

Chronicles, January, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

Despite the zipity-doo-dah rhetoric that many conservatives have spouted for the last decade, the United States in the 1990's will encounter challenges that neither the "right" nor the "left" is prepared to recognize, much less meet. The challenges go far beyond the "relative decline" that Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers prophesied in 1988. Mr. Kennedy argued only that the United States would be unable to keep pace with the redistribution of economic power toward the Pacific Rim and the transfer of military might that will follow it. He never broached the much more serious threats that today signify the rapid unraveling of American society: high school and college students who don't know when Columbus discovered the New World and who think the slogans of Karl Marx are drawn from the U.S. Constitution; urban murder rates that even idiot savants would find difficult to calculate; drug wars fought with arsenals the Viet Cong would have envied; political corruption that makes the senators of ancient Rome look like Eliot Ness's picked men; and a population so frightened of thrift and sacrifice and so addicted to instant gratification that it often prefers foregoing reproduction altogether to the responsibility of bearing and raising children.

Yet these signs of moral and social decomposition are not as alarming as the prospect, celebrated vociferously by right and

left alike, of the United States' speedy absorption into a transnational or global economy that threatens to extinguish American national and cultural identity itself. Ignorance, crime, corruption, and avarice are vices that can be cured, regardless of how drastic the medicine. The danger of economic globalism is that, like the AIDS virus, it destroys the very mechanisms that enable the patient to recover, even as it entices him into the illusion that the disease is harmless.

That illusion is the dream of universal material acquisition that has animated the consolidation of the American Republic into what may be called "MacNation," a colossal aggregate bound together not by any natural sense of historic community but through the artificial bonds imposed by bureaucratic routines and disciplines, corporate market strategies, mass media, and the mass collective channels in which millions of Americans move, work, play, eat, spend, vote, and communicate daily. Having broken down the institutional distinctions and regional diversity that once characterized the Republic and its cultural identity, the dream and its current material incarnation in economic globalism are now in the process of folding MacNation into MacPlanet.

Last March, the prominent Japanese economist and management consultant Kenichi Ohmae told an audience at Washington's Institute for International Economics that "national borders are disappearing," a development Mr. Ohmae welcomes, at least for other peoples' nations, even as traditional Japanese nationalism enjoys a renaissance. Many self-professed conservatives greeted Mr. Ohmae's prediction with hearty approval, and The Wall Street

Journal's Walter S. Mossberg reported on the appearance of conservative "one-worlders," "economists and academics who believe that in a global economy, with goods and especially capital surging across political borders, the economic fortunes of individual countries aren't important anymore."

But if national borders aren't important anymore, neither are trade deficits, or mass migrations, or even "national interests."

The same logic that dismisses borders and populations as meaningful features of national identity also implies that the nation itself is an artificial abstraction that can possess no interests for which individual "citizens" (another artifice) should be expected to sacrifice. It's no accident that the "conservatives" who sing the progressive utopia of the global economy are usually the same ones who drool over a Wilsonian "global democracy" in place of concrete national interests as the proper goal of our foreign policy.

Indeed, the ideology of economic globalism logically involves a kind of social and political nominalism that denies any meaning to groups smaller than "humankind." Not only nations but also classes, ethnic groups, religious sects, local communities, and families are artificial identities that merely thwart the fulfillment of universalist, cosmopolitan, humanist perfection and which have about as much permanency as a group of Las Vegas poker players. Contemporary globalism, economic or democratist, right or left, has a remote ancestor in the ruminations of the ancient Stoics, who argued for a "city of the world" that would transcend city-states and empires. Closer relatives are the political

fantasies of the Enlightenment and their Marxist derivative that "the international party shall be the human race." But whatever despots the universalist dream could inspire in earlier eras, only in this century has it been able to assume the technological and economic integument to put the flesh of power on its ideological bones.

The exponents of economic globalism defend it with the argument that foreign investments and free trade create new jobs and provide sources of capital otherwise unavailable for economic growth, that the technological and economic integration of the planet will engender peace, fraternity, and opportunity for all human beings, and that democracy and human rights will follow such growth and opportunity as the night the day. Even if a new generation of Japanese warlords should come to power, the globalists argue, it would be unlikely to bomb Pearl Harbor if the Japanese already own most of Hawaii.

Of course, if the Japanese already owned most of Hawaii, it would be problematical to what extent Hawaii could be said to be part of America anyway. And Japanese ownership of the pearl of the Pacific is not out of the question. Earlier last year, Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi complained that Japanese purchases of \$9 billion worth of real estate in the islands had caused the price of housing in his city to rise 50 percent between 1987 and 1989. "They're buying up our homes and farmland," the mayor said, "Many Hawaiians can no longer afford to live here." Foreigners, mainly Japanese, already own nearly 75 percent of the office space in downtown Los Angeles, up from 64 percent in 1988 and 51 percent in

1987. In the District of Columbia, foreigners own 23 percent of the office property; in Maine, 10 percent; and in Atlanta, 25 percent. In the Farm Belt of the continental United States, the Japanese bought up 218,000 acres of farmland in 11 months in 1988 and 1989.

Whatever the material advantages of allowing foreigners to buy up our land, close out our industries, steal our inventions, take over our jobs, and move into our country, the economic globalists seem oblivious to the non-economic implications of their ideology and its practical consequences for the independence and integrity of the nation and its culture. Their larger error consists in their adherence to an economic determinism that they are the first to denounce when it pops up among Marxists and other socialists. Globalists assume not only that economic motivations are the chief springs of human action, that the desire for and pursuit of wealth and economic opportunity are what all human beings at all times in all cultures and all countries are seeking, but also that economic considerations are paramount in evaluating social and political arrangements.

Those assumptions bring the globalists close to what both Albert Jay Nock and the German free market economist Wilhelm Röpke called "economism," the "incorrigible mania," as Röpke defined it, "of making the means the end, of thinking only of bread and never of those other things of which the Gospel speaks." Nock, a religious skeptic who was less concerned but no less knowledgeable about the Gospel, held that economism "interpreted the whole of human life in terms of the production, acquisition and

distribution of wealth. Like certain Philippians in the time of St. Paul, its god was its belly."

A nation, or even a planet, that recognizes no god other than its belly will quickly start wallowing in the ignorance, crime, corruption, and avarice that today afflicts the United States, and it will find itself unable to free itself of them. "After wealth, science, invention, had done all for such a society that they could do," wrote Nock, "it would remain without savour, without depth, uninteresting, and withal horrifying." What is horrifying about the planetary utopia the economic globalists envision is not so much the impoverishment that may yet be visited upon the United States as other nations, less enchanted by this dream of days to come, gain wealth and power at our expense, but that Americans, whether they gain or lose, will cease to be Americans at all and find themselves reduced to "resources," stripped of the distinctive set of norms that unite and identify them as a people and dispossessed even of the memory of how to make themselves one. As resources, they will become interchangeable parts in the global economic mechanism, and their functions in it can be performed just as easily (or better) by workers from Latin America, managers from Asia, or investors from Japan or Europe. If whatever remains of the Middle American core of the American nation and its civilization is to preserve itself from the dispersion and dispossession that the new global economy promises, it will have to assert its national identity and interests in economic no less than in cultural and political terms.

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Economic globalism, beloved of the contemporary right, may be the major threat to the national and cultural identity of American civilization in the coming decades, but its logical counterpart is the political globalism, long beloved of the left, that marches under the banner of "one world." As the economic dependence of the United States on foreign trade, investment, and credit waxes, the political autonomy, legal sovereignty, and national independence of the country will wane. The architects of the new world order understand this, and they are quietly pushing a series of treaties, laws, and new international arrangements intended to diminish national independence and construct a transnational regime to which American laws, jurisdictions, and citizens will be subordinated.

The major achievement of political globalism in the United States in recent years has been the ratification of the "U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" and the enactment of implementing legislation by the U.S. Congress to bring federal law into conformity with the convention's terms. Largely forgotten until revived by Ronald Reagan on the eve of the 1984 presidential election, the genocide treaty originally provided for the trial and punishment of persons, including U.S. citizens, who were accused and convicted

of the crime of genocide. American citizens, that is, could be extradited to foreign countries to stand trial for a crime unknown to their own laws until the treaty created it. "Genocide" under the original language of the treaty was so broadly defined as to be absurd. Telling Polish jokes might be construed as genocidal under its terms if they could be shown to cause "serious mental harm" to sensitive Polish egos.

Mainly through the efforts of Sen. Jesse Helms, the genocide treaty was amended and its most flagrant abuses neutralized before a Republican Senate adopted it. In 1988 the Congress passed legislation that puts the treaty into effect and creates the new crime of "genocide" for the first time under U.S. law. Regardless of the changes the Senate approved, however, the principle of the treaty remains as obnoxious and harmful as ever, enacting the fundamental premise of political globalism that the domestic laws of a nation must yield to conventions passed by other states or by international organizations.

One of the major reasons there was any conservative opposition to the treaty at all was the concern about its effects on the state of Israel, which treats Palestinians in a way that might plausibly be interpreted as genocidal under the most generous reading of the definition contained in the treaty. I know of one conservative aide in the Senate who actually checked with the Israeli embassy to find out if it was all right for her and her principal to oppose the pact. Concern for the security of an ally is of course a legitimate reason to adopt or oppose a proposed act of statecraft, but it would have been refreshing if

conservatives in the 1980s could have mustered similar solicitude for the fate of their own country as well.

Reliance on the treaty-making powers of the Constitution to change domestic laws is an old and favored trick of the one-world lobby, and it was to squelch such tricks forever that Sen. John Bricker sponsored his famous Bricker Amendment in the 1950s. The measure would have restricted the treaty-making powers of the president and was a favorite hobby horse of conservative statesmen well into the 1960s. Unfortunately, they failed in their efforts, and today with Republicans and conservatives embracing virtually unrestricted presidential power in foreign policy, we may soon expect to see some of the worst nightmares of Sen. Bricker and Robert A. Taft take flesh and come to life. The executive branch and its diplomatic bureaucracy in the State Department are already pushing several treaties that bind or alter U.S. domestic laws -- on labor relations, torture, human rights, and other subjects of intense emotional appeal and closely connected to the internal institutions and legal preferences of this or any other country.

But nothing offers more opportunities for one-worldist mischief than environmentalism. Since the "environment" obviously extends across national borders, managing it cannot be restricted to a single state and has to be undertaken by several governments.

The result of the "global environmental crises" now routinely discovered every year will be the regulation of the social, economic, and political life of particular nations in accordance with environmental rules promulgated (and presumably enforced) by a supra-national authority.

Writing in the lead article of Scientific American's September, 1989 issue devoted to the topic of "Managing Planet Earth," William C. Clark of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government announced that one requirement for "adaptive planetary management" is

the construction of mechanisms at the national and international level to coordinate managerial activities. ... In fact, a dozen or more global conventions for protection of the environment are now in effect. ... [But] the immediate need at the international level is for a forum in which ministerial-level coordination of environmental-management activities can be regularly discussed and implemented, much as is already done for international economic policy.

The kind of transnational management of the natural environment that Mr. Clark advocates would indeed complement the similar arrangements already in place for global economic management. As libertarian scholar Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr. recently pointed out, "Under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements ... banking is now regulated on a global basis. And the Bush administration is pushing for world regulation of the stock, bond, and futures markets. The administration is also promoting -- with the other G-7 industrialized nations -- international cash controls, international financial police, international tax collusion, international fiscal controls, and a UN treaty to make confidential banking a crime."

If global management of the environment doesn't polish off the nation-state, managing the global economy certainly will. New Republic senior editor Robert Wright, in a recent essay in

explicit defense of one-worldism, argues that global economic interdependence and the resulting "policy coordination" are pressures for the kind of "institutional subordination of national autonomy to international will" that he envisions for the planet of the future. "As the leaky national economy becomes hostage to international forces," he writes, "we can either seize control of these forces in concert with other nations, or surrender a good measure of control altogether."

