

TerrorismMonitor

In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror

Volume II, Issue 24 ♦ December 16, 2004

IN THIS SPECIAL ISSUE ON ZARQAWI:

ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH By Gary Gambill	1
ZARQAWI'S PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAEDA: FROM MU'ASKAR AL-BATTAR, ISSUE 21 Translated by Jeffrey Pool	4
UNRAVELING ZARQAWI'S AL-QAEDA CONNECTION By Gordon Corera	6
ZARQAWI'S JORDANIAN AGENDA By Matthew Levitt and Julie Sawyer	8
RICIN FEVER: ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI IN THE PANKISI GORGE By Andrew McGregor	10



Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has come to be enemy number one in Iraq.

TerrorismMonitor is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy-makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Jamestown Foundation. The Terrorism Monitor's Managing Editor is Mahan Abedin, a consultant on financial, political and security affairs related to the Middle East. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any Jamestown publication is strictly prohibited by law.



For comments or questions about our publications, please send an email to pubs@jamestown.org, or contact us at:

4516 43rd Street NW
Washington, DC • 20016

Tel: (202) 483-8888
Fax: (202) 483-8337

Copyright ©2004

Editor's Note on Special Issue on Zarqawi:

Originally a gangster with a drug habit and propensity for sexual assault, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is an unlikely Salafist militant. His murky origins, combined with his sudden projection into the limelight on the eve of the invasion of Iraq and the grisly exploits of his organization in that country have ensured that much of the information on the man and his organization are often inaccurate or misleading. This special is designed to provide timely and accurate information and analysis on the man who is increasingly touted as the United States' most dangerous adversary in Iraq. The range of articles presented here discuss and assess a number of acutely relevant topics; including Zarqawi's background, the precise nature of his relationship with al-Qaeda, enmity towards the Jordanian regime and the more eccentric misinformation campaigns that have centered on him. It also becomes apparent, throughout this collection of articles, that Zarqawi's Achilles' heel truly is his lack of vision and the weak ideology underpinning his operations.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch

By Gary Gambill

In the span of just eighteen months, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has emerged from obscurity to eclipse Osama bin Laden as public enemy number one in the Bush administration's war on terror. Less gifted than bin Laden in nearly every way, Zarqawi rose to become the "emir" of radical Islamist terror groups in Iraq largely on the strength of his networking

skills. While probably not the terrorist mastermind he is often made out to be, Zarqawi is responsible for forging the broad outlines of a seemingly effective terrorist strategy for derailing Iraq's postwar political transition.

Zarqawi was born Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah in October 1966 to a family of modest means in the working class Jordanian town of Zarqa, 16 miles northeast of Amman. Contrary to many Western media reports, he is not of Palestinian descent – the Khalaylah clan is a branch of the Bani Hassan, a large East Bank bedouin tribe loyal to Jordan's Hashemite royal family. Zarqawi's father, a local *mukhtar* (mayor) and retired army officer, died in 1984, leaving his mother a small pension to raise six daughters and four sons.

Devastated by the death of his father, the seventeen-year-old adolescent dropped out of school and descended into a life of drinking, drug abuse, and violence on the streets of Zarqa. He soon ran afoul of the authorities and was jailed for drug possession and sexual assault. Ironically, it was probably his criminal activities that first drew him into the city's abject and lawless Palestinian refugee camp, where he was exposed to radical Salafist preachers. He quickly fell under their influence and gave up drugs and alcohol. After acquiring a clerical job in the local municipality, he married one of his maternal cousins.

In 1989, however, Zarqawi abruptly left his family to go to Afghanistan. By this time, Soviet troops had already pulled out of the country – evidently he was expecting to join a triumphant march on Kabul and witness the establishment of the world's first Sunni Islamist state. Instead, he saw the Mujahideen front fragment along tribal and ethnic lines, unable to deliver the *coup de grace* to the “godless” Soviet-installed regime in Kabul for three years. Zarqawi is believed to have taken part in some fighting, but he mainly worked as a correspondent for a radical Islamist magazine during this period. By 1991, he was spending most of his time in Peshawar, Pakistan – once a way station for Arab volunteers going to Afghanistan, now teeming with disillusioned Arab fighters debating what to do next.

It is here that Zarqawi came under the influence of Muhammad al-Maqdisi (aka Issam al-Barqawi), a well-known radical Salafist thinker and fellow Jordanian. Together they established a network called Bayat al-Imam to organize Jordanian Afghan veterans. After the fall of Kabul in 1992, as rival Mujahideen commanders finally “liberated” the Afghan capital only to turn their guns on each other and tear the city to shreds, Zarqawi and Maqdisi returned to Jordan to prepare for a jihad closer to home.

One thing that Zarqawi had not learned from Afghanistan's swaggering militia environment was how to operate discretely. Upon his return, he began publicly condemning the government and denouncing mainstream clerics who supported it – a bad idea made worse by the fact that he had been naively stockpiling weapons and explosives in his own home. In March 1994, security forces raided his house, discovered the arms cache and arrested him. Zarqawi was brought before the state security court on charges of membership in an illegal organization and weapons possession – a predicament that might not have been so dire had he treated the court respectfully. He did not. “[Zarqawi] handed me a written indictment. The first defendant in this bill was the late His Majesty King Hussein and the second was me...I was expected to inform the first defendant of the charges,” recalls the judge who presided over the trial. [1] Zarqawi was sentenced to 15 years in jail with hard labor and sent to Suwaqa prison, where he was soon joined by Maqdisi.

Maqdisi quickly established a loyal following among the prisoners, with Zarqawi (who worked out incessantly with buckets of rocks) acting as his enforcer. Over time, however, the focus of the prisoners' loyalty shifted decidedly to Zarqawi and a power struggle erupted between the two. While Maqdisi was far more respected as a spiritual leader than his disciple (whose single greatest learned achievement was memorizing the Qur'an) and his background earned him considerable sympathy from the predominantly Palestinian prisoners, Zarqawi's military experience and courage in confronting guards and rival prisoner factions were much more important assets in a prison environment and he eventually became the group's undisputed leader.

