Glyn Hughes'
Squashed Philosophers
The
Condensed Edition of "Cogito, ergo sum" [I think, therefore I am] |
INTRODUCTION
TO The Meditations
His
leading work in physics, mathematics, optics, physiology,
geometry and astronomy would have been quite enough to mark out
Descartes as one of the founders of the Western way of thinking.
But this petit bourgeois former soldier from La Haye in
central France determined to round-off his career in the sciences
by presenting to the world his thoughts on how it is, and why, we
construct truth.
These Meditations begin by attempting to doubt
everything, and to build up from that to those few things which
we can know with certainty. The result is an idea of the human as
essentially spiritual, but temporarily connected to a material
body, which knows that its perceptions are valid because God is
no deceiver. And how do we know about God? Because we couldn't
have even the concept of so perfect a being unless God had put it
into us, like the mark of the craftsman on his work.
But isn't this no more than saying that "I know what I
know", and justifying this by saying "one of the things
I know is a benevolent God" in a pointlessly circular
process of introspection? Possibly so, but the Meditations
may still be seen as a foundation of modern philosophy inasmuch
as it, as with all the best philosophy, properly asks the right
questions for its time, questions which we are only now
discovering how to answer.
Descartes was extraordinarily honest, at least by the standards
of his time, in circulating the manuscript of The Meditations
for comment and publishing these "Objections and
Replies" alongside the text. These are actually larger than the original book and are rarely
reproduced today, but we include a precis of the dialog with
Thomas Hobbes to give a feel of the whole.
THE
VERY SQUASHED VERSION
I: Many of
the things I used to be certain of, I now know to be nonsense. To
find some firm foundation for science, I must try to establish
what is absolutely true. So, I'll imagine that some evil genie is
deceiving me about absolutely everything.
II: I can't be sure of the things I know, but I can be sure that
I know things. I think therefore I am.
III: All ideas have a cause. The cause must either be inside me,
or something else. Infinity and perfection are not within me, so
the idea of an infinite and perfect God must have come from
something outside me, so God must exist.
IV: A perfect God would not cause the imperfection of deceit, so
He is not deceiving me about the things of which I have clear and
certain knowledge.
V: I am certain that I know material objects, inasmuch as I can
define them by mathematics. This knowledge doesn't make things
exist, but my knowledge of God makes me certain that they are
something.
VI: I imagine that I have a body and that my knowledge comes from
my senses. Using several senses together I can determine what is
true. But we don't always have time for this, so we often make
mistakes.
THIS
SQUASHED VERSION
The fame and significance
of the Meditations has led us to take more than usual
care in selecting source material. This squashed version is
substantially based on the English translation by John Veitch of
1901 and the French of Duc de Luynes of 1647. Reference has also
been made to the original Latin version of 1641, for which we are
indebted to the Latin scholar Susan Hallam.
Put together the French "ne... pas" negative form,
Descartes' extraordinary fondness for multiple negatives and the
desire of many translators to render his words exactly
into English and you commonly get a text which is constructed of
double, treble and at least one octuple negative. This does not
make for easy reading. It has been an extraordinarily complex
task to clean-up M.Descartes words, to correct his appalling
syntax and remove his fondness for repitition and so squash the Meditations
to about 1/8th its original size.
The famous phrase 'cogito ergo sum' [I think, therefore I am]
does not occurs in the original of the Meditations, but
in the earlier Discourse on Method. But, by happy
coincidence, a sentence towards the beginning of the second
meditation correctly condenses, by our rules, into exactly that
phrase.
GLOSSARY
Ideas: Mental
images we create of things which appear to be outside of
ourselves.
Cartesian: A word used to mean 'from Descartes'
The Cartesian Circle: Descartes concept that we
know that which is clear and distinct because it is assured in us
by God, and that we know God because He is a clear and distinct
idea.
Cartesian dualism: Descartes concept of mind and
body being two entirely separate things.
The Cogito: Shorthand
for Descartes principle that 'I think, therefore I am' (Latin:
Cogito Ergo sum)
MEDITATIONS
on
First Philosophy in which the Existence of God and the
Distinction Between Mind and Body are Demonstrated.
By René Descartes, 1641
Squashed
version edited by Glyn Hughes © 2001
DEDICATION
To the Most Wise and Illustrious the Dean and Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of Theology in Paris.
We have faith that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, but it certainly does not seem possible to persuade infidels of any religion, or of any moral virtue, unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts by natural reason.
For the truth will easily cause all men of mind and learning to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the atheists, who are usually more arrogant than learned or judicious, to rid themselves of their contradictions. And, finally, all others will easily yield to such a mass of evidence, and there will be none who dares to doubt the existence of God and the real and true distinction between the human soul and the body. It is for you now in your singular wisdom to judge of the importance of the establishment of such beliefs.
