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Report on the
CODEP Conference 2001
The economics of war and peace: addressing the dilemmas

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Contents:

CODEP CONFERENCE 2001
Executive Summary

The Conflict, Development and Peace Network (CODEP) hold a major conference every year to promote learning, debate and networking around key issues relating to conflict, peace and development. This year the conference, titled "*The Economics of War and Peace: addressing the dilemmas*", focused on the impact of the global economy on violent conflict and efforts at achieving peace, and the response of civil society at local, regional and international levels. This is an area receiving increasing attention from policymakers, donors, academics and corporations, and the conference provided network members with an opportunity to share the latest thinking, and discuss questions, such as:

- Is globalisation a new phenomenon and, if so, what are its distinctive characteristics?
- What are the implications for the dynamics of war and peace?
- Who are the main actors in initiating, prolonging and resolving intrastate conflicts in a global context, and how to they interrelate?
- To what extent does the 'greed versus grievance' framework help to understand the motivations of these actors?
- What other tools do we have to understand conflict in an increasingly complex, global political economy?
- What are the implications of the above for constructing appropriate policy and programme responses to conflict?

These questions were explored through both keynote speeches by renowned experts in the fields of conflict, peace, globalisation and economics, and a series of workshops, which gave the opportunity for more detailed and focused debate.

Understanding globalisation:
Ankie Hoogvelt, researcher, writer and teacher on the global political economy and development, and *Samir Amin*, Director of the Third World Forum and leading thinker on the changing nature of capitalism, both spoke about the characteristics of globalisation as the current phase of capitalism, distinct from previous forms and stages. Although Samir Amin highlighted a number of repeating patterns in the evolution of capitalism from which we can gain a better understanding of our present context, both speakers agreed that a fundamental difference is the undermining of the nation state and creation of a unitary system, a new phenomenon qualitatively different from the pluralist system that went before.

Ankie Hoogvelt defined globalisation as "*the reconstitution of the world economy into a single space*", a system which connects and excludes elements without heed for national borders. Under the conditions of this new international system have arisen new roles and relationships. As the shape of the labour force changes, the nation state is undermined and military and commercial alliances change the nature of political alliances, old forms of resistance to imperialism become ineffective and new forms of organisation are just beginning to evolve. In particular we must be aware that we all have a personal

responsibility and involvement in the conflicts of the world, as consumers by whom the transnational corporations justify their continued engagement in war economies.

Analysing conflict in the new global political economy:
Paul Collier, Director of the Development Research Group of the World Bank and expert in African Economics, spoke about recent research to add a quantitative dimension to conflict analysis. It is from this research that the 'greed v grievance' approach has gained prominence, as Collier's analysis of data from civil wars throughout the last 30 years has pointed to economic factors more than socio-political grievances as motivation for conflict.

David Keen from the London School of Economics responded to Paul Collier's speech by questioning the neutrality of numbers, and the ability of econometric analysis to explain or weight motivations for violence. Many of the factors that are taken to indicate a high level of economic motivation for violence could equally be understood to be responsible for grievance, and the linkages between greed and grievance are strong.

The dangers of reducing the complexity of conflict situations to such simple dichotomies was a theme expanded by *Jenny Pearce*, Professor of Latin American Politics at Bradford University. She challenged the relevance and value of dichotomies such as greed/grievance, state/civil society, or reason/emotion, in understanding and responding to conflict today. Gone are the ideological, geographical and social containments by which complex processes could be reduced and understood in the Cold War era. We need now to develop conceptual tools by which we can understand the human relationships and multiple identities through which macro-processes work.

Workshops on "*Recent Trends in the Political Economy of War*", "*Using the 'Greed Versus Grievance' Approach*" and "*War and Underdevelopment*" explored further the issues raised in these keynote speeches with reference to case studies and an opportunity for discussion.

Reacting to conflict in a global political economy: new roles and relationships
Dennis Bright, Peace Commissioner and NGO Director in Sierra Leone, echoed some of the points made by earlier keynote speakers about the changing roles and responsibilities in understanding and responding to conflict. He gave what he described as a 'non-official insider's perspective' of the role of the international community in peace building in Sierra Leone. He observed that large international missions can create imbalance in a community, in the case of the UN peacekeepers in Freetown with their affluence, in the case of foreign NGOs with their jargon, and in the case of donors, with their agendas.

Several workshops explored issues of relationships and responsibilities:
- "*Dying for Oil*", "*Conflict Diamonds/ Logs of War*" and "*The Black Economy in Conflict Situations*" provided case studies of the interplay between commercial interests and power in war economies;
- Unpicking relationships often obscured by the traditional dichotomies of analysis, "*Collapsing masculinities*", "*Gender and Conflict*" and "*The Cost of Internal*

4

Displacement" studied some of the intricacies of human relationships in conflict situations; and

- The relationships between and within different groups with an interest or capacity to respond to conflict were explored, from "*UK NGO/Donor Relations*" and *"EU policies and mechanisms", to "The Diaspora and Peace in West Africa"* and the role of the state and the international community in *Tackling small arms abuse in Africa*".

In the final evaluation it emerged clearly that the key lessons and issues which had arisen from the Conference were the importance of recognising diversity, resisting simple solutions and opening up discourse between different disciplines; and the need for foreign actors in conflict resolution or peace building to be aware of their impact, their place in power relations, and the views of people on the ground. In the words of one participant: "*we need to be thinking workers, at every level*."

Understanding Globalisation

Globalisation and Contemporary Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Ankie Hoogvelt, researcher, writer and teacher on global political economy and development, provided a theoretical framework for understanding contemporary conflicts. She began her presentation on globalisation with a warning: that statistical methodology is not value-free, and not straightforward. Empirical connections can be established falsely and spurious relationships mistaken for reality unless we have a theoretical framework through which logical and meaningful connections between relationships can be made intelligible.

According to Kofi Annan's 1998 political report on Africa, the thirty-plus wars occurring in Africa since 1970 were responsible for more than half of all war-related deaths. Some of these were inter-ethnic, others apparently sustained by foreign resource interests, but Ankie Hoogvelt argues that the underlying cause that connects them can only be understood in terms of globalisation: in part because of the contribution of globalisation to exclusion and the collapse of the state in Africa; and in part because of the globalist discourse which acts as an ideological mask for imperialism, which can contribute to the generation of functioning war economies.

Globalisation and exclusion:
"*I do believe that globalisation is a new real historical process and it is qualitatively different from what went before during the period of internationalisation...*"

Previously, capitalism was expanding worldwide, with emphasis on the nation state. Up until the 1970s Africa was more embedded in the world capitalist system than now on any count - trade, direct foreign investment, indirect capital flows - but globalisation has reversed this, as the world condenses into a single system. Ankie Hoogvelt defined globalisation as *the reconstitution of the world economy into a single social space*, driven by the convergence of information technology and telecommunications, operating

> Over the last 30 years Africa's primary commodity trade has collapsed from 7% of global trade in 1970 to only 0.5% today. Its share of foreign direct investment flows into developing countries has dropped from a 13% share to less than 5% now.

through nodes and hubs in different parts of the world which include some segments of populations and exclude others, and connect without heed for national borders.

Pre 1980: USA Europe Japan / Eastern Bloc / Developing countries

Now: Middle classes / Hinterland of workers / Systemically excluded

These structural changes can be illustrated through two diagrams (*above*), which demonstrate that where previously divisions were political and geographical, now there are those at the centre, in the hinterland and excluded throughout the world.

If processes of globalisation systemically exclude then hopes of making it work for the poor and against inequality can only be fantasy. There are three key reasons for this systemic exclusion:

… the conditions of global competition:
There has been a transition from complementary trade to adversarial trade, in a winner takes all market. The UNCTAD World Investment Report (2000) shows that in the last 15 years 83% of all foreign direct investment flows were mergers and acquisitions.

… the labour market
The economy has been shifting from an industrial base to a knowledge/ information base, and the labour market has changed correspondingly from an expansive curve to a U shape, with a growth in highly skilled and unskilled labour and a decline in the middle. Furthermore highly skilled workers are becoming more mobile, and the more dynamic and educated elements of poor societies are migrating away towards rich regions. It is estimated that sub-Saharan Africa has lost 30 percent of its educated elites through the brain drain.

… the new economy
The knowledge economy has overcome previous limitations by deepening rather than expanding the market. New products overtake old ones as companies tap further into the same consumer base.

Africa and Globalisation:
Africa was already feeling the effects of globalisation in the 1970s, in terms of economic decline and impoverishment, but bureaucratic states were bankrolled by the international community to perform a welfare and accumulation function in line with modernism and cold-war politics. Kleptomania, clientelism and corruption were widespread, but in practice kept the peace, as foreign-bankrolled resources of the State were used to buy off the opposition – the same process as the formation of European states centuries earlier.

In the 1980s enters the globalist discourse, with neo-liberal policies of rolling back the state, deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation. The debt left from the bankrolling of the modernist era became the noose by which African countries were articulated to the global economic system. This leverage over African economies was applied in wholly contradictory ways, contributing to the collapse of the state.

Structural adjustment programmes were designed to raise revenue from Africa's existing resource base, which had the effect of tying in Africa's traditional resource base into the old, declining segments of the world economy instead of encouraging dynamic investment into the new. At the same time policies of financial liberalisation and deregulation oiled the financial machinery to transport money out of Africa to the centre of the system. Furthermore, political conditionalities to aid contributed to the implosion

of the corrupt patrimonial state and left rival factions to seek their own benefits, hastening a collapse into banditry, warlordism and violence.

Participation in war economies:
"We have to be morally aware of the connections between our lifestyles and the spread of conflict in the third world... our lifestyles are deeply implicated in the mess that is contemporary Africa."

The globalist discourse also serves to *take scrutiny away from imperialism*, as this is associated with hierarchies of states and globalisation is associated with statelessness. However, imperialism continues to exist where there is a hierarchy of groups of people, whether these are states or not.

Reno describes in 'Shadow State' (1995) the unofficial and illicit ties between state officials or rulers and foreign commerce and investors. Such illicit private commercial relationships allow rulers, and rival strongmen, to buttress their wealth, extend patronage, finance armies, control territory and market resources. There are a few other studies that lay bare the murderous intertwining of international rivalries for Africa's mineral wealth and the fractious explosion of resource wars on the ground (Collins1997; Outram1997), although they stop short of challenging the right of foreign companies to bloody their hands for the sake of accessing resources necessary to sustain our lifestyles in the West.

We should be aware that the imperialist connections of trans-national corporations are legitimated with reference to us. Ankie Hoogvelt quoted a Shell Director with responsibility for Africa who argued that Shell made no profits in Nigeria, and stayed there only to maintain a stake in the resources for the sake of consumers at home.

