The concept of race today is meaningless, or rather only has meaning in whatever specific context the speaker is using.

A fine example of Goldblatt's contention that race is primarily a matter of self identification is Halle Barry. Why is she black? Why isn't she white? She is half of each, and therefore could claim either or neither classification. Obviously, at the present moment she is "black" so she can bask in the glow of being the first to win an Oscar.

Or look at Tiger Woods, who has so far consistently refused to identify himself as black - or asian, or American Indian, or white. He's taken much grief from those who would categorize every American, because if he claims any one label he then denies all the others. He wants to take pride in his entire heritage, not one portion of it. And bravo for him, I say.

Sex and gender is more complex. I believe gender has displaced sex in most discussions because it can be claimed to be optional. Sex is explicit - you have the dangly bits you're male, you have the tucked in bits you're female. What you wish has no bearing. By shifting the labels to ones which can be arbitrarily assigned we can claim that every person is a self generated construct independent of physical reality.

Or so my cynicism informs me.

During the deep dark days of anti black feelings in America--long before all that stuff vanished--Lenny Bruce once asked an audience the following:

Black should be avoided if you are white, sexually. But if you had a choice, would you rather sleep with (ie, fuck) Lena Horne (black) or Kate Smith (very very fat singer, white.)...
But now we carve out our identities, and Michael Jackson went from being a poor, black boy to a rich white woman.
Race is meaningless. Having said that, it is and will always be with us.

All of the problems that plague racial categories can be found in one form or another in the classification of virtually any object. I find the Halle Barry self-identification argument particularly unpersuasive in this context. There is chocolate ice cream, vanilla ice cream, and chocolate/vanilla (mixed) ice cream. The existence of a combination does not render the pre-combined entities meaningless.

Furthermore, I don't deny "wetness" as an attribute of objects just because I can't find the attribute at an atomic level. If you look at electrons, neutrons and quarks, you will never find "wetness," and if you search amongst genes, you may never find race. Some attributes exist only at a certain level of reality, so reducing them to smaller parts does not prove anything. The same thing happens in brain science. Does our inability to locate beliefs (or thoughts) in the brain mean that the concept of belief is meaningless or invalid?

Many of the categories we use to think are as imprecise as race. People are tall, short, fat, thin, muscular, handsome, and pretty. These words have meanings and are useful ways of identifying people, but they are not precise and many people fall into gray areas when measured against them.

If anyone is interested in a thought-provoking defense of race as a category, read this article by Robert Locke (http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=983).

Well, but this is exactly the point, Derk. Because race, as a category, doesn't exist on the essential (blood) level, it shouldn't be treated as though it does -- which is precisely the way it IS treated by those who claim to be promoting race as a social construct; that is, proponents of social construction theories of race, for all their efforts to save "race" as a category by distancing it from faulty blood arguments, end up making the essentialist argument nevertheless (as my earlier linked post argues). From that earlier post:

And so race, as it turns out, is either an essence or an illusion. Those who believe race to be an essence (say, the KKK, who base their ideas on bad science) have no need for a project of qualifying race as a social construct; and those who believe race to be non-essential have no grounds, theoretically, for promoting racial identity other than that same bad science (which, it turns out, underlies the constructivist argument), or else their social concern that we somehow need to continue the project of racial identity, for whatever the political reasons.[emphasis added].

Of course we can still use imprecise labels to categorize things. The question is, should we, in the case of "race"? -- particularly when it's clear that race IS a biological fiction. My argument is that by distancing ourselves socially from such labels -- at least as they are currently marshalled as factors in social engineering projects -- we will be going a long way toward beginning to reduce certain social ills.

I have been living in Japan for the past six year and I can assure you that I have never been mistaken for a person of Japanese ethnicity. On the other hand, Koreans in Japan are often mistaken for being Japanese. I assume this is because there are some very real physical attributes that distinguish me from both the Japanese and the Koreans. The same is true for one of my Indian friends. Japanese people know immediately that she is not Japanese, not Chinese, not Korean, not Vietnamese, not black, and not white. Furthermore, they know this easily and with absolute certainty on the basis of her physical characteristics alone. Physical attributes are encoded in the genes, which means that the attributes through which I am known to be white and she is known to be Indian are encoded in the genes.

