i, B_i) is joint lognormal, independent for different years, with means (μ_A, μ_B) , standard deviations (σ_A, σ_B) , and instantaneous beta β . Similarly, the distribution of (A_i^*, B_i^*) is joint lognormal, independent for different years, with means (μ_{A^*}, μ_{B^*}) , standard deviations $(\sigma_{A^*}, \sigma_{B^*})$, and instantaneous beta β^* (which may differ from β due to initial taxes).

To find the joint distribution (specified by μ_{A^*} , μ_{B^*} , σ_{A^*} , σ_{B^*} , and β^*) for the tax-deferred investor, moment conditions are imposed in order to make the joint distribution of after-tax compounded horizon rates of return (of the partially diversified portfolio and for the benchmark) nearly identical for the actual and the tax-deferred investors at this

particular value for x . That is, the joint probability distribution of (r_x, r_B) is closely matched to that of (r_x^*, r_B^*) using the following five moment conditions:

$$E(r_x) = E(r_x^*), \quad E(r_B) = E(r_B^*) \quad (9)$$

$$\sigma_{r_x} = \sigma_{r_x^*}, \quad \sigma_{r_B} = \sigma_{r_B^*} \quad (10)$$

$$Cov(r_x, r_B) = Cov(r_x^*, r_B^*) \quad (11)$$

The yearly expected rates of return for the tax-deferred investor can then be shown to be given by

$$\mu_{B^*} = \left\{ [1 - \tau(1 - C_0)](1 + \mu_B)^n + \tau(1 - C_0) \right\}^{1/n} - 1 \quad (12)$$

$$\mu_{A^*} = \left(\frac{(1-x)(1+\mu_A)^n + x[1-\tau(1-C_x)](1+\mu_B)^n - x^*(1+\mu_{B^*})^n + \tau x(1-C_x)}{1-x^*} \right)^{1/n} - 1 \quad (13)$$

Define $v_A = 1 + \mu_A$, $\theta_A^2 = \sigma_A^2 + v_A^2$, and similarly for A^* , B , and B^* to reduce the complexity of the equations to follow, and also define $\delta = v_A v_B (\theta_B^2 / v_B^2)^\beta$ and similarly $\delta^* = v_{A^*} v_{B^*} (\theta_{B^*}^2 / v_{B^*}^2)^\beta$. The yearly standard deviations and systematic risk β^* for the tax-deferred investor are given by

$$\theta_{B^*}^2 = \left\{ [1 - \tau(1 - C_0)]^2 \left[\theta_B^{2n} + \frac{2\tau}{1-\tau} v_B^n + \frac{\tau^2}{(1-\tau)^2} \right] - \frac{2\tau C_0}{1-\tau} v_{B^*}^n - \left(\frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} \right)^2 \right\}^{1/n} \quad (14)$$

$$\sigma_{B^*} = \sqrt{\theta_{B^*}^2 - (1 + \mu_{B^*})^2} \quad (15)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\delta^* = & \left\{ \frac{1}{1-x^*} \left(\left[\frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} + \tau x(1-C_x) \right] \left\{ \left(\tau + \frac{\tau^2 C_0}{1-\tau} \right) + [1-\tau(1-C_0)] v_B^n \right\} \right. \right. \\
& + \left(\tau + \frac{\tau^2 C_0}{1-\tau} \right) \left\{ (1-x)v_A^n + x[1-\tau(1-C_x)]v_B^n \right\} \\
& + x[1-\tau(1-C_x)][1-\tau(1-C_0)]\theta_B^{2n} + (1-x)[1-\tau(1-C_0)]\delta^n \\
& \left. \left. - \left(\frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} \right)^2 - \frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} \left[(1-x^*)v_{A^*}^n + (1+x^*)v_{B^*}^n \right] - x^*\theta_{B^*}^{2n} \right\}^{1/n}
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

$$\beta^* = \frac{\ln \left(\frac{\delta^*}{(1+\mu_{A^*})(1+\mu_{B^*})} \right)}{\ln \left(\frac{\sigma_{B^*}^2 + (1+\mu_{B^*})^2}{(1+\mu_{B^*})^2} \right)} \tag{17}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\theta_{A^*}^2 = & \left\{ \frac{1}{(1-x^*)^2} \left(\left[\frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} + \tau x(1-C_x) \right] \right. \right. \\
& \left. \left\{ \left[\frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} + \tau x(1-C_x) \right] + 2(1-x)v_A^n + 2x[1-\tau(1-C_x)]v_B^n \right\} \right. \\
& + (1-x)^2\theta_{A^*}^{2n} + x^2[1-\tau(1-C_x)]^2\theta_{B^*}^{2n} + 2x(1-x)[1-\tau(1-C_x)]\delta^n \\
& \left. \left. - \frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} \left[\frac{\tau C_0}{1-\tau} + 2(1-x^*)v_{A^*}^n + 2x^*v_{B^*}^n \right] - (x^*)^2\theta_{B^*}^{2n} - 2x^*(1-x^*)(\delta^*)^n \right\}^{1/n}
\end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

$$\sigma_{A^*} = \sqrt{\theta_{A^*}^2 - (1+\mu_{A^*})^2} \tag{19}$$

The tax-adjusted yearly expected rate of return and standard deviation may now be computed using the values derived above:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_x &= E \left[(1-x^*)A_1^* + x^*B_1^* \right] \\
&= (1-x^*)\mu_{A^*} + x^*\mu_{B^*}
\end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma_x &= \sqrt{\text{Var} \left[(1-x^*)A_1^* + x^*B_1^* \right]} \\
&= \sqrt{(1-x^*)^2\theta_{A^*}^2 + (x^*)^2\theta_{B^*}^2 + 2x^*(1-x^*)\delta^* - \left[(1-x^*)v_{A^*} + x^*v_{B^*} \right]^2}
\end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

