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Francis Bacon (1561-1626): The Proficience and Advancement of Learning (London, 1605).
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EDITORIAL COMMENT: First published as
"The tvvoo bookes of Francis Bacon, of the proficience and aduancement of
learning, diuine and humane. To the King. At London: Printed for Henrie Tomes
[...] 1605."
Text based
on G.W. Kitchin's 1861 edition. Paragraph sections according to J. Spedding's
1854 edition. Chapter and
section numerals of W.A. Wright's 1869 edition have also been included. Paragraph
sections of Spedding's 1854 edition that were apparently disregarded in
Wright's 1869 textual analysis are marked as omissions [--]. Page
numbering of J. Spedding's 1854 edition has been added in bold
square brackets in the following manner: to avoid word separation, page
numbers precede words that were separated in the original edition. Greek words
and sentences have been enclosed within angle brackets < > and will be rendered as Greek
characters with appropriate True Type Fonts like Scholars Press' Ionic
(SPIonic). Quotations within paragraphs have been capitalized. Spedding's marginal titles and italics within
the text had to be omitted as well as his tables. Please consult recent
editions for translations and references for Bacon's quotations.
THE TWO
BOOKS OF
FRANCIS
BACON,
OF THE
PROFICIENCE
AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,
DIVINE AND
HUMAN.
THE FIRST
BOOK
To the King
1. THERE
were under the law, excellent King, both daily Sacrifices and free-will
offerings; the one proceeding upon ordinary Observance, the other upon a devout
cheerfulness: in like manner there belongeth to Kings from their servants both
tribute of duty and presents of affection. In the former of these I hope I
shall not live to be wanting, according to my most humble duty, and the good
pleasure of your Majesty's employments: for the latter, I thought it more respective
to make choice of some oblation, which might rather refer to the propriety and
excellency of your individual person, than to the business of your crown and
state.
2. Wherefore,
representing your Majesty many times unto my mind, and beholding you, not with
the inquisitive eye of presumption, to discover that which the Scripture
telleth me is inscrutable, but with the observant eye of duty and admiration;
leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been touched,
yea, and possessed with an extreme wonder at those your virtues and faculties, which
the Philosophers call intellectual; the largeness of your capacity, the
faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of your apprehension, te penetration
of your judgment, and the facility and order of your elocution: and I have
often thought that of all the persons living that I have known, your Majesty
were the best instance to make a man of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge is
but remembrance, and that the mind of man by nature knoweth all things, and
hath but her own native and original notions [1605: "motions"; 1629;
1633: "notions"] (which by
the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered)
again revived and restored: such a light of nature I have observed in your
Majesty, and such a readiness to take flame and blaze from the least occasion presented,
or the least spark of another's knowledge delivered. And as the Scripture saith
of the wisest king, THAT HIS HEART WAS AS THE SANDS OF THE SEA, which though it
be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest
portions; so hath God given your Majesty a composition of understanding
admirable, being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and
nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least; whereas it should seem an impossibility
in nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for great and small works.
And for your gift of speech, I call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of
Augustus Caesar: AUGUSTO PROFLUENS, ET QUAE PRINCIPEM DECERET, ELOQUENTIA FUIT.
For, if we note it well, speech that is uttered with labour and difficulty, or speech
that savoureth of the affectation of art and precepts, or speech that is framed
after the imitation of some pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent;
all this hath somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But your Majesty's
manner of speech is indeed prince-like, bowing as from a fountain, and yet
streaming and branching itself into nature's order, full of facility and
felicity, imitating none, and inimitable by any. And as in your civil estate there
appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your majesty's virtue with your
fortune; a virtuous disposition with a fortunate regiment; a virtuous expectation
(when time [2] was) of your greater fortune, with a prosperous possession
thereof in the due time; a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage, with
most blessed and happy fruit of marriage; a virtuous and most Christian desire
of peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes thereunto: so
likewise, in these intellectual matters, there seemeth to be no less contention
between the excellency of your Majesty's gifts of nature, and the universality
and perfection [1605: profection] of your learning. For I am well assured that
this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive and measured truth;
which is, that there hath not been since Christ's time any King or temporal
Monarch, which has been so learned in all literature and erudition, divine and
human. For let a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the succession
of the emperors of Rome; of which Caesar the Dictator, who lived some years
before Christ, and Marcus Antoninus were the best learned; and so descend, to
the emperors of Graecia, or of the West; and then to the lines of France,
Spain, England, Scotland, and the rest, and he shall find this judgment is truly
made. For it seemeth much in a King, if, by the compendious extractions of
other men's wits and labours, he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and
shows of learning; or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned men:
but to drink indeed of the true fountains of learning, nay, to have such a
fountain of learning in himself, in a King, and in a King born, is almost a
miracle. And the more, because there is met in your Majesty a rare conjunction
as well of divine and sacred literature, as of profane and human; so as your Majesty
standeth invested of that triplicity, which in great veneration was ascribed to
the ancient Hermes; the power and fortune of a king, the knowledge and
illumination of a priest, and the learning and universality of a philosopher. This
propriety inherent [the logical PROPRIUM QUOD CONSEQUITUR ESSENTIAM REI] and
individual attribute in your Majesty deserveth to be expressed not only in the fame
and admiration of the present time, nor in the history or tradition of the ages
succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed memorial, and immortal monument,
bearing a character or signature both of the power of a King, and the
difference and perfection of such a King.
3. Therefore
I did conclude with myself, that I could not make unto your Majesty a better
oblation than of some Treatise tending to that end, whereof the sum will
consist of these two parts; the former, concerning the excellency of Learning
and Knowledge, and the excellency of the merit and true glory in the
augmentation and propagation thereof: the latter, what the particular acts and
works are, which have been embraced and undertaken for the Advancement of Learning;
and again, what defects and undervalues I find in such particular acts: to the
end, that though I cannot positively or affirmatively advise your Majesty, or
propound unto you framed particulars; yet I may excite your princely
cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your own mind, and thence to
extract particulars for this purpose, agreeably to your magnanimity and wisdom.
I. 1. IN
the entrance to the former of these, to clear the way, and as it were to make
silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the dignity of Learning to be
better heard, without the interruption of tacit objections, I think good to
deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath received; all from
ignorance; but ignorance severally disguised, appearing sometimes in the zeal
and jealousy of Divines; sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of Politiques;
and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.
2. I hear
the former sort say, that Knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted
of with great limitation and caution, that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge
was the original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man, that
Knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore where it entereth
into a man it makes him swell; SCIENTIA INFLAT: that Salomon gives a censure, THAT
THERE IS NO END OF MAKING BOOKS, AND THAT MUCH READING IS WEARINESS OF THE
FLESH, and again in another place, THAT IN SPACIOUS KNOWLEDGE THERE IS MUCH
CONTRISTATION, AND THAT HE THAT INCREASETH KNOWLEDGE INCREASETH ANXIETY, that
St. Paul gives a caveat, THAT WE BE NOT SPOILED THROUGH VAIN PHILOSOPHY, that
experience demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how learned
times have been inclined to atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes
derogate from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.
3. To
discover then the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the misunderstanding
in the grounds therof, it may well appear these men do not observe or consider
that it was not the pure knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge by
the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in paradise, as they
were brought before him, according unto their proprieties, which gave the
occasion to the fall: but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with go intent
in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God's commandments,
which was the form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge,
how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill,
much less extend the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God; and therefore
Salomon, speaking of the two principal senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear,
affirmeth that the eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with
hearing; and if there be no fulness,
then is the continent greater than the content: so of knowledge itself, and the
mind of man, whereto the senses are but reporters, he defineth likewise in these
words, placed after that Kalendar or Ephemerides, which he maketh of the
diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes; and concludeth
thus: GOD HATH MADE ALL THINGS BEAUTIFUL, OR DECENT, IN THE TRUE RETURN OF
THEIR SEASONS: ALSO HE HATH PLACED THE WORLD IN MAN'S HEART, YET CANNOT MAN
FIND OUT THE WORK WHICH GOD WORKETH FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END: declaring
not obscurely, that God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass,
capable of the image of the [3] universal world, and joyful to receive the impression
thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only delighted in
beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but raised also to
find out and discern the ordinances and decrees, which throughout all those
changes are infallibly observed. And although he doth insinuate that the
supreme or summary law of nature, which he calleth THE WORK WHICH GOD WORKETH
FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END, is not possible to be found out by man; yet that
doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind, but may be referred to the
impediments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition
of knowledge over from hand to hand, and many other inconveniences, whereunto
the condition of man is subject. For that nothing parcel of the world is denied
to man's inquiry and invention, he doth in another place rule over, when he
saith, THE SPIRIT OF MAN IS AS THE LAMP OF GOD, WHEREWITH HE SEARCHETH THE INWARDNESS
OF ALL SECRETS. If then such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it
is manifest that there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of
knowledge, how large soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass
itself; no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in quantity
more or less, if it be taken without the true corrective thereof, hath in it
some nature of venom or malignity, and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity
or swelling. This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh Knowledge so
sovereign, is Charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth to the former
clause: for so he saith, KNOWLEDGE BLOWETH UP, BUT CHARITY BUILDETH UP; not
unlike unto that which he delivereth in another place: IF I SPAKE, saith he,
WITH THE TONGUES OF MEN AND ANGELS, AND HAD NOT CHARITY, IT WERE BUT AS A
TINKLING CYMBAL; not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues
of men and angels, but because, if it be severed from charity, and not referred
to the good of men and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory,
than a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that censure of Salomon,
concerning the excess of writing and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit
which redoundeth from knowledge; and that admonition of St. Paul, THAT WE BE
NOT SEDUCED BY VAIN PHILOSOPHY; let those places be rightly understood, and
they do indeed excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby
human knowledge is confined and circumscribed; and yet without any such
contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal nature
of things; for these limitations are three: the first, THAT WE DO NOT SO PLACE
OUR FELICITY IN KNOWLEDGE, AS WE FORGET OUR MORTALITY: the second, THAT WE MAKE
APPLICATION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, TO GIVE OURSELVES REPOSE AND CONTENTMENT, AND NOT
DISTASTE OR REPINING: the third, THAT WE DO NOT PRESUME BY THE CONTEMPLATION OF
NATURE TO ATTAIN TO THE MYSTERIES OF GOD. For as touching the first of these,
Salomon doth excellently expound himself in another place of the same book,
where he saith: I SAW WELL THAT
KNOWLEDGE RECEDETH AS FAR FROM IGNORANCE AS LIGHT DOTH FROM DARKNESS; AND THAT
THE WISE MAN'S EYES KEEP WATCH IN HIS HEAD, WHEREAS THE FOOL ROUNDETH ABOUT IN
DARKNESS: BUT WITHAL I LEARNED, THAT THE SAME MORTALITY INVOLVETH THEM BOTH. And
for the second, certain it is, there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth
from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident; for all knowledge and wonder
(which is the seed of knowledge) is an impression of pleasure in itself: but
when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to
their particular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast
desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of:
for (gee knowledge is no more LUMEN SICCUM, whereof Heraclitus the profound said, LUMEN SICCUM OPTIMA ANIMA; but it becometh
LUMEN MADIDUM, OR MACERATUM, being steeped and infused in the humours of the
affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon,
and not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall think by view and
inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby
he may reveal unto himself the Nature or Will of God, then indeed is he spoiled
by vain philosophy: for the contemplation of God's creatures and works
produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but
having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge.
