

Excerpts from a 160-page secret DIA report that shows President Bush inherited a dangerous world in January 2001.

### III. Global Issues and Assessment

Operational Issues

governments — insurgents and to a lesser extent, narcotics trafficking organizations — and that generated by external elements, most notably Islamic extremists. Although these elements are expected to focus on Israeli or other Middle Eastern targets, the Americas also provide a potential avenue to the U.S. homeland and an external source of income.

(3) **Asian terrorism** will be fueled in religious extremism and ethnic differences. In some cases, governments will use terrorists or insurgents to further territorial goals in neighboring countries. Viable countries like Afghanistan will provide safe havens for external and terrorist groups.

(4) **African terrorism** in general will be generated by ethnic differences and will be a subject of intergovernmental or separatist. Transnational terrorist organizations will



(10) U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi

find **Al Qaeda** favorable environment in which to operate, as poor security and unstable governments permit.

**Long Term Outlook**

(5) New developments in technology will be used primarily to improve methods of delivery or concealment of terrorist weapons. The emphasis will be on simplicity, effectiveness and limited risk to the terrorist, his organization or sponsor. Terrorists increasingly will use information operations to collect intelligence and potentially to attack infrastructure.

(6) It is probable that terrorist organizations or individuals will employ a weapon of mass destruction against U.S. interests by 2020. Heightened publicity about the vulnerability of civilian targets, an increased interest in inflicting mass casualties, emergence of less predictable groups and greater availability of WMD-related production knowledge and technology have already drawn the attention of some terrorist organizations. Additionally, the high or black market value of WMD is a potentially powerful psychological weapon in itself, and its use can be expected to increase in the future.

#### WMD PROLIFERATION

(1) Proliferation by adversaries and non-weaponized states will lead to enhanced warfighting capabilities that will complicate U.S. contingency planning. U.S. forces may have to engage in warfare in which advanced



(10) UNSCOM inspectors arrive in Iraq

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 Transnational Issues

because they are resistant to current Western countermeasures, and are not effectively captured by the CWI.

(SNP) Many of the components needed for chemical or biological agent weaponization are used in other types of weapon systems, many of which are available in the international arms market. Chemical and biological agents can be disseminated by tube and rocket artillery, ground and naval mines, aerial bombs, submunition dispensers for aircraft, and a wide variety of spray devices. An increasing number of countries are also capable of employing unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles for chemical and biological attack. Terrorist use of chemical and biological agents is also possible.

(SNP) Currently, those countries that have a delivery capability for both chemical and biological agents include Russia, Iraq, China, and North Korea. Iran has a chemical weapons capability and probably a limited biological agent delivery means. Libya, South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, North Korea, and Syria have chemical weapons capabilities. In addition, Pakistan, Sudan, Serbia, and Croatia are believed to have programs to develop CW capabilities. Moreover, Libya, Syria, and Pakistan probably can produce biological agents on a limited scale and presumably have some means of delivery even if not by military systems.

(U) Chemical and biological agents threats also can derive from sources other than conventional armed forces of low-technology states. The nature of agent dissemination devices is such that special operations forces and terrorist groups can use chemical and biological agents.

conventional weapons, and WMD are used directly against U.S. forces, and on access and embarkation points. Conflict between other nations or groups to which such weapons are used may also affect subsequent U.S. involvement.

**Chemical/Biological Weapons (CBW)**

(U) The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) remains in place, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in April 1997, is gaining wide acceptance. Nevertheless, some countries will maintain covert chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Many countries possess the infrastructure to develop chemical and biological weapons, and those lacking an indigenous capability can purchase it. Furthermore, chemical and biological warfare programs can be concealed within legitimate dual use R&D and industrial operations.

(U) Agents such as sarin and mustard, now the mainstay of chemical warfare arsenals, will continue to be a threat in the near term, and the persistent nerve agent VX will enter the operational inventories of more countries as their programs mature. An increasing number of countries with biological warfare programs will be able to develop infectious agents such as anthrax and plague, as well as toxins such as botulinum and ricin, for weaponization. U.S. forces, deployed in either military or peacekeeping roles, could be exposed to these agents.

(SNP) Agent delivery developments (programs will continue to focus on microencapsulation, particulate aerosol (dry) preparations, and other agent formulation components that enhance effectiveness. New types of agents, such as modified infectious organisms, low-molecular-weight phytochemically active substances that disrupt body functions, and synthetic/modified toxins, are also in development. A new generation of toxin agents developed originally by the Soviets pose a significant problem

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in ways that could have a major impact on national security and warfighting capabilities. The technology required to disseminate agents using aircraft, trucks, small boats, or man-portable devices is readily obtainable in the form of agricultural sprayers and similar forms of equipment. Improvised devices are also likely to be used for agent dissemination.

**Nuclear**

(S) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology poses a particularly grave threat. A related problem involves the transfer of nuclear technology of all types, including that used for peaceful purposes, as well as the improper security and handling of nuclear materials that are dangerous in their natural or processed form. The threat will grow as more nuclear technology is used. Several factors, including increasing nuclear counterproliferation agreements, general geopolitical opposition, and the fact that nuclear weapon technology is

expensive and difficult to obtain, will preclude the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the number of countries acquiring nuclear weapon technology and materials will slowly increase into the next century.

(S) By 2030 Iraq, Iraq, and perhaps Libya will have produced or purchased nuclear weapons, assuming their respective leadership maintains the will to do so. Other countries such as Germany and Japan, which have developed their technology base and finite material production base in support of their civilian nuclear power programs, could develop a nuclear warhead within a year should the political decision be made to pursue such capability.

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Selected Worldwide Nuclear Weapons Inventories		
Country	1992	2020
Russia*		
Strategic	4,200-10,400	1,400-2,400
Tactical	4,500-15,900	3,400-4,000
China		
ICBM	40-45	180-220**
SLBM	0-12	28-44
SSBM	100	150-200
India		
Population	10-15	60-70
Israel	25-38	40-80
Israel	50-80	65-85
North Korea***	1-2	10+
Iran		10-20
Iraq		10-20

**Biggest problem: Chemical and biological capabilities used by subnational groups that are not easily deterred or identified. Growing threat: tactical operations and terrorism.**



(U) Jordan Shattir-J nuclear test site.

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(U) The proliferation of WMD increases the probability that armed forces or a terrorist attack will have a CW/BW component.



69 Russian troops working for food.


(5) Given the magnitude of the armed forces' problems and the paucity of resources available to deal with them, the condition of Russia's military will not improve substantially over the next decade and in some areas could get worse.

(6) At the extreme, Russia's military could even face institutional collapse, punctuated by military unrest, mutinies, and violent political intervention.

(7) Limited defense funds have forced a Russian emphasis on nuclear weapons, which in turn has accelerated the deterioration in conventional force capabilities. This downward spiral leaves Russia with extremely unattractive options for dealing with the regional conflicts, territorial disputes, peace-keeping operations, and terrorist threats that it will most likely face over the next decade.

military reform process remains in limbo while the armed forces descend deeper into crisis. Defense-industrial capabilities continue to deteriorate, raising doubt on Russia's ability to produce and deploy future generations of high tech weapons.

