A History of the Carvakas

A History of the Cārvākas

Phil Hari Singh

Introduction

The problem that faces us in addressing the status of the Cārvākas in the history of Indian thought has been expressed by one of the leading experts in the field of Indian materialism, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya:

However, as it is well known, there is a special reason that makes the study of the Lokāyata particularly difficult. While at least the major texts of the other schools are preserved for us, all the original works of the Lokāyatikas are lost beyond the prospect of any possible recovery. What we are actually left with are merely a few fragmentary survivals of the Lokāyata, but all these as preserved in the writings of its opponents, i.e., of those who wanted only to refute and ridicule it. Lokāyata thus remains to be reconstructed from the essentially hostile references to it^.[1]

Whilst this is true to certain extent, Lokāyata is not alone in this. It must be noted that in the writings of all schools of Indian thought, refutation of rival views and the presentation of opponent's ideas that can sometimes border on caricature occurs in order to advance the arguments of the proponents. Nevertheless, it is clear from the materials at our disposal that Lokāyata was viewed with far greater opprobrium than any other darśana, although it is not exactly clear why this should be the case. There appears to be an underlying hostility towards the Cārvākas that is not fully borne out by the analysis of their doctrines. The depth and variety of Indian thought actually precludes the idea that the Cārvākas came to be so disparaged on philosophical arguments alone.

There is however a glaring difference between the ontological position of the Cārvākas and all the other major streams of thought in ancient and medieval India. The Cārvākas rejected absolutely the concept of an afterlife in any shape or form, and that there was no karmic law of reward and retribution that could influence the destiny of a human being whatsoever. A widely respected account of Lokāyata,[2] given by the Advaita Vedanta theologian Sāyana Mādhava (in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha, 14^th century CE), says of this, "There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world, nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect."[3] The text continues:

The Agnihotra [fire sacrifice], the three Vedas, the ascetics three staves and smearing oneself with ashes were made by nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness. If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven, why then does the sacrificer not offer his own father immediately?…While life remains let a man live happily, let him eat ghee [clarified butter] even if he runs into debt. When the body turns into ashes, how can it ever return again? If he who departs from the body goes to another world, how is it that he does not come back again, restless because of his love for his kindred? Hence it is a means of livelihood that the Brahmin priests have established all these ceremonies for the dead- there is no fruit anywhere. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons.[4]

We may note here some of the features that have come to be associated with this school. There is the rejection of the efficacy of Vedic sacrificial ritual and ascetic practises, combined with a contemptuous attitude directed towards the Vedic priesthood. There is also a tacit acknowledgement of the "Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we may die" philosophy that has been associated with the Cārvāka system. It is noticeable that only three Vedas are mentioned, which we may assume to mean the Rig, Yajur and Sāma Vedas. The exclusion of the Atharvaveda from the text is curious, given that by the 14^th century it had become part of the Vedic corpus in Samhitā recension. The reason for this could be that the text or oral tradition that Mādhava based his account on was composed before the Atharvaveda was accepted as śruti. It is generally accepted that the ancient Indian tradition in general speaks of only three Vedas, and that the Atharvaveda occupies a rather ambivalent position in the Veda. There may be a different explanation to be placed on the exclusion, in this text, of the Atharvaveda (and its possible relationship to Lokāyata) in Chapter 2.

Mādhava gives in his account an exposition of the philosophical tenets of the Cārvākas. These are as follows:

1. Metaphysics- "In this school the four elements, earth, etc., are the original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced."^[5]

2. Ethics- "The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures."[6]

3. Epistemology- "Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, etc."[7]

4. Causality- "From this it follows that fate, etc., do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you do not thus allow adrishta,[8] the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things."[9]

We shall deal with the origins and development of these tenets, and whether the tradition that Mādhava is drawing on is an entirely accurate one, in later chapters. First, let us examine the meaning of the term Lokāyata.

1. Lokāyata

Early in the Sarvadarśanasamgraha we find this interesting quotation:

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śastras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Cārvāka. Hence another name for that school is Lokāyata - a name well accordant with the thing signified.[10]

The use of the phrase "The mass of men" is curious. Does Mādhava really mean to suggest here that the majority of the Indian populace were adherents of a system that denied the validity of the concept of rebirth, a central theme in Indian thought from the post-Vedic period onwards?

The word Lokāyata is a compound term, a combination of loka (the material world) and ayatah (that which was prevalent in or amongst).[11] Rhys Davids says, "Lokāyata is explained by Wilson as ‘the system of atheistical philosophy taught by Cārvāka’, and by the Petersburg Dictionary as ‘Materialism’."[12] He also quotes from a Buddhist text: "Buddhaghosa in our passage has: Lokāyatam vuccati vitanda vāda-sattham: ‘the Lokāyata is a text-book of the Vitandas (Sophists)’."[13] This quotation of Rhys Davids' own interpretation gives another meaning to Lokāyata:

…about 500 BC the word Lokāyata was used in a complimentary way as the name of a branch of Brāhmin learning, and probably meant Nature-lore - wise sayings, riddles and rhymes, and theories handed down by tradition as to cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, the scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and of beasts and of plants. To be a master of such lore was then considered to by no means unbecoming to a learned Brāhmin, though it ranked, of course, below his other studies… The amount then existing of such lore was too small to make a fair proficiency in it incompatible with other knowledge. As the amount of it grew larger, and several branches of natural science were regularly studied, a too exclusive acquaintance with Lokāyata came to be looked upon with disfavour. Even before the Christian era, masters of the dark sayings, the mysteries, of such mundane lore, were marked with sophists and casuists.[14]

Rhys Davids is quite correct in stating that the study of Lokāyata was at one time not incompatible with Brāhmanical learning. In the Arthaśāstra, composed sometime around 300 BCE,[15] we find this reference:

…1.The branches of learning are: Logic, the three Vedas (trayī), agriculture, cattle-raising and trade (collectively called vārtā) and the technique of ruling (dandanīti)…3. For, logic is only a branch of Vedic lore…10. Logic-based philosopy (anvīkshikī) (is represented by the following three): Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata…12. Logic is ever accepted to be the lamp of all branches of learning, the means for all kinds of activities and the basis of all virtues (dharmas).[16]

Against this, we have a text from a much later date that depicts the Cārvākas in a distinctly different manner. Gunaratna (c. 15^th century CE) is here commentating on the Saddarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra, a Jain philosopher (c. 8^th century CE):[17]

First, the characteristics (svarūpa) of the Nāstikas[18] are being stated. The Nāstikas are a kind of people, including Brahmins and ending with the low-born, who carry human skulls, smear their bodies with ashes and practise yoga.

