This is a summary of the investigation result of the May 18 Incident and the related political events before and after the incident published on July 18, 1995 as was disclosed by the Seoul District Public Prosecutor's Office and the Prosecution Bureau of the Ministry of Defense. The prosecutors had invested 269 relevant people and examined and conferred various relevant materials for the investigation. These materials draw a clear map of the modern history in Korea from the extension of the Martial Law, through the suppression of the demonstration in Gwangju and the course of political situations after the Gwangju incident, to the ascendency of the former president Jeon Duhwan into power. These materials considered an invaluable resources in understanding the role of Jeon Duhwan's military faction, the origin of the Gwangju Democratization Movement, the retirement of the former president Choe, and General Jeon's coming into power.
1.1. Facts Confirmed through the Investigation
1.1.1. The extension of the Martial Law and the arrest of politicians were sanctioned by Choe Gyuha after being notified.
1.1.2. The extension of the Martial Law, the arrest of politicians, the prohibition of politician's activities, and establishment of the National Security Committee were initiated by the commander of the Armed Forces Intelligence Command, Jeon Duhwan without any direction of President Choe Gyuha.
1.1.3. The extension of the Martial Law was imposed to take control of the political situation.
1.1.4. The series of the events were a process of political change for General Jeon to procure the political power.
1.1.5. The Gwangju Incident was not intended in advance.
1.1.6. The allegation that Gim Daejung was the mastermind behind the Gwangju Incident turned out to be groundless.
1.1.7. Firing of the troops in Gwangju was begun to defend and threat when they were put on the defensive. None of the commanders issued the order to fire.
1.1.8. The paratroopers were under a single commanding system. They did not operate of their own.
1.1.9. The demonstrators began to capture the arms and ammunitions after the firing of the airborne units.
1.1.10. There was no volley of machine gun from helicopter or using of a flame thrower. But bayonets were used.
1.1.11. There were incidents in which unarmed innocent people were shot to death.
1.2. Investigation Result
The prosecutors investigated unproven issues about the Gwangju Incident which raised numerous controversies in the past. The following are the issues clarified by the prosecutors, which would be helpful to understand the truth of the Gwangju Democratization Movement.
1.2.1. As to the claim that the military faction staged an insurrection
On May 13, 1994, Jeong Dongnyeon (the chair of the Gwangju Uprising Association), Gim Sanggeun (the co-chair of the National Association for Fact-Finding and Inheritance of the Spirit of Gwangju Uprising) and other people related to Gwangju Incident indicted and accused the former presidents, Jeon Duhwan and No Tae-u along with other 35 military unit commanders.
The indictment says that the process of the General Jeon's ascendency into power was against the constitution and a usurpation of the power by Jeon's military faction. The military faction "rebelled to disturb the constitution and in that process manipulated the army for the usurpation of the power. Thus they committed treason violating the military law and committed murder and attempted murder."
Based on the accusation, prosecutors investigated 269 people and produced 217-page- long. documents which will be of great help to clarify the Gwangju Democratization movement.
The prosecutors, after investigation, reached a significant conclusion. They declared that series of actions which might have implicated illegality or unconstitutionality at least superficially took place with sanction or approval of President Choe Gyuha. For example, such measures as appointment of Jeon Duhwan to the acting chair of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency, extension of the Martial Law, dispatch of the martial army into Gwangju, and suppression of the demonstration and establishment of the National Security Committee were within the scope of proper administration of the president.
They also disclosed that on the other hand the series of the measures taken by Jeon's faction were nothing but a political change with the purpose of creating a new constitutional order and regime on the basis of the military power led by the commander of National Security Committee.
1.2.2. Process of shooting by the troops
The plaintiffs insisted that there is a possibility that the firing by the troops was planned and ordered. The prosecuting attorneys clarified that the first shooting was initiated by paratroopers on May 19, 1980 near Gwangju High School. However, they concluded that it was not planned in advance to instigate the citizens of Gwangju nor it was ordered by a specific person independent from the formal chain of command.
1.2.3. The dual chain of command of the army units dispatched to Gwangju
The plaintiffs insisted that there was an independent chain of command of the army units dispatched to Gwangju from the formal chain of command as planned in advance. However the result of the investigation asserted that the dispatch to and retreat from Gwangju of the 7th airborne brigade followed by the 11th and the 3rd brigades were under the command of the 31 division commander Jeong Ung and the Combat Training Commander Yun Heungjeong. The operation of re-entry into Gwangju was ordered by the Combat Training Commander under the command of the martial law command with consultation of the Special Operations Command. The conclusion put it that there was no dual chain of command.
1.2.4. There was no intended instigation of bloody incident.
The plaintiffs insisted that there was a scenario planned in advance to instigate the citizens to break in the armories and to arm themselves to create and find an excuse for the forceful re-entry to the city. The investigation says that the police and the army were so much preoccupied by the suppression of demonstration that they were not able to intentionally make possible the break-ins.
1.2.5. The possibility of strafing from helicopters
Priest Jo Bio, Buddhist monk I Gwang-yeong, and Reverend Arnold Peterson asserted that there were incidents of strafing from helicopters. However, the investigation shows that there were no strafing incident but some force demonstration of helicopters for 48 hours in Gwangju. Ms. Hong Ran and Sim Dongseon were casualties of common gun shot though they were supposed to be strafed by helicopters. The red flashlight of a helicopter in the picture of Reverend Peterson is considered as a light to prevent collision.
1.2.6. The possibility of using bayonets and flame throwers
The investigation shows that the paratroopers used bayonets without being ordered to use them on the spot while suppressing demonstration. But there was no evidence of flame throwers being used.
1.2.7. The possibility of shooting at the unarmed civilians
The investigation shows that five to six arrested demonstrators were suffocated by tear gas and beaten to death in a truck while the five battalions of the 3rd airborne brigade were moving them to a prison.
In addition, the 62nd battalion of the 11th airborne brigade fired at a minibus to kill 10 passengers and shot two severely wounded to death. The 62nd battalion of the 11th airborne brigade also shot four villagers to death after mistakenly confronting and exchanging gun shots with the guards of the Combat Training Command.
1.2.8. The number of casualties
The investigation based on the government documents shows that the number of killed during the incident was 23 soldiers, four policemen, and 166 civilians. 47 people acknowledged to be missing and compensated. However, the investigators claimed that it was not possible to reach a correct figure at the moment of investigation.
The prosecutors concluded that there was no planned scenario of demonstration and ensuing suppression, saying, "It is difficult to assume that the dispatch of the paratroopers to Gwangju was done with specific intention, and that the new military faction planned to intentionally instigate the bloody suppression." Accordingly, there was no riot which the plaintiffs claimed and which is the basis to form a insurrection to the accused.
Part II: "Report of the Operation 'Chungjeong' (loyalty) by the 20th Division"
- the full text as provided by the Ministry of Defense
The facts about the military suppression of the Gwangju Uprising are revealed in detail recently. "A report of the 'Chungjeong operation,'" the record of the activities by the 20th infantry division and the paratroopers attached to the division, was submitted to the Gwangju Hearing Committee. Document verification team of the committee cross-examined the original copy of the report which was kept in the Central Archives of the Army. The two documents were similar in content. The number of the killed etc., however, betrayed a considerable gap, and it caused controversy. The original copy at the Archive has it that the number of the people shot dead were 17, and that of arrested were 595 while the copy which the Army submitted to the committee says that 4 were killed and 322 were arrested. While the document which the Army submitted to the committee says that "08:00, May 21, the attitude of the Gwangju citizens were favorable to the operation executed by the 20th division," there is no statements similar in content to that in the original copy which reveals that the Army tried to propagate the operation as an act of placation. We publish the full text of the original copy which was kept in the Archive of the Army. The contents which appear only in the submitted copy, but not in the original copy, will be underlined. (Editor)
2.1. Synopsis
2.1.1. Unit transfer for the operation: Army operation # 80-21, 80-23
- The 61 regiment transfer: from 22:30, May 20 to 04:00, May 21, 1980 (by train)
- Division (-1) transfer: from 02:00 to 08:58, May 21, 1980. (by train)
- The 60 regiment transferred: from 22:00, May 21 to 07:00, May 22, 1980 (by air)
2.1.2. Strength
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Unit |
ranks |
files |
sum |
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60 regiment |
88 |
1,514 |
1,602 |
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61 regiment |
82 |
1,413 |
1,495 |
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62 regiment |
84 |
1,450 |
1,534 |
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headquarter unit |
30 |
105 |
135 |
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total |
284 |
4,482 |
4,776 |
2.1.3. Date of operation: from May 21 to May 29 (nine days)
2.1.4. Operation area: in and around Gwangju (refer to 1:50,000 map of Gwangju)
2.1.5. General circumstances which necessitated the operation at the level of the divisional forces of arms.
24:00, May 17: Intermittent riots in and around Gwangju after nationwide extension of the martial law necessitated the dispatch of the 3rd, 7th, 11st airborne brigades. As the size of the number of crowds increase up to around 100,000 rapidly, in conformity with the operation number 80-21, three regiments of the 20th division and the headquarter unit were transferred to the Gwangju area by train or by air and committed to suppress the riot.
May 20: The crowds turned rioters and seized the arms and ammunitions in the Jeonnam Provincial Hall, Gwangju Police Station and other neighboring places not only to slaughter, set fire and rob innocent citizens, but attack army vehicles and burn down the ammunitions and the hospitals. Consequently, the situation grew worse so much as it would be impossible to keep order and the Gwangju saw an anarchic state.
21:00, May 21: Martial Law Commander ordered military units to defend themselves actively and the rioters at the outskirts of the city were quelled in part. The rioters, however, strengthened their numbers and encamped with the seized arms and ammunitions at the outskirts of the city and were confronted with the army. We, the army of the people, waited while appealing peaceful settlement of the situation to restore peace and order and to protect the life and property of the innocent people. The rioters at the mercy of gangsters, ruffians, and instigators, on the contrary, kept going on murdering, robbery and rape all the more. In this situation, to prevent the good citizens of Gwangju from getting hurt and to liberate them from the horror of the rioters, and to restore the peace and order of the nation, the army committed the operation.
2.2. Development of the Operation
May 20, 1980
20:00 About 100,000 rioting crowds were gathered in the downtown of Gwangju and the situations grew worse that it's impossible to keep order with the forces of police and the army within the area. The operation units received an order to dispatch the force of one regiment of 20th division to the city at 20:00 (Army operation number 80-20).
22:30 The 61 regiment departed Yongsan Train Station in Seoul and arrived at Songjeong-li Train station at 04:00 and redeployed at Sangmu army base.
22:30 20th and 30th divisions received an order to dispatch more force of arms (Army operation number 80-23).
May 21
02:30 The Headquarter-Division and the 62nd regiment departed Yongsan station and arrived at Songjeong-li at 08:58. The force was redeployed at Sangmu army base at 10:00 and get prepared to commit operation.
08:00 The 61 regiment was dispatched to suppress the rioters around the Gwangju industrial complex, but failed to return (The number of force of arms were 82 officers and 1,413 ranks and 40 vehicles.).
Effect: As the gathered crowd of 2,000 got extremely excited, after talking with the representative of the crowd, the commander of the 61 regiment judged that the operation is impossible and pulled out to the base after getting permission from the commander in chief. It helped for the citizen of Gwangju to have a favorable attitude to the operation that was executed by the 20th division.
08:10 The moment when the commanding vehicles arrived in front of the Gwangju industrial complex by road, 14 vehicles of 1/4 tonnage were captured and two of the soldiers got injured, and one was disappeared. But 25 has escaped and returned at 12:00 to the base. The one disappeared found alive later and identified as the corporal Bag yunsu of the 62 regiment.
Just before the departure in Seoul the division's logistics staff asked the 3rd corps logistics staff to announce to the CTC logistics staff that 14 vehicles for commanding purposes are to move by road. The 3rd corps logistics staff notified the fact to the CTC logistics staff. But the CTC didn't posted a messenger yet and the vehicles moved into Gwangju without warning. This is why the vehicles were captured.
To block off the rioters from moving into and out of Gwangju and neighboring areas, troops were posted for the first time.
One regimental force was posted to the Provincial Hall and another one to Sangmu Hall. While scouting in helicopter, the commander of 61 regiment and three battalions commanders judged and reported that intermittent sniping of the rioters around the Provincial Hall makes it impossible to go on the surveillance any longer.
17:00 Positioning of the troops were rearranged. To block the state road 1, one regiment was posted. One regiment was posted to block the toll gate. One regiment was posted between Gwangju and Sonjeong-li.
18:20 The 2nd battalion of the 62nd regiment was confronted with the crowds as soon as posted at the Armed Forces Hospital.
18:55 The 3rd battalion of the 62nd regiment was dispatched to the gate of the Songjeong-li airdrome and Seochang bridge.
18:55 The 1st battalion of the 61st regiment was dispatched to block the state road between Gwangju and Mogpo. (11 officers and 207 ranks)
18:56 The 3rd battalion of the 61st regiment was dispatched to block the toll gate. (11 officers and 228 ranks)
19:25 The 62 regiment took charge of guarding Songjeong-li. One company took charge of the residence of the commander in chief, another company the outside the Headquarter, one another company the north fence, and one the ammunitions.
21:00 After receiving an order to reinforce (Army operation number 80-23), regiment 60 moved by air from the Seongnam airdrome to the Songjeong-li airdrome and arrived at 07:00 next morning.
21:00 The crowds turned rioters and more and more got excited. They began to shoot with the arms seized at the reserved army ammunitions and attempted to get hold of the operation unit at some operation zones.