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**Longer-Term Potential**

(5) Beyond the next decade, prolonged political and economic difficulty probably will yield a chronically weak military that could do little beyond defend Russia's borders. Such a force would pose less of an external threat than an internal danger due to its instability and questionable reliability, particularly if skilled on for internal disorders and threats. However, a chronically weak Russia might also have a greater propensity to compensate by resorting to other means, such as covert operations or diplomatic grandstanding.

(6) The possibility also exists that under the right conditions — effective political leadership, sustained economic progress, and successful military reform — Russia could emerge 10 years from now as a strengthened regional power with a significantly reduced but modernized military. A strengthened Russia could play a greater role in international military efforts, such as peacekeeping operations. Whether it would employ its new strength in cooperative or less helpful ways, however, would depend on the will of its leaders.

(7) Russia's long-term military direction should become clearer by around 2005, when the lasting impact of leadership transition and the effectiveness of efforts at economic recovery, military reform, and defense industry restructuring, privatizing and modernizing will be more apparent.

**Strategic Forces**

(5) As Russian strategic nuclear force levels shrink, the need to maintain a credible missile attack warning system will increase. Russia's priority will be to ensure that a comprehensive detection system is preserved. In the short term, deficiencies in the nuclear warhead security program, coupled with severe economic constraints, increase the risk of nuclear warheads being diverted, especially by insiders. However, in the longer term, U.S. assistance in improving nuclear warhead security is designed to lead to a reduction in the potential for nuclear warhead diversion.

(6) Ratification of START II in its current form probably will not occur. Acceptance with significant modifications and conditions is more likely. These conditions will complicate the implementation of START II and impede progress on a START III treaty. Ultimately, continued economic instability will push START II further down on the Russian government's overall agenda. It will also continue to be held hostage to the machinations of Russian-American relations involving multiple issues such as Iraq and Kosovo.

(7) Problems with START II ratification and, more important, funding shortfalls have delayed the conversion of SS-18 and SS-19 systems to the SS-27. This is a short-term problem. Age and life extension operations will force resolution of the issue sometime in the next decade. Deployment of the road-mobile SS-27 is expected between 2002 and 2005, thus supplanting the aging SS-25 systems.



68 The prospects for Russia's economic local look bleak for the near decade.

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THE MIDDLE EAST



Islamic community would intercede by then to stop the fighting. Such a conflict, which probably would start in the Aegean, would be primarily an air and naval fight with a Turkish attack on some of the smaller Greek islands in the Aegean and possibly a limited ground operation in Thrace. A conflict that begins in the Aegean would not necessarily spread to Cyprus, but such expansion should not be ruled out. Turkey is expected to hold a quantitative and qualitative edge on force capabilities, though Greece will make modest improvement to its air and air defense capabilities. Greek military equipment acquisitions in the coming years will begin the prospects of a catastrophic defeat at the hands of Turkey.

(C/NF) Turkey sees its position as an epicenter of three unstable regions: the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This "rough neighborhood" will continue to be plagued with problems of ethnic strife, regional conflicts, religious fanaticism, international terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Turkish relations with Syria will increasingly be strained over distribution of water from the Euphrates River. Syria's support for the PKK, Turkey's military cooperation with Israel, and Syrian claims to Hatay Province, both Iraq and Iran will complicate Turkish interests in the region. As with Syria, the Kurds' issue further strains relations with Iraq.

(C/NF) These issues are in addition to Turkey's close relations with the United States and budding relations with Israel. Iran has the potential of becoming the more important Turkish adversary in the Middle East. Competing interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus and the fact that Turkey is a secular Muslim state will place Ankara in odd positions with Iran. Turkey's tactical solutions to regional problems with Iraq and Iran also have the potential for bringing Ankara quickly into conflict with U.S. interests.

(C/NF) Although Turkey appears militarily positioned to survive any of these external challenges and remain a regional power, the Turkish ruling elites will face a fundamen-

tal problem that will likely determine if in fact it can do so. It is almost inconceivable that within the next ten years there will not be a power at which the ongoing ideological clash between secularism and an increasingly fervent Islamic political movement will reach a climax. Squatier forces, led by the military, are expected to charge and will almost certainly remain so for at least the next five years. It is inconceivable, however, whether the secularists can last. Especially just as the military's suppression of the Kurds led the Kurdistan movement, continued efforts to quash Islamic political movements in the midst of a religious revival could lead to deeper divisions in society and across urban violence. The key question, then, would be how long the military — seemingly becoming more and more estranged from civilian society — could maintain control.

BELARUS - UKRAINE - MOLDOVA



(C) These three states will pose opportunities for both cooperation and friction between Europe, Russia, and the United States. Of these, Belarus already has close ties with Moscow. It already has close military cooperation with Russia with political integration by 2005 not being ruled out. Though these military ties pose no near-term conventional threat, it is worth noting that the new NATO area of responsibility will be in direct contact with Belarus.



60 Belarusian President Lukashenko shakes the hands of a NATO official at a national meeting of two former rivals.

Given the dismal state of the Belarusian economy, a potentially unstable state already exists on that border. Ukraine will continue a balanced relationship with Russia — if anything as a deterrent, since Russia is considered its only external threat. In addition, Kiev will continue to pursue close political, economic, and military cooperation with Europe and NATO, eventually establishing both as its primary security relationship. The economic crisis in the Ukraine will limit military capabilities for the next 5 to 10 years. Moldova's problems with its breakaway Transnistria region will continue over the next decade but without significant escalation of the conflict or resolution.

EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

(C) Europe will have moved closer to building a credible, perhaps much different security structure in NATO, but these efforts face many impediments from the European states themselves. Political cohesion of Europe will become equally important to the actual advantages of collective security. The development of ESDI will proceed haltingly for at least the next decade. Its successful implementation will depend on continued support from NATO — but expe-

IV. Regional Assessments  
Air

(U) China is not likely to build the capability to project large conventional forces beyond its immediate borders or nearby seas. China is likely to continue to build a strategic missile/WMD capability.

(U) China's foreign policy will seek to avoid conflict and sustain the trade, investment, and access to technology essential to economic development.

(C) Within this cooperative framework, however, several points of friction will persist. China believes the United States is bent on containing, dividing, and weakening China, and perceives Japan as its principal rival in the region. Chinese leadership views U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation as increasing the long-term Japanese threat. Taiwan remains the major stumbling block to a coherent and unitary China, and will continue to be a focus for the Beijing government. China believes U.S. policy encourages the independence movement in Taiwan both deliberately and inadvertently. Territorial disputes may flare periodically—though Beijing prefers to defer these disputes until it is strong enough to impose peaceful resolutions in its own terms. Furthermore, China remains concerned over ethnic agitation, espe-



(U) Chinese Type 69MB Tank

cially in Tibet and the northwest, and the potential threat such movements pose to the country's stability and unity.

**Military Trends**

(C) The Chinese military will decrease in size during the next two decades to conserve funds for military modernization, although its forces will remain large in comparison with its neighbors. Now numbering about 2.5 million, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) most likely will decline by 10% to 20%.