Thus, there is a very real (essential) relationship between a person's genetic information and the physical attributes that are used to group that person into different racial categories. I think it is important to distinguish racial categories from the attributes upon which those categories are based. I will concede that racial categories (not attributes) are, to some extent, social constructs (though not entirely). However, this is true of virtually any object. The Japanese view shrimp and lobsters as simply large and small versions of a single animal. The same can be said of deer and elk. Furthermore, in Japanese, peas, beans, and nuts are all varieties of "mame." It is actually quite difficult to explain the difference between nuts and beans to a Japanese person. However, this doesn't mean that there is no meaningful difference, and it doesn't mean that the categories can be socially constructed however we want. Shrimp and lobster may be viewed as a single animal, but not shrimp and dogs. In the same way, there may be some argument over whether Arabs are "white," but Bruce Lee is clearly not white. The fact that racial categories are partially influenced by social factors does not mean that there are no real racial differences.

I don't think that race has to be "either an essence or an illusion." To my mind, people are put into racial categories based on physical attributes that are rooted firmly in biology (essence.) However, the categories into which such attributes are grouped can be a bit crude (hence there may be a degree of illusion), but no more so than most other categories. If you were to apply your argument to language, there would be no languages. Where does one language end and another begin? Is Swiss German really German, given that Northern Germans basically can't understand it? If we looked in the brains of German speakers would there be any consistent difference compared to, say, Chinese speakers? Clearly the line between languages is somewhat arbitrary (Danish is probably closer to Swedish than Swiss German is to High German), but that hardly warrants throwing out the entire concept of language.

If I am meeting someone at a train station and they tell me in advance that they are black, white, or Asian, I have a fairly good idea of what type of attributes to look for. While I agree with you that racial categories can be harmful in many situations (and I certainly support the Racial Privacy Initiative being pushed by Ward Connerly), I think that they will continue to be used in normal conversation (because they are useful) and, personally, that doesn't bother me.

Lord help the raceless soul who bears none of the attributes necessary for others to be able to label him/her with any degree of certainty.

The whole phenomenon of "passing" in the 19th and early 20th century gives lie to the idea of race you seem to be defending. Either those who could pass for white were truly white (perception makes them so); or they are Blacks who are able to pass themselves as white (in which case, something essential must make them Black, although to the casual observer they appear white). It is the marginal cases that determine the rule.

As I am married to a non-white individual, my kids will fit into the category of "raceless souls" you speak of. As the number of mixed citizens grows, the importance of belonging to one of the traditional racial categories will (hopefully) decline, but that doesn't mean the categories will cease to function with respect to people in other parts of the world.

I think our disagreement probably comes down to the word "truly white." You seem concerned with the way people are pigeon holed into rigid categories in an all-or-nothing way. Thus, if I understand you correctly, you are against some of the ways racial categories are applied. I agree with you that this is a problem, but I don't think the denial of "race" is the solution. Marginal cases do not determine the rule; they are exceptions to the rule. Look at dogs. There are specific breeds and there are various mixes. Just because there are some part-wolf dogs doesn't mean that there are no wolves. It might be a problem politically if you were trying to force dogs to live in packs filled with their own breed, but theoretically it is not really a problem (at least no more so than anything else). Races will disappear through interbreeding, not because we say they don't exist. Changing words doesn't, as far as I can tell, change reality. Anyway, I know this issue is far from settled and I am not an expert on genetics, so take my comments for what they are worth (i.e. probably not much).

My wife is Japanese-Irish. Me, I'm adopted. So there's no way to tell what I am, I suppose.

Changing words doesn't change genetic makeup, obviously; nor will changing terminology somehow change similarities in traits shared by groups. But "race" is not the same as "genetic similarities shared by groups," otherwise we'd have a "race" of tall people, or people with "outty" belly buttons, for instance.