21:00 The army secured the measure of active self-defense and the Combat and Command Headquarters (CTC) ordered to execute the right of self-defense with the following code of conduct: Warn them. Don't let the others come near to you. In case they approach you, you are allowed to shoot them in the belly.
21:30 Two tanks and two APCs were reinforce to the operation zone of the 2nd battalion of the 62nd regiment.
22:11 Six buses driven by the rioters and the 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment confronted on the road to Mogpo, and clashed for the first time (till 04:00 next morning) in response to the shots from the rioters.
The blocked area where the 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment took in charge (on the road toward the right side of the Udang mountain) six buses full of rioters rushed in to the to break the barricade from the direction of Mogpo to Gwangju. The unit stopped them, but one of the rioters in the bus shot at our troops and one was injured in the head. Our forces immediately fired at them and two buses were turned upside down.
Four of the buses, however, in the meantime, sped away into the city. They returned to the same place with 10 vehicles full of the rioters, and attacked our forces later.
Results: Killed three, captured 16 pieces of arms, and arrested one. We fired off about 500 ammunitions and one was sent back to the Seoul Army Hospital by a helicopter. Two of our forces were injured.
Effect: We taught the rioter to know that they are not fit for the battle with the army and succeeded in arousing fear with superior marksmanship of our forces.
23:25 Dispatched reinforcements to where the 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment is in charge. (One battalion and two companies of five officers and 125 ranks, and a search company of three officers and 67 ranks.)
May 22
00:15 Reinforcements were arrived and deployed along the operation zone of the 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment.
The army took measures to execute active self-defense and aroused fear among the rioters with sophisticated marksmanship.
07:00 The 60 regiment completed transfer by air and assigned at the airfield. (88 officers and 1,514 ranks)
07:22 The rioters around Songjeong-li began to move in twelve buses. They were confronted with the 3rd battalion of the 62nd regiment at the gate of the airfield. (No firing.)
07:30 The rioters were threatening the hostages at the Mareug-li army apartment complex. And the Combat and Training Headquarters ordered to dispatch two platoons to guard the area. Two platoons of the company 12 of the 61 regiment were posted at 09:58.
10:35 The commander of the division asked the principal of the logistics division to reinforce vehicles. Three tanks were reinforced to the 3rd battalion of the 60th regiment, the 3rd battalion of the 62nd regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 62nd regiment.
12:00 The armor school was reinforced with six tanks and three APCs.
13:35 The rioters of Songjeong-li demanded permission to get in Gwangju in return for voluntary return of the arms.
15:00 About 300 rioters of Songjeong-li were permitted to go into Gwangju in a bus and three trucks. Among them 160 headed to Gwangju. Arms and ammunitions returned were 37 M1s, 10 carbines, 10 air rifles, and about 100 ammunitions.
16:30 Battalions 2 and 3 of the 60 regiment got hold of the Songjeong-li area and assigned to guard the munitions facility in Gwangsan Police Station.
Results: Our forces marched into Songjeong-li and blocked the roads and secured major facilities and munitions such as class 1 and class 3 at the Sam-yang Tire Company, police stations, and the train station. Got the arms and ammunitions returned and permitted about 150 people to get into and out of Gwangju.
16:50 Reconnoiter in force that covering the whole Songjeong-li area.
17:00 The 2nd battalion of the 62nd regiment launched an operation to secure Armed Forces Hospital and clashee with the rioters at about Dolgogae Pass. The rioters were threatening sniping at the places like as the rooftop of the apartment. Division staffs also helped to fight out.
17:50 Got hold of Armed Forces Hospital.
Achievement: Three were shot to kill, 10 were injured, and 25 were arrested.
Casualties: One KIA, and four injured.
* Decision to launch the operation was made to secure better treatment for the injured (both civilian and military) despite inevitable sacrifices.
* Effect: Tested the resisting fire-powers of the rioters. And made the rioters experience the terror that might be raised if clash with the army.
18:00 The 2nd battalion of the 62nd regiment confronted with the rioters. Confronted again at the distance of 1 km.
21:05 Two search units of the division (two officers and 18 ranks) were lay ambushed between Sangmu army base and Armed Forces Hospital.
May 23
06:60 Issued an order to secure the KBS Broadcasting Station.
06:47 Assigned the 3rd battalion of the 61st regiment (10 officers and 197 ranks) to Bia KBS Broadcasting Station (completed at 08:00)
11:48 Issued operation guide-lines as to the construction of the blocking line.
* Never allow the armed rioters to pass over the blockade.
* Arrest those who do not resist, but shoot to kill those who resist.
* In case the rioters attempt to run on, shoot to kill with APCs or tanks.
* Watch and prevent the rioters from escaping not only at the main roads but by-ways.
14:30 10 riot policemen were reinforced to West Police Station(8), and Gwangju Police Station(2).
15:00 Wirelesses Signal Units (P-77:30, KP-6:50, VRC:160 each) were reinforced by Army Communications Command's office.
16:00 Rearranged the positioning of the troops in preparation for the later operations. The 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment at Mogpo line completed alteration (Infantry School). The 3rd battalion of the 61st regiment at the via KBS Broadcasting Station, and the toll gate completed alteration (Armored School). The 2nd battalion of the 62nd regiment at Armed Forces Hospital completed alteration (Infantry School). The 3rd battalion of the 62nd regiment at Seonchang bridge completed alteration (Artillery School). The 1st battalion of the 62nd regiment at Sangmu army base completed alteration (Chemical School).
19:15 Issued an order to reinforce to Mudeung Mountain area (completed at 20:54).
May 24
01:10 Received an order to alternate (operation number 80-14).
02:00 Issued an order to prepare the alteration of the forces.
09:00 61 regiment started to move to the Junam village on the state road between Gwangju and Hwasun.
09:50 The 62 regiment started to move to the Gwangju Penitentiary area.
10:50 The 61 regiment completed alteration with 11 paratroop units.
12:30 The 62 regiment completed alteration with three paratroop units.
14:00 The 60 regiment started to move and arrived at Sangmu army base at 15:30.
17:00 All force of arms completed re-encampment.
18:00 Issued an order to cease fire (operation number 80-16).
21:00 The CTC commander issued and order to reinforce the guard.
May 25
11:20 The company 7 of the 62 regiment completed pulling out the vehicles.
11:40 Received an order from the CTC (# 80-15 of the operation "loyalty") and passed down the order.
11:55 The company 7 of the 61 regiment was pulled out by air.
13:00-24:00 All force of arms were ordered to plan and prepare the later operations.
May 26
08:00 Each regiment commander summoned meeting to map out operations(S-3).
11:00 Received the order of the operation "loyalty" (operation number 4).
13:00 Meeting was called up and passed down the divisional operation (number 80-8).
23:00 Airborne units began to infiltrate into Gwangju.
May 27
01:00 The 3rd brigade (14 officers and 66 ranks). The 7th brigade (39 officers and 224 ranks). The 11th brigade (four officers and 34 ranks).
02:00-03:00 Each regiment was assigned to the PL*1 line.
04:00 Striking units of the 3rd airborne brigade penetrated around the Provincial Hall.
04:10 Eleven shots were heard at the Provincial Hall.
04:15 The 3rd airborne brigade clashed with the enemy. Casualties: One got injured.
04:23 The 7th airborne brigade was engaged in a violent battle with the enemy and killed two of them.
04:25 The 61 regiment clashed at around Jeonnam National University Hospital.
04:30 Each regimental forces of the division passed on over the PL*1 line.
04:38 The 11st airborne brigade clashed with enemy at Jeon-il building and Tourist Hotel.
04:40 Secured Jeon-il building and the hotel.
04:45 Issued an order to move 18 tanks and 75 APCs.
04:50 The 3rd airborne brigade and the rioters were engaged in hard battle. The 3rd airborne brigade asked reinforcement of the divisional forces.
04:51 The 61 regiment was reinforced at the Provincial Hall.
04:53 The 91st artillery battalion (six officers and 190 ranks) prepared to reinforce and moved in front of the Hospital.
04:55 Divisional forces passed on over the PL*2 line. There was hard battle at the operation zone of the 61 regiment (Gwangju Park, the Provincial Hall). Casualties: Two got injured.
05:04 The 11st airborne brigade arrested two rioters at Tourist Hotel.
05:05 18 vehicles and five APCs were moved to the Provincial Hall.
05:06 The 7th airborne brigade was engaged in battle at Gwangju Park. Casualties: One was killed in action, four were severly injured, and two were slightly wounded.
05:08 Tanks and APCs paused to wait while moving on in front of the hospital.
05:10 The 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment rushed into and occupied Gwangju Police Station.
05:13 Intermittent shots were heard at Jeon-il building.
05:16 500MD armed chopper showed firepower in the sky above the Provincial Hall.
05:18 The 11st airborne brigade were engaged in battle with 40 rioters and two were wounded.
05:21 The 3rd airborne brigade occupied around the Provincial Hall and enjoined with 61 regiment. Achievement: Killed two, arrested 200, and recovered 2,000 guns and ammunitions. Casualties: One was severely injured.
05:25 The 3rd airborne brigade occupied Gwangju City Hall.
05:30 The 60 regimental forces secured the operation zone.
05:32 The 61 regiment occupied the Provincial Hall completely.
05:42 The 7th airborne brigade occupied Gwangju Park and enjoined with the 1st battalion of the 61st regiment.
05:53 The 2nd battalion of the 62nd regiment was confronted with 15 rioters and clashed at Gyerim Elementary School.
06:00 Reconnoiter in force flying with two AH-1Js and three 500MDs were pulled out.
06:01 18 tanks and five APCs were arrived at the Provincial Hall and redeployed.
06:02 Cleared Jeon-il building and Tourist Hotel and enjoined the 61 regiment. Achievement: Recovered 16 carbines and one LMG.
06:14 Regiments 61, 62 secured the operation zones.
06:17 Temporary report of the CTC commander. Achievement: Killed two and arrested 207. Casualties: One killed in action, and five were injured. Civilian Casualties: A woman got wounded.
06:20 Jeon-il building and YMCA were occupied completely. Achievement: Arrested 27.
06:29 Two patients were sent back by helicopter.
06:34 The 11th airborne brigade reported the results of the battle: Arrested 29. Killed three. Recovered 500 carbines, one M16, one M203, a wireless, an LMG, and four boxes of ammunitions.
May 27
06:50 The 62 regiment reported the results of the battle. Killed three. Arrested 20. Recovered a gas mask, three carbines and a P-77 wireless.
06:51 The 91st artillery battalion was reinforced at the Provincial Hall and redeployed.
07:05 The 3rd, 7th and 11th airborne brigades pulled out of the operation zones.
07:25 The 20th Division took over all the task.
07:40 15 tanks and two APCs and a vehicle of 1/4 tonnage demonstrated around the downtown of Gwangju and reinforced to the forces at the Provincial Hall later.
08:00 Rearranged the positioning of the troops. Scouted and cleared the area. And exercised a control over the people at night. Platoons secured strong-points and patrolled the area.
May 28
12:00 Rearranged the forces at the level of company and cracked down the remnants and strengthened patrols.
May 29
04:00 Handed all the task over to the police. The division forces focussed on watching and preserving important facilities and safety targets.
2.3. Results of the Operation
2.3.1. Achievements
2.3.1.1. The number of rioters arrested by: the divisions - 332; the airborne brigades - 263. Total - 595.
2.3.1.2. The number of rioters killed by: the divisions - 4; the airborne brigades - 13. Total - 17.
2.3.1.3. The arms and ammunitions recovered: carbines - 2, 581; M1s - 445; AR - 14; pistols - 2; machine guns - 16; MG 50s - 1; air rifles - 45. Total - 3,103.
2.3.2. Casualties
KIA - 1; the injured - 5.
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Achievements |
Casualties |
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2.3.3. Major Operations
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2.3.4. Commanders and Staffs
2.3.4.1. Division Headquarters
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2.3.4.2. 61 regiment
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2.3.4.3. 62 regiment
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2.3.4.4. 63 regiment
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2.4. Reasons of Successful Operation
2.4.1. Surprise Attack
2.4.1.1. The army collected exact informations about activities of the rioters in Gwangju.
2.4.1.2. The army took measures to preserve the operation through developing it only as tentative plans for security reasons. The order was issued only two hours before launching the operation properly.
2.4.1.3. The order of the operation was passed down at once to the 20th and 31th divisions at H-hour not to be exposed. (At 04:00 to the 20th, and at 05:00 to the 31th division respectively.)
2.4.1.4. No wirelesses were used in developing the plans. Instead the officials in charge (the commander in chief, the commander of the divisions, and the commanders of the airborne brigades) met person-to-person to develop the plan.
2.4.1.5. The army disconnected all the communications system of Gwangju before issuing the order to launch the operation.
2.4.1.6. The army mustered the then scattered police in Gwangju and put under the control of army. They were used as guide in executing the operation.
2.4.1.7. The army established an efficient commanding system and succeeded in infiltrating secretly into the city.
2.4.2. With the centralized commanding system, the army enabled an efficient joint operation between airborne forces and infantry units.
2.4.3. Every soldier was well-understood the importance of his task and did his best to defend the nation from danger.
2.4.4. As the army of the nation, we never forgot the sense of duty to protect the life and property of the people.
2.4.5. The army established a centralized commanding system and the commanding officers always were at the head of the troops.
2.4.6. Every soldier was deeply attached to his unit and stood together all the time.
2.4.7. The army made the most of psychological tactics and activities of pacification.
2.4.7.1. The army aired placating broadcast through KBS Broadcasting Station. A mobile broadcasting unit (demanded May 21, 1908) was organized and propagated the messages.
