|OVERCOMING THE BONDAGE OF REVICTIMIZATION : A RATIONAL/EMPIRICAL DEFENSE OF THOUGHT REFORM|
In 1994 Christian counter-cult researchers Robert and Gretchen Passantino published a major article in Cornerstone magazine attempting to debunk the theory of cult mind-control.* Beginning with a rundown of several alleged "assumptions of mind-control" and proceeding to numerous objections to mind-control, the authors sought to demonstrate what they consider to be the faulty basis of the mind-control model of cult recruitment and influence, as well as the incompatibility of the mind-control model with Christian theology. The present article shows that the Passantinos assertions are incorrect and misguided. Specifically, this article demonstrates that mind-control is more than cult conversion; that, while mind-control does not rob people of moral responsibility, it mitigates it; and that there is no conflict between biblical theology and the reality of mind-control. We contend that theological considerations inform our understanding of the sociological and psychological destruction caused by cults. Cults distort ones perceptions of both natural reality (sociological and psychological) and spiritual reality. Since the former is supposed to reveal the latter, as in the Christian tradition, those interested in spiritual issues must address both sides in order to minister adequately to cultists.
* "Mind-control" is used with a hyphen in this article to be consistent with the Passantinos many quotes.
The Passantinos are well known and respected evangelical writers. Consequently, their critique, which is rife with errors and misinterpretations, disturbs us very much and calls for a detailed rebuttal. In this article, we will show that the Passantinos' assertions are incorrect and misguided. We will demonstrate that (1) use of mind-control, or thought reform, brings about a special variety of conversion; (2) having been under the influence of a thought-reform program, mind-control mitigates an individuals moral responsibility, although it does not remove it entirely; and (3) there is no conflict between biblical theology and the reality of mind-control.1 For us, theological considerations inform our understanding of the sociological and psychological destruction caused by cults, although others hold similar positions without considering theological issues. Cults distort one's perceptions both of natural reality (sociological and psychological) and spiritual reality. In the Christian tradition, the former is supposed to reveal the latter; therefore, those interested in spiritual issues must address both sides in order to minister adequately to former cult members.
The Passantinos misstate the fundamental concepts of mind-control, then imply that many countercult workers do not support the mind-control theory, and finally argue that the mind-control concept is counter to or incompatible with biblical Christianity. Whether or not all, most, or only a few countercult workers support a mind-control model is irrelevant to our critique of the Passantinos' misrepresentations. Certainly, experience with models of psychotherapy has shown that different models can be applied with equal effectiveness to similar situations. Therefore, there is room for disagreement about which theoretical model is most internally consistent, parsimonious, and consistent with empirical data. We do not claim that current mind-control models are the end-all and be-all of countercult thinking. Indeed, we believe that this field needs newer theoretical models that are more amenable to empirical testing. We are not so much defending the mind-control model as we are refuting the Passantinos' misleading interpretation of that model. If the model is to be criticized, let it be criticized for what it really says, not for misrepresentations of what it says. We use the term "mind-control," despite its sometimes being used in a sensationalized way, because we believe it expresses in simple language what this dispute is about, namely, the control (which doesnt necessarily mean "total control") of the mind by forces outside that mind.
Exit Counseling and Postcult Treatment
The Passantinos' article begins with a description of a concerned parent seeking help. The authors cite former Unificationist and current exit counselor Steve Hassan as stating that the average fee for exit counseling is $3,000 plus expenses for about four days of exit counseling. That is probably not too far off the mark. In spite of the authors' insinuation that exit counselors make good money, few have a gross annual income of more than $35,000. Because of the nature of their work, exit counselors must be on call virtually 24 hours a day, like firemen and paramedics. The $3,000 to $4,000 is not much, given that an average of one case a month is about all that is possiblemany exit counselors do not even do that many cases. Many counselors spend much time in research and preparation, and they must be willing to go where circumstances demand. Considering the work involved in a thorough exit counseling, we believe that the Passantinos' reaction to exit counselors' fees is unwarranted.
The Passantinos' implied criticism of the fees for postcult residential treatment demonstrates their complete ignorance of the overhead and staffing costs necessary to maintain a center such as the Wellspring Retreat and Resource Center, where we work. If Wellspring were making as much money as the Passantinos insinuate, it wouldn't have a history of financial crises, as did all other postcult rehabilitation centers, of which Wellspring is the only survivor. Wellspring's weekly fee for room, board, and a highly individualized treatment program (we rarely have more than three clients at one time) is lower than that of some specialized psychiatric inpatient facilities.
The Passantinos write, "Of course, there were no guarantees: some ex-cultists needed additional in-patient counseling at a special 'recovery center'" (p. 31). This statement implies that exit counseling is unreliable. It also ignores the reality of postcult psychological distress that calls for professional treatment. Research (Martin, Langone, Dole, & Wiltrout, 1992) on the psychological state of cult members before and after exit counseling demonstrates that, despite the effectiveness of exit counseling in helping cult members make a decision to leave their cults, exit counseling does not usually relieve the psychological distress. This is not surprising because exit counseling is an educational intervention designed to help clients reevaluate their group involvement, not to "recover" from it. Consequently, a client's attending a residential treatment center after exit counseling reflects not on the exit counseling's ineffectiveness, as the Passantinos imply, but on the psychological needs of the client due to the aftereffects of cult involvement. Recommending postcult counseling may be considered an ethical obligation of exit counselors, not a sign of their inadequacy. Moreover, only a small percentage of exit-counseled clients actually seek out residential postcult treatment.
In their book Witch Hunt, under the heading "It's Not Always Either/Or," the Passantinos state: "Another problem Christians often have in discerning between good and bad is the tendency to miss some of the options" (Passantino & Passantino, 1991, p.113). Remarkably, the article that concerns us relies on the all-or-nothing fallacy criticized by the Passantinos. They suggest, for example, that all who subscribe to a mind-control model believe that every cult member is completely under mind-control, and totally and always unable to think for himself or herself.
No responsible researcher or practitioner subscribes to the mind-control model described by the Passantinos. In Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, Robert J. Lifton wrote:
Behind this web of semantic...confusion [regarding the definition of thought reform] lies an image of "brainwashing" as an all-powerful, irresistible, unfathomable, and magical method of achieving total control over the human mind. It is of course none of these things, and this loose usage makes the word a rallying point for fear, resentment, urges toward submission, justification for failure, irresponsible accusation, and for a wide gamut of emotional extremism (1961, p. 4).
In Cults in Our Midst, Margaret Singer and Janja Lalich write:
Thankfully, these [thought reform] programs do not change people permanently. Nor are they 100 percent effective. Cults are not all alike, thought reform programs are not all alike, and not everyone exposed to specific intense influence processes succumbs and follows the group. Some cults try to defend themselves by saying, in effect, "See, not everyone joins or stays, so we must not be using brainwashing techniques." Many recruits do succumb, however, and the better organized the influence processes used, the more people will succumb (1995, p. 61).
In an essay entitled "Persuasive Techniques in Religious Cults," Dr. Louis J. West wrote:
The persuasive techniques used by totalist cults to bind and exploit the members, while not magical or infallible, are sufficiently powerful and effective to assure the recruitment of a significant percentage of those approached, and the retention of a significant percentage of those enlisted. (1989, p.188).
The Passantinos Assumptions of Mind-Control
In a section headed, "Assumptions of Mind-control," the Passantinos contrast biblical apologetics with psychological techniques. The authors suggest that postcult recovery should involve conversion, but that the secular mind-control model concerns itself only with the recovery of precult personality. These two notions, the biblical and the secular, cannot be reconciled, according to the Passantinos. They assert that mind-control adherents do away with theological concerns: "Biblical analysis and evangelism of the cults has been overshadowed by allegedly 'value neutral' social science descriptions and therapy-oriented counseling" (p. 32). This all-or-nothing dichotomy is not characteristic of the program we offer at Wellspring, nor that of many others.
The Passantinos list, summarize, and critique eight categories that they say represent "the principal assumptions of the cult mind-control model" (p. 32). Before addressing the details of their critique, we want to state that the Passantinos' eight-assumption model is inaccurate in so many respects as to be useless as a summary of mind-control models, although aspects of their summary are valid. Our critique will attempt to show what is false and what is correct in their analysis.