**The Chinese clock keeps the same time as clocks in the west but the Chinese perception is of decades passing — not hours or days.**

**China's effort to gather technology from open interaction and industrial and governmental espionage will continue. China's involvement with selected countries in proliferation will also continue.**

(U) Absent a major resurgence of Russian power, Beijing sees the air and naval theater from the east as much greater than the ground threat from the north. China's top military priorities will therefore remain its air, air defense, missile, and naval forces, in order to protect Chinese claims in the South China Sea, pose a credible threat to Taiwan, and repel any possible attack from advanced rivals such as the United States or Japan.

(C) With the growth of U.S. long-range strike capabilities, increased defense requests the PLA Navy to expand its operating area further out to sea. The PLA Navy's main strength is an offensive punch against surface ships, especially its anti-ship cruise missiles launched from ships, submarines, aircraft, and land-based elements. China's ability to project a naval task force far missions other than coastal defense will remain limited.

(C) China is well aware it would be at a technological disadvantage against any advanced opponent, and would seek to overcome this through force multipliers or unconventional countermeasures, and tactics. China believes that information operations will become a major factor in future conflicts and is actively restructuring offensive information warfare capabilities.

IV. Regional Assessments  
Air

(S) China has recently streamlined all components of developing an aircraft carrier and related lighter aircraft for its navy. It is possible that this program will be revived some time in the future, but equally likely that Beijing will decide to rely on anti-ship cruise missiles and fleet air defense, and forego a carrier altogether.


(C) China's nuclear strategy will continue to emphasize a survivable retaliatory capability to deter use of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia, or India. China feels this deterrent is at risk over the next decade because of U.S. targeting capabilities, missile accuracy, and potential ballistic missile defenses. Beijing is therefore modernizing and expanding its missile force to restore its deterrent value. Mobile, solid fuel missiles and a new ballistic missile submarine will improve the force's ability to survive a first strike, while more launchers, on-board penetration aids, and possibly multiple warheads will improve its ability to penetrate missile defenses. Nothing indicates China will field the much larger number of missiles necessary to shift from a limited, retaliatory strategy to a first-strike, war-fighting strategy.

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Expected New Chinese Military Systems	Quantity in 2020
Su-27	320
F-16	320
New fighter	60
F-7 fighter-bomber	180
New Surface Warships	20
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles	1,000
AEW Aircraft	25
New SSBN	1

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China: Future Military Trends	1999	2020
Tanks	6,990	7,150
Active Divisions	80	70
Rapid Reaction Divisions	11	21
Fighter/Jet interceptors	3,684	1,550
Ground Attack/Jet Bombers	779	350
Airbus Submarine	67	35
Aircraft Carrier	0	1
Other Surface Warships	54	75
Strategic SAMs	612	1,650
Military Satellites	4	15



Instead, North Korea has prioritized select industrial capabilities, especially a few of its defense industries, relaxed some internal controls to allow its hard-pressed populace more flexibility in acquiring food and other necessities, and boosted the military's internal security role (including enhanced provision for the regime). Ultimately, renewed economic development is likely to hinge on a relaxation of tensions and economic accommodations with Seoul.

(C) Lacking economic power and allies upon whom it can depend for military support, North Korea clearly believes it must maintain a viable military capability at all costs. This provides not only deterrence and, if necessary, defense, but Pyongyang also uses it indirectly as leverage in international negotiations and in the policy formulations of concerned governments. In the short term, the North will retain the ability to inflict enormous destruction on South Korea. Its ability to conduct large-scale maneuver warfare against the South is eroding, but it is attempting to balance this erosion with improvements in long-range artillery, ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and special operations forces and associated delivery platforms. Were conflict to erupt, these elements could wreak heavy damage on the northern part of South Korea.

(S) Social problems, including widespread hunger, increased crime, and corruption among civilian and military officials, have accompanied economic failure. Though the possibility of leadership change cannot be entirely dismissed, the regime, with its enhanced security apparatus, appears firmly in control. The likelihood that North Korea will initiate a war to remedy the peninsula's diminishing is the possibility of conflict opened by internal instability, miscalculation, or provocation is increasing.

(C) In the longer term, North Korea is not likely to maintain its capacity for conventional military operations without reversing its economic decline, and it cannot reverse that decline without major reform, without opening itself to the outside world, and



(D) North Korean SAMMO-class missile submarine.

without relaxing tensions with the South. If it refuses to follow that path, as is likely, it might be able to mobilize through "indirectly" maintaining its missile, nuclear, and special operations capabilities, but losing its capacity for conventional maneuver warfare. If it does not cooperate or reunify with the South, economic rehabilitation of the North will be an enormous task for many years to come and will influence Seoul's relations with China, Japan, and the United States.

#### Military Trends

(S) If North Korea remains hostile, it will maintain its large forward-deployed air force and artillery force, deploying additional long-range systems and emphasizing artillery training. Pyongyang will try to maintain the capabilities of its large special operations forces, including platforms for clandestine insertion of forces into the South. North Korea has thousands of significant underground facilities, dispersed widely throughout the country, making precision destruction of warfighting capability very difficult.

(S) North Korean air and air defense capabilities are modest and will remain so in the future. Economic constraints will preclude buying new aircraft to replace its obsolete, scant inventory, and pilot training will remain inadequate.

(S) Pyongyang will maintain large surface-to-air missile and air defense artillery forces but will have difficulty in investing in newer, more capable systems. The army will continue to harden air and air defense facilities and may upgrade its main anti-

missile air defense command and control system.

#### Missile and WMD Programs

(S) Pyongyang continues to determine effort to develop and field more capable ballistic missiles, supplementing its existing army of older PRIOG, SCUD-B, and SCUD-C missiles. The progress of this program, despite the country's severe economic problems, clearly indicates it is a top priority and likely to continue as long as the regime survives. North Korea has deployed medium-range No Dong missiles over the past two years, capable of hitting U.S. bases in Japan. The No Dong can deliver a 700 kg payload to a range of 1,200 km.

(S) North Korea recently attempted to launch a satellite using a variant of the Taepo Dong 1 (TD-1) MRBM. This launch may have satisfied Pyongyang's requirements for flight testing of the TD-1. The launch demonstrated critical technologies applicable to MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs, such as stage separation and ignition of the second and third stage at altitude. It also demonstrated the potential to substitute an unguided third stage and a smaller payload for the standard TD-1 warhead and guidance package, extending the missile's range at the expense of greatly reduced payload and accuracy.

(S) North Korea also has a program to develop a larger missile, the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) ICBM. Many uncertainties remain, but if this program is successful, Pyongyang

could field a TD-2 ICBM within three years that could deliver a 650 kg warhead to Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest, or a much lighter warhead to most of the United States. The system could be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.