The obvious, but seldom asked, question, of course, is: "who is 'we'?" Those who will gain from the evanescence of the nation-state and of the concept of nationality itself will be those elites able to preserve and enhance their own power in the new, denationalized order that the globalists anticipate -- those who will be managing the environment, planning and running the world economy, and enacting, administering, or enforcing the transnational laws and treaties by which the planetary regime is to be governed and the human proclivity to differentiate into distinct groups restrained. The cultures, religions, languages, and nations from which this elite emerges will be largely irrelevant to its powers and interests. They will in fact present an obstacle to the furtherance of its powers and interests and will therefore need to be reduced or eliminated entirely if the emergent transnational managerial elite is to flourish. The elite may retain some quaint vestiges of nationalism, just as we today conserve places like Williamsburg, and it may even find nationalist imagery useful in gaining the confidence of patriotic types who fail to see the glories of the new age. But whatever

the merits of the globalist argument that the world had just better get itself together or else face disaster, the logic of the new elite's interests will increasingly ensure that nationality -- and the legal and political claims and cultural identities that go with nationality -- is extinguished and its own global technocratic regime perpetuated.

Americans, who began their national history by severing the bonds that connected them to a dying civilization and who ventured into history determined to build a new civilization politically independent of and culturally unique among the powers of the earth, will find themselves reduced in both power and identity by the emergent world order that both the "right" and the "left" today like to celebrate. They will eventually find themselves delivered back to the mercies of whatever glorified pencil-sharpeners from Europe or the Third World happen to be in charge of their future this year, and they may become indistinguishable from the rest of the cattle in the global barnyard who provide the fluctuating, mobile populations of the planetary economy and government. Americans who don't want to become such cosmopolitan coolies need to start thinking about what they can do to preserve their nation, its heritage, and themselves from the managerial colossus that now begins to straddle the globe.

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Like Satan in Dante's Inferno, the forces threatening the integrity of the American nation and its culture have three faces.

The "global economy" and political one-worldism jeopardize the historic character, independence, and the very sovereignty of the United States. The third threat, the mass immigration that this country has endured for the last fifteen years or more, is no less a danger to the cultural norms by which American civilization has identified itself throughout most of its history. Nevertheless, like the internationalization of our economy and government, the internationalization of our population is consistent with the interests of the elites that welcome and encourage it.

Some 600,000 legal immigrants and refugees and as many as 1 to 2 million illegal aliens enter this country every year, most of them from Third World countries as different from the United States as the tatoos of the Jivaro Indians are from the painting of Rembrandt. Actually, no one knows how many illegal aliens are here. Some experts guess as many as 10 million. The New York Times reports the presence in the United States of some 20 million Mexican nationals whom the Mexican government is trying to manipulate to influence U.S. foreign policy. Most authorities now acknowledge that the immigration to this country in the last decade rivals the size of the last inundation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Americans who live on the periphery of the United States in

the east, south, or west are familiar with the commonplace results of the invasion: clerks, waiters, and cab drivers who can't speak English and can't make change in dollars and cents; stores, churches, and whole shopping districts where the signs are in languages or scripts that most us can't even identify, let alone read; and entire neighborhoods of men and women who dress, look, and sound like the extras in Casablanca or A Fistful of Dollars. But these are mainly just irritants. Eventually they will be resolved as the newcomers and their children are "assimilated" -- i.e., pick up televisionese and adopt the sartorial splendors of K-Mart in place of their customary beach towels and pajamas.

When defenders of mass immigration talk about "assimilation," that's the kind they usually mean. Unfortunately, it doesn't help, unless you believe (as many defenders of mass immigration do believe) that American culture consists merely in what can be purchased at the nearest shopping mall. But Third Worlders who eat at McDonald's and wear Adidas T-shirts are no more real Americans than a nineteenth-century British proconsul who bought his daily bread at an Indian bazaar was a Hindu.

Those who believe a deeper American culture still exists and ought to be conserved (they used to be called "conservatives") have good reason to worry that the new throngs of foreigners among us will not assimilate to it in any enduring way. Not simply language and clothing but also less tangible qualities such as the unspoken assumptions of political culture, art and literature, entertainment and religion, education, morals, the family, and concepts of work and property together create the set of common

norms by which Americans know themselves to be different from Canadians, Mexicans, Europeans, and other cultures. Those who ignore such cultural particularities or deny they exist will readily believe that immigrants from across the globe can become Americans in pretty much the same way that Pepsi Cola can market its products in Asia and Africa. But the process of becoming a real member of a living society is somewhat more complicated than translating advertising slogans into Japanese or Swahili.

It is especially complicated when, as today, there are major obstacles to assimilation. Sociologist Nathan Glazer, a supporter of immigration, points out that the discrimination and prejudice that in earlier eras helped accelerate the acculturation of new immigrants is today largely illegal. Civil rights legislation, equal opportunity codes, and court decisions have weakened the power of private and social institutions, no less than that of public authorities, to induce immigrants to conform to American norms. Today's "cultural authorities" legitimize and instigate "alternative life styles," eschew stereotypes, scorn WASP ethnocentrism, and indulge every known form of deviation and idiosyncrasy from the religious exotica of Santeria to the perversions of the National Man-Boy Love Association. Restaurants where once only the coated and tied dared enter now beg their customers to wear shirts and shoes. "Popular opinion," writes Mr. Glazer, "now questions the legitimacy and desirability of forcefully imposing a common identity on immigrants and members of minority groups."

But it's less "popular opinion" perhaps than the interests of

the elites that run the country and refuse to take the minimal steps to restrict immigration, which actually serves to enhance their power even as it promotes the decomposition of a common culture. The uses to which the millions of new immigrants may be put go well beyond the cheap labor they provide to Western agribusiness and Southern construction firms.

The elites that prevail in the United States today are bureaucratic and technocratic, gaining power by their ability to manage and manipulate social change through the fused apparatus of the state, the economy, and cultural organizations in the form of mass media, foundations, schools, and churches. In the past, these elites have been able to ally with the American underclass - - first, with the industrial working class in the early twentieth century; more recently, with the urban black lumpenproletariat -- to dislodge rival elites in private, social, and local institutions and jurisdictions and to exploit the middle class. But as the underclasses of the past graduate to middle income status, the elites need new proletarians as allies to help sustain their dominance.

Third World immigration allows for the importation of a new underclass and provides unglimped vistas of social manipulation in the form of new opportunities for managing civil rights, ethnic conflicts, education, health, housing, welfare, social therapy, and assimilation itself. In 1988, state officials in California were bickering over who would control their state's 55 percent of \$3.4 billion in federal aid intended as welfare, education, and health care aid for immigrants; and other states also were

contending for their fair share of the booty. Last year, The New York Times reported, "Two recent surveys of newly legalized immigrants in California have found such low levels of education, employment and fluency in English that ... current levels of federal and state assistance will be inadequate for them." Nor, of course, will they be adequate for the politicians and bureaucrats who can expect to administer the funds and run the programs.

Government elites thus anticipate using immigration as a new fulcrum of bureaucratic power, and they will have allies in other elites, public or private, that can advance their own agenda of managing social change and displacing traditional cultural institutions through the care and feeding of immigrants. "Hate crime" laws, racial sensitivity courses, and anti-Western Third World curricula are among the instruments for imposing a new cosmopolitan cultural hegemony and plowing under Euro-American patterns of culture.

In Washington, a private foundation, the International Counseling Center, thrives on providing psychotherapy and counseling to Third World immigrants apparently driven to the brink of madness by their encounter with American civilization. The center also offers what it calls "cultural awareness training programs" to social service workers, school guidance counselors, corporate executives, and local government officials who have to deal with immigrants. The idea seems to be that if the aliens don't adapt to American folkways, the folkways must adapt to the aliens. Local "fire and rescue squads," says center associate

Linda Camino, an anthropologist, "are called upon to supply services to a culturally diverse population. Cultural misconceptions [among the Americans thus "called upon"] can be insidious and can lead to unwanted outcomes."

One "unwanted outcome," also useful to American elites, is the political exploitation of the immigrants, legal or not, who constitute a new electorate as well as a new underclass. Liberal Democrats are demanding "instant voter registration" laws, to be enforced and supervised by federal officials against local and state jurisdictions, that are thinly disguised mechanisms for allowing illegals to cast ballots. The proposal was imbedded in the 1988 Democratic platform -- this explains why Michael Dukakis and Lloyd Bentsen went around chattering in Spanish all the time - - and is currently being peddled in the Senate by California Sen. Alan Cranston, who stands to benefit from the alien vote. But Republicans are not far behind, and in 1988 neo-conservative idol Jack Kemp gaily predicted that "in 10 years, one-quarter of the Republican Party will consist of conservative blacks, conservative Hispanics, conservative Asian-Americans -- or else the Republican Party will resign itself to permanent minority status." Which party will take care of traditional Americans no one seems to know, or care.

Mass immigration is also perhaps the most useful instrument by which the very idea of nationality can be liquidated, and it thus fits well with the forces of economic and political globalism and with the interests of the emerging transnational elite, into which our own technocrats are fusing. As national populations and

the cultures they carry become interchangeable through migration, the concrete meaning of citizenship, political loyalty, sovereignty, and other elements of nationality will yield to a new supranational regime over which the emergent elite presides.

Caught between the new underclass and the new elite, plain old Americans can look forward to subsidizing through their taxes not only their own cultural dispossession but also the eventual disappearance of the nation itself, to the advantage of an elite that has disengaged itself from the body of the society it manages. If the Americans at the heart of that body are serious about preserving their nation and their culture, they will have to escape from the vise the new elite and the new proletariat have constructed by freeing themselves from the newcomers above and below them.

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It is hardly an accident that the decomposition of the American nation and its culture is paralleled by the decomposition of the American middle class. In the nineteenth century, nationality and the middle classes were born together as Siamese twins, and their enemies understood their linkage and tried their best to strangle them in their common cradle. They failed, and the twins grew up as inseparable companions. It therefore makes sense that they remain united in death as they were in life.

In American as in European history, the middle class was the creator and carrier of nationalism, so much so that a cliché common among historians and sociologists holds that in the United States the middle class includes everyone. Of course it doesn't, and didn't; but the epoch that historian John Lukacs calls the "Bourgeois Interlude" -- from 1895 to 1955 -- remains even today the normative period of American history, the era that bred the culture and character that most people, Europeans as well as Americans themselves, still think of as typically American, against which we still measure our achievements and failures.

But as Professor Lukacs notes, "middle class" and "bourgeois" are not the same thing. The former refers to a merely economic category that happens to enjoy a material income between that of the poor and that of the wealthy. A middle class is as logically necessary to social existence as the obverse of a coin is to its

reverse. But the "existence of the bourgeoisie," writes Professor Lukacs, "has been a particular phenomenon, a historical reality."

The principal characteristics of the bourgeoisie were not economic but cultural and psychic -- "the sense of personal authenticity and liberty, the desire for privacy, the cult of the family, permanence of residence, the durability of possessions, the sense of security, and the urbanity of the standards of civilized life." They derived from or were associated with the bourgeois attribute of "interiority," a preoccupation with the self manifested in literature and the arts through the novel, the portrait, the keeping of diaries, and the publication of letters, and appearing socially and politically in the creeds of individualism and the self-determination of nations.

The life dates Professor Lukacs gives for the Bourgeois Interlude (1895-1955) identify the era's cultural personality, but the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in culture followed its economic and political triumph in the American Civil War by about 30 years, just as its demise in the mid 1950's followed by about 25 years its political and economic overthrow in the Depression and New Deal. In the pre-bourgeois period of American history, during what might be called the "First Republic," neither nationalism nor the bourgeois psyche prevailed, and a decentralized constitutional and social order prevented the consolidation of power by either the bourgeois capitalism of the Northeast or the aristocratic capitalism of Southern plantation masters.

The "Second Republic," the political expression of the Bourgeois Interlude, emerged from the Civil War and made the

United States a singular noun and a real nation-state, just like Napoleon III's France or Bismarck's Germany. Bourgeois economic, political, and cultural dominance meant that the new elite no longer had to be content with patching up its own psychic interior. Now it could redecorate the souls of Southerners, Indians, Latin Americans, Filipinos, European dynasts, and anyone else whose spiritual architecture failed to meet bourgeois standards. The technology, industry, urbanization, and mass educational and communications institutions that the new bourgeois elite set up enabled it to start straightening out regional and social bumps in the road of progress within the United States and to make preparations for turning the rest of the world into a bourgeois parking lot.