Zarqawi's leadership style blended authoritarian and compassionate tendencies. He imposed strict rules on his disciples – they had to dress identically (Afghan-style robes, beards, short hair, black head cloths), could watch only news broadcasts on television, could read only books that he pre-approved, and were not allowed to socialize with non-Islamist prisoners or even speak to each other in his presence without permission. However, stories also abound of Zarqawi's devotion to his followers. On one occasion, he flew into a rage and attacked a guard who was beating one of his disciples. He was “well-known for loving his brothers in God more than his relatives,” recalls one Jordanian Islamist who knew him well. [2] When an Islamist whose legs had been blown off in a terror attack was brought to the prison, Zarqawi personally bathed and took care of the new arrival. Former friends and associates also remember him as very emotional and easily moved to tears.

In May 1999, following the ascension of King Abdullah II, Zarqawi was released as part of a sweeping amnesty. However, in a replay of Saudi and Egyptian efforts to “export” their violent Islamist opposition, Jordanian intelligence incessantly harassed Zarqawi and other newly released Islamist detainees, preventing them from getting jobs or starting businesses. Several months after his release, Zarqawi left the country and returned to Peshawar. Interestingly, he brought his ailing mother with him in hopes that the climate there would help her battle with leukemia. When his visa expired six months later, however, he was arrested and ordered to leave the country. While his mother flew back to Jordan, Zarqawi crossed the border into Afghanistan for the first time in eight years.

Shortly after entering the country, Zarqawi met with bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders in Kandahar and asked them for support in establishing a terror network aimed at overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy. It appears that they assisted him substantially – by late 2000 he had established his own training camp near Herat in Western Afghanistan, catering mainly to exiled Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian Islamists in Europe. As his network developed, Zarqawi abandoned his exclusive focus on overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy – in part because some operatives refused to go back to Jordan, preferring instead to plot attacks against Israel or Jewish targets in Europe.

While Zarqawi’s network – by this time known as al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War) – was not completely independent of al-Qaeda, it was clearly autonomous. Zarqawi’s men “refused to march under the banner of another individual or group,” recalls Nu’man bin-Uthman, a Libyan Islamist leader now living in London who was in contact with Zarqawi at the time. [3] Zarqawi’s choice of Herat as a base of operations was significant – it allowed him to bypass Pakistani way stations into Afghanistan used by al-Qaeda and instead create his own highly sophisticated “underground railroad” to ferry operatives between Europe and Afghanistan through the eastern Iranian city of Mashhad. According to the interrogations of captured Tawhid operatives in Germany, the two networks’ fundraising branches competed with each other in Europe.

Zarqawi’s Iranian connections paid off – in the aftermath of 9/11, he and most of his operatives in Afghanistan were able to cross overland into Iran. However, his efforts to resume operations there backfired. In February 2002, three Tawhid operatives on a mission to carry out bomb attacks against Israel were arrested crossing into Turkey from Iran; their interrogation alerted Western intelligence agencies to Zarqawi’s presence in the Islamic Republic. Pressure on

Iran to expel Zarqawi intensified in April after eight Tawhid members were arrested in Germany for plotting terrorist attacks against Jewish targets.

Weeks later, Zarqawi was obliged to relocate to a remote area of northern Iraq controlled by the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam. A number of Arab Islamists had already set up camp in the mountainous enclave and Zarqawi quickly joined forces with them. Believing that an American invasion to oust Saddam Hussein was inevitable, Zarqawi began preparing the groundwork for the battle ahead. He spent a considerable part of the summer in Baghdad and the so-called Sunni triangle of Iraq, apparently to establish local support networks. Since Iran was no longer a reliable conduit for the travel of Tawhid operatives, Zarqawi spent time in Syria setting up an alternate route.

During or shortly before the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Zarqawi returned to Iran, where he met with bin Laden’s military chief, Muhammad Ibrahim Makawi (Saif al-Adel), who asked him to coordinate the entry of al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq through Syria. Zarqawi readily agreed and by the fall of 2003 a steady flow of Arab Islamists were infiltrating Iraq via Syria. Although many of these foreign fighters were not members of Tawhid, they became more or less dependent on Zarqawi’s local contacts once they entered the unfamiliar country. Moreover, given Tawhid’s superior intelligence gathering capability, it made little sense for non-Tawhid operatives to plan and carry out attacks without coordinating with Zarqawi’s lieutenants. Consequentially, Zarqawi came to be recognized as the regional “emir” of Islamist terrorists in Iraq – without (until last month) having sworn fealty to bin Laden.

In essence, Zarqawi has pursued a four-pronged terror strategy in Iraq. The first track of this strategy is intended to pressure international actors into rescinding their support for Iraq’s American-led transition. The truck bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 effectively ended the UN involvement on the ground in Iraq; other targets have included the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad (August 2003) and the headquarters of Italy’s paramilitary police headquarters in Nasiriyah.

The second is designed to deter Iraqis from supporting the US-led transition. Zarqawi operatives have carried out numerous car bomb attacks on police stations and recruitment centers, killing hundreds, and have assassinated several leading Iraqi politicians.

The third is designed to obstruct Iraq’s reconstruction by abducting and beheading civilian contractors, humanitarian

aid workers, and other foreigners in Iraq and distributing the gruesome videos of their executions over the Internet. Zarqawi's network pioneered this practice with the execution in May of Nicholas Berg (who Zarqawi himself beheaded) and carried out at least ten subsequent killings, while other al-Qaeda-linked groups are believed responsible for another two dozen murders.