They do not admit the self, virtue (punya), vice (pāpa) and the like. They speak of the world as consisting of only four forms of matter. Some sections of the Cārvākas, considering ākāśa as the fifth form of matter, declare that the world consists of five forms of matter.

In their view, consciousness is produced from these forms of matter, like the power of intoxication. Living beings are like water-bubbles. The self is nothing but the body as characterised by consciousness. They take spirituous drinks and meat and also copulate with those unfit to be sexually approached (agamyā) like the mother, etc. Every year, on a particular day, they assemble and copulate randomly with women. They do not consider dharma to be anything different from kāma.[19]

Gunaratna here appears to be identifying the Cārvākas with what is evidently some form of Tantric ritual.[20] This identification however is not clearly made in the Saddarśanasamuccaya, and it is possible that Gunaratna is using a different text or oral tradition for this view.[21]

Thus it appears that there is no exact consensus regarding the meaning of Lokāyata, and these are the possibilities that have been presented: a populist doctrine that concentrates purely on the means of self gratification in one's lifetime (the pursuit of wealth and desire, artha and kāma); an atheistic system that stands in comparison to the materialist school of Epicurus (341-270 BCE) in ancient Greece[22]; a form of sophistry or casuistry; folk-lore (touching on elements of witchcraft?) that anticipates a more formal approach to scientific enquiry; a respected branch of logic-based philosophy; or a sect that is inclusive of Brāhmanas and Tantrikas, holding a physicalist (or more precisely epiphenomenalist) position whilst engaging in what appear to be hedonistic practises. Not all of these descriptions are mutually exclusive (apart from the stark contrast between anvīkshikī and Tantric ritualism), but they do nevertheless represent shadings of difference.

What is also noticeable is the lack of a clear, precise chronology as to when (or indeed if) these views of Lokāyata were in circulation. This is a problem that faces all scholars engaged in the study of Sanskrit literature. Of this, K.B.Krishna gives the view that, "We are confronted in Indian history with the perennial difficulty of assigning dates of events of individuals. Because Brahmins, one of the ruling and dominant classes in India, systematically sabotaged history-writing. They substituted myth-making to history-writing."[23] It is highly debatable whether Brāhmanas did actually engage in wanton destruction of texts that were not to their liking.[24] However it would be fair to say that a great deal of what is referred to as history in the Western tradition has been, in India, embedded within a more mythic tradition from the time of the Rigveda onwards. There are historical arguments that can and indeed, in the sense that we are deprived of any hard historical "facts", must be constructed from these texts, for it is in these that we find the first mention of the founder of Lokāyata.

2. Brihaspati

An alternative appellation for the Lokāyata system is Bārhaspatya, a straightforward term that means, "those who follow Brihaspati." Most scholars are agreed that this Brihaspati was the founder of the Lokāyata system, though there is a question as to the historicity of this person. The tradition associated with Lokāyata suggests that Brihaspati also provided it with its original sūtras, but in the absence of a clearly substantiated Bārhaspatya text, this claim is not sustainable. We do have at our disposal far more material on the mythic Brihaspati. He was originally an early Vedic deity also known as Brahmanaspati, and there are references to him stretching back to the Rigveda. There appears to be some confusion as to the exact role of Brihaspati within the Vedic pantheon. With reference to the god Indra, Brockington states:

Indeed, he is often joined or replaced in allusions to the myth [the slaying of Vritra] by Brihaspati, a little mentioned deity who does not figure in the original pantheon, and accompanied by the priestly band of Angirases, who sometimes play the major role. The term Brihaspati was no doubt originally an epithet of Indra, indicating his priestly functions as king of the gods, for the word means "lord of brahman (the power of the ritual, but originally ‘hymn’ or ‘formula’)"; indeed the title is occasionally applied to Agni, the priestly god. Just as the Vedic king progressively relinquished his religious duties to professional priests, so Indra was replaced by Brihaspati in this context.[25]

In contrast to this apparent respectability, we find this reference in the Maitri Upanishad vii. 9:

Really speaking, Brihaspati, taking the guise of Śukra, created this ignorance for the security of Indra and the destruction of the Asuras. It is because of this (ignorance) that they (Asuras) consider good as evil and evil as good. They claim: Let people consider as dharma that which is destructive of scriptures like the Veda, etc. [26]

The mention of the destruction of the Asuras is odd, because we find in the Rigveda that Asura is interchangeable with the word Deva (i.e., god or deity).[27] But between the composition of the hymns of the Rig-Veda and the Upanishads, the application or meaning of epithets undergoes a great deal of change, and the Asuras are demonised in the latter. Not only that; the focus of attention in the Upanishads (though not exclusively) is on a quest for the meaning behind the mythology and ritual formulae of the Vedic hymns.

But what exactly do we mean by Vedic hymns? As we briefly touched on in the introduction, there is a section of Veda that sits rather uneasily with the rest of corpus, in that it is not primarily centred on the sacrificial ritualism of the earliest section of the Rigveda. Brockington says of the Atharvaveda:

The Atharvaveda is, like the Rigveda, a collection of complete hymns rather than isolated verses, but its general lack of connection with sacrificial ceremonial led to some reluctance to accept its authority alongside the other three Vedas. It takes its title from one of the great priestly families (partly mythological) of the Rigveda, while an older name for it links the Atharvans with that other notable priestly family, the Angirases. It consists of a diverse compilation of spells for every purpose, whether to secure success and wealth, or to procure health and offspring. There is, of course, little basic difference between the spell and sacrifice, for both seek to achieve similar ends, and the distinction between the Vedas is by no means absolute; the Rigveda contains, for instance, a hymn likening the chanting of Brāhmans to frogs croaking (RV 7.103), often misunderstood as satirical but in fact a rain charm used as such up to modern times. So too, the spells of the Atharvaveda have been given a priestly veneer throughout, some spells have been included which do pertain to the sacrifice, and its last and latest book, book twenty, seems to have been added specifically to link the work to the sacrificial cult.[28]

Speculative thought is also more prevalent in the Atharvaveda:

Philosophy in India has always been firmly rooted in practical aspirations, so the presence in the Atharvaveda of a greater amount of philosophical speculation than in the other three Vedas is not inappropriate. Knowledge of the true nature of things is not seen as merely a liberating force for the individual concerned, but as a means of acquiring ascendency [sic] over his fellows, particularly his enemies, and thus of gaining wealth and temporal success… Altogether, the Atharvaveda provides important evidence of older Vedic thought and, as a forerunner of the oldest Upanishads, presents a valuable insight into the continuity and development of Indian speculative reflections.[29]

The development of the Veda is commonly portrayed in a rather linear fashion by scholars; we are presented with the early Vedic hymns, commentated and expanded upon in the Brāhmana literature and in the Aranyāka texts, before reaching their final culmination in the brahman/ātman identification in the Upanishads.[30] But this brief analysis of the Atharvaveda suggests a rather different model. What we have instead is a division of Vedic religion into two aspects: the sacrificial and the magical[31], and it is by no means certain which of the two is anterior to the other. As the speculations of those connected to the sacrificial cult developed, so too did those of the priests who had followed the traditions of the Atharvaveda, at least until the harmonising of all these trends in the final redaction of the Vedic corpus. Could the rituals associated with the fourth Veda have been the knowledge imparted by Brihaspati to the Asuras?[32] And if so, did this knowledge have any bearing on the development and doctrines of Lokāyata?