In the process, the bourgeois elite generated its own destruction. Its corporations, banks, and universities and its pubescent bureaucracies gave birth to a new class of technocrats who had little use for bourgeois beliefs and institutions. In the economy, the "separation of ownership and control" removed bourgeois property-holders from the direction of their own firms and empowered professional managers in their place. In the state, democratization served to disperse sovereignty among the newly enfranchised and politically active masses, with the result that the "people" received the name of power but the experts who managed the state held its substance. Culturally, the new intelligentsia that crept out of bourgeois universities and into tenured chairs and the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines despised the bourgeois class that had created and

subsidized it, and the new savants knit their brows to devise ways to humiliate, subvert, and overthrow the bourgeois order. All that was really necessary to accomplish that goal was for the new elites in the economy, state, and culture to meet, marry, and set up housekeeping, which they did with the blessing of progressivist ideology and an ample dowry from their new federal godfather.

By the end of World War II, the bourgeois class had been effectively decapitated as the dominant minority in the United States or had been subsumed into the new managerial elite that now prevailed. No fratricidal conflict marked the transition from the Second Republic to the managerial imperium because the bourgeois elite, contemplating its interior navel, never fully grasped what was happening and was unable to muster the will or the temperament to resist it. Having insisted on wrecking the First Republic and reconstructing it to its tastes, the bourgeois elite lacked the capacity to preserve its own power or the national culture its power had created. In the end, its members lost only their dominance and not their fortunes or their heads, and there is no good reason for most Americans today to lament its passing.

But there is good reason to mourn what will befall those millions of Americans who were never part of the bourgeois elite but who formed their lives around bourgeois culture. As the managerial successors to the bourgeoisie push the United States into a new transnational order and ally with the underclass, the American middle class is being crushed between them and stripped of its cultural identity and heritage.

The end of the bourgeois order in the middle of the century

transformed the American middle class from a bourgeois Mittelstand to a post-bourgeois proletariat. As political scientist Andrew Hacker describes this "new middle class," it is considerably larger than the old and hence is "unwilling and unable to adhere to rules tailored for a quite different group of individuals in quite different settings." It differs from the old middle class also in its high degree of transiency and mobility, its "national" rather than its local character, and its lack of property. While the new middle class glories in its affluence and ability to consume whatever managerial capitalism sets before it, it conspicuously lacks the material independence of the old middle class and the authority, security, and liberty that independence yields. The members of the new middle class, writes Mr. Hacker, "are employees, and their livelihoods are always contingent on the approval and good will of the individuals and organizations who employ them. ... Whatever status and prosperity today's middle-class American may have is due to the decision of someone to hire him and utilize his services."

Masticated by the Depression and World War II and digested by the mass organizations that swallowed the more compact bourgeois institutions, the American middle class has suffered a profound dispossession, regardless of the number of credit cards it carries. Alienated from the nation's past by its size and rootlessness, it retains only a fragmented memory of an identity with the historic national experience. Lacking the autonomy of the bourgeois middle class, it is unable to formulate a new identity that would offer resistance to the emerging transnational

elite and its allies in the underclass. "In fact," writes Mr. Hacker, "the new middle class has many attributes in common with the traditional conception of a proletariat."

In the emerging global managerial regime, the middle class may soon be reduced to the other attributes of a proletariat as well. "By any measure," The Wall Street Journal reported in 1987, "the share of households with middle-class incomes has steadily declined"; the "once-tightly knit group has broken apart" and its "broad consensus on how to live and what constitutes success has given way to an increasingly fragmented array of life styles and values." The need for wives and mothers to work to sustain middle class incomes and living standards weakens family bonds. Middle class home ownership is already obsolescent in many urban areas, and the violence of the underclass, domestic or imported, is abetted by the elite and drives the middle class from the cities their forebears built.

In Detroit, where nearly 10 per cent of the population has left since 1980, only two building permits for single family homes were issued in all of 1987, and the Catholic archdiocese announced the closing of 43 churches in the city in 1988. During the Hundred Years War in Europe, wolves roamed the streets of medieval Paris; today ring-necked pheasants strut through the abandoned lots and buildings of Detroit, keeping company with the human wolves who have inherited the city that put America in the driver's seat. In Los Angeles, reports The New York Times, "the exodus of white middle-class residents began at least a decade ago but recent alarm over smog, gang violence, traffic and

housing costs appears to have accelerated the trend." More than 282,000 Californians moved out of the state entirely in 1988-89. "My 9-year-old daughter comes home from school and says a classmate is dealing drugs," 29-year-old Carol Woolverton told The San Francisco Examiner last July, "And there've been so many kidnappings." She is reported to have moved to Oregon with her husband, three children, and two pets. Where will they run next?

Without the cultural cohesion that the bourgeois elite imposed, the new middle class cannot expect to retain for long its traditional identity and values, let alone its political and economic power. But the new proletariat is no longer part of a bourgeois social and political order; it is only an artifact or remnant of it, and it cannot look to the bourgeois elite for leadership or salvation. That elite is extinct, and the national republic it governed during the Bourgeois Interlude is defunct along with it. If the post-bourgeois middle class seriously wishes to avoid its own extinction, it will have to evolve a new group consciousness and a new identity independent of both the moribund bourgeois elite and the techno-bureaucracy of the global managerial order. It will have to expurgate the self-indulgent "interiority" that ultimately proved lethal to the bourgeoisie, and it must aspire to form the core of a new political and cultural order in which it can assert its own hegemony.

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Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

In the space of a few months in 1989, the Soviet imperium in Eastern Europe began to disintegrate like a soda cracker in salt water, and even within the U.S.S.R. itself, long dormant national, ethnic, and religious passions began to sputter and whine. The Berlin Wall was turned into a collection of pet rocks, and Americans suddenly began hearing of peoples unknown to their ears since the days when the pope had divisions: Moldavians and Wallachians, Armenians and Azeris, Croats and Slovaks, Lithuanians and Ukrainians, Turks and Tazhiks, Bulgarians, Balts, and Byelorussians. One almost expected the Gepids and the Ostrogoths to set up their pennants and apply for membership in the United Nations.

Yet even as Mikhail Gorbachev, to the thunderous cheers of the West, restructured the Soviet Communist Party last winter, Soviet military advisers were helping Angola's Marxists polish off Jonas Savimbi's anti-communist guerrillas. Moreover, two days after what must have been the 357th emendation of the Soviet constitution since 1917, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander for rapid deployment forces in the Middle East, testified to Congress that the Soviets are still pulverizing Afghanistan and pulling the wires of their puppet regime in Kabul, with more military aid than they forked up when they occupied the place. Communism may have been chucked out of the economic and intellectual ring, but it still throws a good punch, and the vision entertained by some

people in the West of a bucolic planet full of peace and democracy may be just a bit premature.

Nevertheless, whatever happens to Mr. Gorbachev or the Soviet regime, it's probably true that the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States has forever ceased to be the defining concept of American foreign policy. The Soviets may overrun Angola and keep Afghanistan, and their apparatus of spies, propagandists, and hired malcontents may continue to conspire, demonstrate, and subvert all they want. But the truth is that there is very little, short of nuclear attack, that the decrepit Soviet empire can do to the United States directly. The day-to-day business of indigenous bureaucrats in Washington and the technocratic therapies they plot to impose on American civil society are far more serious threats to us than MiG-23s in the Khyber Pass or Moscow's pet herds of clergymen armed with banners and chicken blood.

The end of the Cold War, or at least the withdrawal of the United States from the contest, affords an opportunity for American to redefine, for the first time since the days of the Truman administration, what we want to be and do in the world beyond the oceans that surround us. The redefinition will involve not only deciding who gets the booty of the Peace Dividend or which congressional districts will lose military bases, but also an identification of what the United States as a nation and a culture is going to be in the opening years of the next century. Foreign policy is almost always a reflection of what kind of order prevails at home.

So it was when the Cold War began, and the long quarrel that bubbled between anti-communist conservatives, who sought a strategy for victory, and liberal globalists, who wanted to cast America as the world's social worker, mirrored a more basic division over what kind of society the United States would be in the late twentieth century. To Harry Truman, "the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife," and "our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."

Communism, to the uplifted mind, was largely a symptom of underlying social illnesses -- poverty, disease, political repression -- that only global programs of bureaucratically administered foreign aid and development could cure, just as only analogous domestic programs could provide the social and economic panaceas that Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and their fellow liberals prescribed.

The concept of foreign policy as an extension of liberal social therapeutics opened vast opportunities for social engineering all over the world and offered huge rewards for those leaders and elites, foreign and domestic, clever enough to seize them. Most of the "corrupt dictators" installed or buoyed up by U.S. money and power began their careers as progressive reformers, and even Francois Duvalier kept on his desk the portraits of three icons of liberal hagiography -- John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Pope John XXIII -- along with two loaded revolvers.

Any or all of these items may have helped Papa Doc die in his bed

with his savage autocracy intact, one of the few rulers in the history of Haiti to do so; but the "progress" his brother despots or their American-trained elites imposed on their tribal and feudal societies only helped to provoke the rebellions that eventually caused their governments to turn belly up in the tropical sun. Most of these gentlemen, whom their American admirers would not have cared to meet in a dark alley in Manhattan, possessed as much character and common sense as a Hollywood sex kitten, and neither their collapse nor the whittling away of American power that resulted from their fall should have been surprising.

Of course, U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War, once it had fallen under the control of liberal elites, no more protected American national interests than domestic liberalism protected citizens from professional cutpurses. Not enforcement of elementary civic relationships and national security but the entrenchment of bureaucratic and institutional interests was the real purpose of both. Hence, the United States found itself saddled with a military that was unable or was not permitted to win wars, intelligence agencies increasingly impotent to acquire reliable information or competently execute covert policies, and a diplomatic service that could plausibly be accused of harboring treason.

Such public bureaucracies were matched and indeed closely linked with private interests that nursed at the federal mammary glands: businesses that grew fat off foreign aid; government contractors who designed and sold the high-tech equivalents of

underwater real estate in Florida; universities that swelled their "plants" with federal research grants and contracts; and a horde of consultants in every known field of study who thought the unthinkable and earned what should have been the unearnable. Meanwhile, the Soviets stole atomic, military, and technological secrets, infiltrated the government, and supported surrogates who overthrew U.S. allies in Cuba, Central America, Asia, and Africa.

Fortunately, Mr. Gorbachev's predecessors never fully gauged what mush they were up against, and their own oligarchy of crooks and commissars entered its terminal stage before they found out.

Just as East Europeans seem to be throwing out their ruling bums, so the end of the Cold War ought to offer a chance for Americans to rid themselves of the parasitical mafias that have mangled the pursuit of our national interests for the last forty years. To do so would not necessarily lead to the much-dreaded "isolationism" that is more often an epithet than a real option, but it would involve a definition of specific and concrete goals and interests in place of globalist slogans and the chicanery they encourage. Dealing with the Third World debt, foreign (especially Asian) economic competition, massive illegal immigration, and the restoration of the Monroe Doctrine are probably the major problems that a serious nationalist foreign policy ought to address.

Unfortunately, there seems little prospect of doing so, since the same elites that mismanaged the Cold War remain firmly in place and seem to have learned nothing from their lackluster performance over the past two generations. Managing the global environment, creating democracy everywhere, and making sure the

sclerotic Soviet economy gets enough economic and technological fixes to save Mr. Gorbachev from early retirement in Siberia appear to be the main appetizers on the globalist diplomatic plate just now.

Such goals simply regurgitate what James Burnham more than twenty years ago called the "set of uprooted abstractions out of which globalism compounds its heady brew."

What distinguishes the globalist abstractions from genuine internationalist ideas is precisely their divorce from technical, social and historical realities. There are three billion plus human beings now living on the face of the earth, but there is no Humanity: that is to say, actual human beings, though they may share a metaphysical and theological identity, do not in point of fact have common psychological, social and historical traits that link them into an operative social grouping that we may name "Humanity." In real life men are joined on a much less than universal scale into a variety of groupings -- family, community, church, business, club, party, etc. -- which on the political scale reach the maximum significant limit in the nation.