The fourth track of Zarqawi's strategy is the string of deadly car bomb attacks outside Shiite mosques (most recently, Hamid al-Najar mosque in Baghdad on December 3) that have killed hundreds of worshippers. These attacks are not intended to punish or deter collaboration with the coalition – they are deliberately indiscriminate. In his January 2004 letter to bin Laden, Zarqawi explains their purpose: "Targeting and striking their religious, political, and military symbols, will make them show their rage against the Sunnis and bear their inner vengeance. If we succeed in dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death." [4]

While Zarqawi's brutal methods appeal to many radical Sunni Islamists, they have begun to spark considerable controversy in the Arab world. Iraqi insurgent leaders in Iraq frequently complain that Zarqawi's brutality has detracted from international sympathy for their cause. The Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq has repeatedly condemned the beheading of foreign hostages as a violation of Islamic law. [5] Zarqawi's defense – that the Prophet Muhammad ordered the killing of prisoners after the Battle of Badr – is not seen as very persuasive by most Islamic scholars. [6] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a well-known Egyptian cleric living in Qatar, has compared Zarqawi to the ancient Kharijites, "who used to pray and fast all the time . . . but read the Qur'an without understanding it." [7]

Zarqawi's mass murder of Shiites has puzzled many informed observers, since he was suspected of having loose ties with Iranian intelligence until recently and al-Qaeda has scrupulously avoided targeting Shi'as. Some speculate that the poorly educated Zarqawi has been heavily influenced by one of his close associates in Iraq, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Musab al-Suri), a prominent Syrian-born radical Islamist ideologue known for his rabid hatred of heterodox Islamic sects. Whether Zarqawi's wanton killing of Shiites precludes cooperation with maverick Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is not entirely clear. Sadr, whose militia has battled coalition forces off and on over the past year, appears reluctant to unequivocally rule this out – his spokesman in Baghdad recently claimed that atrocities attributed to Zarqawi are actually the work of Israeli intelligence. [8]

Gary C. Gambill, a political analyst for Freedom House and adjunct professor at College of Mount Saint Vincent, has published widely on Lebanese and Syrian affairs. He is the former editor of Middle East Intelligence Bulletin.

Notes:

1. Documentary interview, LBCI Satellite TV (Beirut), 27 November 2004.
2. Documentary interview, Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), 1 July 2004.
3. *Al-Hayat* (London), 8 November 2004.
4. Agence France Presse, 12 February 2004.
5. Interview with Muthanna Harith al-Dari, *Al-Dustour* (Amman), 2 November 2004.
6. *Al-Quds al-Arabi* (London), 12 May 2004.
7. Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), 3 October 2004.
8. Interview with Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji, Al-Manar TV (Beirut), 2 December 2004.

* * *

Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to al-Qaeda: From Mu'askar al-Battar, Issue 21

Translation by Jamestown Researcher Jeffrey Pool

Translator's Introduction: On October 17, 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his Tawhid wal-Jihad organization issued an online statement pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda and its commander, Sheikh Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda reprinted and acknowledged the statement, responding favorably to the new development in their online magazine Mu'askar al-Battar. The newly-affiliated group is known as Tanzim Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq), and has already claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the December 13 bombing at an entrance to Baghdad's Green Zone.

The bay'ah (oath of allegiance) has been deemed authentic by US military and intelligence analysts, and was further reaffirmed by al-Qaeda's public acknowledgement. For this reason, Jamestown has chosen to print a translated version of the segment from al-Battar, in the interest of providing its readership with primary material on key developments in global terror.

Osama bin Laden and his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri have endorsed and praised Zarqawi and the Iraqi insurgency in

the past, and Zarqawi has been happy to acknowledge these remarks, while carefully maintaining his subordinate role in the greater mission and demonstrating his willingness to show loyalty. Many conclusions can be drawn from the text: firstly, Zarqawi's oath challenges past perceptions of rivalry between his organization and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Secondly, it demonstrates his desire to establish himself as a key player in al-Qaeda's mission in Iraq. Finally, the text serves as a recruiting statement for the Iraqi insurgency, through the endorsement of al-Qaeda leadership.

* * *

“Hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be divided.”
(Qur'an 3:103)

Praise be to God, the Cherisher and Sustainer of worlds, and let there be no aggression except upon the oppressors; and peace and blessings be upon our beloved Prophet Mohammed, son of Abdullah, and upon all his family and companions.

It should bring great joy to the people of Islam, especially those on the front lines, and it was with good tidings of support during this blessed month that Tawhid wal-Jihad's leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (God protect him) and his followers announced their allegiance to the Sheikh al-Mujahideen of our time, Abu Abdullah Osama bin Laden, God protect him.

God said the following: Hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be divided.

The order was given to unite the major jihadi organizations with their counterparts in Iraq, and more significantly, the Jamaah Salafiyah united with Tawhid wal-Jihad. Then this [newly unified] blessed group pledged allegiance to mujahid commander Abu Abdullah [Osama bin Laden] (God protect and help him).

This is undoubtedly an indication that victory is approaching, God willing, and that it represents a return to the glorious past. We shall, with great fury, instill fear in the enemies of Islam, who consider that through their war in Iraq they have nearly uprooted Islam from its recent stronghold. For this, we will turn [the war] into a hell for them.

The land of Babylon, as it is called by the Jews and their compatriots in the extreme American right who perpetrate the war, is not the piece of cake expected by the people. Rather, they wish a return to the year 2001, for even though they suffered great losses, there is no doubt that those

resulting from the blessed [9/11] attacks are not on the scale of their defeat in Iraq, God willing. They have thrown their weight around in this Muslim land, deciding that it would be the cornerstone in their plan which they named 'the Greater Middle East' in their effort to impose their infidel democracy, transform the peoples of the region and uproot Islam [from it]; however God will shame them and forsake them, grace and praise be unto Him.

[...]