2.4.7.2. Three sets of loud speaker were supplemented. (Asked on May 22, 1980 and set up accordingly.)
2.4.7.3. Microphone systems were set in the vehicles for the commander of battalion and above.
2.4.7.4. Various scripts were composed and read in the streets.
2.4.7.5. Guidebooks were manufactured and distributed.
- Why did we come to Seoul: 300 copies distributed, one copy to each platoon
- Source books for pacification acts were made and one copy was distributed to each platoon.
- Various handbills were dropped from the airplane and broadcasted.
2.4.8. Vigilance systems of the arms and ammunitions of the police and the reservation army were reexamined and improved.
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Addenda
2.5. Addendum 1: The concept of the operation.
2.5.1. The operations were executed subdivided into three parts. Each regiment took responsibility for the operation zone. (Attached- Map #1)
2.5.2. The execution of the Operation was gradated.
i. 1st stage: Securing of the position and scouting.
ii. 2nd stage: After securing and arrangement of the position started house-to-house checkup and searched out the rebellious people.
2.5.3. The troops, after being assigned to the operation zones, were dictated to infiltrate secretly and to strike and suppress the enemy at the same time.
2.5.4. The airborne brigades executed secret infiltration operation at the specified target.
2.5.5. Rearrangement of the forces
i. Watch and beguiling units were expected to open up attacking line and to guide the routes.
ii. Striking units attacked and arrested the enemy.
iii. The task force (one reinforcement unit) was expected to attack and crack down the violently resisting rioters.
iv. The injured or the arrested were to be send back with the help of the reserved unit.
2.5.6. Tactics. In case of confrontation with violent rioters detour immediately and let the task force attack them.
2.5.7. Post tanks or tanks at the places specified in the plan. After occupying the target areas, encamp at the choice place to make the best of the firepower.
2.5.8. Block the outskirts of Gwangju and the roads to the neighboring areas.
2.5.9. Prevent accidental clash between our forces by specifying, for example, a neutral zone or limiting the operation line in advance with the help of each units.
2.5.10. Keep going on to recover the arms seized by the rioters and execute pacification operation.
* Reinforcements after launching the operation
- 18 tanks, nine APCs.
- One 500MD for commanding use and four armed 500MDs. Three UH-1Hs and two AH-1Hs. 40 vehicles.
2.6. Addendum 2. Operation guide
2.6.1. This operation will be named "loyalty" (i.e., loyalty)
2.6.2. When carrying out the mission at the basement, attack after nullifying the enemy with gas bombs.
2.6.3. When engaged in the battle, point muzzle at the lower part of the belly if possible.
2.6.4. Tanks and APCs will be supplemented at the demand of the commander of the unit posted and the attached force should be submitted to the direction of the commander from the very moment when assigned.
2.6.5. Two policemen will be assigned to each company to be guided to the target when executing operation.
2.6.6. After securing the target area, the operation unit is expected to do best to restore administrative network of the area. For example, normalize the function of the police station and village council, and to summon the police, reservation army and the head of the neighborhood association.
2.6.7. Protect the foreigners, their houses, and celebrities foremost and post the guards.
2.6.8. Do excercise to execute the mission.
2.6.9. Arrest the rioters if possible, if not nullify them.
2.6.10. After securing the target area, post platoons to the strategic places or building where it is easy to observe and defend.
2.6.11. Do best to keep the secret and do not use wirelesses. Codify the wire communication. Authorized personnel only are recommended to develop the operational plans.
2.6.12. Close cooperation among the forces is a must. The mission at the level of platoons, especially, should be executed in conformity with the command of the 20th division.
2.6.13. Try best not to damage the innocent people.
2.6.14. Avoid executing operations on the state roads only. Attack the branch road sometimes. Or attack the both roads alternately.
2.6.15. Be prepared not to clash among the operation units.
(1) In preparation for the case of being confronted with powerful rioters, designate in advance the place to gather afterward.
(2) Take measures to disintegrate TNT set in the building or to incapacitate machine guns.
(3) Take measures to alert enough to the surprise attack of the mobile task force of the rioters.
(4) Take measures to disarm the rioters violently resisting at the cost of civilian's life.
2.7. Addendum 3. The copy text of the orders issued by the CTC
The Combat and Training Command
Gwangju, Jeonnam (CP 040912)
May 26, 1980
"Loyalty"
The Operation "loyalty" #4.
Refer to the 1:12,500 map of Korea.
2.7.1. Circumstances: Omitted.
2.7.2. Duty: The CTC should launch the operation "loyalty" in the operation zone.
2.7.3. The Operation
2.7.3.1. The concept of the operation
(1) As to the operation zone the CTC in charge, divide the zone into Gwangju and the neighboring areas and draw a distinction in executing the operations.
(2) Gwangju Area
i. Subdivide the Gwangju area into two. The divisional forces of the 20th, and 31th are to attack the downtown of the city and clear the remnants of the rioters. And the troops of infantry, artillery, and armor are to block the outskirts of the city. Make sure to accomplish infiltration, surprise attack and suppression simultaneously in stealth.
ii. Rearrangement of the forces
a. Watch and beguiling units were open up attack-line and guide the operation routes.
b. Striking units attack and arrested the enemy.
c. The task forces (one reinforcement unit) was expected to attack and crash down violently resisting rioters.
d.. The injured or the arrested were to be send back with the help of the reserved unit.
iii. Tactics
In case of confrontation with violent rioters detour immediately and let the task force attack them.
iv. Enjoin the agents infiltrated in advance.
v. Post tanks at the places the plan does designate. After occupying the target areas, encamp at the choice place to make the best of the firepower.
vi. Block the outskirts of Gwangju and the roads to the neighboring areas.
vii. Execute infiltration operation at the specified target in stealth. (Extra plan)
viii. Keep going on to recover the arms seized by the rioters and execute pacification operation.
(3) Other neighboring areas
i. Operation zones
1) The 31st division take charge in Jeonnam province except Gwangju.
2) The 35th Division take charge in Jeonbug province.
ii. Execute the operation under the direction of the commanders of the army in the area where the assigned or training forces are. Other areas where there is no troops execute the operation under the direction of the chief of the police individually.
iii. Targets to be secured in the zone
1) The penitentiary should be secured.
2) Others are to be secured according to the priority.
iv. Keep blocking the traffics as well as the main roads.
v. Provide an extra air mobile strike units.
2.7.3.2. The 20th Division
(1) Replenishment
Tank: 18, APC: nine, 500MD for commanding use: one, UH-1H: three, Cobra: two, vehicle: 40.
(2) Execute the operation "loyalty" in the operation zone in conformity with the order.
(3) Prepare to command the attached airborne units in conformity with the order.
2.7.3.3. 31th Division
(1) Replenishment
Tank: six, APC: three, 500MD for the commanding use : one, UH-1H: one.
(2) Execute the operation "loyalty" in the operation zone in conformity with the order.
(3) Keep going on to execute the operation "loyalty" in the Jeonnam province except Gwangju.
2.7.3.4. 35th Division
(1) Replenishment
Tanks:10, 500MD for the commanding use: one.
(2) Keep going on to execute the operation "loyalty" in the Jeonbug province.
2.7.3.5. Infantry School
(1) Of the three tanks replenished, hand over two to the 20th Division as soon as the operation "loyalty" begin.
(2) Keep going on to carry out the present task and block the outskirts of the city.
2.7.3.6. Artillery School
(1) Keep going on to carry out the present task and block the outskirts of the city.
2.7.3.7. Armor School
(1) Replenish 15 tanks to the 20th Division.
(2) Replenish six tanks to the 31th Division.
(3) Redeploy three tanks at the Infantry School (in front of Army Hospital) to the 31th Division.
(7) Keep going on to carry out the present task and block the outskirts as the transparency designates.
2.7.3.8. Commanders of the 3rd, 7th, and 11th airborne Brigades
(1) Gather at the airdrome and set the equipments in good condition.
(2) Execute the tasks the CTC took in charge, while preparing mobile striking in conformity with the order.
2.7.3.9. Reserved Forces
(1) The airborne Brigades 3
(2) The airborne Brigades 7
(3) The airborne Brigades 11
(4) Be prepared to be assigned to the divisions 20, and 31 in conformity with the order.
2.7.3.10. Operation Guide
(1) This operation will be named "loyalty" (i.e., loyalty)
(2) Apply the principles of urban warfare in executing the operation.
(3) When carrying out the mission at the basement, attack after nullifying the enemy with gas bombs.
(4) When engaged in the battle, point muzzle at the lower part of the belly if possible.
(5) Tanks and APCs will be supplemented at the demand of the commander of the unit posted and the attached force should be submitted to the direction of the commander from the very moment.
(6) Do best to preserve the secret and do not use wirelesses. Codify the wire communication. Authorized personnel only are recommended to develop the operational plans.
(7) Pay heed not to inflict any harm on the innocent people.
(8) Prevent accidental clash between the our forces by designating, for example, a neutral zone or limiting the operation line in advance.
(9) Avoid executing operations on the state roads only. Attack the branch road sometimes. Or attack the both roads alternately.
(10) The commander of the units blocking the outskirts of the city and the commanders of the divisions 20, 31 have to execute the operation in close cooperation.
(11) When the operation necessitate reinforcement report and ask it.
(12) Mark our forces in advance to prevent clash among us. (Refer to the communications material.)
(13) This operation will be executed in conformity with the order. (To be delivered at D-day H-hour.)
2.7.4. Administration and Logistics: Refer to the related regulations.
2.7.5. Command system and Communications
2.7.5.1. Communications: Refer the supplementary material "A" (Communications material distributed already as part of the operation "loyalty" will do.).
2.7.5.2. Commanding System
(1) Commanding offices of the CTH: the present location.
(2) Commanding offices of the attached units are to be reported after being assigned at the operation zone. So Jun-yeol (the major general of the CTH) and Bag Nam-i (the leading operations staff, colonel) are to receive and notify the report.
Appendix
2.8. Operations in Detail in Different Areas
2.8.1. The Provincial Hall
2.8.1.1. Date: 04:10, May 27, 1980
2.8.1.2. Location: Jeonnam Provincial Hall in Gwangju
2.8.1.3. Operation units: The 11st Battalion of the 3rd airborne Brigade (Operation zone #1).
2.8.1.4. Synopsis
At the time and the date mentioned above our operation units marched into the road bend leading to the backdoor of the Provincial Hall building. The battalions attempted to go over the wall (about 2.5 meters high), when we discovered the night-watch team of the rioters were moving on the road to the Jeonnam National University Hospital in a captured truck. We hid for a moment and started to go over the wall moments later. At the moment CAR machine gun started to fire at us not only at the rooftop of the main building of the Provincial Hall and the backdoor, but at every floors of the building. The rioters at the rooftop of the Jeon-il building, Sangmu Hall, and the rooftop of the Gwangju Police Station also started to fire to support. In the process two were severely wounded (one in the throat, and the other shot through the leg). Despite the Casualties the forces kept the operation go on according to the original plan. The results are as follows. The 1st battalion succeeded in securing the backdoor; the 2nd battalion rushed into the second floor of the building; the 3rd battalion began to checkup the first floor; the 4th battalion reinforced the ammunitions and the backdoor; the airborne company got hold of the ammunitions; the 11st battalion secured the front gate at 05:10. Thus the rioters were disarmed completely.
- Countermeasures
Despite concentrated firing at the wall (two got injured at the scene) the units occupied the Provincial Hall and killed 13, and arrested 200, and seized 300 rifles, 15 wirelesses, and considerable amount of TNT.
2.8.2. Battle at the YWCA
2.8.2.1. Date: 04:40, May 27, 1980
2.8.2.2. Location: YWCA building
2.8.2.3. Operation units: The Company 4 of the 61st Battalion of the 11th airborne Brigade
2.8.2.4. Synopsis
At the time and date mentioned above, the moment when the operation unit was just about to move around the Jeon-il building to reinforce the unit at the Provincial Hall, four of the rioters who were posted with rifles at the window of the second floor of the building shot at us all of a sudden and one of us was shot through in the shoulder while shooting back behind the postbox which was at the back of the Jeon-il building. Another soldier also was shot through in the leg at the same spot while shooting back after taking the place of the wounded.
- Countermeasures
The commander, after the two got injured, attempted to persuade saying, "Drop the gun and give up! The martial law army do not shoot!" The rioters, however, kept shooting. The commander consequently shot three M203s at the window where the rioters are, and let the two squads detour the spot and broke into the second floor with the help of anchors. The squads killed two rioters, arrested 29, and seized 31 carbines and recovered 1,500 ammunitions.
2.8.3. Operation Units Got Surprise-Attacked
2.8.3.1. Date: 16:00, May 21, 1980
2.8.3.2. Location: On the road to Hwasun
2.8.3.3. Operation units: The 35th battalion of the 7th airborne Brigade
2.8.3.4. Synopsis
At the time and date mentioned above the operation units, on the way to Hwasun by 30 vehicles, got fired from the houses both sides the road. During the time-span while moving four kilometers, a paratrooper was killed in action, six were injured, and one was disappeared. Besides three vehicles turned upside down.
- Countermeasures
To reduce the casualties that might be inflicted on us if we shoot back at them, the unit moved to Junam village (four kilometers south from Gwangju) leaving the cars damaged and a driver. The disappeared driver found killed in action later. (Refer to the photo.)
2.8.4. The Surprise Attack by Ambushed Rioters
2.8.4.1. Date: 02:30, May 27, 1980
2.8.4.2. Location: Weolsan-dong, Gwangju, Jeonnam
2.8.4.3. Synopsis
At the time and date mentioned above, the operation unit of two platoons were moving on to the operation area, Gwangju Park, on along the road of two meters of width in secret. But, suddenly, 15 ambushed rioters began to shoot at us and killed one, and wounded three at the place.