If Americans don't want to find themselves embarked on another forty years in the global wilderness, they will have to take matters out of the hands of those, on the left and the right, who still peddle a foreign policy based on "Human Rights," "Global Democracy," "Transnational Issues," and what Burnham called the "other capitalized familiars put into general circulation by the ideological hucksters of our time." Otherwise, those abstractions eventually will show up on the national doorstep to tell us not only how we ought to run our neighbors' houses but also how to manage our own.

Chronicles, June, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

"Black History Month," sometimes called "February," used to be about as exciting as National Jogging Week, but this year it stood up and pranced. First, executives at CBS gave the bounce to commentator Andy Rooney to punish him for unkind remarks he may or may not have uttered about the African-American gene pool. Then, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, lifelong liberal Democrat, arrived at Vassar College to harangue the sisters in the annual "Eleanor Roosevelt Lecture," only to hear himself denounced for "racism." Probably other, less illustrious citizens also fell under the month's lash for their insensitivity to such well-established historical truths as the negritude of Nefertiti and the African origins of the Pythagorean theorem, but their names have not surfaced and their fates are unknown. In any case, to humiliate a leading senator and nearly ruin the career of a nationally famous opinion-maker in the space of less than a month is itself no small historical achievement.

Yet the greatest accomplishment of this year's Black History Month was the decision of the New York State Board of Regents to scuttle the "Eurocentric" orientation of its entire educational system and to authorize development of a curriculum that would reflect, in the words of The New York Times, "the contributions of non-white cultures" to American civilization. The most likely

such plan, which already exists and which New Yorkers spent most of January and February fretting about, is the now-notorious "Curriculum of Inclusion," which recommends sending Eurocentric values, ideas, and assumptions to the back of the school bus.

The plan, written by Dr. Henry Hamilton of the State University of New York at Albany, where he chairs the Department of Atmospheric Sciences, begins with the assertion that "African Americans, Asian Americans, Puerto Ricans/Latinos, and Native Americans have all been the victims of an intellectual and educational oppression that has characterized the culture and institutions of the United States and the European American world for centuries." The purpose of the new curriculum is to destroy that "oppression" by overturning and reversing the racial and cultural dominance on which it is based.

One way to achieve that purpose is to insist, as the report and its appendices do throughout, that European and American civilizations are themselves derived from or dependent on non-white and non-European races and cultures (the term "minorities," the report warns us, merely reflects the assumption that the European-descended majority is dominant). Thus, the report faults the current syllabus on "Global History" used in New York schools because it fails to acknowledge sufficiently that "the latest scientific evidence has established Africa as the birthplace of humanity and the earliest cradle of civilization. ... The African factor is crucial in world history and the Nile Valley is fundamental to appreciating its significance." The new teaching on the role of Asians and blacks in American history will

emphasize the importance of their labor in the economies of the Far West and the Old South, and neither the Framers nor even poor old Christopher Columbus are sacred any more.

"The erroneous and racist attribution of Christopher Columbus as so-called 'discoverer' and 'civilizer' of Native Americans [i.e., Indians] can be exposed as an essential part of the ideology of 'white nationalism' designed to justify the exploitation and eventual genocide of indigenous Americans," writes Leonard Jeffries, head of the Black Studies Department at CCNY, in an appendix to the report. Exploring the contributions of "Native American" traditions to American government can combat the "racism" of the Constitution and the quaint conceit that the Framers had any original ideas. "Some of these ['Native American'] traditions, such as the Iroquois system of governance," writes Dr. Jeffries, "have had an impact on the development of institutions and practices of the State of New York and the United States." Anthropologist William A. Starna, incidentally, in a letter to The New York Times on March 7, 1990, noted that "no good evidence exists to support" the idea that the Iroquois had any influence on the forming of the U.S. Constitution. But that's only one of the falsehoods the "Curriculum of Inclusion" perpetuates.

The curriculum's goal is not simply to supplement school courses with increased knowledge about the contributions of non-whites to American civilization but to challenge the merits and legitimacy of "Eurocentric" culture itself. "An educational system centered around the Eurocentric world view," the report

informs us, "is limited and narrow." "The near exclusion of other cultures in the curriculum gives European American children the seriously distorted notion that their culture is the only one to have contributed to the growth of our society." It makes white children "arrogant" and instills in them the idea that they are "part of the group that 'has done it all,'" while exerting "harmful" effects and "negative socialization" on non-white children.

Conservatives and neo-conservatives, of course, have generally howled splenetically in response to the "Curriculum of Inclusion," and properly so. But, as is common in such responses, they often seem not to have grasped firmly the fundamental issues the proposed reforms raise.

U.S. News and World Report's John Leo, for example, was one of the first columnists to criticize the report (November 27, 1989), while praising an alternative curriculum reform co-authored by neo-conservative education expert Diane Ravitch that was adopted in California. The California plan, Mr. Leo wrote, "frankly celebrates America's democratic values -- freedom, tolerance, equality, the rights and responsibilities of citizenship -- not as the inventions of a white power structure but as the heritage of all Americans, regardless of color." Similarly, Scott McConnell and Eric Breindel, criticizing the "Curriculum of Inclusion" report in The New Republic (January 8-15, 1990), accurately noted that "European intellectual traditions" were "essential to the establishment of political democracy on these shores," and they argued that

... in the years since the Founders, immigrants from all over the world have come here because they were attracted by that democracy and the vibrant economy it engendered. This blend produced a genuinely pluralist society -- indeed, the very concept of pluralism is itself a product of the European (or "Eurocentric") tradition.

But the problem with such criticisms of "A Curriculum of Inclusion" is that they fail to recognize that "America's democratic values" and "pluralism" are not only precisely what the "Curriculum of Inclusion" is rejecting but also that pluralism in itself contains nothing with which to prune the budding totalitarianism that the report manifests. Indeed, by acknowledging the legitimacy of even anti-pluralist ideas and their expression, pluralism provides the soil in which totalitarian minds and movements can sprout. The "multiculturalism" of "A Curriculum of Inclusion" exploits pluralist assumptions to demand acceptance. But since it rejects any serious commitment to the values of Western liberalism, its advocates have no intention of preserving pluralist mechanisms.

Moreover, regardless of the rhetorical and propaganda excesses of "A Curriculum of Inclusion," it is bang right about one thing: American civilization historically has been the product of European-descended peoples and their ideas. What else can "Eurocentric dominance" mean? The language, the religion, the dominant political institutions, the economic organizations and goals, and the literary, intellectual, and aesthetic traditions that have informed American culture from its inception have all derived from Europe and its peoples. It is all very well to point

to black cotton-pickers and Chinese railroad workers, but the cotton fields and the railroads were there because white people wanted them there and knew how to put them there. Almost all non-white contributions to American history either have been made by individuals and groups that have assimilated Euro-American ideas, values, and goals or have been conceived, organized, and directed by white leaders.

At least implicitly, the "Curriculum of Inclusion" acknowledges this truth; it just doesn't like it, and its authors resort to the most labyrinthine confusions about the role of non-whites in American history to get around the truth and reverse it.

What they are seeking, then, is not simply to join a civilization that has excluded and subordinated them and their peoples but to delegitimize it and destroy it, with the idea of replacing it with their own conception of civilization, to which whites themselves will be subordinated.

Of course, "A Curriculum of Inclusion" is not the only such challenge to historic American civilization. It is all of a piece with the attack on "Western culture" courses at Stanford a couple of years ago and at other universities and colleges across the country. At the elementary and secondary levels, a group called the "National Black United Front" is launching similar assaults on school curricula in at least 10 major American cities and school systems, according to Carol Innerst of The Washington Times, with the purpose of expunging what its activists call the "white supremacy" of the public schools. "Now that we are clear," says NBUF's chairman, Conrad Worrill, "that the European world did not

bring the light of civilization to Africa, and in fact it was the other way around -- Africans in ancient times had a profound influence on the rest of the world -- we ought to put African contributions at the center of the curriculum." And, of course, feminist and homosexual activists seek similar "revisions" of traditional curricula to challenge male heterosexual dominance. No wonder this year's Black History Month was such fun.

The total assault is part of the struggle for what the Italian Communist theorist Antonio Gramsci called "cultural hegemony," the subversion and control of the dominant ideas, values, tastes, and moral standards of a society, which is an essential precondition for seizing political power and without which enduring revolutionary power is not possible. The assault is also part of the continuing cultural dispossession of the historic core of American civilization, and as such it enjoys at least tacit support from the already dominant elites that gain power through managing and manipulating social change and which therefore thrive on "pluralism."

Invoking "pluralism" and "democratic values" will do nothing to resist the assault but will only legitimize it, since the attackers rely on such slogans of liberalism and the sanctity these slogans enjoy to move their vanguard forward. Those Americans who want to preserve their historic civilization will need to re-assert their own hegemony against that vanguard, and incantations of pluralism and democracy will be of less help to them in achieving it than a firm insistence on the greatness of who they are, where they come from, and what they have achieved.

Chronicles, July, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

On the same day last year that the Supreme Court sliced a few ounces of flesh out of its 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision on abortion, it also carved up an American tradition governing the public observance of Christmas. In the case of Allegheny vs. ACLU, the Court held that Allegheny County in Pennsylvania could not display a Christian Nativity scene without also surrounding it with symbols of secularism. But in the same decision the Court ruled that because authorities in Pittsburgh had put up symbols of Hanukah alongside Christian symbols, the latter were -- well -- kosher. That display therefore was held not to be an endorsement of a particular sect or doctrine but only a tip of the city's hat to the idea of religion in general. Presumably, if your city next year similarly honors Quetzalcoatl or Apollo the Mouse-Slayer, along with the more mundane Christian and Jewish faiths, the ACLU will leave you alone.

But in the Allegheny case, the ACLU was not the real plaintiff. That honor belongs to one Malik Tunador, a Moslem on whose behalf the ACLU brought the suit and saw it through to the final wisdom imparted by the nine unelected magistrates who rule America. Most of the sensible journalistic commentary on the case at the time dwelled on such staple themes as the dangers of judicial activism, social engineering under the guise of civil liberties, and triumphant secularism. All of these were apposite,

but there is another that relates to the person of Mr. Tunador himself and which seems to have been lost in the verbal underbrush: namely, what happens to a nation's cultural identity when unassimilated aliens within it gain political power and legal rights?

Mr. Tunador's passion to rid Allegheny County of public endorsements of Judeo-Christian symbolism is not unique. Last year also, adherents of the Caribbean voodoo cult Santeria, who worship an odd god called "Babalu" and slaughter animals to his glory, brought suit against Miami in an effort to overturn that city's animal protection laws so they could adore their bloodthirsty deity with impunity. They lost the first round in court, but they haven't given up, and, Babalu willing, they may yet prevail over the forces of repression. Actually, letting Santeria devotees chop up dogs and chickens may be preferable to tolerating the liturgies of closely related cults also being imported into this country. In 1989 a gang of drug smugglers from Mexico kidnapped an American youth, cut off his legs, and buried his corpse in the desert as part of a magico-religious ceremony to avoid capture.

It's probably unlikely that adherents of Babalu and similar divinities will become Episcopalians any time soon. For that matter, it's also improbable that such newcomers will convert to the constitutional republicanism that historically has governed the politics of the United States, traces its ancestry to British and Western European roots, and remains as rare in the Third World today as a pair of trousers. Nor should we expect too many of our

new citizens to adopt the social and moral institutions that most Euro-Americans have long followed and on which our government, legal system, economy, and indeed the education, arts, and sciences of our higher civilization rest. Not since the Salem witch trials of the late seventeenth century have Americans expressed much faith in the kind of paleolithic sorcery that the animistic creeds of the Third World are now fetching hither, but their primitive paganism may soon percolate into our pantheon and permanently alter the basic assumptions and values of our national culture.

Indeed, for all the clichés among the professional xenophiles about the "strong family values" that the new immigrants are bringing to our exhausted society, many of the pilgrims appear to carry on a highly lucrative traffic in prostitution, narcotics, baby-selling, and other quaint Third World customs. Today, no less than 20 percent of the population of the federal prison system consists of aliens, and Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas, ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, notes that "What's worse is that seven out of eight [criminal] aliens are either released or given probation and never serve time in prison." He also says that present deportation procedures take so much time to send alien lawbreakers back to their fatherlands "that we're talking about a massive problem, with potentially hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens who have committed crimes."