PREFACE
to THE READER
I
have already touched, in passing, on the two questions of God and
the human soul in the Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences,
published in French in the year 1637. These questions have
appeared to me to be of such importance that I did not judge it
to be expedient to set it forth at length in French, in case it
be read by feebler minds and they come to believe that it was
permitted to them to attempt to follow the same path.
I now intend to discuss these matters in greater depth, without
expecting any praise from the vulgar or hoping that my book will
have many readers. I should never advise anyone to read what I
have to say excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with
me, and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense, and
deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice. I know
too well that such men exist in a very small number. Those many
who form their criticisms on detached portions of my reasonings
will not obtain much profit from this Treatise. And although they
may perhaps find trivial complaint, they can for all their pains
make no objection which is deserving of reply.
I venture to promise that it will be difficult for anyone to
bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have not been
already touched upon. This is why I beg those who read these
Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they have given
themselves the trouble to read all the objections as well as the
replies which I have made to them
SYNOPSIS of THE SIX FOLLOWING MEDITATIONS
In
the following meditations I will show that doubt is possible, and
from that show that to doubt is proof of the existence of mind.
In order to know that the soul is immortal we must first have a
clear picture of the soul- we know that mind is indivisible and
that you can't have half a soul, and that the body may change,
but mind is always mind. I will prove that God exists without
reference to the corporeal world. I will prove that what we
perceive is true and explain the origin of falsity. And I will
prove that things exist
MEDITATION
ONE
Of the Things which may be brought within the Sphere of the
Doubtful.
So
many of the opinions I held so firmly in my youth were false,
that I must admit how doubtful is everything I have since
constructed. Thus, I have become convinced that, if I ever want
to establish firm structure for the sciences, I must build anew
from the foundation. To-day, since I have a leisurely retirement,
I shall at last seriously address myself to this problem. To
examine each opinion would take forever; so I shall begin by
attacking those principles upon which all others rest.
I have formerly accepted as true and certain those things I learn
through the senses. Like the fact that I am seated by this fire,
in a dressing gown, with this paper in my hands. And how could I
deny that this body is mine, unless I was as mad as those whose
cerebella are so clouded by black bile that they believe they
have an earthenware head or a glass body? Yet, I must remember
that I have dreams, which are almost as insane. Often I have
dreamt that I was dressed and seated near this fire, whilst I was
lying undressed in bed! It seems to me that I am now awake, but I
remind myself that I have dreamt that too. Yet even dreams are
formed out of things real and true. Just as a painter represents
sirens or satyrs from a medley of different animals; even quite
novel images are still composed of real colours.
For the same reason, although general things may be imaginary, we
are bound to confess that there are simpler objects which are
real and true; such as colours, quantity or magnitude and number.
That is why Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and those sciences which
consider composite things, are dubious; but Arithmetic, Geometry
and sciences which treat of things very simple and general
contain some certainty. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and
three always form five, and a square has four sides. It does not
seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be uncertain.
Now, I have long believed in an all-powerful God who made me. I
can imagine that other people deceive themselves, but how do I
know that I am not deceived when I add two and three, or count
the sides of a square? If God is good, how can it be that he
sometimes permits me to be deceived?
Let us, for the present, imagine that God is a fable. Whether I
have come about by fate or accident or by a continual succession
of antecedents - since to deceive oneself is a defect, it is
clear that the author of my skills must be a greater deceiver
still.
I confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed,
which I cannot doubt in some measure. We must be careful to keep
this in mind, and fear not that there is peril or error in
yielding to distrust, since I am not considering questions of
action, but only of knowledge.
So, I intend to attach myself to the idea that some evil genie is
deceiving me; that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures,
sound, even my body and senses are nought but illusions and
dreams. This task is a difficult one, for just as a prisoner who
dreams of liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but a
dream, fears to awaken, so I may fall back into my former
opinions.
MEDITATION
TWO
Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily Known
than the Body.
Yesterday's
meditation left me all but drowning in doubts. Nonetheless, I
will continue the journey in hope of finding, like Archimedes
moving the earth, some fixed point of certainty.
It is not even necessary that God puts ideas into my mind, for it
is possible that I am producing them myself. But am I myself
something? I have chosen to deny that I have senses and body, but
the deceiver can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think
that I am something. So, we must definitely conclude that; I
think therefore I am, is necessarily true each time I mentally
conceive it.
But I do not yet know clearly what I am. I believed myself to be
a man, but what is a man? To say 'man is a reasoning animal'
means that I should have to inquire into the subtleties of what
an animal is, and what reasonable. But I know that I considered
myself as having bones and flesh, that I was nourished, that I
walked, that I felt, and that I thought, and I referred all these
actions to the soul: but I did not stop to consider what the soul
was, or if I did, I imagined that it was something extremely
subtle like a wind or flame within my grosser parts.
I have determined to imagine that that evil genie is deceiving me
even about my knowledge of my own self. So what are those
attributes of my own self?
I knew that I could eat and walk, but that would be impossible if
my body were a deceit. I knew that I had sensations. But one
cannot feel without body, and besides, I have dreamt of having
sensations. What of thinking? This surely is an attribute that
belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. Could it be
the case that if I ceased to think, then I would cease to exist?