2.8.4.4. Countermeasures
We hid immediately and shot back. After killing two of the rioters we moved on to the operation area to get at the operation zone on time.
- Characteristics
* We have arrested a squad of seven including the leader.
* They found to have organized the mobile strike forces and they have certificates (half the size of A4) of their own.
* They were carrying a license (half the size of A4) to drive the car which was issued by the Citizens' Settlement Committee.
* We killed the person who fired about 24 shots at the helicopter.
* They broke chairs, tables, and windows in the school.
* Civilians were uncooperative while we're patrolling.
* They hid themselves under floors or in water-tanks for fear of retaliation.
2.8.5. The Mopping-Up Operation of the Provincial Hall
2.8.5.1. Date: 03:30-06:30, May 27, 1980
2.8.5.2. Location: The Provincial Hall
2.8.5.3. Operation Unit:
2.8.5.4. Synopsis
The operation unit started to move at 03:30 May 27 from Sotae-dong and passed on over the PL*1 line at 04:30 and kept moving on. While moving on the unit was attacked by the rioters who were ambushed at the rooftop of the Jeonnam National University Hospital building and the Joseon University Hospital building (two to three gun shots). The commander of the company ordered to hide into the building immediately. And after that posted snipers to shoot back while the company was moving on to the target. As the rioters kept shooting at, the commander of the battalion dictated company 3 to cover the company 1. The company 1, under the covers along the road in Hag-1-dong, moved rapidly and attempted to enjoin the 3rd airborne brigade who had infiltrated into the Provincial Hall at 05:25. The commander of the company decided to go into from the flank over the stone-wall of the building because of the violent resistance of the rioters who were encamped in front of the Provincial Hall. In this way part of the company were ordered to contain the rioters in front while most of the company side-stepped the rioters and attacked at the flank. The company killed the resisting rioters in the encampment and enjoined the 3rd airborne brigade. After that they started to search out the rioters who ran away into the building. Before the search, the forces persuaded the rioters to drop the arms and surrender as part of the psychological tactics of pacification. But the rioters resisted to the end shooting. The army killed resisting rioters at the second floor and got hold of the building at 06:30.
2.8.5.5. Achievement: Killed one rioter and arrested 156.
2.8.5.6. Casualties: None.
2.8.5.7. Map
2.8.5.8. Breakage
* Vehicles of the army: three trucks of 2.1/2 tonnage and five trucks of 1/4 tonnage.
* Vehicles of the civilian: three buses and six cars.
* Vehicles of the police: three police cars.
* Lots of arms of the reservation army: 100 of 1,800 M1s got broken. 50 of 500 carbines got broken. 10 air rifles got broken.
2.8.6. Army Hospital Operation
2.8.6.1. Date: 17:00-18:00, May 22, 1980
2.8.6.2. Operation units: The 2nd battalion of the 62 Regiment of the 20th Division (Infantry)
2.8.6.3. Location: Around the road in front of Armed Forces Hospital in Gwangju
2.8.6.4. Synopsis
This is the record of the operation at the time and date mentioned above. The operation unit was assigned at 18:00 May 21, 1980 to the area to prevent the rioters from moving toward Songjeong-li and threatening the army in and around the CTH. The unit was in confrontation with rioters for 24 hours at that time. The unit was strong enough to disarm the rioters as soon as they were assigned to the area. However the neighboring places were composed of private houses and the circumstance made it impossible not to inflict harms to the civilians if operation executed. So the army tried to persuade the rioters to dissolve, only to fail. Especially as the number of wounded people--both army and civilian--began to increase, the situation grew worse so much as it's impossible to send wounded people to the hospital, but to treat the army personnel. This all the more necessitated immediate securing of the hospital. The same operation unit started to move followed by tanks in three subdivided units at 17:00 and made it clear from the very first that the forces are to secure the hospital only and not to march into the city. The rioters, however, didn't hear and kept firing at the forces. As number of soldiers got wounded, the commander ordered to shot back immediately and soon the battle broke out. It took about an hour for the units to went forward about 600 meters because of violent resistance of the rioters. The operation units, however, occupied Armed Forces Hospital and scattered the rioters back to about Dolgogae Pass in the city at about 18:00. The operation gave a stimulus to the fighting spirit of the armed forces and appraised as the most significant urban warfare.
2.8.6.5. Achievement: Killed three, injured 10, and arrested 25
2.8.6.6. Casualties: one killed in action, injured four.
2.8.7. Battle at the blockade on the state road between Gwangju and Mogpo
2.8.7.1. Date: 20:30 May 21, 1980.
2.8.7.2. Operation units: The 2nd battalion of the 61st regiment of the 20th Division (Infantry)
2.8.7.3. Location: Around Hyocheon Train Station on the road between Gwangju and Mogpo (OP0786 on grid)
2.8.7.4. Synopsis
At the time and date mentioned above, the same operation units arrived at the road of 4 lanes at about 20:00 and prepared to lay ambush. About half the barricade were raised on the road when the rioters in six buses started to shoot at the forces rushing in full speed toward Gwangju from the direction of Mogpo. Three buses passed through the barricade and one of the ranks got wounded at the moment and the unit shot back at them in a body and severe battle ensued accordingly. Consequently the unit was confronted with the remnant rioters contained. And two vehicles of the rioters turned upside down after got hit in the tires at the place. The commander of the same unit ordered cease fire to reduce the loss to the minimum. The rioters in and around Gwangju informed of the loss and gathered to approach again in two buses to the area to rescue the injured firing at the unit. But the unit did not shoot back and just defended the encampment. This is to induce for the rioters to rescue the injured and to slip away by themselves. Among the rioters were about 30 to 40 women. For this reason the unit avoided battle. The unit, however, scattered successfully the rioters with lots of arms and ammunitions from Mogpo.
2.8.7.5. Achievement: Killed three, arrested four, recovered 16 guns and 500 ammunitions.
2.8.7.6. Casualties: Two wounded.
2.8.8. Battle at Gyerim Elementary School
2.8.8.1. Date: 03:20-07:30, May 27, 1980
2.8.8.2. Location: Gyerim Elementary School, Gwangju High School
2.8.8.3. Operation units: Companies 6, 8 of the 2nd Battalion of the 62 Regiment of the 20th Division (Infantry)
2.8.8.4. Achievement: Killed one, arrested 15.
2.8.8.5. Casualties: one KIA
2.8.8.6. Characteristics
* We have arrested a squad of seven including the leader.
* They found to have organized the mobile strike forces and they have certificates (half the size of A4) of their own.
* They were carrying a license (half the size of A4) to drive the car which was issued by the Citizens' Settlement Committee.
* We killed the person who assumed to have fired about 24 shots at the helicopter.
* They broke chairs, tables, and windows of the school..
* Civilians were uncooperative while we're patrolling.
* They hid themselves under the floor or in the water-tank for fear of retaliation.
2.8.8.7. Synopsis
The same operation unit was on the move, started from Gwangju Penitentiary at 03:20 May 27, and passed over PL*1 line at 04:30. At that time the 6th battalion passed by Gyerim Elementary School and the rear of the 8th battalion was about to pass, when the 10 rioters ambushed at the school started to shoot at the forces. The commander of the battalion, considering that the 8th battalion might be threatened in moving, ordered the 6th battalion to stop. And attacked the rioters at the flanks using the backdoor of the school. It took about 10 minutes to quell the rioters. The rioters ran away to the direction of Gwangju High School and enjoined about five rioters who were ambushed at the firing line. They moved into the second floor of the school and keep shooting at the unit hindering the advance of the forces. The commander of the battalion ordered the company 8 to contain the rioters in front while making the company 6 to shoot the enemy at the flanks using the stone-wall of the Gyerim Elementary School as covering. The rioters disappeared into Gyerim-dong at the end of the battle because the guns went out of order and they were clumsy at handling the arms. (The result of interrogation of the arrested rioter.) The commander conducted house-to-house search using the police and defeated the rioters at 07:30 completely.
Part III. Who is responsible for the shooting in Gwangju?
by Jong-yeol Bag, Reporter of Dong-a Ilbo
"I was arrested and forced to retire with the false accusation of treason, mutiny to the military command and that I was responsible all the atrocities of the Gwangju Uprising. The real reason of the arrest and the forced retirement was because I did not follow the order to suppress with force the peaceful demonstration in Gwangju. In 1981 I ran for the general election in order to restore the honor of the Gwangju citizens, but I was arrested again and tortured to give up running for the election. My house was fire-bombed at night on August 8th last year when I was inaugurated as a vice chair of the Association of Democratic Movement. In the recent election of 1985, my oldest son was arrested while distributing the news of Gim Daejung's visit to Gwangju. He was tortured so severely that the bone of his neck was broken and he is now hospitalized unable to move."
On July 5, in the 13th National Assembly, Assemblyman Jeong Ung continued to talk after declaring that the Gwangju Incident was instigated by the generals as one of the conspiracies of the military group to take over the government. "I declare to the world that Gwangju Uprising is the righteous uprising in which people fought and lost their lives for the democracy of this country despite the atrocities of the military dictators."
In this assembly meeting, the debate on Gwangju continued for 12 hours with sequence of quarrel between two parties over the copies of the address of Assemblyman Jeong. Meantime, Jeong spoke on, "I came to this National Assembly to accuse the criminals who killed the people in Gwangju, restore the honor of the victims, and open the road to democracy of this Nation." Assemblyman Jeong described the Gwangju incident while the dispute continued between representatives of Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and Peace and Democracy Party (PDP).
The dispute on the person responsible for the order to fire to the people continued by the PDP which censured that Mr. O Jabog, Minister of Defense for perjury. PDP assemblymen distributed to the press a five page memo on the perjury, which asserted that Mr. O gave clearly incorrect answers to the Assembly by saying that
- There was no discussion on establishing the National Security Council in the Military Commander's General Meeting.
- Mr. Jeong Hoyong, Special Operations Commander, did not say "Wipe out all the demonstrators."
- Mr. Jeong Hoyong did not order to fire in the Gwangju air base.
- Mr. Jeong Ung, commander of the 31st division, proposed the shooting.
- Mr. Jeong Ung withdrew from the election at the advice of the senior officers.
The memo by the PDP was accompanied by evidences, direct and contextual.
The dispute between DJP and PDP
The PDP became certain of the perjury of Minister O after the analysis of the book by Cheon Geumseong, whose book was published to provide the rationale the coup d'etat of the power-mongering generals. The PDP said that the book contains plenty of helpful descriptions of the facts regarding the Gwangju incident.
Immediately after the assertion of the PDP on the perjury of Minister O, the DJP Gwangju Committee chair I Minseob declared that they had the evidence that Assemblyman Jeong proposed the shooting and it would be disclosed in the session of the committee. They asserted that no fact is factual with evidence. Another committee member said that Assemblyman Jeong Hoyong will also appear in the committee to give witness's account along with others. They asserted that they would dominate the Gwangju Committee though they might not be able to do so in the Fifth Republic's Corruption Committee.
Most of the issues of the Gwangju Incident have already been raised. Once the hearing begins, the government side might be obliged to disclose more hidden documents to protect those who got involved even though there is a limit of the objective credibility of the documents. It depends on the committee whether we can get closer to the truth of Gwangju.
This article deals with the issues which have been raised by Assemblyman Jeong Ung, Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil who appeared to the podium in place of Assemblyman Jeong Hoyong, Minister of Defense O Jabog, and Commander So Jun-yeol of the then Jeonla Province Martial Law command.
Conspiracy of Establishing the National Security Council
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: Right before Gwangju Uprising, Jeon Duhwan and his clique completed to position soldiers at Gwangju before martial law was proclaimed with a clear objective of the political gain. The very day Jeong Hoyong, commander of the Special Operations Command proposed to proclaim martial law and establishing the National Security Committee. In addition they took an oath and signature from commanders on May 17 at 10 PM, which is two hours before the martial law was proclaimed. Many democratic activists including Gim Daejung, current president of the PDP were arrested as dangerous elements of the society. At 4 PM, May 18, special operations units, which were previously stationed in Gwangju were ordered to disperse the demonstrators as if they were armed infiltrators from the communist North. On May 31, 1980, National Security Committee was established, and on August 16 Choe Gyuha was forcefully retired. On August 27 Jeon Duhwan was inaugurated as the President. With these facts in consideration, Gwangju Uprising was used by the coup d'etat leaders to install Jeon Duhwan as the President and his group members to important positions in the government. It is clear that they knew that the Gim Daejung's arrest should give rise to demonstration in Gwangju. The press mislead readers to believe that the democratic dissidents and activists as communists and the demonstration as a riot. So they used army that is suppose to guard the people to suppress these riot in the name of national security.
General O Jabog answers: Armed Forces Commanders' General Meeting was held on May 17 and not May 16. From 10:00 to 15:00 May 17, 44 major commanders of army, air force, and navy gathered at the Ministry of Defense in the form of Martial Law commanders since the martial law was in effect at that time. The issues of the meeting were mostly on the serious activity of the North, and on the domestic security issue. All participants were asked to give their own opinions as to how the army should react. The conclusion of meeting was to extend the local martial law into a nation-wide martial law to ensure the national security. However, there was no talk on the establishment of National Security Committee. So it is not true that all participants gave their oath to it. The meeting was chaired by Ju Yeongbog, Minister of Defense, but not by General Jeong Hoyong, the then Special Operations Commander, who was not appropriate to chair the meeting with is his rank.