"Cults ability to control the mind supersedes that of the best military 'brainwashers'" (p. 32). In a footnote, the Passantinos mention two factors offered by proponents of the mind-control theory to account for cults' success: "(1) greater levels of sophistication, technology, and psychological knowledge; and (2) the addition of hypnosis techniques to the practice" (p. 40). Not mentioned, however, is one factor we believe is perhaps more significant than either of these two¾ namely, that in military brainwashing the subjects were unwilling participants, and, in fact, antagonists of the brainwashers (at least in the most well-known instance of the brainwashing of Korean War POWs); whereas in cultic mind-control, generally the subjects are favorably disposed toward the cult members and, indeed, toward the teachings with which they are being indoctrinated. This factor must not be ignored or minimized. Moreover, the indoctrination of cult members is so subtle and deceptive that they often do not even realize they are objects of persuasion, unlike POWs who were painfully aware of their captors' desire to change them. So, it really is not at all surprising that cultic mind-control is more successful than the "brainwashing" inflicted on POWs. We will elaborate on this point when we criticize the Passantinos' objection to the "brainwashing connection."
"Cult recruits become unable to think or make decisions for themselves" (p. 32). This is another example of all-or-nothing thinking, which the Passantinos have criticized in other works. We reject the implied assertion that we and our colleagues in this field accept this statement as it is written. We are well aware that many cult members do retain the ability to think for themselves in many areas of life, even in matters religious. We have always recognized that there are many degrees of mind-control, depending on numerous factors, including, but not limited to (1) the type and severity of any precult spiritual or psychological problems; (2) the degree of divergence of the cult's teachings and practices from the cult member's prior religious affiliation; (3) the intensity of the cultic indoctrination; (4) the degree to which the cult severs the cult member from his or her previous connections (family, friends, activities, etc.); and (5) the kind and degree of any corrective or disciplinary measures exercised by the cult on members who step out of line.
Having said this, we hasten to add that during the 12 years of Wellspring's operation we have worked with many ex-cult members who did have very serious difficulty thinking for themselves and making decisions. Their problems cannot be glibly dismissed as "precult problems" that presumably had nothing to do with the cultic experience. One girl who came to Wellspring from a well-known "shepherding movement" would sit at the dinner table and wait until she received permission to eat any item on her plate before she would do so.
"Cult recruits assume 'cult' personalities and subsume their core personalities" (p. 32). This statement conforms to clinical experience. For example, most ex-cult members who come to Wellspring recognize this very thing about themselves. They report that while they were in the cult they became more aggressive or more passive, more self-assured or more confused, more judgmental of others or more arrogant. Some have told us that they lost touch with their own feelings and became emotionally numb, while putting on a happy front when with parents or noncult friends. We have seen these things ourselves in ex-cultists, and we have witnessed the dramatic changes when these individuals reverted to their normal, precult selves. But again, we would acknowledge degrees of this "personality replacement." Not every cult member changes to the same degree; and, in fact, some might already have a personality that meshes with the cult, and so they will not change much, if at all. The assumption the Passantinos uphold for ridicule is, in our opinion, generally valid, unless it is interpreted in an all-or-nothing way.
"Cultists cannot decide to leave their cults" (p. 32). We do not know anyone who would make such a blanket statement. It is manifestly contradicted by the hundreds, if not thousands, of former cult members who have left their cults of their own volition. What we would assert, however, is that many cult members find it difficult to leave the cult, even when they may want to. Often this is due to fear of the threatened consequences of leaving (e.g., forsaking God, being condemned to hell, suffering divine wrath in the form of accidents or disease). Even the thought, "What if the cult leader really is a prophet of God or the Messiah?" can hold a member in a cult long after the bloom has faded. One female member of the Branch Davidians being interviewed for an Australian television broadcast was asked, "Do you believe David Koresh is the Messiah?" Her response as she smiled up at the camera: "I hope so." She was one who stayed and perished in the final conflagration.
The Passantinos contend that those who hold the mind-control model believe that "successful intervention must break the mind-control, find the core personality, and return the individual to his/her pre-cult status" (p. 32). We would qualify this assertion by acknowledging that even the most abusive organizations have some redeeming qualitiesfew are all bad. In cults it is possible, for example, to learn the value of giving oneself to a cause, to learn the benefits of hard work, of getting along with others in a working environment, and so on. Further, we would emphasize that if the cult in question is a Bible-based organization on the order of the "shepherding" movement, or what we refer to as a TACO (a totalist aberrant Christian organization), which teaches orthodox biblical doctrine while committing emotional, spiritual, and behavioral abuses, then clearly not everything of the cult needs to be stripped away. Whatever was accurate, orthodox, and healthy can remain, while the inaccurate, aberrational, and unhealthy must be excised. Probably no cult (except some satanic cults) is all bad; therefore one of the most important, and difficult, tasks of the counselor is helping the ex-member winnow out the bad from the good.
"Psychology and sociology are used to explain cult recruitment, membership, and disaffection" (p. 32). Another blanket statement, this is worded so as to exclude other disciplines as sources for explanations, specifically theology. While many secular proponents of the mind-control model might reject the role of theology in seeking such explanations, we do not, nor do other evangelical proponents of the mind-control model with whom we are familiar. Later in the article the Passantinos (p. 32) quote from an official description in an article in Wellsprings newsletter entitled, "Wellspring's Approach to Cult Rehab":
Paul Martin asserts that cult mind-control renders its victims virtually unresponsible for their actions or beliefs: "The process whereby he or she was drawn into the cult was a subtle but powerful force over which he or she had little or no control and therefore they need not feel either guilt or shame because of their experience" (Wellspring Messenger, 4(5), p.1. November/December 1993).
While the Wellspring statement might be slightly overstated, the Passantinos overstate it further in their summary. By itself, the Wellspring statement could be broadly interpreted, as the Passantinos have chosen to do. However, the original context is concerned specifically with joining a cult. 2 It was not a blanket statement concerning anything and everything cult members may have done after they joined. Regardless, our experience in treating more than 400 former cultists and interviewing hundreds more indicates that most people who join cults think they're joining a good group, a moral group, a healthy group. But this is largely because they have not been afforded full information about the group they are joining. We would agree that those who join cults are "guilty" of not asking all the right questions, of not examining the cults claims thoroughly enough against the records of history and Scripture, of not adequately applying the rules of logic to the groups teachings and explanations, and of not having an adequate knowledge of coercive persuasion techniques. In other words, cult recruits are "guilty" of allowing themselves to be deceived. But is that a sin? Should we rebuke the victim of a con artist for allowing himself to be victimized? Do we blame the battered wife for falling in love with and marrying a batterer?
We feel it is crucial to distinguish between true guilt and false guilt. Cult members are constantly made to feel guilty for actions and thoughts which neither society nor the Bible would consider sinful. In such cases, the guilt is false and one needs to understand and accept that and move beyond it. (The Passantinos imply as much when they refer later to "unscriptural feelings of guilt" [p. 33].) Where truly sinful, immoral, or illegal actions have been committed, these actions need to be acknowledged and owned by the perpetrators. We insist, however, that to the extent that such actions are committed while under the influence of mind-control techniques, or a thought-reform program, the perpetrator must be held less culpable.
Under mind-control a man may be persuaded to believe or do things that would have normally violated his conscience. His conscience may tell him that an action or belief is wrong, but what the cult leader has persuaded him of has so strongly influenced him that it may override his conscience. He may be led to believe that the promptings of his conscience are really of his "lower nature," "of the flesh," and that the mission of the group is of a "higher purpose," that the thoughts of his conscience are doubts that show lack of faith or signs of rebellion. Thus, he may still have a conscience, but through the powerful influence of the group he has reinterpreted it, or reframed his moral outlook.
The Passantinos seem unable to conceive of noncoercive mind-control that does allow for some measure of "free will." No one drags people into a cult. They do join freely most of the time. When they don't, it's the rare exception rather than the rule. The point here is not whether these people are acting as free, volitional, rational beings. The point is they don't join a cultthat is, they don't see the group as a cult. They don't see the fine print because in most cases, it is kept from them. The prevalence of such perceptual and judgmental errors in all areas of life is why we have laws regarding defective products, "truth in advertising," and fraud. It is also why for centuries the law has recognized the concept of undue influence. The same principles hold here.