There is another aspect of Brihaspati that requires mention. In 1921, Dr. F.W Thomas translated and published "The Brihaspati Sūtra."[33] This document is a work devoted to the art of statesmanship and the ordinances of correct government, bearing a close resemblance to the Arthaśāstra, and exhibits no clear affiliation to any particular school of philosophy. However there are several indications that the text draws upon Lokāyata traditions, e.g., "…5. Universally the Lokāyata system of doctrine is alone to be followed at the time of acquiring gain; 6. Only the Kāpālika as regards attainment of pleasure;…"[34] Here we see Brihaspati connected with a system advocating the pursuit of artha and kāma, in conjunction with the attainment and consolidation of political power. Set against this, we have an episode in the Mahābhārata that can be interpreted as casting a different complexion on the ethics of the Cārvākas.

3. Cārvāka

The earliest explicit mention of the name Cārvāka is not found in any of the philosophical texts dealing with Lokāyata, but in the Mahābhārata. The Epic deals with the war between the Kurūs and the Pāndavas, and its most important aspect for later Hindu theology is the separate text incorporated within it, the Bhāgavād Gīta. The episode involving Cārvāka is found in 12. 1. 414 of the Mahābhārata, and it is worth quoting in full:

When the Brahmins were now once again standing silent, Cārvāka the Rāxasa,[35] in the disguise of a Brahmin, addressed the King. This friend of Duryodhana, concealed under the garb of a mendicant with a rosary, a lock of hair on his crown, and a triple staff, impudent and fearless, surrounded by all the Brahmins exceeding a thousand in number, who were anxious to utter their benedictions - men who practised austerity and self-restraint - this wretch, wishing evil to the magnanimous Pāndavas, without saluting those Brahmins, thus addressed the King: "All these Brahmins, falsely imputing the malediction to me, themselves exclaim, woe to you, wicked king, the son of Kuntī? Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and elders, death is desirable for you, and not life." Hearing this speech of the wicked Rāxasa the Brahmins were pained and indignant, being maligned by his words. But they, as well as King Yudhishtira, all remained silent, being ashamed and cut to the heart. Then Yudhishtira said: "Let all your reverences be reconciled to me, who bows down and supplicates you: you ought not to curse me who has recently (?)[36] undergone such great misfortunes." All the Brahmins then exclaimed: "We never uttered the words imputed to us; may your Majesty enjoy prosperity." Then these noble-minded Brahmins, versed in the Vedas and purified by austerities, recognised (the pretend mendicant) by the eye of knowledge, and exclaimed: "This Rāxasa called Cārvāka, friend of Duryodhana; in the garb of a vagrant he seeks to accomplish the purposes of your enemy; we speak not so, righteous King; let all such fears be dissipated; may prosperity attend you and your brothers." Then all these Brahmins, infuriated with anger, uttering menaces, slew with, with muttered curses, the wicked Rāxasa; who fell down consumed by the might of of utterers of Vedic incantations, burnt up by the bolt of Indra, like a tree covered with leaves.[37]

Of chief interest to us here the reasoning behind Cārvāka's denunciation of the King: "Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and elders, death is desirable for you." There was evidently something in this particular act of war that appalled him. Before we address this, let us first examine the etymology of Cārvāka.

Dakshinranjan Shastri says, "The word cārvāka is often taken as carū (beautiful) and vāka (speech). And it is interesting that carū is also a synonym for Brihaspati. Thus it may be suggested that cārvāka stands for "the word of Brihaspati".[38] The first explanation, "Beautiful speakers", could indeed be another way of describing sophists or casuists. The second is slightly less convincing, in that the name Bārhaspatya occurs frequently in texts in order to serve roughly the same purpose. It is still a possibility though. Another view is that Cārvāka is derived from the root cārv, "to chew or to eat". Richard King says, "This may be the name of their founder, but Cārvāka means ‘one who eats’ and so may refer to the materialist philosophy of ‘eating up’ all that is given in perception."[39] Gunaratna gives a similar explanation in the text we have already quoted from.[40] Alternatively, the name can be interpreted in a more literal sense, and requires a somewhat lengthy digression.

There is this strange passage in the Chāndogyopanishad, I. xii:

Next we come to the chant of the dogs.

Baka Dālbhya, or [as he was called,] Glāva Maitreya, retired to study the Veda. [One day] a white dog appeared on the scene, and other dogs gathered round him saying: "Venerable sir, get us some food by singing; we are hungry."

[The white dog] said to them: "Gather round me here tomorrow morning." So Baka Dālbhya, that is, Glāva Maitreya, kept watch.

[The next day] the dogs appeared making the same motions as [priests] make when, hand in hand, they start chanting the hymn of praise called Bahishpavamāna. Then they sat down together and said: "Hin! Om. Let us eat; Om, let us drink! Om. May the god Varuna, may Prajāpati and Savitri bring food here! O Lord of food, bring food here, - bring it here![41]

Most commentators have understood this passage to be a rather curious satire on the excesses of priestly ritual. But why choose dogs to satirise priests? Why is the satire confined merely to the description of the participants in this strange rite, and not to the actual words of the rite itself? As has been noted, the hymn of the croaking frogs in the Rigveda may not have been intended as a satire on the Vedic priesthood. They were called frogs not out of a playful or mythical sense, but because "the frogs" was the name of the clan or tribe to which these priests belonged. And the use of the term dogs was not meant as an insult or as a parody, but was in fact the tribal name of this group of people involved in this act. There are surprising examples of this:

Kautilya in his Arthasastra spoke of a people called the dogs. They, along with a few other people, belonged to the raja-sabdopaviji-gana. A whole chapter of the Harivamsa was devoted to describe the geneology of a highly respected family, called the family of dogs. The Mahabharata referred to a section of the Yadavas called the dogs. The same epic, at least in two more places, mentioned human groups called the dogs.[42]

