The debate about whether Iran has constructed a clandestine centrifuge program drives me nuts.

You mean other than the one we already found?

And by we, I mean the United States—or at least its intelligence community. As I understand the sequence of events, the United States—knowing full well that Iran had a clandestine centrifuge program—watched Iran dig two MASSIVE HOLES near Natanz (see the big picture), then ratted the Iranians out to the IAEA. About the same time, someone leaked that information to an Iranian dissident group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which then released the second-hand dope in a press conference where they got the details wrong.

This is something that has come up in the comments, so I think I should take the time to walk a timeline using what information we have. (Your grandkids will know for sure, when this stuff gets declassified.)

The whole public debate did begin in August 2002, when NCRI identified Natanz as an undeclared nuclear facility (correct!) responsible for the production of “nuclear fuel production” (not so much).

In December 2002, however, Mark Hibbs reported (no online copy) that the United States had briefed the IAEA on the purpose and location of Natanz before the NCRI allegations, at the optimal time to buy maximally incriminating satellite photographs:

For about a year, analysts at U.S. intelligence agencies and national laboratories, in part based on high-resolution reconnaissance imagery, and supported by procurement information, have been hardening suspicions that Iran was building a clandestine uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and a heavy water production facility in Arak, Western officials told NuclearFuel.

[snip]

About six months ago, sources said, a limited amount of crucial information from the U.S. findings, including the precise geographical coordinates of the sites, was provided to the IAEA. Officials there said the agency then tasked a handful of Vienna personnel to examine the data using commercial satellite photos of the two locations.

Mark Hibbs, “U.S. Briefed Suppliers Group in October on Suspected Iranian Enrichment Plant,” Nuclear Fuel 27:26, December 23, 2002, p. 1.

(ElBaradei confirmed the six month bit to AP’s Ali Akbar Dareini in December, as well.)

In December 2002, ISIS released those satellite photographs of Natanz, explaining that “it is unlikely that the site contains a fuel fabrication facility, but it possibly has a uranium enrichment plant … most likely … a gas centrifuge facility.” ISIS’s Corey Hinderstein, speaking on CNN, was the first person to publicly identify Natanz as a gas centrifuge facility.

Hibbs’ account and the correct identification by ISIS, however, didn’t seem to dislodge the conventional wisdom that NCRI had discoverd the sites, rather than merely passing along second hand information.

In February 2004, former DCI George Tenet tried a more direct approach, claiming it was “flat wrong” that the IC was surprised. In May 2005, Newsweek’s Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball cited “current and former senior U.S. national-security officials” claiming athat “all the major revelations MEK publicly claims … were reported in classified form—and from other sources—to U.S. policymakers before MEK made them public.”

Part of the problem is that US intelligence sources didn’t want to say how they knew—and, thus, how much we knew—so the story that NCRI ratted out the Iranians persisted. This summer, though, I think the last piece of the puzzle appeared.

In The One Percent Doctrine, Ron Suskind confirmed that US intelligence had flipped Urs Tinner —a member of the Khan network—in the 1990s and had allowed him to remain in place to identify Khan’s customers.

This also helps explain why the Clinton Administration was so persistent in its (successful) efforts to cut off foreign assistance to Iran’s uranium conversion facility at Esfahan, as well as as series of pre-August 2002 721 reports stating that “Iran has continued to attempt using its civilian nuclear energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities … well suited to support fissile material production for a weapons program …”

Comment [4]

The amazing John Fleck issues a plea “for a little calm while we wait to see what was actually on the mobile home meth lab jump drives ”:

When the national news media went all apedung over Wen Ho Lee back in March 1999, it seemed reasonable. After all, no less than the New York Times suggested Lee may have been spying for the commies. It turned out not to be the case.

Then in 2000, the national news media went all wildness over missing hard drives at Los Alamos that contained scary nuclear weapons secrets. They ended up not to be missing after all. Sort of.

Then the national news media went all scarified over missing “classified removable electronic media” containing more scary superscary nuclear secrets in 2004. This was so scarybad they actually shut the whole lab down, in order to determine that the things had never existed in the first place.

Do you detect a pattern here?

I feel so dirty.