The Passantinos do not seem to realize that human beings operate by certain laws of human behavior. Consider the case of a Christian college student who goes out and buys a used car, considering herself to be very responsible. Later, she finds out that the car is not as "perfect" as the salesman told her it was. In fact, it throws a rod on her way to work. She goes back to try to have the car fixed, but the salesman informs her that the warranty is also not exactly what he told her when she bought the car. Now, the unfortunate girl is left with a lemon on her hands. The church would not castigate her as having some sort of spiritual problem because of this plight, would it?
If the same girl would go out and start attending a Bible study that later turned out to be a Way "twig," then the Passantinos would put a spiritual twist on it, impugning her motives or her spiritual state for leading her into a "heretical" Bible study group. But if she buys a car that breaks down, the Passantinos would, we suspect, hold her innocent. There seems to be a double standard here.
One other point regarding the Wellspring statement quoted above by the Passantinos: by broadly interpreting the statement, they have misrepresented us. The senior author of this article [PRM] testified in the criminal case of a cult member who participated in the killing of five people3. Martin and his colleagues in this case did not argue that the cult member was innocent and need not feel guilt or shame. They argued that the young man was guilty. The defendant was Danny Kraft, Jr., who had been a member of a small cult led by Jeffrey Lundgren, who killed a family of five in Kirtland, Ohio.4 Nevertheless, in this case the defendant's attorney maintained that although Mr. Kraft was guilty, there were mitigating circumstances¾ namely, that Kraft was under the influence of Lundgren through a process of mind-control. Therefore, Kraft was not acting entirely as a free, moral agent because he was suffering from a mental disorder. In other words, Kraft was made to believe something that was not true, namely, that Lundgren was the prophet of God, and, thus, whatever he said was divinely inspired. The court unequivocally concurred that the techniques used by Lundgren were those of mind-control. The court agreed that Kraft did indeed suffer a dissociative disorder, identified by the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV as scientific. Kraft was sentenced to many years in prison, but his sentence was lighter than it would have been had mind-control not been seen as a mitigating circumstance.
The Passantinos attempt (p. 33) to strengthen their argument by quoting Hassan:
Hassan recognizes that the cult mind-control model (which he has adopted) is incompatible with the traditional philosophical and Christian view of man as a responsible moral agent: "First of all, accepting that unethical mind-control can affect anybody challenges the age-old philosophical notion (the one on which our current laws are based) that man is a rational being, responsible for, and in control of, his every action. Such a world view does not allow for any concept of mind-control" (Hassan, 1988).
The problem here is that Hassan is simply wrong, and so is the Passantinos' attempt to attribute Hassan's error to all advocates of the thought-reform model. First, our current laws do recognize diminished capacity in the commission of crime as exculpatory, as it recognizes undue influence in the civil arena. Second, the biblical worldview also recognizes exculpation by reason of diminished capacity due to mental underdevelopment (Dt. 1:39); lack of knowledge (Luke 12:36-48) or demonization (Mt. 8:28-34; Ac. 16:16-185). So, neither Western, secular philosophy nor Judeo-Christian doctrine views man as always fully rational and responsible for his actions. In addition, the apostle Paul writes, "You foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you?" (Gal. 3:1, New American Standard Bible). Translated, the word "bewitched," baskaino, means "bewitch, as with the 'evil eye'" (Bauer, Arndt, & Gingrich, 1979, p. 137) and "to bring evil on one by feigned praise or an evil eye, to charm, bewitch one, hence, of those who lead away others into error by wicked arts." (Thayer, 1972, p.98). It is doubtful that in the Galatians reference Paul is expressing belief that the Christians actually had the "evil eye" directed at them. However, in conjunction with the word "foolish" (anoetos = not thinking or mindless), it seems evident that Paul recognizes that the Galatians had been manipulated to a point where they were no longer thinking clearly. Thus, the concept of mind-control may apply to the situation described by Paul, or at least to quantitative extensions of the Galatians' problem.
Assumptions Seven and Eight
We accept assumptions seven and eight as written, but reject what the Passantinos infer from these assumptions: "7. Religious conversion and commitment may be termed mind-control if it meets certain psychological and sociological criteria, regardless of its doctrinal or theological standards"; and "8. The psychological and sociological standards, which define mind-control, are not absolute, but fall in a relative, subjective continuum from 'acceptable' social and/or religious affiliation to 'unacceptable'" (p. 32).
The Passantinos conclude this section by saying, "According to most cult mind-control model advocates, no one is immune to the right mind-control tactics used at the right time. Anyone is susceptible" (p. 32). After quoting Hassan, the authors quote from Martins book, Cult-Proofing Your Kids: "But the truth of the matter is, virtually anyone can get involved in a cult under the right circumstances... Regardless of one's spiritual or psychological health, whether one is weak or strong, cultic involvement can happen to anyone" (Martin, 1993, pp. 21, 179).
Claiming to state the views of mind-control model proponents, the Passantinos write, "Cult mind-control must be distinguished from 'mere' deception, influence, or persuasion. A main distinguishing characteristic at the core of mind-control is the idea that the individual becomes unable to make autonomous personal choices, not simply that his or her choices have been predicated on something false" (p. 32).
This paragraph again reveals the authors' fundamental misunder-standing of the model as propounded by most of those who hold it. Mind-control advocates do not deny that cult members make choices; rather, the advocates assert that these choices result from a systematic, intense, and prolonged program of "deception, influence, [and] persuasion." Mind-control is not something qualitatively different from deception, influence, and persuasion because it subsumes all of these. It is an extension of these processes and others (e.g., lack of information, fear of considering certain choices, and perceptual narrowing due to dissociative processes such as prolonged singing, chanting, tongue speaking, meditating, listening to charismatic speakers, etc.). This is a crucial point. It is not either deception or mind-control. Mind-control involves deception and other processes that affect making choicesthat is, the cult member, and on occasion even the recruit, is gradually manipulated to the point where other options are no longer considered viable.
Objection: The Brainwashing Connection
In a section entitled "Objection: The Brainwashing Connection," the Passantinos allege that mind-control advocates demonstrate a "contradictory embracing and rejecting of the brainwashing connection" (p. 33). According to the Passantinos, mind-control advocates say that the early methods of mind-control were ineffective compared to later methods, which require less coercion and employ techniques such as hypnosis. The Passantinos write:
"However, it stretches one's credulity to believe that what highly trained and technologically supported CIA, Russian, Korean, and Chinese experts could not accomplish under extremes of mental, emotional, and physical abuse, self-styled modern messiahs like David Koresh (high school dropout), Charles Manson (grade school dropout), and Hare Krishna founder Prabhupada (self-educated) accomplished on a daily basis and on a massive scale with control methods measurably inferior to those of POW camp torturers." (p. 33).
However, the Passantinos' quotation from Hassan two paragraphs earlier (p. 33) responds to this objection. Hassan points out that "mind-control is more subtle and sophisticated. Its perpetrators are regarded as friends or peers, so the person is much less defensive. He unwittingly participates by cooperating with his controllers and giving them private information that he does not know will be used against him. The new belief system is internalized into a new identity structure" (Hassan, 1988, pp. 55, 56).
The subtlety of mind-control is the key to its effectiveness, and "love bombing" is one key to its subtlety; the overwhelming "friendliness" of the cult recruiter tends to disengage the potential recruit's defenses, catching him off guard, and luring him into the net. Despite the ridicule expressed by the Passantinos and others, the fact is that some contemporary cults are indeed able to control members more effectively than did the CIA and other intelligence agencies.
If those who heap ridicule on this assertion studied the early "brainwashing" literature more closely they might understand that their criticism is unfounded because it is based on the false assumption that early instances of brainwashing depended on physical coercion. On the contrary, much of the early brainwashing literature concerned situations involving civilians. Chen (1960), for example, amply documents that half a million Chinese Christians signed pledges of allegiance to Mao. (Was it mere coincidence that so many "weak-willed" Christians happened to live in China at that time?) Lifton's best-known research dealt with the effects of thought reform practiced in Chinese Communist revolutionary colleges (Lifton, 1961). There was no physical restraint or confinement in those environments. There was very little overt coercion, and yet there was massive thought reform. Schein and his colleagues also found that the Communists effectively used thought reform without using physical restraint or coercion (Schein, Schneir, & Barker, 1961). In fact, Segal (1957) demonstrated that there was an inverse correlation between threat and physical abuse and the degree of compliance on the part of American POWs in Korea. Testifying before a congressional panel, he stated that "70 percent of all the repatriated Army PW's [sic] made at least one contribution to the enemy's propaganda effort (p.89)."