The origin of the use of the name dogs could have been a form of totemism. Chattopadhyaya states:

The essence of totemism is as follows. Each clan of which the tribe is composed associates itself with an animal (or a plant), which is called its totem. The clansmen regard themselves as akin to their totem-species and as descended from it. Thus the people belonging to the dog-clan, for example, would consider themselves to be dogs and as descended from the dog.[43]

The evidence of totemism in Vedic literature is not accepted unanimously.[44] But the use of animal names is almost certainly retained in the Upanishads:

Even some of the principal Upanishads bear obvious animal names. These are the Svetasvatara (from the white mule), the Mandukya (from the frog), the Kausitaki (from the owl), the Taittiriya (from a species of bird). Another Upanishad, though it is now extinct in its Sanskrit form was called Chagaleya, a name derived from the goat.[45]

What is being suggested here is not that the name cārvāka itself is totemistic, rather it relates to a form of ritual that was prevalent in India when the predominant structure of society was on a tribal basis. We do have this example from the Taittiriyopanishad :

Bravo! Bravo! Bravo!

I am food! I am food! I am food!

I am an eater of food! I am an eater of food! I am an eater of food!

I am a maker of verses! I am a maker of verses! I am a maker of verses!

I am the first-born of the universal order (rita),

Earlier than the gods, in the navel of immortality!

Whoso gives me away, verily, has succoured me!

I who am food eat the eater of food!

I have overcome the whole world!

He who knows this shines with a golden light.[46]

"I am an eater of food." Could this be a primitive cārvāka, and, if so, what significance does this have for the passage from the Mahābhārata?

Cārvāka's hostility in this episode is directed at the slaying of svajānam (one's own kindred) in the name of dharma. That the war involved fratricide is not contested, and is indeed the source of the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna in the Bhāgavād Gīta. The passage explicitly notes that the priests evidently felt shame as a result of Cārvāka's denunciation of inter-tribal killing. But whatever qualms they may have held about this were soon dispelled, and Cārvāka is killed by them. If cārvāka is truly representative of an older form of tribal ritual, then the death of Cārvāka in this passage could be interpreted as marking the disappearance of religious practises that focussed exclusively on the needs of the immediate tribe. Admittedly, this is pure hypothesis,[47] and that the Cārvākas are not viewed by Kautilya in the Arthaśāstra as opposing the requirements of the state and society in general (if indeed his reference to Lokāyata is concomitant with Cārvāka). However, there is evidence that there were teachers proclaiming doctrines similar to the Cārvāka position in the period that saw the rise of Jainism and Buddhism.

4. Dehātmavāda

For the Cārvākas, there was no metaphysical concept of the "Self" as depicted in the Upanishads, and the karmic law that necessitated the rebirth of this entity into the next life was nonsensical. The believed that consciousness was the body endowed with intelligence. Mādhava adds that the Cārvākas quote from the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad ii. 4, 12 to support this assertion,"Out of these elements (bhūta) do [all contingent beings] arise and along with them are they destroyed. After death there is no consciousness (samjnā): this is what I say. Thus spake Yājnavalkya."[48] Yājnavalkya here was presumably acting as pūrvapakshin,[49] as his true philosophical position was in direct opposition to the Cārvāka view. In fact, we can fairly say that that is the case for all the Upanishadic sages, with the possible exception of Brihaspati in the Maitrī Upanishad.

These philosophers have one other thing in common: their caste status is either Brāhmana or Kshatriya. And in many instances we find examples of a reversal of the functions of these twice-born castes, whereby the Brāhmana becomes the pupil of the Kshatriya. It could possibly be that what we are witnessing here is a reflection of the political realities that faced Indian society in the period when fully-fledged statehood is being carved out between warring tribal factions (as evidenced, or at least hinted at, in the events of the Mahābhārata and possibly the Rāmāyana). The important point is that we do not have at our disposal in these texts the philosophical speculations of those castes that were outside of this Brāhmana-Kshatriya hegemony. This is not a simply a question of literacy. As in all Vedic literature, the Upanishads were taught and expanded upon by centuries of oral tradition long before transcription, and there is no reason to believe that the lower castes in Indian society did not have a similar oral tradition over the same period, or at the least have leaders or teachers who shaped these traditions.

The most famous of these teachers who rejected the Vedic orthodoxy were of course the Buddha and Mahāvīra. There were other thinkers in this period who are documented in the Buddhist and Jain literature. Makkhali Gosāla[50] appears to have been quite a formidable influence at the time and his sect, the Ājīvikas, may have at one time been more important than the Jains.[51] There are others who appear to have been expounding a form of crude materialism.[52] One such teacher was Ajita Keśakambala, and we have this said of his thought:

A second teacher, Ajita Keśambala, represented the following view: "There is no gift in charity, there is no sacrifice, there are no offerings. There is no fruit and ripening of good and bad actions. There is not this world or that. There is no mother nor father. There are no suddenly-born beings. In the world, there are no ascetics and Brāhmanas who have gone along the right path of conduct and follow the right conduct, who have seen this world and that world out of independent knowledge and proclaimed it. A man consists of four Elements. When he dies, earth goes into the mass of earth (prithivīkāyah), water into the mass of water, fire into the mass of fire, breath into the mass of air, and the sense-organs enter into space (ākāśah). Four men, with the bier as the fifth, carry forth the dead person, and they carry on their talk until they come into the place of cremation. Then there remain only white bones and all sacrifices end in ashes. The gift of charity is, therefore, the doctrine of a buffoon; it is empty and false talk when anybody asserts that there is something beyond. Fools and wise men are destroyed and disappear when the body falls to pieces. There are no more after death.[53]

The are extremely close similarities between this text and the description of Lokāyata in Mādhava's account, although there are no references in the Buddhist literature to Ajita Keśambala explicitly naming him as a Cārvāka or a Lokāyatika. Another notable feature of his teaching is the sense of pessimism that pervades the text. This is not surprising, as it could be argued that these anti-Brāhmanical thinkers were as much influenced by the perceived deterioration of the material culture in which they lived as by their rejection of the hollowness of the sacrificial cult.