Obviously, not all, not even most, Third World immigrants are murderous cultists, drug dealers, or deadbeats, but the stereotype

of the new Americans as hard-working mathematical geniuses who start computer industries and carry the amenities of Seven-Eleven civilization into the inner cities is no less exaggerated. If even a small percentage of the several million illegal aliens who meander across our borders every year is criminal, that alone is sufficient reason to stop the influx and expedite deportations.

The larger point is that even immigrants who want to assimilate often can't, since a culture consists largely of unspoken and unconscious beliefs and behavior produced by long immersion in a particular institutional environment. The cultural apparatus that immigrants bring with them cannot be discarded, nor can the apparatus of the host country be adopted, as easily as American tourists exchange sombreros and pith helmets for black ties and evening gowns on their Club Med safaris. Learning English, getting a job, and wearing Western clothes in themselves betoken only minimal assimilation, and they mean nothing with respect to absorption of the underlying habits that define a culture and distinguish it from others. The names of two famous immigrants in American history illustrate what ought to be obvious to common sense. Both gentlemen arrived here in their early youth, grew up poor, and through hard work became eminently successful in their chosen professions. Both came to speak English fluently and dressed impeccably. But to their dying days there remained something about Al Capone and Lucky Luciano that just wasn't American.

One fundamental part of a nation's culture that no immigrant can possibly assimilate is its past. Even today, to some

descendants of immigrants who came here in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, the names of battles like Gettysburg and Lexington are as remote as the medieval carnage at Tewkesbury and Bosworth Field. It is one thing to learn the military and political history of a country from schoolbooks, but it's not the same as having ancestors who fought it, conquered it, and endured it and whose participation in long stretches of the national experience has been passed down to their posterity by word of mouth and inheritance of artifacts. If Abraham Lincoln were to deliver his Gettysburg Address today, he could not possibly speak of "our forefathers" without being accused of insensitivity by the descendants of those who didn't arrive until it was considerably safer to be an American.

Nor does the ambition of many immigrants to enjoy the civil liberties and political freedoms of the United States necessarily imply any deep loyalty to or understanding of what allows our political culture to flourish. Just because you're running for your life from death squads and secret police doesn't mean you know much about the First Amendment or the incorporation doctrine, the separation of powers or the rule of law. Even many British immigrants to the United States often find the concept of federalism almost incomprehensible, and they discover fewer and fewer Americans who can explain it accurately. Moreover, only a small number of immigrants are willing or able to abandon entirely the prejudices and preconceptions that animate their own politics back home, and they often bring their strange animosities and enthusiasms with them in their baggage. The various ethnic

constituencies whose never-ending quarrels and quibbles seem to determine the content of American foreign policy suggest that many who think of themselves as Americans are really little more than transplanted foreigners. In the last several years, one of the most dangerous sources of terrorist activity in the United States has consisted of aliens -- from Iran, Libya, Central America, the Middle East, Armenia, etc. -- who insist on importing their own local fixations, ethnic or ideological, to these shores.

The ethnic, racial, and cultural mosaic into which the United States, for the first time in its history, is metamorphosing suggests that eventually it will go the way of just about every other multicultural society in human history. The late Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the dominions of the Habsburgs and the Romanoffs, among others, all presided over a kind of rainbow coalition of nations and peoples, who for the most part managed to live happily because their secret compulsions to spill each other's blood was restrained by the overwhelming power of the despots and dynasties who ruled them. Political freedom relies on a shared political culture as much as on the oppositions and balances that social differentiation creates, and when the common culture disintegrates under the impact of mass migrations, only institutionalized force can hold the regime together. Mr. Gorbachev and his satraps are discovering this truth even now as their bureaucratic empire decomposes into national and ethnic fragments that contest for dominance. It is ironic that the long-suppressed nations of the Eurasian Heartland seem to be on the eve of satisfying their

aspirations for political identity and cultural renaissance even as the American nation faces oblivion.

Whether new Americans like Citizen Tunador and the worshippers at the shrine of Babalu will be happy in the new Moslemo-Santerio-Buddho-Confucio-Judeo-Christian society they are trying to create is dubious. Of course, if their creation is not to their liking, they can always pick up and hoof it somewhere else, and since they've already done so once, maybe they won't mind moving on again. But those Americans who remain loyal to the national heritage their forefathers created or received may find it more difficult to locate an adequate substitute for what massive and uncontrolled immigration is helping to destroy.

Chronicles, August, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

One of the unmistakable signs that a new civilization is about to leap forth from the crumbling cocoon of an old is the transformation in the meaning of traditional holidays. When a rising Christian elite seized political and cultural power in the late Roman Empire, it lost no time in turning the old Roman Saturnalia of late December into Christmas. The word "Easter" derives from the name of a pre-Christian dawn goddess, and the Christian observance of the Resurrection is closely linked with the rites of earlier religions that marked the vernal equinox and the annual rebirth of natural life. The elite that forms the core of a civilization understands that it's usually easier to build its power on the wreckage that lies to hand than to start all over from a blank slate.

So it is with the emerging global civilization that now twitches in the neurons of the planet's transnational elites. Today in the United States, the real year begins not with the midnight debauchery of New Year's Eve but with the far more pious festivals of Martin Luther King Day and Black History Month, which offer occasions for exposing the evils of the old regime and proclaiming the universalist, cosmopolitan, and egalitarian vision that makes the eyes of the new elite flutter and drip. But these celebrations are not nearly as useful in binding the planet's

human cattle to the chariots of the coming Caesars as this year's orgy of health, safety, and sunshine known as "Earth Day."

No doubt for the several hundred thousand greenies who descended on the nation's metropolitan centers on April 22 to prostrate themselves in homage to the earth, the festival really was a chance to spit in the face of what they think is a capitalist oligarchy that insists on making people work in factories, eat cholesterol, and get suntans. But the truth is that the celebration, so far from being a revolt against the powers that rule the earth, was actually a proclamation from their headquarters.

Regulation of the "environment" involves much more than the solar panels and tree-planting beloved of schoolchildren and grown-ups whose mental age is no higher than that of 12-year-olds.

Since the environment includes everywhere and everything, "preserving," "protecting," and "taking care" of it is little more than a formula for a new species of totalitarianism far more profound than even la famille Ceausescu could have imagined. As currently understood, it encompasses not only the labor you perform but also what and how much you eat, where and how you travel, what you do with your leisure time, how you maintain your health, how you raise your children, and indeed whether you may have children.

Unknown to most of those who swoon in adoration of the earth are the bottomless opportunities this understanding of the environment offers to those who would like to control all these ordinary activities. Nor do most earth-worshippers seem to

suspect the sacrifices their new goddess and her high priests will demand of them. Anti-tobacco zealots who rejoice in the illegalization of smoking may not be so merry once they realize they are creating precedents for the banning of meat and potatoes.

Mawkish maidens who weep over the fate of youngsters molested by their parents and demand federal action to save the children may one day regret that the state will tell them who they may or may not marry. Citizens who vow to study war no more may recoil when potentates halfway around the globe are drafting the rules that govern their lives. So far, the "right," immersed in its economic determinism and obsessions, has whimpered only about the jobs that will be lost and the taxes that will have to be paid as a result of environmentalist laws and policies; but it has largely ignored or failed to recognize the far more serious danger that the Cult of the Earth presents -- the technocratic manipulation of the daily lives of individuals and societies by the elites that have created and make use of environmentalism.

The environmentalist movement is an odd bag that contains, besides the innocent calves who provided the cannon fodder for Earth Day, at least two main components. On the one hand, there is the part represented by the professional, well-funded, highly-skilled, and well-connected environmentalist lobbies that include the heavily bureaucratized and technocratic funds and foundations, as well as the corporate, governmental, and academic organizations that understand how to use the movement to enhance their own power at the expense of social institutions and habits, local jurisdictions and national sovereignties, and cultural identities

and relationships. It is this part of the movement that has effectively created Earth Day and environmentalism as respectable and even fashionable causes, because it realizes they and their symbols are not threats to its power but rather the best thing to happen to it since the Earl of Sandwich invented fast food.

On the other hand, there is another component of environmentalism that is usually manipulated and exploited by the first. This part of the movement rejects the whole idea of a technological society and an elite that bases its power on technology. As some of its champions readily acknowledge, it is not, strictly speaking, a "left" or "progressivist" movement but a reactionary force. It not only rejects technology and its applications to man, machine, and nature, but also seeks to make a quick march out of the Newtonian universe, Darwinian biology, Lockean sensationalist psychology, and a unilinear conception of history.

But it is reactionary mainly because it merely rejects modernism, not because it seriously aims at restoring pre-modernism. While it idealizes pre-modern (usually primitive and animistic) communities, it seems to be content with fantasizing about pastoral Nirvanas where the meanest machine available is a slingshot. It offers no realistic social models as alternatives to technological modernism, no means of arriving at such alternatives, and no particularly compelling reasons to look for them. Many of its adherents wind up (or start out) sucked into occultism, mysticism, and New Age esoterica.

Its critique of modernism is essentially ethical, but it

nevertheless relies on scientific (or pseudo-scientific) prophecies of material, natural disasters that will ravage the earth unless we abandon modern technology and the social structures and world-view that support it. When these prophecies turn out to be unreliable (as global warming theories have), the environmentalist challenge to modernism collapses. But by depending on science to support its claims, reactionary environmentalism crawls into bed with the very technological system it claims to repudiate and allows managerial environmentalists to assimilate it and manipulate it for their own purposes.

One reason reactionary environmentalism offers no sustained ethical critique of modernism is that its proponents probably realize it would sound even more bizarre than the doomsaying they usually thunder about. For all the pother about global warming, acid rain, resource depletion, carcinogenic foods, insecticides, and spray deodorants, no one other than the most marginal oddballs and the most ethereal eggheads really wants to live like the Iroquois Indians, the Eskimoes, or medieval serfs. No one even wants to live like American farmers of the nineteenth century. The remarkable absence of people who choose to exist at pre-industrial levels of subsistence is due only in part to the materialism which holds that for some reason such technologies as indoor plumbing are preferable to squatting in the cow pasture. Societies that do prefer such levels or can't move beyond them don't survive in competition with those that don't or can. Moreover, the civilization of the West is distinguished from other

cultural complexes in large part by a quality that Oswald Spengler called its "Faustian" character, its seemingly irrepressible impulse to expand, explore, conquer, and create, and its capacity to institutionalize this impulse in intellectual and aesthetic life, as well as in politics, the economy, and technology.

Contrary to Spengler, the Faustian dynamism of the West is characteristic not only of modernity but also of ancient and medieval Europe. Probably its first manifestation was in the prehistoric outpourings of the Indo-Europeans into continental Europe and their rapid conquest of more primal societies that had the misfortune to get in their way. Millennia later it popped up again in the ethos that impelled Europeans to build roads and aqueducts across deserts, design Gothic cathedrals, invent capitalism and industry, stretch out to China, Africa, and North and South America, hold sway over continents and the oceans that link them, and ultimately intrude into the caverns of the atom and reach upward toward the stars.

Whether they called their holidays Christmas or the Saturnalia, the elites that created European civilization understood that they and the people they ruled were destined for something other than the bucolic toe-picking that reactionary environmentalists seem to think is the chief and proper end of mankind. They understood also that while economic growth and technological innovation are part of the Faustian ethos, they are not the whole of it. They would therefore have regarded the preoccupation with acquisitive and hedonistic individualism and the manic pursuit of growth and gratification championed by

contemporary "conservatives" as a deformation of that ethos, no less than the primitivist whinings of the greenies; and they would have recognized in the resurrection and cultivation of Faustian aspirations the only authentic source of an enduring technological civilization of the future.

Chronicles, September, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

After two years of desperate pretense that the Bush administration is but the long afternoon of the Reagan era, many of Mr. Bush's conservative supporters now begin to suspect that morning in America is fast lurching toward chaos and old night. The president's apparent willingness to consider tax increases, despite his best known campaign promise, and the return of Secretary of State James Baker from Moscow last spring wearing little more than his underpants have disabused many on the right of any illusions they may have harbored. They are late, but they are not alone, and far from the Beltway comes the unsettling murmur of rebellion, this time not from the tenured revolutionaries of the left or the tax-exempt populists of the right, but out of the swamps and hills of the American heartland.