Putting aside all which is not necessarily true: then I can
accurately state that I am no more than a thing which thinks,
that is to say a mind or a soul, or an understanding, or a
reason.
I am, however, a real thing; but what thing? I have answered: a
thing which thinks. I exist, but what am I? I am the I whom I
know exists. The very knowledge of my existence does not depend
on uncertain things, nor could I feign it; for there would still
be the I that feigns things. I am a thinking thing which doubts,
understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines and feels.
Finally, I am the same who perceives things like noise and heat
by the organs of sense. But could these be naught but dreams and
chimera? I seem to comprehend corporeal things in the world, and
even to know them better than I know the contents of my mind, but
could they still be false?
Let us consider one simple corporeal thing- this piece of wax:
freshly taken from the hive, with the sweetness of its honey and
the aroma of flowers. It has its colour, its figure, its size. It
appears hard, cold, and if you strike it with the finger, it will
emit a sound. But while I speak, I take it near to the fire; the
smell, colour, shape is all destroyed. It becomes liquid, it
heats so that scarcely can one handle it, and when one strikes
it, no sound is made. All sensation is changed, yet we confess
that it is the same wax
I can imagine that this wax might be made into a square or a
triangle and still be the same wax. No! More! I imagine that it,
or any piece of wax, could be formed to any shape, even though my
mind cannot encompass such an infinitude of forms. I seems that I
could not even understand through the imagination what this piece
of wax is. So, must I conclude that the wax is properly known
through vision rather than from intuition of mind? But if we
grant this, may we not also grant that the men I see outside my
window are just automatic machines wearing hats and coats?
It is now manifest to me that bodies are not properly known by
the senses or by the imagination, but by the understanding only.
Things are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched,
but because they are understood. I now see clearly that there is
nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind.
But it is difficult to rid oneself of a long-held view, so it
will be well that I should rest at this point, to meditate on
this new knowledge.
MEDITATION
THREE
Of God: that He Exists.
I
shall now close my eyes and my ears, and put away all thought of
physical things, to try to better understand my own self. So far,
my only assurance is to accept those things which I perceive very
clearly and very distinctly as true, yet I know that I have often
been mistaken. It remains possible that God might deceive me,
though I cannot imagine how he might persuade me that I don't
exist, or that two plus are not five. To remove such doubt, I
must enquire as to whether God exists, and whether he is a
deceiver.
If I hear sound, or see the sun, or feel heat, I judge that these
sensations come from things outside of me. Just now, for
instance, whether I will it or not, I feel heat, and it seems
obvious that this feeling is produced by something different from
me, ie. the fire. But I must doubt that it is nature which impels
me to believe in material things, for, given a choice between
virtue and vice, nature has often led me to the worse part. But I
do not find it any more convincing that ideas proceed from
objects outside me, for there is often a great difference between
knowledge and appearance. The sun, for instance, seems very
small, yet we know from astronomical calculation that it is very
great. It seems that blind impulse, not judgement, has given me
my knowledge of the world.
Those ideas which represent substances all seem more solid than
those that represent modes or accidents; and that idea of a
supreme God, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, seems to
have even more objective reality.
Now it is manifest that effects derive their reality from their
causes, that something cannot proceed from nothing and that the
perfect cannot proceed from something imperfect. For example, the
idea of stone can only be produced by something which possesses,
either formally or eminently, all that constitutes stone.
Likewise heat must come from a cause at least as perfect as heat,
and so on.
But further, the idea of heat, or stone, cannot exist in me
unless it has been placed there by some cause at least as real as
that which I conceive exists in the heat or stone. Thus the light
of nature causes me to know clearly that my ideas may fall short
of the perfection of the objects from which they derive, but they
can never be greater or more perfect. What I can conclude from
all this is that I cannot myself be the cause of an idea, the
cause must be outside me and greater than my idea. But I seem to
know so little about corporeal objects, as we found with the wax
yesterday, that such ideas may well proceed from myself.
Moreover, things such as light, colours, tastes, heat or cold are
so obscure and confused that I do not even know if they are true
or false. It seems that I have no ideas that might not originate
solely in my own mind.
There remains only the idea of God, whose attributes of infinity,
independence, all-knowledge and all-power seem so exceptional
that no idea of them could have come from within me; hence we
must conclude that God exists.
The idea of substance could be from within me, as I am a
substance, but, since I am finite, the idea of an infinite
substance must proceed from elsewhere. I could not have gained
the idea of infinite substance just by negating the finite, as I
perceive darkness as negation of light; for there is manifestly
more reality in infinite substance than in finite. Indeed, how
could I have the notion that I am finite and imperfect, unless I
had some idea of a Being more perfect, by which to recognise my
deficiencies?
We must say that the idea of God is very clear and distinct and
more objectively real than others. Even if we can imagine that
God does not exist, we cannot imagine that the idea of him means
nothing.