(S) As a two-stage missile, the TD-1 can deliver a 750 kg warhead, large enough for a first-generation nuclear device, to about 2,500 km, covering all of Japan and Okinawa. A three-stage TD-1 could deliver a 250 kg unguided payload to a range of 5,500 km, reaching Alaska and western Hawaii, or a 75 kg payload to most of the continental United States. Over half the payload would have to be the shielded re-entry vehicle to protect the warhead, leaving a very small explosive device and no room for guidance packages.


(S) In the near term, it is unlikely that the North Korean nuclear weapons program can achieve nuclear yield from a 100 kg device. An early-generation warhead weighing 650-750 kg is the best Pyongyang could achieve. A 100 kg payload is sufficient to deliver chemical, biological, or radiological agents (radioactive contaminants). Of these, only biological agents are lightweight enough to cover a large area with such a small payload. Weight constraints and high re-entry velocity severely limit the effectiveness of any dispersal mechanism, however, so even biological agents are not likely to achieve effective wide-area coverage.

(S) North Korea continues efforts to extend the range of its SCUD missiles. The new 1,000 km extended-range SCUD is currently being fielded at Kumsong-ni, 75 km south of the DMZ. With range comparable to the No Dong, but cheaper to construct, the extended-range SCUD (also called SCUD-ER) can deliver a 750 kg warhead to western Japan from Kumsong-ni, or reach all of South Korea, even from southern bases near the Chinese border. In addition



(D) SA-7 SAM on parade.

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to its increased (possibly, the SCUD-ER has proven cheaper to produce than the No Dong.

(S) North Korea is estimated to possess an offensive biological warfare program designed to develop, produce and weaponize agents. Despite limited intelligence on the status of its biological warfare capabilities, North Korea is thought to have developed agents including anthrax, plague, cholera and botulin. The North Korea military will continue to try to increase production rates for traditional biological warfare agents compatible with Pyongyang's effort to develop its pharmaceutical and biological products industries, but is unlikely to deploy genetically engineered biological warfare agents within the next decade.

(S) North Korea almost certainly is self-sufficient in the production of all necessary precursor chemicals for first-generation chemical agents, including nerve agents. The size of the North Korean chemical agent stockpile is unknown, but is estimated to be between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons. Many of North Korea's chemical weapons are stored underground, including in railroad tunnels.



### SOUTHEAST ASIA

(C) Southeast Asian countries will likely forge greater political and economic cooperation through the next decade, but neither ASEAN nor the larger ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will evolve into a cooperative defense alliance similar to Europe's security architecture.

(C) Multilateral mechanisms such as ARF are likely to further enhance ASEAN's regional leadership and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. However, resolution of the area's intractable

(S) Several MENA states could further their economic and political development, becoming more benign. These states might become more receptive to international norms of conduct. Likewise, they could view their strategic military assets as providing stability for their position in the region.

### IRAN

#### Political Outlook

(S) Iran's economic difficulties will influence its domestic and foreign policies through most of the next two decades. Internal demographic-resource tension will drive attempts at internal reform. Iran will evolve into a consensus government with more power-sharing among clerics, technocrats, and secularists. Tehran will reduce emphasis on exporting the revolution, but radical Muslims will probably continue to lead acts of terrorism, some of which will be traceable to Iran. Tehran will continue to seek to undermine regional belief in U.S. security assurances and subvert other regional states that remain pro-Western. Iran will also steadily increase its influence in the Middle East and Central Asia over the next decade as a means of projecting itself as a regional power.



(C) President Khatami

(S) Iran's economy has potential, but economic growth during the rest of the decade is likely to remain sluggish and could suffer significant problems. Oil prices likely will remain weak through 2005, and Iran will have difficulties maintaining the current level of oil exports. Iranian domestic consumption of oil continues to increase, further complicating the economic picture. Natural gas resources will be further exploited, eventually leading to significant amounts of natural gas exports by 2010. Iran is working hard to diversify its economy, develop its industrial base, and increase non-oil exports. Tehran will be moderately successful in these endeavors, particularly in the heavy industrial sectors of mining, metals, and petrochemicals. This should result in a moderate increase in non-oil exports and improvements in the defense industrial sector.

#### Defense Resources

(S) Declining oil revenues will force Iran to prioritize defense spending and delay or cancel at least some procurement and construction projects. However, Iran will continue to assign priority to resources dedicated to its missile and WMD programs. Temporary delays in these programs are possible if the oil revenue decline lasts beyond 2005. Iran can survive temporary reductions in resources allocated to conventional forces and support entities without having a long-term impact on force structure. Iran is likely to protect personnel, but would cut personnel costs around the edges. Special units, such as the Quds force, could avoid cuts entirely.

#### Military Outlook

(S) Iran is expected to present a continuing regional threat unless major political change occurs. It will remain suspicious of Iraqi long-term objectives and is increasingly concerned with its eastern border where the extreme orthodoxy of the Sunnis (Jaibari) challenges the Shiites of Iran's

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## IV Regional Assessments

Middle East — North Africa

Islamic Republic. Iran is developing new military capabilities to deter a post-sensation. Enhancements to its conventional forces will be gradual, with a focus on homeland defense. However, underlying difficulties with eventual effectiveness and overall readiness will remain in place for at least the next several years. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Command (IRGC) will continue to compete with the Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Forces (IRGF) for resources as well as internal responsibilities, adding another challenge to overall Iranian capabilities.

(SNT) Iran should have a greater capability to disrupt the flow of commerce in the Gulf over the next decade, primarily through the use of mine warfare and integrated ships cruise missiles. In fact, absent U.S. intervention, Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic indefinitely. Even in the face of determined U.S. opposition, Iran could deny or substantially interfere with free passage for several weeks. Tehran's ability to conduct mine warfare will continue to increase both in complexity and tactical proficiency. Any vessel in the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) is

**Iran seeks to establish political-military hegemony over the Gulf Region.**



(8) Iranian female troops.

a potential mine-layer, and any civil-regioned ship also holds the same distinction. Iran does not typically utilize purposeful missions for its naval equipment and allows for a high degree of latitude for mining operations. After 2000, the IRIN should be capable of mine-laying operations with its three KJLQ-Class submarines. Iran's acquisition of the Chinese C-402 naval cruise missiles, and Hsinsheng missile patrol craft gives its navy a credible mobile anti-ship cruise missile capability. With both mine laying and cruise missile operations, however, systemic problems in command and control will inhibit overall combat effectiveness for the foreseeable future.

(S) Advances in WMD programs will remain a priority and extend Tehran's military power projection capability. It will continue to place importance on improved ballistic missile capabilities, in part to acquire a strategic strike capability useful against a variety of regional contingencies as well as more distant potential opponents, such as Israel. Iran is expected to have an operational Shahab-3 MRBM sometime in 2000 or 2001. The Iranians could readily adapt their existing SCUD production infrastructure—focusing new production facilities—to manufacture the Shahab-3, with series production beginning about one year after the design is frozen. To adapt existing SCUD facilities, tooling, and equipment to Shahab-3 production is an expedient approach to MRBM production



(9) Iranian soldiers and Cobra helicopter, encountering with ongoing problems.

and would allow Iran to employ a readily available workforce rather than train a new cadre of production workers. This option would allow the Iranians to field an MRBM relatively quickly, but at the cost of disrupting the SRBM program.