We at the centre of the global capitalist system are the cause of much plunder, pauperisation and degradation in the margins, in fact our lifestyle and conditions of socio-economic well-being depend on it. Just as the abolitionists argued 200 years ago for the boycott of rum and sugar purchased on the back of slave labour, we should say to Shell and the likes of them that if chances for peace are improved when there are no outside economic interests then we can do without. Now, as then, blaming Africans for complicity in this trade does not let us off the hook.

References

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Neoliberal globalism is not peace but permanent and growing conflict:
Samir Amin, Director of the Third World Forum in Senegal and renowned thinker on the changing nature of capitalism and international relations, provided a historical perspective of this present stage of capitalism, and conflicts arising from this, to highlight the lessons we can learn from history and the challenges confronting all of us.

History is conflict, and conflict must be seen within an historical framework. There are many types of conflict, those which are positive and those which are blind alleys, those between dominant groups and struggles against dominance. To get an idea of the types of conflict we are faced with, we need first to analyse the characteristics of the system from which they emerge, the major contradictions, issues and challenges.

The history of capitalism:
A review of the major stages of capitalism brings out patterns and changes which can inform our current debate.   During the mercantilist period of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries previous patterns of globalisation centred around India and China with Europe and Africa on the periphery were replaced with systems organised around the domination of Europe.

In the 'classic' stage, from the 1800s until late last century, the centre became synonymous with industrialised countries and the periphery non-industrial. There were attempts to move beyond this dichotomy, with socialist revolutions, conflicts and protests against the logic of global imperialism along the periphery in Russia, China and Africa.

Repeating patterns:
Samir Amin described the current period in the development of capitalism as the "third age of global imperialism" with specific characteristics different from the 'classic' as well as a number of similarities. The 'Belle Epoque' period preceding the First World War offers a good comparison to the stage of capitalism we are now experiencing, with the following shared characteristics:
- Deep technical and industrial revolution;
- Globalisation;
- Monopoly capitalism of the 'belle époque', ancestor of today's transnational companies;
- Financialisation, as the world opened to capital flows with the same rhetoric of peace and development we hear today;
- Social democracy, as people on the periphery felt so vulnerable they were encouraged to 'adjust' to colonisation not to reject it, echoing the discourse today.
- Imbalance of power (in the same triad of North America, Japan and Europe as exists today), which led then to a period of conflict, economic depression, fascism and populism, revolution, and movements of national liberation in Asia and Africa to shift benefits towards the working classes, the East and the South. This balance was not changed with rhetoric and policy but through conflict and struggle.

New forms of organisation:
The struggles following the 'belle époque' ushered in a period of high growth and development, of the welfare state, so-called socialism, and populist modernisation projects which made huge changes to the organisation of societies. As this reached its ceiling, we have moved into a new period of chaos, where the logic of the previous period has lost its credibility and efficiency and no new logic has yet appeared. This creates the environment for conflict and disorder, but these are negative, blind alleys, not based on an understanding of the real challenge facing us but moving in old directions.

The old form of organisation corresponded to the old working class: male, little education, informed by radio and newspaper, with an organic intelligencia and associations with middle class intellectuals. They formed patterns of hierarchical organisation which had efficiency but are not longer credible. Young people now do not accept these old forms but they have yet to invent an alternative. This can only be done by building on existing social movements to develop new strategies for organisation, it would be very dangerous to bring in a blueprint in advance.

New forms of globalisation:
Until World War Two imperialism was pluralistic, with centres competing against one another. Samir Amin argues that today this is not the case: imperialism is singular with the US as leader and Europe and Japan politically allied. It is not possible to imagine a war breaking out between them now. There is a reflection of the past, with the debate over the role of Europe and the rise of neo-fascist politics, but in different conditions.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are the two major instruments that manage the system and perpetuate imbalance, the former protecting the interests of Transnational corporations and the latter as a unitary tool. Previously the international system was negotiated through the United Nations, now this has been replaced by military and business organisations. And the same rhetoric of adjustment is reoccurring, but Samir Amin urged that "*we must fight them, not adjust to them. We must refuse to adjust to injustice.*"

New forms of conflict:
As a result of this current situation we have negative conflicts all over Africa, not people fighting the system but conflicts between and among the ruling classes. For over 30 years after independence the regimes of Africa, whatever their ideology, had a degree of legitimacy. They were working for a positive rate of economic growth to enlarge the middle classes and raise the level of education of the population. This was their basis of power. However, as the surplus disappeared the ruling classes began to fight amongst themselves, seizing whatever exists to recreate legitimacy, whether ethnicity or mineral resources. These types of conflicts are not permanent features in these societies but rooted in changes at the global level.

Analysing conflict in the new global political economy

Why do conflicts start, why do they last so long and what can the international community do?
Paul Collier, Director of the Development Research Group of World Bank and on leave from University of Oxford where he is Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economics, presented work on statistical patterns of conflict, possible interpretations of these patterns and policy implications.

Until recently the quantitative research skills of economists were neglected from the study of conflict, but it can bring something new to analysis and should not be ignored. Collier noted that statistical patterns are produced without any presupposed theory or ideology, and although they can be challenged they are reasonably robust.

Statistical findings:
The research has compared conflict situations in four phases: prior to conflict, the initiation of conflict, during conflict and post-conflict. Prior to conflict, analysis of military expenditure figures shows that there are strong regional linkages. Increases in military expenditure tend to in relation with similar increases in neighbouring countries. Countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea are locked into permanently higher military spending as a result of the conflict, meaning that the cost of the conflict continues after the war is over.

… initiation of conflict:
Many economic variables appear to have an impact on the initiation of conflict. Civil war seems to be overwhelmingly a characteristic of the poorest countries. Statistically, the higher a country's income the less risk of conflict. Economic growth also appears to reduce the risk of conflict with every 1% growth signifying a 1% drop in the risk of conflict. The structure of the economy also correlates, with those countries dependent on primary commodity exports much more prone to conflict. However, statistics do not show a relationship between land or income inequality and risk of conflict.

Social variables are also analysed, showing that although ethnic and religious diversity can reduce the risk of conflict, where there is ethnic dominance, i.e. one majority ethnic group in a diverse society, there is twice the risk of conflict. Societies that have diasporas in rich countries have a higher probability of a conflict recurring, although this statistic was based on data only of diasporas residing in the USA. Paul Collier stated that the existence of ethnic inequality can be a factor, although it is difficult to identify with statistics and that in some cases the risks can be due not to the inequality itself but to attempts to reduce the inequality.

Politically there are no figures suggesting a link between types of regime and conflict risk, although there is some research ongoing which suggests that political differences within democracy do have an impact, with countries with proportional representation having lower risk than those with a 'first past the post' system. Geographical analysis, which Paul Collier conceded would not be much use for policy makers, showed that

11

mountainous and forested countries, and those with a widely dispersed population were more prone to conflict.

… during conflict:
The factors affecting the duration of conflict include education, social structure and the type of intervention. Also, conflicts seem to be getting longer through history, now being on average three times longer than before 1980.

Conflicts tend to be shorter where the population has a higher level of education and longer where the population is more ethnically diverse. Where there was inequality of political rights before the conflict it is likely the conflict will last longer, but this is difficult to measure during wartime. Analysis shows that there is a higher chance of peace in the first two years of a conflict, and practically no chance for the next two years, and that early interventions on the side of the rebels make for a longer conflict.

… post conflict:
After the end of conflict economic recovery is usually swift, where peace is maintained. However, statistics show that there is a high risk of recurring conflict within five years of peace. This is in part because the factors which made the society prone to conflict still exist. Aid appears to be more effective pre-conflict than post-conflict, perhaps because of the effectiveness of the state.

Interpretation of statistical findings:
Paul Collier gave his interpretation of the figures, although recognised that more than one interpretation of the same figures could be viable. While groups exist in every society with grievances they only rarely use organised violence to address them.   The circumstances where large-scale violence occurs have little to do with grievance.

It seems that the decisive factor in conflict is whether there are circumstances making rebel organisations financially and militarily capable of organised killing. A viable rebel organisation needs finance, and this can come from hostile neighbouring governments, superpowers, diasporas and commodities. It needs military coherence, and this comes from ethnic cohesion… "*far from ethnic hatred causing conflict, ethnic hatred is deliberately generated during conflict*." Where aid can be used to raise economic growth and diversify the economy, it can be effective in preventing conflict.

Policy implications:
From the interpretation of the statistics, Paul Collier highlighted a number of implications for policy:

- Conflict can be prevented if it is made financially unviable and that means making it harder for rebel groups to raise finance. In many countries rebel groups make big money from primary commodities, from diamonds in Sierra Leone to cocaine in Colombia, and there is a lot that has been done, and more to do, to improve governance of revenues from these commodities, including transparency in corporate sector payments to governments and civil society participation in control of revenue flows.

- The UN are just beginning to establish standards of performance and behaviour of diaspora organisations, and work needs to be done to ensure that their capacity is used to improve rather than finance conflict situations.

- Equally there is a need to monitor behaviours of neighbouring countries, as often conflicts are one stage removed from international war, with each financing the others' rebellion.

- Spending on military is also linked between neighbouring countries and can only be scaled down collectively. Military reductions should be coordinated.

- Intervention should be made early and on the side of the government to ensure that conflicts are not sustained. Rebels are unlikely to accept peace deals from the governments, so an international architecture is needed to strengthen confidence in such deals.

- Post conflict societies are a good environment for making economic structural and policy changes, as was seen in Europe and Uganda, to usher in economic growth and lessen the risk of recurring conflict.

> *This and other research on conflict is available from the World Bank website: www.worldbank.org/research/conflict, or email Paul Collier on: pcollier@worldbank.org*

Response to Paul Collier

David Keen *from the London School of Economics gave a response to Paul Collier's presentation and previous publications, in which he sought to demonstrate that such quantitative analysis is not as neutral and technical as it purports to be. Comments in boxes relate to questions from the floor.*

Paul Collier's analysis of statistical evidence states that rebellions are motivated more by greed than grievance. David Keen argued that although it is important to recognise the importance of economic agendas in conflict, it is problematic to assume that econometric analysis can provide simple proof of the dominance of one motivation over another. He explained *four problem areas*:
- the issue of choosing proxies to determine levels of greed or grievance;
- the danger of using numbers to disqualify grievances;
- the role of state actors; and
- the simplification of linkages between greed and grievance.

How to measure greed and grievance?
The difficulty in doing this type of econometric analysis of conflict is that you can't directly put a figure on either greed or grievance, but instead quantifiable factors need to be chosen to stand in for each of these phenomena. For greed, factors such as a high

share of primary exports in GDP, the proportion of young men in society, or a low level of education of the population were chosen. Grievance is represented by features such as ethnic fragmentation, a high level of economic inequality, lack of political rights or economic mismanagement as shown by low per capita growth.