Modifications in case of Stepped Up Basis at Maturity

If the investor receives a step-up in basis at maturity, then the partially diversified investor keeps the compounded amount from Equation (1) without paying the tax of Equation (2), resulting in a total after-tax compounded horizon rate of return equal to

$$r_x = (1-x) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i + x [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)] \prod_{i=1}^n B_i - 1 \quad (22)$$

in place of Equation (3). We keep the definition of x^* from Equation (4) unchanged. For the stepped-up tax-deferred investor, in place of Equation (7) we find a total after-tax compounded horizon rate of return equal to

$$r_x^* = (1-x^*) \prod_{i=1}^n A_i^* + x^* \prod_{i=1}^n B_i^* - 1. \quad (23)$$

In the fully diversified case ($x = x^* = 1$) we have total rates of return r_B and r_B^* for the stepped-up actual and tax-deferred investors (in place of Equation 8):

$$\begin{aligned} r_B &= [1 - \tau(1 - C_0)] \prod_{i=1}^n B_i - 1 \\ r_B^* &= \prod_{i=1}^n B_i^* - 1 \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

We use the same forms for the joint distributions of (A_i, B_i) and (A_i^*, B_i^*) as before, and use the same five moment conditions (Equations 9-11). The yearly expected rates of return for the stepped-up tax-deferred investor can then be shown to be given (in place of Equations 12 and 13) by

$$\mu_{B^*} = (1 + \mu_B) [1 - \tau(1 - C_0)]^{1/n} - 1 \quad (25)$$

$$\mu_{A^*} = \left(\frac{(1-x)(1 + \mu_A)^n + x [1 - \tau(1 - C_x)] (1 + \mu_B)^n - x^* (1 + \mu_{B^*})^n}{1 - x^*} \right)^{1/n} - 1 \quad (26)$$

Using definitions of ν , θ , and δ as before, the yearly standard deviations for the stepped-up tax-deferred investor are then given (in place of Equations 14-19) by

$$\theta_{B^*} = \theta_B [1 - \tau(1 - C_0)]^{1/n} \quad (27)$$

$$\sigma_{B^*} = \sqrt{\theta_{B^*}^2 - (1 + \mu_{B^*})^2} \quad (28)$$

$$\delta^* = \left(\frac{x[1 - \tau(1 - C_x)][1 - \tau(1 - C_0)]\theta_B^{2n} - x^*\theta_{B^*}^{2n} + (1 - x)[1 - \tau(1 - C_0)]\delta^n}{1 - x^*} \right)^{1/n} \quad (29)$$

$$\beta^* = \frac{\ln\left(\frac{\delta^*}{(1 + \mu_{A^*})(1 + \mu_{B^*})}\right)}{\ln\left(\frac{\sigma_{B^*}^2 + (1 + \mu_{B^*})^2}{(1 + \mu_{B^*})^2}\right)} \quad (30)$$

$$\theta_{A^*}^2 = \left(\frac{(1 - x)^2\theta_A^{2n} + x^2[1 - \tau(1 - C_x)]^2\theta_B^{2n} - (x^*)^2\theta_{B^*}^{2n} + 2x(1 - x)[1 - \tau(1 - C_x)]\delta^n - 2x^*(1 - x^*)(\delta^*)^n}{(1 - x^*)^2} \right)^{1/n} \quad (31)$$

$$\sigma_{A^*} = \sqrt{\theta_{A^*}^2 - (1 + \mu_{A^*})^2} \quad (32)$$

With these modifications, the tax-adjusted yearly expected rate of return and standard deviation in the case of stepped-up basis may now be computed as before, using Equations (20) and (21).

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Figure 1: After-tax horizon liquidation value, for an initial \$1 concentrated security with volatility 40%.




Figure 2: Horizon after-tax liquidation value for an initial \$0.80 diversified portfolio with volatility 15%.




Figure 3: Trade-off between expected return and risk in the absence of taxes.




Figure 4: The actual investor's diversification decision as determined by optimizing the Sharpe Ratio faced by the matched tax-deferred investor.




Figure 5a: Sensitivity to Initial Stock Volatility. Risk–return curves at different levels of volatility.




Figure 5b: Sensitivity to Initial Stock Volatility. Diversification, x , as a function of volatility.




Figure 6: Sensitivity to Horizon.
Diversification, x , as a function of horizon.




Figure 7: Sensitivity to Cost Basis.
Diversification, x , as a function of cost basis.




Figure 8: Sensitivity to Excess Return.
 Diversification, x , as a function of Excess Return.




Figure 9: Sensitivity to horizon with and without cost basis step-up
 Diversification, x , as a function of horizon.
 Initial volatility $\sigma_A = 25\%$




Figure 10: Empirical tracking error vs. tax cost