PDP retorts on July 9: Minister O gave a false response that they held the Armed Forces Commanders' General Meeting on May 17 and not on May 16. He gave false testimony that all he did was to hear opinions from commanders and concluded that local martial law should be extended to nation-wide martial law. The evidences for the false testimony are as follows (October Assassination of President Bag, Dec. 12 Coup by Jeon Duhwan, and Gwangju Incident Vol. 1, 2., Mal May 1988, Monthly Joseon, July 1988, "Interview with General Jang Sabog").
According to these books, in the previous night, Jeong Hoyong, Choe Sangtaeg prepared a proposal the dissolution of the National Assembly, establishment of the National Security Committee, and the expansion of the martial law. But Yu Byeonghyeon the then Joint Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces argued that the dissolution of the National Assembly is a political issue and it is not appropriate for the meeting. There is an allegation that one of the generals talked about the possibility of meticulous planning of the meeting in advance. The attempt of his arrest was dissuaded by Choe Sangtaeg. In this way, the commander's meeting on May 16 approved establishment of the National Security Committee, and the expansion of the martial law, but not the dissolution of the National Assembly. The resolution failed to reach President Choe. So the National Security Committee and the expansion of the martial law were again proposed by the second meeting on May 17 and approved by President Choe. We should acknowledge the validity of these books since they were written long ago without expecting the current controversy.
DJP's response: The General Meeting was held on May 17 but not on May 16. And it was also confirmed that National Security Committee was not considered in this meeting.
The Possibility of Gwangju Incident Planned in Advance
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: An excessive suppression by the army is not the real cause nor the fact of Gwangju Uprising. It was the cause of the death to many patriotic and democratic citizens. The soldiers, however, only followed the orders of the officers. Nor was Gwangju Uprising not caused by Gim Daejung, the president of the PDP. He did not instigate the students of Joseon University and Jeonnam National University for political gain. Nor was it instigated by spies from North Korea, who would have influenced the mob psychology of Gwangju citizens against the martial law. Every Korean knows that it was manipulated by the power-hungry generals, who seized the power of the government after the December 12 coup to acquire the presidentship.
Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: At the May 17 martial law extension, is it a fact that martial army were positioned in all major cities including Jeonju and Seoul? Why is it that in other cities the demonstration was suppressed but not in Gwangju and some parts of Jeonnam region? Who do you think is responsible for this?
Minister of Defense O Jabog: After the May 17 martial law extension, 25,000 soldiers were positioned near 167 major facilities including 31 universities around the nation. After that measure, nationwide demonstration was subdued but in Gwangju and Jeonnam region, where the arrest of Mr. Gim Daejung upsetted and frustrated people especially the followers of Mr. Gim. In addition, the accidental collision in front of the main gate of Jeonnam National University on May 18 made the incident flare up. The small number of martial soldiers armed with only clubs were not strong enough to face the large number of the students, so the method of suppression became comparatively forceful, which made the resistance of students radical. In addition, people were upsetted by vicious rumors based on regionalism such as "Soldiers from Gyeongsang province killed hundreds of students, trying to exterminate the population of Jeonla province," "Martial army even cut out the breasts of women," or "Martial army cut the belly of a pregnant woman to take a fetus and throw it away to the street." The accidental encounter in the confusing situation does not make it possible to find a fault in one side but both sides are responsible. If we try to find a liability in the side of the army, it is upon the 31th division commander from May 17 to 21 and upon the Regional Martial Law Commander from May 22 to May 27.
The possibility of Gwangju Incident planned in advance by the martial army's side and the rumors radicalizing the incident would be major issues in the Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement. Gu Yongsang, the then Gwangju mayor, who appeared in the National Reconciliation Committee as a witness last February 8, took the rumors as one of the causes of the incidents, saying, "The excessively radical way of the early suppression angered many citizens and it also upsetted many students. In addition rumors stimulating regionalism made the situation worse." Ministry of National Defense in their report "Gwangju Incident Report" on June 1985 said, "Rumors forged by dangerous elements stimulated regionalism and alienated citizens and the army. It caused incendiaries, destruction and murders. Finally armed riot made Gwangju city in chaos and made it anarchy."
Rampant Rumors
The statement of the Ministry of Defence asserts that the crucial causes of deteriorating the incident, and that the group responsible for the rumors were already clearly known to the public by the judiciary process. Though it does not point to Mr. Gim Daejung as the group responsible for the rumors, it is clear that it is Mr. Gim and his faction based on the context of the statement. The Ministry of Defense considers the rumors as the causes of the incident with the following conclusion. "The nine days of the incident was initiated by the stone throwing by students and by the conflict with the martial army. It was worsened to the uncontrollable level by a group which skillfully manipulated rumors."
PDP's document "The fact of the Gwangju Uprising" published on Dec. 14, 1987 also reports that some of the abusive languages which low-level army officers used to the knelt-down student demonstrators in Gyeongsang accent were transferred from one person to others such as "We will kill all the Jeonra people," or "There will be no more people alive in this region."
The book by Cheon Geumseong also wrote a lot about the rumors. "On May 18, Special Operations Commander Jeong Hoyong received a report from Major Gen. Sin Usig, commander of the 7th Airborne Brigade that the demonstration of Gwangju is getting intense. He boarded C54 plane especially arranged for him, after he ordered Major General Choe Sechang, commander of the 3rd Airborne Brigade to be ready for the possibility to go to Gwangju as martial army. Lieut. General Jeong and Lieut. General No took charge of the 7th and 9th Airborne Brigades respectively for two years since they were created.... Commander Jeong arrived in Gwangju, and get the briefing from the commander of the 7th Airborne Brigade, and then met with General Yun Heungjeong, CAC commander and Associate commander Gim Giseog.
"The situation develops into what we did not expected," said General Yun.
"Seoul also agreed with you. We cannot stay this if the riot continues even after the martial law extension. The martial army should show its determination at the beginning to suppress the will of the multitude," answered Commander Jeong.
"However, in the chief administrators' meeting of the local government organizations most of the participants thought that the demonstration of students and the citizens were legitimate," added General Yun.
"It is opposite to what I expected," answered General Jeong. "I was reported of the situation during the Busan-Masan Incident. At the time, all the chief administrators said that we should break the legs of the demonstrators whatever the cause might be." He added, "I heard that there are strange rumors rampant." To this commend, an information office of the CAC began to read the list of rumors to the three generals.
"Soldiers from Gyeongsang province killed people regardless of gender, and that's why there are so many casualties...."
"What did you say?" Commander Jeong, who is from Gyeongsang province, was surprised and asked, "What? Isn't it designating me?"
"That is why it is a rumor." General Gim answered.
"It is a surprising rumor. It will be effective to raise the regionalism."
The information officer continued to read the note. "On May 18, 40 were killed, making the Geumnam Street a sea of blood. The paratroopers stabbed boys and girls with bayonets and they forced them to be only in the bras and panties on."
"Stop, stop." General Jeong forced him to stop reading. "I feel shameful to be in the uniform." General Yun also became serious, who had been to West Germany and Taiwan as military attache, served as a representative of Korea at the military armistice committee, and served as a chief justice at the court on the October Assassination of President Bag.
"This is a creation of the communist spies, which is so mean..." Commander Jeong went to the Ministry of Defense in Seoul. In the ministry continued a meeting by Minister Ju Yeongbog, Martial Army Commander I Huiseong, Armed Forces Security Commander and acting KCIA director Jeon Duhwan and other high ranking military officers. Commander Jeong briefly reported on the Gwangju incident. "It is not going to be calm down soon. The feeling of the citizens got deteriorated by rumors. We need to increase the strength of the martial army as soon as possible."
"Seoul also has some sporadic demonstration." Commander I said.
"There will be no more expansion of demonstration in Seoul. However Gwangju will develop more seriously if left as it is now. The situation of the North puppet is not usual. I already ordered the 3rd Airborne Brigade to be ready to move. However I will send the 1st Airborne Brigade at the same time."
"Let's send the 20th Infantry Division to make the strength of our side more overwhelming," said General Jeon. He also added. "But avoid any extreme conflict."
The 11th Airborne Brigade came to Gwangju at the order of commander Jeong, Two battalions were stationed in Jeonnam National University and another two in Joseon University (October Assassination, December 12 Coup, and Gwangju Incident).
Even though the government insisted that the rumor was systematically created and spread by a group of dangerous elements, we should not disregard the comments of a veteran newspaper reporter of Gwangju who covered the incident: "It came from the lack of communication and the social tension. The social tension derived from the lack of correct information which was enforced by censorship. Under the Martial Law, all the news were completely distorted and reduced by the hands of press officers. The national news was so much different from the fact which Gwangju citizens experienced and witnessed that they did not believe any announcement of the Martial Law HQ. The disbelief was aggravated by the disruption of phone and regular broadcasting, and they were eager to accept any information." He also witnessed, "The TV news reported that the number of killed was one to two even though ten or more were killed. Its natural consequence was to burn the TV stations." He also insisted that the Gwangju Committee should clarify who was responsible for the distortion of news in addition to the development of situation, and the announcement by the Martial Law HQ.
The Last Operation Order at the Gwangju Airport
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: Special Operations Commander Jeong Hoyong, while staying in Gwangju, asked Military Security Commander Jeon Duhwan, Defense Minister Ju Yeongbog, and Martial Law Commander I Huiseong for the reinforcement of three airborne battalion strength of 1500 from the 11th Airborne Brigade on May 18, reinforcement of the 20th Infantry Division on May 21, and the last invasion on May 25. He got the permission on all his request.
On May 26, 1980, he gave his order to only the 20 Infantry Division Commander and three airborne brigade commanders, excluding me who was a regional division commander. Special Operations Commander Jeong Hoyong was the real commander and moderator of the operation with all the relevant power and influence even though formerly he was not in the position to command. It is just like Military Security Commander Jeon Duhwan took control of all the government branches though he was not visible to the public. I wonder how it was possible for Special Operations Commander Jeong Hoyong to exclude me at the time of giving the order on the last operation. I suppose that he excluded me because the operation was not appropriate to be disclosed.
Minister O Jabog: At the time, the commanding line is ordered from Martial Army commander, to the second Army district martial law commander, and to the Jeonnam and Jeonbug regional martial law commander. And Special Operations Commander Jeong Hoyong was not included in the line. It is not correct that Special Operations Commander Jeong Hoyong gave the order on the last operation. It is not correct either that he gave orders only to the three airborne brigade commanders. The order was given at the CAC operation room by Regional Martial Law commander So Jun-yeol.
PDP's response: Documents including the book written by Cheon Geumseong give the situation in detail: at 11:00 May 26, 1980, Mr. Jeong and Mr. So went to the Armed Forces Security Command to meet and ask Mr. Jeon Duhwan and Mr. Baeg Untaeg for the order of operation. Going out of the command both Mr. Jeong and Mr. So promised, saying, "We will be responsible and get rid of them." Then in the afternoon of the same day they summoned the 20th Infantry Div. Commander and the three Airborne Brigades Commanders excluding the 30th Division Commander to give operation order. This account was well recorded in the above-mentioned documents.
DJP's response: It is not true that Mr. Jeong Hoyong gave the last order of operation to suppress the demonstration. The order was already given before General So arrived at the Airport. General So found that the units were ready to move, and he asked them to be careful for the citizens. The PDP asserted that on May 26 General So Jun-yeol and General Jeong Hoyong went to Seoul to ask Armed Forces Security Commander Jeon Duhwan and Seoul Defense Commander No Tae-u to give the order of operation. But it is not true. Mr. So did not go to Seoul on that day.
Reporter's description: So Jun-yeol, the current president of the Veteran's Association and the then CAC Commander and Regional Martial Law Commander, told me that he did not go to Seoul since he came to Gwangju at 4:30 pm on May 21 when he was ordered to work in Gwangju at 1:30 PM on the same date. When I asked Mr. Cheon Geumsong on this matter, he said, "I got my information through interviews with Army Chief of Staff Jeong Hoyong, the current Armed Forces Security Commander No Tae-u and Infantry Division Commander Baeg Untaeg. I might have incorrect information on General So's trip to Seoul because I did not meet with him personally."
General So, when asked about the order from SOCOM Commander Jeong Hoyong, added that he devised and ordered all the operation, saying, "I had a strategic meeting at 2:00 PM on May 26. In this meeting we planned to form three task forces of 30 each to invade the Provincial Hall, Jeon-il Building, and Sajig Park. The meeting was held in a hangar of the Gwangju Air Base, where the 20th Infantry Division Commander Bag Junbyeong was present." He said that the same witness was also given to the National Reconciliation Committee in last February. When asked about General Jeong Hoyong's presence in the meeting, General So simply responded that he came to the location from Seoul at night in his memory. The fact of SOCOM Commander Jeong Hoyong's presence in the meeting and his final order on the operation depends on General So's testimony.
The "Get rid of them all" Remark at the Prime Minister's Visit to Gwangju
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: When Prime Minister Bag Chunghun participated in the joint meeting of Armed Forces Commanders and the high ranking local public officials, General Jeong Hoyong did not hesitate to say, "We have to show the Gwangju guys what we really are. We have to get rid of them all." It was a principal code of operation from the Special Operations Commander to the martial armies. He also dispatched airborne units to Gwangju after confidently remarking in the Army HQs in Seoul that one Airborne Brigade can suppress any demonstration which might take place in Gwangju after Gim Daejung's arrest. He is the person who made it possible for the airborne unit to carry out the radial suppression. However, General Jeong Hoyong denied his involvement in Gwangju when he met reporters at his retirement from the job of Minister of Defense.
Minister of Defense O Jabog: General Jeong Hoyong denied that he was absent in the meeting, and the former operation staff General Jang Sabog of the CAC, who were present in the meeting, also said that General Jeong Hoyong was not there.