I'm not denying the validity of categorizing or grouping; I'm denying that "race" is an objective category that we can appeal to as a starting point for categorization. Instead, race, I'd argue, is an invented way to categorize based on a certain set of criteria -- though you (and of course you're not alone) seem to wish to argue that race is essential. Fine. I mean, my argument is that race is either essential (which is the position you are taking) or else illusory -- which doesn't mean we can't continue to use it as a category, just that it cannot stand up to theoretical rigor.

If that makes sense...?

As with many arguments I have, I think our disagreement stems from a different understanding of certain key words (in this case "race"). By insisting that race fit into an either/or category (either essential or illusory), you find it necessary to reject the notion of race altogether. If faced with such a choice, perhaps I would too. However, I think that race, like many concepts, is evolving, and when I use the word I don't really have either of those two ideas in mind.

I don't see race in terms of "essence" or "illusion" at all. As I stated already, I think that physical attributes are real and reflect the genes that built them. I think that racial categories are crude but useful groupings based on such attributes. I think it is an overstatement to say that race is entirely a social construct because there is a limit to how race can be constructed. That is, the groupings are constrained by the capacity of the physical attributes to be grouped, and this capacity is not infinitely malleable (see my shrimp/dog example above). Because the categories are based on real physical attributes tied to the genes that produced them, I don't think the racial categories are pure illusion either. However, given that there is some room to change the groupings (a degree of arbitrariness), people that believe the categories are inflexible truths are suffering from a mild illusion. But, as I have already stated, this same illusion exists for most of the concepts we use. So, while I think I see your point, I would rather see the concept of race refined to reflect our current understanding than done away with altogether (just a personal preference, I guess).

Saying that race describes sets of physical attributes -- that it is "real" and stamped into the genetic coding -- is simply to say that race is essential.

The reason I think "race" should be done away with as a category -- rather than "refined to reflect our current understanding" (which reflects something different than our traditional understanding of race) -- I've noted in the discussion here.

I am arguing that the "objects" have two components. First there are physical characteristics amenable to conceptual grouping. Second, there are the concepts (categories) themselves. The parameters set by the concepts admit some aspects of the physical world while excluding others. It does not matter how you define a concept, there will be some aspects of the physical world that will fall on the line, making the concept boundary look somewhat arbitrary. Race is not unique in this regard. The same can be said for languages and anything else. When I was a kid, I remember learning that it is difficult to group Cheetahs because, although they seem to be a type of cat, they do not have retractable claws (which makes them similar to dogs). Last summer I talked to a Paleontologist who said she runs into similar problems all the time (where is the line between a film, a membrane, and a shell?). Just because there are animals that have coverings that are not quite shells and not quite membranes does not necessarily mean that the concept "shell" should be thrown out. In most cases the concept functions well. If someone tells me they found a shell on the beach, I have a pretty good idea of what they mean. If the police are looking for a missing child and you are able to tell them that the child is white, or Asian, or black, I think that, for the most part, the concept would facilitate the investigation.

So, I am arguing against your division of things into either essence or illusion. The attributes that are grouped (whether physical attributes of humans, animals, shell/membranes etc.) are essential in some sense. They exist regardless of our categories. On the other hand, the concepts (or categories) are somewhat arbitrary and a belief that they are absolute could qualify as an illusion. Shells, languages, race, and virtually everything else are compounded of a concept and that part of the physical world that falls under the concept. They are not either illusion or essential; they are compounds of both.

If you wish to continue this argument (I realize it is time consuming and perhaps even annoying, so I am not pressuring you), please clearly address the following two issues.

1. I have shown that race and other things are compounded of essential and arbitrary elements (physical attributes and the conceptual groupings under which they fall). Thus, why should we maintain a rigid distinction between essential and illusory? (I believe that most of your argument hinges on this assumption).

2. Insofar as your argument is correct, it could be applied to virtually anything. Why must we apply it to race and not to other concept/entities? I have always wondered why everyone naturally accepts that ostriches and hummingbirds are both "birds," but humans and apes are distinct animals (some even doubt that we are animals).

1) You have NOT shown that race and other things are compounded of essential and arbitrary elements. You have shown, instead, that we use the word "race" to account for some essential elements and some arbitrary elements that are joined ONLY by our decision to group them under the rubric of "race."