On a memorable, historic day in this holy month, Sunday the third of Ramadan to be specific, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-the known Islamic leader- pledged allegiance to the mujahid sheikh Osama bin Laden, to hear and obey for better or worse, and to the cause of jihad until all of Islam is in God's service.

The Iraqi mujahideen issued a statement to this effect, reprinted here in its entirety:

Praise be to God who has united the ranks of the mujahideen and disperses the forces of the infidels, and praise be to God who said: "hold fast to the rope of God and you shall not be divided". Blessings and peace be upon he who, through God, united the hearts of believers, and who stood as a bulwark in the face of the enemies of Islam (they are severe against disbelievers, and merciful among themselves), and upon his family and companions, who raised the sword of truth against the propagators of falsehood.

Numerous messages were passed between 'Abu Musab' (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission.

With the appearance of Ramadan, the month of the gift of victories, Muslims are compelled to join forces and be a stick in the eye of Islam's enemies.

[Let it be known that] al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh "Osama bin Laden" (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the sake of God until there is no more discord [among the ranks of Islam] and all of the religion turns toward God.

For we have heard the words of our Prophet, whom we believe and trust, (let the world not succumb to baseness

and depravity), and we have seen the absurdity of today's political leaders. We are waiting in regard to his final promise on succession:

“Prophethood will remain with you for as long as God wills it to remain, then God will raise it up wherever He wills to raise it up. Afterward, there will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood remaining with you for as long as God wills it to remain. Then, He will raise it up whenever He wills to raise it up. Afterward, there will be a reign of violently oppressive rule [unjust Muslim kings] and it will remain as long as God wills it. Then, there will be a reign of tyrannical rule and it will remain for as long as God wills it to remain. Then God will raise it up whenever He wills to raise it up. Finally there will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood.”

By God, O sheikh of the mujahideen, if you bid us plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate infidels and apostates!

Now then, people of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of the mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry [‘there is no God but the one God’], as the flag waves, raised by our newest heroes. Let us cleanse all Muslim lands of every infidel and wicked apostate until Islam enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.

Thus ends the statement, and it reminds us of the Companions and of the heroes of our great people, for this written message is like those from the history of Islam. It returns us to the time of the Prophet (God bless him and grant him salvation) and his Companions (may God be pleased with them), and so for God's sake, carry on, O people of Jihad, and return to the people of Islam their lost glory, doing that of which previous centuries were incapable.

It is worth mentioning that this oath of allegiance caused frustration and alarm among the American leadership. As one counter-terror official stated, “it is certain that this is not a step forward toward American security, but its effects thus far remain to be seen”. A Pentagon official clarified that the Army would attempt to restrict the means of distributing Zarqawi's statement.

* * *

Unraveling Zarqawi's al-Qaeda Connection

By Gordon Corera

An October 17th statement posted on an Islamist website and published in al-Qaeda's military journal *Mu'askar al-Battar* claiming to be from the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTI) group led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi began with a personal pledge of allegiance from Zarqawi and his fighters to Osama bin Laden: “[Let it be known that] al-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh “Osama bin Laden”... Numerous messages were passed between ‘Abu Musab’ (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose to restore them, and our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission.” [1]

After this, JTI began issuing statements of responsibility under its new name *Tanzim Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* (al-Qaeda in Iraq). At the time, some Islamist circles expressed doubt about the statement's authenticity suggesting that it was part of a US-inspired campaign to associate the violence in Iraq with “international terrorism” rather than “legitimate” nationalist insurgency. [2] But the identities of the posters as well as the language and style indicated that the messages were from Zarqawi's group. U.S. intelligence sources say they are confident of the validity of the original pledge.

The statements marked a surprising twist in the long, complex and disputed tale of Zarqawi's links with al-Qaeda. Few have doubted that there has been contact, but the generally accepted view so far has been that Zarqawi constructed his own parallel network which may have in some ways been in competition, or at the very least independent of, al-Qaeda.

Historically, the links were limited. According to an interview in *Al-Hayat* a former Afghan jihadist claims that Zarqawi was not a well-known or significant fighter in Afghanistan during the late 1980s and early 1990s. [3] He participated with a number of jihadi fighters in the battlefield at Khost, where a number of Jordanians fought, but had no identifiable links to al-Qaeda as it began to emerge.

After spending some time in a Jordanian prison, Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan and subsequently established a training camp in the western city of Herat. Though he apparently assembled 80 to 100 people, largely Palestinians and Jordanians committed to jihad but with no formal name for the group, there is not thought to have been any links to al-Qaeda at this time. Evidence gathered from Shadi Abdullah, an Islamist arrested in Germany in 2002, even points to competition between Zarqawi and bin Laden for recruits during this period, though Zarqawi seemed far more focused on overthrowing the Jordanian regime and recruited almost exclusively Palestinians and Jordanians.

After the U.S. attacked the Taliban, Zarqawi moved first to Iran. He was then pressured to move on and traveled just over the border into Iraqi Kurdistan as the only available place for refuge. Here he developed links with a new generation of Salifists who had not fought in the original Afghan jihad, including Ansar al-Islam, which had established itself on the Iranian border and taken control of a number of villages. Reports from militants claim that Iran was concerned over their location and asked them to move three miles from the border to avoid any direct contact between Iranians and the Ansar forces. Jihadist fighters then flowed into Northern Iraq from Afghanistan and Pakistan through Iran. [4]

In his February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council, the U.S. Secretary of State described Zarqawi as “an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants.” Although Secretary Powell was careful not to call him a formal member of al-Qaeda, Zarqawi was depicted as a key link in the evidence designed to outline an association between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. But firm evidence of strong links either way – to Saddam on the one side and to al-Qaeda on the other – is largely absent.