But neither the Buddhists or the Jains reached the conclusion that the only existent property in the world was matter, as Lokāyata did. The theory of consciousness that the Cārvākas developed from this position is referred to as dehātmavāda or bhūtacaitanyavāda in the philosophical texts of classical India. In a Nyāya[54] text that explicitly mentions the latter, the bhūtacaitanyavādin is described as "one who admits the consciousness of material elements."[55] In his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra,[56] Śankara gives this view of dehātmavāda:

The existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the bode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz, that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence be a mere attribute of the body. Hence, activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.[57]

There is a problem here with Śankara's use of the word intelligence, rather than using cit or caitanya, i.e., consciousness. It could be argued that the theory of mind depicted here is synonymous with the Sāmkhya theory of how intelligence is arrived at.

Sāmkhya is a form of dualism that accepts the separation of consciousness and matter. It is an ancient philosophical system that was in its original form atheistic, and pre-dates the composition of the Upanishads. The Sāmkhya system views the world as a construction of prakriti and purusha, i.e., primeval matter and consciousness.[58] The relationship between these two concepts forms the basis of Sāmkhya philosophy. Prakriti, and its constituents, evolves in order to liberate the purusha that is imprisoned within the material world, and the system is sometimes (though not always) referred to as the "Evolutionist" school. Prakriti can also be translated as "primal nature".

Primal nature is the physical phenomenon through which everything, except purusha, comes into being. In the unevolved avyakta state it consists of three gunas (literally ropes or strands): sattva, rajas and tamas. These are intelligence, energy and mass,[59] respectively. The mixture of these unfolds, and the intellect, mahat, comes into being. Following on from that is the ego, ahamkara, and from that emerges the mind-organ, manas. At each stage of this development, the evolutes of prakriti are in contact with the organs of sense and action, and the potentialities inherent within them. Purusha, the indestructible consciousness that pervades and is contained within every human individual, is held in bondage within this material world until liberation is achieved; and that occurs when the individual realises he or she is not at one with the individual's body:

This evolution, from the Great to the specific elements (bhuta), accomplished by the modifications of Nature (prakriti), is for the emancipation of each individual spirit. It is for the sake of another, though it appears to be simply for its own sake.

Just as insentient milk flows for the nourishment of the calf, so too does Nature (prakriti) act for the sake of the spirit's liberation.

Just as people engage in action to satiate desire, so does the unevolved function for the liberation of the spirit.

Just as the dancer stops dancing after she has displayed to the spectators, so too does primal Nature (prakriti) stop after displaying herself to the spirit.[60]

The Sāmkhya philosophers constructed an elaborate system whereby all the features of the mind, except for what we would be later called ātman by the Advaita Vedānta school, could be produced from insentient matter. There is the possibility that this could have been influential in the development of Lokāyata, although the Cārvākas apparently saw no difference between the products of mind (i.e., intelligence, ego etc.,) and the quality of consciousness that Sāmkhya refers to as purusha.

Dehātmavāda, in the sense of being a negation of anything outside of the material elements from which the body was constituted,[61] could also be construed as being "the cult of the body". The Tantrikas and the adherents of the Yoga school also emphasised the importance of the body, and bodily functions, in their systems. But the ultimate goal of their rituals and practises was similar to the liberation aimed at by Sāmkhya. Nevertheless, there are scholars who see a connection between Lokāyata and Tantrism, i.e., the Kāpālika sect. Dhakshinranjan Shastri states:

Formerly, this sect flourished in an independent form. In course of time it became weak, and lost its independence. Probably the inhuman cruelties, or the dreadfulness of the sect, brought about its ruin. As kāma or the enjoyment of sensual pleasure was the goal of this sect, it came gradually to be affiliated to the Nāstika form of the Lokāyata school, according to which the summum bonum of human life is pleasure. Thus the Kāpālikas, like the Assassins, became the solitary historical example of a combination of materialistic philosophy with cruelty, lust, supernatural power and systematic crime. Or, it may be that the followers of orthodox schools, through bitter contempt, identified the Lokāyatikas with the fierce Kāpālikas, as in previous cases the Vedicists used freely terms of abuse like "bastard", "incest" and "monster" with regard to the Lokāyatikas. At the time of the author of Arthaśāstra, these Kāpālikas were a distinct sect. In Gunaratna's time we find them identified with the Lokāyatika school which had already become a hated name in the country.[62]

It must be noted that the evidence connecting Lokāyata with the Kāpālikas is extremely fragmentary, and that we do not possess a definitive chronology for the development of the latter sect. But Shastri may be right in suggesting that there was an alternative form of Lokāyata that did not meet with the approval of other schools of thought.

Chattopadhyaya gives this quotation from the Vinaya Pitāka:

Now at that time the Chabbagiya Bhikkhus learnt the Lokayata system.

People murmured, etc., saying "Like those who still enjoy the pleasures of the world!"

The Bhikkhus heard of people thus murmuring; and those Bhikkhus told the matter to the Blessed One.

"Now can a man who holds the Lokayata as valuable reach up, O Bhikkhus, to the full advantage of, or attain full growth in, to full breadth in this doctrine and discipline?"

"This cannot be, Lord!"

"You are not, O Bhikkhus, to learn the Lokayata system. Whosoever does so shall be guilty of dukkata (a form of offence for the monk)".

Now at that time the Chabbagiya Bhikkhus taught the Lokayata system.

People murmured, etc., saying, "Like those still enjoying the pleasures of the world!"

They told this matter to the Blessed One.

"You are not, O Bhikkhus, to teach the Lokayata system. Whosever does so shall be guilty of dukkata."

…"You are not, O Bhikkhus, to learn - to teach, - the low arts."[63]

Could these low arts have been some form of magic? If they were, it may be that some Lokāyatikas still adhered to the forms of ritual that are found in the Atharvaveda. The use of such rituals by magicians is for attaining power (for whatever purpose), and is also the aim of Hindu Tantrikas in their sex rituals. This does open up the (admittedly hypothetical) possibility that the Cārvākas, or at least some of them, were connected to the Kāpālikas, using the Tantra in the pursuit of artha and for the fulfilment of kāma.