John has a point—the good people at Los Alamos have been subjected to some pretty ugly attacks by folks in Washington, attacks that often are about the independence of the labs, refusal to hear opposing views or some fleeting beltway power grab.

Comment [3]

Welcome to the tiny community of arms control blogs, Mr. Nuclear Mangos.

Comment [1]

Nearly every newspaper and blog seems to be doing the “Obama may run for President” story. So, this is really like peer pressure.

Where does Barack Obama stand on some of those nonproliferation issues we all obsess about?

CTR & Nunn-Lugar – First of all, he is buddies with Lugar, which gets one serious brownie points in nonproliferation land. Maybe Lugar got lonely doing the nonpro without Nunn. Maybe titles like “Lugar-Lugar Act” just do not have the same ring. In any case, last August he took Obama with him to Russia and Ukraine to inspect nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons facilities. Obama has made statements calling for greater urgency in securing weapons and material in Russia and developing a strategic vision for nonproliferation programs.

The Lugar-Obama bill (extending Nunn-Lugar program activities, detection and interdiction capabilities, second line of defense) was introduced in April 06.

North Korea -Obama thinks that we should try to make sanctions work, use the 6-party talks, but at some point engage in bilateral discussions.

“But I think that, in time, it would make sense for us to initiate some bilateral conversations in parallel with the six-party talks”… “partly because it would strengthen, I think, the commitment of China and South Korea to really put some pressure on North Korea.”

Iran – Obama told the Chicago Tribune in 2004 that he believes that the US is not in a good position to militarily strike Iran, but he does not rule out the option.

“The big question is going to be, if Iran is resistant to these pressures, including economic sanctions, which I hope will be imposed if they do not cooperate, at what point are we going to, if any, are we going to take military action?” Obama asked.

[snip]

“In light of the fact that we’re now in Iraq, with all the problems in terms of perceptions about America that have been created, us launching some missile strikes into Iran is not the optimal position for us to be in,” he said.

“On the other hand, having a radical Muslim theocracy in possession of nuclear weapons is worse. So I guess my instinct would be to err on not having those weapons in the possession of the ruling clerics of Iran. ... And I hope it doesn’t get to that point. But realistically, as I watch how this thing has evolved, I’d be surprised if Iran blinked at this point.”

India deal – Seemed skeptical when Secretary Rice was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 2006. From FT.com:

Barack Obama, the Illinois Democrat, asked Ms Rice whether the fact that eight of India’s 22 nuclear plants would not fall under inspections, would allow India to transfer weapons grade nuclear materials to plants to produce more weapons. When Ms Rice responded that they already could build more weapons if they wanted, Mr Obama shot back: “If it doesn’t constrain them, why bother checking on the 14?” (original transcript here%)

And, on having a good sense of humor – Stephen Colbert was invited to speak at the Knox College graduation earlier this year. Obama sent him a really funny letter of congratulations, which included some important advice:

Second, use hand sanitizer after the Pumphandle. Lots of germs there. I cannot stress this enough.

Comment [1]

I … I just … no … this is so wrong.

Let’s say you live with your boyfriend in a mobile home, from which he supports himself by selling methamphetamines.

Query: What could possibly be worse than having the neighbors call the police after overhearing your domestic dispute, resulting in a police raid that finds the meth?

Answer: The police also finding the documents marked Secret Restricted Data that you’ve improperly removed from you place of work, Los Alamos National Laboratories.

For the whole sordid story, POGO gets dirty, with a little help from the Los Alamos Monitor and the Associated Press .

Comment [7]

Say that three times fast.

And, yes that is a picture of Iran’s 164 centrifuge cascade.

Reuters’ Mark Heinrich reports that Iran has completed a second 164 centrigue cascade at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant—but that the Iranians are conducting only “dry runs” without any uranium:

“The second cascade was brought on line earlier this month but they appear to be just running it empty. That is, vacuum-testing to assess durability,” said the diplomat, close to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency.

George Jahn with AP had a similar story, but his nearly 800 word article was hacked to death by a number of newspapers. (The link I posted has everything, I think). ElBaradei confirmed the second cascade during his visit to the US (see stories by WaPo’s Linzer and NYT’s Sanger), adding that Iran was ready to introduce uranium into the new cascade.