Analysis of figures showed that the first set of proxies, those related to greed, correlated more closely to conflict than the latter. However, David Keen argued that factors such as reliance on primary commodities and lack of education could also be understood to represent underdevelopment, and as such could be related to grievances. Furthermore, it is perhaps safer to assume that high inequality and political repression are effective in preventing rebellion than to conclude that grievances, when they do occur, are not motivated by grievance.

> **Validity of quantitative analysis**:
> Responding to questions about whether abstract economic measures can capture complex social processes behind conflict, Paul Collier responded that the quantitative analysis he presented is not opposed to other social sciences but *complementary*.
>
> Findings regarding the relationship between inequality and conflict may not please social activists, he stated, but "*passion has a role in advocacy, but not in analysis*"

If there are problems with the 'science' of proxies, these are compounded by the way this science is being used in the service of disqualifying certain discourses.

Disqualifying grievance:

There is a danger in using numbers to disqualify the discourses of sociology, politics and anthropology, and deny the need to listen to grievances which are, often, against the very establishment of which the World Bank is a major player. Paul Collier virtually rules out the value of listening to the grievances of rebels, writing in 1992 that *"since both greed-motivated and grievance-motivated rebel organizations will embed their behaviour in a narrative of grievance, the observation of that narrative provides no informational content to the researcher as to the true motivation for rebellion."*

To declare from a self-referential citadel of numbers that no grievance is legitimate is to in effect to block out the mass of information and feeling of which conflicts are made and increase the risk of falling into the types of traps mentioned above.

> **Criminalizing rebel groups**:
> One questioner noted that while Paul Collier's analysis tends to label all rebels as criminals, in cases such as Eritrea where rebels later form governments, the likes of the World Bank then have to deal with them.
>
> Paul Collier responded that it was important neither to denigrate nor idealise rebel leaders. However he also noted that it was very rare that rebel movements "*turned into the successes of Eritrea and Uganda*". The statistical success rate for rebellions is 18% and they tend to last a long time with a social and human toll disproportionate to what they achieve.

The role of state actors:

Another problem with Collier's analysis is the lack of attention paid to the manipulation of conflict for profit and power by state actors and ruling elites. Instead the whole weighing of greed and grievance focuses on rebel movements. Conflicts are often deepened and perpetuated by forces associated with the government, and to concentrate on rebel groups, who may be suppressed opposition to the government, can be tantamount to scapegoating, and contribute to the impunity of other abusive actors.

Furthermore, stigmatising rebels detracts attention from the vital question of how reconstruction might handled to produce a more equitable society where grievances are less intense and violence less deeply institutionalised.

Linking greed and grievance:
To compare the relative importance of greed and grievance is to ignore the importance of how the two factors interact in conflict situations. Part of this involves looking at how greedy individuals manipulate the grievances of others. Violent greed is in large part the product of grievances, and where selfishness and ruthlessness is prominent, we have to investigate the causes of this. To label as 'greed' the pursuit of economic interest which has been lauded and encouraged in other contexts by the World Bank and others, is to marginalize a range of questions about the origins of selfishness, the anger and fear which feed into atrocities.

A local aid worker in Sierra Leone prevented his security staff from defecting to the rebel or government armies by paying them wages, but also by providing medical care and spending time with them. He said "*it's not much money they want. But when they know you have no trust or care for them, all they want to do is make money on the side*."

> **Broadening the focus:**
> The lack of an international dimension to Paul Collier's analysis was queried from the floor, as was the decision to only measure diaspora in the United States. Does the political position of the country in which Diasporas are hosted not impact on the type of intervention made?
>
> Paul Collier responded that there was no clear correlation between the end of superpower funding and occurrence of conflict, and that although the study will cover Diaspora in more countries soon, the USA is deemed to be representative.

Globalisation and Complex Conflicts:
Jenny Pearce, Professor of Latin American Politics at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford and co-author (with Dr Jude Howell) of Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration (2001), *gave a presentation on the challenge of transforming complex thinking into practical action.*

Jenny Pearce welcomed the theme of the conference, which brings back economic and material life into the study of contemporary conflict. Her presentation aimed to question not the importance of the subject matter itself, but the framing of the debate in ways that encourage us to "choose" between two approaches to the subject.

Dichotomies are seductive, but Jenny Pearce argued that they neither help us understand the real world of conflict today nor to develop appropriate responses. Complex contemporary conflicts require capacity for complex thought. The challenge is transforming such thought into practical action. This is the converse of allowing the urgent need for practical action to shape and simplify our thinking.

> **Dichotomies of conflict:**
> Discussion in the field of conflict and development is replete with dichotomies, including:
> - failed/successful state;
> - state/civil society;
> - ethnic/non-ethnic,
> - conflict/post conflict,
> - pro/anti-globalisation,
> - North/South;
> - structure/agency;
> - redistribution/recognition;
> - economics/politics;
> - qualitative/quantitative;
> - greed/grievance.
>
> There is another implicit dichotomy amongst academics and policy makers: that between reason and emotion, particularly dangerous as these are *both* essential to our engagement with the social world around us. Acknowledging our feelings about a situation does not mean we have to analyse it less rigorously.

Understanding complex conflicts:
Globalisation has generated great complexity. It could be argued that conflicts are always complex, but during the Cold War there were containments. These are well known and could be summarised as:
- Mental containments (the ideological frameworks in which most conflicts took place);
- Gendered (it was mostly men who fought the wars and made the political decisions about them);
- Territorial (they were largely contained in 'theatres of war');
- Geographical (most fighting took place in the Third World);
- Authored (there were clear authors of particular acts of violence);
- Organised (they were waged by armies and insurgent armies); and
- Political (they were about competing visions of state and nation building and resource distribution).

In the present period of globalisation those containments have collapsed. Neo-liberalism does not seek to contain but activate competitive market oriented economic behaviour and we are intellectually and conceptually at a loss as to how to deal with this new reality. The really difficult problem is to understand the way that these macro-processes work through the capillaries of human social relationships in particular cultural contexts. If statistical analysis asks the rights questions, it can enlighten, illuminate, validate and challenge, but it is doubtful whether they can capture the complexity at work, or produce models and policies to be applied to any conflict in any part of the world. This may suit the purposes of the World Bank, but local and international NGOs and those working in the midst of conflict should resist such thinking at all costs.

We are being asked to understand conflict in terms *either* of individual motivations *or* of systemic structural processes, either that:
- economic motivations, particularly in the context of failed states, are now predominant in civil wars and responsible for prolonging them. These are reduced to individual agents that result in violent behaviour, focusing the policy debate on only one factor in conflict: armed actors and rebel groups;

or that
- the logic of globalisation, international trade, financial deregulation and emphasis on individual accumulation generates the opportunities and incentives which fuel conflict. This analysis focuses on the systemic structural factors in capitalism and has different policy implications to the former.

Although this is an interesting debate, neither angle is wholly relevant for people on the ground who, as Jenny Pearce put it, "*don't want to be forced into another debate between economic man and exploited man.*"

Acknowledging complexity:
In fact, a wealth of new social theory and analytical tools have been emerging over the last two decades that mean we no longer have to limit ourselves to such a debate. We can now go beyond dichotomies that reduce all social problems either to structures of violence and exploitation or to problems of individual motivation and behaviour. We can for instance recognise our multiplicity of identities and learn to understand better in what

conditions one comes to matter more than another, and how this might relate to peace and conflict. No study of war today should leave out the way male and female identity construction and the relationship between them relates to changing patterns of socialisation, economic accumulation and livelihood. A process for which the empowerment of women, new approaches to male identity formation and ultimately the positive transformation of gender relations, may not be sufficient but is absolutely necessary for construction of a more peaceful society.

One of the major problems with dichotomies lies in the questions that they do not let us ask. Of course, much depends on why and for whom you are asking questions. While the World Bank is very concerned with the cost of conflict in the South and its impact on economic growth, development and global competitiveness, many other organisations are more concerned with a broader range of questions derived from a close connection to the reality of suffering on the ground. Their task is precisely to develop thinking in the context of the complexity in which they work which can effectively challenge the World Bank view while working around concrete and realizable objectives *with* (rather than for) populations affected by war and violence.

Deconstructing dichotomies:
In order to illustrate why complex thinking is so essential in working in conflict today, Jenny Pearce gave very brief accounts of issues arising in four conflicts where she has long experience of field work, each of which challenges a common dichotomy.

Bradford, UK – challenging the North/South dichotomy:
Although it cannot be counted as having conflict comparable to the wars being waged in many parts of the South, but precisely because it is not so extreme, it enables us to see more clearly the way conflicts gestate and develop. There are frequent skirmishes, occasional riots and evidence of an incipient gun culture in some parts of the District.

A dichotomised analysis from the outside might interpret this situation in terms of White/Asian racial conflict. The greed/grievance dichotomy might "see" the rise of drugs trafficking, which is seen as a quick route to the consumer durables young Asian men are encouraged to aspire to but not given the means to legally access. It is in the context of this trade that gangs and gun culture emerges. On the grievance side, one might look at what happened to the Asian community, many of whom were originally brought to Britain to provide labour for manufacturing industries, on the collapse of these industries.

However, to reduce the present situation to either the greed or the grievance issues would be a crude and unproductive approach. Other categories for exploring the situation include class, poor whites and poor Asians in an increasingly segregated inner city that fosters distrust and despair; or religious differences. Or the category of "Asian" could be deconstructed, into different Asian communities from distinct parts, with the particular role of the Kashmiri villages from where many in the Bradford District originate, or in terms of generational differences, in particular the experiences of the teenagers who lie between the traditional cultures of their Muslim parents and the global culture of the streets. Or we could look at the gender divide, and the way Asian women suffer particular hardship and oppression, forced marriages and domestic violence.

17

Southern Mexico - challenging the failed/ successful state dichotomy:
The conflicts in Latin America demonstrate an even greater range of complexities. The Mexican state is neither failed nor weak, and the conflicts in, for instance, the three states of Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas has neither the same roots nor the same form in each. The violence in each state has many layers: the conflict of Chiapas, for example, requires an understanding of religion, village, indigenous, land and other conflicts.

The Zapatistas challenge assertions connected to the greed/grievance dichotomy that all rebel armies today are motivated by greed. They have consciously elaborated the ethical dimensions of their struggle and these, not arms, have been the basis of their arguments since the initial uprising. Under the previous PRI government, members of autonomous Zapatista communities refused to accept health, education and other government programmes which were being used to co-opt and divide indigenous people.