The Passantinos, Bromley and Shupe, and others have misunderstood the mind-control model in a fundamental and vital way. Bromley and Shupe, for example, ridicule what they describe as claims that "such rapid transformation can routinely be accomplished by neophytes against an individual's will" (Bromley and Shupe, 1989, pp. 325, 326). But this is a patently false representation of mind-control models, even some of the less sophisticated models. The transformation that cults bring about is not against an individual's will. He no longer sees things as he once did, he does not have adequate information to make an informed choice, and he has been manipulated emotionally to make the choice presented to him by the cult. The cult recruit is brought to the point where he either gives up his own will in order to be taught and directed by someone (the cult leader) who knows better than he, or he "wills" what the leader wants because the member's perceptions and judgments have been changed as a result of a series of manipulations. As former Children of God member Rick Seelhoff said in "Thy Will Be Done" (Moore, 1980). "I wanted to put myself over onto someone that knew better than I did... I willed to not will."
The authors dismiss hypnosis as a factor in cult involvement in toto. They miss an important point in their own references. In their notes (p. 40, n., 5) the Passantinos quote the Encyclopaedia Britannica:
Altogether then hypnosis should not be considered as a technique for achieving supernormal performance or control. Rather it is a collaborative enterprise in which the inner experience of the subject can be dramatically altered (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, and Vol. 9).
The dramatic alteration of inner experience is precisely what cults hope to effect by their efforts. A predictable internal experience can be induced on willing participants, and then cosmic, supernatural, or spiritual significance can be ascribed to it. Thus, what is actually a physiological process takes on a cosmic perspective. This is essentially what Lifton called "mystical manipulation."
We further suggest that mystical manipulation is a pathway to the other seven criteria listed by Lifton. Appealing to the initial event of dramatically altered "inner experience" can then enhance control. Cult recruiters, for example, tell their prospective converts to ask God for a "sign" as to whether their movement is the true path to enlightenment or their church the true church. Those who see the "divine light" or receive the "burning in the bosom" as a result of their earnest prayer easily interpret it as the sought-for "sign." But they are not aware of how their internal experiences have been manipulated by outside events.
Objection: The Deterministic Fault
The Passantinos' false argument that the concept of mind-control is counter to biblical Christianity has been addressed earlier, but we believe their argument deserves additional discussion.
Part of the marvelous power of the human mind is its ability to analyze information and make value judgments about that information. However, as with electronic "minds" (computers), the human minds conclusions are only as good as the information it receives. When individuals receive erroneous information about a subject in the absence of correct information about that same subject, they will make erroneous judgments.
Persons can also discount their own knowledge and abilities in favor of other persons believed to be more competent. In such cases, individuals will tend to reject conflicting data, not because it is illogical or fails to correlate with previous experience, but because it does not line up with the external "mind" they have "freely decided" to trust (what philosophers call "argument from authority"). If the authority is incorrect, these individuals once again base their decisions on false information and make incorrect judgments.
In both of these situations, one could argue that these individuals freedom has been compromised. They may be free to decide, but how meaningful is that freedom when the information on which they base their decision is incorrect, or even deliberately falsified by someone seeking to control them? Is the false information baseespecially when it is deliberately concocteda mitigating circumstance in evaluating moral responsibility? Would Adam and Eve have been as guilty for eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil if God had never told them to avoid that tree? And would they have been guiltier if there had been no tempter, if they had merely said to God, "You're not telling me what to do!"? The Passantinos do not seem to take such nuances into account when evaluating the moral responsibility of cultists, especially with regard to the mind-control model.
The Passantinos state that "many cults have made deceptive claims, used faulty logic, misrepresented their beliefs, burdened their followers with unscriptural feelings of guilt, and sought to bring people into financial or moral compromise to unethical demands. Yet it does not necessarily or automatically follow that these pressures, practices, or demands remove an individual's personal responsibility for his or her actions" (p. 33). The key word in this statement is "remove," an all-or-nothing word: either something is removed or it is not. The more appropriate word would be "mitigate." Deception, group pressure, and so on may not remove all personal responsibility; but they do diminish it. Choices that "have been predicated on something false" (p. 32) are not truly free choices. The outcome is predetermined by the skill of the information provider, not the ethical or even rational faculties of the agent making the "choice." What sense can be made of "free agency" when choices are based on false data? If "free choices" result in agents being cut off from any further source of information for a lifetime, are the agents free in any meaningful sense? Further, in what sense can agents make a free choice to return to a life in which they will continue to be deceived? Might the agents capacity to make informed choices (their minds and wills) be under the control of those who control the information? If agents respond to personal experience or outside data on the basis of false information about the consequences of certain actions, are they making free choices when they reject true data on the basis of lies? In what sense are such persons truly responsible for their decisions?
We are reminded of several biblical passages. While hanging on the cross, Jesus said, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34). Jesus also said, "That slave who knew his master's will and did not get ready or act in accord with his will, shall receive many lashes, but the one who did not know it, and committed deeds worthy of a flogging, will receive but few" (Luke 12:47-48a, New American Standard Bible; see also Mt. 11:20-24). In other words, the moral responsibility taught in the Scriptures is based on how much one knows. If one has been deceived, if one has been pressured, if one has been denied access to information, or if the truth has been made to seem like a lie, then one is either held completely guiltless or regarded as only partly culpable. We have yet to meet one person in 12 years of working in this field full-time who says, "I knew what I was doing; I knew I was joining a cult. I knew it was wrong, but I did it anyway."
That is exactly what the Passantinos are attempting to force the ex-cult member to admit: "I knew it was wrong." But if the ex-cult member denies that he knew it was wrong, the Passantinos are faced with the unfortunate dilemma of saying, "Either you are lying or you're deceived." It is difficult to accuse tens of thousands of cult members from hundreds, if not thousands, of groups of lying. So, the Passantinos must conclude that at least some of these ex-members were deceived. Acknowledging the diminished, though not nullified, moral responsibility of these ex-members would be consistent with common sense and Scripture. However, in many cases the deceit is so cleverly contrived and engineered that only God himself could see the intrigue. But it seems that the Passantinos are so single-minded in their desire to discredit the mind-control model that they turn it into a vulnerable all-or-nothing strawman that compels them to advocate an all-or-nothing view of human culpability, at least with regard to cults. In our view, their position is unbiblical and unkind.
The Passantinos' position, by way of extrapolation, would hold, as do some New Age trainings, every battered wife responsible for ending up married to an abusive husband. To be consistent, the Passantinos would have to argue that these women knew what they were getting into. The senior author [PRM] of this article has explained the dynamics of thought reform to hundreds of former cult members and asked them, "Did you know that this was what your group was doing when you decided to join?" The ex-members have all answered, "No." They are then asked, "Would you have joined if you knew they practiced thought reform?" Again their answers were all "No."
The Passantinos' assertion that there is no diminished responsibility without the gun-at-the-head, strawman view of mind-control that they advance runs counter to biblical and legal traditions of fraud. Lack of knowledge has, throughout the history of law, been used to reduce a person's culpability, and the same is true in the case of cultic deception and mind-control. It seems to us that the Passantinos have confused bearing responsibility with facing consequences. An investor who is conned into committing resources to a fraudulent enterprise must face the consequence that those resources may never be recovered. The investor is in every sense a victim of the con, even if in hindsight one can identify events or choices that may have adumbrated the coming con. It is, however, not the investor but the con artist who is morally and legally responsible for the investor's flawed decision.
In the current legal climate, a con artist who cheats investors out of money faces prison, fines, and/or court-ordered restitution; yet, a cult leader who precipitates wrongful death by discouraging or prohibiting medical care on the basis of false or misleading information faces no legal penalty. It seems that the Passantinos support this unfortunate state of affairs and would absolve the cult leader of his or her responsibility, laying it completely at the feet of the follower. The injustice of the present legal system, we hope, will eventually be rectified in spite of such reasoning, but the psychological damage caused by blaming the victim will undoubtedly continue.