5. Svabhāvavāda

The following is an account of Lokāyata epistemology, drawing from traditional sources, by Surendranath Dasgupta:

…The Cārvākas admitted the validity only of perception. There is nothing else but what can be perceived by the five senses. No inference can be regarded as a valid means of knowledge, for inference is possible only when the universal concomitance of the reason (hetus) with the probandum is known, and such a reason is known to be existing in the object of the minor term (vyāpti-pakśa-dharmatā-śāli hi lingam gamakam). Such a concomitance must first be known before an inference is possible; but how can it be known? Not by perception, for concomitance is not an objective entity with which the senses can come in contact. Moreover, the concomitance of one entity with another means that the entities are associated with each other in the past, present and future (sarvo-pasamhārayatrī vyāptih), and the sense organs can have no scope to future associations or even with regard to all past time…If the concomitance cannot be perceived by the sense organs, it cannot be perceived by the mind either, for the mind cannot associate itself with the external objects except through the sense organs. The concomitance cannot be known through inference, for all inference presupposes it. Thus, there being no way of perceiving concomitance, inference becomes impossible...[64]

It would be an extremely rare occurrence for one to come across a modern textbook on the schools of Indian philosophy where an analysis differing from this one is to be found. It has become something of a cliché in the modern understanding of Lokāyata that its adherents accepted pratyaksha (perception) as the only pramāna. The Cārvāka rejection of anumāna (inference) is dealt with in greater length in the pūrvapakśin tradition than any other doctrine of theirs by their contemporaries. The material pertaining to this argument is probably the decisive factor in persuading modern scholars that there was an inherent, inescapable flaw in the Cārvāka's philosophy that today renders it as almost a footnote or an afterthought in our texts. And let us make no mistake about this: the refusal to accept inference as a pramāna, and reliance on perception alone renders not only the discipline of philosophy impossible. If we cannot rely on an object of knowledge that is not immediate to our sense-data, if we cannot believe in anything that is not presented before our very eyes, then we have ceased to be rational human beings and our ability to function as such in the world is practically nil. That, in essence, is the epistemology of the Cārvākas followed to its logical conclusion. Chattopadhyaya quotes the Nyāya philosopher Udayana as reaching the same conclusion.[65]

There is simply something intuitively wrong in accepting this as a true representation of Lokāyata logic, and a closer look at the passage above reveals why: "…and the sense organs can have no scope to future associations or even with regard [etc]." The future associations in this context simply mean that which is likely to be known or to happen in the future, e.g., the sun rising in the east and setting in the west. The method in determining this is a process of induction that involves inferential reasoning. But what if the object of future knowledge in question is extended beyond the phenomena of this world? We have already seen in Mādhava's critique that the Cārvākas denied the existence any object belonging to a future world outside of the one lived in on a daily basis, that "There is no heaven, no final liberation." The rejection of inference by the Cārvākas was not an attempt to stunt and distort the human intellect. They rejected inferential thinking as a means of establishing the existence of paraloka.

However, in the extant sources this argument is corroborated on only one occasion. Dasgupta finds this reference to a certain Purandara in Kamalaśīla's Panjikā:

Purandara, however, a follower of Cārvāka (probably of the seventh century), admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the laws of Karma which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience. The main reason for upholding such a distinction between the validity of inference in our practical life of ordinary experience, and in ascertaining transcending truths beyond experience, lies in this, that an inductive generalization [sic] is made by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence together with agreement in absence, and no cases of agreement in presence can be observed in the transcendent sphere; for even if such spheres existed they could not be perceived by the senses.[66]

This explanation must be measured against the arguments found in the Tattvopaplavasimha, an apparently newly discovered text that is accredited by some scholars to the Cārvāka school, and dating from the 8^th century CE.[67]

The author, Jayarāśi Bhatta, claims to be drawing on Brihaspati as an authority.[68] But the main aim of his text is to demolish the epistemological arguments of the Cārvāka's opponents, rather than establishing any definite pramāna-vāda for his own school. In that sense the text is a-pramāna, i.e., Jayarāśi Bhatta rejects not only inference but all pramānas as being valid sources of knowledge, and that his true philosophical position is one of agnostic scepticism. Walter Ruben writes:

In this way, a definite sophistic-agnostic-antiphilosophic tradition comes down through more than a thousand years and our author is to be placed as belonging to this trend to certain extent [sic]; but the difference of his argumentation, in several instances, is also to be noted. Jayarāśi Bhatta specially invents for himself a bagful of points of opposition and hair-splittings…He declares with pride at the end of his work that his arguments have not come under the purview of Brihaspati. As Jayarāśi's agnosticism does not hold good philosophically, so is his claim of originality unfounded and the sign of pettiness.[69]

The mention of hair-splittings and pettiness is significant, for this could be the vitandā, fallacious argumentation, that Buddhaghosa accused the Cārvākas of engaging in.

But if the Cārvākas rejected the use of the pramānas in establishing the existence of a world outside of our sense-data, then how were they to account for existence of the empirical world and its causal relations? Lokāyata had no place for Divine creation in its system, nor did it hold that the world unfolded as an outward manifestation of Brahman, as taught by the Advaita Vedanta school. Causality, if the materialists were to maintain a consistent doctrine, must be due to purely physical processes only and there could be no room for adrishta in this system. We can quote from Mādhava:

From this, it follows that fate, etc., do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you do not thus allow adrishta, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said -

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the breeze of morn;

By whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born.[70]

Gunaratna gives a more precise definition of the doctrine self-origination:

The Svabhāvavādins argue as follows. Here, it is the "essential nature" (svabhāva) of a thing that it undergoes transformation by itself (svatah). All entities are born due to the influence of svabhāva. Thus for example, from clay, a jar is produced and not cloth, and from yarn, a cloth is produced and not the jar, etc. But this production according to a fixed rule cannot be explained to take place without it being characterised by such specific svabhāva. Therefore, it is to be concluded that all this is due to svabhāva. Thus it has been said: "Who produces sharpness in thorns? (Who creates) different dispositions in animals and birds? All this has proceeded from svabhāva. There is no scope for action according to one's will. What is the use of effort?"[71]

He also describes an alternative view of causality:

According to the view of the Yadricchāvādins, the word yadricchā means the attainment of objects without any prior deliberation (abhisandhi) (i.e. accidentally). But who are these Yadricchāvādins? The answer is as follows. The Yadricchāvādins are those who, in this world, do not admit to any fixed cause-effect relation in respect to objects, but maintain (such relation to be due) to yadricchā (accident).[72]

As we have noted with regard to Lokāyata epistemology, there are clearly problems in establishing a cause-effect relationship in the absence of perceptually verifiable evidence. Gopinath Kaviraj[73] has this to say on the relationship of the theories described above:

It is very difficult to distinguish between Svabhāva and Yadricchā, as both are identical so far as the rejection of the causal principle is concerned. But the distinction, however, may be taken to lie in this, that whereas in svabhāvavāda a niyama is formally admitted which is technically known as svabhāvāniyama, in yadricchāvāda there is no scope for any such restriction. With reference to the question - why a jar should be produced from vlay and not from threads - the answer of the Svabhāvavādin is a plain statement of the nature of the thing which is unchangeable; but the answer of the Yadricchāvādin would be a flat denial of any such natural principle. The observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere chance, they would say.[74]

It is possible that the Cārvākas held the view that the world was caused merely by accident. We would certainly not be surprised to find that this was the view of a sceptic such as Jayarāśi Bhatta. But the element of chance in the causal process also opens up the possibility that there is a property outside of our sense-data that has an influence on events in the physical realm. If the Cārvākas accepted yadricchā as the causal axiom, then they would be accepting, however crude, a form of adrishta into their system. On balance, the Cārvākas probably accepted svabhāvavāda. It could be consistent with their materialistic outlook by virtue of the fact that even if the creation of an entity or object could not be directly experienced, then it could be inferred (if Purandara's account of inference is to be accepted) that the object actually present in the world contained within itself the potentiality for that origination.