Hard to say whether the Iranians are deliberately going slow or having technical trouble. David Ignatius had a long story in September, reporting that Iran’s “centrifuges are overheating when uranium gas is injected.”

“The Iranians are unable to control higher temperatures, and after a short period they must stop because of higher temperatures. So far they haven’t been able to solve this,” says one Western intelligence official who has been briefed on the IAEA findings. In addition, this official said, some centrifuges “are simply crashing—10 or so have broken down and must be replaced.”

Apparently some (but just some) of these analysts think the problem relates to Iran’s dirty hex—something I have blogged to death. (Oh say, here, here, and here just to get you started.)

Paul recently summarized all the intel dope that we have through October.

Placing Iran’s Enrichment Activities in Standby

I give you all of this to renew an old debate that began with a paper my colleague, Matthew Bunn, wrote entitled, Placing Iran’s Enrichment Activities in Standby. In that monograph Bunn argued that placing the centrifuges at Natanz in one of two “standby” modes offered a way out of the current stand-off over suspension:

One option for Iran to suspend enrichment activities without compromising its future ability to resume enrichment is to place the 164 centrifuge cascade at Natanz in a standby mode. The United States considered “warm standby” and “cold standby” options for its Portsmouth enrichment plant several years ago. Despite the vast technical differences between a large gaseous diffusion plant and a small centrifuge facility, these approaches may provide analogies that the parties could draw on to forge an approach acceptable to all sides. An acceptable approach would have to assure the United States and Europe that the standby activities would not significantly increase Iran’s capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons material; by the same token, accepting such an approach would require Iran to make a strategic decision not to pursue an option for rapid production of such material.

David Albright and Jackie Shire disagreed, calling warm standby a “bad idea” and citing an IAEA report that warned Iran would learn information about “the life expectancy and durability of key mechanical components, the failure of materials, the effects of vibrations, electric power requirements…a detailed understanding of the different ways that centrifuges can fail, and information needed for the development of more advanced centrifuge systems.”

Policy disagreements are good for our community. Jackie and I even still did BloggingHeads together.

And, David and Jackie had a point: they were right that Matt (and me, too) didn’t emphasize that zero centrifuges would be the best option. But—as the recent news points out—our choice is probably not between zero and 164, it’s between 164 (or 328 now) and something worse—an Iranian nuclear weapon, maybe, or a war … or both.

The IAEA hasn’t released the report (hello, friends! it’s called e-mail!) but one of the areas where actually running UF6 through the centrifuges could improve’s understanding of centrifuge operations turns out to be … the relationship between UF6 gas flow, temperature and stress corrosion.

So, it would seem to me—given the problems that Ignatius claims Iran has experienced—we do have an interest in keeping the hex out of the centrifuges, something that placing the centrifuges in standby—either warm or cold—accomplishes.

The Downside

Of course, that means we don’t get to send in assault teams to blow up nuclear facilities near Natanz and Esfahan—which you know, is kind of a bummer.

Fortunately, we have virtual reality. Kuma\War—a free online war game—makes first person shooter games based on “real-war events from the news.”

And, oh yes, that is a CGI centrifuge cascade at Natanz (right, above).

Mission 58: Assault on Iran is a little wet work to stop the Iranian bomb, a chance—in the words of the trailer—to “destroy the materials … destroy the knowledge … leave no trace ….”

And, hell yes, “destroy the knowledge” means you get to mow down Iranian nuclear weapons scientists at their desks (left).

I don’t know, did that guy look like he tried to surrender?

Anyway, makes for great virtual fun, even if it would also make for lousy real-life policy.

Comment [10]

Yes, you know exactly which movie that line is from.

War Games is fun for several reasons (including the putting of the phone on some receiver thing to dial and connect to somewhere. I clearly need one of those). But mostly I like the giant map of the world in the nuclear control room.

The people at Introversion Software also seemed to like that part, as they have made a whole computer game called DEFCON out of it. You pick a continent, set up your ICBMS, subs, radars, etc. and then at some point, nuke all your opponents. I am not sure, but it appears that at least part of the point is to have the screen light up in a nifty pattern.