Objection: The Double Bind
The Passantinos section on the double bind, or circular reasoning, is rather curious. The Passantinos assert that the exit counselor provides no proof to the cultist that his or her group uses coercive persuasion. The authors say, "If you leave the cult as a result of deprogramming (or exit counseling), that proves you were under mind-control. If you return to the cult, that proves you are under mind-control" (p. 34).
This quote presumes that exit counselors don't do any homework before taking on a case, that they simply come into a situation and say, "Yup, it's mind-control." Before seeing a cult member, exit counselors who are thorough will make a reasonable determination that the group member really is in a group that uses thought-reform techniques. Those who are not subjected to mind-control, even though the family may think they are (e.g., a family complains that their son in Bahai no longer goes to Christian church services and therefore must be under mind-control) will not be considered for an exit counseling. Thus, competent exit counselors do not place group members in a double bind because the counselors determine that exit counseling is appropriate before seeing the person. We are not saying that no exit counselor views every unorthodox group as characterized by mind-control, or that such a person would not place group members in a double bind. We are saying that the exit counselors we have worked with demonstrate much more discernment and integrity than the Passantinos give them credit for.
Thus, the Passantinos are mistaken when they say, "The standard for determining mind-control is not some objective evaluation of mental health or competency, but merely the assumed power of mind-control the critic accords to the cult" (p. 34). The Passantinos seem to overlook the fact that exit counselors arrive on the scene literally with suitcases full of evidence. Responsible exit counselors will have documentation on the practices of the group and how those practices relate to principles of mind-control. Such documentation may take the form of personal testimonies of former members of the group, of relatives of members or former members, or of law enforcement officials or other agency personnel who have investigated the group or otherwise had dealings with it. The documentation may be from news reports on the activities of the group or the writings of mental health professionals. Exit counselors will also have a history of how the cult members personality has changed since joining the cult. Exit counselors will note the member's reactions to their presentation of information about the group and its practices. For example, the cult member may meet contrary information with a response such as, "All this stuff is just a bunch of lies of the devil." An experienced exit counselor will show the cult member that such remarks really do not settle the issue of whether or not the information is correct. The exit counselor will challenge the cult member to examine the evidence, to put the evidence to the test of veracity. Although one might challenge the persuasiveness of the exit counselor's evidence, fair-mindedness demands that their competence and diligence be respected. Exit counselorsat least the competent and ethical onesare not the unthinking, hired guns that the Passantinos make them out to be.
The remaining part of this section in the Passantinos article has to do with definitional issues. Here the Passantinos do two things. First, they demonstrate that the network of cult critics disagree about how best to define terms such as "mind-control" and "cult." This is true. Their discussion of Enroth (1977, 1992) and certain contributors to Langone's (1993) Recovery from Cults (Zimbardo, Andersen, & Galanti) demonstrates simply that different scholars in the field conceptualize the issues somewhat differently from Singer, Martin, and others. None of us tries to enforce a "party line." And, as noted previously, theoretical clarification and refinement is a need in this field. However, these differing perspectives do not negate a common base, a common recognition that certain groups do things to some people that seriously diminish their informed consent and seriously violate a number of generally accepted ethical precepts.
The second point the Passantinos make, however, is way off the mark. They say:
A definition of mind-control that removes its involuntary component is intrinsically at odds with the prevailing teachings of Singer, Hassan, Martin, and others that cult victims are unable to think for themselves or make decisions. Instead, it is more in agreement with the case we have been arguing that cult members are capable of independent thought and rational choice-making, but because of factual and spiritual deception, faulty presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, and improper religious commitments, they make unwise choices and adopt false beliefs instead (p. 34).
Again, there is a little truth mixed in with error here. We reiterate: we do not believe Singer, Hassan, and others hold this robotic view of mind-control that the Passantinos attribute to them. Certainly, we do not. Further, the Passantinos' description of cult dynamics in the above quote fails to recognize that through deception and seductive, specious reasoning cult members have been taught that "independent thought and rational choice" are "rebellious," "factious," "divisive," and/or "of the devil." This is not to say that cult members are totally incapable of independent thought. On the contrary, in many areas, most members are still able to make their own decisions; but typically these are areas in which the cult has not made rules or pronouncements. We would also expand the Passantinos' description of cult dynamics to be more specifically applicable to spiritually legalistic or restrictive cults. Such groups present a form of religious legalism (rule keeping) which, through cunning and clever reasoning, a "spiritual leader" is able to persuade his followers is the will of God. The cult member, convinced that this is "of God," may be driven by guilt and fear to the point of exhaustion. Such an environment can lead to severe depression, anxiety, or even, in some cases, nervous breakdown and attempted or successful suicide.6
In addition, how do the Passantinos know that solely spiritual deception, faulty presuppositions, fallacious reasoning, improper religious commitments, and unwise choices cause cultists problems? If a person joins a cult, according to the Passantinos, he has been spiritually deceived and has made an improper religious decision. Well, how do the authors know? Have they talked to him? The Passantinos may respond, "Well, yeah, we did, but he denies he's deceived." So, the Passantinos could end up in circular reasoning themselves. If the ex-cult member admits he was spiritually deceived, then the Passantinos are right. But if he denies he was spiritually deceived, he does so, according to the Passantinos, because he is spiritually deceived.
Objection: The Brainwashing Evidence
In the section on brainwashing, the authors argue that all the relevant literature shows that brainwashing is not particularly effective. This argument is very odd. Are the Passantinos saying there is no such thing as brainwashing? Are they saying there is brainwashing, but it does not work very well? Or are they saying, "Brainwashing does work, but only on a few people"? It seems that the Passantinos are suddenly jumping from presuppositional arguments against brainwashing of any kind to admission on empirical grounds that there is brainwashing of an involuntary, robotic, Manchurian-Candidate type, but that it doesn't happen very often. Which way do they want it? Do they discount brainwashing on biblical and other presuppositions? If so, then they can't allow for even rare cases of brainwashing on the basis of empirical evidence.
They go on to state that the Koreans and Chinese used extreme forms of physically coercive persuasion, but very few prisoners changed their basic worldviews and commitments. However, the footnote attached to this remark (n. 36) quotes psychologist Gary Collins as writing,
Fewer than 15% of the prisoners in Korean detention camps collaborated with the enemy. When the war was over and prisoners were given their freedom, only a few chose to remain in Communist China. Of these, several later rejected the Communist way of life and returned home (Collins, 1969, p. 148).
The figure of 15% seems to us, however, to be quite high, especially when the standard is collaboration. Apparently, the U.S. military was sufficiently impressed by these results that soldiers in Vietnam were warned not to resist, but instead were told to do whatever it took to stay alive.7 Moreover, others report much higher figures related to collaboration.
In addition to Segal's (1957) assertion that "70 percent of all the repatriated Army PW's [sic]" collaborated in some way with the enemy, Hinkle and Wolff, in their testimony at hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations of the U. S. Senate (1956), when asked, "What percentage [of POWs] confess in some manner?" agreed that the figure would be "well over 90 percent" and that "it would be a very small group who do not sign some form of protocol, which is called a confession..." (1956, p.20).
Further, what about the huge numbers who were radically transformed in the Chinese revolutionary colleges mentioned earlier? What about the large segments of the Chinese Christian community that succumbed to Mao? What about the classified military experiments that were discontinued because those conducting them could not devise effective means to resist brainwashing?8Why would mothers in Iran during the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime send their young children into the minefields to explode mines so that the soldiers could then cross the fields? History is replete with examples of horrendously irrational behavior that people engage in when under the influence of mind-control. We have talked to many women who, while members of the Children of God, willingly engaged in "flirty fishing" (using sex to recruit new members) at the urging of their leaders. When they came out of the group's mind-set they said, "I just can't believe I did that. I wasn't in my right mind." Any historian can document that some of the most radical things that have ever been done in history, especially current history, were done by men who had put masses of people under their control. We only have to look at Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Khomeini. The senior author of this article has had hundreds of desperate parents tell him, "Our son isn't the person we once knew. We don't know what has happened to him." If mind-control does not exist or is ineffective, we would hate to see something that is effective.