2) Because real attributes are arbitrarily grouped and then presented as belonging to a particular group as a biological rule (the appeal here is to a vision of geographically isolated genetic purity which hasn't existed in milennia), the classification of "race" is a misleading fiction when presented as essential -- and when presented as a constructed social fiction, relies on essentialist appeals in order to hold together theoretically.

I've said that there are arguments to be made for the social usefulness of maintaining the category -- but I've shown that the category itself can't account for its internal contradictions.

I think we are reaching a dead end. We have different assumptions about the relationship between the material world and the concepts we use to group it. I am willing to go into the issue further, but I will leave that for you to decide. Here is a brief response:

1) It is precisely the joining of elements together under the rubric of one concept or another that makes "things" what they are. So, by showing that, I have shown that race and other things are combined of essential and arbitrary elements. If you stare at a point on a tree (and don't move your eyes), you could be staring at a leaf, a branch, a tree, or a forest, depending on which concept you use to delineate the sense data into "things." It is the delineating power of thought that makes "things" from the incoherent chaos of physical characteristics in the world at large. This is without exception, and does not apply to race alone.

2) The attributes are not arbitrarily grouped. They are grouped based on the natural tendency of certain aspects of the physical world to fall together into patterns. A degree of arbitrariness does not imply total arbitrariness. The appeal is not to a geographically isolated genetic purity. There may be some people who claim that, but I am not one of them. Race obviously has its roots in the notion of an extended family. I can really see that here in Japan. As with race, the border between family and non-family is vague and there are all kinds of exceptions. Where does one family end and another begin? Is there more genetic variation within families than between them? There is absolutely no doubt that Swedes, Danes, and Germans are more closely related to each other than Swedes and Japanese, or Swedes and Nigerians. Thus, in a very general sense, race does give information about genetic relationships. I am not saying that race will serve as an instrument of scientific inquiry. I am saying that for everyday conversation it is far too useful to get rid of.

By the way, I have read that Chimpanzees are actually more closely related to humans than they are to Gorillas. Perhaps Chimps are a type of man? My point, once again, is that the same argument could be used to destroy any of the concepts we use to group the physical characteristics of the world.

I don't recall suggesting that a degree of arbitrariness implies total arbitrariness; nor that I have any problem whatsoever with the idea of categorization -- which is a useful tool given a task that can benefit from it. I simply pointed out that "racial" categorization relies on sets of arbitrary patterns (geography, extended family, etc. -- rather than, say, femur size, bone density, or hair color) that have proved unreliable scientifically and counterproductive socially.

There are more exact descriptions by which to categorize. Swedes, Nigerians, and Japanese, to use your example, are perfectly fine descriptors (esp. because they each appeal to a definite place rather than some ill-defined notion of historical origin and genetic purity). And personally, I find those terms far more useful than Caucasiod, Negroid, and Mongoloid -- especially for everyday conversation, where such ideas matter in establishing public policy.

We'd be less likely to promote social programs that use public funds to celebrate transnational diversity than we would to celebrate "racial" diversity -- and I believe such a maneuver would help prevent the kind of Balkanization of "cultures" we're seeing here in the US.

Bottom line is, you find "racial" categories useful and accurate; I find them scientifically inexact and socially dangerous.

So we'll just have to agree to disagree for now.

I am not saying I find them "accurate." I think there is enough accuracy to make them useful in many situations.

"We'd be less likely to promote social programs that use public funds to celebrate transnational diversity than we would to celebrate "racial" diversity"

This is a good point, and I will consider it further on my own.
I still think there may be circumstances in which it is usefull or necessary to speak of, say, white Europeans in contrast with Asian Europeans. That is why reference to region alone may not always be sufficient.

Regards

My name is Steve Sailer. I sympathize with the conceptual difficulties you are having with the term "race." That's extremely common, which is why I recently published the essay "It's All Relative: Putting Race in Proper Perspective" at http://www.vdare.com/sailer/presentation.htm

In it, I offer a simple but scientifically all purpose definition of "race." As a professional writer on the topic of diversity, I've found it's made my job infinitely easier. -- Steve Sailer