Since the formal end of the Iraq war in April 2003, many of the most high-profile attacks, in particular suicide bombings and kidnappings have been attributed to Zarqawi’s organization. But some question whether Zarqawi is really as significant in organizing the insurgency as portrayed. It is helpful for the U.S. to personalize the insurgency and emphasize the role of foreign fighters because doing so provides a link to al-Qaeda while obscuring the essentially “nationalist” character of the Iraqi insurgency. For the Iraqi interim government it is also helpful to emphasize international links because it diminishes the sense that there is a domestic Sunni-led insurgency against the state and that Iraqis are willing to kill each other.

Though Zarqawi and his fighters numerically make a

small proportion of the resistance (estimates run from 50 to 500), they exercise an exaggerated degree of influence due to their coupling of extreme violence with an acute understanding of the power of the media; tactics which have developed in symmetry and through close observation of other international terrorist groups including al-Qaeda and its offshoots in Saudi Arabia. Over the summer of 2004 with Osama bin Laden yet to appear and Zarqawi carrying out increasingly bloody and high profile attacks, some began to question whether Zarqawi was beginning to rival or even succeed bin Laden.

So what explains the October 2004 pledge of loyalty? The message claims that talks have been going on for eight months between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi which encountered many interruptions as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad explained its strategy before the final offer of loyalty. Zarqawi is alleged to have sought al-Qaeda support in the past but without success. In January 2004, an individual was captured carrying a 17-page letter on a CD thought to be written by Zarqawi calling for help from al-Qaeda in fomenting a sectarian war in Iraq. The implication was that Zarqawi’s group was independent but nonetheless looking for support as the tone was at once supplicatory but also written as if from one equal to another.

The letter said that Zarqawi’s group had “our backs to the sea, the enemy before us” and “we do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you,” but instead seek to “work under your banner, comply with your orders.” U.S. officials said they believed al-Qaeda had rebuffed these advances but there are some doubts over the provenance and authorship of the letter.

Various explanations have emerged for the October pledge. One senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told the author in early November 2004 that it may be a sign of weakness, a view which is supported by the January letter. The view is based on the supposition that groups like Zarqawi’s would prefer to retain their independence and autonomy to enhance their maneuverability and ability to attract recruits and funding. Any decision to associate themselves with another group is thus indicative of internal and external pressures. They argue that pressure on Fallujah as a base of operations and sanctuary for Zarqawi forced him to reach out. Other Arab analysts contend that Zarqawi was put under pressure by the growing al-Qaeda presence in Iraq to subsume his organization under a broader movement.

Zarqawi is never described as a great thinker or religious ideologue. One of those who knew him in prison said that he would attack other inmates with his fists: “That’s all he

could do. He's not like bin Laden with ideas and vision. He had no vision." Meanwhile, ideologically there is not a total overlap between Zarqawi and bin Laden. Both clearly subscribe to jihadist salafism, but Zarqawi's use of violence has been more extreme and graphic. Historically, whilst bin Laden in the last decade has focused on the far enemy of the United States, Zarqawi has focused on enemies nearer at hand like the Jordanian regime and now the interim Iraqi government.

One Arab who claimed to have recently met with Zarqawi in Fallujah stated that Zarqawi's purpose was to turn Iraq into a new base of operations to carry out further attacks in the region. "Rescuing Jerusalem and the neighboring countries will come only after the rise of an Islamic state from which the youth will set out to liberate the neighboring areas," the Islamist Arab told *Al-Hayat*. [5]

The legitimacy of attacking Muslims looks to be the greatest difference between al-Qaeda and Zarqawi. In particular, Zarqawi has been more focused on fomenting sectarian strife within Iraq by attacking the Shi'as. In an April 2004 message on a website attributed to Zarqawi, he threatens to "kill their [Shi'a] imams and cut off their heads" and describes the August 2003 killing of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim as a "generous act of God," as Hakim was "full of deception and hostility to the people of Islam." [6]

The problem for Zarqawi may be that the extreme levels of violence which he uses could end up isolating him and his group. One former jihadist compared him to the Algerian GIA in his willingness to engage in mass slaughter of both personnel and civilians. In July, Arabic media reported Iraqi intelligence sources saying that a number of factions of the Iraqi resistance had cut their ties with Zarqawi because of the level of civilian casualties he causes and because they saw him as a "terrorist" rather than part of the "resistance." Whether this is a problem for al-Qaeda is debatable, but the oath of loyalty to bin Laden could hurt Zarqawi because it makes clear that his group – already led by a foreigner – has an al-Qaeda dictated international agenda and is no longer acting in the exclusive interest of Iraqis.

Observers believe Zarqawi's organization is certain to continue escalating its violence as the January elections approach, hoping in particular to exacerbate sectarian tensions by exploiting Sunni fears of Shi'a domination. The ability of the elections to draw communities into the political process may be the ultimate determinant of Zarqawi's durability, as his organization requires networks of local support to survive. If a new government can gain some legitimacy then that may well turn the tide against his group.

Gordon Corera is the BBC's Security Correspondent

Notes:

1. Translated by the Jamestown Foundation.
2. Diya Rashwan quoted in *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, October 19, 2004
3. *Al-Hayat*, London, November 8, 2004
4. *Al-Hayat*, London, November 8, 2004
5. *Al-Hayat*, London, September 10, 2004
6. Translated by BBC Monitoring.

* * *

Zarqawi's Jordanian Agenda

By Matthew Levitt and Julie Sawyer

Though most famous for funding and organizing suicide bombings and beheadings in Iraq, Ahmad Fadil Nazal al-Khalaylah – aka Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – has long assumed a leading role in terrorist operations in other countries, including his native Jordan.

An East Banker and a member of the Bani Hassan tribe (one of the largest in Jordan), Zarqawi is often denigrated as a "thug" by fellow Jordanians [1]. Even after spending several years in Afghanistan in his early twenties, Zarqawi remained little more than a violent criminal until he met Abu Mohammed Maqdisi, a radical Palestinian cleric and figurehead of the militant Bayat al-Imam network in Jordan. In 1999, King Abdullah assumed the throne and issued a general amnesty in which Zarqawi was freed. As of July 2004, Maqdisi remained in a Jordanian prison, convicted of trying to overthrow the government and establishing an Islamic caliphate.