(SNT) Iran is already looking ahead to developing a longer range (2,000km) Shahab-4 MRBM, probably with a greater payload. The latter will employ the implications of WMD warheads. The greater range will put not only Israel within reach but southeastern Europe as well. With access to Russian technology and expertise, Iran could fight out with a missile as early as 2001, with operational capabilities as early as 2003. Further missile developments include the Kousar (Shahab-5) IRBM with a potential range between 4,000 and 5,000km. This system could be developed over the next five years and possibly become operational between 2008 and 2010. An operational Kousar system could have the ability to reach all of Europe. Through current U.S. program goals are ambiguous, Iran could pursue a "Shahab-6" ICBM platform, potentially achieving an initial capability before 2010 with external assistance. This system could have a range of about 10,000km.

(SNT) Paralleling the expanding missile inventories and capabilities are nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, which by early in the next century are expected to provide Tehran with new warhead types that will make any shortcoming in ballistic missile accuracy and payload not less important to wartime effectiveness. Iran will continue its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability to back its claims to regional dominance. Iran probably will not have the capability to independently produce a nuclear weapon before 2009 based on the known state of its R&D efforts. However, Tehran could purchase fissile material before that time. If Iran were to acquire enough suitable fissile material on the black market, it



(9) Iran will continue to place importance on improved ballistic missile capabilities in part to achieve strategic strike capabilities usable within the region. The Shahab-3 pictured above will increase Iran's missile capability to 1,000km by July of 2000.

could develop a nuclear weapon capability within the first part of the next decade. Expectation of both uranium and plutonium weapons technology will aid in this venue since it is advanced beyond the research and development stage. Tehran does not yet have fuel cycle facilities that could serve as critical nodes for the production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. Iran is also upgrading its technological infrastructure and is actively seeking foreign scientific cooperation in genetic engineering and other advanced technologies. Advanced biological technology could be applied to Iran's BW program within 3 to 5 years, resulting in development of enhanced biological agents. Iran is seeking self-sufficiency in dual-use BW agent production equipment, CBW protective clothing, and medical protection against BW agents. An indigenous precursor and CW agent production capability should become a reality for Iran over the next five years. Iran is already self-sufficient in the production of tuban, arsin, and V series nerve agents, but probably not soman and other so-called fourth generation novel agents. Unless key foreign suppliers can be dis-

**Iran is slowly, but steadily building on offensive capability far in excess of its mere defensive needs.**

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Middle East — North Africa

late future conflict with Turkey. Demand for water will increase in Iraq's cities and towns over the next two decades as more than 80% of Iraqis are expected to make their homes in urban centers by 2020. Any inhibiting action by the Turks on water flow into Iraq will further stress civil infrastructure as well as the Iraqi leadership.

**Military Outlook**

(5) Iraq will remain capable of incursions against its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors. Baghdad retains the goal of dominating Kuwait, however, its inability to hold against a determined Western counterattack will limit its options. Retained or suspended UN sanctions will allow the Iraqis to modernize their armed forces and will enhance Iraq's ability to pursue this objective. Iraq's conventional priorities will be improved missile, air defense, and ground forces. If sanctions are lifted in the next 10 years, Iraq will focus on acquiring new capabilities specifically intended to provide an asymmetric means to counter U.S. dominance and deter U.S. involvement in the region.

(S/NF) A post-sanction Iraq will move rapidly and probably clandestinely to rebuild its WMD and ballistic missile production capabilities. Iraq will have the enhanced ability to launch a number of CSM strikes against Israel as well as U.S. deployment areas. For at least the next five to ten years, Iraq ballistic missile capabilities will probably remain limited to SRBM systems, but purchases of longer range systems or technology as well as earlier deployments cannot be ruled out. Iraq probably has the necessary civil and hidden military assets to resume production of chemical and biological offensive programs within a short time after the removal of sanctions, and has managed to develop a basic indigenous capability for making many BW dual use products, such as pres-  
sure equipment and media. Iraq has

retained the capability to restart its nuclear weapons program and, from the time sanctions are lifted, Iraq—given intent and foreign assistance—could develop a nuclear device in 5 to 7 years. Such a capability will be alarming to Iran as it will be for Israel, Europe, and the U.S.



(6) Iraqi soldier morning air defense gun.

**SAUDI ARABIA  
Political — Military Outlook**



(7) Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, is committed to a strong US-Saudi bilateral relationship.

(5) Over the next 5 to 10 years, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will experience a rapid succession of changes, but U.S. Saudi relations will remain viable. The Saudi regime will increasingly feel the threat of prolonged economic constraints and internal demographic resource tensions. Weakened government finances and declining living standards will pose a challenge to the Saudi government. Under opposition pressure, the regime will likely try to distance itself from the United States on a variety of policy and military issues. However, renewed threats from Iraq

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and Iran counterbalance this circumstance. The Saudi leadership will also try to restrain the growth of government spending while implementing fiscal reforms, but this will be an uphill effort.

**Missile Programs**

(3) Riyadh will try to reduce military spending by canceling or delaying major arms procurements and reducing the numbers of U.S. combat forces present in the Kingdom. Although the Royal Saudi Armed Forces (RSAF) will remain the largest and best equipped of all the militaries, cuts in the military budget will severely degrade capability for the next two to three years if not longer. The RSAF is probably the most affected by these cuts. Without immediate remedial action, foreign military assistance programs will be drastically reduced or canceled. Dependence upon the U.S. and other Western nations in the face of a significant external threat is more critical than ever.

(S/NF) Saudi Arabia maintains a mature CSS-2 MRBM ballistic missile force. No CSS-2 modernization efforts are currently known to be in progress. However, Saudi Arabia will modernize its long-range capability either by refurbishing the CSS-2 or by purchasing new ballistic missile systems or technology within the next ten years. These efforts could be carried out in tandem with

Islam is the only force on the horizon capable of channelling discontent and fear into attempts to change the political status quo in particular states.



(8) Missile preparations for the possibility of chemical/bio attack.

perceived missile threats that arise with the acquisition of advanced ballistic missile systems and capabilities in Iran or Iraq. Once Iran or Iraq appear close to becoming nuclear weapon capable, Saudi Arabia may well try to obtain nuclear weapons for some of its CSS-2 or follow-on MRBM systems.

**STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

(S/NF) Unless the Arab-Israeli Peace Process succeeds, U.S. influence will be reduced in the Middle East for the next few years because of perceived favoritism toward Israel, policies toward Iraq that seem to hurt the Iraqi people more than Saddam Hussein, and differing perceptions of the Iranian threat. Some states will also distance themselves from U.S. policies and take more independent stances, particularly toward Iraq because of domestic pressure and challenges. However, Baghdad's recent threats against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will mitigate criticism of the U.S. over the near term.

(U) The balance of power between GCC states and Iran and Iraq—critical to the United States—will remain profoundly unfavorable to the GCC states without external influence.

(5) The Arab-Israeli rivalry will persist in some form throughout this period, remaining highly significant to the interests of the United States.

