| Rockefeller memo
Here is the full text of the memo from the office of Sen. Jay Rockefeller
(D-WVa.) on setting a strategy for pursuing an independent investigation
of pre-war White House intelligence dealings on Iraq.
We have carefully reviewed our options under the rules and believe
we have identified the best approach. Our plan is as follows:
1) Pull the majority along as far as we can on issues that may lead
to major new disclosures regarding improper or questionable conduct
by administration officials. We are having some success in that
regard.
For example, in addition to the President's State of the Union speech,
the chairman [Sen. Pat Roberts] has agreed to look at the activities
of the office of the Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz,
as well as Secretary Bolton's office at the State Department.
The fact that the chairman supports our investigations into these
offices and cosigns our requests for information is helpful and
potentially crucial. We don't know what we will find but our prospects
for getting the access we seek is far greater when we have the backing
of the majority. [We can verbally mention some of the intriguing
leads we are pursuing.]
2) Assiduously prepare Democratic 'additional views' to attach to
any interim or final reports the committee may release. Committee
rules provide this opportunity and we intend to take full advantage
of it.
In that regard we may have already compiled all the public statements
on Iraq made by senior administration officials. We will identify
the most exaggerated claims. We will contrast them with the intelligence
estimates that have since been declassified. Our additional views
will also, among other things, castigate the majority for seeking
to limit the scope of the inquiry.
The Democrats will then be in a strong position to reopen the question
of establishing an Independent Commission [i.e., the Corzine Amendment.]
3) Prepare to launch an independent investigation when it becomes
clear we have exhausted the opportunity to usefully collaborate
with the majority. We can pull the trigger on an independent investigation
of the administration's use of intelligence at any time. But we
can only do so once.
The best time to do so will probably be next year, either:
A) After we have already released our additional views on an interim
report, thereby providing as many as three opportunities to make
our case to the public. Additional views on the interim report (1).
The announcement of our independent investigation (2). And (3) additional
views on the final investigation. Or:
B) Once we identify solid leads the majority does not want to pursue,
we would attract more coverage and have greater credibility in that
context than one in which we simply launch an independent investigation
based on principled but vague notions regarding the use of intelligence.
In the meantime, even without a specifically authorized independent
investigation, we continue to act independently when we encounter
footdragging on the part of the majority. For example, the FBI Niger
investigation was done solely at the request of the vice chairman.
We have independently submitted written requests to the DOD and
we are preparing further independent requests for information.
SUMMARY: Intelligence issues are clearly secondary to the public's
concern regarding the insurgency in Iraq. Yet we have an important
role to play in revealing the misleading, if not flagrantly dishonest,
methods and motives of senior administration officials who made
the case for unilateral preemptive war.
The approach outlined above seems to offer the best prospect for
exposing the administration's dubious motives. |