After his release, Zarqawi moved to Pakistan, and then Afghanistan where he ran a training camp near Herat. After 9/11, he settled in northern Iraq where he met up with Jordanians from his hometown of Zarqa and from the Suwaqa prison and established a training camp tied to Ansar al-Islam. Zarqawi has been affiliated with several groups, which over time have coalesced into one large network. These include Jund al-Shams, Bayat al-Imam, Ansar al-Islam, al-Tawhid, Al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, and most recently, al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (Iraq).

At the turn of the millennium, Zarqawi was involved in a plot to target hotels frequented by Jewish and American

tourists in Amman during millennial celebrations. Zarqawi is believed to be behind the failed assassination attempt in February 2002 of Ali Bourjaq, a Jordanian secret-police official. In October 2002, Zarqawi planned and facilitated the assassination of U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley in Amman. According to the indictment of captured assassin, Salem Said Bin Sewid, Zarqawi snuck into Jordan to personally recruit members of the cell. In April 2004, Zarqawi was convicted for his role in the plot along with Libyan and Jordanian attackers and four others.

One of Zarqawi's most successful operations targeting Jordanian interests was the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad in August 2003 – an attack which killed at least fourteen people. While Jordanian officials first maintained both in public statements and in an interview with the author that Ahmed Chalabi or elements tied to him were responsible for the attack, Jordanian authorities now believe Zarqawi was behind this plot. [2]

The most spectacular of Zarqawi's plots was foiled, but would have been considered a mega-terror attack had it not been. In April 2004, Jordanian officials announced they had thwarted a major plot to attack various locations in Amman, targeting Jordanians and Americans. Zarqawi personally recruited the cell's leader, Azmi Al Jayousi, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, along with several other Jordanians and Syrians. The cell's targets included the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) Headquarters, the Prime Ministry, and the U.S. Embassy in Amman. Hussein Sharif, one of the operatives recruited by Jayousi, confessed that Jayousi told him that the aim of the attack was to execute an operation that would "strike at Jordan and the Hashemites, a war against the crusaders and infidels."

The operation as planned was audacious not only in its targets, but in the scale of the intended attack. Jordanian authorities maintain that the twenty tons of explosives intended for the multiple coordinated attacks contained more than ninety-two chemicals and would have resulted not only in a large explosion but a chemical cloud. Based on an analysis of the explosives that were confiscated, Jordanian experts maintain that the bomb had the potential to injure 160,000 people. [3]

Just as disconcerting is the fact that this attack was largely funded and facilitated by a logistical support network operating out of Jordan and Syria. For example, Haithem Omar Ibrahim, a Syrian member of the Zarqawi network, entered Jordan via Iraq and arranged safe houses for the plotters where they lived for several months while preparing the planned mega attack. During this time, the

cell manufactured 20 tons of explosives and organized the logistics of the attacks.

Throughout, Jayousi remained in contact with Zarqawi by messengers, most of whom traveled between Jordan and Iraq through Syria. One of Zarqawi's most prominent aides, a Syrian named Suleiman Khaled Darwish, supervised this communications channel, arranging for couriers to deliver messages, forged passports and identity cards. Jordanian intelligence further discovered that Zarqawi's network would often send couriers with messages written in invisible ink on paper currency carried in their wallets. [4] Passing messages on bills of small denominations raised no alarms since anyone passing through the border would be expected to have a small amount of cash on their person. Zarqawi also used these couriers to send large amounts of money – presumed to have been raised in Europe and the Persian Gulf states – to fund the operation. According to Jayousi, Zarqawi "started sending me money through messengers, payments of ten and fifteen thousand, until I had a total of about \$170 thousand; I bought a large quantity of the material with that money."

The Jayousi plot was not the only time messengers and money were smuggled across the Syrian-Jordanian border. Facilitated by several key aides residing in the country, Zarqawi has made Syria a springboard for his activities both in Iraq and Jordan. Already in April 2003 Italian prosecutors warned that "Syria has functioned as a hub for an al-Qaeda network" linked to Zarqawi. The Italian investigation revealed that Zarqawi operatives in Europe were acting at the instruction of superiors in and around Damascus and Aleppo, including "Mullah Fuad" (described as the "gatekeeper in Syria for volunteers intent on reaching Iraq"), "Abdullah," and "Abderrazak."

According to Jordanian intelligence, despite Zarqawi's connections to al-Qaeda, his group has developed its own networks of operatives and sources of funding and is not dependent on any external organization. Couriers deliver money collected in Europe and Persian Gulf states, while cars are bought in Jordan and sold or traded in Iraq. [5] Such was the case with Bilal al-Hiyari, a Jordanian businessman sentenced in October 2004 to six months in jail by Jordan's military court for raising funds to finance Zarqawi's attacks in Iraq and Jordan. According to the indictment, in August 2003 al-Hiyari allegedly raised approximately \$3,000 to buy a German-made Opel car that was sent to Zarqawi in Iraq. Jordanian intelligence officials explained that such schemes allow Zarqawi to move funds from Jordan and other countries into Iraq, thus avoiding the risk of messengers being caught at the border with large sums of money. [6]

Zarqawi's ambitions clearly extend beyond Iraq, and the implications for Jordan are particularly chilling. Beyond Zarqawi's demonstrated interest in targeting fellow Jordanians, he and his operatives have been definitively linked to several other terrorist organizations that have implications for Jordan's security.