(5) Both Iran and Iraq will continue to pose an enduring unconventional threat to U.S. interests and a conventional threat to our regional allies.

(U) The importance of MENA energy resources to the economies of U.S., Asian, and European allies and partners will guarantee the region's strategic importance to the United States for at least the first part of the new century.

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Possible Status of MENA WMD Programs in 2020

Country	Nuclear Operational Program/Status	Biological Operational Program/Status	Chemical Operational Program/Status	Ballistic Missile Operational Program/Status
Egypt	no/possible development	yes/active	yes/active	yes/modernizing SIBVI
Iran	yes/modernizing	yes/active	yes/active	yes/active E/ICBM
Iraq	yes/modernizing	yes/active	yes/active	yes/ICBM development
Israel	yes/modernizing	yes/active	yes/active	yes/active SIBVI
Libya	no/possible development	no/development	yes/active	yes/modernizing SIBVI — active W884
Saudi Arabia	no/possible acquisition	no/possible (slow)	no/possible development	yes/active SIBVI
Syria	no/active	yes/limited	yes/active	yes/modernizing SIBVI
UAE	no/active	no/none	no/possible development	yes/possible SIBVI
Yemen	no/none	no/none	no/possible development	yes/possible SIBVI

\*This is an illustrative scenario based on an extension of current and projected MENA NBC/misile capabilities and intentions described in this plan.



(U) Hamas militants torch U.S. flag in Lebanon.

alter theater force balances, the nature of regional war and conflict, and U.S. contingency planning and execution.

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Latin America



(U) Ocean locks, Panama Canal.

be likely to spark debate over the extent of political liberalization inside and outside the Communist Party. Fundamental political change would probably result.

(C) Cuba's division-edited and personality-dependent domestic opposition groups are unlikely to gain much future leverage, even in a post-Castro Cuba. The Catholic Church will support democratic reforms, but not regime destabilizing activities. Cuban elites lack the military capability or political support in Cuba to destabilize the island, but their activities could provoke a U.S.-Cuban military confrontation.

Alternative Futures

(C) Though currently unlikely, a prolonged global financial crisis would take its toll on the economies of Brazil and Mexico. An economic collapse would create major instability in these states, compounded by widespread social disorder. This could generate a migration surge and endanger U.S. citizens and interests in the region. In addition, such an environment would disrupt countering efforts in Latin America.

CUBA

(C) Fidel Castro remains in firm control of the Cuban government and is likely to be its chief of state for as long as he desires. His departure from power, however, is virtually certain before 2020, probably from natural death or voluntary resignation. Political calculations will influence heavily any decision by Castro to voluntarily leave office, and he no doubt would name his successor and assume the role of elder statesman with veto power over important policies.

(C) The Cuban Communist Party—even without Castro at the helm—likely will remain in power. However, a post-Castro government—particularly after Castro's death—probably would liberalize the economy more rapidly, and any constitutional relaxation of U.S. foreign policy would

(C) Maintaining economic stability and growth will be the chief challenge to Castro and the Party over the upcoming 5-10 year period. Poor or declining economic growth would be far more likely than Castro's departure to provoke domestic instability and disagreement over appropriate actions to be taken. Some control of the economy and Havana's stability to borrow money from international lenders will continue to hinder economic growth. As a result, Havana will have to choose between continued state control of the economy with accompanying popular frustration, and genuine economic liberalization that may pro-

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(U) The Cuban MIG-29, on acquisition after its sale.

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Latin America

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(R/NF) Scouted Cuban Kaim Class Rigate

MEXICO

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direct authoritarian power bases and demands for political reforms.

(C) Continued state control of the economy and/or slow economic recovery will encourage Cuban emigration to the United States. The Cuban government currently seems intent on favoring the migration agreement with the United States, but several hundred thousand Cubans would like to leave the island. A change in Cuba's policy or significant economic or political turmoil on the island could lead to a major outflow of refugees.

(S) The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) will remain loyal to Castro. The high command has demonstrated concern over the speed of economic reforms—they favored more rapid change prior to 1994—but probably will continue to agree with Castro on the need to maintain the Communist Party's monopoly on political power.

(S) Continuing budgetary constraints will prevent the 50,000-man FAR from deploying substantial numbers of combat troops abroad or substantially improving fighting ability for at least the next decade. A small number deployed in the Congo and Haiti are providing a funded service. However, Cuban security forces are likely to remain fully capable of maintaining internal stability in the face of any spontaneous or organized domestic unrest.



(R) Mexican Army on patrol in the troubled southern state of Chiapas.

(S/NF) Mexico will continue its historic democratic transition. Political power will become more diffused as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) loses its traditional dominance and a multi-party system emerges. Opposition parties will continue to gain a more active role in governing the country, contesting elections in the federal, state, and local levels. The presidential election in July 2000 will shape Mexico's political future, and at this point, any of Mexico's three major parties could win this election.

(S/NF) Mexico's military will become responsive to a more diverse political elite as opposition parties grow more involved in governing the nation. Future civil-military relations may be redefined, and civilian

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Latin America

leaders may try to remove the military from some civil police and control functions. (C) Narcotics trafficking and its ability to intimidate and corrupt officials at all levels will pose a formidable challenge to Mexico's government and society in general. Mexican criminal groups will become even more involved in both the movement and distribution of cocaine serving the U.S. market. Mexico also will remain a heroin supplier and the main source for most of the foreign-derived methamphetamine and marijuana in the United States through 2020.

(U) Mexico's participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)


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Population Growth in Latin America (in millions)	
Brazil	200.0
Mexico	208.5
Colombia	125.0
Argentina	38.9
Peru	37.0
Venezuela	25.7
Chile	24.2
Panama	5.2
	2.9
	3.6

will make the transition to a market economy irreversible. Northern Mexican states increasingly will become integrated with the U.S. economy—reflecting new direct foreign investment, substantial infrastructure improvements, and slowly expanding free trade arrangements with the rest of the world—while southern states will continue to lag in job and income growth.

(C) Economic restructuring, underdeveloped safety nets and government services, marginalization of impoverished states, and continued deficiencies in public education will hamper Mexico in resolving pressing social issues, increasing its vulnerability to continued insurgent activity and occasional localized, violent upheavals.

(S/NF) Long-standing, deeply-rooted Mexican sensitivities over perceived U.S. encroachment on Mexican sovereignty and undue U.S. influence over Mexican affairs will continue to affect and limit the nature of bilateral relations with the United States. Mexico periodically will show its disapproval of perceived U.S. meddling in its internal affairs but will avoid jeopardizing economic ties.



(R/NF) Brazil is attempting to pursue one of the most extensive force modernization programs in Latin America to replace its antiquated military equipment. However, the Brazilian government focuses on consolidating economic growth, consequently curtailing modernization efforts.

BRAZIL

(C) Brazil should make considerable progress toward asserting itself in the political, economic, and military power in South America by 2020. Political calls, Brazil is widely democratic. Despite a series of political and public security crises that could have afforded the military the pretext for intervention in politics, the armed forces have shown no interest in involving themselves in the political process except for lobbying on defense matters. The influence of the military service chiefs will diminish even further with the establishment of a unified Defense Ministry within the next year, though the complete subordination of the independent services to the military will be gradual.