I caved and tried to play the demo but it didn’t work on my computer. Anyway, I bet it’s more fun than this ‘nonviolent strategy’ game, which my interns played for 30 minutes a few months ago and deemed too slow. But, if you do want to learn how to fix the world while safely hidden behind the computer screen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has a long article all about negotiation and mediation games.

Comment [4]

If Arms Control Wonk.com had a mascot, it would be Mark Fiore’s Buster, the friendly nuke. (That or maybe Nick Neutron. Tough call.)

Anyway, Fiore’s Axis of Oops is brilliant. He joins the The Onion in using satire to better get at the heart of the issue than can the real news.

The Onion’s latest entry is “N. Korea Detonates 40 Years Of GDP”:

N. Korea Detonates 40 Years Of GDP
Remains Of Country’s Economy Sent Deep Into Earth’s Core

[snip]

Across the country, North Korean citizens cheered wildly after learning their nation had violently transformed the equivalent of 2.3 billion hot meals, 11 million housing units, and 1,700 hospitals into their component atoms. Others celebrated by gleaning recently harvested rice paddies for leftover grains.

“This fraction-of-a-second blast is what I, and my parents before me, have given up everything to achieve,” said tractor driver Chin Lee-Park, whose machine was cannibalized for bomb derrick parts in 1997.

Spread the nuclear love.

Comment

Momentarily lost in the hullaballoo over North Korea’s probable failed nuclear test is the last state to test a nuclear weapon as well as lie about the yield: India.

Oh, they are going to love that statement on the Bharat Rakshak BBS.

Okay, I am just winding those guys up; India at least refused to sign the NPT in the first place, which counts for something.

India’s Sweetheart Deal Breaking Down Over Safeguards?

But India has done rather better than North Korea in getting away with building and testing nuclear weapons and now stands on the verge of a sweetheart deal that would open up US law and NSG guidelines and end India’s nuclear isolation—if only they could negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Mark Hibbs—an international man of mystery so awesome his byline has two cities (Vienna and Bonn)—has a pair of stories in Nucleonics Week and Nuclear Fuel that detail just how broken that process has become.

On September 28, Hibbs reported (subscription only) that the IAEA Board of Governors and India were at an impasse, because India will not negotiate a safeguards agreement based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, which does not allow a state “to unilaterally suspend or terminate a safeguards agreement.”

Seems fair to me. We’re calling this the Tony Soprano rule of nonproliferation: Once you enter this Family, there is no getting out.

Now, in the October 9 edition Hibbs (still subscription only) has a massive 1,900 word monster declaring that India has yet to notify the IAEA that it intends to negotiate a safeguards and the US-India bilateral negotiations on a nuclear cooperation agreement, as a result, have “bogged down”—all over this question of “in perpetuity.”

You’re going to love this little wrinkle …

The Administration, in answer to questions from lawmakers, stated that India must sign an INFCRIC/66 agrement and that GOV/1621 is the basis for safeguards being applied “in perpetuity.”

GOV/1621 is restricted, so I don’t actually know what it says. Sources, however, told Hibbs that GOV/1621 has to do specifically with safeguarding items which are transferred to a state from third parties—a loophole those experts told Hibbs would allow India to interpret the agreement as excluding the 8 indigenous Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors New Delhi offered to place under safeguards pursuant to the US-India agreement (see the shaded reactors in the table, below).

That would mean that India’s safeguards obligations on the reactors are voluntary, allowing India to terminate or suspend safeguards on these 8 reactors after removing any imported fuel.