PDP's response: Minister of Defense O Jabog's denial is based on Lieutenant General Jang Sabog. However, the then 31st Division Commander Jeong Ung, who was seated right beside General Jeong Hoyong, testifies that General Jang Sabog was not in the meeting General Jeong Ung has all the evidences that General Jang's remark is not true.
Who Ordered the Violent Suppression
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: On May 18, the Regional Martial Law Commander So Jun-yeol, who was Lieutenant General and the CAC Commander at the time, easily succeeded in suppressing the demonstration with 1,000 strength of two Airborne Battalions. On May 19, three more Airborne Battalions were dispatched with no consultation with me, and the official reports said that the demonstration was suppressed with minor confrontation. However, the information given by the civilian side showed that there were many casualties, which was confirmed with additional information that the airborne units used the methods exclusively reserved for the communist infiltrators. The suppression procedure was review because it was clearly against the regional division's principle of low intensity suppression even though it might have been routine to the airborne units. However, there was an order that five airborne battalions should be dispatched in addition to the existing five battalions. The total strength reached 5,000, which could have caused casualties of 5,000 to 15,000 in that specific development of the incident. That is the main reason that I made my mind to make a drastic measure, and I held a general unit commanders' strategic meeting, in which I ordered a bloodless suppression on my own decision. It was against the order of the commanding line, on which I should risk a death penalty. As a result the situation got milder even in the presence of strength of 5,000 airborne soldiers. General Jeong Hoyong and General So came to know the reason that there was no fatal strike to the demonstration, and they excluded me from the chain of command and exercised the right of command themselves. Since then, the commands were given in the chain beginning from Martial Law Commander, to Regional Martial Law Commander, and finally to unit commanders. Only soldiers of the 31st Regional Divisions were under my command. When I knew that the soldiers guarding the MBC Broadcasting Station and CBS Broadcasting Station buildings were under danger of being harmed by demonstrators on that afternoon, I ordered them to avoid any confrontation.
Minister of Defense O Jabog: The battle report of the CAC (or Regional Martial Law Command) report shows that the right of command of the airborne brigade was under the 31st division commander until 16:00 on May 21 until when the right of command was completely under the control of the division commander. Only afterwards, the right of command was transferred to General So, who was CAC commander and the regional martial law commander.
PDP's response: Lieutenant General Jeong Ung opposed the violent suppression in May 19 evening, and ordered a bloodless suppression, for which he was abdicated from his right of command at noon, May 20. Even Minister O testified that Jeong was abdicated his command on May 21.
DJP's response: Assemblyman Jeong Ung said that General So witnessed in the National Reconciliation Committee that General Jeong's command was abdicated at 10:00 May 23. However, it was known that General So took over the command at 10:00 on May 22.
Who Ordered to Fire?
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: On May 20 in Gwangju, two hundred taxies demonstrated, and on May 21 some demonstraters used buses to get out of the city. Though the Operation Chief of the Army HQ ordered me to stop them using tanks and armed helicopters, I didn't follow the order since I assumed that it was not right to use the heavily armed units to suppress the demonstration. On May 25, Regional Martial Law Commander General So ordered me to submit a plan to deal with demonstrations, so I submitted my opinion in a document, in which I said that the best way to control the situation is to use a political method instead of a high-handed physical method armed units. From this circumstance, I assume that the order to shoot was determined by Regional Martial Law Commander General Yun Heungjeong and Special Operations Commander General Jeong Hoyong who was participating in the operation after paratroopers asked for permission to shoot. It is also noticeable that May Association of the Injured insisted that the casualty took place on May 20 even though the order of self-defense was given at 18:00 on May 21.
Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: Is it true that during the Gwangju Incident, Regional Division Commander, who commanded operational forces including paratroopers, asked for the permission to open fire and notified the order to open fire to the operating units?
Minister O Jabog: Martial Law Commander's order of self-defense confirmed individuals of the martial army that they had the right to use their weapons in certain situation and that they should follow the guidelines not to abuse the weapons. The use of self-defense was promulgated by Martial Law Commander at 19:30 on May 21, and then it was given to the Regional Martial Law Commander at 20:30 on the same date, and then again to the Head of the 2nd Branch Martial Law Bureau at 10:30 on May 22. The right self-defense was proclaimed to be in effect as of 12:00 on May 22 by the Martial Law Commander.
Documents on the operation show that twelve hundred soldiers were surrounded by more than 100,000 demonstrators, while guarding the Provincial Hall. They were under the danger of being attacked by rifles and armored vehicles and other cars of the armed demonstrators. The order of shooting was proved to be given by an anonymous officer in order to protect his soldiers. This shooting is an individual measure of self-defense justified by Criminal Law Clause 21, and an act of self-defense in unavoidable circumstances while executing the official duties justified by Criminal Law Clause 21. This was a purely individual measure of self-defense, but not a measure following the order of the higher ranking officers.
Regional Martial Law Commander General Yun Heungjeong and Operation Staff General Jang Sabog confirmed me that they got memorandum of unknown number from Regional Division Commander General Jeong Ung asking for the permission to open fire several times, but they did not give the permission. It is also known that Regional Division Commander did not order to open fire to his units.
PDP's response: Minister of Defense O said that he confirmed from the then Regional Martial Law Commander General Yun Heungjeong and operation staff General Jang Sabog that they got unknown number of memorandums for the permission to open fire, even though they did not give the permission.
However, on July 5, 1988, the day when Minister O gave a false witness, he called Assemblyman Jeong Ung and said, "I have never recieved any question about the order of opening fire and I have not received any memorandum on the permission General Jeong Ung to open fire during the Gwangju Uprising." The following circumstances clearly prove that it is false that General Jeong Ung.
- General Jeong Ung opposed the violent suppression of the demonstration on the night of May 19;
- General Jeong Ung was called to the commanders' meeting at Gwangju Airport on May 26. There is no reason not to call him to the meeting if he was cooperative with the so-called reform group of that time to the extent that he asked for the permission to open fire.
- General Jeong Ung was relieved from his position as of June 4, 1980 and was forced to retire on September 30, 1980 even though there was nothing wrong with his personal record.
- On the 11th general election, he was arrested without warrant, tortured and forced to give up his bid for the Assembly.
- He was intimidated and even fire bombed last year when he was appointed as a vice chair for the Association of Democratic Movement.
DJP's response: We will disclose the evidence of General Jeong's Order to open fire in the next Special Committee.
Dispute on the Order to Open Fire
After the DJP disclosed its comment on the shooting, Assemblyman Jeong Ung responded to the question of his memorandum, saying, "I never submitted any memorandum to get the permission to open fire. I do not know if some of my staff submitted that memorandum without my permission." He added that the truth will be found in the committee.
The time and as well as the chain of command will be disputed because both Martial Army and citizens claimed that the other side fired first and their shooting was an act of a self defense.
While Minister of Defense O disclosed that the firing is a self-defense based on the time of fire, the then Martial Law Commander I Huiseong witnessed in his letter submitted to the National Reconciliation Committee. "On May 21 the martial army was placed in the suburban areas to minimize the casualties of both sides, and an appeal was made to the people on the 7:30 national broadcast with a warning of execution of the right of self-defense. The self-defense is based on the martial law clause 15 item 2, and the code of conduct of armed forces personnels clause 233, and police forces code of conduct clause 7, which specify the circumstances in which police and armed forces are allowed to use fire arms.... The execution of the self-defense was given to the lower units as Martial Law commands number 11 as of May 22. The order also asked for their understanding on the unavoidable circumstances."
I Huiseong's testimony does not specify the exact time of shooting. However, Assemblyman Jeong claimed in the previous speech to the National Assembly that the execution of self-defense right of the army was given at 18:00 on May 21. However, May Association of the Injured of the Gwangju Uprising said that they were shot on May 20. So there is a time difference between two assertions regarding the moment of shooting. While answering to the National Assembly, Minister of Defense O also admitted that at 13:30 on May 21 one of the officers fired at the demonstrators as a means of warning. The exact time of shooting will remain a controversy in the Investigation Committee.
It is asserted by several books on the Gwangju Uprising that the first shooting was done at 1:30 May 21 by the martial army. The books include Gwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age, refer to the glossary Operation Order: An Extravagant Leave, and Democratization Movement in the 1980's: Gwangju Uprising Documentation and the First Half of the Decades Diary.
About the Responsibility of 31st Division Commander Jeong Ung
Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: The comment related to Gwangju incident by Assemblyman Jeong Ung seems to be intended to avoid the liability on several matters the Regional Division Commander should be responsible for Gwangju Incident. Who takes the responsibility for local disturbances which took place under the martial law and the public security which was not guaranteed, because hundred kinds of weapons and mobile equipments were robbed. What should have been measured for this commander? I understand, especially, the situation became deteriorated as citizens were getting armed with weapons and bullets of the Reserved Forces which was robbed in Gwangju area. Then who takes the responsibility for the safety of weapons and bullets in Gwangju and Jeonla province. In my opinion, if the commander who couldn't manage weapons and bullets under his control and even had been robbed them, he should be prosecuted. However, who takes the responsibility?
Minister of Defense O Jabog: Regarding the direct command responsibility for the suppression of Gwangju incident, General Jeong Ung was responsible during the period from May 17 to 21, and the Regional Martial Law Commander So Jun-yeol was after the transfer of the right of command. I expect that the matter of responsibility will be cleared at the investigation by the Investigation Committee. of Gwangju Incident.
The primary responsibility of the weapons and bullets of the Reserved Forces lies on the police and the persons in charge of the Reserved Forces units. The secondary responsibility lies on General Jeong Ung, who commanded the martial army in Gwangju area under the martial law. Immediately after the incident, General Jeong Ung was relieved from his position due to his responsibility. In this case, he should have been subjected to trial by courtmartial to clarify his responsibility during his service as a Division Commander. I will ask the then Martial Law Commander General I Huiseong General for his opinion and will give a further response.
DJP's response: We consider the dispute over false testimony raised by Peace Democracy Party as a political ploy to avoid the responsibility of Assemblyman Jeong Ung in the Investigation Committee.
Evaluation of the Military Operation to Suppress Gwangju Incident
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: The military authority still assess the Gwangju operation as a honorable success in the history of the armed forces. Is it really a successful operation even if the armed forces massacred the people? Is this operation a historic one which will be glorified for the history of army?
Minister O Jabog: I do not think that I should repeatedly characterize the Gwangju Incident, its development and the achievement of the military operation at this moment. Gwangju incident itself was the crisis of the nation. Nobody doubts that the army had played a decisive role to protect the country from the crisis. We concluded that the final operation on May 27 was inevitable to immediately settle the situation, because the anarchy prevailed for ten days in the absence of law enforcement to guarantee the security and welfare of the people. I think that we should not diminish the morale nor damage the honor of the armed forces regarding the Gwangju Incident.
Mr. So Jun-yeol testified last February in the National Reconciliation Committee, in which he asserted that he ordered the army not to kill even one citizen because even one victim is our own victim. He remembered that it was the continuance of difficult moments as a commander. General So commented on the doubt of some people regarding the martial army's lack of effort to persuade citizen army before it began its final operation. He said, "Before we began the operation, we did our best through various means including leaflets. It was difficult to fly helicopters because there was a machine gun of caliber 50." He continued, "It is lucky that the final operation made it possible to reduce the casualty. Many people asked me why there was an uncontrollable expansion of the incident. But I was simply in charge of the settlement, and I do not know of much about the previous development."
Cheon Geumseong's book describes the scene touchingly after the suppression operation: "In the morning on May 27, the sun is rising with its full brightness onto the wreckage of Gwangju. Guided by General Jeong Hoyong, Minister of Defense Ju Yeongbog repeatedly said, "I expected more than 500 casualties, and that was the reason that we postponed this operation. I am impressed by this faultless operation!" The national anthem accompanied the national flag being hoisted on the flag stone at the roof of the Provincial Hall, while Minister Ju stood there accompanied by General Jeong Hoyong, General So Jun-yeol, and General Bag Junbyeong (October Assassination, December 12 Coup, and Gwangju Incident).
The Most Outstanding Issue: the Number of the Dead
Assemblyman Gim Jeonggil: "What I heard in the last hearing of National Reconciliation Committee was that the martial army used only M16 guns in the Gwangju Incident, but how people got shot by M1s, carbines, machine guns, and how there were people who were run over by military trucks? What is the number of the victims and why that happened? And among the people who died, how many were civilians, and how many were soldiers and policemen?"
Minister O Jabog: "According to the autopsy report of the people who died in the Gwangju Incident and related data, among the 190 dead people, 163 were civilians, 23 were soldiers, and four were policemen, and the 135 of dead civilians were died from gunshot wounds and four were died from stab wounds, 17 from bruises, and seven from vehicle-related accidents. Among the 135 who died from gunshot wounds, 98 deaths were by carbine rifles and other guns."
Since the martial army was carrying out their duty only using M16 rifles, the 37 deaths by M1s and carbine rifles, which the martial army did not carry at that time, were estimated to be yielded by accidental firings between demonstration groups, by stray bullets which demonstration groups fired, and by collisions between demonstration groups after the demonstrating crowd were armed, and I assume that some people were bruised and injured by vehicle accidents in the process of the demonstrating crowd's violent demonstration and their disorderly operation of the vehicles that they snatched from others.
On the other hand, the number of the dead seems to be the most outstanding issue in the debate of the Gwangju Hearing Committee, because the viewpoints of the government and the opposition side are far apart.