When David Duke announced in 1988 that he would run for the Louisiana state legislature, few paid much attention. Mr. Duke first gained national headlines in the early 1970s, when he won fame for being a member of the Ku Klux Klan as well as a college graduate, and he has run for office several times before -- most recently for president in 1988. Any almanac will give you a complete list of such also-rans, from anti-Masons and Know-Nothings down to the candidacies of Angela Davis, Dr. Spock, and Lyndon LaRouche. But then Mr. Duke won the legislative race, the

almanacs had to be re-written, and ears, even inside the Beltway, began to prick.

Mr. Duke not only won his election -- against the brother of a former governor and despite the fulminations of President Bush and Republican National Committee Chairman Lee Atwater and the avuncular counsel of Ronald Reagan -- but also now seems to be on the verge of trouncing Republican state Sen. Ben Bagert in Louisiana's senatorial primary next month. If, as seems likely, Mr. Duke beats Mr. Bagert and keeps Democratic incumbent Bennett Johnston from winning more than 50 per cent of the vote, he will face Sen. Johnston in November. Should he win against him, the rebellion will begin to sprint.

Mr. Duke, however, has come a long ways since he posed for pictures in Klan robes and Nazi uniform. While he refuses to denounce the Klan, he does not spend time or energy arguing that God has cursed the children of Ham or that the Elders of Zion are fluoridating the drinking water from their headquarters in the federal reserve system. Nor does he dote on the conclusions of researches conducted by the late William Shockley, Arthur Jensen, and others who believe that human intelligence is largely inherited and that white people generally got a larger slice of the intellectual pie than black people. Just because he doesn't talk about such matters does not mean that Mr. Duke doesn't believe them, and he is quite cagey about whether he does or doesn't. But regardless of what he thinks about these and other subjects, Mr. Duke's success in the polls has little to do with such beliefs or with the kind of clothes he used to wear.

Louisiana and most other states are full of characters who wear all kinds of funny uniforms and would like to have lots of political power, but few citizens there or anywhere else are dumb enough to vote for them.

Mr. Duke has gained and kept a political following because he understands something most contemporary conservatives have forgotten or in some cases never knew: What attracts voters to a candidacy of the right is not what the candidate thinks or says about the gold standard, creating democracy in Afghanistan, expanding economic opportunities, or being kinder and gentler, but what he will do to preserve and protect what used to be called the American Way of Life, the normative patterns and institutions that define and distinguish what Americans believe and do from what other peoples believe and do -- in short, the American culture.

Voters -- not all of them, but many -- are attracted to candidates who express clear positions supportive of traditional American culture because they have to live every day with the cultural erosion spawned by politically engineered assaults from individuals and groups that despise American culture and want to get rid of it. For example, the ACLU and kindred lobbies that manipulate judicial power to uproot folkways and the distribution of social and political power that folkways support; the "multiculturalism" lobby, which uses the government education system to crush Euro-American culture and subordinate it to its own Third-World-Marxist-feminist-homophile superstitions; and the civil rights establishment and its allies in the immigration lobbies, which seek to dig a bottomless pit of welfare rights,

political privilege, affirmative action programs, and set-asides to dispossess white Americans economically, politically, and culturally and gain the loyalty of their non-white following in the black underclass and the government-created middle class. Such forces also enjoy the support or acquiescence of the bureaucratic elites in the managerial state, corporations, unions, and mass media, which use them to expand their own power.

The practical results of the success of this alliance are commonly known in the forms of violent crime that crippled police and prosecutors are unable to suppress, of entire systems of local government overturned by courts for the purpose of ensuring "minority" power, of competent white students denied admission to college because of the lower standards of enrollment universities allow for non-whites, and of qualified white job applicants unable to work because of affirmative action and set aside plans. Yet such material consequences of the racial and cultural revolution merely frame its substance. In high school and college, television and film, the traditional culture of Europe and America is vilified, belittled, debunked, and deconstructed, while white, Christian, male heterosexuals are consistently portrayed as criminals, tyrants, incompetents, and madmen. Probably more than the direct material effect of dispossession, this less tangible but far more pervasive dismantling and discrediting of an entire civilization has produced the smoldering psychic embers from which rebellion bursts into revolutionary flame.

The core of the revolution consists in what sociologist Donald I. Warren some 16 years ago called "Middle American

Radicals," or "MARs," a social and political force largely identical to what is usually called -- depending on one's inclination to affect dispassion, enthusiasm, or contempt -- "lower middle class white ethnics," the "Reagan Democrats," or the "Bubba vote." Professor Warren, however, defined MARs in terms of a common attitude they shared. "MARs are a distinct group," he wrote, "partly because of their view of government as favoring both the rich and the poor simultaneously. ... MARs are distinct in the depth of their feeling that the middle class has been seriously neglected. If there is one single summation of the MAR perspective, it is reflected in a statement which was read to respondents: The rich give in to the demands of the poor, and the middle income people have to pay the bill."

The white voters who elected Mr. Duke to the state legislature last year from District 81 are virtual MARs archetypes. According to a survey conducted for the New Orleans Times Picayune after the election,

Duke's constituents live in a microcosm of white, suburban America. District 81 is characterized by middle incomes, fear of crime and a distaste for taxes. Moreover, the voters ... express a smoldering [there's that word again] sense that, at worst, government confiscates the work of its best citizens and lavishes it, to no apparent effect, on people who are ungrateful or openly hostile.

Affirmative-action programs, minority set-asides, racial quotas and other efforts on behalf of blacks have tilted the system against them, the voters said. When it comes to job and educational opportunities, they feel whites increasingly are ending up on the short end of the stick.

In Duke, voters said they saw an opportunity to fight back.

Voters won't get that opportunity from Mr. Bush, however, nor from Dan Quayle, Jack Kemp, Newt Gingrich and the other luminaries of the Republican firmament, nor even from their ideological mentors who shine under the labels of "neo-conservatism," "big government conservatism," "cultural conservatism," and, most recently, "the New Paradigm." Last summer the Heritage Foundation published a report on the Kennedy-Hawkins Civil Rights Bill of 1990, and while Heritage properly opposed the bill and affirmative action, it pronounced what is nothing less than an abandonment of traditional conservative principle regarding civil rights legislation.

The "conservative view of progress" on civil rights, Heritage informed us, demands that "government must prosecute cases of discrimination against individuals to the full extent of the law.

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ... should be strengthened to include remedy of damages against those who wilfully discriminate. Building on this enforcement strategy, the conservative civil rights strategy would call for aggressive court and legislative action to challenge modern-day Jim Crow laws that stifle minority business development." Examples of such latter-day "Jim Crow laws" include "the 1931 Davis Bacon Act, which freezes out minority firms from government construction contracts, and onerous licensing laws for professions ranging from cosmetology to child care."

Yet these laws, as the Heritage paper acknowledges, are "seemingly neutral in their impact on the races," and, unlike Jim

Crow laws, which explicitly discriminated on the basis of race, merely have the effect of placing black-owned firms under disadvantage. There are good reasons to repeal Davis-Bacon and many occupational licensing laws, but to do so because they have the effect -- rather than the intent -- of racial discrimination is to embrace conventional liberal ideas that legitimize affirmative action and special privileges for members of certain races over others. Through exactly the same logic, universities require lower SAT scores for black applicants than for whites because holding all applicants to the same standards, while "seemingly neutral," would in effect exclude many blacks from admission. Thus the new "conservative civil rights strategy" winds up in the same place conventional leftism started out.

Nor does Heritage explain why ending and punishing "racial discrimination" should be legitimate goals and activities of the federal government at all or why the state should undertake special efforts to ensure "business development" -- or home-owning, or an end to poverty, or psychic contentment -- for any particular group. Whatever the flaws of Jim Crow codes before the 1960s, federal involvement in chasing racial discrimination through the Civil Rights Act resulted in a massive expansion of centralized power on behalf of the therapeutic management of social, political, economic, and cultural relationships that no real conservative can countenance.

Heritage is not alone in demanding further acceleration of the civil rights revolution through the use of federal power. Last winter, conservatives gathered secretly in New York to

discuss what they were going to do with their little empires in the coming decade. For "cultural conservative" Paul Weyrich, the agenda seems to be focused mainly on helping the black underclass.

An eight-page memorandum circulated by Mr. Weyrich at the meeting centered almost entirely on measures designed to help minorities in inner cities while largely ignoring traditional white middle-class conservative constituencies on farms and in small towns and urban neighborhoods that continue to face social, economic, and cultural demolition.

Yet it is precisely such constituencies that supported conservative activism -- indeed, made it possible through their donations -- and voted the current crop of Republican politicoes into office. They did so because the propaganda and rhetoric these activists and politicians uttered made them believe that their interests would be defended and that the continuing assault on their beliefs, life styles, institutions, and aspirations would be resisted. But except for campaign applesauce about Willie Horton, the Pledge of Allegiance, the American flag, capital punishment, and religion, today's "conservatives" have no serious intention whatsoever of doing so.

There is a good deal of talk these days about the "conservative crack-up," and much of it is justified. But what has cracked up is not the popular radicalism of the right but rather the phony "populism" of the conservative establishment, which has signed up with the other establishments that run the country. Even from their watchtowers on the Washington Beltway, the barons of this establishment can smell the smoke of rebellion

drifting in from the prairie, and they know they didn't start the fire, can't control it, and can't put it out. It won't take any more secret meetings in New York to learn that whoever does control that fire will determine the real political agenda for the next decade.

Chronicles, October, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

Two years after George Bush moved downtown to the White House, the suspicion begins to twinkle in the brains of his conservative followers that the president is not one of them after all. What tipped them off to this shattering truth was their leader's non-chalant decision last summer to support a tax increase. But for some months previously they had had ample warnings that the Duke of Kennebunkport was not in fact the Gipperite they had concocted in their heads.

The same week Mr. Bush broke his pledge not to raise taxes, he was wining and dining Mr. and Mrs. Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress. Mr. Mandela, sometime fellow of the penal colony on Robben Island, is most noted for a brutally conceived but incompetently executed plot to wage people's war against white South Agricans in the 1960s. His consort, the incomparable Winnie, has more recently acquired fame in her own right as an apostle of "necklacing" as well as the object of an official investigation into the torture and murder of a young man in her household. Given the lies and propaganda that have enveloped the Mandela family since Nelson's emancipation last February, it is perhaps understandable that the president had to meet with him. But that he and Mrs. Bush greeted the gruesome twosome so gladly ought to have suggested something about the first family even more strongly than the president's new fiscal

policy.

Indeed, the whole substance of the Bush era is suggestive in a way that ought not to please the right. You can tell a good deal about politicians from the social gatherings they attend and the symbols they play with. Last spring Mr. Bush invited to the White House representatives of the "gay community" to observe the presidential signing of what is now known as the "Hate Crimes Act." That too ought to have dropped a hint to social conservatives that the president and his closest advisers don't experience the kind of abdominal heaves that normal people, not to mention real conservatives, invariably feel when they contemplate the subject of sodomy. But though there was some muted grumbling about the incident, most right-wingers were silent.

Then, perhaps most substantively, there is the actual legislative record. The first two years of the Bush administration have witnessed an expansion of federal power on a scale probably not seen since the Great Society legislation of 1965. Not only the "Hate Crimes Act" itself, which requires the federal government to keep records of criminal assaults against ethnic and sexual "minorities" -- for the ultimate purpose of showing that American society is pathologically hostile to such groups and that major therapeutic programs are needed to extirpate its sickness -- but also half a dozen other noisome statutes have sailed through Congress this year with not much more than a whimper of opposition from Mr. Bush.

The Child Care Bill, the Disabilities Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Kennedy-Hawkins Civil Rights Act of 1990 all promise to

embark the country on the shoreless sea of utopianism. Unlike most of the social and economic legislation of Lyndon Johnson's era, these laws threaten not merely to cost taxpayers more money, restrict freedom, and fatten the bureaucratic herds but also to manage, manipulate, and generally reconstruct the cultural norms of American society. As enacted, some of them may seem a bit toothless, but the point is that almost all of them stick their toes in a door that the federal government had not until recently been able to force open. The common assumption of most of them is that there is something profoundly wrong with some of the characteristic norms of American life, that these norms are and ever have been racist, brutalizing, and unfair toward more or less supposedly helpless or victim categories of citizens -- the handicapped, the young, the deviant, the non-white, and the simple souls who want merely to breathe pure oxygen and drink clear water -- and that it is the duty of the state to cure mainstream America of its spiritual and behavioral affliction of being mean to such groups.