And therefore it was most aptly said by one of Plato's school, THAT THE SENSE
OF MAN CARRIETH A RESEMBLANCE WITH THE SUN, WHICH, AS WE SEE, OPENETH AND
REVEALETH ALL THE TERRESTRIAL GLOBE; BUT THEN AGAIN IT OBSCURETH AND CONCEALETH
THE STARS AND CELESTIAL GLOBE: SO DOTH
THE SENSE DISCOVER NATURAL THINGS, BUT IT DARKENETH AMD SHUTTETH UP DIVINE. And
hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that divers great learned men have
been heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the Deity
by the waxen wings of the senses. And as for the conceit that too much
knowledge should incline a man to Atheism, and that the ignorance of second
causes should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is the first cause;
first, it is good to ask the question which Job asked of his friends. WILL YOU
LIE FOR GOD, AS ONE MAN WILL DO FOR ANOTHER, TO GRATIFY HIM ? For certain it is that God worketh nothing
in nature but by second causes: and if they would have it otherwise believed, it
is mere imposture, as it were in favour towards God; and nothing else but to
offer to the Author of Truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But further, it is
an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial
knowledge of Philosophy may incline the mind of man to Atheism, but a further
proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to Religion: for in the entrance
of Philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer
themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some
oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on further, and seeth the
dependence of causes, and the works of Providence; then, according to the
allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's
chain must needs [4] be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. To conclude
therefore, let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied
moderation think or maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well studied
in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works; divinity or
philosophy: but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficience in
both; only let men beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling;
to use, and not to ostentation; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or
confound these learnings together.
II. 1. And
as for the disgraces which Learning receiveth from Politiques, they be of this
nature; that Learning doth soften men's minds, and makes them more unapt for
the honour and exercise of arms; that it doth mar and pervert men's
dispositions for matter of government and policy, in making them too curious
and irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory or positive by
strictness of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and overweening by reason of
the greatness of examples, or too incompatible and differing from the times by
reason of the dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert men's
travails from action and business, and bringeth them to a love of leisure and
privateness; and that it doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline,
whilst every man is more ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of this
conceit, Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that ever
lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage to Rome, and that the
young men of Rome began to flock about him, being allured with the sweetness
and majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate that
they should give him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should infect and
enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and at unawares bring in an
alteration of the manners and customs of the state. Out of the same conceit or
humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage of his country, and the
disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of separation between policy
and government, and between arts and sciences, in the verses so much renowned,
attributing and challenging the one to the Romans and leaving and yielding the
other to the Grecians:
Tu regere
imperio populos, Romane, memento, Hae tibi erunt artes, etc.
So likewise
we see that Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article of charge
and accusation against him, that he did, with the variety and power of his
discourses and disputations, withdraw young men from due reverence to the laws
and customs of their country, and that he did profess a dangerous and
pernicious science, which was, to make the worse matter seem the better, and to
suppress truth by force of eloquence and speech.
2. But
these, and the like imputations, have rather a countenance of gravity than any
ground of justice: for experience doth warrant, that both in persons and in
times, there hath been a meeting and concurrence in Learning and Arms,
flourishing and excelling in the same men and the same ages. For, as for men, there
cannot be a better nor the like instance, as of that pair, Alexander the Great
and Julius Cesar the Dictator; whereof the one was Aristotle's scholar in philosophy,
and the other was Cicero's rival in eloquence: or if any man had rather call
for scholars that were great generals, than generals that were great scholars,
let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian; whereof the one
was the first that abated the power of Sparta, and the other was the first that
made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of Persia. And this concurrence is yet
more visible in times than in persons, by how much an age is a greater object
than a man. For both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Graecia, and Rome, the same
times that are most renowned for arms, are likewise most admired for learning,
so that the greatest authors and philosophers, and the greatest captains and
governors have lived in the same ages. Neither can it otherwise be: for as in
man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much about an age, save
that the strength of the body cometh the more early: so in states Arms and Learning, whereof the one correspondeth to
the body, the other to the soul of man, have a concurrence or near sequence in times.
3. And for
matter of Policy and Government, that learning should rather hurt, than enable
thereunto, is a thing very improbable: we see it is accounted an error to
commit a natural body to empiric physicians, which commonly have a few pleasing
receipts whereupon they are confident and adventurous, but know neither the
causes of diseases, nor the complexions of patients, nor peril of accidents, nor
the true method of cures: we see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or
lawyers, which are only men of practice and not grounded in their books, who
are many times easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their
experience, to the prejudice of the causes they handle: so by like reason it
cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric
Statesmen, not well mingled with men grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it
is almost without instance contradictory that ever any government was
disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors. For howsoever it hath
been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable learned men by the names
of PEDANTES; yet in the records of time it appeareth, in many particulars, that
the governments of princes in minority (notwithstanding the infinite
disadvantage of that kind of state) have nevertheless excelled the government
of princes of mature age, even for that reason which they seek to traduce,
which is, that by that occasion the state hath been in the hands of PEDANTES;
for so was the state of Rome for the first five years, which are so much magnified,
during the minority of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, A PEDANTI; so it was
again, for ten years' space or more, during the minority of Gordianus the
younger, with great applause and contentation in the hands of Mistheus, A
PEDANTI: so was it before that, in the minority of Alexander Severus, in like
happiness, in hands not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the women, who
were aided by the teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the government
of the bishops of Rome, [5] as, by name, into the government of Pius Quintus,
and Sextus Quintus, in our times, who were both at their entrance esteemed but
as pedantical friars, and he shall find
that such popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer principles of estate,
than those which have ascended to the papacy from an education and breeding in
affairs of estate and courts of princes; for although men bred in learning are
perhaps to seek in points of convenience and accommodating for the present,
which the Italians call RAGIONI DI STATO, whereof the same Pius Quintus could not
hear spoken with patience, terming them inventions against religion and the
moral virtues; yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in
those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and moral virtue, which
if they be well and watchfully pursued, there will be seldom use of those
other, no more than of physic in a sound or well dieted body. Neither can the experience
of one man's life furnish examples and precedents for the events of one man's
life: for, as it happeneth sometimes that the grandchild, or other descendants,
resembleth the ancestor more than the son; so many times occurrences of present
times may sort better with ancient examples than with those of the latter or
immediate times; and lastly, the wit of one man can no more countervail learning
than one man's means can hold way with a common purse.
4. And as
for those particular seducements, or indispositions of the mind for policy and
government, which Learning is pretended to insinuate; if it be granted that any
such thing be, it must be remembered withal, that Learning ministereth in every
of them greater strength of medicine or remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition
or infirmity. For if by a secret operation it make men perplexed and
irresolute, on the other side by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon
what ground to resolve; yea, and how to carry things in suspense without
prejudice, till they resolve; if it make men positive and regular, it teacheth
them what things are in their nature demonstrative, and what are conjectural,
and as well the use of distinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of
principles and rules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of
examples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the errors of comparisons,
and all the cautions of application; so that in all these it doth rectify more
effectually than it can pervert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men's
minds much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of examples. For let
a man look into the errors of Clement the seventh, so lively described by
Guicciardine, who served under him, or into the errors of Cicero, painted out
by his own pencil in his Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being
irresolute. Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he will beware how he
be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the fable of Ixion, and it will
hold him from being vaporous or imaginative. Let him look into the errors of
Cato the second, and he will never be one of the ANTIPODES, to tread opposite
to the present world.
5. And for
the conceit that Learning should dispose men to leisure and privateness, and
make men slothful; it were a strange thing if that which accustometh the mind
to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce slothfulness: whereas
contrariwise it may be truly affirmed, that no kind of men love business for
itself but those that are learned: for other persons love it for profit, as a
hireling, that loves the work for the wages; or for honour, as because it beareth
them up in the eyes of men, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise
would wear; or because it putteth them in mind of their fortune, and giveth
them occasion to pleasure and displeasure; or because it exerciseth some
faculty wherein they take pride, and so entertaineth them in good humour and
pleasing conceits towards themselves; or because it advanceth any other their
ends. So that, as it is said of untrue valours, that some men's valours are in
the eyes of them that look on; so such men's industries are in the eyes of others,
or at least in regard of their own designments: only learned men love business
as an action according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind as exercise is
to health of body, taking pleasure in the action itself, and not in the
purchase: for that of all men they are the most indefatigable, if it be towards
any business which can hold or detain their mind.
6. And if
any man be laborious in reading and study and yet idle in business and action,
it groweth from some weakness of body or softness of spirit; such as Seneca
speaketh of: QUIDAM TAM SUNT UMBRATILES, UT PUTENT IN TURBIDO ESSE QUICQUID IN
LUCE EST, and not of Learning: well may it be that such a point of a man's
nature may make him give himself to Learning, but it is not learning that breedeth
any such point in his nature.
7. And that
Learning should take up too much time or leisure; I answer, the most active or
busy man that hath been or can be, hath, no question, many vacant times of
leisure, while he expecteth the times and returns of business (except he be
either tedious and of no dispatch, or lightly and unworthily ambitious to meddle
in things that may be better done by others:) and then the question is, but how
these spaces and times of leisure shall be filled and spent; whether in
pleasures or in studies; as was well answered by Demosthenes to his adversary
Aeschines, that was a man given to pleasure, and told him, THAT HIS ORATIONS
DID SMELL OF THE LAMP: INDEED (said Demosthenes) THERE IS A GREAT DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE THINGS THAT YOU AND I DO BY LAMPLIGHT. So as no man need doubt that
learning will expulse business, but rather it will keep and defend the
possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise at unawares
may enter to the prejudice of both.
8. Again,
for that other conceit that Learning should undermine the reverence of laws and
government, it is assuredly a mere depravation and calumny, without all shadow
of truth. For to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer
obligation than duty taught and understood, it is to affirm, that a blind man
may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a light. And it is without
all controversy, that learning doth make the minds of men [6] gentle, generous,
maniable, and pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish,
thwart, and mutinous: and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion,
considering that the most barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most
subject to tumults, seditions, and changes.
9. And as
to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well punished for his blasphemy
against Learning, in the same kind wherein he offended; for when he was past
threescore years old, he was taken with an extreme desire to go to school
again, and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek authors;
which doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the Grecian learning was
rather an affected gravity, than according to the inward sense of his own
opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though it pleased him to brave the world
in taking to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving to others the art of
subjects; yet so much is manifest that the Romans never ascended to that height
of empire, till the time they had ascended to the height of other arts. For in
the time of the two first Caesars, which had the art of government in greatest perfection,
there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro; the best historiographer, Titus
Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus Varro; and the best, or second orator,
Marcus Cicero, that to the memory of man are known. As for the accusation of
Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was prosecuted; which was under
the Thirty Tyrants, the most base, bloody, and envious persons that have
governed; which revolution of state was no sooner over, but Socrates, whom they
had made a person criminal, was made a person heroical, and his memory
accumulate with honours divine and human; and those discourses of his which
were then termed corrupting of manners, were after acknowledged for sovereign
medicines of the mind and manners, and so have been received ever since till
this day. Let this, therefore, serve for answer to Politiques, which in their
humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw
imputations upon Learning; which redargution nevertheless (save that we know
not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not needful for the
present, in regard of the love and reverence towards Learning, which the
example and countenance of two so learned Princes, Queen Elizabeth, and your
Majesty, being as Castor and Pollux, LUCIDA SIDERA, stars of excellent light
and most benign influence, hath wrought in all men of place and authority in
our nation.
III. 1. Now
therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or diminution of credit that
groweth unto Learning from learned men themselves, which commonly cleaveth
fastest: it is either from their fortune; or from their manners; or from the
nature of their studies. For the first, it is not in their power; and the
second is accidental; the third only is proper to be handled. But because we are
not in hand with true measure, but with popular estimation and conceit, it is
not amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. The derogations therefore which
grow to Learning from the fortune or condition of learned men, are either in
respect of scarcity of means, or in respect of privateness of life and meanness
of employments.
2.
Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men usually to begin with
little, and not to grow rich so fast as other men by reason they convert not
their labours chiefly to lucre and increase: it were good to leave the common
place in commendation of poverty to some friar to handle, to whom much was
attributed by Machiavel in this point; when he said, THAT THE KINGDOM OF THE
CLERGY HAD BEEN LONG BEFORE AT AN END, IF THE REPUTATION AND REVERENCE TOWARDS
THE POVERTY OF FRIARS HAD NOT BORNE MD THE SCANDAL OF THE SUPERFLOSTICS AND
EXCESSES OF BISHOPS AND PRELATES. So a man might say that the felicity and
delicacy of princes and great persons had long since turned to rudeness and
barbarism, if the poverty of Learning had not kept up civility and honour of
life: but without any such advantages, it is worthy the observation what a
reverend and honoured thing poverty was for some ages in the Roman state, which
nevertheless was a state without paradoxes. For we see what Titus Livius saith
in his introduction: CAETERUM AUT ME AMOR NEGOTII SUSCEPTI FALLIT, AUT NULLA UNQUAM
RESPUBLICA NEC MAJOR, NEC SANCTIOR, NEC BONIS EXEMPLIS DITIOR FUIT; NEC IN QUAM
TAM SERAE AVARITIA LUXURIAQUE IMMIGRAVERINT; NEC UBI TANTUS AC TAM DIU
PAUPERTATI AC PARSIMONIAE HONOS FUERIT. We see likewise, after that the state
of Rome was not itself, but did degenerate, how that person that took upon him
to be counsellor to Julius Caesar after his victory where to begin his
restoration of the state, maketh it of all points the most summary to take away
the estimation of wealth: VERUM HAEC, ET OMNIA MALA PARITER CUM HONORE PECUNIAE
DESINENT; SI NEQUE MAGISTRATUS, NEQUE ALIA VULGO CUPIENDA, VENALIA ERUNT. To
conclude this point, as it was truly said, that RUBOR EST VIRTUTIS COLOR,
though sometime it come from vice; so
it may be fitly said that Paupertas est virtutis fortuna, though sometime it
may proceed from misgovernment and accident. Surely Salomon hath pronounced it
both in censure, QUI FESTINAT AD DIVITIAS NON ERIT INSONS; and in precept, BUY THE TRUTH, AND SELL IT
NOT; AND SO OF WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE; judging that means were to be spent upon Learning,
and not Learning to be applied to means. [--] And as for the privateness, or
obscureness (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life of
contemplative men; it is a theme so common to extol a private life, not taxed
with sensuality and sloth, in comparison [with] and to the disadvantage of a
civil life, for safety, liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom
from indignity, as no man handleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy
it hath to men's conceits in the expressing, and to men's consents in the
allowing. This only I will add, that learned men forgotten in states and not
living in the eyes of men, are like images of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral
of Junia: of which not being represented, as many others were, Tacitus saith,
EO IPSO PRAEFULGEBANT, QUOD NON VISEBANTUR.
3. And for
meanness of employment, that which is most traduced to contempt is that the
government [7] of youth is commonly allotted to them; which age, because it is
the age of least authority, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those
employments wherein youth is conversant, and which are conversant about youth. But
how unjust this traducement is (if you will reduce things from popularity of
opinion to measure of reason) may appear in that we see men are more curious what
they put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned; and what mould they lay
about a young plant than about a plant corroborate; so as the weakest terms and
times of all things use to have the best applications and helps. And will you
hearken to the Hebrew rabbins ? YOUR YOUNG MEN SHALL SEE VISIONS, AND YOUR OLD
MEN SHALL DREAM DREAMS; say they youth is the worthier age, for that visions
are nearer apparitions of God than dreams. And let it be noted, that howsoever
the condition of life of PEDANTES hath
been scorned upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny; and that the modern
looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of schoolmasters
and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did always make a just
complaint, that states were too busy with their laws and too negligent in point
of education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort
revived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard
of their superstition I may say, QUO MELIORES, EO DETERIORES; yet in regard of
this, and some other points concerning human learning and moral matters, I may
say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus. TALIS QUUM SIS, UTINAM NOSTER
ESSES. And thus much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned
men.
4. As
touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing personal and individual: and
no doubt there be amongst them, as in other professions, of all temperatures:
but yet so as it is not without truth, which is said, that ABEUNT STUDIA IN
MORES, studies have an influence and operation upon the manners of those that
are conversant in them.
5. But upon
an attentive and indifferent review, I for my part cannot find any disgrace to
Learning can proceed from the manners of learned men not inherent to them as they are learned; except it be a fault
(which was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca,
and many more) that, because the times they read of are commonly better than
the times they live in, and the duties taught better than the duties practised,
they contend sometimes too far to bring things to perfection, and to reduce the
corruption of manners to honesty of precepts, or examples of too great height. And
yet hereof they have caveats enough in their own walks. For Solon, when he was
asked whether he had given his citizens the best laws, answered wisely, YEA OF
SUCH AS THEY WOULD RECEIVE: and Plato, finding that his own heart could not
agree with the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear place or once,
saying, THAT A MAN'S COUNTRY WAS TO BE USED AS HIS PARENTS WERE, THAT IS, WITH
HUMBLE PERSUASIONS, AND NOT WITH CONTESTATIONS. And Caesar's counsellor put in
the same caveat, NON AD VETERA INSTITUTA REVOCANS QUAE JAMPRIDEM CORRUPTIS MORIBUS
LUDIBRIO SUNT: and Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato the second, when
he writes to his friend Atticus; CATO OPTIME SENTIT, SED NOCET INTERDUM
REIPUBLICAE; LOQUITUR ENIM TANQUAM IN REIPUBLICÂ PLATONIS, NON TANQUAM IN FAECE
ROMULI. And the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philosophers for going
too far, and being too exact in their prescripts, when he saith, ISTI IPSE
PRAECEPTORES VIRTUTIS ET MAGISTRI, VIDENTUR FINES OFFICIORUM PAULO LONGIUS QUAM
NATURA VELLET PROTULISSE, UT CUM AD ULTIMUM ANIMO CONTENDISSEMUS, IBI TAMEN,
UBI OPORTET, CONSISTEREMUS: and yet himself might have said, MONITIS SUM MINOR
IPSE MEIS, for it was his own fault, though not in so extreme a degree.
6. Another
fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to learned men; which is,
that they have esteemed the preservation, good, and honour of their countries
or masters before their own fortunes or safeties. For so saith Demosthenes unto
the Athenians; IF IT PLEASE YOU TO NOTE IT, MY COUNSELS UNTO YOU ARE NOT SUCH
WHEREBY I SHOULD GROW GREAT AMONGST YE, AND YE BECOME LITTLE AMONGST THE GRECIANS:
BUT THEY BE OF THAT NATURE, AS THEY ARE SOMETIMES NOT GOOD FOR ME TO GIVE, BUT
ARE ALWAYS GOOD FOR YOU TO FOLLOW. And so Seneca, after he had consecrated that
QUINQUENNIUM NERONIS to the eternal glory
of learned governors, held on his honest and loyal course of good and free
counsel, after his master grew extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can
this point otherwise be; for Learning endueth men's minds with a true sense of
the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their fortunes, and the dignity
of their soul and vocation: so that it is impossible for them to esteem that
any greatness of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being
and ordainment; and therefore are desirous to give their account to God, and so
likewise to their masters under God (as kings and states that they serve) in
these words; ECCE TIBI LUCREFECI, and not ECCE MIHI LUCREFECI, whereas, the
corrupter sort of mere Politiques, that have not their thoughts established by
learning in the love and apprehension of duty, nor never look abroad into universality,
do refer all things to themselves, and thrust themselves into the centre of the
world, as if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes; never caring in
all tempests what becomes of the ship of estates, so they may save themselves
in the cockboat of their own fortune: whereas men that feel the weight of duty
and know the limits of self love, use to make good their places and duties,
though with peril; and if they stand in seditious and violent alterations, it
is rather the reverence which many times both adverse parts do give to honesty,
than any versatile advantage of their own carriage. But for this point of
tender sense and fast obligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind
withal, howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in the depth of their corrupt
principles may despise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, and therefore
needs the less disproof or excusation.
7. Another
fault incident commonly to learned men, which may be more properly defended
than truly [8] denied, is, that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to
particular persons: which want of exact application ariseth from two causes;
the one, because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell
in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature and customs of one person:
for it is a speech for a lover, and not for a wise man: SATIS MAGNUM ALTER
ALTERI THEATRUM SUMUS. Nevertheless I shall yield, that he that cannot contract
the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great
faculty. But there is a second cause, which is no inablity, but a rejection
upon choice and judgment. For the honest and just bounds of observation by one
person upon another, extend no further but to understand him sufficiently,
whereby not to give him offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful
counsel, or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a man's
self. But to be speculative into another man to the end to know how to work
him, or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is double and
cloven and not entire and ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of
integrity, so towards princes or superiors is want of duty. For the custom of
the Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon
princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous, but the moral is good: for men
ought not by cunning and bent observations to pierce and penetrate into the
hearts of kings which the scripture hath declared to be inscrutable.
8. There is
yet another fault (with which I will conclude this part) which is often noted
in learned men, that they do many times fail to observe decency and discretion
in their behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in small and ordinary points
of action so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater
matters by that which they find wanting in them in smaller. But this
consequence doth often deceive men, for which I do refer them over to that
which was said by Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to
himself out of his own mouth, but, being applied to the general state of this
question, pertinently and justly when, being invited to touch a lute, he said,
HE COULD NOT FIDDLE, BUT HE COULD MAKE A SMALL TOWN A GREAT STATE. So, no
doubt, many may be well seen in the passages of government and policy, which
are to seek in little and punctual occasions. I refer them also to that which
Plato said of his master Socrates, whom he compared to the gallipots of
apothecaries, which on the outside had apes and owls and antiques, but
contained within sovereign and precious liquors and confections; acknowledging
that to an external report he was not without superficial levities and
deformities, but was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers. And
so much touching the point of manners of learned men.
9. But in
the mean time I have no purpose to give allowance to some conditions and
courses base and unworthy wherein divers professors of learning have wronged
themselves and gone too far; such as were those trencher philosophers which in
the later age of the Roman state were usually in the houses of great persons,
being little better than solemn parasites; of which kind Lucian maketh a merry
description of the philosopher that the great lady took to ride with her in her
coach, and would needs have him carry her little dog, which he doing officiously
and yet uncomely, the page scoffed and said, THAT HE DOUBTED, THE PHILOSOPHER
OF A STOIC WOOLD TURN TO BE A CYNIC. But above all the rest, the gross and
palpable flattery, whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their
wits and pens, turning, as Du Bartas saith, Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina
into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of learning. Neither
is the moral dedication of books and
writings, as to patrons, to be commended: for that books, such as are worthy
the name of books, ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. And the
ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends, or to
entitle the books with their names: or if to kings and great persons, it was to
some such as the argument of the book was fit and proper for: but these and the
like courses may deserve rather reprehension than defence.
10. Not
that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of learned men to men
in fortune. For the answer was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in
mockery, HOW IT CAME TO PASS THAT PHILOSOPHERS WERE THE FOLLOWERS OF RICH MEN,
AND NOT RICH MEN OF PHILOSOPHERS? He answered soberly, and yet sharply, BECAUSE
THE ONE SORT KNEW WHAT THEY HAD NEED OF, AND THE OTHER DID NOT. And of the like
nature was the answer which Aristippus made, when having a petition to
Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his feet; whereupon
Dionysius staid, and gave him the hearing, and granted it; and afterward some
person, tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that he would
offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity as for a private suit to
fall at a tyrant's feet: but he answered, IT WAS NOT HIS FAULT, BUT IT WAS THE FAULT
OF DIONYSIUS THAT HAD HIS EARS IN HIS FEET. Neither was it accounted weakness,
but discretion in him that would not dispute his best with Adrianus Caesar;
excusing himself, THAT IT WAS REASON TO YIELD TO HIM THAT COMMANDED THIRTY
LEGIONS. These and the like applications, and stooping to points of necessity
and convenience, cannot be disallowed; for though they may have some outward
baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are to be accounted submissions to the
occasion, and not to the person.
IV. 1. Now
I proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened amongst the
studies themselves of the learned, which is that which is principal and proper
to the present argument; wherein my purpose is not to make a justification of
the errors, but by a censure and separation of the errors to make a
justification of that which is good and sound, and to deliver that from the
aspersion of the other. For we see that it is the manner of men to scandalize
and deprave that which retaineth the state
and virtue, by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt and
degenerate: as the heathens in the primitive church used to blemish and taint
the Christians [9] with the faults and corruptions of heretics. But
nevertheless I have no meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion of
the errors and impediments in matters of learning, which are more secret and remote
from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto such as do fall under or near unto
a popular observation.
2. There be
therefore chiefly three vanities in studies, whereby learning hath been most
traduced. For those things we do esteem vain, which are either false or frivolous,
those which either have no truth or no use: and those persons we esteem vain,
which are either credulous or curious; and curiosity is either in matter or
words: so that in reason, as well as in experience, there fall out to be these three
distempers, as I may term them, of learning: the first, fantastical learning;
the second, contentious learning; and the last, delicate learning; vain
imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations; and with the last I
will begin.