6. The Disappearance Of The Cārvākas

The Cārvākas are not mentioned in any other text after the 16^th century CE, and there are no sects in India today that claim any direct descent from them. What happened to them, and why has none of their literature been preserved? Richard King has this to say:

The fact that so little is known about the Cārvākas may stem from their suppression by other groups, but it may also reflect their own repudiation of tradition. Ancient Indian philosophical systems have survived for millenia not just because their views and arguments have proved compelling and worth taking seriously by adherents, but also because they have been associated with institutional structures and traditions. The rejection of authoritative testimony (śabda-pramāna) or tradition (āgama) in any form as a valid source of knowledge (as exemplified in their critique of the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist adherence to their own sacred texts), made it less likely that the materialists would be able to preserve their views as a sustained tradition with some form of institutional backing or lineage (sampradāya).[75]

For the latter, it could be argued that the Cārvākas did in fact consistently argue that they claimed their descent from Brihaspati, who as a Vedic deity could certainly be seen as authoritative, at least in terms of stature. But the texts that we have at our disposal that actually quote him as an authority, the Brihaspati Sūtra and the Tattvopaplavasimha, are not considered by scholars to be truly representative of the Lokāyata school. We should also be wary of reading too much into the favourable manner in which the Arthaśāstra viewed Lokāyata. There is a good deal of evidence that some rulers in India found common cause with materialism for purely atavistic purposes, and this may have been the reasoning behind Kautilya's advocacy of the Lokāyata doctrine.[76]

As to possibility of suppression by other groups, we have already noted that K.B Krishna believed, without presenting any real evidence for this claim, that the Lokāyata texts were systematically destroyed by the Brahman class. That there is evidence that there was a certain level of misinterpretation by the Cārvāka's opponents is probably not beyond dispute. But that these texts were systematically destroyed by them is not provable, for we are hardly likely to come across any written evidence where the opponents actually admit doing it. There is an alternative hypothesis for the disappearance of their literature.

What we do know is that towards the end of the first millenium CE, atheism in India was under sustained attack, due to the resurgence of the Brahmanical tradition, i.e., the Vedānta and Bhakti (i.e., devotional) movements. Even the ancient Sāmkhya system had long succumbed to the admittance of a theistic element. The major victims in this were the Buddhists. It is widely acknowledged that for centuries the Buddhists had played a massive role in the collection of, and commentaries on, all the philosophical traditions in India.As the Buddhist presence in India dwindled, it is possible that the texts dealing with the older atheistic movements became concentrated in fewer places, possibly at Nālanda. This university, and with it the Buddhist presence in India, was eradicated during the invasions and eventual domination of Northern India by the Islamic conquests that began in the 11^th century. It is not entirely implausible that the Lokāyata texts were also lost in the ferocity of the Islamic attitude towards Buddhism. Of course, that would also hold true for any individual who proclaimed to be a follower of the stark atheism of the Cārvākas. The Brahmanic faith survived due to the eventual accommodation reached between its adherents and the Islamic conquerors. It is doubtful whether there was any possibility of accommodation with Lokāyata.[77]

Conclusion

For a text that bears the title, "A History of the Cārvākas", the most striking feature of this document is the lack of a precise chronology that we would normally associate with a historical examination. If I am to be accused of being rather vague with dates, then it is entirely due to the fact that all histories of Indian thought must be constantly aware of the problems in assigning absolute and non-controvertible dates to the key events and the formation of new ideas. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Vedic and Epic material that I have used in the argument set out, though I believe I have not deviated too far from the overall development of philosophical structures in India.

Before I begin to summarise this argument, there is this interesting quotation from Nirad Chaudhuri:

Hinduism differs fundamentally from Christianity in this, that for its followers it is not an alternative to the world, but primarily the means of supporting and improving their existence in it. Of course, as in all other religions, so in Hinduism there is belief in another world, in life after death, and in all the supra-mundane things which form the staple of every religious system. The Hindus also make a distinction between this world (iha-loka) and the other world (para-loka), between things which belong to here (ahika) and those that belong to there (pāratrika). They also speak of salvation (moksha). But the unwordly aims of religion when put against the worldly have hardly ant weight.

As to the notion of salvation, it is wholly unreal and unattractive - a mere talking point, as indeed so much verbiage about it shows. Salvation is never the object of the religious observances and worship of the Hindus. The main object is worldly prosperity, and this absorption in the world has made the doctrine of rebirth in it the most appealing and strongly held belief among all the notions put forward by them about existence after death. They so loved the world that they made the possibility of leaving it for good even after many cycles of birth as remote and difficult as possible.[78]

Of course, no one in ancient India is represented as loving the material world more than the Cārvākas. And yet they saw no reason for believing that they were ever coming back to it. Did they pursue artha and kāma because the denial of the karmic law necessitated enjoying the one and only life to the full? There is a maxim attributed to them in the Kāma Sūtra: "A pigeon to eat is worth more than a peacock in the sky."[79]

The worldliness of the Hindu religion is not a recent phenomenon. We can trace this right back to the Rigveda, where the sacrifices and rituals are performed with the express intention of receiving some earthly benefit. As the performance of these rites increased in complexity so too did the speculations that dwelled on their meaning, ultimately developing into the thoughts recorded in the Upanishads. Alongside of this, there was the different tradition of the Atharvaveda, not completely independent of Vedic society, but nevertheless viewed by the more orthodox Brahmanas as somewhat lacking the authority of their own tradition. If the interpretation of the episode in the Chāndogyopanishad is correct, the "chanting dogs" could have been priests who were allied to the shamanistic aspect of the Atharvaveda rituals, in fact, the forerunners of the later Lokāyata. But I have only been able to infer or hypothesise this; the link between magic and materialism (as a philosophical school) is a difficult one to establish in the absence of texts.