Possibly all those perfections of God are in some way potentially
in me, for I am sensible that my knowledge increases little by
little, and I see nothing which can prevent it from increasing to
the perfection of the Divine. At the same time, I recognise that
this cannot be, since it can never reach a point so high that it
could not attain to yet greater increase. But I do not easily see
why the idea of perfection must have been placed in me, so I ask,
do I derive my existence from myself, or my parents, or some
other source than God? But if I myself were the author of my
being, I should doubt nothing, desire nothing, lack no perfection
and be unable to ever find myself discovering new things.
It is perfectly clear and evident to all who consider the nature
of time, that, in order to have existence at a particular moment,
a substance must have the power to create itself anew in the next
moment. But I am conscious of no such power in myself, and by
this, I know clearly that I depend on some being different from
myself. Possibly, this being is not God, perhaps it is my parents
or some other imperfect cause?
This cannot be, because, as I have said, there must be at least
as much reality in the cause as in the effect; and since I am a
thinking thing, it must be that the cause is likewise a thinking
thing. But from what cause does God derive? If it derives from
another cause, we must ask whether this second cause has a cause.
But it is perfectly manifest that there can be no regression into
infinity.
Finally, it is not my parents who conserve me, they are only the
authors of that body in which the self, ie. the mind, is
implanted. Thus we must necessarily conclude from the simple fact
that I exist, and that I have the idea of a perfect Being, that
the proof of God's existence is grounded on the highest evidence.
It only remains to ask how I have acquired this idea of God. Not
through the senses, nor as a fiction of my mind, for I cannot
take from or add anything to it. The only alternative is that
God, in creating me, placed this idea within me, like the mark of
the workman on his work. The whole strength of the argument is in
recognising that it is not possible that my nature should be what
it is, and that I should have the idea of God, if God did not
veritably exist. From this, it is manifest that He cannot be a
deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that deception
necessarily proceeds from some defect.
But before I go on, it seems right to pause to think on His
majesty; at least as far as my dazzled mind will allow. For faith
teaches us that the glory of this, and the other, life is
contemplation of the Divine.
MEDITATION
FOUR
Of
the True and the False.
Over
these past days I have found little certainty respecting
corporeal objects, some respecting the mind, and more regarding
God. I shall now go on to consider things purely intelligible
which have no contact with matter.
I recognise it as impossible that God should ever deceive me; for
fraud and deception testify to imperfection, malice or
feebleness, which cannot be of God. So, my capacity for
judgement, as it is from God, can never mislead me if I use it
aright. The more skilful the artisan, the more perfect his work,
and God always wills what is best; is it then for the best that I
should be subject to error?
In the first place, knowing that I am feeble and limited, while
God is infinite, I recognise that some of his ends, which seem
imperfect, would be found to be perfect if we could but
comprehend the whole.
Considering my own errors, I find that they depend on my
knowledge, and on my power of choice or free will. Though I
recognise that my knowledge, memory and imagination are
imperfect, in my free will I find power so great that I cannot
conceive of any greater, and so see there the image of God. Thus,
when I feel indecisive, this rather evinces a lack of knowledge
than any imperfection of will: for if I always recognised clearly
what was true and good, I should never have trouble deliberating.
Whence then come my errors? They come from the fact that my will
is much wider in range than my understanding, and extending it to
things which I do not understand I fall into error and sin. If I
abstain from giving judgement on things that I do not perceive
with clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly.
But if I determine to affirm what is not true, then I deceive
myself, and misuse free will to create error.
I have no cause to complain that God has not given me more
powerful intelligence, since it is proper that a finite
understanding should not comprehend all things. Nor have I reason
to complain that He has given me a will larger than my
understanding, since free-will is such that if it were less than
complete, it would not exist at all.
Finally, I must not complain that God concurs with me in errors
of my will, because, in a certain sense, more perfection accrues
to me from the fact that I can will them, than if I could not.
This is no imperfection of God; but it is without doubt an
imperfection in me not to make a good use of my freedom. I
nevertheless perceive that God could have created me so that I
never should err, although I remained free yet limited in my
knowledge, perhaps by giving me a perfect memory. Nevertheless,
it seems that it is a greater perfection that parts of the
universe should have error rather than all parts be the same.
In this day's Meditation, I have discovered the source of falsity
and error. I see that as long as I make judgements only on
matters which I clearly and distinctly understand, I can never be
deceived and will, without doubt, arrive at truth.
MEDITATION
FIVE
Of the
Essence of Material Things, and, again, of God, that he Exists.
Many
questions about God and my own nature remain. But I must try to
emerge from the state of doubt I have held to these last few
days, and to see which of my ideas of the corporeal world are
clear and which confused.
In the first place, I can clearly imagine extension in length,
breadth or depth. I can number different parts, and attribute to
them size, figure and movement. For example, when I imagine a
triangle, even if it be imaginary, it has a certain nature, or
essence, immutable and eternal, which I have not imagined. For
instance, its angles equal two right angles.