(C) There are few significant threats that would jeopardize the democratic order in Brazil. Leftist labor parties have won elections at local and state levels as well as in the national legislature, but their agenda has little public support at the national level. Protests and property confiscations by organized homeless groups have generated localized conflict and national publicity but have not generated effective political

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V. Defense Systems, Science and Technology

Naval Force Threat



(A) Future Indian Shishumar Class Submarine (German type 209/1400)

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Selected Future Submarines Operational by 2020	
Type	Country
Dolgorukiy SSBN	Russia
Severodvinsk SSN	Russia
SSBN-P-1	China
SSN-P-1	China
ATV SSN/SSBN	India

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Selected Major Countries with Submarine Forces in 2020	
Russia	China
Iran	Korea
UK	Germany
Israel	South Africa
Australia	Sweden
India	Pakistan
Algeria	France
Japan	Egypt
Chile	Brazil
Yugoslavia	Indonesia




(B) The Dolgorukiy (Borey) class SSBN, the fate of which hinges on improved funding, will not enter service prior to 2010.

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(C) North Korean Taepo Dong 1 (TD-1) MRBM.

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BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPMENT		
System	Country	Deployment
<b>ICBM (&gt; 5,500km)</b>		
SS-27*	Russia	1998-2001
(Advanced system)	Russia	2010-2020
Scud Bong 2**	North Korea	2002-2006
DF-31	China	2002-2004
DF-31A	China	2006-2009
Shenzhou 6***	Iran	2010-2015
* Missile system in development ** System could have an ICBM flight capability between 70"-81" *** System name is speculative		
<b>IRBM (3,000-5,500km)</b>		
Agni II	India	2012-2015
Kaear Ghazab 5	Iran	2000-2010
<b>MRBM (1,000-3,000km)</b>		
CSS-5 Mod 2	China	1999-2002
CSS-5 Mod 2 (conventional)	China	2005-2007
Luzon Dong 1*	North Korea	2000-2001
Agni I	India	2002-2005
Ghauri	Pakistan	1999-2002
Ghauri 2 (Shahnoa)	Pakistan	2000-2003
Shahnoa 1	Iran	2010-2018
Shenzhou 3	Iran	2000-2002
Shenzhou 4	Iran	2005-2007
Scud-Bonged system**	Iran	2008-2010
Scud-Bonged system**	Iran	2008-2010
* Country could add its assets to submarine's ICBM ** New system in development/under approval		

Missiles with ranges 3,000km and under are also considered Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs).

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BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPMENT		
System	Country	Deployment
<b>SRBM (&lt;1,000km)</b>		
Vector	Egypt	2005—2007
Al Samoud	Iraq	2000—2002
Ababil-100	Iraq	2005—2007
Basir 2000	Iraq	2005—2010
Iran 170*	Iran	2002—2004
Iran 700*	Iran	2005—2007
(solid-fueled system)**	Syria	2005—2007
Al Falah	Libya	2009—2011
Prithvi 1	India	2000—2003
Dhanush	India	2002—2005
(solid-fueled system)**	India	2010—2012
Tarmuk	Pakistan	2005—2008
S9-X-26	Russia	1999—2000
CSS-X-7 Mod 2	China	2000
CSS-X-9***	China	2002-2003
Scud D	North Korea	1999—2000
<small>U.S. designation (where available) * U.S. intelligence assessment (name unknown) ** Export model only</small>		
<b>SLBM</b>		
JL-1	China	1999—2001
JL-2	China	2010—2012
Sagolika	India	2010—2015
(standardized system)	Russia	2010—2020



(S) Iraq's Al Samoud SRBM will have a maximum range of 1,000km with a payload capability of 300kg

**"India has reached a stage where nobody from anywhere would pose a threat."**  
— George Fernandes  
Indian Defense Minister  
(After spring 1999 Agni missile tests)

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be national priorities. In particular, North Korea will continue to develop D&D measures in support of its WMD program, and to complicate and degrade U.S. and South Korean indications and warning capabilities. Other countries will increasingly represent D&D challenges over the next 20 years, as well non-state actors, terrorist organizations, organized crime, and narcotraffickers.

**Underground Facilities**


(SNF) The proliferation of underground facilities (UGFs) in recent years has emerged as one of the most difficult and significant challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community and is projected to become even more of a problem over the next two decades. Increasingly, rogue states and other nations of critical interest to the U.S. are digging deep into mountains and below the surface of the earth to conceal and protect key programs — particularly WMD and missile delivery systems — as well as leadership, command, control, and communications. Many countries also house strategic military production operations in tunnelled facilities. In addition, countries such as Russia, China, North Korea and Cuba make extensive use of underground complexes for storage and operational launch sites for ground, naval, and air assets.

(SNF) Underground facilities are an effective countermeasure to the current U.S. military precision engagements strategy. Facilities at extreme depths, many meters below the surface, may also shield the working area from destruction by nuclear weapons. Underground facilities are often difficult to detect and to characterize (that is, determine or assess facility function, layout, internal and external features, vulnerability, etc.) because of their inherent nature. Emission and activity control are a key feature of the

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**Rogue State Strategic Hardened Facilities**

(Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria)



(S//NF) Although the majority of hardened facilities are relatively shallow and thus vulnerable to our current suite of precision munitions, an increasing number of strategic assets are being housed in deeper and harder facilities that are less susceptible to conventional kinetic attack. Greater intelligence granularity is required to identify and explore alternative methods for finding these facilities at risk.

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## VI. Future Warfare

Category of Conflict

effectiveness of these facilities. Furthermore, more countries employ very sophisticated active D&D efforts at underground facilities, making analysis even more difficult. This trend is expected to continue and expand.

(SINF) Russia, China, and North Korea and some other states (Cuba, Libya), already have well established deep underground infrastructure. Over the next two decades, they will slowly carry out new construction—probably in support of upgrading or replacing current underground facility infrastructure considered vulnerable or outmoded, and also to support new follow-on high-value military programs such as WMD and ballistic missiles.

(SINF) The continuing growth of deep underground facilities in Iraq, Syria, Libya, India and Pakistan and the initiation of deep underground facilities in Iraq—currently only known to possess shallow underground facilities—is expected over the next two decades. All these countries have burgeoning WMD and ballistic missile programs and they continue to increase deep underground facilities into these infrastructures. As more countries commence or expand NBC weapon programs and missile capabilities, the number of underground facilities to construct and to protect strategic assets is likely to grow.

**Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare**

(U) The likelihood of a chemical or biological attack—and to a lesser extent, a nuclear threat—increases with the changing nature of warfare and the recognition



(U) Conflicts in the future are more likely to involve a chemical or biological component.