Colombia – challenging the greed/grievance dichotomy:
Violence in Colombia is neatly understood in terms of armed groups and control of drugs and oil. This simplification into motivations of greed ignore the historical dimensions and character of the conflict. It not only negates arguments that economic reform and political inclusion would go at least some way to dealing with claims around the conflict, but also create a false hope that only by offering alternative economic incentives to armed actors could there be peace in the country.

Real productive employment for men and women would undoubtedly help, but in reality there are many different kinds of violence in Colombia. There are differences between rural and urban violence, between different cities, and between different regions. Focusing on the armed actors ignores the struggle to keep open a safe civilian space by many social actors, men and women. Any discourse that forces choice between state army, paramilitary and guerrilla armies will fail to deal with the complex reality in which all are part of a problem which goes to the very heart of the socialization processes of the country from family, to community to the nation state and in which the ruling elite also have a considerable share of responsibility.

Huehuetenango, Guatemala – challenging the conflict/ post-conflict dichotomy:
This is not to argue that there aren't clear differences between a situation of actual war and the ending of that war. However, for the people of Huehue the end of the war has not meant an end to violence, suffering or poverty. The failure of many innovative and costly post-war reconstruction programmes to generate sustainable livelihoods is felt heavily by a population, that still lives with only the minimum state presence and a lack of the rule of law that encourages some in the wake of experiences of army massacres, to mete out their own form of justice through lynchings. The situation of desperation was summed up by some peasants Jenny Pearce met in San Concepción Huista in April, who said "*we have gone from violence to slavery*".

Conclusion:

In summary, Jenny Pearce stated: *"I don't want to choose between two interpretations or visions of anything. I want to debate the relationship between economic motivations and structures but not reduce the analysis to that. I wish to consider the way economic dynamics intersect with social and individual identities."*

Complex thinking is about incorporating new conceptual tools that enable us to take into account complexity without paralysing us into inaction. It does not mean abandoning normative positions, these are present implicitly in all analysis we do and it is preferable to make them explicit rather than have proxy debates around such themes as "greed and grievance" which conceal the assumptions being made about the individual and society.

Peace building is ultimately a discussion of what kind of a world we want to build. There is no model for this, we need to think through what works and what doesn't and in situations of complex conflict, where no one organisation can possibly have the overview of everything that is going on, it means that working and talking together is essential. Ongoing learning, ongoing debate and above all resistance to dichotomised categories of analysis is essential. There is no substitute for thought, and that is something we can all do.

Responding to conflict in a global political economy:
new roles and relationships

Sierra Leone: The Conflict and The World
Dennis Bright, *Country Director of the Regional Institute for Cooperation and Development in Sierra Leone, and on the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace supervising the implementation of the peace agreement, gave a "*non-official Sierra Leonean insiders perspective*" of the process of peace building and the role of the international community.*

Sierra Leone is described as the UN's biggest theatre of peacekeeping operations, with over 17,000 peacekeepers posted there. There are also British troops and police retraining and restructuring the army and police force, and a high concentration of foreign NGOs and religious missions working in the country, the majority of which have only recently arrived. This has inevitably led to some duplication of effort, and attempts by the Department of Planning to standardise assistance have met with resistance from international NGOs.

The impact of international presence in Sierra Leone:
What did this influx of highly visible foreign helpers look like from within Sierra Leone? Dennis Bright said that the arrival of UN troops was greeted with relief, that the world did not stop at Kosovo and the international community was behind the people of Sierra Leone. Controls and checkpoints provide comfort and a feeling of security to people who had no more confidence in their own system. For years the same army who were supposed to protect people had been facilitating the propagation of the conflict by supplying arms to the rebels, and in some cases soldiers by day were rebels by night.

The peacekeeping operation has also created many job opportunities for Sierra Leoneans, especially in lower level occupations such as driving, security and other services. People working for the international community in Sierra Leone are exposed to higher standards of performance and efficiency, in return for better pay and status. "*Every driver considers himself a scaled down version of Kofi Annan*!" However, in turn the image of the international community as an expression of affluence reinforces the stereotyped impression of an easy and comfortable life for all in England and America. And just when Sierra Leone so badly needs its young people they are looking outside for their future, while the level of participation in the black market and prostitution is rising and the age of prostitutes is falling.

Meanwhile state power, already weakened by the rebellion, now finds itself playing the tune paid for by the powerful international community. When a government becomes the beneficiary of such large-scale international military and humanitarian assistance what scope does it have to make choices of its own, without bearing in mind the needs of donors? An example of this is the campaign for a special court for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The government want to wait until disarmament is concluded and security restored, but is under pressure to get on with creating the court now.

20

Key issues and implications for action:
It is important to make a proper assessment of the real impact of large NGOs on their target communities, as too often the success documented in annual reports doesn't reflect reality on the ground. There is also an interesting psychological phenomenon where ordinary people, often illiterate, learn a new language, new way to express themselves in order to communicate with NGOs. Improved articulation with smaller and less privileged organisations would prevent the loss or corruption of brilliant initiatives.

Children are now being released by the rebels in large numbers: children whose only parents have been their bush commanders, their only fact of life a pistol and who, under the influence of hard drugs, have committed terrible atrocities. We have a moral responsibility to protect and preserve the innocence of these children against the abuse that transformed them into killing machines.

This does not just mean ratifying international agreements but taking positive action, action against those who produced and sold the small arms and drugs which fuelled these atrocities. The international conference on small arms next month will be an opportunity to use the evidence of thousands of brutalised and militarised children to launch a final offensive on the trafficking of weapons.

It is also important that future directions of aid acknowledge and understand the role and potential of telecommunications technology in shrinking our world. The RUF avoided isolation through the media and satellite telephones, and by the same technology the atrocities of conflict in Sierra Leone were communicated around the world. Former exiles have become familiar with email, money transfer and other tools of communication. This may be where the future of aid lies.

Finally, it is important to consider more devolved forms of bilateral aid, creating linkages at local government level to exchange knowledge and skills. In this way work on reconstruction and training can be undertaken directly between schools, government departments, hospitals and other institutions in Sierra Leone and donor countries in a manner more appropriate to both communities.

Workshops

A series of workshops were held in order to explore the issues raised in the speeches in more detail, in many cases in relation to recent research and case studies, and to give the opportunity for more direct engagement and debate.

Analysing conflict:
The following three workshops looked at the analysis of global political economy in relation to conflict, one highlighting current trends in the political economy of war, another looking at war and underdevelopment, and a third using the example of Kyrgyzstan to explore the applicability of the greed versus grievance framework to conflict situations.

Recent Trends in the Political Economy of War:
New trends may not be that new after all, but **Phillipe Le Billon** *and* **Pyt Douma** *ran this workshop to highlight tendencies that can be observed within the dynamics of many contemporary conflicts.*

Economics is inextricably related to conflict: from financing of conflict; the management and structure of the economy during war; and economic strategies used as weapons of war, including manipulation of the market and sanctions. In many cases war has a negative impact on investment, leaving the economy more dependent on imports, while in other cases, such as Sudan, sustained investment in primary resources can fund and sustain a war. The presenters highlighted the following trends:

Crisis of the state:
The distinction between intra and inter state conflict has become progressively blurred as actors are involved in extensive networks with supporters and business contacts abroad vital to the maintenance of fighting capacity. A selective policy of cooption and exclusion has emerged in which enterprising politicians and business elites further weakened the remnants of state bureaucracies and used the security apparatus to suppress dissent.

Open state repression has become a normal feature of many so-called states, in which ultimately human cleansing cynically seems to have become a rather efficient instrument for the maintenance of political power by an endangered section of the elite. The human cleansing of oil rich areas such as have been executed by the national army and militia in Sudan provides an appalling example of these new practices.

Globalisation:
The profound uneven character of global economics, and the inherent inequality between rich and poor states and elite and non-elite groups within them raise considerable doubts about the cumulative effects of globalisation processes. One element of this process, the revolution in communications technology, demonstrates the unequal impact of current resource exploitation and extraction, creating conditions for:
- Increased interconnections between local warlords, business elites, intermediaries and corporate business, bypassing the state;
- Bypassing of national control and legislative control mechanisms in the exploitation of certain resources;
- Enhanced direct competition between contending elites engaged in political power struggles due to demand for specific goods and resources;
- Localised patterns of warfare, selective human cleansing and a high degree of internal disruption of formal economies in resource rich 'poor' states

Economic middlemen:
In the oil industry one can observe the emergence of small oil companies that in reality provide useful links between incumbent elite groups, major oil companies, weapons producers and exporters and the formal financial sector. These small companies are used to bypass the national treasury to fund arms purchases under cover of legal window dressing. Furthermore, such companies are used to operate under difficult security circumstances, sometimes in conjunction with foreign mercenary firms. Due to growing civilian awareness, NGO activities and possible future consumer boycotts, formal economic actors are progressively dependent on the existence of such interface actors.

Examples include small oil companies in Angola and junior mining companies in Sierra Leone and Angola.

Privatisation of military services:
The use of mercenary firms by threatened elite groups, such as the use of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, has attracted much attention. However, it remains obscure to what extent such firms have received extraction contracts as a reward for their activities. These firms therefore seem to provide the missing link between private business, local elite and securing resource extraction amidst violent conflict.

As foreign based firms, which attract much attention, become less enticing for elites trying to secure shadow economics, the regular armed forces are becoming more enterprising in the niche market of providing security under difficult circumstances. For example, isolated army commanders provide security at a price to foreign mining firms.

The decentralisation of war economies
As regular armed units begin to turn to commercial enterprise and rebel movements are scattered due to military setbacks, operating as nomad economic units, bartering valuable resources and living off the land, conflicts are increasingly fragmented.

Enclave versus non-enclave economies
Some rebel movements have had to resort to so-called enclave tactics in order to survive the enormous political and military pressure waged against them. Such movements, as seen in Sierra Leone and Mozambique, are based on the disruption of formal economics and the prevailing modes of economic exchange and ultimately destroy the social fabric of local society.

Cooption of external donor interventions
Political and economic reform have not led to structural changes but instead to increased inter-elite competition and electoral manipulation, government deregulation and privatisation of state assets. These changes have been manipulated to strengthen existing clientelist networks by selling off state owned companies cheaply to political protégées. The decline of government expenditure has helped such elites to weaken bureaucracies and turn them into private instruments.

Discussion:
The presentations were followed by discussion, and it was felt that while the framework was useful for untangling the issues and responsibilities within complex war economies, it must be recognised that analysis cannot be value free. Countries at war are embedded in international structures, people are motivated by different interests and the inability to hold people accountable, in part due to weaknesses in implementation of international legal and humanitarian frameworks, propagates atrocities. What is the best way forward for advocacy, who should we target?