I have seen triangles; yet, I can form in my mind other shapes
which have never been seen, but still clearly know their
properties. Hence they are something, for it is clear that what
is true is something, and I have shown that what I know clearly
is true. Indeed, I have always counted geometry and mathematics
as the most certain.
When I think of it this with care, I clearly see that existence
can no more be separated from the essence of God than having
three angles can be separated from the essence of triangle.
Still, from the fact that I, say, know that a mountain must have
a valley, it does not follow that there is a mountain. Similarly,
although I conceive of God as having existence, my thought does
not impose any necessity upon things. Just as I can imagine a
winged horse, although no such exists, so I could perhaps
attribute existence to God, although no God existed.
But this is mere sophism; for whether the mountain and the valley
exist or not, they cannot be separated from one another. But from
the fact that I cannot conceive God without existence, it follows
that existence is inseparable from Him, and hence that He exists.
I cannot think of God without existence, though it is in my power
to imagine a horse either with or without wings.
It is not necessary that I should ever think of God,
nevertheless, whenever I do, it is necessary that I attribute to
Him every perfection, although I cannot enumerate them all. The
idea of God, I discern in many ways. First, because I cannot
conceive anything but God to whose essence existence necessarily
pertains. Second, because it is not possible for me to conceive
two or more Gods. Third, granted that such a God exists that He
must exist eternally. Finally, because I know an infinitude of
other properties in God, none of which I can either diminish or
change.
For the rest, we must always return to the point that only those
things that we conceive clearly and distinctly are true. And this
applies just as much to those matters that are understood only
from careful examination as to those which are manifestly
obvious. For example, in the case of every right-angled triangle,
although it is not so obvious that the square of the base is
equal to the squares of the two other, still, when this has once
been apprehended, we can be certain of its truth.
If only my mind were not pre-occupied with prejudices, there
would be nothing I could know more immediately and more easily
than God. Once I recognise this, and see that He is not a
deceiver, I can infer that what I perceive clearly and distinctly
must be true. And such knowledge will remain true, even if I
forget the reasons which led me to the conclusion. And so I very
clearly recognise that the certainty and truth of all knowledge
depends alone on the knowledge of the true God. Now that I know
Him, I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of many
things.
MEDITATION
SIX
Of the
Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction between
the Soul and Body of Man
It
now remains to inquire whether material things exist. I clearly
and distinctly know of objects, inasmuch as they are represented
by pure mathematics, and I know that my imagination is capable of
persuading me of physical existence, perhaps by the application
of knowledge to the body, which is immediately present to it and
which therefore, exists.
This is the more clear when we see the difference between
imagination and pure intellection. For example, when I imagine a
triangle, I conceive it, not only as a figure of three lines, but
also by an inward vision, which I call imagining.
But if I think of a chiliagon, a thousand-sided figure, I cannot
in any way imagine or visualise it, as the imagination is a
different power from understanding. It may be that I can imagine
corporeal objects by turning the mind towards the body. This
differs from pure intellection, where the mind turns on itself.
Because I can discover no other explanation, I think it likely
that the body does exist.
First I shall consider those matters perceived through the senses
which I hitherto held to be true.
I perceived that I had all the members of this body - which I
considered part, or possibly the whole, of myself. Further, I
sensed that this body was amidst others, from which it could be
affected with pain or pleasure. I also experienced appetites like
hunger, thirst, and also passions like joy, tittilation, sadness
and anger. Outside myself, in addition to extension, figure and
motions of bodies, I beheld in them hardness, heat, light and
colour, and scents and sounds, so that I could distinguish the
sky, the earth, the sea and other bodies. And because I
remembered that I had made use of the senses rather than reason,
I came to believe that all the ideas in my mind that had come to
me through the senses.
But when I inquired, why painful sensation leads to sadness, and
pleasurable sensation to joy, or a mysterious pinching of the
stomach called hunger leads to desire to eat, and so on, I could
only reason that nature taught me so. There is certainly no
affinity (that I at least can understand) between the craving of
the stomach and the desire to eat, any more than between pain and
sadness.
But experience has gradually destroyed my faith in my senses. I
have seen round towers from afar, which closely observed seemed
square, and colossal statues, which appeared tiny when closely
viewed. I found error in the external senses, and in the
internal; for is there anything more internal than pain? And yet
I learn that some persons seem to feel pain in an amputated part,
which makes me doubt the sources of my own pain. I have
experienced sensations when I sleep, yet I do not think they
proceed from objects outside of me, so I do not see any reason
why I should believe those I have while awake. Furthermore,
nature persuaded me of many things which reason found repellant,
so that I did not believe that I should trust nature. I knew that
my will did not control the ideas I received from the senses, but
did not think that reason to conclude that they proceeded from
outside myself, since possibly some hidden faculty in me might
produce them.
Now that I begin to know myself better, I do not so rashly accept
all which the senses seem to teach, but nor do I think I should
doubt them all.