(a) Martin
Luther, conducted no doubt by a higher providence, but in discourse of
reason finding what a province he had
undertaken against the bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the church,
and finding his own solitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of his own
time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his
succours to make a party against the present time. So that the ancient authors,
both in divinity and in humanity, which had long time slept in libraries, began
generally to be read and revolved. Thus by consequence did draw on a necessity
of a more exquisite travail in the languages original, wherein those authors did
write, for the better understanding of those authors, and the better advantage
of pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew again a delight in their
manner of style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing; which
was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the
propounders of those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the
schoolmen; who were generally of the contrary part, and whose writings were altogether
in a different style and form; taking liberty to coin and frame new terms of
art to express their own sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard
to the pureness, pleasantness, and, as I may call it, lawfulness of the phrase
or word. And again, because the great labour that then was with the people (of
whom the Pharisees were wont to say, EXECRABLIS ISTA TURBA, QUAE NON NOVIT LEGEM) for the winning and persuading of them,
there grew of necessity in chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse,
as the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar sort: so
that these four causes concurring, the admiration of ancient authors, the hate
of the schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of preaching,
did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and copie of speech, which then
began to flourish. This grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more
after words than matter; more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the round
and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses,
and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than
after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of
invention or depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery vein of
Osorius the Portugal bishop, to be in
price. Then did Sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero the
Orator, and Hermogenes the Rhetorician, besides his own books of Periods and
Imitation, and the like. Then did Car of Cambridge, and Ascham with their
lectures and writings almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young
men that were studious, unto that delicate and polished kind of learning. Then
did Erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing Echo: DECEM ANNOS CONSUMPSI IN
LEGENDO CICERONE; and the Echo answered in Greek, < w(/ve >, ASINE. Then
grew the learning of the schoolmen to be utterly despised as barbarous. In sum,
the whole inclination and bent of those times was rather towards copie than
weight.
3. Here,
therefore, is the first distemper of learning, when men study words and not
matter; whereof, though I have represented an example of late times, yet it
hath been and will be SECUNDUM MAJUS ET MINUS in all time. And how is it
possible but this should have an operation to discredit learning, even with
vulgar capacities, when they see learned men's works like the first letter of a
patent, or limned book; which though it hath large flourishes, yet is but a letter?
It seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this
vanity: for words are but the images of matter; and except they have life of
reason and invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love
with a picture.
4. But yet
notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn
the obscurity even of Philosophy itself with sensible and plausible elocution. For
hereof we have great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of
Plato also in some degree; and hereof likewise there is great use: for surely,
to the severe inquisition of truth and the deep progress into philosophy, it is
some hindrance; because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and
quencheth the desire of further search, before we come to a just period. But
then if a man be to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions, of
conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like; then shall he find it
prepared to his hands in those authors which write in that manner. But the
excess of this is so justly contemptible that as Hercules, when he saw the image
of Adonis, Venus' minion, in a temple, said in disdain, NIL SACRI ES; so there
is none of Hercules' followers in learning, that is, the more severe and
laborious sort of inquirers into truth, but will despise those delicacies and
affectations, as indeed capable of no divineness. And thus much of the first
disease or distemper of learning.
5. The
second which followeth is in nature worse than the former: for as substance of
matter is better than beauty of words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse
than vain words: wherein it seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was not only
proper for those times, but prophetical for the times following; [10] and not
only respective to divinity, but extensive to all knowledge; DEVITA PROFANAS
VOCUM NOVITATES, ET OPPOSITIONES FALSI NOMINIS SCIENTIAE. For he assigneth two
marks and badges of suspected and falsified science: the one, the novelty and
strangeness of terms; the other, the strictness of positions, which of
necessity doth induce oppositions, and so questions and altercations. Surely,
like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrify and corrupt into
worms; so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrify and
dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and, as I may term them, vermiculate
questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no
soundness of matter or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning
did chiefly reign amongst the Schoolmen: who having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and
small variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few
authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the
cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of nature
or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit
spin out unto those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books.
For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation
of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby;
but if it worketh upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless,
and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of
thread and work, but of no substance or profit.
6. This
same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two sorts; either in the subject
itself that they handle, when it is a fruitless speculation or controversy,
(whereof there are no small number both in Divinity and Philosophy,) or in the
manner or method of handling of a knowledge, which amongst them was this; upon
every particular position or assertion to frame objections, and to those
objections, solutions; which solutions were for the most part not confutations
but distinctions: whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as the strength
of the old man's fagot, in the band. For the harmony of a science, supporting
each part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation and
suppression of all the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other side, if
you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the fagot, one by one, you may
quarrel with them, and bend them, and break them at your pleasure: so that, as
was said of Seneca, VERBORUM MINUTIIS RERUM FRANGIT PONDERA; so a man may truly say of the schoolmen,
QUAESTIONUM MINUTIIS SCIENTIARUM FRANGUNT SOLIDITATEM. For were it not better
for a man in a fair room to set up one great light or branching candlestick of
lights, than to go about with a small watch candle into every corner? And such
is their method, that rests not so much upon evidence of truth proved by arguments,
authorities, similitudes, examples, as upon particular confutations and
solutions of every scruple, cavilation, and objection; breeding for the most
part one question as fast as it solveth another; even as in the former
resemblance, when you carry the light into one corner, you darken the rest; so
that the fable and fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image of this kind
of philosophy or knowledge; which was transformed into a comely virgin for the
upper parts; but then
Candida
succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris:
so the
generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good and proportionable; but
then, when you descend into their distinctions and decisions, instead of a
fruitful womb for the use and benefit of man's life, they end in monstrous
altercations and barking questions. So as it is not possible but this quality
of knowledge must fall under popular contempt, the people being apt to contemn
truth upon occasion of controversies and altercations, and to think they are
all out of their way which never meet; and when they see such digladiation
about subtilties, and matters of no use or moment, they easily fall upon that
judgment of Dionysius of Syracuse, VERBA ISTA SUNT SENUM OTIOSORUM.
7.
Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those Schoolmen to their great thirst of
truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined variety and universality of
reading and contemplation, they had proved excellent lights, to the great
advancement of all learning and knowledge: but as they are, they are great
undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark keeping: but as in the inquiry of the
divine truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle of God's word, and to
vanish in the mixture of their own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature,
they ever left the oracle of God's works, and adored the deceiving and deformed
images which the unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few received authors
or principles did represent unto them. And thus much for the second disease of
learning.
8. For the
third vice or disease of learning, which concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of
all the rest the foulest; as that which doth destroy the essential form of
knowledge, which is nothing but a representation of truth: for the truth of
being and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than the direct beam
and the beam reflected. This vice therefore brancheth itself into two sorts; delight
in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived; imposture and credulity; which,
although they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming to proceed of
cunning and the other of simplicity, yet certainly they do for the most part
concur: for, as the verse noteth,
Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,
an
inquisitive man is a prattler; so, upon the like reason a credulous man is a
deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he that will easily believe rumours, will
as easily augment rumours, and add somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus
wisely noteth, when he saith, FINGUNT SIMUL CREDUNTQUE: so great an affinity
hath fiction and belief.
9. This
facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly authorised or
warranted, is of two kinds according to the subject: for it is either a belief
of history (as the lawyers speak,
matter of fact); or else of matter of art and opinion. As to the [11] former,
we see the experience and inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical
history; which hath too easily received and registered reports and narrations
of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and other holy
men, and their relics, shrines, chapels, and images: which though they had a
passage for a time by the ignorance of the people, the superstitious simplicity
of some, and the politic toleration of others holding them but as divine
poesies; yet after a period of time, when the mist began to clear up, they grew
to be esteemed but as old wives' fables, impostures of the clergy, illusions of
spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to the great scandal and detriment of
religion.
10. So in
natural history, we see there hath not been that choice and judgment used as
ought to have been; as may appear in the writings of Plinius, Cardanus,
Albertus, and divers of the Arabians, being fraught with much fabulous matter,
a great part not only untried, but notoriously untrue, to the great derogation
of the credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober kind of wits: wherein
the wisdom and integrity of Aristotle is worthy to be observed; that, having
made so diligent and exquisite a history of living creatures, hath mingled it
sparingly with any vain or feigned matter: and yet on the other sake, hath cast
all prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into one
book: excellently discerning that
matter of manifest truth (such whereupon observation and rule were to be
built), was not to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful credit; and
yet again, that rarities and reports that seem incredible are not to be
suppressed or denied to the memory of men.
11. And as
for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and opinions, it is
likewise of two kinds; either when too much belief is attributed to the arts
themselves, or to certain authors in any art. The sciences themselves, which
have had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man than
with his reason, are three in number; astrology, natural magic, and alchemy: of
which sciences, nevertheless, the ends or pretences are noble. For astrology
pretendeth to discover that correspondence or concatenation which is between
the superior globe and the inferior: natural magic pretendeth to call and
reduce natural philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of
works: and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of
bodies which in mixtures of nature are incorporate. But the derivations and
prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories and in the practices, are full
of error and vanity; which the great professors themselves have sought to veil
over and conceal by enigmatical writings, and referring themselves to auricular
traditions and such other devices, to save the credit of impostures: and yet
surely to alchemy this right is due, that it may be compared to the husbandman
whereof Aesop makes the fable; that, when he died, told his sons that he had
left unto them gold buried under ground in his vineyard; and they digged over all
the ground, and gold they found none; but by reason of their stirring and
digging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the
year following: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to
light a great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments, as well
for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man's life.
12. And as
for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto authors in sciences, in
making them dictators, that their words should stand, and not counsellors to
give advice; the damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby, as the
principal cause that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or
advancement. For hence it hath come, that in arts mechanical the first deviser
comes shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth; but in sciences the first author
goeth farthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see, artillery, sailing,
printing, and the like, were grossly managed at the first, and by time
accommodated and refined: but contrariwise, the philosophies and sciences of
Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour
at the first and by time degenerate and imbased; whereof the reason is no other,
but that in the former many wits and industries have contributed in one; and in
the latter many wits and industries have been spent about the wit of some one,
whom many times they have rather depraved than illustrated. For as water will
not ascend higher than the level of the first springhead from whence it
descendeth, so knowledge derived from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of
examination, will not rise again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And
therefore although the position be good, OPORTET DISCENTEM CREDERE, yet it must
be coupled with this, OPORTO EDOCTUM JUDICARE; for disciples do owe unto
masters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgment until
they be fully instructed, and not an absolute resignation or perpetual
captivity: and therefore, to conclude this point, I will say no more, but so
let great authors have their due, as time, which is the author of authors, be
not deprived of his due, which is, further and further to discover truth. Thus
have I gone over these three diseases of learning; besides the which there are some
other rather peccant humours that formed diseases: which nevertheless are not
so secret and intrinsic but that they fall under a popular observation and
traducement, and therefore are not to be passed over.
V. 1. The
first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities; the one antiquity,
the other novelty; wherein it seemeth the children of time do take after the
nature and malice of the father. For as he devoureth his children, so one of
them seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while antiquity envieth there
should be new additions, and novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface.
Surely the advice of the prophet is the true direction in this matter, STATE
SUPER VIAS ANTIQUAS, ET VIDETE QUAENAM FIT VIA RECTA ET BONA ET AMBULATE IN EA.
Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men. should make a stand thereupon and
discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to
make progression. And to speak truly, ANTIQUITAS SAECULI JUVENTUS MUNDI. These
[12] times are the ancient times, when the world is ancient, and not those which
we account ancient ordine retrogrado, by a computation backward from ourselves.
2. Another
error induced by the former is a distrust that anything should be now to be
found out, which the world should have missed and passed over so long time; as
if the same objection were to be made to time, that Lucian maketh to Jupiter
and other the heathen gods; of which he wondereth that they begot so many
children in old time, and begot none in his time; and asketh whether they were
become septuagenary, or whether the law PAPIA, made against old men's marriages,
had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt lest time is become past children
and generation; wherein, contrariwise, we see commonly the levity and
inconstancy of men's judgments, which till a matter be done, wonder that it can
be done; and as soon as it is done, wonder again that it was no sooner done: as
we see in the expedition of Alexander into Asia, which at first was prejudged
as a vast and impossible enterprise; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to
make no more of it than this: NIL ALIUD QUAM BENE AUSUS VANA CONTEMNERE; and
the same happened to Columbus in the western navigation. But in intellectual
matters it is much more common; as may be seen in most of the propositions of
Euclid; which till they be demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but
being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the
lawyers speak), as if we had known them before.