Yet what is surprising about their passage through Congress is not only the generally tepid resistance from the Bush White House but also the equally spineless response they received even from congressional conservatives. Utah's Sen. Orrin Hatch actually helped co-sponsor (with Sen. Ted Kennedy) the Hate Crimes Bill -- "I feel very deeply about people's heartaches and problems, and I don't care what their sexual preferences are," Mr. Hatch told The New York Times. "That's their business and I'm not going to judge them by my standards or what I think is right."

The Clean Air Act, strenuously opposed by the journalistic myrmidons of the right, nevertheless galloped through the Senate with only six Republican nays. While Sen. Jesse Helms, Idaho's Steve Symms and James McClure, Oklahoma's Don Nickles, Wyoming's Malcolm Wallop, and Mr. Hatch's colleague from Utah, Jake Garn, voted against it, other tory stalwarts clambered on board, including Mr. Hatch himself, Texas Sen. Phil Gramm, known for his free marketism, and retiring solons William Armstrong of Colorado and Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire, who can have no reason to fear the orchestrated votes of the earth-shoe lobby.

Of course, most of these gentlemen, including the president, have sought to redeem their conservative souls by strapping themselves to the pole of the flag amendment, thundering for more capital punishment, denouncing drugs, and polishing up periodic declamations on the greatness of America and the sanctity of the family. So far that has succeeded in persuading their constituents to keep them in office, but how much longer it will work is unknown. In any case, such issues are thin substitutes for the meatier dishes that the seemingly immortal left keeps serving up. To be fair to Mr. Bush, why should he call for stronger wine when the guests at his own table sip only Perrier?

In the last few years, much has been written (a bit of it by me) about the intellectual derailment of the American right and the transformation of its mind into a body of notions indistinguishable from New Deal-Great Society liberalism. A foreign policy that dotes on "global democracy" rather than the national interest as the defining object of the state's affairs, a

domestic policy that celebrates the charms of the underclass and ponders how to improve its condition even through government redistribution, and a cultural style that twitters at the feet of the cheap idol of "pluralism" in order to avoid confronting the programmatic challenges to American civilization are now the content of what some are still pleased to call "conservatism." The metamorphosis has occurred under a variety of labels -- "neo-conservatism," "cultural conservatism," "opportunity society Republicanism," "Big Government conservatism," the "New Paradigm," etc. -- but upon scrutiny, all turn out to be plain old vanilla liberalism writ large.

Although the metamorphosis has largely been intellectual and literary, its chickens now have finally found their political roost. Sooner or later, the intellectual disintegration of the right was certain to trickle down from the lofty corridors of think tanks and well-endowed chairs (most of which curiously seem to be named after the same man) to the plain little people who hold public office. Such gentlemen are never noted for their grasp of intellectual subtleties, and when their aides, speechwriters, campaign advisers, and other hired guns present them with books, articles, and lectures spawned by the eggheads of the right, they tend to swoon with the thought of how intelligent they must really be. It is always a mistake for sitting politicoes to read and think very much, and usually there is little danger of it. But at least since the time of John F. Kennedy, public men have been expected to sport not only beehive mops of dry-blown hair but also "new ideas." Of course, the left

knows perfectly well that the "new ideas" it boasts are merely the same stale premises of tyranny it's always harbored. Only the right actually falls for the slogan and earnestly tries to catch up with its rivals by emulating them.

The rout of the right in the last couple of years in Congress is the logical extension of the new ideas its officeholders have swallowed, but that won't preserve us, in the next two years, from having to endure from these same statesmen every known species of threat, cajolment, pledge, and hucksterism known to democratic politics and the conservative repertoire. There will be (and already is) much moaning about having to run for office under the burden of the president's broken promise. There will be fretful prophecies of the price -- political and economic -- the president will have to pay for raising taxes. There will be mutterings about "not supporting George Bush anymore" and rumblings about founding a "third party" -- which, should it ever come to pass, would merely be the rank-and-file of the Republican Party under a different label but without most of its nationally known leaders.

But in the end, Mr. Bush will survive, even as President Nixon survived similar disgruntlement in 1972 when he recognized Communist China and returned from Moscow with the SALT I agreement. The president may or may not survive a challenge from the Democrats in 1992, but one thing he doesn't have to worry about is anything serious from a conservative "movement" that ceased being meaningfully conservative, or a movement, or serious, some time ago.

Chronicles, November, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

"And the bogeyman will get ya, if ya don't watch out," sang James Whitcomb Riley in one of his most popular and most insipid poems.

The bogeyman is still out there, it seems. Sometimes he's Libya's Muammar Qaddafi; sometimes Syria's Hafez Assad, or Idi Amin, Yassir Arafat, the Ayatollah Khomeini, Abu Nidal, or any of a small army of other characters who seem to bear more resemblance to the kinds of villains that Sax Rohmer used to make up than they do to any real human being. Late last summer the bogeyman shifted his shape once again, this time becoming Saddam Hussein of Iraq. He was going to get us -- if we didn't watch out.

Even before Hr. Hussein decided to top off his summer vacation by swallowing Kuwait in a midnight snack, U.S. News and World Report dubbed him "the most dangerous man in the world," a sure signal that the bogeyman was about to change his address once more. What exactly Mr. Hussein had done or even contemplated doing to merit this appellation remains unknown to me. It's perfectly true that the dictator of Iraq is not the sort of fellow that English lady mystery writers would use as one of their heavies. His capacity for brutality, cunning, and mendacity far transcends the very limited grasp of human evil that Agatha Christie, Dorothy Sayers, and their sisters displayed. But why he was any more dangerous than a host of other malefactors -- including a number of utterly unscrupulous and repulsive American politicians -- was never clear.

But once Mr. Hussein had smashed Kuwait, the monsters of a thousand slasher films seemed to leap from the celluloid, expropriate his sullen puss, and cast their torches toward our temple doors. Rotgut liberal columnist Mary McGrory, assuring us

that the "beast of Baghdad" was "capable of anything," advocated doing just about anything to get rid of him. Neo-conservative Paul Greenberg called for an American onslaught against Iraq. Professional Negro Jesse Jackson intoned that the United States must be ready to "use military force, multilaterally or unilaterally," to drive Hussein back into his lair. Leftist Sen. Chris Dodd opined that "obviously, the oil reserves pose an immediate, major security threat." And before the week was over, President Bush and the Pentagon were dispatching some 200,000 U.S. troops in the largest force to go abroad since the Vietnam war to the Arabian desert, there perhaps to die for the security of the House of Saud and to save the clan of Sabah from the cruel fate of munching caviar on the Riviera for the rest of history.

Not even the Ayatollah Khomeini's attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979 provoked the kind of unanimous consent to commit mayhem against the aggressor that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait incited, nor did terrorist attacks against Americans or the Soviet massacre of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in the 1980s. And yet Hussein had done absolutely nothing to the United States itself or its citizens or their property. All he wanted to do was gobble up a small feudal enclave that could not possibly have existed without superpower protection and to raise the price of oil so he could pay off the \$70-billion debt he piled up during his nine-year war with Iran.

Of course, his drastic and bloodthirsty means of satisfying that ambition did raise serious implications for the national security and economic well-being of the United States, and even more so for

those of Western Europe and Japan. There was ample reason for Mr. Bush, in concert with the Europeans and the Japanese, to explain patiently but firmly to Mr. Hussein that while, like any other Third World cobra, he might sink his fangs into the flesh of any of his neighbors he chose, he'd better forget about any plans to bite or blackmail the West. Hussein should have been open to this argument, since, in the long run, he needs the markets of the West as much as we need the oil itself, and eventually, if market forces had prevailed, we would probably have gotten the oil, albeit at a somewhat higher price, without finding our economy in ruins or even having to stand in line at the pump to buy it. That at least seemed to be the consensus of most oil experts as the crisis began quickly to turn into a disaster.

But the wrath directed against Mr. Hussein went far beyond any legitimate concern for the concrete security and economic interests of the West or the United States, and when Mr. Bush addressed the American people on the morning of August 8 to explain why he was sending their sons and daughters to gape into the jaws of the new Great Satan, he made only passing reference to our own national interests and security.

After roundly denouncing Hussein's "outrageous and brutal act of aggression" against Kuwait, Mr. Bush asserted what he called four "principles" that would guide our policy and which presumably justified his use of military power. These were the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of "Kuwait's legitimate government," "the security and stability of the Persian Gulf," and the protection of the lives of American citizens. With the

exception of the last, however, none of these "principles" -- in fact, they are merely policy goals or objectives -- arose from any expression of the real interests and security of the United States, nor was it likely that any of them could be achieved through the means the president had chosen.

It would require far more military power than the United States deployed to the sands of Araby to force Hussein out of Kuwait, let alone deposit the emir back into his palace, and Mr. Bush did not seem to contemplate an invasion of Iraq. In the absence of such a military blow to his solar plexus, Hussein had no reason to disgorge the rich morsel he had just masticated. Mr. Bush, moreover, never explained his solicitude for the emir and his government or why Americans should be prepared to die for it.

Nor did Mr. Bush's goal of stabilizing the Persian Gulf reflect an accurate reading of U.S. interests there. The "Carter Doctrine," which was dusted off and hauled out to justify U.S. intervention, says nothing about the "security and stability" of the Gulf, but rather warns against efforts by any "outside power" -- namely, the Soviets -- to gain control of it. Granted that we have a strong interest in keeping outside powers from dominating access to our oil supply, it does not follow that we should use force to manage the internal squabbles of the Gulf powers themselves, unless these conflicts threaten to close off our access, which Iraq's invasion did not.

Mr. Bush's fourth principle -- protecting American lives abroad -- is certainly a legitimate U.S. interest, and one that legitimately may require force. But Mr. Hussein did not threaten the lives of

the 3,000-odd U.S. citizens living in Iraq and Kuwait. He simply forbade them to leave the country, as he did other foreigners resident there, and he forcibly rounded up a number of Yanks and hosted them at five-star hotels in Baghdad. Of course his intentions were unclear and his methods uncalled for, but he acted only after Mr. Bush had declared an embargo against Iraq and frozen its assets in the United States. Given the absence of any hostile act on the part of Iraq against this country, the president's policy could be construed only as an act of aggression by the United States against Iraq. In other words, the Iraqi detention of U.S. citizens, as frightening as it was, was a response to a U.S. provocation, not an act of aggression. The United States loves to slam sanctions on countries it doesn't approve of and to strut about setting an example to the world, but it would be well for our policy-makers to consider that sanctions and embargoes are serious matters in international affairs and invite retaliation. Not all countries are as supine about a cut-off of their economic lifelines as South Africa has been.

In sum, then, despite brief references to U.S. dependence on foreign oil -- far less now than it was in the early 1970s -- Mr. Bush said absolutely nothing to show that the interests and security of the United States were so seriously jeopardized by Mr. Hussein's invasion that American military forces were needed abroad. What, then, are the real reasons for the president's actions and for the nearly hysterical chorus of assent to his response to an act of conquest that was neither unique nor unprecedented?

The real reasons may be elicited from Mr. Bush's other remarks in his address and from what a number of commentators let drop in their own jeremiads against Iraq. "We're beginning a new era," the president intoned in his speech. "This new era can be full of promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression, or it will destroy our freedoms."

The real reason why American troops must risk their lives for the emir of Kuwait and the safety of his tribe, the reason for the strong support for the president's action among publicists who have made a career out of denouncing the United States when it acts unilaterally in its own interests and of concocting extenuations of aggression when it was committed by the Soviets, the Vietnamese, the Sandinistas, and the Cubans, and the reason for the quick endorsement and cooperation from the Soviets and the United Nations is that they all have seen the future and it works.

That future is to be one in which specific nations and their interests are to be subordinated to the "global economy," the "new international order," the needs of the "global village," and other cosmopolitan shadows that flit through the speeches and books produced by the emerging transnational elite. "We," the president continued, referring to the other leaders of Western Europe, the Middle East, Asia, North and South America, NATO, and presumably the Red Cross and the Knights Templars, "we agree that this is not an American problem or a European problem or a Middle East problem. It is the world's problem." At which point the citizens of every independent country in the world should have quietly

slipped the safety catches on their revolvers.