In an interview with the authors, Jordanian officials recently revealed that a number of Zarqawi operatives regularly visit Osbat al-Ansar's "base" in Ain al-Hilweh, a Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon known as a hotbed of Islamic extremism. (For further information on Ain al-Hilweh, see *Terrorism Monitor*, Issue 21, Nov. 4, 2004) The officials maintained that these Zarqawi men meet with members of Osbat al-Ansar (designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Treasury in March 2002) a small but dangerous Sunni extremist group that Jordanian officials claim has planned attacks on Western and Jordanian embassies in Beirut. [7]

Facing such threats, Jordan has developed a well-rounded counterterrorism strategy combining both tactical and strategic measures. The raids and arrests that thwarted the Jayousi plot are but one example of the country's tactical counter-terrorism capability. Jordan's Special Forces' counter-terrorism unit can boast of many such successes, including the November 2002 arrest of a group of Islamists in the southern city of Maan who had been terrorizing the population, carrying weapons and bombs in the street, and setting fire to homes. In September 2003, Jordanian authorities arrested the Jordanian militant Mohammad Shalabi, also known as Abu Sayyaf, for plotting to carry out terrorist attacks against American targets in the country, possessing explosives, inciting riots in Maan, and belonging to the banned militant group Takfir wal-Hijra. According to Jordanian intelligence, Abu Sayyaf was captured in northeast Jordan on his way to join Zarqawi in Iraq. [8]

Strategically, Jordan is one of the few countries truly engaged in the battle of ideas. As important as it is to conduct raids, make arrests, and freeze terror funds, the war on terror also requires that countries deny jihadists the ability to radicalize and deploy new recruits. In November 2004, during the holy month of Ramadan, Chief Justice Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al Tamimi delivered a sermon during a religious ceremony in the presence of King Abdullah II emphasizing tolerance, humanity, the true values of Islam and rejecting extremism. Subsequently dubbed the "Amman Message," the official statement proclaims: "On religious grounds, on moral grounds, we denounce the contemporary concept of terrorism which is associated with wrongful practices wherever they come from... These despotic attacks on human life transgress the law of God, and we denounce them." [9] Jordan has

called for a regional Islamic conference sometime next year to discuss and endorse the message. The Amman Message and the conference Jordan plans to host are significant milestones in the battle of ideas. Such efforts are critical if jihadists like Zarqawi are to be defeated. The alternative, allowing jihadists to dominate the battle of ideas and recruit several new terrorists for every one killed or captured, is a recipe for failure.

Matthew Levitt, a former FBI counterterrorism analyst, is a senior fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Julie Sawyer is a Research Assistant at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The two authors just returned from a research trip to Jordan and Israel.

Notes:

1. Author interview with Jordanian scholar, Nov 11, 2004.
2. Author interviews with Jordanian officials, Sept 11, 2003 and Nov 11, 2004.
3. Author interview with Jordanian official, Nov 11, 2004.
4. Author interview with Jordanian official, July 7, 2004.
5. Author interview with Jordanian official, Nov 11, 2004.
6. Author interview with Jordanian official, Nov 11, 2004.
7. Author interview, November 11, 2004.
8. Author interview with Jordanian official, Nov 11, 2004.
9. "Jordan issues the 'Amman Message' on Islam." Embassy of Jordan – Washington DC Press Release. Nov 9, 2004.

* * *

Ricin Fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the Pankisi Gorge

By Andrew McGregor

With Russia once again threatening pre-emptive strikes on "terrorist" installations in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, it seems timely to re-examine the alleged activities of Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the region several years ago. The Pankisi Gorge is a river valley about 34 km long in north-eastern Georgia. It is home to about 10,000 Kists, belonging to the same ethnic group as the Chechens and Ingush. After the outbreak of the second Russo-Chechen war in 1999, eight thousand Chechen refugees joined the Kists there. Arriving later were Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev and the survivors of the Battle of Komsomolskoye (site of a major Chechen defeat). Gelayev chose to rebuild his forces in the Pankisi Gorge; with Georgia engaged in

a struggle with Russia over the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia there was little danger of extradition.

By 2002, unsubstantiated reports began to emerge of al-Qaeda leaders taking refuge in the Gorge after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov even suggested Bin Laden himself might be in the Pankisi Gorge. [1] Russia wished to focus international attention on the Gorge, where Gelayev had built up a significant armed force of 800 Chechens, together with about 80 international mujahideen, mostly Turks and Arabs. Georgian authorities pretended to be ignorant of their presence, despite having negotiated a deal to supply and arm Gelayev's force in return for a little extra-curricular combat on behalf of Georgia in Abkhazia in 2001.

In his pre-Iraq invasion address to the United Nations Security Council Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that "we know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network said their goal was to kill Russians with toxins." Powell emphasized the production of ricin as a major threat, and the importance of Zarqawi as a master poisoner. Abu Atiya (Adnan Muhammad Sadik) was named by Powell as the leader of al-Qaeda's Pankisi operations and part of Zarqawi's network. In July 2002, there were reports that the CIA had warned Turkish officials that Abu Atiya had sent chemical or biological materials to Turkey for use in terrorist attacks.

Georgian raids started in February 2002, while the main security "crackdown" in Pankisi was carefully timed to follow the September 2002 departure of Gelayev's forces from Russian territory. At the end of the security sweep in October, fifteen minor Arab militants were turned over to the U.S. The operation marked the first deployment of Georgian graduates of the Train and Equip program, a U.S. initiative to train a core professional army for Georgia. No evidence of chemical labs was discovered, though Georgia cautiously conceded that some militants in the Pankisi Gorge "may" have been chemical weapons experts.

The Ricin Crisis

There seems little reason for Zarqawi to move to the Pankisi Gorge, which makes a useful base for striking into Chechnya but is remote from Middle Eastern operational environments. The languages in the region are unfamiliar to most Arabs and the militants in Pankisi under the command of Ruslan Gelayev were nearly all bound for Chechnya. Gelayev

feuded constantly with Islamist commanders in the Chechen resistance, and would be unlikely to have taken orders from Arab Islamists. Indeed, the entire story conflicts with the usual account of Zarqawi being wounded in Afghanistan and receiving medical treatment in Baghdad before joining Ansar al-Islam in the north.