3. Another
error, that hath also some affinity with the former, is a conceit that of
former opinions or sects, after variety and examination, the best hath still
prevailed and suppressed the rest; so as, if a man should begin the labour of a
new search, he were but like to light somewhat formerly rejected, and by
rejection brought into oblivion: as if the multitude, or the wisest for the
multitude's sake, were not ready to give passage rather to that which is
popular and superficial than to that which is substantial and profound; for the
truth is that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream, which
carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth
that which is weighty and solid.
4. Another
error, of a diverse nature from all the former, is the over early and
peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods; from which time
commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation. But as young men, when they
knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature; so knowledge,
while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth: but when it once is
comprehended in exact methods, it may perchance be further polished and
illustrate and accommodated for use and practice; but it increaseth no more in
bulk and substance.
5. Another
error, which doth succeed that which we last mentioned, is that after the
distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have abandoned universality,
or PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA; which cannot but cease and stop all progression. For no
perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level: neither is it possible to
discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon
the level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science.
6. Another
error hath proceeded from too great a reverence, and a kind of adoration of the
mind and understanding of man; by means whereof men have withdrawn themselves
too much from the contemplation of nature, and the observations of experience,
and have tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits. Upon these intellectualists,
which are notwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine
philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying, MEN SOUGHT TRUTH IN THEIR
OWN LITTLE WORLDS, AND NOT IN THE GREAT AND COMMON WORLD; for they disdain to
spell, and so by degrees to read in the volume of God's works: and contrariwise
by continual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and as it were invocate
their own spirits to divine and give oracles unto them, whereby they are deservedly
deluded.
7. Another
error that hath some connection with this latter, is, that men have used to
infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which
they have most admired, or some sciences which they have most applied; and
given all things else a tincture according to them utterly untrue and unproper.
So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle with
logic; and the second school of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics.
For these were the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them severally. So
have the alchymists made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace;
and Gilbertus, our countryman, hath made a philosophy out of the observations
of a lodestone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the nature of
the soul he found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony, saith
pleasantly, HIC AB ARTE SUA NON RECESSIT, etc. But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh
seriously and wisely, when he saith, QUI RESPICIUNT AD PAUCA DE FACILE
PRONUNCIANT.
8. Another
error is an impatience of doubt and haste to assertion without due and mature
suspension of judgment. For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the
two ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients; the one plain and smooth
in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in
the entrance, but after a while fair and even. So it is in contemplation; if a
man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be
content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.
9. Another error
is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of knowledge, which is for the
most part magistral and peremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort
as may be soonest believed, and not easiliest examined. I: is true, that in
compendious treatises for practice that form is not to be disallowed: but in
the true handling of knowledge, men ought not to fall either on the one side
into the vein of Velleius the Epicurean: NIL TAM METUENS, QUAM NE DUBITARE ALIQUA
DE RE VIDERETUR; [13] nor on the other side into Socrates his ironical doubting
of all things; but to propound things
sincerely with more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man's own judgment
proved more or less.
10. Other
errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves, whereunto they
bend their endeavours; for whereas the more constant and devote kind of
professors of any science ought to propound to themselves to make some
additions to their science, they convert their labours to aspire to certain
second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or commenter, to be a sharp
champion or defender, to be a methodical compounder or abridger; and so the patrimony
of knowledge cometh to be sometimes improved, but seldom augmented.
11. But the
greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or
farthest end of knowledge: for men have entered into a desire of learning and
knowledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite;
sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for
ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction;
and most times for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true
account of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men: as if there
were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless
spirit; or a tarrasse, for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down
with a fair prospect; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself
upon; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and contention; or a shop, for
profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse, for the glory of the Creator and the
relief of man's estate. Rut this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt
knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly
conjoined and united together than they have been; a conjunction like unto that
of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation, and
Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action: howbeit, I do not mean, when I
speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge
to lucre and profession; for I am not ignorant how much that diverteth and
interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge, like unto the golden
ball thrown before Atalanta, which while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take
up, the race is hindered;
Declinat
cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.
Neither is
my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy down from heaven to
converse upon the earth, that is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and to
apply knowledge only to manners and policy. But as both heaven and earth do
conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man; so the end ought to be, from
both philosophies to separate and reject vain speculations, and whatsoever is
empty and void, and to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful:
that knowledge may not be, as a curtesan, for pleasure and vanity only, or as a
bondwoman, to acquire and gain to her master's use; but as a spouse, for
generation, fruit, and comfort.
12. Thus
have I described and opened, as by a kind of dissection, those peccant humours,
(the principal of them,) which hath not only given impediment to the proficience
of learning, but have given also occasion to the traducement thereof: wherein
if I have been too plain, it must be remembered, FIDELIA VULNERA AMANTIS, SED
DOLOSA OSCULA MALIGNANTIS. [--] This, I think, I have gained, that I ought to
be the better believed in that which I shall say pertaining to commendation;
because I have proceeded so freely in that which concerneth censure. And yet I
have no purpose to enter into a laudative of learning, or to make a hymn to the
Muses; (though I am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly
celebrated:) but my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to weigh
the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things, and to take the true
value thereof by testimonies and arguments divine and human.
VI.1. First
therefore let us seek the dignity of knowledge in the archetype or first
platform, which is in the attributes and acts of God, as far as they are
revealed to man and may be observed with sobriety; wherein we may not seek it
by the name of Learning; for all Learning is Knowledge acquired, and all
knowledge in God is original: and therefore we must look for it by another
name, that of Wisdom or Sapience, as the Scriptures call it.
2. It is so
then, that in the work of the creation we see a double emanation of Virtue from
God; the one referring more properly to Power, the other to Wisdom; the one
expressed in making the subsistence of the matter, and the other in disposing
the beauty of the form. This being supposed, it is to be observed that for
anything which appeareth in the history of the creation, the confused mass and matter
of Heaven and Earth was made in a moment; and the order and disposition of that
chaos or mass was the work of six days; such a note of difference it pleased
God to put upon the works of Power, and the works of Wisdom; wherewith
concurreth, that in the former it is not set down that God said, LET THERE BE
HEAVEN AND EARTH, as it is set down of the works following; but actually, that
God made Heaven and Earth: the one carrying the style of a Manufacture, and the
other of a Law, Decree, or Counsel.
3. To
proceed to that which is next in order from God, to spirits. We find, as far as credit is to be given to
the celestial hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius the senator of Athens, the
first place or degree is given to the angels of Love, which are termed
Seraphim; the second to the angels of Light, which are termed Cherubim; and the
third, and so following places, to Thrones, Principalities, and the rest, which
are all angels of power and ministry; so as the angels of Knowledge and
Illumination are placed before the angels of Office and Domination.
4. To
descend from Spirits and Intellectual Forms to Sensible and Material Forms; we
read the first Form that was created was Light, which hath a relation and
correspondence in nature and corporal things to Knowledge in Spirits and
incorporal things.
[14] 5. So
in the distribution of days we see the day wherein God did rest and contemplate
His own works, was blessed above all the days wherein He did effect, and
accomplish them.
6. After
the creation was finished, it is set down unto us that man was placed in the
garden to work therein; which work, so appointed to him, could be no other than
work of Contemplation; that is, when the end of work is but for exercise and
experiment, not for necessity; for there being then no reluctation of the
creature, nor sweat of the brow, man's employment must of consequence have been
matter of delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for the use. Again,
the first acts which man performed in Paradise consisted of the two summary
parts of knowledge; the view of creatures, and the imposition of names. As for
the knowledge which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the
natural knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of good and evil;
wherein the supposition was, that God's commandments or prohibitions were not
the originals of good and evil, but that they had other beginnings, which man aspired
to know; to the end to make a total defection from God and to depend wholly
upon himself.
7. To pass
on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall of man, we see, (as the
Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not violating at all the truth of the story
or letter,) an image of the two estates, the contemplative state and the active
state, figured in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two simplest and
most primitive trades of life; that of the shepherd, (who, by reason of his
leisure, rest in a place, and living in view of heaven, is a lively image of a
contemplative life,) and that of the husbandman: where we see again the favour and election of God went to the shepherd,
and not to the tiller of the ground.
8. So in
the age before the flood, the holy records within those few memorials which are
there entered and registered have vouchsafed to mention and honour the name of
the inventors and authors of music and works in metal. In the age after the
flood, the first great judgment of God upon the ambition of man was the
confusion of tongues, whereby the open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge
was chiefly imbarred.
9. To
descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God's first pen: he is adorned by the
Scriptures with this addition and commendation, THAT HE WAS SEEN IN ALL THE
LEARNING OF THE EGYPTIANS; which nation, we know, was one of the most ancient
schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the Egyptian priest saying unto
Solon: YOU GRECIANS ARE EVER CHILDREN; YOU HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANTIQUITY, NOR
ANTIQUITY OF KNOWLEDGE. Take a view of the ceremonial law of Moses; you shall find,
besides the prefiguration of Christ, the badge or difference of the people of
God, the exercise and impression of obedience, and other divine uses and fruits
thereof, that some of the most learned Rabbins have travailed profitably and
profoundly to observe, some of them a natural, some of them a moral sense, or
reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances. As in the law of the
leprosy, where it is said, IF THE WHITENESS HAVE OVERSPREAD THE FLESH, THE
PATIENT MAY PASS ABROAD FOR CLEAN; BUT IF THERE BE ANY WHOLE FLESH REMAINING,
HE IS TO BE SHUT UP FOR UNCLEAN; one of them noteth a principle of nature, that
PUTREFACTION IS MORE CONTAGIOUS BEFORE MATURITY THAN AFTER: and another noteth
a position of moral philosophy, that MEN ABANDONED TO VICE DO NOT SO MUCH
CORRUPT MANNERS, AS THOSE THAT ARE HALF GOOD AND HALF EVIL. So in this and very
many other places in that law, there is to be found, besides the theological
sense, much aspersion of philosophy.
10. So
likewise in that excellent book of Job, if it be revolved with diligence, it
will be found pregnant and swelling with natural philosophy; as, for example,
cosmography, and the roundness of the world, QUI EXTENDIT AQUILONEM SUPER
VACUUM, ET APPENDIT TERRAM SUPER NIHILUM; wherein the pensileness of the earth,
the pole of the north, and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly
touched. So again, matter of astronomy; SPIRITUS EJUS ORNAVIT COELOS, ET OBSTETRICANTE
MANU EJUS EDACTUS EST COLUBER TORTUOSUS. And in another place; NUNQUID
CONJUNGERE VALEBIS MICANTES STELLAS PLEIADAS, AUT GYRUM ARCTURI POTERIS
DISSIPARE ? Where the fixing of the stars, ever standing at equal distance, is
with great elegancy noted. And in another place, QUI FACIT ARCTURUM, ET ORIONA,
ET HYADAS, ET INTERIORA AUSTRI; where again he takes knowledge of the
depression of the southern pole, calling it the secrets of the south, because
the southern stars were in that climate unseen. Matter of generation; ANON
SICUT LAC MULSISTI ME, ET SICUT CASEUM COAGULASTI ME ? etc. Matter of minerals;
HABET ARGENTUM VENARUM SUARUM PRINCIPIA: ET AURO LOCUS EST IN QUO CONFLATUR,
FERRUM DE TERRA TOLLITUR, ET LAPIS SOLUTUS CALORE IN AES VERTITUR: and so forwards in that chapter.