In the "Truth of the Gwangju Uprising," which was published on December 14 last year, Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) claimed that 1,000 were killed in the Gwangju Uprising, which is smaller figure than the 2,000 deaths that the related organizations of the May Uprising claimed so far, they present the testimony of the U.S. ambassador William Gleysteen for the basis: "In fact, at least more than 1,000 were dead." But up to recent time, the government has maintained firmly the same as Army headquarters officially announced in June, 1980 in the "Truth of the Gwangju Incident," that the number of the dead is less than 200.
However, the victims of the Gwangju Incident including the ones who were injured in the incident regard this government announcement as false one and distrust it, and for the ground of their distrust, they lodge the suspicion to the Gwangju Annual Report, which the Assembly member Mun Jeongsu commented on, the secret burial of the victims and cremation, and testimonies that people are not asked to identify themselves. The victims are sure that the number of people who actually died is bigger than the government announcement says.
Last February in National Reconciliation Committee, I Gwang-yeong, who was wounded in the May Uprising, insisted that
The number of the dead which the government announced only indicates the
ones that were in the morgues of each hospital such as Christian Hospital, Red
Cross Hospital, and Jeonnam National University Hospital. The announcement
did not even include the number of the dead in Armed Forces Hospital and the
huge number of the dead, who loaded away by the martial army trucks is
excluded. Then, Gi Jongdo, who was a garbage man in a district office, was
unexpectedly put in jail and died after the Gwangju Incident, and I directly heard from him that he moved dead people by garbage trucks and he knows where the people are buried.
But So Jun-yeol, the then Regional Martial Law Commander, refuted against I Gwang-yeong's claim in the testimony at National Reconciliation Committee, saying, "According to the result of my thorough investigation, at least the number of the dead is correct as announced after the initial investigation. I give my word to this on my honor. We then accepted reports of disappearance freely, but there was no other report. At that time, the martial army was carrying M16s and the citizens' army carrying M1s and carbines, and after the autopsy of the corpses, it turned out that only 45 were shot dead by M16s."
Meanwhile, O Gugbang testified at the hearing in last July saying that 98 were killed by M16s, and it is also different from So Jun-yeol's testimony. And the previously issued material of the Ministry of Defense showed another difference. "The Truth of Gwangju Incident" reported that after the autopsy of 128 deaths by gunshot wounds, it was confirmed that 29 were killed by M16s, 47 were by machine guns, and 52 were by carbines or M1s.
The number of the dead is different from each material and each testimony: the material of the Ministry of Defense said it's 29; General So Jun-yeol testified in National Reconciliation Committee that it's 45; O Gugbang's reply at National Assembly in last July indicated that the number is 98, and Gwangju citizens are confused by them.
Concerning the matter of the dead, people who are related to the Gwangju Incident still have doubts about the deaths reported after the repression of the demonstration on the last day of the Gwangju Incident (May 27) and about the number of day laborers, career women, and people without relations among the dead. The government enlisted the people who were dead during the Gwangju Incident once again recently, but it is reported that there is not a big change. People are still expecting to hear satisfactory answer for 'the number of the dead' in the next hearing committee, but since eight years have passed already after the incident, it is uncertain how close we can get to the substantial truth.
Particularly, the doubts about the number 2,627, which is recorded in Gwangju Annual Report as dead in June, 1980--Jeong Seogmo, the Minister of Internal Affairs, explained that this was written wrong--is well posed in the statement of the National Committee for Memorial Projects for the Victims of May 18 Gwangju People's Uprising, which retorted the report of Yun Seongmin, the Minister of Defense, on June 7, 1985. We are expecting to have proper explanation for this.
The Intervention of the U.S. and Its Responsibility
Assemblyman Jeong Ung: "I Huiseong, the Martial Law Commander of the day, said that the martial army, which was consisted of the paratroops and the 20th division upon the incident of the Gwangju Uprising, could not be called out without the recognition of the Commander of Korean-American Allied Forces; and the U.S. Department of State agreed to transfer unspecified number of Korean soldiers to subdue the turbulent situation of Korea on May 22; then who is telling the truth? Was the martial army called out after the recognition of the Commander of Korean-American Allied Forces or were they called out without it?"
Minister O Jabog: "The units that were committed to Gwangju at that time were the three paratroops brigades and the 20th division of infantry. According to the strategic directions no. 1 of Korean-American Armed Service Committee of July 28, 1978, the three paratroops brigades submitted to the Special Operations Command usually are not under the controls of Korean-American Allied Forces. Regarding the 20th division, as the right of commanding the military operations of the 20th division was undertaken from the Allied Forces upon the October Assassination of president Bag in 1979 already and the command of military operations of the unit was wholly reverted to Korean army, there shouldn't be any disagreement on that matter between Korea and the United States."
While, on the standpoint with the U.S., the Martial Law Commander I Huiseong told the similar point with Minister O's reply at National Assembly in a written statement:
As the Gwangju incident being deteriorated, the Martial Law Command reinforced two brigades of paratroops additionally and on both May 20 and 21, they dispatched more divisions from somewhere in Gyeonggi province. The division was concentrated in the suburbs of Seoul, not under the command of the Allied Forces Headquarter in Korea, so that it could be used for martial purpose anytime, anywhere. The military force of paratroops can be used without the consent of Allied Forces Headquarters. Therefore, the misunderstanding that the Commander of Allied Forces in Korea supported military force for the purpose of suppressing the Gwangju Incident should be eradicated.
On July 11, Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement with regard to the U.S. involvement in the Gwangju Incident, urged the U.S. to reveal the measure of withdrawing Americans living in Gwangju just before May 18 to the outskirts; and the role of the U.S. government which approved the calling out of troops; frequent contacts between the U.S. authorities and the new military faction on the May 17 declaration of the martial law around May 17. The committee particularly demanded an explanation from the U.S. about its responsibility to the calling out of the 20th division from DMZ: "The 20th division is under the command of the Korean-American Allied Forces Command. On May 22, 1980, the spokesman of the U.S. Department of State announced that the U.S. agreed to the calling out of the 20th division and later Gleysteen asserted same thing, but Lilley, in the recent interview with Dong-a Ilbo, contrarily asserted that the 20th division was reverted to the command of Korean army. Why the utterances of the ambassadors of same country are that different?"
Disclosing the Truth of the Gwangju Uprising, Will that happen?
Since the birth of the Fifth Republic, the Gwangju Incident was commented on for the first time at the budget committee of the 11th session of the National Assembly (November 17, 1983) by the Assemblyman Im Jaejeong (Democratic Korea Party, Northeast district of Gwangju); he demanded historical appreciation of the Gwangju Incident and he raised questions to the government asking whereabouts of 700,000,000 won, which was raised for Gwangju citizens in 1980, but the government completely ignored the questions. Like this, Gwangju was regarded as "sacred precincts" at the 11th session of National Assembly.
At the 12th session of National Assembly in 1985, thanks to the general election on February 12 in which the public consensus displayed its power, New Democratic Party secured 103 seats at the Assembly and rose to the second largest party and at the early part of the session, Assemblymen like I Min-u, Bag Chanjong, Sin Giha mainly discussed about the Gwangju problem, but it was pushed aside in the middle of struggle for party hegemony and by pending problems like amending the constitution for direct election, and it could not make any significant progress, so only the dissidents questioned steadily. The Gwangju Incident was not highlighted in the world of politics until the 13th session of National Assembly of the Sixth Republic convened.
One of the victims of the Gwangju Incident said, "Despite the truth of the Gwangju Uprising should be revealed as it was, there is no one who steps forward to say that he is responsible and to take the blame among the "generals" who were the supreme commanders. The truth of the Gwangju must be one thing, but why it is different each day and each mouth? Who can the people count on? Being incapable of waiting for the government and National Assembly to investigate and reveal the truth, at last, Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement had a press interview at the Christian Hall (Yeonji-dong, Jongro-gu, Seoul) inquiring the commanding system when Gwangju massacre was occurred whether the U.S. intervened in Gwangju massacre; and the background of the Gwangju Uprising.
Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement asserted that the immediate responsibility of Gwangju massacre was on the eight generals such as Jeon Duhwan, No Tae-u, and Bag Junbyeong, who were in the command during the Gwangju massacre, and their doings during the incident should be revealed clearly. The committee urged the government to reveal the proceedings of the meeting that No Tae-u and General Jeong Hoyong decided to extend the Martial Law in the meeting room of the Ministry of Defense on May 16, 1980 and the development of the formation of National Security Committee; and demanded an explanation of the reason deploying paratroops only in Seoul and Gwangju when the Martial Law had enforced on May 17; and it urged the revealing of the doings of Jeong Hoyong the Commander of Special Operations Command of the day, who commanded to fire during the Gwangju Uprising since May 19. Investigation Committee of the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement already announced in the first investigation report on the Gwangju Uprising on June 30 that, for the total investigation of the charges of the people who are related and for the punishment of them, the eight persons who are immediately responsible for Gwangju massacre shouldn't be allowed to leave the country for a time; as soon as these eight persons' charges were clearly revealed, they must resign from their public offices; all the materials on the commanding system in 1980 should be open to the public; and to clarify the matter of the U.S. intervention in Gwangju massacre and to define who's to blame, the materials of the U.S. Department of State embassy in 1980 must be revealed instantly. And the committee claimed that it is inevitable to summon Wickham, the Commander of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea of the day and Ambassador Gleysteen, who were the accomplices of Gwangju massacre and to investigate the case (Voice of People, no. 53., July 7, 1988).
Now, eight years have passed since the Gwangju Incident, and it seems that it's time to reveal the truth of the Gwangju Incident at last. The Gwangju Incident, which was compared to a "nuclear bomb" and regarded as sacred precincts since the birth of the Fifth Republic, is standing in front of us as a flaming "active volcano" to tell us that it is not the issue of yesterday but of today. There is no way to escape from Gwangju.
"So have no fear of them; for nothing is covered up that will not be uncovered, and nothing secret that will not become known. What I say to you in the dark, tell in the light; and what you hear whispered, proclaim form the housetops" (Matthew 10.26-27).
Part IV: Gwangju Incident by Martial Law Command in June, 1980
The violent riot, which had taken place in and around Gwangju
caused by university students' demonstrations from May 18 until May 27 when
it was suppressed, endangered the national security and obstructed the normal
administration of state affairs. In addition, it is an unprecedented tragedy
which provoked unstability and anxiety to the people. Fortunately, the order
and the stability were regained by the effective suppression of the martial
army on May 27. As a martial law commander I hereby give a general description
on the development of the Gwangju incident, and disclose the measures to be
taken as follows.
1. The background and motivation of the incident
The nationwide demonstrations and sitting-in since last March when schools opened after vacation turned into disturbances and violent riot, which subsided down after the extension of the martial law. However, the street demonstration by approximately 200 Jeonnam National University students continued in Gwangju until May 18. The conflict between demonstrators and the police got so volatile that martial army were dispatched to subside the students who violated the martial law. The conflict between the demonstrators and the martial army gave rise to misunderstanding and unimaginable rumors, which worsen the situation. The Gwangju area became the place of lawless disturbance by armed mobs who had seized weapons.
The mass expression of the political development exceeded the reasonable limitation, and the ensuing violence resulted in disruption of law and order of the society such as destruction of properties, looting, incendiaries, and even killing by the so-called citizen army, which instigated resistance and uprising against the government. Even though this incident was a disturbance by a small number of subversive segments of the senseless mobs, it deserves to a serious incident for all the people to regret over and review.
In this regard, I am giving a brief description of the
development of the incident to correct the incorrect understanding on the incident
caused by words of mouth along with some mass media reports. This clarification
would hopefully help not to repeat this tragic incident which had brought about
tremendous national loss.
2. The development of the incident
a. The real fact of the conflict between the army and the demonstrators
The street demonstration which illegally advanced toward the city center by 200 Jeonnam National University students was getting intensified with slogans such as "Repeal the martial law." The number of demonstrators increased to 1,000 at around 2 PM. The situation became uncontrollable for the police to deal with the demonstrators throwing rocks to the police, setting fires on police jeeps.
The martial authority was obliged to dispatch army units to suppress the demonstration with force at around 5:40 PM. The majority of demonstrators were students and they confronted young soldiers with rocks violently. Even some citizens the nearby buildings participated in the violence throwing rocks. The conflict resulted in a number of the wounded in each side. The vigor of the youth of both side, young soldiers and students, exploded into an emotional and verbal insult toward each other. In addition, unimaginable rumors appeared which seemed to have originated from subversive segment of people. Around the whole Gwangju area were the rumors spread which were based on regionalism such "Soldiers from Gyeongsang province were dispatched to sweep away Jeonla province people," or "Soldiers from Gyeongsang province were exclusively selected." They effectively provoked citizens and made the demonstration extremely violent.
These groundless rumors were organized and spread with
the intension of provoking innocent citizens and demonstrators by subversive
segments and the spies to segregate people and to make the situation worse,
disregarding the uncontrollable situation in which the soldiers happened to
make violent suppression in front of citizens while having the demonstrators
arrested or when they were hit by demonstrators.
b. The disturbance process till it is suppressed
On May 19, with the rumors spread more widely around the city, the mass emotion prevailed the whole city, and the some people without proper reasoning and composure staged violent demonstration, setting fires on police stations and police vehicles. More agitating rumors were created and spread every moment. On May 20, 10,000 agitated demonstrators took to the street setting fire on the MBC Broadcasting Station, destroying the City Hall, running over four policemen in front of the Provincial Hall in the process of demonstration.
On May 21, demonstrators burnt down the building of Gwangju Internal Revenue Service. They also set fire on the CBS Broadcasting Station for revenge and seized 200 items of military and civilian vehicles while attacking the Asia Motors factory, a munition factory. The mobs moved toward the Naju area and the Hwasun area and captured TNT bombs, guns and ammunitions to make themselves fully armed. They even carried out five times of attack in one day to the Gwangju Penitentiary, where 2,700 prisoners were held including 170 leftists with the intention to have the prisoners join in the mob. In the course of attack, mobs fought against the martial army who guarded the prison, resulting in numbers of casualties for each side. Gwangju turned into a horrible city with no law and order.