Unit	Location	Type	Capacity (MWe)	Date of Commercial Operation
TAPS-1	Tarapur, Maharashtra	BWR	160	28-Oct-1969
TAPS-2	Tarapur, Maharashtra	BWR	160	28-Oct-1969
RAPS-1	Rawatbhata, Rajasthan	PHWR	100	16-Dec-1973
RAPS-2	Rawatbhata, Rajasthan	PHWR	200	01-Apr-1981
MAPS-1	Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu	PHWR	170	27-Jan-1984
MAPS-2	Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu	PHWR	220	21-Mar-1986
NAPS-1	Narora, Uttar Pradesh	PHWR	220	01-Jan-1991
NAPS-2	Narora, Uttar Pradesh	PHWR	220	01-Jul-1992
KAPS-1	Kakrapar, Gujarat	PHWR	220	06-May-1993
KAPS-2	Kakrapar, Gujarat	PHWR	220	01-Sep-1995
KAIGA-1	Kaiga, Karnataka	PHWR	220	16-Nov-2000
KAIGA-2	Kaiga, Karnataka	PHWR	220	16-Mar-2000
RAPS-3	Rawatbhata, Rajasthan	PHWR	220	01-Jun-2000
RAPS-4	Rawatbhata, Rajasthan	PHWR	220	23-Dec-2000
TAPS-4	Tarapur, Maharashtra	PHWR	540	12-Sept-2005
Total	...	...	3310	...

At least one description of GOV/1621 seems to support this view, describing the duration of safeguards on the transfer of fuel:

This reflects IAEA policy with regard to perpetuity flowing from the recommendations made by the IAEA Director General in a memorandum. GOV/1621, supra note 62. Paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Director General’s Memorandum states:

The primary effect of termination of the agreement, either by act of the parties or affluxion of time, would be that no further supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material could be added to the inventory. On the other hand, the rights and obligations of the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue to apply in connection with any supplied material or items and with any special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with any supplied material or items which had been included in the inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory.

Antonio F. Perez, “Survival of Rights Under The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards,” 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 749 (Summer 1994).

A similar summary—for those without lexis-nexis—is provided in a conference presentation by Laura Rockwood— Principle Legal Officer, and Section Head for Non-Proliferation and Policy-making, in the Office of Legal Affairs of the IAEA.

Now, I don’t think India will get away with this little maneuver—I believe the folks in the Administration, Congress and IAEA who say they are serious about a safeguards agreement in perpetuity. And the loophole—if it exists—would be easy enough to close: the BOG should insist that the PHWRs themselves are put under safeguards “in perpetuity”—not just the material or other items supplied under the safeguads agreement.

But these are the kind of little things one wants to make sure are all wrapped up, all neat and tidy before we carving out exceptions for India in US law and NSG supplier guidelines.

***

Guess who else has noticed India’s attitude toward INFCIRC/66 and is using to kick our arse all over Vienna? Our buddies in Iran: “Iran has said,” one Western told Hibbs, “that states must join the NPT if they want to get access to nuclear trade, and that rewarding India with a special safeguards agreement letting them terminate safeguards if they are outside the NPT weakens the NPT itself.”

Oh, I see, we’re all about honoring that safeguards agreement now.

When foreign policy disasters collide!

A former safeguards official described Iran’s position on India as “win-win”: Iran can use the argument to enhance its NPT credentials and obstruct at US foreign policy initiative, “while preparing the ground for being able to quit the NPT sometime in the future in part because giving India nuclear trade rights reserved only for NPT states will have made the NPT meaningless.”

Comment [6]

ACA just posted an analysis from Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel on the DPRK nuclear test.

It contains some evidence that I don’t think has been made public before. Here’s an example:

...it is not surprising that a range of yields has been reported. One authoritative estimate from Terry Wallace, a seismologist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, based on an unclassified analysis of open data, estimates a yield between 0.5 and 2 kilotons, with 90 percent confidence that the yield is less than 1 kiloton.[7] A second authority, Lynn R. Sykes of Columbia University estimates a yield of 0.4 kilotons, with 68 percent confidence that the yield is between 0.2 and 0.7 kilotons and a 95 percent probability that the yield is less than 1 kiloton.[8]

I also liked this observation:

One notable byproduct of the test is that it has demonstrated that university and other independent seismic detection systems, as well as those of governments and the International Monitoring System of the Vienna-based Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization very effectively detect underground explosions in the sub-kiloton range.

But read the whole thing…I can’ t do it justice. And I need time to help Jeffrey pick out a third vacation home, now that our fear-mongering has pushed revenues through the roof.

Jeffrey Adds: “Perhaps North Korea’s weapon designers tried to go directly to a weapon in the 500-1000 kilogram class that could reach South Korea on a Scud missile…” Sounds familiar, eh?

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