I know that God may may have placed in me the things which I
comprehend, but I can only explain my ability to make
distinctions between one thing and another by concluding that my
essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing.
And although possibly I possess a body, because I have a clear
and distinct idea of myself as only a thinking and unextended
thing, and it is thereby that I possess an idea of body as an
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this soul, by
which I am what I am, is entirely and absolutely distinct from my
body, and can exist without it.
I further find that faculties of imagination and feeling cannot
be conceived apart from me, that is without an intelligent
substance in which they reside. I also observe in me faculties
like change of position, which can only be conceived as being
attached to corporeal substance. There is also in me a faculty of
perceiving sensible things which is entirely passive, but this
would be useless if there were not an active faculty capable of
forming and producing these ideas. But this active faculty does
not presuppose thought, and, as I am a thinking thing, it is
necessarily the case that the faculty resides in some substance
different from me. Either this substance is a body, that is, a
corporeal nature, or it is God, or some other noble creature. But
He would be a deceiver if these ideas were produced other than by
corporeal objects. Hence we must allow that corporeal things
exist. They may not be exactly as we perceive them, but we must
at least admit that such part of them as is clear and distinct
(such as that described by mathematics) are truly to be
recognised as external objects.
Nature teaches me by the sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc.
that I am not merely lodged in my body as a pilot in a ship, but
that I am so closely united to it that I seem to compose with it
one whole. For if that were not the case, when my body is hurt,
I, the thinking thing, should not feel pain, but would perceive
the wound just as the sailor perceives something damaged in his
vessel. For all these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain, etc.
are in truth just confused modes of thought produced by the
apparent intermingling of mind and body.
But there are many other things which nature seems to have taught
me. For example; I hold the opinion that all space in which there
is nothing that affects my senses is void. That a warm body
contains something similar to my idea of heat. That a white or
green body has in it the same whiteness or greenness that I
perceive. Or that bitter or sweet taste exists in bitter or sweet
things. Or that the stars, towers, and other distant bodies are
of the same figure as they appear to our eyes. Nature teaches me
to flee from things that cause the sensation of pain, and seek
things that communicate to me the sentiment of pleasure. But I do
not see that this teaches me that from those sense-perceptions we
should ever form any conclusion regarding things outside of us,
without having carefully mentally examined them. For it seems to
me that it is mind alone, and not mind and body in conjunction,
that is requisite to knowledge of the truth about such things.
Thus, although a star makes no bigger impression on my eye than a
tiny candle flame, yet I have always judged it larger.
Approaching fire I feel heat, and approaching too near I feel
pain, but there is no reason to accept that there is something
resembling my notion of heat in fire, or than it contains
something resembling pain. All that I have any reason to believe
is that there is something in it that excites in me these
sensations of heat or of pain. Nature has provided me with this
sense merely to signify to my mind what things are beneficial or
hurtful. Yet, I interpret them as the essence of bodies outside
me, as to which, in fact, they can teach me nothing but what is
most obscure and confused.
This pursuit or avoidance things, taught me by nature, sometimes
leads to error; as when the agreeable taste of some poisoned food
may induce me to partake of the poison. Though here nature may be
excused, for it only induces me to desire pleasant food, not
poison. Thus, I can infer that I am not omniscient, which should
not be astonishing, since man is finite in nature.
But we frequently deceive ourselves even in those things to which
we are directly impelled by nature, as happens with those who
when they are sick desire things hurtful to them. It might be
said that sickness corrupts nature, but a sick man is as much
God's creature as he who is in health. Just as a badly-made clock
still follows the laws of nature, so the body of a man with no
mind in it, would have the same motions as at present, excepting
those movements due to the direction of the will. It would be
natural for such a body, if it suffered the dropsy, to move the
nerves and other parts to obtain drink, which is the feature of
this disease although it is harmful to the sufferer. This
comparison of a sick man to a faulty clock may be a mere verbal
quibble, but it remains to inquire how the goodness of God does
not prevent the nature of man from being fallacious.
There is a great difference between mind and body, as body is by
nature always divisible, and the mind is indivisible. When
considering the mind, I cannot distinguish in it any different
parts. And although the whole mind seems united to the whole
body, yet if a foot or an arm is separated from my body, nothing
has been taken away from my mind. Those faculties of willing,
feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be said to be its parts, for it
is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in
feeling and understanding. But I know that corporeal objects can
readily be divided into parts, which alone would teach me that
the mind or soul is entirely different from the body, if I had
not already learned it from other sources.
I further notice that the mind does not receive impressions from
the body directly, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from
the small part of the brain where common sense resides. But
because the nerves must pass through a long route, it may happen
that some intervening part is excited, which may excite a
mistaken movement in the brain. More usually, when, say nerves in
the feet are violently moved, their movement, passing through the
medulla of the spine to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a
sign to the mind which makes it feel pain, as though in the foot.