The Passantinos state further that the Korean and Chinese "techniques of torture, beatings, and group dynamics," and the CIA experiments with drugs, all failed to produce even one potential Manchurian Candidate, and that the CIA program was finally abandoned. The Passantinos have chosen the most infamous examples of failed attempts of using mind-control, and then try to use them to debunk the effectiveness of all methods of mind-control. This seems like another instance of the Passantinos' violating one of their own cautions from their book Witch Hunt, namely, "Similar Does Not Prove Same" (Passantino & Passantino, 1991). They have failed to take account of the GAP study (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1957, pp. 272-274) of downed American pilots in Korea and how many of those were led to believe that the US was engaging in germ warfarewell over 50% of the American pilots not only signed statements that America was engaging in germ warfare over Korea, but they also believed it. We do not consider a 50+% success rate ineffective. If the Passantinos are going to cite the brainwashing literature, they should cite all of it, including the studies that point to the remarkable successes of some mind-control efforts.
The Passantinos say, "Some mind-control model advocates bring up studies that they feel provide objective data in support of their theories. Such is not the case. These studies are generally flawed in several areas: (1) Frequently the respondents are not from a wide cross section of ex-members" (p. 37). First of all, invoking methodological purity is a common ploy for avoiding the real issue in psychological discussion. Psychology is not nuclear physics. It is rare to find fields in which all the relevant research uses representative samples. That is why replication of empirical studies is so important and also why clinical findings are respected, despite their limitations. These methodological problems are compounded by ethical constraints on research (one cannot study the effects of trauma, for example, by randomly assigning one group of subjects to a bus crash and another group to a pleasant bus ride) that are especially applicable to the field of cultic studies. Nevertheless, a growing body of empirical literature and a huge amount of clinical experience supports the primary contention of mind-control advocates¾ namely, that cult involvement causes psychological distress to many if not most cult members (Galanter, 1989; Langone, 1993; MacDonald, 1988; Martin et al. 1992; Yeakley, 1988).
The Passantinos also say that it is "almost impossible to gather data from the same individuals before cult affiliation, during cult affiliation, and after cult disaffection" (p. 37). This is true, but it does not mean that psychological researchers are helpless. The same problem existed with regard to the study of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among Vietnam vets. There was no way to study them before they suffered PTSD; yet some excellent studies have been done using regression analysis (Winocur, Whitney, Sorenson, Vaughn, & Foy, 1997).
Objection: Low Recruitment Rates
The Passantinos raise an objection to the mind-control model on the basis of "low recruitment rates." They write:
Studies show that the vast majority of young people approached by new religious movements (NRMs) never join despite heavy recruitment tactics... Eileen Barker documents that out of 1,000 people persuaded by the Moonies to attend one of their overnight programs in 1979, 90% had no further involvement. Only 8% joined for more than one week and less than 4% remained members in 1981, two years later (p. 37).
In our opinion, the fact that almost 4% stayed in the group after one overnight program is remarkable! That is amazing compared to Billy Graham's crusades in which only about 1% of the attendees heed the altar call. And those who do heed the altar call return to their families, jobs, and personal lives. They do not become full-time missionaries like the 4% who join the Moonies after a brief workshop (Langone, 1993). That the Passantinos seem impressed by Barker's finding reveals again their lack of understanding of mind-control. No responsible mind-control advocate ever said that mind-control is 100% effective on everyone, just as no doctor ever said that Tylenol is ineffective because not everyone who takes it finds relief from headache. Are the Passantinos saying that mind-control must be 100% effective in order to exist at all? Are they again shifting from a presuppositional position, which says that mind-control cannot exist because people can't lose their free will, to an empirical argument that says mind-control does exist, people do lose their free will, but it doesn't work very well because only a very few people succumb? What do they really wish to say?
Low recruitment rates demonstrate that a mind-control environment interacts with idiosyncrasies within the person or his situation, not that mind-control does not exist. A net will only catch fish bigger than the net's holes. If a majority of fish pass through the net safely, one does not conclude that the net does not exist. Mind-control is defined by its conditions, not its results, just as a net is defined by its structure, not how many fish it catches. The power of mind-control is revealed in what it does to those whom it captures, not by the number that it captures. Recruitment creates the opportunity for mind-control to occur. Recruitment, though it may be very manipulative, is not necessarily a full-fledged mind-control program (Zablocki, 1997).
Objection: High Attrition Rates
The Passantinos' next objection is a corollary of the last-namely, "high attrition rates." The authors assert that the fact that many people who join cults eventually leave them within a year or two without outside aid is "deadly to the mind-control model" (p. 37). If mind-control did exist, they imply, no one would be able to break its hold by himself. This is a distraction. The issue is not whether there are high attrition rates or low conversion rates. The issue is whether mind-control exists. We know of no professional who believes that mind-control is 100% effective. On the other hand, an examination of history reveals that when mind-control is effective, it can be deadly. How else do we explain the mass suicide of 912 people in Jonestown? 9 A coincidental gathering of spiritually deceived individuals? What kind of hold did David Koresh have over his followers that made them stay in the building after the FBI started spraying tear gas into it? They had from about 6 o'clock in the morning untill about noon to leave before the building finally caught fire. They could have left. What kept them in there? What made one woman run back into the fire after she had run out of the burning building? We could offer story after story of similar incidents. What led an innocent boy from a small town in Illinois, Danny Kraft, to participate in the killing of a mother, a father, a 13-year-old girl, an 11-year-old girl, and an 8-year-old girl? What led the Nazis to gas Jews by the millions, and what led millions of Germans to pretend they did not know what was going on?
The effects of mind-control can be diminished by numerous factors. One of them is how conflicts and dissonance are dealt with. One young woman, describing her own voluntary exit, said that every time she had a doubt or a misgiving about the group she would put it on an invisible shelf so she wouldnt have to deal with it. But then one day, the shelf got too heavy and caved in (Tobias & Lalich, 1994, p. 55). In other words, eventually there were simply too many doubts and questions, and she was no longer able to ignore them; she had to deal with them.
Another factor that may weaken mind-control is a traumatic event that occurs in the cult member's life or in the group as a whole. This could be a beating administered (or threatened) by the leader or another member at the leader's behest. Haferd and Outlaw describe one such incident involving Rose Watson Thomas, a member of an obscure group named the Christian Alliance Holiness Church. They write:
Rose was terrified of what would happen when [an expected phone call from the imprisoned leader] came through. Since the night before, the commune residents had harangued her and threatened her with punishment. And she had seen the punishment that Bishop Thomas [her father-in-law] meted out to those who displeased him in his Christian Alliance Holiness Churchmerciless bloody beatings that left men and women with flayed skin on their backs and flowing wounds for days afterward. This time, Rose felt sure, she was going to be the one who would be beaten. She was sure the bishop's next orders would deal with the punishment to be inflicted upon her. So Rose had decided to take her son and run away from The Frontier [the cult's compound in eastern Ohio] (Haferd & Outlaw, 1993, p. 5).
The ability to leave a cult on one's own is not necessarily a sign of health, that is, that the individual has been unaffected by the group. To say and acknowledge that many people do leave cults on their own does not address the question of why they leave, or whether they have been detrimentally affected during the time of their involvement, in spite of the fact that eventually they are able to walk away. We believe it is a gross error to assume that those who leave cults on their own are as healthy psychologically and spiritually (or even physically) as when they joined.
Objection: The Anti-religious Bias of Mind-control Assumptions
The Passantinos' next objection is "the anti-religious bias of mind-control assumptions." Basically the Passantinos say that brainwashing is a value judgment rather than an analytical concept, and that the brainwashing/mind-control model almost inevitably arises from or creates an antireligious bias. They quote sociologist Thomas Robbins, who says that the mind-control model derives from Enlightenment ideals that seek to liberate man from religion. Then, they quote William Sargant, who argued that Christian evangelical preaching techniques are similar to Communist brainwashing methods. Finally, they refer to Conway and Siegelman, who criticized fundamentalist Christians in the first edition of their book Snapping.
We fail to see, however, what relevance the antireligious sentiments of some authors have to do with the modern concept of cult mind-control as held in particular by evangelical proponents of the model. That some people in the field might be biased against religion does not mean the concept itself is antireligious or necessarily leads to such a bias. Mind-control theories can apply to a religious setting, a psychotherapy setting, a political setting, a business setting. Are mind-control advocates, then, antipsychotherapy, antipolitics, and antibusiness? Are mind-control advocates antimilitary because the concept was first studied under military conditions? Hardly.