There was a suggestion that CODEP set up a platform for analysis and advocacy around political economies of war in different countries, starting with Afghanistan.

War and Underdevelopment:
*Wars are known to be one of the most potent causes of human suffering and underdevelopment yet economic analysis of developing countries at war is relatively rare. This neglect is particularly notable in view of the high incidence of wars in poor countries. **Frances Stewart** ran a workshop to explore the direct and indirect economic consequences of war at all levels, drawing on case studies from Afghanistan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.*

Between 1950-1990, around 15 million deaths were caused, directly or indirectly, by war in developing countries. These deaths are not only the direct results of physical assault, but to a much greater extent result from economic mechanisms of war which lead to famine and disease. While much has been written on the costs of military expenditure, most economists treat countries at war as subject to exogenous developments which take them outside the normal realms of analysis. For example, war and its effects were not analysed in the first *Human Development Report* as a cause of failure in human development, despite the fact that among the ten countries listed with the lowest Human Development Index, eight have suffered serious civil wars in recent years.

Understanding conflict:
A multidisciplinary approach is needed to analyse conflict situations. Political and sociological analysis is essential for understanding motivations and behaviour during conflict; economic analysis is essential for understanding the economic mechanisms at play, which in turn affect and are affected by changing motivation and behaviour. In this complex canvas, in which human reactions and economic behaviour vary substantially according to the economic, social and cultural conditions of the society in question, generalisation is difficult and conclusions depend critically on the nature of the economy, the level of development, the role, strength and objectives of the government, as well as the character of the conflict.

The impact of war - QEH findings:
The QEH research in seven countries shows considerable variations in the costs of wars across countries, depending on the nature of the conflict, the nature of the economy, and above all on the nature of the government and its reactions. However, there are invariably some negative effects on GNP, on food production, on exports, and on investment. There are gainers as well as losers from conflict, and it is essential to identify them since often the conflict is perpetuated by those who gain.

People respond and change during conflict so as to protect their livelihoods, as seen by the enlargement of the informal sector; greater economic participation of women; migration; and also crime. These effects often help the wider economy, but they may also harm it. Outside interventions must be assessed in relation to their effects on the capability of the economy to sustain itself and people's livelihoods and on whether they feed or reduce the forces making for conflict. In practice, interventions are often counterproductive from both perspectives.

The empirical work of QEH provides crude assessments of the aggregate costs of war: for example, it is estimated that GDP loss in Nicaragua over the war period was equivalent to

24

the 1965 level of GDP, while the higher infant mortality rate associated with war led to the equivalent of 1.2m infant deaths in Ethiopia. For the most part, both external and domestic policies have not been well designed in terms of moderating these costs. While the study permits us to identify policy changes (domestic and external) that would reduce the costs quite substantially, the political analysis suggests that the needed changes will be very difficult to achieve.

Implications for policy:
Two particularly important conclusions were identified from the QEH research. First, the major costs of civil wars in developing countries are indirect, i.e. more people die from economic consequences of war - lack of access to food, lack of income and employment, production failures, and the collapse of social services - than directly in battle from physical injuries. *This means that potentially policies which moderate the economic costs could greatly reduce the human costs.*

Secondly, war is generally rational, not a mindless phenomenon as it has often been depicted. A major motive appears to be control over resources, both at a state and a private level. While the initial motivation usually relates to control over state power and the economic and other benefits that this would confer, once it gets underway, individuals and groups use the war to make private gains. The war economy itself creates opportunities and the respectability of violence provides new weapons for the pursuit of economic gain.

To be most effective and target development, policy needs to be based on clear analysis of the interrelated political, social and economic elements of war in order to counter the profitability of war, sustain the entitlements of the vulnerable and address underlying causes.   However, members of the workshop group questioned who these policy recommendations were addressing, as in many situations the main actors in the war are pushing policies of displacement and benefit from the war economy.

Use of Greed and Grievance approach to strategic conflict analysis: a practical example from Kyrgyzstan
Jonathan Goodhand and Tony Vaux facilitated a workshop on using the greed and grievance approach to the examine the dynamics of conflict, using the case study of Kyrgyzstan from DfID sponsored research to devise a methodology of conflict analysis.

The research:
The first stage of research, which is being carried out in four countries, was to map the sources of latent or open conflict in terms of security, political, economic and social factors. Connections were established between these factors and the importance of each ranked.

In Kyrgyzstan, the researchers found a population highly vulnerable to any environmental or economic shocks, with the following causal factors:

- *Security*: a weak state with strong rebel groups;
- *Economic*: the end of agricultural subsidies after the collapse of the Soviet Union, informalisation of the economy, oil and gas deposits;
- *Political*: recycling of political elites in the transition from soviet – democratic states;
- *Social*: pan-Islamic rebel groups influenced by Russian and Uzbek media.

After examining these causes of conflict, the 'greed and grievance' approach was applied as a mechanism to examine the dynamics of conflict.

'Greed' and 'Grievance' factors in Kyrgyzstan:

Although Collier's distinction between greed and grievance is very seductive for Central Asia, where finance, mobilisation and coherence are critical factors and the population passive making grievance an unlikely motivation, it also provides a classic example of the dangers of exacerbating 'greed' elements of conflict. Firstly, governments are criminalizing Islamic groups, the key focus for popular expression of grievance, undermining a legitimate focus of resistance. Secondly, unequal distribution of power between ethnic groups means that conflict is likely to appear along these lines. International aid has focused on greed, attributing this as a motive for Islamic movements without understanding the dynamics of greed, and the role of aid in this, or addressing issues of grievance.

Case study: Ferghana Valley

Although the area of the case study is not currently experiencing conflict, a series of interconnected issues make it extremely vulnerable. Apart from the influence of neighbouring Uzbekistan, a mountain range and oil deposits, the area has undergone land privatisation processes, impoverishment has led to a rise in fundamentalism, the drugs trade is active and there are high levels of corruption. The ethnic minority, Uzbeks, own much of the land, while the Kyrgyzstanis have political power, and there are accusations that Uzbeks collude against Kyrgyzstanis with neighbouring countries.

The researchers found that the DfID programme, part of a World Bank agricultural programme, was being co-opted by local official elites and staff recruitment did not follow equal opportunities policies, with nepotism rife, and very few Russians or members of other ethnic majorities. The poor were denied access, or given dangerously bad advice, while the rich and powerful had captured the project for 'greed' purposes.

An analysis of the situation in Ferghana Valley shows that greed and grievance factors are interlinked. Deep poverty and depression are fuelling fundamentalism and vice versa. Since the end of communism public services such as health and education have declined, and elites have found opportunities for exploiting this situation, giving the poor more reason to feel aggrieved.

Conclusions and recommendations:
The presenters found that while a 'greed and grievance' framework is useful in conflict analysis it requires great sensitivity in application, bearing in mind the complexity of interests, capacities and opportunities. 'Greed' factors are valuable, allowing analysts to perceive the interests of actors and therefore to suggest likely future dynamics. Greed is often associated with a capacity to bring about change. On the other hand, grievance appears to be considerably less useful because the connection between grievance and capacity for change is much weaker.

However, there is no substitute for broader analysis on changing norms and expectations and listening and responding to grievances are important preventative measures. An analysis of this 'pre-conflict' situation shows that grievances *are* significant, and it is important monitor more precisely ethnic tensions which can be manipulated by greed elements. CBOs and NGOs should act to strengthen civil society, uniting the elites and poor, and more legal aid should be made available. Finally, it is important to provide economic opportunities that are sustainable, beyond micro-credit.

At a national level, a balance needs to be struck between the market economy approach, which can promote greed, and good governance.   At international level it is important to avoid a single-issue focus, such as drugs, and explain the connections between a variety of factors to policymakers, the public and the media.

War economies in practice:
The following three workshops provided an opportunity to discuss the role of international and national commercial interests in sustaining conflict, with reference to case studies from Afghanistan, Sudan and Sierra Leone/ Liberia.

The Black Economy in Conflict Situations: The Afghanistan Experience
*This workshop was designed to link emerging lessons from Afghanistan with broader debates on 'greed' and 'grievance'. **Peter Marsden** and **Jonathan Goodhand** ran a workshop to look at changes in the Afghan economy over twenty years of violent conflict, the impact and response of the local communities, and the relevance of these lessons to current analysis on 'greed' and 'grievance'.*

Afghanistan is in many respects a classic example of a 'complex political emergency' – a collapsed state, protracted conflict, wide spread destruction and humanitarian distress, the erosion of pre-war livelihoods and the emergence of new forms of political economy. The country has been transformed from a buffer state into a transport and marketing corridor

27

for illegal contraband and the opium trade. It is now located at the centre of an extremely complex and volatile regional conflict system. Instability in Afghanistan is undermining the economies and polities of the neighbouring powers. However, there has been comparatively little analytical work on Afghanistan which might be used to inform wider policy responses to complex political emergencies.

Mapping the black economy:

Distinguishing between the 'black', 'grey' and official economy is difficult in contexts where the state has collapsed and legal frameworks are unclear or contested. The main elements of the black economy are smuggling, drugs, timber, arms, minerals and artefacts. A wide range of internal and external actors secure a livelihood through the black economy including armed groups, the transport mafia, Pakistani politicians, Afghani villagers and Pakistani tribal people. Different elements of the Afghan political economy include:

The war economy	Collateral impacts of war	Economic strategies of war
- Control of predation by armed groups – taxation of opium, transport, precious metals, timber and artefacts - Asset transfer	- Collapse of infrastructure - Foreign investment - Traditional trading routes blocked.	- Deliberate destruction of economic infrastructure by Russia - Blockade of Hazarra areas by Taliban forces. Military blockade of the Panjshir valley.

The arrival of the Taliban has seen the expansion and consolidation of the war economy since they control the main trading routes and customs posts with neighbouring countries. In effect they have established a monopoly of predation. The collateral impacts of war have been great and for many Afghans there are few alternatives to joining the military or engaging with the black economy.

The view from the field:

Uzbek is a Northern Alliance controlled area of North East Afghanistan and the opium trade has been growing in the area for several reasons, namely: global demand, the end of cold war subsidies, and the collapse of national security. Pressure on land, environmental degradation and growing impoverishment have increased the vulnerability of poor farmers. Poppy cultivation represents a low risk option in a high risk environment. There is some evidence that opium production benefits the village, although there are also signs of stress, particularly between generational tensions. Older men tend to say that things are worse now, while young men say they have more choices and opportunities.

The challenge of understanding… and of action:

To formulate appropriate responses and build a peace economy in Afghanistan, the complex relationships of factors must be properly understood. The particular situation in this region of Afghanistan provides an interesting test ground for application of new academic theory.