**Intop Asymmetric Planning**

(SINF) Iraq has modified its U.S. (and coalition) air attack—into a sustained, remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) air attack for "suicide" (one-way) strikes. Some of Iraq's 1,200 trainer aircraft have been equipped with spray tanks that could be fitted for biological warfare (BW) delivery. A low-altitude RPV detected at the radar limit of radar could release a BW agent within range of the target before being intercepted. Alternatively, the RPV could lay down an effective BW agent from beyond the radar horizon, even if an RPV were intercepted and destroyed. A few Al-Qaida cells could produce a lethal amount of BW agent that could defile over a substantial force.

As asymmetric responses to conventional military dominance can achieve measurable results. Actual or threatened use of NBC warfare places significant stress on both troop morale and national decision-making confidence. Protection measures against NBC warfare attacks make it difficult to carry out military missions because they restrict vision, add weight and time, and increase stress. Further logistic burdens are added by the need for decontamination equipment, detection gear, and specialized reconnaissance divisions and vehicles. Training is a prerequisite to effective coalition-NBC activity, and few nations have effective training programs.

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

(U) As information technology becomes ubiquitous in military and commercial applications, efforts to attack or manipulate the opponent's information systems, and 'defend' one's own systems against attack, will become an increasingly important part of warfare. Attacks will occur on the information in the systems as well as

## VII. Outlook

Key Challenges to the U.S.

**Key Challenges to the U.S.****NATIONAL THREATS**


(S) **Russia:** Continued political, economic, and social turmoil, as well as large military reforms and crisis in defense industries, have forced Russia to rely on strategic forces. Although unlikely to reemerge as a large-scale regional threat over the next two decades, Russia will retain more nuclear weapons and delivery systems than any other state.

(S) **China:** China will continue to prioritize economic reform and development, but military modernization will proceed at a steady but gradual pace, resulting in across-the-board improvements from a very low baseline. However, China is still 20 years away from developing large-scale regional threat capabilities.

(S) **North Korea:** Worsening economic and internal security situations will steadily erode Pyongyang's conventional military capabilities, but WMD, missiles, artillery, and SCIF strike options will remain viable threats. Iran is a long-term regional problem.

(S) **Iran:** Economic, political, and social disintegrable problems will constrain Iran's conventional military development over the next two decades, but expanding WMD, missile, anti-ship and terrorist capabilities will create asymmetric/strategic threats. Iran is a long-term regional problem.





## Alternative Futures 2000-2020

(U) The future security environment described in this Primer encompasses the outcomes that seem most likely, given our current knowledge of economic, social, technological trends, and the national priorities and linear performance of the major and regional powers. Perceiving a notoriety economic collapse, however, and some trends could produce significantly different outcomes than those already depicted.

(CNF) **Chinese economic collapse** thought about by a crisis in currency and banking, state-owned enterprises and without administrations feel the initial impact of an economic collapse. This produces a political crisis resulting in the collapse of the current Communist Party regime. The aftermath sees greater political decentralization, but not fragmentation. The end result is a hostile, xenophobic regime that is still authoritarian.

(U) **Strong, hostile China:** After great economic success and increasing regional influence, China remains disillusioned by perceived U.S. repression and containment and holds a collective chip on their

shoulder" view. However, such economic strength is possible only after a long period of international cooperation and outside investment. Thus a strong, hostile China is only possible in the latter part of the forecast period.

(U) **Russian economic/political collapse:** Russia's failure to cope with the ongoing economic and political crisis results in a steady decrease of central control over the regions, particularly the Baltic lands. Most of the regional rulers are authoritarian as well as extremely nationalist. They are xenophobic and hostile to the West. The remaining vestiges of a central government continue futile efforts to control resources. Most worrisome is the total loss of control of the military/security forces and defense industries, and proliferation of WMD and critical technologies.

(U) **Strong, hostile Russia:** Toward the middle of the forecast period, successful economic reform prevents the resurgence of national power. Russia finances the regeneration of its military capabilities and pushes new R&D. Although it will not return to superpower status in this time frame, Russia is quite capable of regional power projection.

(CNF) **Confrontation in Northwest Asia:** China and Japan heighten their struggle for regional influence and Korea is the primary point of contention. The U.S. alliance structure in the region is undermined, which subsequently pushes Japan toward development of offensive military capabilities. Japan then becomes a destabilizing factor throughout East Asia.

(CNF) **Nuclear weapons use:** A conflict either in India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, Israel-ether, or North-South Korea escalates. One or several of these states — or terrorists — back the nuclear taboo. An interregional nuclear exchange is plausible in light of perceived or actual outside inter-



At the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, Chinese protest the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

ference in local conflicts. This fosters a rapid escalation and ends the era when nuclear weapons were regarded as qualitatively different from conventional weapons.

(U) **Strong, coherent Europe:** European economic integration finally succeeds in fostering greater political cohesion. A central European government is able to develop and implement a robust European Security and Defense Identity. Europe is less dependent on U.S. leadership — through not hostile to the U.S. — and is more independent in its actions throughout the world.

(CNF) **Intra-European conflict:** The 50 to 70 years of peace ends between major European powers. Major disagreements over failed economic integration, the Balkans, the Aegean, or other friction points result in major political/military tensions. There is a breakdown of consensus on security objectives, economic agendas, strategic and open economic competition among European powers increases accordingly.

(U) **Increased power of hostile non-state actors:** Criminal or terrorist organizations undergo a major increase in size through the acquisition of political, commercial, and grassroots movements. These groups have greater access to high technology and advanced weapons and strategic information technology. They are centrally motivated by hostility to the U.S. or West. It becomes increasingly difficult to trace their actions or distinguish them from legitimate and non-legitimate activities and organizations.

(CNF) **Collapse of international structures:** The IMF, World Bank, and UN are brought down by a combination of failures and inadequate financial support. Skepticism increases due to their ineptness, and the collective approach to economic/political/social problems falls out of fashion.

(U) **Global recession leading to significant economic transformation:** Several key areas fail to implement necessary structural reforms resulting in a global



(U) Self-police aim of Kosovo Liberation Army troops.

reactions of competitive currency devaluations. The G7 is unable to cope, and protection rises around the globe. Embellishment declines for market reforms and U.S. leadership faces greater pressure. New and shifting alliances develop, and there is a global shift away from the Bretton Woods-era economic and financial arrangements.

(U) **Strategic anti-U.S. alliance:** Two or more major powers (Europe, China, Japan, Russia, India, etc.) join together to oppose, undermine, and counter U.S. leadership, power, and policies around the globe.

(U) **Emergence of anti-U.S. leader or ideology:** The perceived dominance of U.S./Western ideas, institutions, culture, presence, etc. gives rise to an 'anti-American' ideology that eventually enjoys widespread support as an effective counterpoint to U.S. dominance and provides a strategic 'conscience of interest' among disparate individuals, groups, and states.

(U) **Removal of key U.S. allies:** One or several key pro-U.S. leaders or regimes fall either through natural death, political succession, coups, or economic collapse. U.S. access to resources, markets, bases, and other strategic facilities in the affected region is severely curtailed or eliminated. Diplomatic efforts are hampered — both regionally and globally — in the absence of the compliant partner.

"Gentlemen, I am always three courses (of action) open to an enemy and that he usually takes the fourth."  
— von Moltke the Elder