11. So
likewise in the person of Salomon the King, we see the gift or endowment of
wisdom and learning, both in Salomon's petition and in God's assent thereunto,
preferred before all other terrene and temporal felicity. By virtue of which
grant or donative of God Salomon became enabled not only to write those
excellent Parables or Aphorisms concerning divine and moral philosophy; but
also to compile a Natural History of all verdure, from the cedar upon the
mountain to the moss upon the wall, (which is but a rudiment between
putrefaction and a herb,) and also of
all things that breathe or move. Nay, the same Salomon the King, although he
excelled in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping and
navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and renown, and the like, yet he
maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to the glory of inquisition
of truth; for so he saith expressly, THE GLORY OF GOD IS TO CONCEAL A THING,
BUT THE GLORY OF THE KING IS TO FIND IT OUT; as if, according to the innocent
play of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works, to the end
to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour than
to be God's playfellows in that game; considering the great commandment of wits
and means, whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.
[15] 12.
Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times after our Saviour came
into the world; for our Saviour Himself did first show His power to subdue
ignorance, by His conference with the priests and doctors of the law, before He
showed His power to subdue nature by His miracles. And the coming of the Holy
Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues,
which are but VEHICULA SCIENTIAE.
13. So in
the election of those instruments, which it pleased God to use for the
plantation of the Faith, notwithstanding that at the first He did employ
persons altogether unlearned, otherwise than by inspiration, more evidently to
declare His immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom or knowledge; yet,
nevertheless, that counsel of His was no sooner performed, but in the next
vicissitude and succession He did send His Divine Truth into the world waited
on with other learnings, as with servants or handmaids; for so we see St. Paul,
who was the only learned amongst the Apostles, had his pen most used in the
Scriptures of the New Testament.
14. So
again, we find that many of the ancient Bishops and Fathers of the Church were
excellently read and studied in all the learning of the heathen; insomuch that
the edict of the Emperor Julianus, whereby it was interdicted unto Christians
to be admitted into schools, lectures, or exercises of learning, was esteemed
and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination against the Christian
Faith, than were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could
the emulation and jealousy of Gregory the first of that name, bishop of Rome,
ever obtain the opinion of piety or devotion; but contrariwise received the
censure of humour, malignity, and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men; in that
he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen antiquity and authors.
But contrariwise, it was the Christian Church, which, amidst the inundations of
the Scythians on the one side from the north-west, and the Saracens from the
east, did preserve in the sacred lap and bosom thereof the precious relics even
of heathen learning, which otherwise had been extinguished as if no such thing
had ever been.
15. We see
before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves and our fathers, when it pleased
God to call the Church of Rome to account for their degenerate manners and
ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious and framed to uphold the same
abuses; at one and the same time it was ordained by the Divine Providence that
there should attend withal a renovation and new spring of all other knowledges.
And on the other side we see the Jesuits, (who partly in themselves, and partly
by the emulation and provocation of their example, have much quickened and
strengthened the state of learning,) we see, I say, what notable service and
reparation they have done to the Roman see.
16.
Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that there be two
principal duties and services, besides ornament and illustration, which
philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and religion. The one,
because they are an effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God:
for as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to consider and
magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation
of the exterior of them, as they first offer themselves to our senses, we
should do a like injury unto the Majesty of God, as if we should judge or
construe of the store of some excellent jeweller, by that only which is set out
toward the street in his shop. The other, because they minister a singular help
and preservative against unbelief and error: for our Saviour saith, YOU ERR,
NOT KNOWING THE SCRIPTURES, NOR THE POWER OF GOD; laying before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be
secured from error; first, the Scriptures, revealing the Will of God; and then
the creatures expressing His Power;
whereof the latter is a key unto the former: not only opening our
understanding to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures, by the general
notions of reason and rules of speech; but chiefly opening our belief, in
drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is
chiefly signed and engraven upon His works. Thus much therefore for divine
testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of Learning.
VII. 1. As
for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a discourse of this nature and
brevity it is fit rather to use choice of those things which we shall produce,
than to embrace the variety of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of human
honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to a veneration and
adoration as a God. This unto the Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak
now separately of human testimony: according to which, that which the Grecians
call APOTHEOSIS, and the Latins, RELATIO INTER DIVOS, was the supreme honour
which man could attribute unto man: especially when it was given, not by a
formal decree or act of state, as it was used among the Roman Emperors, but by
an inward assent and belief. Which honour, being so high, had also a degree or
middle term; for there were reckoned above human honours, honours heroical and
divine: in the attribution and distribution of which honours, we see antiquity
made this difference: that whereas founders and uniters of states and cities,
law-givers, extirpers of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent
persons in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of worthies or
demi-gods; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos, Romulus, and the like: on the
other side, such as were inventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and
commodities towards man's life, were ever consecrated amongst the gods themselves;
as were Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, and others: and justly; for the
merit of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation; and is
like fruitful showers, which though they be profitable and good, yet serve but
for that season, and for a latitude of ground where they fall; but the other is
indeed like the benefits of heaven, which are permanent and universal. The
former, again, is mixed with strife and perturbation; but the latter hath the true
character of Divine Presence, coming in
AURA LENI, without noise or agitation.
[16] 2.
Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the
inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of
relieving the necessities which arise from nature; which merit was lively set
forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus' theatre, where all
beasts and birds assembled; and, forgetting their several appetites, some of
prey, some of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to
the airs and accords of the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was
drowned by some louder noise, but every beast returned to its own nature:
wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men, who are full of
savage and unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as
they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched with eloquence
and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues, so long is society and peace
maintained; but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult
make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion.
3. But this
appeareth more manifestly, when kings themselves, or persons of authority under
them, or other governors in commonwealths and popular estates, are endued with
learning. For although he might be thought partial to his own profession, that
said, THEN SHOULD PEOPLE AND ESTATES BE HAPPY, WHEN EITHER KINGS WERE
PHILOSOPHERS, OR PHILOSOPHERS KINGS, yet so much is verified by experience,
that under learned princes and governors there have been ever the best times: for
howsoever kings may have their imperfections in their passions and customs; yet
if they be illuminate by learning, they have those notions of religion, policy,
and morality, which do preserve them, and refrain them from all ruinous and
peremptory errors and excesses; whispering evermore in their ears, when
counsellors and servants stand mute and silent. And senators or counsellors
likewise, which be learned, do proceed upon more safe and substantial
principles, than counsellors which are only men of experience: the one sort
keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other discover them not till they come near
hand, and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or avoid them.
4. Which
felicity of times under learned princes, (to keep still the law of brevity, by
using the most eminent and selected examples,) doth best appear in the age
which passed from the death of Domitian the emperor until the reign of
Commodus; comprehending a succession of six princes, all learned, or singular
favourers and advancers of learning, which age for temporal respects, was the
most happy and flourishing that ever the Roman empire, (which then was a model
of the world,) enjoyed: a matter revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a
dream the night before he was slain; for he thought there was grown behind upon
his shoulders a neck and head of gold: which came accordingly to pass in those
golden times which succeeded: of which princes we will make some commemoration;
wherein although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter for a
declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is, yet because it is
pertinent to the point in hand,
Neque semper
arcum Tendit Apollo,
and to name
them only were too naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The first
was Nerva; the excellent temper of whose government is by a glance in Cornelius
Tacitus touched to the life: POSTQUAM DIVUS NERVA RES OLIM INSOCIABILES
MISCUISSET, IMPERIUM ET LIBERTATEM. And in token of his learning, the last act
of his short reign left to memory, was a missive to his adopted son Trajan, proceeding
upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended in a
verse of Homer's:
Telis,
Phoebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras.
5. Trajan,
who succeeded, was for his person not learned: but if we will hearken to the
speech of our Saviour, that saith, HE THAT RECEIVETH A PROPHET IÎ THE NAME OF A
PROPHET, SHALL HAVE A PROPHET'S REWARD; he deserveth to be placed amongst the
most learned princes: for there was not a greater admirer of learning, or
benefactor of learning; a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer of learned
men to office, and a familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors,
who were noted to have then most credit in court. On the other side, how much
Trajan's virtue and government was admired and renowned, surely no testimony of
grave and faithful history doth more lively set forth, than that legend tale of
Gregorius Magnus, bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy he bore
towards all heathen excellency: and yet he is reported, out of the love and
estimation of Trajan's moral virtues, to have made unto God passionate and
fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul out of hell: and to have obtained it, with a caveat that
he should make no more such petitions. In this prince's time also, the persecution
against the Christians received intermission, upon the certificate of Plinius
Secundus, a man of excellent learning, and by Trajan advanced.
6. Adrian, his successor, was the most
curious man that lived, and the most universal inquirer; insomuch as it was
noted for an error in his mind, that he desired to comprehend all things, and
not to reserve himself for the worthiest things: falling into the like humour
that was long before noted in Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs
over-rule and put down an excellent musician in an argument touching music, was
well answered by him again, GOD FORBID, SIR, saith he, THAT YOUR FORTUNE SHOULD
BE SO BAD, AS TO AVOW THESE THINGS BETTER THAN I. It pleased God likewise to
use the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of His Church
in those days. For having Christ in veneration, not as a God or Saviour, but as
a wonder or novelty; and having His picture in his gallery, matched with
Apollonius, with whom in his vain imagination he thought he had some
conformity; yet it served the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times
against the Christian name, so as the Church had peace during his time. And for
his government civil, although he did not attain to that of Trajan's glory of
arms, or perfection of justice, yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he
[17] did exceed him. For Trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings;
insomuch as Constantine the Great in emulation was wont to call him Parietaria,
wall-flower, because his name was upon so many walls: but his buildings and
works were more of glory and triumph than use and necessity. But Adrian spent
his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a perambulation or survey of the Roman
empire; giving order and making assignation where he went, for re-edifying of
cities, towns, and forts decayed; and for cutting of rivers and streams, and
for making bridges and passages, and for policing of cities and commonalties
with new ordinances and constitutions, and granting new franchises and
incorporations; so that his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses
and decays of former times.
7.
Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince excellently learned; and had
the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman; insomuch as in common speech, which
leaves no virtue untaxed, he was called Cymini Sector, a carver or divider of
cummin, which is one of the least seeds; such a patience he had and settled
spirit to enter into the least and most exact differences of causes; a fruit no
doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind; which being no ways
charged or incumbered, either with fears, remorses, or scruples, but having
been noted for a man of the purest goodness, without all fiction or
affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made his mind continually present and
entire. He likewise approached a degree nearer unto Christianity, and became,
as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, half a Christian; holding their religion and law
in good opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, but giving way to the
advancement of Christians.
8. There
succeeded him the first DIVI FRATRES, the two adoptive brethren, Lucius
Commodus Verus, (son to Aelius Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind of
learning, and was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil,) and Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus; whereof the latter, who obscured his colleague and survived
him long, was named the philosopher: who, as he excelled all the rest in
learning, so he excelled them likewise in perfection of all royal virtues;
insomuch as Julianus the emperor, in his book entitled CAESARES, being as a pasquil
or satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned that they were all invited to
a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the
table, and bestowed a scoff on every one as they came in; but when Marcus
Philosophus came in, Silenus was gravelled, and out of countenance, not knowing
where to carp at him; save at the last he gave a glance at his patience towards
his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued with that of his predecessor,
made the name of Antoninus so sacred in the world, that though it were
extremely dishonoured in Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore
the name, yet when Alexander Severus refused the name, because he was a
stranger to the family, the senate with one acclamation said, QUOMODO AUGUSTUS,
SIC ET ANTONINUS. In such renown and veneration was the name of these two
princes in those days, that they would have it as a perpetual addition in all
the emperors' style. In this emperor's time also the Church for the most part
was in peace; so as in this sequence of six princes we do see the blessed
effects of learning in sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest table of the
world.
9. But for
a tablet, or picture of smaller volume, (not presuming to speak of your majesty
that liveth,) in my judgment the most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth,
your immediate predecessor in this part of Britain; a princess that, if
Plutarch were now alive to write lives by parallels, would trouble him, I
think, to find for her a parallel amongst women. This lady was endued with
learning in her sex singular, and great even amongst masculine princes; whether
we speak of learning, of language, or of science, modern or ancient, Divinity or
Humanity: and unto the very last year of her life she was accustomed to appoint
set hours for reading, scarcely any young student in a university more daily,
or more duly. As for her government, I assure myself I shall not exceed, if I
do affirm that this part of the island never had forty-five years of better
times; and yet not through the calmness of the season, but through the wisdom
of her regiment. For if there be considered of the one side, the truth of
religion established; the constant peace and security; the good administration
of justice; the temperate use of the prerogative, not slackened, nor much
strained; the flourishing state of learning, sortable to so excellent a
patroness; the convenient estate of wealth and means, both of Crown and
subject; the habit of obedience, and the moderation of discontents: and there
be considered on the other side the differences of religion; the troubles of neighbour
countries; the ambition of Spain, and opposition of Rome; and then, that she
was solitary and of herself: these things, I say, considered, as I could not
have chosen an instance so recent and so proper, so I suppose I could not have
chosen one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand, which is concerning
the conjunction of learning in the prince with felicity in the people.