The period that saw the emergence of Buddhism and Jainism, roughly 600 BCE onwards, also saw the rise of the Mahājanapādas,[80] possibly alluded to in the Epic literature where we first see an explicit mention of Cārvāka. His death at the hands of the orthodoxy could be interpreted as the point at which Lokāyata lost the tribal basis of its origins, but nevertheless retaining the mantras from its early history.[81] And these mantras were only later viewed in disfavour by other philosophical schools as their own doctrines increased in sophistication. The Lokāyata mantras, connected with wordly things, could have been influential in informing the Cārvāka philosophy that the only thing that existed was the materiality of the world. But I think it is doubtful that Lokāyata is synonymous with the modern usage of scientific materialism.

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[1] D Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism, New Delhi, 1959, p xv

[2] D Chattopadhyaya, ed., Cārvāka/Lokāyata: An anthology of source materials and some recent studies, New Delhi, 1990, p. 247

[3] R King, Indian Philosophy: An introduction to Hindu and Buddhist thought, Great Britain, 1999, p. 16

[4] ibid, pp. 16-17

[5] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 248

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] Literally meaning "The unseen"; here it is referring to a non-empirical process of causation.

[9] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p.253

[10] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 248

[11] Chattopadhyaya gives a slightly different version, "Lokesu ayatah lokayata. It was called Lokayata because it was prevalent (ayatah) among the people (lokesu)." Chattopadhyaya, op cit, p. 1

[12] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p.369

[13] ibid, p. 371

[14] ibid, p. 374. It must also be noted that Rhys Davids held the view that there was no specific school of thought known as Lokāyata/Cārvāka, though scholarship in general is of the view that it was a firmly established darśana.

[15] S. Radhakrishnan, History of Philosophy Eastern and Western Volume I, London, 1952, p. 107

[16] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, pp. 74-75

[17] ibid, p. 257

[18] ibid, p. 258. Although nāstika is a label that is applicable to all non-Brahmanical sects, Haribhadra explicitly designates the Lokāyatas as nāstikas, and I am inclined to think that his description of them is from drawn from āstika sources that used the same identification.

[19] ibid, pp. 266-267

[20] I am not quite sure whether he is referring to the Aghorin or Kapālika sects. There seems to be a general consensus amongst scholars who have discussed the connection between Lokāyata and Tantrism that the reference is to the Kapālikas.

[21] There is, of course, the possibility that Gunaratna has included this reference from his own invention as a purely slanderous device, concentrating on the rather more salacious aspects of Tantrism. We must also bear in mind that he is writing some seven centuries after the composition of the Saddarśanasamuccaya, and that the denigration of the (probably by then extinct) Cārvākas may have been a commonplace occurrence.

[22] K.B. Krishna, Studies in Hindu Materialism, Guntur, 1994, p. 40

[23] ibid, p. 33

[24] I will assess the evidence for the absence of Lokāyata texts in Chapter 6.

[25] J. L. Brockington, The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its continuity and diversity, Edinburgh, 1981, p.12

[26] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 7

[27] Brockington, op cit, p. 10

[28] ibid, pp. 22-23

[29] ibid, p. 24

[30] Not all presentations of Indian philosophy are as simplistic as this model; nevertheless, due to the influence of Advaita Vedānta in modern Indian thought, this tends to be the general impression given.

[31] I would argue that the use of spells in the context of the Atharvaveda could be classed as a form of sorcery or witchcraft, which is the distinction I wish to draw by using the word "magical".

[32] I have made a connection between Brihaspati and the Atharvaveda on the admittedly slim evidence of the proximity of Brihaspati to the Angirases in the Rigveda. I have done this because it is highly unlikely that his instruction to the Asuras was the Lokāyata doctrine in its advanced philosophical form, which appears to be the view of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. See Chattopadhyaya, op cit, pp. 40-42

[33] F.W. Thomas, Brihaspati Sutra: or the Science of Politics According to the School of Brihaspati, Lahore, 1921.

[34] ibid, p. 11

[35] This should spell "rākshasa", meaning demon or evil spirit.

[36] Translator's question mark.

[37] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, pp. 358-359

[38] ibid, p. 429

[39] King, op cit, p. 17

[40] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 267

[41] R.C. Zaehner, Hindu Scriptures, London, 1966, p. 85

[42] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, p. 85

[43] ibid, p. 88

[44] ibid, p. 89-91

[45] ibid, p. 83

[46] Zaehner, op cit, p. 144

[47] Some may argue that this is actually pure fantasy, but I am trying to locate the Cārvākas in a period when there are very few historical records to work from, and the general consensus is that the period covered in the Great Epic does represent a time of massive social upheaval in India where there is, with the emergence of nāstika sects, a great deal of opposition to the prevailing norms.

[48] Zaehner, op cit, p. 47

[49] In the Indian philosophical tradition, the pūrvapakshin first expounds the view of his opponent in order to criticise or refute their position.

[50] The spelling of this name varies in different texts.

[51] Brockington, op cit, p. 80

[52] By materialism here, I mean in the strict ontological meaning of the term, i.e., the existence of matter only.

[53] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, pp. 479-480

[54] School of logic in classical India.

[55] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 85

[56] ibid, p. 234

[57] ibid, p. 235

[58] Or sometimes rendered as spirit, though obviously not in any "ghostly" sense.

[59] This is sometimes translated as darkness or inertia.

[60] Sāmkhya Karika, verses 56-59

[61] Apart from those Cārvākas quoted by Gunaratna who included ākāśa as a fifth element.

[62] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 424

[63] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, pp. 39-40. Chattopadhyaya also states here that "the low arts" was understood by these Buddhists to be some form of sorcery, which was the view of T. Rhys Davids.

[64] S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy Volume III, Great Britain, 1940, pp. 533-534

[65] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, p. 23

[66] Dasgupta, op cit, p. 536

[67] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 491

[68] ibid, p.505

[69] ibid, p. 516

[70] ibid, p. 253

[71] ibid, pp 296-297

[72] ibid

[73] ibid, p.441

[74] ibid, pp. 448-449

[75] King, op cit, p. 22

[76] See Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, chapter on Pāyāsi Suttanta pp. 8-32, and essay by Eric Frauwallner pp. 474-486

[77] It could be argued that in laying the blame firmly at the door of the Muslims, I am seeking the easy way out. What we do know is that atheism was anathaema to the more extreme exponents of martial Islam, and Lokāyata was atheism par excellence.

[78] N.C. Chaudhuri, Hinduism: A Religion to Live By, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 10-11

[79] A. Danielou, trans., The Complete Kāma Sūtra, Vermont, 1994, p. 38

[80] The absorption of the gānas, the small tribal units, into the larger "nation-state" ethos.

[81] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, pp. 37-38