It is the emerging transnational order that constitutes Mr. Bush's "new era," and Saddam Hussein's brutality against Kuwait, which produced what the pundits immediately denominated as the "first international crisis of the post-Cold War era," is a definite no-no under the still misty codes that will govern the new age. Not only wars of conquest for the satisfaction of national interests and grievances but also any action that threatens the functioning of the whole is equally illegitimate and is fair game for coordinated multinational police measures.

It was specifically for that reason that Washington Post columnist Haynes Johnson, who has spent most of the last two years spearing Mr. Bush, hailed the president's actions as demonstrating "presidential leadership of high order." "It's possible," warbled Mr. Johnson, "given the extraordinary unanimity of world opinion and sanctions endorsed across the ideological spectrum of nations, that a new and more hopeful world order can emerge from the latest threatening actions in the Persian Gulf. If so, Bush will receive justified credit for helping to create it."

Mr. Johnson's ruminations on the new age were soon echoed by other pundits. The editorial page of the Wall Street Journal instructed us a few days later as to the "more significant" reasons we should be in the Gulf in addition to the narrowly selfish one of protecting "the integrity of the world's oil supply." "With the world now being made small by the wonders of electronic miniaturization and instant communication, it has grown extraordinarily vulnerable to this kind of threat. If in the next

century the world is to realize the promise of the interdependencies it has begun to create, it will have to learn to suppress piracy."

Zbigniew Brzezinski, ever prepared to strike his lyre in praise of the "technetronic age," joined in the chorus also. "A brutal and forcible annexation of a member of the international community by a more powerful neighbor cannot be accepted, and it should not be tolerated. The international order would be in grave jeopardy if it were to be otherwise." Neoconservative Charles Krauthammer sang the same song: "Today there is another value at stake in the Gulf. It is even more important than oil. It is world order."

Mr. Bush's speech was indeed a kind of declaration of interdependence for that new order, and he began it less sonorously than Thomas Jefferson but no less ominously. "In the life of a nation," he pronounced, "we're called upon to define who we are and what we believe." Mr. Bush's speech was nothing less than a redefinition of the United States for the new era to which he will deliver us, and his remarks told us, perhaps more subtly than the president knew, what the U.S. role in it will be. Not an attack on American interests and security, not geopolitical and strategic concerns for our own security or treaty obligations to which we are publicly and legally committed, will mobilize American troops for warfare, but any act of "aggression" that derails the evolution of the new transnational regime.

The new enemy is neither fascism nor communism nor the ever-changing Third World bogeyman, but rather national autonomy itself, and the wicked and violent autonomy asserted by Saddam

Hussein against Kuwait seemed to be a good place to start mopping up the foe before he got out of hand. Global trade, narcotics, anti-genocide, and anti-terrorism conventions are already helping to transcend national independence and midwife the birth of the new order, but what Mr. Bush and the states cooperating with his policy achieved in the Gulf last summer brings us closer to a formalization of that order than any other action previously taken. What country will be the next to feel its concerted wrath; how many Americans will have to die for it; and how long will it be before our own nation is punished for not submitting to its universal hegemony?

Chronicles, December, 1990

Principalities and Powers

Samuel Francis

Until the discovery in the spring of 1989 that the National Endowment for the Arts was conducting tax-supported amphibious landings on the farther shores of anatomy, physiology, and abnormal psychology, probably few Americans had ever heard of the relatively obscure agency that presides over the floating wreckage of the American arts. Founded in 1965 and with an annual budget costing less than a good battleship, the NEA has gloried in the anonymity that bureaucrats and the avant-garde underworld covet. But once the light of publicity had begun to shine on the NEA's woodwork, and the maggoty creatures that infest it had started scrambling for their beloved darkness, the bureau that serves as a kind of federal gestapo of the dominant culture quickly became a synonym for the sewage in which these august personages love to wallow.

The first scandal arose from the revelation that the agency had helped finance exhibitions of the work of the late Robert Mapplethorpe, now deceased of AIDS, who had missed his true vocation of dressing womens' hair, arranging flowers, or selling antiques and had instead dedicated his genius to the high and mysterious art of photography. Mr. Mapplethorpe was indeed a man of no small talent and reportedly commanded no less than \$20,000 for a sitting. Had he confined his career to perpetuating the images of weddings and commencements and capturing the toothless

gapes of bubbling infants, he might have passed on to the great Turkish bathhouse in the sky with nary a peep from his following or his adversaries. But, as it developed, Mapplethorpe concocted the notion that he was called to employ his gifts in enshrining on film forever some of his favorite recreations. Since the content of most of these pictures is such that not even adult bookstores could display them with impunity, he had no recourse but to call them "art."

What exactly these photographs depict may not be fully described in such wholesome publications as Chronicles, and indeed their precise characterization might elude even one of such jaded imagination as your correspondent. One may search the works of Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis in vain to find parallels to some of the deviations that Mapplethorpe relished.

L'affaire Mapplethorpe might have passed with merely the usual struttings and expectorations from congressmen who saw in it a convenient vehicle for posturing as latter-day Catos, but it soon was followed by the exposure of even more bizarre practices that the NEA had helped to finance. There was the case of Andres Serrano, who delights in portraying objects of religious devotion immersed in urine and who readily acknowledges his preoccupation with bodily fluids of all kinds. Later there were confirmed reports of NEA support for the exotic entertainments devised by the guild of "performance artists," most of which make Mapplethorpe's creations look like the crossword puzzles in Jack 'n Jill. Aside from the live nudity, dabbles in excrement, and contortions of bodily orifices in which these artists delight,

their work also emitted what the performers were pleased to claim as political pronunciamentos. Although the political meaning of the acts escaped most of those who witnessed them or read accounts in the yellow press, the artists themselves were eager to explain that they were exposing the "oppression of women" and other forms of "cultural hegemony" inflicted on us by the sinister and ubiquitous "Eurocentrists" and their heterosexual cohorts.

As the world now knows, the whole sordid mess was seized upon by religious fanatics, conservative congressmen, New York cab drivers, and other fossilized representatives of nearly extinct political species who imagined that there might be something objectionable in using the moneys handed up by taxpayers to finance the production and exhibition of works these same taxpayers found abhorrent. As the temperature of the congressional battle escalated, platoons of actors, actresses, and aesthetes of all descriptions bellied up to the bars on Capitol Hill to explain with their customary hauteur why taxpayers and other white trash should shut up, fork over, and docilely submit to the subsidized subversion of their own institutions.

To their credit, a number of congressmen thought otherwise, and for the past year or so they have been trying to draft legislation that would prohibit the NEA from sponsoring obscenity, blasphemy, and other objectionable excesses of liberated speech. North Carolina's Sen. Jesse Helms and California's Rep. Dana Rohrabacher took the lead in trying to trim the NEA's lurid sails.

But in the end they failed. Just before the Congress scuttled off to tell the voters how much it had done for them in the past two years, it voted to reauthorize the NEA without any "content restrictions" at all. It is noteworthy that President Bush played a significant role in stopping legislation for such restrictions by coming out against it at a key moment in the debate.

In lieu of content restrictions, it is probable that next year will see the revelation of even more scandals of the Mapplethorpe-Serrano-"performance artist" kidney and that the struggle in Congress will resume. Next time, one may hope, congressmen willing to do battle on the NEA issue ought to come loaded with heavier ammunition than they carried this year.

What conservative legislators need to do is not merely rest with restricting the content of what the NEA subsidizes but advance to questioning the whole concept of federal sponsorship of the arts. In the battle just concluded, they didn't do that, but confined their attention simply to efforts to eliminate obscenity and blasphemy. That omission points to a flaw in contemporary conservative political tactics and perhaps to an underlying misconception of what conservatives should be fighting for and against.

Conservative wrath about the NEA seems to have derived merely from outrage at the misuse of public funds for unseemly projects and from realization that dwelling on such abuses would accrue to the political benefit of office-holders bold enough to campaign

against them. But by failing to connect these abuses with the actual functioning and purposes of the NEA, proponents of "content restrictions" missed an opportunity to "raise consciousness," as our friends on the left like to put it, and thereby to mount a far more radical challenge to the dominance of liberalism than they expressed.

The ostensible rationale for the NEA, a creature of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society legislation of 1965, is, as President Johnson put it in asking for its creation, that "Government can seek to create conditions under which the arts can flourish." But the demand for federal support for the arts (and the humanities) was also an expression of the interests of the cultural and intellectual elites that have flourished in the United States throughout this century. Federal support for the sciences after World War II and following the Soviet launching of Sputnik excited the appetites of humanists and artists, who began to fear that they weren't getting their fair share of the federal boodle, and both the inept John Kennedy and the far more efficacious Johnson sought to set up an agency that would fatten and tame these literati.

The federal care and feeding of the intelligentsia, especially that part of it lodged in such mass bureaucratic and managerial organizations as universities and foundations, has been as fundamental to twentieth century liberalism as analogous catering to business titans has been to the Republican Party. In

the 1960s, the cultural and intellectual elite played a crucial role both in writing the mood music for the New Frontier and the Great Society and in actually designing the sets and writing the script. "The liberal mood of 1960," writes historian Allen J. Matusow, "was largely defined by elite intellectuals residing on the East Coast, principally in New York City and Cambridge, Massachusetts. Constituting an intense subculture at the center of the nation's communication network, these intellectuals -- nearly all of them liberals -- shared a world view that profoundly influenced the political climate in this election year." The NEA -- and to an even larger extent its sister agency, the National Endowment for the Humanities -- were not only the eggheads' pay-off for their support of the Democrats and their agenda but also an effort to wed or fuse permanently the intellectual and cultural elites with the managerial leviathan in Washington.

Of course, it wasn't the first such wedding. Historian Richard Hofstadter pointed out that in the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new, enlarged scale of intellectual and cultural institutions, paralleling the similar expansion of business and government -- "large universities with adequate libraries, laboratories, huge endowments, graduate schools, professional schools, and advancing salaries" -- were essential to the whole Progressivist project in the state. "The development of regulative and humane legislation," wrote Hofstadter, "required the skills of lawyers

and economists, sociologists and political scientists, in the writing of laws and in the staffing of administrative and regulative bodies. Controversy over such issues created a new market for the books and magazine articles of the experts and engendered a new respect for their specialized knowledge. Reform brought with it the brain trust."

In the Depression, Franklin Roosevelt's Works Progress Administration undertook the first formal engagement of the intelligentsia and the state, and it paid off when, as Hofstadter recognized, "a generation of artists and intellectuals was nursed through a trying period and became wedded to the New Deal and devoted to Roosevelt liberalism."

Since the real -- as opposed to the ostensible -- purpose of this fusion of state and culture was to facilitate the social reconstruction and engineering that liberalism championed, the "abuses" of the NEA really ought not to surprise us. The subversion of "Eurocentric," "male chauvinist," and "homophobic" institutions and beliefs is only the most recent stage of the never-ending struggle to liberate us from the American Way and replace it with the emancipated and militant cosmopolitanism of what is now openly called the New World Order. Obstacles to the entrenchment of that order -- and of its transnational bureaucratic and technocratic elites -- such as the integrity of American cultural tradition and the social institutions that support it have to be "deconstructed" if the elites are to perfect

their own cultural hegemony. So far from "abusing" the funds appropriated for the NEA, Mapplethorpe, Serrano, the performance artists, and the munchkins who awarded them their grants were simply breeding the ideological progeny that the marriage of state and intelligentia has promised from the first.

If conservative politicians are really going to resist the deracination that the NEA has come to symbolize, they will have to broaden their attack on it beyond moralism and fiscal responsibility. Restricting the content of publicly funded art to stop only the most offensive productions will accomplish little to preserve traditional norms and institutions from the federally endowed assault on them. Mapplethorpe and Co. offer a valuable opportunity to inform Americans of exactly what is really going on in the belly of the beast, why it is going on, and why it is so difficult to stop. It remains to be seen whether contemporary conservatives have the imagination to understand the challenge or the courage to confront it, let alone any desire to resist it seriously in the first place.