Using the 'greed v grievance' approach it appears that the conflict in Afghanistan has become more about greed as it has progressed. However, in such complex situations it is important to use clear, precise terminology and not to label motives and processes carelessly. The conflict and economic motives are intertwined, with Pakistani political goals and the Islamic radial network influential.

Action is needed which does more than just cut off funding and arms, but also offers incentives for long-term development. Can development aid provide alternatives to the poppy? Can Afghani professionals be supported to return to their country to help build a peace economy?

Dying for oil
Dan Silvey of Christian Aid and Julie Flint, a freelance journalist facilitated a workshop to look at the relationship between oil and war. A recent Christian Aid report, 'The Scorched Earth' *shows how the presence of international oil companies is fuelling the war in Sudan. They conclude that* "without oil, the civil war being fought between the government of Sudan and the SPLA is at a stalemate; with oil, it can only escalate."

Oil and war in Sudan:
Financial and technological investment by companies from Asia and the West have helped build an oil industry in southern Sudan, but have also fuelled the war by taking it into areas which were previously uncontested. The infrastructure built to serve the oil companies is used by the military as part of the war, and the government revenue from oil, estimated at US$1 per day, is roughly equivalent to the amount spent on fighting the war.

For the ordinary people who live in the oil rich areas the legacy of oil has not been development but displacement and death. An ever-increasing area where oil production is centred has been cleared of civilians by government forces and militias, and this combined with the denial of access to humanitarian agencies, means that the area now has the highest proportion of people in need anywhere in the country. Oil companies clearly are implicated in this situation, but despite the evidence remain silent, deny that human rights violations are linked to their activities or claim that their presence and investment will help bring peace and prosperity to the country.

Responsibilities of oil companies:
The report states that oil should be Sudan's peace dividend, an incentive for peace. For this to happen, foreign oil companies must no longer claim ignorance of the human rights abuses that happen in the name of oil. The presence of the companies gives a justification and the means to expand the conflict. A code of conduct for these companies will not be sufficient action; Christian Aid is calling for the suspension of oil production in Sudan until there is a just and lasting peace agreement.

The group discussed possible advocacy strategies and targets for this work: including our own governments and oil industry. Christian Aid are using the example of Sudan to highlight the lack of regulation of multinationals' activities overseas and the incoherence of government policy which on the one hand seeks to promote peace in Sudan, but on the other allows (and sometimes encourages) investment to the oil sector which is directly linked to human rights abuses.

Conflict Diamonds and Logs of War:
In today's conflicts, rebel armies need to pay for arms and munitions, maintain troops and keep strategic allegiances alive, and will turn to any available commodity with a readily accessible market, including timber, animal trophies, gold or diamonds, to do so. **Patrick Alley** *presented research from* **Global Witness** *into the impact of the timber and diamond industries on instability in Sierra Leone and Liberia, including recommendations to the international community and commerce.*

Profits from the sale of diamonds from Sierra Leone and timber from Liberia have been used to prolong conflict in the region, with relationships between the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone and the government of Liberia cemented through mutual financial and strategic gain.

Conflict diamonds:
Diamonds are one of the most concentrated forms of wealth known to man and as a result they offer potentially huge financial returns. In addition they are small and easily concealed. They occur in many countries across the globe - many in Africa. They can be mined using sophisticated equipment and techniques or they can be dragged from the earth by hand often in terrible and unsafe conditions. Tragically Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are beset with a terrible paradox - enormous mineral wealth and devastating civil conflict.

Several of the most destabilising and destructive conflicts in Africa are partly funded through the mining and marketing of high-quality gem diamonds. These diamonds end up for sale in jewellery shops around the world as beautifully crafted gifts of love, a paradox that the international consumer is beginning to feel increasingly conscious and wary of. From consumers and retailers to importers, exporters, refineries and miners, the illicit profits from these industries rely on the complicity and ignorance of a long chain of individuals and institutions.

The diamond trade has failed to put recognisable or verifiable controls or certification in place that can reliably attach 'conflict-free' status to diamonds. In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front was transformed into a well-equipped and lethal fighting force due to the control and sale of high-value gem diamonds. The UN, despite deploying its largest ever peacekeeping force there, did not have a single member of staff responsible for monitoring diamonds. If any of these diamond-funded conflicts in Africa are to have a chance of peaceful conclusion then the international community must act swiftly and decisively to prohibit the sale and marketing of these 'blood diamonds'.

Since late 1998 there has been a shift in world opinion on the issue of conflict diamonds, which in itself is a new term. No longer is the soaking up of open market goods from areas of conflict deemed to be an inevitable consequence of the need to stabilise the world price of diamonds. Governments have ceased to accept an argument for non-interference, as have consumers. Indeed, perhaps most importantly, in terms of long-term change, the commercial part of the diamond industry has itself begun to change its position on this issue.

It is vital that a long-term solution to this very complex problem be found, and that can only work if some of the underlying structures are addressed. It is clear that there is a need to create a 'chain of custody' within the diamond trade - an auditable trail from the mine to the consumer that can work with existing structures and patterns of trade. Global Witness has developed a number of key recommendations for governments and commercial sectors to use in developing controls to reduce the flow of conflict goods. Initial research identified applicable technology that is developed, or being developed, including systems that can record and identify individual surface profiles of rough stones, and mark with codes and logos rough and cut diamonds. A system using elements of these coupled with improved regimes in exporting countries could be used as a basis for reform by both governments and trade.

Logs of War:
It is evident that the forestry industry in Liberia is helping to arm and prolong conflict in the region and will continue to do so unless it faces restrictions. As long as President Charles Taylor has access to revenue generated from this industry, it is unlikely that regional stability will be a reality, with Liberians facing human rights abuses, loss of income to the Treasury and environmental degradation.

Liberia's timber industry is actively involved in regional insecurity, support to RUF in Sierra Leone, and thus the UN Security Council recognise the importance of considering an embargo on Liberian timber exports . However, Resolution 1343 (2001) excludes restrictions on Liberian timber exports. *Global Witness* maintains that, for a real and effective solution to escalating regional insecurity, an embargo on the exportation and transport of Liberian timber, and its importation into other countries as well as an investigation into the Liberian timber industry must be imposed. Left as it is, the strong link between the timber industry, President Charles Taylor and regional conflict will remain intact and UN efforts to bring peace and security to the region will be undermined.

> For more information on these issues, including the report on conflict diamonds and recommendations in full, see the Global Witness website on www.globalwitness.org

Unpicking human relationships:
The next three workshops broadened the analysis of conflict to explore the human relationships underlying macro processes, including gender relations and the normative models of masculinity, and the costs of internal displacement.

Gender and conflict:
This workshop was an opportunity to hear about three pieces of research into aspects of gender and conflict: the situation of women refugees in East Africa; oral history research in Somalia by Acord; and recent work by International Alert.

Security for women refugees:
*Research carried out by **Edward Mogire** into the situation of women refugees in Kenya and Tanzania shows how women and girls face double the problems and challenges facing refugees, as the patriarchal structures and ideology remains operational in the refugee camps.*

Refugees in camps face many problems, but some are gender specific. The governments of host countries regard refugees as a security and economic threat, and their policies reflect this, with restrictions on freedom of movement and location of camps in geographically hostile areas with little access to means of survival creating dependency on food aid.

Within the camps women alone are responsible for the upkeep of children and other vulnerable groups, rape and sexual violence is commonplace and the fertility rate is significantly higher than outside. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, and perpetrated by refugees, officials and host communities, with men offering little protection or support in many cases. Women also abuse other women, particularly of other tribes or nationalities.

The dependency on aid from the UNHCR disrupts the usual relationship between husband and wife, and gender roles are shifting. Aid agencies tend to target women, creating further tension, as men feel marginalised from the process of change.

Gender and Conflict: the work of ACORD:
Judy El-Bushra profiled some ongoing research aiming to examine the connections between gender and development approach and work in conflict situations in five African countries.

The areas of conflict analysis and gender analysis have been at cross-purposes for many years, with the former focussing on big players and relationships, and the latter offering analysis of linkages on the ground but not able to articulate findings in an accessible or meaningful way. The aim of the research has been to develop conceptual tools to relate the two approaches.

The focus of gender and development has been on women's economic autonomy, but this does not resonate with people on the ground, who in most cases do not desire autonomy but strong, positive relationships with mutual respect. The literature on gender, development, masculinity and violence also has interesting points to make but fails to match up to realities on the ground.

For this reason the research project was initiated, aiming to listen to people's opinions about how conflict affects them and how they are involved in five countries: Angola, Mali, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The methodology is built around oral history

collection: women's and men's experiences, memories and the changes in their lives and prospects for the future.

Hypotheses:
The research was based on an understanding of gender as the relationship between men and women, not exclusively focusing on women. People's testimonies were gathered to test the following hypotheses:

- Economic, social and political domains are interrelated, of equal importance and difficult to separate;
- Understanding conflict requires an understanding of what makes up peoples' identity, what gives them power and what values underpin their actions;
- Gender inequalities are manifest at all levels and links between them are traceable.

> "I maintain my husband and his father in Mogadishu. He is unemployed. What else can he do if the government service is not available? He has retreated to the house and the mosque and he doesn't come out. Him and his father have been sitting and waiting for me just like my children for the 10 years of the civil war."

Findings so far:
With the oral testimonies that have been received so far, it is possible to test tentatively the hypotheses. Initially it is notable that people's memories of what happened in conflict are very sharp. They are able to recount terrible events in precise detail and the impact of these experiences is still being felt in their relationships. Also, people are very clear in their analysis of what was happening in the country and identifying the changes which need to take place. The role of the state in controlling conflict is well understood.

So far the hypotheses have been borne out with the testimonies received.

- Conflict has created radical changes in social relations of all kinds, not just gender relations but between groups at community level, with reduced collaboration between neighbouring clans and groups.
- There have been changes in production relations, with money playing a more important role in exchange and production and those with power able to extort money from those who need services.
- Existing power relations are exacerbated through war.
- Things become commonplace which are against people's values, and the importance of a solid moral code increases, as a way of distancing from those who are committing the rapes and lootings.
- There is a lot of despair. People have been living a nightmare for many years and don't see any chance of improvement, nihilism.

> "Before, they used to share with us what ever we eat, what ever we used to need from them we used to get it, but now since the conflict started, the matter changed to clanism, with everyone providing assistance only to his clansman."

> "What people used to shy away from, now they are proud of it. What used to be our customs, values have all been violated."

> "The impact of war in this country has reached a level where its difficult for the country to recover for 40 years... you see a government is unable to be formed?"

Even these initial outcomes show the value of really listening to people, and this needs to become a fundamental part of policy and programming work.