In the buildup to the Iraqi war in early 2003, dozens of North Africans (mainly Algerians) were arrested in Britain, France and Spain on charges of preparing ricin and other chemical weapons. Colin Powell and others trumpeted the arrests as proof of the threat posed by the Zarqawi-Chechen-Pankisi ricin network (which had now been expanded to include the Ansar al-Islam of Kurdish northern Iraq).

French and British security officials were astounded by Powell's insistence on February 12, 2003, that "the ricin that is bouncing around Europe now originated in Iraq." With the Iraq invasion only weeks away, the source of the ricin threat moved from Georgia to Iraq. In the UK charges were dropped when government laboratories could find no trace of the poison in seized material. In Spain all the suspects were released when the poisons turned out to be bleach and detergent. In France, ricin samples were revealed to be barley and wheat germ. [2]

Responding to the arrests in Britain and France, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that the suspects had been trained in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, where al-Qaeda laboratories were manufacturing ricin. Few bothered to question why anyone would set up a ricin lab requiring large numbers of castor beans for the production of even a tiny amount of purified ricin in a region with no native castor plants.

The "Chechen Network"

French Judge Jean-Louis Brugiere (a leading anti-terrorism official) led the attack against what came to be known as the "Chechen network" declaring that "the Chechens are experts in chemical warfare. And Chechnya is closer to Europe than Afghanistan." The "Chechen network" was curiously devoid of Chechens: nearly all the suspects were Algerian. Despite the outcome of the European cases, the myth of the ricin-producing "Chechen network" took hold.

Chechen Brigadier General Rizvan Chitigov is the only Chechen leader who appears to have taken an interest in chemical weapons, and is frequently accused by the FSB of planning chemical operations against Russian troops. In 2001, leading FSB officials cited "serious grounds for suspecting him to be a CIA agent." [3] Last October, Chechen police

discovered two kilograms of mercury, which they claimed Chitigov intended to use to poison a water intake facility.

By August 2002 reports were emerging that Ansar al-Islam were experimenting on animals with aerosolized ricin under Zarqawi's direction. Aerosolization is the only method of delivering lethal doses of ricin to large numbers of people, but requires a great deal of specialized equipment and expertise, certainly far beyond the limitations of a primitive lab. Ricin cannot be absorbed through the skin and was abruptly dropped from most state weapons programs as soon as the more lethal Sarin nerve gas was developed. Despite its potency, no effective method has yet been devised for the mass distribution of ricin. The weaponization of ricin is sufficiently complex that it almost precludes such use by non-state parties.

Conclusion

There is no evidence that Zarqawi knows anything about the manufacture or deployment of chemical and biological weapons. In the aftermath of the Jordan bombing attempt in April, Zarqawi made his only known statement on the use of chemical weapons, posted on <http://alminbar.front.ru>: "If we had such a bomb – and we ask God that we have such a bomb soon – we would not hesitate for a moment to strike Israeli towns." [4]

Jordan's King Abdullah II referred to Zarqawi as a "street thug" last July, adding that the media had inflated Zarqawi's intelligence and skills to create a larger threat. Jordanian security services claimed the attempted attack was a chemical assault using nerve gas and blister agents, capable of killing 80,000 people. No evidence was presented, and even Zarqawi refuted the use of chemical agents in the plot. [5] Zarqawi's career has followed the path of high-school dropout, failed video retailer, prisoner and gunman. It is thus impossible to identify how or when Zarqawi became an expert in chemistry.

The identification of a ricin-producing "Chechen network" under Zarqawi's control developed because it was useful. In the media, every unproven allegation "from un-named intelligence sources" was treated as unquestionable evidence, each being used as proof of the last. This house of cards was saluted by Britain, Russia, the U.S. and eventually even the Georgians as it served to advance the interests of each. The British government was trying to justify an unpopular decision to join the Iraq war, and Russia was able to implicate Georgia in a Chechen-al-Qaeda network of terror, invoking "the common cause" of the anti-terror coalition in support of their methods in Chechnya. The U.S. trained Georgian

troops essential for the protection of the two new oil pipelines about to cross Georgia under the cloak of counter-terrorist assistance, while using the Zarqawi chemical threat to drum up support in the United Nations. [6]

Last month Russia claimed that Abu Atiya (together with Abu Hafs "Amjet" and Abu Rabiya) commanded 200 Chechens and 30 Turkish "mercenaries" in Pankisi, though there is no explanation of how Abu Atiya, who was arrested in Azerbaijan in September 2003, has returned to action. [7] Georgia continues to deny the presence of any Chechen or Arab militants in the Gorge, calling Russian statements "a provocation." Meanwhile Abu Musab al-Zarqawi remains central to the disinformation campaigns that obscure our understanding of Islamist terrorism.

Dr. McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle International Security Analysis in Toronto, Canada.

Notes:

1. "FM: Bin Laden could be in Caucasus", Associated Press, Feb. 17, 2002.
2. "The strange case of the dangerous detergent" *New Statesman*, April 14, 2003, By Justin Webster, "Ricin scare in Paris is false alarm," AP, April 11, 2003.
3. Russian Public TV (ORT), Interview with Nicolai Patrushev and Aleksandr Zdanovich, April 18, 2001 (BBC Monitoring, April 19, 2001).
4. Translation from "'Zarqawi tape' says non-chemical attack planned on Jordanian intelligence", AFP, April 30, 2004.
5. "Al-Zarqawi denies the Jordanian version over the chemical attack", Arab News, May 1, 2004, <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040501/2004050110.html>.
6. Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.
7. Not to be confused with the late Abu Hafs al-Misri or Abu Hafs 'the Mauritanian'.