10. Neither
hath learning an influence and operation only upon civil merit and moral
virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace and peaceable government; but
likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in enablement towards martial and
military virtue and prowess; as may be notably represented in the examples of
Alexander the Great, and Caesar the dictator, mentioned before, but now in fit place
to be resumed: of whose virtues and acts in war there needs no note or recital,
having been the wonders of time in that kind: but of their affections towards
learning, and perfections in learning, it is pertinent to say somewhat.
11.
Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle,
the great philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto him:
he was attended with Callisthenes and divers other learned persons, that
followed him in camp, throughout his journeys and conquests. What price and
estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these three particulars:
first, in the envy he used to express that he bore towards Achilles, in this,
that he had so good [18] a trumpet of his praises as Homer's verses; secondly,
in the judgment or solution he gave touching that precious cabinet of Darius,
which was found among his jewels; whereof question was made what thing was
worthy to be put into it; and he gave his opinion for Homer's works: thirdly,
in his letter to Aristotle, after he had set forth his books of nature, wherein
he expostulated with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of philosophy;
and gave him to understand that himself esteemed it more to excel other men in learning
and knowledge than in power and empire. And what use he had of learning doth
appear, or rather shine, in all his speeches and answers, being full of
science, and use of science, and that in all variety.
12. And
herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and somewhat idle, to recite
things that every man knoweth; but yet, since the argument I handle leadeth me
thereunto, I am glad that men shall perceive I am as willing to flatter, if
they will so call it, an Alexander, or a Caesar, or an Antoninus, that are dead
many hundred years since, as any that now liveth: for it is the displaying of
the glory of learning in sovereignty that I propound to myself, and not an
humour of declaiming in any man's praises. Observe then the speech he used of
Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of one of the greatest
questions of moral philosophy; whether the enjoying of outward things, or the
contemning of them, be the greatest happiness: for when he saw Diogenes so
perfectly contented with so little, he said to those that mocked at his
condition, WERE I NOT ALEXANDER, I WOULD WISH TO BE DIOGENES. But Seneca
inverteth it, and saith; PLUS ERAT, QUOD HIC NOLLET ACCIPERE, QUÀM QUOD ILLE
POSSET DARE. There were more things which Diogenes would have refused, than there
were which Alexander could have given.
13. Observe
again that speech which was usual with him, THAT HE FELT HIS MORTALITY CHIEFLY
IN TWO THINGS, SLEEP AND LUST, and see if it were not a speech extracted out of
the depth of natural philosophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth of
Aristotle or Democritus, than from Alexander.
14. See
again that speech of humanity and poesy; when upon the bleeding of his wounds,
he called unto him one of his flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him
divine honour, and said, LOOK, THIS IS VERY BLOOD; THIS IS NOT SUCH A LIQUOR AS
HOMER SPEAKETH OF, WHICH RAN FROM VENUS HAND, WHEN IT WAS PIERCED BY DIOMEDES.
15. See
likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic, in the speech he used to
Cassander, upon a complaint that was made against his father Antipater: for
when Alexander happened to say, DO YOU THINK THESE MEN WOULD HAVE COME FROM SO
FAR TO COMPLAIN, EXCEPT THEY HAD JUST CAUSE OF GRIEF ? And Cassander answered,
YEA, THAT WAS THE MATTER, BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THEY SHOULD NOT BE DISPROVED. Said
Alexander laughing: SEE THE SUBTILTIES OF ARISTOTLE, TO TAKE A MATTER BOTH
WAYS, PRO ET CONTRA, ETC.
16. But
note again how well he could use the same art, which he reprehended, to serve
his own humour: when bearing a secret grudge to Callisthenes, because he was
against the new ceremony of his adoration, feasting one night where the same
Callisthenes was at the table, it was moved by some after supper, for
entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, might speak of
some theme or purpose at his own choice; which Callisthenes did; choosing the praise
of the Macedonian nation for his discourse, and performing the same with so
good manner, as the hearers were much ravished: whereupon Alexander, nothing
pleased, said, IT WAS EASY TO BE ELOQUENT UPON SO GOOD A SUBJECT. But, saith
he, TURN YOUR STYLE, AND LET US HEAR WHAT YOU CAN SAY AGAINST US: which
Callisthenes presently undertook, and did with that sting and life, that
Alexander interrupted him, and said, THE GOODNESS OF THE CAUSE MADE HIM ELOQUENT
BEFORE, AND DESPITE MADE HIM ELOQUENT THEN AGAIN.
17.
Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent use of a metaphor or
translation, wherewith he taxed Antipater, who was an imperious and tyrannous
governor: for when one of Antipater's friends commended him to Alexander for
his moderation, that he did not degenerate, as his other lieutenants did, into
the Persian pride, in use of purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, of
black; TRUE, saith Alexander, BUT
ANTIPATER IS ALL PURPLE WITHIN. Or that other, when Parmenio came to him in the
plain of Arbela, and showed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies,
especially as they appeared by the infinite number of lights, as it had been a
new firmament of stars, and thereupon advised him to assail them by night:
whereupon he answered, THAT HE WOULD NOT STEAL THE VICTORY.
18. For
matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction, so much in all ages
embraced, that he made between his two friends, Hephaestion and Craterus, when
he said, THAT THE ONE LOVED ALEXANDER, AND THE OTHER LOVED THE KING: describing
the principal difference of princes'
best servants, that some in affection love their person, and others in duty
love their crown.
19 Weigh
also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary with counsellors of princes,
that they counsel their masters according to the model of their own mind and
fortune, and not of their masters', when, upon Darius' great offers, Parmenio
had said, SURELY I WOULD ACCEPT THESE OVERS, WERE I AS ALEXANDER; saith
Alexander, SO WOULD I, WERE I AS PARMENIO.
20. Lastly,
weigh that quick and acute reply, which he made when he gave so large gifts to
his friends and servants, and was asked what he did reserve for himself, and he
answered, HOPE: weigh, I say, whether he had not cast up his account right,
because HOPE must be the portion of all that resolve upon great enterprises. For
this was Caesar's portion when he went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly
overthrown with largesses. And this was likewise the portion of that noble
prince, howsoever transported with ambition, Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it
was usually said, that he was the greatest usurer in France, because he had
turned all his estate into obligations.
[19] 21. To
conclude, therefore: as certain critics are used to say hyperbolically, THAT IF
ALL SCIENCES WERE LOST THEY MIGHT BE FOUND IN VIRGIL! so certainly this may be
said truly, there are the prints and footsteps of learning in those few
speeches which are reported of this prince: the admiration of whom, when I
consider him not as Alexander the Great, but as Aristotle's scholar, hath
carried me too far.
22. As for
Julius Caesar, the excellency of his learning needeth not to be argued from his
education, or his company, or his speeches; but in a further degree doth
declare itself in his writings and works; whereof some are extant and
permanent, and some unfortunately perished. For, first, we see there is left
unto us that excellent history of his own wars, which he entitled only a
Commentary, wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid weight of
matter, and the real passages and lively images of actions and persons,
expressed in the greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever
was; which that it was not the effect of a natural gift, but of learning and
precept, is well witnessed by that work of his, entitled, DE ANALOGIA, being a
grammatical philosophy, wherein he did labour to make this same VOX AD PLACITUM
to become VOX AD LICITUM, and to reduce custom of speech to congruity of
speech; and took, as it were, the picture of words from the life of reason.
23. So we
receive from him, as a monument both of his power and learning, the then
reformed computation of the year; well expressing that he took it to be as
great a glory to himself to observe and know the law of the heavens, as to give
law to men upon the earth.
24. So
likewise in that book of his, ANTI-CATO, it may easily appear that he did
aspire as well to victory of wit as victory of war: undertaking therein a
conflict against the greatest champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero the
Orator.
25. So
again in his book of Apophthegms, which he collected, we see that he esteemed
it more honour to make himself but a pair of tables to take the wise and pithy
words of others, than to have every word of his own to be made an apophthegm or
an oracle; as vain princes, by custom of flattery, pretend to do. And yet if I
should enumerate divers of his speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are
truly such as Solomon noteth, when he saith, VERBA SAPIENTUM TANQUAM ACULEI, ET
TANQUAM CLAVI IN ALTUM DEFIXI: whereof I will only recite three, not so
delectable for elegancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy.
26. As,
first, it is reason he be thought a master of words, that could with one word
appease a mutiny in his army, which was thus: The Romans, when their generals
did speak to their army, did use the word milites, but when the magistrates
spake to the people, they did use the word QUIRITES. The soldiers were in
tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered; not that they so meant, but by
expostulation thereof to draw Caesar to other conditions; wherein he being
resolute not to give way, after some silence, he began his speech, EGO, QUIRITES,
which did admit them already cashiered; wherewith they were so surprised,
crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech, but
relinquished their demands, and made it their suit to be again called by the
name of MILITES.
27. The
second speech was thus: Caesar did extremely affect the name of king; and some
were set on as he passed by in popular acclamation to salute him king:
whereupon, finding the cry weak and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of
jest, as if they had mistaken his surname; NON REX SUM, SED CAESAR; a speech
that if it be searched the life and fulness of it can scarce be expressed. For,
first, it was a refusal of the name, but yet not serious: again, it did signify
an infinite confidence and magnanimity, as if he presumed Caesar was the
greater title; as by his worthiness it is come to pass till this day: but
chiefly it was a speech of great allurement toward his own purpose; as if the
state did strive with him but for a name, whereof mean families were vested;
for REX was a surname with the Romans, as well as KING is with us.
28. The
last speech which I will mention, was used to Metellus, when Caesar after war
declared did possess himself of the city of Rome; at which time entering into
the inner treasury to take the money there accumulated, Metellus being tribune
forbade him: whereto Caesar said, THAT IF HE DID NOT DESIST, HE WOULD LAY HIM
DEAD IN THE PLACE. And presently taking himself up, he added, ADOLESCENS,
DURIUS EST MIHI HOC DICERE QUÀM FACERE. YOUNG MAN, IT IS HARDER FOR ME TO SPEAK
THAN TO DO IT. A speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest clemency
that could proceed out of the mouth of man.
29. But to
return and conclude with him; it is evident, himself knew well his own
perfection in learning, and took it upon him; as appeared when, upon occasion
that some spake what a strange resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his
dictature; he scoffing at him to his own advantage answered. THAT SYLLA COULD
NOT SKILL OF LETTERS, AND THEREFORE KNEW NOT HOW TO DICTATE.
30. And
here it were fit to leave this point, touching the concurrence of military
virtue and learning; (for what example would come with any grace after those
two of Alexander and Caesar?) were it not in regard of the rareness of
circumstances that I find in one other particular, as that which did so
suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder; and it is of Xenophon the
philosopher, who went from Socrates' school into Asia, in the expedition of
Cyrus the younger, against King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very
young, and never had seen the wars before; neither had any command in the army,
but only followed the war as a voluntary, for the love and conversation of
Proxenus his friend. He was present when Phalynus came in message from the
great king to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they a
handful of men left to themselves in the midst of the king's territories, cut
off from their country by many navigable rivers, and many hundred miles. The
message imported, that they should deliver up [20] their arms, and submit
themselves to the king's mercy. To which message before answer was made, divers
of the army conferred familiarly with Phalynus, and amongst the rest Xenophon
happened to say, WHY, PHALYNUS, WE HAVE NOW BUT THESE TWO THINGS LEFT, OUR ARMS
AND OUR VIRTUE; AND IF WE YIELD UP OUR ARMS, HOW SHALL WE MAKE USE OF OUR
VIRTUE ? Whereto Phalynus smiling on him, said, IF I BE NOT DECEIVED, YOUNG
GENTLEMAN, YOU ARE AN ATHENIAN: AND, I BELIEVE YOU STUDY PHILOSOPHY, AND IT IS
PRETTY THAT YOU SAY: BUT YOU ARE MUCH ABUSED, IF YOU THINK YOUR VIRTUE CAN
WITHSTAND THE KING'S POWER. Here was the scorn; the wonder followed: which was,
that this young scholar or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in
parley by treason, conducted those ten thousand foot through the heart of all
the king's high countries from Babylon to Graecia in safety, in despite of all
the king's forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of
the Grecians in time succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of Persia: as
was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan,
and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act of
that young scholar.