Collapsing masculinities: conflict in northern Uganda
Chris Dolan held a workshop looking at models of masculinity, conflict and the role of the state with reference to Northern Uganda. The forms of socialisation of men and women lead to expectations of behaviour and interrelations. In a situation of conflict men are often unable to meet these expectations and are exposed to psychological pressure which encourages violence and increased conflict.

Chris Dolan argued that this socialisation can be manipulated for political ends and the responsibility for violence emerging from such socialisation lies as much with the state, for promoting normative models of masculinity, as with culture and individual men and women.

The case of Uganda:
During the war in North Uganda serious violence, including rape, abductions, amputations and looting, was commonplace, people were displaced inside and outside the district and infrastructure and social services were destroyed. There were peace initiatives but these were not genuine and windows of peace were never long enough to enable recovery from this destruction and violence.

… the normative model of masculinity:
The model of masculinity and expectations described is homogenous, and clearly real lives never fit perfectly into such generalisations. However, it is very powerful in Uganda and as such is useful to understand the overall situation. The fact that men don't conform to the model does not mean it has no power over them and their expectations.

- *Women*: are considered to be weaker and expected to conform and respect men. They like children, like to gossip, can't be trusted, can't cooperate, don't own assets and do domestic work.
- *Men*: are supposed to do provide protection for their families. They do well at school, work, marry and provide children.

The expectation that men will protect and provide for women and children is key to the emergence of violence and frustration. In a situation of war there is little access to education, land, work or security. Men are unable to protect their families or obtain protection from the army, and are left watching abuses being carried out. The abuse of a person you are supposed to protect can undermine your very identity, leading to violence and self-abuse.

In refugee camps patriarchy is further decayed as men lose their position as head of the family and, as men lose their traditional roles, aid agencies come in to fill the vacuum and women are galvanised into increased participation. However, the changes in the role of women does not signify a change in ideology: boys are still favoured for education over girls, and post-conflict the patriarch reasserts his status and regain their traditional roles.

Creating alternative models:
In order to redefine masculinity it is necessary to listen to and understand the views of both women and men on femininity and masculinity. Research in Niger showed that men

had very little positive to say about themselves, while women spoke more about stereotypes than reality. Women play an important role in socialising boys and girls into their expected roles and it is only honest communication between men and women about their roles and expectations that can make change.

The costs of internal displacement: implications for programming and policy

Fiona Clark and Nadia Saim from HelpAge International ran a workshop looking at the impact of internal displacement on individuals, communities and societies at war. A presentation explored the characteristics and needs of internally displaced people (IDPs), and groups discussed the human, social and economic impact of displacement at various levels.

It is estimated that 23 million people are displaced within their countries worldwide, but the lack of reliable data means that these estimates are likely to in fact be higher. Internally displaced people have similar needs and problems to refugees, but as they remain within their national borders they are the responsibility of their own government, which is often the same authority whose repression caused displacement.

… social stigma:

IDPs are often treated by the host communities with great suspicion, assumed to be either targets of, or associated with, rebel forces. This stigma is increased where the arrival of displaced people is associated with rising crime, overcrowding or unemployment. However, in many cases the new arrivals have previously been wage earners and house owners and find it difficult to adapt to receiving handouts. In forming humanitarian responses and rehabilitation programmes it is important to begin with skills assessments as well as needs assessments. Protection should not be at the expense of people's own efforts to improve their situation, the experience and capacity of displaced people must be recognised and enhanced.

… lack of reliable data:

Few concrete facts are known about the numbers, whereabouts or conditions of IDPs. Furthermore, internal displacement does not necessarily happen en masse, but is often a steady trickle of families leaving to stay with relatives or friends in safer areas of the country. It is clear that most IDPs are women and children, while men are more often killed or recruited to fight but distinctions within that, in terms of age and social structure, are very vague.

… legal status:

IDPs are usually required to be registered in order to access humanitarian aid, and for this they need identity papers. In many cases these are lost, left behind, or in the case of older people, non-existent. In some cases where borders of a country are redrawn people can find themselves outside of their country of origin without the appropriate papers with implications for citizenship and welfare.

... older people:
HelpAge International have conducted an assessment of older people in emergencies and found that they are the most vulnerable group among internally displaced people. Their needs are often left out of mainstream services, they are not listened to or understood and their potential to contribute directly and indirectly to economic and social regeneration is often ignored. They are more likely to be without legal papers, meaning that their access to protection of rights is denied.

Discussion: the cost of internal displacement
Groups were asked to discuss internal displacement in terms of human, social and economic costs at individual, local and national levels. However, they quickly found that this framework was too rigid for a meaningful discussion. The situations which create large internally displaced populations can be very diverse and context specific, and although forced migration through conflict is not a positive situation overall, to be limited to looking at costs is to deny the complexity of such situations.

One group suggested looking at the phenomenon in terms of change, rather than costs, caused by forced migration. When people are displaced the structure of the local and national economy changes, as do individuals, and will not return to prior forms. There will inevitably be negative and positive elements to these changes.

… defining IDPs:
In order to discuss the impact of internal displacement it is important to agree a definition, and the category of IDPs, although defined legally in the same way as refugees but within the national borders, is problematic. To define IDPs is to suggest that it is a separate category of people worthy of aid in a way that others aren't. However, comprehensive responses will look at whole communities, rather than risk increasing friction by targeting newcomers only. Also, the category seems to imply that people belong in one place and will return home at some point, but displacement is a subjective state and can end without people moving back to their original home.

… making connections:
Few of the impacts of displacement can be contained within a single level or type of activity or relationship. In a situation of displacement due to conflict, trauma will impact on human, social and economic relations at all levels.

Displacement often means urbanisation, as people move in from rural areas, and this has economic impact as infrastructure and social systems are overloaded and an informal economy grows to fill gaps. As the countryside empties patterns of production change and food security is threatened. Programmes which provide humanitarian assistance to displaced people can encourage people to continue registering as displaced and slow the process of integration. All of these economic factors have human and social costs at community and individual levels.

At individual level, displacement is primarily a loss of access to rights, social status, assets and space in the labour market and vulnerability to persecution. In conflict situations, displacement may create new congregations of aggrieved people in one place,

intensifying political tension and conflict. Also, as community structures are broken down, traditional coping mechanisms are weakened and trauma increased.

… implications for humanitarian aid:
Internally displaced people are the responsibility of the state, and it is important to include them in any international response. The diverse characteristics of internally displaced communities requires responses to be rooted in an understanding of the situation on the ground, the profile of both displaced people and their host communities, and in particular an assessment of their capacity for self-help. The way in which the arrival of displaced people is managed can have a tremendous impact on the relations between the hosts and new arrivals: diversity can be used positively, or can increase conflict.

Responding to conflict: roles, responsibilities and capacity
The capacity and responsibility to respond to conflict and contribute to peace building is spread among many groups and institutions. Several workshops offered the opportunity to discuss the role and capacity of donors and Diaspora, and another looked at roles and responsibilities in tackling the problem of small arms trade and abuse.

UK NGO/ donor relations in the conflict transformation field
***Andy Carl,** of **Conciliation Resources**, and **Richard Graham** of **Comic Relief** facilitated this workshop for participants to explore key issues which they felt needed to be addressed in changing the relations between donors and NGOs undertaking conflict-related work. The workshop sought to identify an agenda of issues where change is needed, and participants were encouraged to articulate how improved relationships and practices could work.*

UK-based donors have made an enormous commitment to conflict resolution, prevention and management over the last decade. The CODEP conference provided an opportunity for this community of organisations, agencies and individuals engaged in this field to reflect on current practices and think strategically about (re)defining future NGO-Donor relationships. The conference is particularly timely given the beginning of the second term of New Labour's administration. The outcome of the session is summarised below:

Key issues in the donor/NGO relationship which need to be addressed:
Increased Flexibility:
- What are the types of activities and organisations donors will fund?
- There is limited core funding, and continuity of funding is difficult;
- Too much bureaucracy;
- There need to be more resources available for consultation and reflection, rather than just pursuing projects;
- There should be more focus on qualitative indicators

Improved Communication:
- Donors are not transparent enough themselves, there is a communication gap;
- There is a lack of shared understanding of problems, roles and responsibilities;
- There is competition for resources among NGOs, local and international due to the small amount of funds available. NGOs should be able to collaborate and network to put on a common front.

Ownership:
- People on the ground do not control the funding cycles – donors dictate the process.

What does the ideal relationship look like?
- Projects well researched, activities and programmes transparent and long-term funding committed to programmes for the benefit of all actors;
- Resources should be committed to 'think' as well as 'act' in programme work;
- Shared analysis with the owners of the problems
- Self-managed, horizontal network of all recipients manage funds supplied by a combination of corporate donors – the model of a co-op, not the Bank.

What can we do to improve things?
Flexibility:
1. NGOs should lobby donors to be more transparent about policy and priorities, with more open budget lines. "Good donor practice' guidelines should be agreed;
2. Emergency funds should be in reserve for immediate availability;
3. Prepare research and concrete policy paper on the importance of flexibility to convince donors;
4. CODEP could organise an annual poll to rate the best and worst donors as a sort of reverse accountability;

Communication:
1. There should be networking to agree ways improving communications;
2. The Rowntrees model of consultation with grantees and stakeholders on sectoral and geographic priorities in grant allocation should be extended;
3. There should be workshops, including stakeholders, to discuss directions;
4. There should be openness in all relationships, with the ability to discuss failures as well as success;
5. Time needs to be set aside for research and consultation.

Ownership:
1. There should be more participatory approaches on both sides, with greater participation of beneficiaries;
2. There need to be more opportunities for beneficiaries and local NGOs to engage directly with donors (meet face to face);
3. Beneficiaries could network together to influence donors;
4. Stakeholders should be able to choose which NGO to work with, as in a market system, while the NGOs choose the areas of their work.

EU policies and mechanisms in times of war: foundations, practice & realities
*Jane Backhurst of **World Vision** ran a workshop to explore the EU's main instruments for crisis management and response at both supranational and intergovernmental levels, and how these work in practice. The group then discussed options for addressing dilemmas in policy implementation with EU policy makers.*

Foundations, Policies, and Instruments

There are three main pillars of European Union policy and resources in relation to civilian crisis management. The first is humanitarian aid, provided through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in partnership with NGOs. Recent communications have focused on conflict prevention, human rights and democracy and linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

The second pillar is the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy, which includes military crisis management procedures, common strategies and positions, joint actions, political dialogue, special envoys, declarations and sanctions. This covers the Rapid Reaction Force.

A third pillar covers policing, drugs policy, asylum and immigration policy. From these three pillars the main instruments of response are pooled, including humanitarian aid, emergency and rescue services, border controls, police deployment and training, arms control and destruction, rehabilitation and reconstruction, support for human rights and democracy.