By this, the mind is excited to do its utmost to remove the cause
of the evil as dangerous to the foot. It is true that God could
have constituted the nature of man such that this movement would
have conveyed something quite different to the mind, but nothing
would have contributed so well to the conservation of the body.
Notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God, the nature of man,
composed of mind and body, can sometimes be a source of
deception.
This consideration helps me to recognise the errors to which my
nature is subject, so as to avoid them, or correct them more
easily. Knowing that my senses usually indicate to me truth
respecting what is beneficial to the body, and being able almost
always to avail myself of many of those senses in order to
examine things, together with my memory to connect the present
with the past, and my understanding of the causes errors, I ought
no longer to fear the falsity of my everyday senses. So, I ought
to set aside all the doubts of these past days as hyperbolical
and ridiculous, particularly that very common uncertainty
respecting dreams, for I now see that memory never connects
dreams together as it unites waking events. I ought in never to
doubt the truth of such matters, if having called up my senses,
memory, and understanding to examine them, nothing is perceived
by any one of them which is repugnant to that set forth by the
others. For because God is no deceiver, it follows that I am not
deceived in this.
But because the exigencies of action often oblige us to make up
our minds before having leisure to examine matters carefully, we
must confess that the life of man is frequently subject to error.
We must in the end acknowledge the infirmity of our nature.
OBJECTIONS
AND REPLIES
The squashed version of Thomas Hobbes objections to the Meditations,
and Descartes replies.
Against
Meditation I
1st OBJECTION: Even from Plato we have the notion of
wondering whether anything exists or not. It is a pity that such
a distinguished thinker should come out with this old stuff.
1st REPLY: I did not claim any originality. I reviewed these
ideas as a medical writer gives a description of a disease he
will explain how to cure.
Against Meditation II
2nd OBJECTION: Knowledge of the proposition 'I exist'
depends on knowledge of the proposition 'I think'; and knowledge
of the latter on the fact that we cannot separate thought from
thinking matter. M Descartes assumes the soul is not physical
without any proof.
2nd REPLY: When I used the terms like 'mind', 'soul',
'understanding' and 'reason', I meant things endowed with the
capacity of thinking. I did not say that thinking is not
corporeal. I left if undecided up to the sixth Meditation, where
it is proved.
3rd OBJECTION: While not separate from me, my thinking
is different from me, in the same sense as dancing is distinct
from the dancer. If Descartes has shown that understanding is
identical with the person who understands, we shall be back with
the jargon of university philosophers: understanding understands,
seeing sees, or even walking, or at least the capacity to walk,
will walk. This is obscure misuse of language, quite unworthy of
Mr. Descartes'.
3rd REPLY: I merely meant that all those modes of thinking are in
me; and I cannot see what doubt or obscurity can be imagined
here.
4th OBJECTION: It is old Aristotle's reasoning that
there is some difference between imagining and conceiving, as
with the wax. But Descartes has not explained how they are
different. If reasoning is nothing other than using the word 'is'
to join names, then reasoning depends on names; names depend on
images; then it follows that mind is just motions in the body.
4th REPLY: I did explain the difference between an image, and a
concept belonging to the mind - as with what we know of the wax
through images, and what we conceive with the mind. In reasoning,
it is not names that are joined, but the things signified by the
names. If the Philosopher holds that things are signified by
words, then he must accept that our reasonings are about things,
rather than about the words alone. Cannot a Frenchman or a German
reason about the same things, even though they have different
words? I am amazed that the opposite could ever have entered
anyone's head. If he concludes that mind is motion, he could with
equally conclude that earth is sky, or anything else he fancied.
Against Meditation III
5th OBJECTION: Such ideas as we have are based on real
things. Even our idea of an angel as a pretty boy with wings is
based on real observations. But we have no knowledge of God, so
it would be foolish idolatry to have an 'idea' of him in this
sense.
5th REPLY: No more suitable word than 'idea' was available. I
could never satisfy people who prefer to give my words meanings
different from the ones I give them.
6th OBJECTION: Even if fear, for instance, is a thought, I fail
to see how it can be anything other than the thought of the thing
you are afraid of.
6th REPLY: It goes without saying that seeing a lion and being
frightened of it at the same time, is different from merely
seeing it.- and this happens without language. I cannot find
anything here which requires a reply.
7th OBJECTION: This whole inquiry collapses if there is no idea
of God. It has not been proved that there is any such idea. The
idea of my own self, I get it from looking at my body; and of the
soul by reasoning.
7th REPLY: It is obvious that there is an idea of God. When he
says there is no idea of the soul, he means only that there is no
image.
8th OBJECTION: There is no differentiating between the idea of
the sun seen with the eyes, and of the notion of the sun reached
through astronomical reasoning.
8th REPLY: What he says is not an idea of the sun is precisely
what I myself call an 'idea'.
9th OBJECTION: Does it make sense to talk of reality being 'more'
or 'less'?
9th REPLY: Substances are more real than modes or incomplete
things. All this is absolutely self-evident.