In addition to the street broadcasting which stimulated citizen to participate in the incident, they carefully published bulletins and underground newspapers, nine issues of which were published from May 18 to 26, to promote the destruction of martial army and to request the release of Gim Daejung. To their accomplishment did they attribute the coincidental resignation of the former prime minister Sin Hyeonhwag and his cabinet members in the same date. They spread the rumor saying, "President Choe is going to resign soon." and encouraging mobs and agitating citizens to participate in the demonstration.
On the one hand, the army retreated toward the suburban area on the night of May 21 to avoid an unfortunate result to properties and lives of innocent citizens which might have been inflicted from the conflict with the armed mobs. On the other hand, the army blockaded the city from the outside, concentrating on the suppression of the disturbance in the other areas, and without exercising even the least self-defence measure by the strict order to the martial army not to shoot even one bullet.
On May 22, Gwangju was totally under the control of the armed mobs, and the lawless state continued. Armed mobs exhibited dead bodies in the square in front of the provincial hall, trying to mobilize citizens with the laughable show of a so-called combined funeral. In the meantime, the plunder and looting by the mobs were extremely rampant. Citizens were disillusioned in the process, and the number of citizens participating in the demonstration began to decrease, and the mob largely consisted of gangsters and subversive segments aimed at specific political gains. Students consisted of only 30% of the mob.
However, the mobs drove the city into the state of siege by their extreme riot.
On May 23, some influential people and moderate students organized the Settlement Committee and retrieved weapons and tried to negotiate with the government. However, the committee produced no result due to the conflict with the hard-liners, while the retrieved weapons were seized by the hard-liners, who exhibited bodies of victim as a way to attract citizens who wanted to burn incense for the dead. Particularly on this day, some would-be moderate members of the settlement committee visited the Regional Martial Law Command and asked for the release of arrested demonstrators and the exemption of their responsibility on the one hand. They spreaded rumors such as "More disturbances were taking place in support of Gwangju incident," or "Friendly countries are supposed to support us" around the Gwangju city.
On May 24, the mobs held a citizens rally under the excuse of the consolation ceremony of victim's soul with 15,000 people with the purpose of holding a rally to amass more support to them. After the burning ceremony of a certain person's effigy, however, they postponed the consolation ceremony. While the settlement committee was divided into hard-liners and moderates regarding the ways of settlement, the riot continued.
On May 25, the settlement committee did not make any progress with itself divided into two, while the hard-liners held a rally with 50,000 citizens participating, asking for the release of Gim Daejung and the abolition of the martial law. They also paraded through the downtown area. However, with the participation of citizens decreasing, the mobs tried to boost the morale of the citizens, saying "The martial army can not advance to the city," "Five more days are enough to gain the victory," "The situation has become favorable to us," and "Participate in the citizen army to gain victory."
On May 26, just the day before the martial army advanced and suppressed the riot, hard-liner mobs promptly responded to the changing situation by dispatching task forces to appropriate positions. They also propagandized that the martial army broke the promise and were going to advance to the city center, and that the citizens should be ready for the advance. As a result, at around 3 PM. an estimated 5,000 people gathered and had a protest rally and a street demonstration.
Even though the beginning of this incident is caused by the irrational conflict between the martial army and Jeonnam National University students, a careful review of the development of the incident during the nine-day-period shows that there were systematic control of the development and the tactful manipulation of the citizens from behind into riot. In addition, I want to point that
First, the evidences revealed a manipulation of the incident by spies and some subversive segments who cooperated with spies. It coincided with the result of investigation of I Chang-yong, a spy who landed by the west seashore and infiltrated to Gwangju and then moved to Seoul tried to expand the espionage activities, who was arrested on May 23.
Secondly, the evidences also revealed that Gim Daejung
had controlled students of Jeonnam National University and Joseon University
(mainly students who finished their military service and started school again)
behind the curtain for his hidden political gain. While the situation and the
incident were getting worse, some people who blindly followed Gim worsened the
incident systematically.
c. Major controllers behind the curtain and their activities
Right after the declaration of nationwide martial law at 24:00 on May 17, Jeong Dongnyeon (37, junior student in Chemistry, Jeonnam National University) controlled the demonstration along with other students who came back to the university after military service. They had been controlled to stage demonstration for democracy by Gim Daejung since the middle of April when they met Gim and received "Soul of the National" and "Speech at Hansin and Donggug Universities" written by him. Then they manipulated student council president Bag Gwanhyeon and presidents of colleges to instigate students to bring rocks in their school bags when they came to school. After throwing rocks to the martial army in front of the main gate of Jeonnam National University, students moved to the city center in order to attract the citizens' participation.
Gim In-weon (senior student in Law, Joseon University) met Gim Daejung along with 19 other students before they came back to Gwangju. He instigated I Ujeong (senior student in Korean Literature) through the contact with Yang Huiseung (sophomore student in Politics, representative of Committee of Struggles for Democratization of Joseon University) to lead demonstration with other 12 members of the Committee and to take part in the street demonstration with Jeonnam National University students.
Hong Namsun (a lawyer) met Gim Daejung six times after the October Assassination of President Bag Jeonghui. In the end of April, he procured 50 pieces of subversive political brochures called "List of Convicted of Gim Daejung Incident" and had Gim Ungi (sophomore student in Business, who finished military service) spread them in Joseon University campus. In addition, he controlled and encouraged students from behind. When the mobs conquered the Provincial Hall, he visited the students with hard-line committee members such as priest Gim Singeun under the excuse as a member of the Citizens' Settlement Committee from May 23 to 26. He even gave students 1,000,000 won. He instigated the mobs, saying, "Don't return weapons until your requirements are satisfied," "Five more days of struggle will bring the victory," and "Add some political issues to your requirements."
Gim Jongbae (27, junior student in International Trade) took the position of the so-called Struggle Committee chair. throwing out Gim Weongab (who failed in college entrance exam twice) from the position which Gim Weongab originally had taken in the Provincial Hall since May 21. Gim Jongbae insisted that a university student had to lead the mobs. He appointed Heo Gyujeong (sophomore, Engineering College of Joseon University) as administrative section chief, Jeong Sang-yong (31, sales chief of Boseong Industry) as external section chief, Gim Yeongcheol (33, YWCA credit union) as planning section chief, Bag Namseon (26, truck driver) as information section chief, Yun Seogru (24, ceramic worker) as task force chief, and Gim Junbong (21, a business employer) as a spokesman. With this organization shows that he planned a long-term struggle.
Bag Namseon, information section chief, took the control of the operation in the Provincial Hall on May 23. He and Yun Seogru, task force chief, opposed the plan for returning weapons and ordered the mobs to be armed again. He also ordered to shoot back to the martial army. Furthermore he planned to suicide exploding the tremendous amount of TNT and hand grenade in the Provincial Hall if the situation went wrong. He also planned to continue their struggle until the last moment if their requests are not met.
At around 8:00 PM on May 26, an anonymous man at around
33 of age, who insisted that he was a retired captain, organized a task force
of 50 mobs in the YWCA gymnasium independently from the task force of the Provincial
Hall. He trained his men to handle guns and supplied a number of guns and bullets
in cooperation with information chief Bag Namseon. Then he organized four groups
of 10 or 12 people each, and deployed them at the Provincial Hall, at the entrance
to Mt. Mudeung Villa, in front of the south Gwangju Train Station, and in front
of Gwangju High School. He was arrested, while waiting after finishing his own
preparation to fight against the martial army.
3. Inevitability of suppression by force
The army restrained from exercising the least self-defense measure to prevent common innocent people from being hurt or useless blood from being shed. Even one gun shot was fired to prevent the deterioration of the incident even when soldiers were stabbed to death by the hands of the mobs and when the city turned into lawless chaos by the armed.
In addition, we found that it was not wise to station the martial army inside the city. The army retreated to the suburban area on May 21, and was engaged in blockage exercising an extreme patience while waiting for the effort of citizens to pacify the situation. Furthermore, a statement by Prime Minister Bag Chunghun on May 21, another special statement in the Gwangjuarea by the President on 25th, and another statement by the martial law commander were announced to sincerely ask for the self restraint and restoration of order.
In spite of these efforts, the situation continued to get deteriorated, and the effort by citizens to find a way for settlement went nowhere. The mobs regarded themselves as a citizen army. They even set up encampments around the Mudeung Mountain, Hwasun and other mountainous areas outside the city, getting ready for a long-term guerilla warfare. In the provincial hall, tremendous amount of TNT bombs were loaded for self-destruction. The situation reached the point when the army could not exercise any more patience.
In this critical moment, the martial army succeeded in
removing the fuse of explosives and neutralizing machine guns by one of its
agents who had infiltrated in the mob and a member of the mob who had been persuaded
to cooperate. In the process, one was killed and another was severly wounded.
Even though we paid a dear price for the preliminary operation, we succeeded
in avoiding a tragic damages in each side during the suppression on May 27.
We also tried to minimize the damage to the innocent citizens by classifying
innocent citizens from mobs before the final operation.
Casualties: Killed are 144 civilian, 22 soldiers, and four policemen. Wounded are 127 civilians, 109 soldiers, and 144 policemen.
The civilian casualties were made when heavily armed mobs attacked Gwangju Penitentiary five times from May 20 to 22, using the armored vehicles, trucks and jeeps seized from a defense industry and soldiers. During this conflict, 28 people died and 70 people were wounded at a skirmish between the martial army guarding the prison and the mobs. 32 casualties caused by traffic accidents which happened while the mobs were moving to lead demonstrations and to seize the weapons, and 15 people were killed accidental shooting caused by mobs who were not experienced in dealing with weapons such as guns and hand grenades. 17 mobs were killed while resisting the martial army. Some other casualties were caused by conflict between hard-line and moderate mobs. We expect a further clarification of the casualties will be given as the examination is still in progress. It should be noted that high casualties of the army and the police was a result from the extreme self restraint of the martial army while expecting the demonstrators to exercise their own restraint at the beginning of the incident.
Damages on military ordnance: the mobs seized 5401 items of military supplies including machine guns, light machine guns, automatic rifles, M16s, M1s, Calvin rifles, handguns, etc. during this incident. Now 80% of these seized weapons were retrieved. They seized 289,543 bullets, 552 hand grenades, and 3600 boxes of TNT, 70% of which has been retrieved. They also seized 318 items of trucks and armored vehicles, most of which are not usable being totally destroyed.
Damages on civilian items: it is estimated that the damage would reach 26,000,000,000 won in the civilian side. The amount is expected to rise with more result of the investigation disclosed. Eight public buildings were burnt down including Gwangju Internal Revenue Service. 13 public building were partially damaged, 68 vehicles were burnt or damaged, and other 650 items were burnt.
Eight civilian buildings were burnt down including the
MBC Broadcasting Station along with its broadcasting facilities. 43 additional
buildings were damaged including Gwangju Catholic Center. 381 vehicles, 3000
drums of oil were burnt or consumed. The Asia motors factory, a munition factory,
was given the severest damage with 414 vehicles including 314 military and 82
civilian cars and 18 trains.
5. Arrests and measures to be taken on them
The number of the arrests: Since the violent incident took place in and around Gwangju on May 18, 1740 participants have been under arrest by the martial law authority. 1,100 of them have been released. and 730 are still under examination. 686 are from Jeonnam and 26 are from Seoul. This statistics suggests that there was human input from other areas such as Seoul.
The age of 315 participants are under 20's and 310 are in their 20's, 77 are above 30's, 28 are above 40's, which shows that most of the participants did not experience Korean war.
The occupations of 153 participants are high school or university students (including 24 who will take a university entrance exam), 126 unemployed, 83 factory workers, 79 other laborers, 55 drivers, 47 farmers and merchants, 44 shop keepers, and 37 white color employees, and 59 miscellaneous jobs.
Measures to be taken on them: The extent of this incident is beyond imagination and it should have been impossible without presupposing an existence of an underground group which manipulated this incident from behind. The mobs seized explosives, weapons and ammunitions which can inflict a blood shed to a large number of people. They use the weaponry to manipulate people. In addition, there is a strong possibility of the existence of group controlling the incident from behind. For example, the high level skills in dealing with the explosives, the movement of the martial army being transmitted to the provincial hall monitor room, and instant reactions of the mobs.
Investigation following the suppression reveals that some participants possessed subversive documents and underground newspapers at home. House-search of the subversive participants produced many illegal documents and underground newspapers, Rumors were promptly created and immediately spread to innocent citizens who were manipulated by numerous tactics often blaming the martial army for atrocities they committed. A number of mobs attacked Gwangju Penitentiary five times and set up machine guns nearby and kept shooting with the clear purpose of stimulating an revolt in the prison.
With all the above mentioned crimes in consideration, we
are planning to find out and reveal the group behind the scene. In addition,
we will pick out the murderers, criminals, and radicals to be court-martialed
and to be strictly punished. However, simple participants, sympathizers, and
trivial criminals will be released to resume their business.
6. A request
We believe that there should not be such a tragic incident repeated especially based on regionalism, whatever the reason and the motivation of the incident might have been, or whoever might be responsible.
We admit that the armed forces made mistakes in relation
with the residents during this incident. Accordingly, we are planning to take
appropriate measures. At the same time, we want to show our sincere regret regarding
this matter. Again we want to ask all people to take a lesson from the Gwangju
Incident in overcoming the national crisis.