Challenges in EU response to conflict:

Support for these EU resources and instruments must be secured at the level of the member state, and debate tends to surround national interests rather than issues of common concern. More political will is needed for investment in areas of conflict, particularly in accession countries.

More coherence is needed: between policies, including trade, small arms, agriculture, aid etc; between rhetoric and practice; and between the policies of member states and the EU to avoid parallel diplomatic initiatives. Resources need to be pooled, for military intelligence and early warning capacity for example, between member states to ensure the most thorough and complementary response.

Approaches are shifting, away from emergency humanitarian aid towards a more strategic approach to development cooperation, working through partnerships with NGOs, providing more aid to UN agencies, focusing on capacity building and promotion of good governance, including discussion of tools such as smart sanctions. In terms of conflict prevention, more long-term structural programmes are targeted for financial support.

Discussion:
These developments in the military and political force of the EU are all happening very quickly, and some member states are not fully on board, would rather delay the processes.   Whether it is leading to a positive or negative result depends on whether the rhetoric of poverty reduction, conflict prevention, democratisation and capacity building can be delivered. Without transparency and strong consultation with NGOs the danger is that aid will be militarised through the process.

Some people in the workshop group felt that NGOs could be considered to have more legitimacy than these EU mechanisms, because of their close relationships with people on the ground in conflict situations. However, there are different roles and relationships, with politicians taking strategies for peace and issues of common concern forward, and NGOs working on development education.

Challenges and roles – diaspora and peace in West Africa

Jeanette Eno facilitated this workshop, with several resource persons from the Sierra Leonean and Liberian diaspora in the UK, to reach an understanding of the meaning of diaspora, discuss relationships within diaspora and between them and nationals at home, and examine the potential role of the diaspora as a constructive force in the management of conflicts and peace building.

The nature of diaspora:
Ambrose Ganda gave a general profile of diaspora groups. Diasporas are not homogenous groups, and there are complex relationships both within them and between them and the home populations. Some people residing abroad may have no direct links, while others have regular contact. There is also the broader Sierra Leonean community in the UK, which includes people who are born of Sierra Leonean parents born here. Furthermore, there are those who consider themselves in exile, who occupy a different space, often wielding some political influence back home and playing an active role in the conflict.

The nature of the diaspora depends on the context, both host country and origins. The diaspora is largely made up of independent people interested in their own progress, economic, security or education for example. Africans living in rich countries gain skills, education, work experience and capital which could be well harnessed for development in the home country, but members of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian diasporas in the UK explained how conflicts in the home countries can easily be replicated here, making homogenous action difficult to achieve.

The contribution of the diaspora:
People living in the UK might contribute to the economy through transfers and holidays, and can be mobilised around welfare missions, especially at times of immediate crisis such as a coup, but sustained interest and strategic action is more difficult to achieve. This problem can be partly overcome by creating groups focussing on very tight, single issues but once agendas are broadened such associations fall victim to the same divides

creating conflict in the home country. The Sierra Leonean diaspora do not even appear to mobilise around their own right to vote in their home country, due to loss of faith in the political system there, or lack of interest.

The Liberian experience in the UK:
Thomas Jaye explained how the Liberia Community Association explained how, perhaps due to the small size of the Liberian community in London, they had managed to engage with warlords coming through London, to listen to them and confront them in an attempt to seek a peaceful path for their country. They also organise development education seminars to mobilise the opinion of Liberian people and educate the wider British public. Although it is not easy to motivate and unite people, it has been possible to some degree, moving from a welfare-based organisation towards a more strategic purpose.

The home country perspective:
Dennis Bright was able to provide a 'stay-home perspective' of the diaspora in a conflict situation. In 1997 when a lot of Sierra Leoneans were forced to flee to neighbouring countries they found a lot of support in the diaspora. The conflict brought a feeling of solidarity between those outside and those within Sierra Leone, people perceiving the diaspora to be "*a solid cohesive force standing by their fellow countrymen.*"

In other situations, such as Somalia, there can often be resentment against people who have moved away during the war, and apparently missed the suffering. This is a real problem for a country in reconstruction, as it is difficult to reverse the brain drain if people do not feel they are well received on their return. However, if one re-enters with humility, listens to people rather than telling them what to do, and negotiates openly a new space in the community, this resentment can be lessened.

The diaspora and the international community:
Michael Wundah explained that the relationship between the international community and the diaspora is very important to consider. Northern NGOs tend to ignore the diaspora, although they can provide a source of information for foreign NGOs going to work in that country, although this raises questions of legitimacy of diaspora to represent home populations.   DfID, for example, are aware of getting unwittingly caught up in partisanship through lack of understanding of the complexities of the diaspora. Although British troops underwent training with Sierra Leoneans in London before being despatched to Sierra Leone, this has produced mixed reactions within the diaspora.

What can be done to mobilise the diaspora?
Dennis Bright suggested areas of priority for the diaspora to mobilise around. These include:
  - mental health: The population is traumatised, and there is only one psychiatric hospital and one psychiatrist in the country. Many children are being turned in by the RUF who have been uprooted, militarised, taken drugs and are now on the streets in Freetown. There is also a need for resources and expertise on drug rehabilitation.
  - It is anticipated that there will be an explosion of HIV as people come from the bush into the cities. Furthermore, the apparent opulence of the

> peacekeepers in the country is creating a situation of high sexual activity, and both reproductive and preventative health interventions are needed.
>
> - Decentralised cooperation is key, more modest strategies than large bilateral aid, but making linkages at local government level with different countries and institutions within those countries.

Tackling small arms abuse in Africa:

*The majority of the wars occurring around the world now are fought with small arms – such as handguns, machine guns, grenades and rifles – readily available, inexpensive and able to be fired and transported by a single person. The availability of these arms fuel conflict and prolong insecurity in post-conflict situations. A concerted international effort is needed to control production and trafficking of small arms, but this is problematic as, unlike landmines, these weapons have a legitimate function for use in the rule of law. **Brian Wood** of **Amnesty International** held a workshop to explore these issues and ways forward.*

Why small arms?

Small arms are ubiquitous in conflict and post-conflict societies, partly because of the large surplus stocks in Warsaw Pact countries and the development of new weapons which are smaller, lighter and easier to smuggle. To concentrate on the role of armed rebels in their import and use is to ignore the important area of policing. Where the police are well paid and trained the transition to peace may be more successful, but in many places the police themselves are feared and corrupt and citizens feel the need to own their own guns to avoid intimidation. In many current conflicts the use of child soldiers is increasing, precisely because of the availability of weapons small enough for children to carry and use.

Small arms trafficking:

Transnational networks of brokers, dealers, financiers and transporters are the key players in small arms markets, yet most states do not even register them, let alone require each of their deals to be licensed. Small arms from lawful markets make their way to illicit outlets through a variety of means, from illegal sales, thefts and brokering to unlawful authorisation by states. Export licenses may last forever, and import licenses can in some cases be easily falsified. Weapons confiscated from rebels or criminal gangs can find their way back onto the black market.

In some cases prominent public and military figures are involved, and source countries do not do enough to hold brokers accountable. There are examples of French, German and South African brokers dealing with governments and rebels in countries such as Rwanda during conflict. The UK government refused to prosecute UK arms brokers who supplied the Rwandan genocide because officially the arms were sold to neighbouring Zaire. Switzerland, which has a policy not to export arms to countries with armed conflict, currently exports arms to Algeria.

43

What can be done:

The unregulated trade in small arms is responsible for death and suffering, and it is important to raise awareness of the issues and shift public opinion to advocate for government accountability for this trade. From 9-20 July this year the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons to be held in New York, bringing together world governments to address this critical development and human rights issue. The only current protocol to cover the trade of small arms is the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime, but this does not cover the transfer between governments.

For more information on the campaign against small arms trafficking look at the website www.nisat.org, or for information on the upcoming conference look at www.un.org

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Final Evaluation:

The final session of the conference offered participants the opportunity to share their feelings about the event, key issues arising and implications for future work.

Key issues:

James Oporia Ekwaro noted that the analysis of the political economy of conflict had been neglected for too long, and the Conference offered the opportunity to stretch economic tools of analysis to conflict and genocide. Denis Bright was pleased to have had the opportunity to learn more about what globalisation means, new forms of imperialism and the impact on the conflicts we live with.

Kate Graham welcomed the move away from comfortable, tangible dichotomies towards a more complex understanding of the world, but pointed out that questions of how this translates into practice remain unresolved. Muna Khugali picked up on the focus on roles and relationships, noting that more exploration of the concept of 'peace building' is needed in relation to the empowerment of grassroots actors.

Other issues identified included:
- The importance of recognising complexity and resisting simple solutions
- The need to open up links between different discourses
- The limitations of orthodox tools to understand conflict. *We need to meet again to find better tools suited to context specific understanding of conflict*
- The importance of sharing problems and discussing issues. *We need to make dialogue between the types of people at the conference more sustained*
- The need to base development policy on political, social and cultural analysis
- While analysis of political economy is critical we must ensure we hold on to our definition of that
- Being aware of the positive aspects of conflict and avoiding undermining this potential

- The need to develop appropriate strategies to respond to globalisation among most disenfranchised communities
- The evidence of growth in knowledge, competence, expertise and spread of this work
- The evidence of more systematic attention to gender issues in conflict
- The need to be more sensitive to people on the ground and aware of power relations between actors, including donors, INGOs and local communities
- The need for broader, long-term and intelligent analysis of the aid industry
- The need for tools for measuring *success* of government on peace and security, not judging functioning democracies by World Bank standards

It was also felt that the Conference focussed too much on African conflicts.

Implications for action:

James Oporia Ekwaro warned of the need to recognise that working in an NGO should never be a substitute for political action. As Samir Amin said, we need to come together to discuss an alternative system for social justice and struggle. Kate Graham felt that many of the speeches and workshops had challenged her sense of *personal responsibility*. One key impact of globalisation is that as individuals we have more power and responsibility than before, as consumers and also as citizens. We are all part of the processes leading to conflict and conflict resolution.

Other participants identified the following changes they would implement in their work:
- Pass the message on – be critical!
- Learn from colleagues
- Be aware that the critical analysis we do as students hasn't sunk down to all levels
- Listen more when implementing programmes
- Fight the World Trade Organisation
- Use qualitative analysis to understand emergency situation
- Be more sympathetic to dilemmas faced by bilaterals and NGOs
- Relate globalisation to other issues
- Being thinking workers – at every level

And a recommendation for the next conference was to hold a virtual conference in the South beforehand to feed in to the physical meeting, allowing broader participation. It was also felt that more balance between testimonials of people on the ground and academic theory.