Ron Enroth, well known for his evangelical convictions, cannot be accused of an antireligious bias when he says there are churches that abuse (Enroth, 1992). Rather, he speaks as a modern prophet against mistreatment of God's flock. Did the prophet Ezekiel have an antireligious bias when he rebuked the wicked shepherds who were exploiting, harming, and destroying the people of God? In this section, the Passantinos employ an ad hominem argument that is rather poorly thought out. If we were to employ this form of reasoning, we might conclude that the Passantinos are guilty of an "antisecular" bias. It seems that once again the Passantinos have violated their rule, "Similar Does Not Prove Same" (Passantino & Passantino, 1991).
The Passantinos also maintain that the inability to draw a clear-cut line between a legitimate religion and a cult is final proof that mind-control does not exist. Would they use the same reasoning regarding domestic abuse? When does a husband's verbal criticism of his wife become verbal abuse? When does spanking a child become child abuse? Where are the clear-cut lines in these cases? Or where is the clear-cut line between political authority and dictatorship? If the authors can locate it, they will be in great demand all over the world.
The last paragraph of this section is particularly troubling. The Passantinos write, "In short, there is no objective, evidential way to define groups that are 'good' (not using mind-control) versus groups that are 'bad' (using mind-control)" (p. 38). But this is simply not true. A group can be evaluated according to explicit criteria. For example, is it characterized by the use of certain techniques, such as Lifton's eight criteria of thought reform? That is, does it use milieu control, mystical manipulation? Does it have a sacred science? Does it practice doctrine over person? Does it have a loaded language? Does it have a "cult of confession," the demand for purity? Does it dispense with the existence of nonmembers, whether spiritually or physically? One of the most famous books in psychology, The Open and Closed Mind, explains how these systems work (Rokeach, 1960). There is a wealth of literature in the social sciences about controlling, tight organizations versus loose organizations. There are criteria in political science for determining what is and is not a totalitarian system. Moreover, research is now underway to validate the first measure of group psychological abuse (Chambers, Langone, Dole, & Grice, 1994). Undoubtedly, future research will result in improvements in our capacity to evaluate the destructiveness of group environments.
Objection: Creating Victims
The Passantinos object to the mind-control model because, they say, it "creates victims." We would argue instead that it is mind-control, not the mind-control model, that creates victims. We would also argue that cult survivors are revictimized by those, such as the Passantinos, who lay all or most of the blame for their plight at their own feet.
The authors introduce this objection by writing:
Many people who join cults want to help the needy, forsake materialism, or develop personal independence from their familiesnot necessarily bad goals, although misguided by false cult teachings. The cult mind-control model, however, attributes cult membership primarily to mind-control and thereby denigrates or discounts such positive activities and goals, misaffiliated to cults as they are (p. 38).
This passage again illustrates the Passantinos' failure to clearly understand what mind-control model advocates actually say. Mind-control is not exercised in a vacuumit needs information to work with, whether it is cult-generated doctrine or the hopes, dreams, fears, and hang-ups of the potential recruit. Thus, the goals listed by the Passantinos may be used by the cult recruiter as "hooks" to draw the target into the sphere of the group. We do not denigrate such goals at all. We applaud any positive aims and activities. The problem is that they can also be used as lures to attract new members, or as ploys to achieve legitimacy in the community. Most of our clients at Wellspring say, "This is why I joined the group. I wanted to help the needy, forsake materialism, develop some personal independence from my family, and grow up. I wanted to serve the Lord." Jim Jones' Peoples Temple took over nursing homes in the San Francisco Bay Area, significantly improving them to the benefit of the residents. Peoples Temple members also helped drug addicts kick their habits and obtain education. These and many other activities of the Peoples Temple were highly commendable and worth doing, were it not for the fact that Jones exploited these achievements ultimately to lead people to their deaths.
The Passantinos go on to say:
The mind-control model also fails to give proper weight to the role natural suggestibility plays in making people vulnerable to the cults. Highly suggestible people are especially susceptible to religious salesmanship as well as many other "sales pitches" (pp. 38-39).
On the contrary, this is exactly the point we have made. Suggestibility probably does make people more susceptible to mind-control. 10 Some people are naturally more suggestible than others, others go through periods in life in which they are more suggestible than at other times (e.g., times of crisis, bereavement, or transition of some kind or another). In such a condition people may be victimized, whether by a con artist, a Lothario, or a cult recruiter. It is not "adopting a victimization perspective" that "strips the cult member of his capacity for rational activity." Rather, it is the victimization itself that does thisthough we acknowledge that it does so to varying degrees in different people.
The Passantinos assert that "the cult mind-control model epitomizes a 'victim' mentality" (p. 39). They quote Hassan's remarks about the cult member being caught in a trap as an illustration of this "victim" mentality. We find it surprising that the Passantinos should object to this in light of the Apostle Paul's admonition to the Colossians, "Make sure that no one traps you and deprives you of your freedom by some secondhand, empty, rational philosophy based on the principles of this world instead of on Christ" (Col. 2:8, Jerusalem Bible, emphasis added). Elsewhere, Paul reproaches the Christians of Corinth for "tolerating somebody who makes slaves of you, makes you feed him, imposes on you, orders you about and slaps you in the face" (2 Corinthians 11:20, Jerusalem Bible, emphasis added).
Next, the Passantinos appear to digress into a victim-bashing section in which they take potshots at John Bradshaw and his dysfunctional family theory, adult children of alcoholics, the various 12-step programs, and claims of repressed memories that later proved to be false memories.
Some would argue that in some cases mind-control by unethical or incompetent therapists caused false memories of abuse to arise. But that is only one of many possible explanations. We agree with the Passantinos that a persons developing false memories in therapy does not necessarily mean the therapist was practicing thought reform. Yet ironically, false memories are sometimes produced by thought reform. So the Passantinos confront a dilemma: how can they believe in the creation of false memories (and they clearly do), and yet deny powerful influence techniques, such as thought reform? The Passantinos seem to believe that psychological influence can be so powerful that in a few sessions a therapist can (sometimes unwittingly) convince a client that her parents are really members of a satanic cult that sexually abused her for years. Yet, they deride the notion that a group led by a skillful, psychopathic leader can cause radical behavioral changes in people who may be under the group's influence 24 hours a day for many months or years.
The Passantinos again quote Barker, who says: "Research has shown that, unlike those who have been deprogrammed (and thereby taught that they had been brainwashed), those who leave voluntarily are extremely unlikely to believe that they were ever the victims of mind-control" (p. 39, citing Barker, 1989, emphasis in original). Yet, this is precisely what we would expect. If someone has no knowledge of what happened to him, how could he conclude he was a victim of mind-control? One must be exposed to the information. Barker's conclusion is that this belief in mind-control is inculcated into hapless victims, that they have been deceived again into believing that they were under mind-control. Another alternative, however, is that these people are sufficiently responsible individuals that when presented with information about the techniques of mind-control and examples of it they are able to compare their own experience with that information and reach their own conclusion that "that's exactly what happened to me."11 Moreover, Barker faces the same quandary the Passantinos confront regarding false memory: in three days an exit counselor can completely change a persons outlook, but a group over a period of years allegedly cannot.
Perhaps the Passantinos' rejection of the "victim" label for cult members stems from their partially correct criticism of today's pop psychology in which
everyone is a victim. One doesn't need to be saved from one's own sins as much as from the sins of others. Psychology and sociology have replaced Scripture for understanding human behavior and developing emotionally and spiritually healthy persons. Yet nowhere in Scripture do we find support for the complaint first voiced by Eve that 'the devil or the cult leader made me do it.' One cannot remove human responsibility without also destroying human morality (p. 40).
Once again, these remarks are based on a distorted view of mind-control and an either/or approach to understanding human behavior: either psychology and sociology, or the Bible. However, we do not see the necessity of such a dichotomy, though we recognize that some psychosociological and theological theories and approaches leave much to be desired. The Passantinos seem to disallow any reference to prior abuse as even a partial explanation for the current problems many people experience. We believe this is both unfair and detrimental to the individual's healing.