10th OBJECTION: Descartes says that we can get the idea of God
from considering his attributes, and that we should see whether
this could not have originated from within ourselves. Yet the
ideas we have of God may come from external objects.
If God is 'infinite' then we cannot conceive any limits to Him.
But no idea could lack any coming into being or limits
How does Descartes know that God is supremely intelligent?
Again, by what means does he know that God has supreme
understanding?
Even if there exists something 'infinite, independent, supremely
powerful,' etc., it does not follow that it is a creator.
One final point: when Descartes says that the ideas of God and of
our souls are innate in us, what of people in deep and dreamless
sleep? If they have no ideas at all during that period; then it
follows that no idea is innate, since anything innate must always
be there.
10th REPLY: Anyone who understands the concept of 'God' must know
that they know this. So they must have a form, or idea, of
intellectual understanding. By extending this idea indefinitely,
they can form an idea of the divine understanding. The same goes
for the other attributes of God. So it obviously follows from the
fact that his existence has been demonstrated, that it has also
been demonstrated that the whole universe, or absolutely all
things in existence which are distinct from God, were created by
him. Finally, when I say that a given idea is innate in us, I do
not mean that we are always aware of it - if that was what I
meant, then of course no idea would be innate. All I mean is that
we have within ourselves the capacity of summoning it up.
11th OBJECTION: Christianity requires us to believe that no idea
can be had of God. So it follows that the existence of God has
not been demonstrated, still less his creation of the universe.
11th REPLY: When it is said that God is inconceivable, this
refers to the possibility of a concept that would completely
embrace him. As for how we obtain an idea of God, I have repeated
this ad nauseam.
Against Meditation IV
12th OBJECTION: Descartes is wrong to think that ability
to make mistakes requires some special faculty, it needs nothing
more than the possession of reasoning ability- this is why stones
cannot make mistakes. It should also be noted that the freedom of
the will is assumed without proof.
12th REPLY: Making of mistakes is lack of ability, but it does
not follow that the lack has any positive being. Analogously,
stones do not have a sense of sight; but that alone is not enough
for them to be described as blind.
I am amazed that I have not yet come across a single valid
argument among all these objections. In this passage I made no
assumptions about the freedom of the will, beyond what we all
experience in ourselves. It is perfectly evident by the light of
nature- on introspecting, no-one will fail to experience in
themselves the essential identity of willing and being free.
13th OBJECTION: The expression 'a great illumination in my
understanding' is metaphorical, and is inappropriate for logical
reasoning. Those lacking in self-criticism claim illumination of
this sort.
13th REPLY: It is irrelevant whether the expression 'a great
illumination' is appropriate for logical reasoning or not,
provided it is appropriate for explaining what is meant - as
indeed it is.
Against Meditation V
14th OBJECTION: If the triangle exists nowhere in the
world, I fail to understand how it can have any sort of nature.
That which is nowhere has no being. Similarly, the proposition:
'Humans are animals' will be true to eternity, because names are
eternal; but once the human race has died out there will no
longer be any human nature.
14th REPLY: Everybody is familiar with the distinction between
essential being and actual existence; and I have already
demolished what he says here about eternal names, when he should
be talking about concepts or ideas of eternal truth.
Against Meditation VI
15th OBJECTION: It is no sin for doctors to deceive
their patients for the sake of their health; or parents deceive
their children for their own good; the wrongness of deception
does not consist in the falsity of what is said, but in the harm
caused by the deception. Descartes should have considered whether
the proposition that 'there are no circumstances in which God can
deceive us' is true, if taken in a universal sense. If this
proposition is not universally true, then the conclusion
'therefore corporeal things exist' does not follow.
15th REPLY: My conclusion does not require that there are no
circumstances under which we can make mistakes (I have already
admitted that we often make mistakes). What it requires is that
we are not mistaken in circumstances where our error would imply
that God had deliberately decided to deceive us, since that would
be inconsistent with his nature. Again, the inference is invalid
here.
LAST OBJECTION: If the dreamer dreams whether he is dreaming or
not, he cannot dream that his dream coheres with ideas of past
events succeeding each other in a long chain. Besides, according
to Descartes, all certainty depends on a single item of
knowledge, namely that there is an undeceiving God. But it
follows, either that atheists cannot infer that they are awake
from their memories of their past lives, or that someone can know
that they are awake, despite not recognising the existence of the
undeceiving God.
LAST REPLY: A dreamer cannot really connect the contents of their
dream with the ideas of past events, although they can dream that
they are making the connection. Does anybody deny that people can
make mistakes in their sleep? But later, on waking up, they will
readily see that they had been wrong.
Atheists can infer that they are awake from their memories of
previous events in their lives; but they cannot know
scientifically that this is a sufficient indication for them to
be certain that they are not mistaken, unless they know that they
were created by an undeceiving God
René DESCARTES
1596-1650
Descrates' memorial in the
Adolf Fredrik Kyrkogård in Stockholm,
his remains were later removed to Paris