The Passantinos seem to advocate an improper use of the Bible that is disturbingly common in some evangelical and fundamentalist circles. The Bible is implicitly viewed as the only textbook necessary for psychology, not just for doctrine and morality. But the Bible does not make such a claim for itself. Are we to view it as the only textbook necessary for geology, geography, or architecture? Shall we make all engineering students study only the Old Testament because it contains instructions on how to build the tabernacle or the temple and thus all construction must be based on those models? Or shall we base medicine only on what is in the Bible?
Why, all of a sudden, are human sciences suddenly limited to what is in the Bible? Who drew this arbitrary line and said, "We can study astronomy, geology, medicine, whatever, but the Bible must be the only textbook for the human sciences"? That is absurd. The facts refute this. Does the Bible talk about manic depressive illness? Does the Bible talk about psychotic depression? Does the Bible talk about panic disorders or agoraphobiawhat causes them, how are they cured? Does the Bible distinguish between organic and functional psychoses? Does the Bible explain what learning disabilities are, what hyperactivity is? Does the Bible explain what a personality disorder is, how a dependent personality can be distinguished from a borderline personality?
Objection: Theological Inconsistencies
From a theological standpoint, the Passantinos appear to undervalue the role of deceit in the introduction of sin into the world of humans. They write:
If the cult recruiter's skill at manipulation is considered so coercive that members are not responsible for their own beliefs, actions, or even the decision to join/stay in the cult, then many biblical affirmations about personal responsibility and decision-making are jeopardized. To a secular mind-control model advocate, this may seem a trivial objection. But several advocates are Christian evangelicals and must come to terms with the theological inconsistencies introduced when the cult mind-control model is adopted.
For example, in the Garden, Satan personally appeared to orchestrate the temptation of Eveand who could be more persuasive? Our first parents succumbed to the temptation and were cast out of the Garden, and all of humanity thereafter has been penalized by this primal sin. If our first parents could be held morally responsible when confronted by the ultimate tempter, how is it that we seek to excuse ourselves or our offspring when confronted by human tempters of far less power, skill, and charisma? (p. 40).
The simple answer to their question is that the analogy between the serpent's beguilement of Eve in the Garden of Eden and what happens in cult recruitment is like comparing apples with chimpanzees. God had explicitly told Adam and Eve in advance, "Don't eat of this tree." The tree was identified, the tree was located. They knew what it was, they knew where it was, they knew all about it. God had given them complete and adequate information. Most people we know who have joined cults did not have anyone (and certainly not anyone with the authoritative voice of God) saying, "Don't join this group, it is evil, and here is the evidence." But that is basically what God did with Adam and Eve. The comparison of the Garden with the cult situation would be more appropriate if God put Adam and Eve into the Garden with no forewarning. They see the fruit on the tree. It looks so good. The serpent is dangling from a branch and says, "This is good fruit, eat it." They eat it and then God comes along and says, "Hey, you two! You just sinned!" They say, "What? We sinned? How did we sin?" "You should have known better than to eat that fruit." "Why should have we known better?" "You were spiritually deceived." "Well, you never told us not to eat that fruit!" "But if you were more spiritual you would have known."
If cult joining is simply a problem of spiritual deception, then the sword cuts both ways. If cult members are responsible because they lack discernment, why is not the Church also responsible for lack of discernment? Why hasn't the church been able to recognize the wolves and warn the flock? Where was the church speaking before Jonestown? Where was the church when Hitler came along? Where was the church when Mao Tse-tung came along? Where was the church when David Koresh came along? Where was the church when Jeffrey Lundgren came along? Who was warning the people who followed these leaders?
There was great silence in the church. There is still great silence in the church. So, if it is only a deception issue, then we're all wrong, we're all deceived. To say that one group is more deceived than the other when the church has consistently sat on its hands in the face of this cult problem and has provided virtually no resources for cult victims is to engage in self-righteous blame-shifting.
Hardly anything is taught about cults in seminaries and Bible schools.12 Pastors know very little about cults, apart from some of the major doctrinal aberrations of the Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses. Currently, there is only one cult rehabilitation center in the world, and that is Wellspring, and it receives very little support from the church. If we are going to talk about discernment, then we had better talk about the churchs discernment and its obligation to heed the prophetic voice that warns about cults and spiritually abusive churches. The church has not often done these things; it usually speaks out only after the fact. The responsibility for the appalling silence and even complicity of the church in Nazi Germany rests on the heads of evangelicals as fully as it does on those of liberals and Catholics. The appalling silence of the evangelical church with the rise of Red China rests on our heads, too. We could just go down the list. The discernment issue applies equally to other abuses besides those relating to cults. As we write this, the church is experiencing more persecution worldwide than at any time in history. To be sure, some Christians are sounding the alarm, but too few know of the problems. Again, discernment is an issue for those in leadership, not just for the victims.
Mind-control (or thought reform, coercive persuasion, or whatever one might call it) is not merely a secular concept. It is also a biblical concept related to the problem of evil and how all men and women are affected by evil. No group of Christians or non-Christians is any less immune to thought reform than any other. What produces discernment? Is it obedience? Is it more Bible reading? Is it going to seminary? Is it education? Are the discerning more holy or righteous?
The Passantinos appear to be answering this last question in the affirmative. If so, their argument runs counter to the Reformation concepts of the grace of God, the corruption of sin, and justification by faith aloneall beliefs that the Passantinos hold. Their argument appears to imply that humans are capable of unassisted evaluation of data concerning God, and of making unassisted free choices in relation to spiritual matters. Thus, they castigate cult members for being "undiscerning." But according to the Bible in the Reformed tradition, revelation and grace are paramount. Humans may examine the universe and their own nature to learn its complexities, but they may only know about God as he has revealed himself. Furthermore, they may make free choices for or against that revelation only by the grace of God. Without grace, they are only capable of rejecting whatever revelation they might receive. Any other view denies the utter sinfulness of the human condition and subverts the unmerited grace of God. Humans, then, are only responsible for thoughtfully and purposely rejecting revelation and resisting grace, not for making "flawed choices from bad data."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that somehow there is a spiritual hierarchy in which some individuals are less susceptible to cults than others, on what basis are they less susceptible? If their susceptibility is based on works (acquiring information and critical-thinking skills), then, according to the Reformation tradition, their behavior has no spiritual value.13 But if cult-avoiding discernment is based on faith, then all Christians have that and should be able to avoid cults. Thus, the Passantinos have a grave problem, because the empirical evidence unequivocally shows that numerous Christians have joined a variety of cults. Where, then, does discernment come from? Is it always a sin issue in the Scripture, or is it an issue of education, knowledge, and awareness?
Discernment may be lost because one willfully chooses to sin, but discernment may also be lacking because one has not been educated or warned. Is one group (cult victims) culpable, but the other (the church or society that fails to warn about cults) not? Is evil the underlying process and factor with both kinds of discernment deficits? In other words, is our ability to be deceived part of the human condition, part of our fallen nature? If so, and we believe it is, then the cult victim and the silent church and society alike suffer from Adam's fallen nature. But in saying this we are not saying that cult joining is a sin problem that must be dealt with evangelistically. Rather, we are saying that the cult problem for the church and the cult victim alike is akin to the problem of physical disease. Illness, as well as death, is a direct result of the Fall. But the cure for disease is not evangelization leading to spiritual redemption. The cure for disease consists of medicine and education. Through much of history, the church has been largely responsible for the advancement of medical science in the world. Likewise, the church needs to see the problem of cults fundamentally as a problem of evil whose solution is, to be sure, bathed in the prayers of believers, but realized via science and education as well as theology.
The Passantinos' conclusion is a call for evangelization of cult members. But their vision in this regard is a truncated view of Judeo-Christian ethics and theology. Christians and others have traditionally had an interest in opposing sinful systems as well as providing spiritual comfort for those caught in them. The desire for the salvation of the souls of those bound in the literal chains of slavery was admirable, but without the courage of Christian statesmen such as William Wilberforce, strongly supported by John Wesley and other Christian leaders, we might still have slavery in Britain and America. Evangelizing those "who have very real spiritual, emotional, and social needs" and who "are looking for fulfillment and significance for their lives" (p. 40) without working against the oppression that enslaves them is hypocrisy. We believe God loves cult members and wants us to work for their freedom, whether or not they choose to follow him.
Barker, E. (1989) New religious movements: A practical introduction. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Paul R. Martin, Ph.D., Lawrence A. Pile,
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