VIII. 1. To
proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral and private virtue:
first, it is an assured truth, which is contained in the verses:
Scilicet
ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes, Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.
It taketh
away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds; but indeed the
accent had need be upon FIDELITER: for a little superficial learning doth
rather work a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and
insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and
acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn back the
first offers and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined
and tried. It taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all
weakness: for all things are admired either because they are new, or because
they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation
thoroughly, but will find that printed in his heart NIL NOVI SUPER TERRAM. Neither
can any man marvel at the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, and
adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after
that he was used to great armies, and the great conquests of the spacious provinces
in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of some fights and services
there, which were commonly for a passage or a fort, or some walled town at the
most, he said, IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT HE WAS ADVERTISED OF THE BATTLE OF THE
FROGS AND THE MICE, THAT THE OLD TALES WENT OF. So certainly, if a man meditate
much upon the universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon it (the
divineness of souls except,) will not seem much other than an ant-hill, whereas
some ants carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all
to-and-fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of death,
or adverse fortune; which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue, and
imperfections of manners. For if a man's mind be deeply seasoned with the
consideration of the mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily
concur with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman weeping for her pitcher
of earth that was broken; and went forth the next day and saw a woman weeping
for her son that was dead, and thereupon said: HERI VIDI FRAGILEM FRANGI, HODIE
VIDI MORTALEM MORI. And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple
the knowledge of causes and the conquest of all fears, together, as
concomitantia:
Felix, qui
potuit rerum cognoscere causas, Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum Subjecit
pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.
2. It were
too long to go over the particular remedies which learning doth minister to all
the diseases of the mind; sometimes purging the ill-humours, sometimes opening
the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite,
sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and the like; and, therefore,
I will conclude with that which hath RATIONEM TOTIUS, which is, that it
disposeth the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the
defects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and
reformation. For the unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into
himself, or to call himself to account; nor the pleasure of that SUAVISSIMA
VITA, INDIES SENTIRE SE FIERI MELIOREM. The good parts he hath he will learn to
show to the full, and use them dexterously, but not much to increase them: the faults
he hath he will learn how to hide and colour them, but not much to amend them:
like an ill mower, that mows on still, and never whets his scythe: whereas with
the learned man it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction
and amendment of his mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, in
general and in sum, certain it is that VERITAS and BONITAS differ but as the
seal and the print: for Truth prints Goodness; and they be the clouds of error which
descend in the storms of passions and perturbations.
3. From
moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment, and consider
whether in right reason there be any comparable with that wherewith knowledge
investeth and crowneth man's nature. We see the dignity of the commandment is
according to the dignity of the commanded: to have commandment over beasts, as
herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have commandment over children, as schoolmasters
have, is a matter of small honour; to have commandment over galley-slaves is a
disparagement rather than an honour. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much
better, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds: and
therefore it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths
had a sweetness more than in tyrannies; because the commandment extendeth more
over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And therefore,
when Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to Augustus Caesar the best of
human honours, he doth it in these words:
[21]--------------------------------Victorque
volentes Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.
But yet the
commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will; for
it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is
the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For there is
no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of state in the spirits
and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs,
but knowledge and learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme
pleasure that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors are transported
with, when they once find in themselves that they have a superiority in the
faith and conscience of men; so great as if they have once tasted of it, it is
seldom seen that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon
it. But as this is that which the author of the Revelation calleth the depth or
profoundness of Satan: so by argument
of contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men's understanding, by
force of truth rightly interpreted, is
that which approacheth nearest to the similitude of the Divine Rule.
4. As for
fortune and advancement, the beneficence of learning is not so confined to give
fortune only to states and commonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune
to particular persons. For it was well noted long ago, that Homer hath given
more men their livings, than either Sylla, or Caesar, or Augustus ever did,
notwithstanding their great largesses and donatives, and distributions of lands
to so many legions. And no doubt it is hard to say. whether arms or learning have
advanced greater numbers. And in case of sovereignty we see, that if arms or
descent have carried away the kingdom, yet learning hath carried the priesthood,
which ever hath been in some competition with empire.
5. Again,
for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning, it far surpasseth all
other in nature: for, shall the pleasures of the affections so exceed the
senses, as much as the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a
dinner; and must not, of consequence, the pleasures of the intellect or
understanding exceed the pleasures of the affections? We see in all other
pleasures there is satiety, and after they be used, their verdure departeth;
which showeth well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures: and that
it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality; and therefore we see
that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But of
knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually
interchangeable; and therefore appeareth to be good in itself simply, without
fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure of small efficacy and contentment
to the mind of man which the poet Lucretius describeth elegantly,
Suave mari
magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, etc.
IT IS A
VIEW OF DELIGHT, saith he, TO STAND OR WALK UPON THE SHORE SIDE, AND TO SEE A
SHIP TOSSED WITH TEMPEST UPON THE SEA; OR TO BE IN A FORTIFIED TOWER, AND TO
SEE TWO BATTLES JOIN UPON A PLAIN; BUT IT IS A PLEASURE INCOMPARABLE, FOR THE
MIND OF MAN TO BE SETTLED, LANDED, AND FORTIFIED IN THE CERTAINTY OF TRUTH; AND
FROM THENCE TO DESCRY AND BEHOLD THE ERRORS, PERTURBATIONS, LABOURS, AND WANDERINGS
UP AND DOWN OF OTHER MEN.
6. Lastly,
leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning man excelleth in in that wherein
man excelleth beasts; that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their
motions, where in body he cannot come, and the like; let us conclude with the
dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man's nature
doth most aspire, which is, immortality or continuance: for to this tendeth
generation, and raising of houses and families; to this buildings, foundations,
and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration, and
in effect the strength of all other human desires. We see then how far the
monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of
the hands. For have not the verses of Homer continued twenty-five hundred years,
or more, without the loss of a syllable or letter; during which time, infinite
palaces, temples, castles, cities, have been decayed and demolished? It is not
possible to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar; no,
nor of the kings or great personages of much later years; for the originals
cannot last, and the copies cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the
images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of
time, and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called
images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of
others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages:
so that, if the invention of the ship was thought so noble, which carrieth
riches and commodities from place to place, and consociateth the most remote
regions in participation of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified,
which, as ships, pass through the vast seas of time, and make ages so distant
to participate of the wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the one of the
other? Nay further, we see some of the philosophers which were least divine,
and most immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality of the
soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions the spirit of man could
act and perform without the organs of the body, they thought might remain after
death, which were only those of the understanding, and not of the affection: so
immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to be. But we,
that know by divine revelation that not only the understanding but the
affections purified, not only the spirit but the body changed, shall be
advanced to immortality, do disclaim in these rudiments of the senses. But it
must be remembered both in this last point, and so it may likewise be needful
in other places, that in probation of the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did
in the beginning separate divine testimony from human, which method I have
pursued, and so handled them both apart.
7.
Nevertheless, I do not pretend, and I know it will [22] be impossible for me,
by any pleading of mine, to reverse the judgment, either of Aesop's Cock, that
preferred the barleycorn before the gem; or of Midas, that being chosen judge
between Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god of the flocks, judged for
plenty: or of Paris, that judged for
beauty and love against wisdom and power; nor of Agrippina, OCCIDAT MATREM,
MODO IMPERET, that preferred empire with conditions never so detestable; or of Ulysses, QUI VETULAM PRAETULIT IMMORTALITATI,
being a figure of those which prefer custom and habit before all excellency; or
of a number of the like popular judgments. For these things continue as they
have been: but so will that also continue whereupon learning hath ever relied,
and which faileth not: JUSTIFICATA EST SAPIENTIA A FILIIS SUIS.
THE SECOND
BOOK
OF
FRANCIS
BACON
OF THE
PROFICIENCE
AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING
DIVINE AND
HUMAN
To the King
1. IT might
seem to have more convenience, though it come often otherwise to pass,
excellent King, that those, which are fruitful in their generations, and have
in themselves the foresight of immortality in their descendants, should
likewise be more careful of the good estate of future times, unto which they
know they must transmit and commend over their dearest pledges. Queen Elizabeth
was a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life, and was a blessing
to her own times; and yet so as the impression of her good government, besides
her happy memory, is not without some effect which doth survive her. But to
your Majesty, whom God hath already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to
continue and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth
yet promise many of the like renovations; it is proper and agreeable to be
conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government, but in those
acts also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual: amongst the which,
if affection do not transport me, there is not any more worthy than the further
endowment of the world with sound and fruitful knowledge. For why should a few
received authors stand up like Hercules' columns, beyond which there should be
no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your Majesty
to conduct and prosper us? To return therefore where we left, it remaineth to
consider of what kind those acts are which have been undertaken and performed
by kings and others for the increase and advancement of learning: wherein I
purpose to speak actively without digressing or dilating.
2. Let this
ground therefore be laid, that all works are overcome by amplitude of reward,
by soundness of direction, and by the conjunction of labours. The first
multiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth the
frailty of man: but the principal of these is direction: for CLAUDUS IN VIA
ANTEVERTIT CURSOREM EXTRA VIAM; and Salomon excellently setteth it down, IF THE
IRON BE NOT SHARP, IT REQUIRETH MORE STRENGTH; BUT WISDOM IS THAT WHICH PREVAILETH;
signifying that the invention or election of the mean is more effectual than
any inforcement or accumulation of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, for
that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that have been deservers
towards the state of learning) I do observe, nevertheless, that their works and
acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory, than of progression and proficience;
and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the multitude of learned
men, than to rectify or raise the sciences themselves.
3. The
works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about three objects: the
places of learning, the books of learning, and the persons of the learned. For
as water, whether it be the dew of heaven, or the springs of the earth, doth
scatter and leese itself in the ground, except it be collected into some
receptacle, where it may by union comfort and sustain itself, (and for that
cause the industry of [23] man hath made and framed spring-heads, conduits,
cisterns, and pools, which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with
accomplishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and necessity) so
this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration,
or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it
were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places appointed, as
universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the
same.
4. The
works which concern the seats and places of learning are four; foundations and
buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and privileges,
institutions and ordinances for government; all tending to quietness and
privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles; much like the
stations which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving of bees:
Principio
sedes apibus statioque petenda, Quo neque fit ventis aditus, etc.
5. The
works touching books are two: first, libraries, which are as the shrines where
all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true virtue, and that without
delusion or imposture, are preserved and reposed: secondly, new editions of
authors, with more correct impressions, more faithful translations, more
profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, and the like.
6. The works
pertaining to the persons of learned men, besides the advancement and
countenancing of them in general, are two: the reward and designation of
readers in sciences already extant and invented; and the reward and designation
of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not sufficiently
laboured and prosecuted.
7. These
are summarily the works and acts, wherein the merits of many excellent princes
and other worthy personages have been conversant. As for any particular
commemorations, I call to mind what Cicero said, when he gave general thanks;
DIFFICILE NON ALIQUEM, INGRATUM QUENQUAM PRAETERIRE. Let us rather, according
to the Scriptures, look unto that part of the race which is before us than look
back to that which is already attained.
8. First,
therefore, amongst so many great foundations of colleges in Europe, I find it
strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts
and sciences at large. For if men judge that learning should be referred to
action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the
ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had
been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do,
nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach
that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: so if any man think philosophy
and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions
are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath
hindered the progression of learning, because these fundamental knowledges have
been studied but in passage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than
it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the
stirring of the earth and putting new mould about the roots that must work it. Neither
is it to be forgotten, that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to professory
learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon the growth of
sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states and governments. For hence
it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them
in causes of state, because there is no education collegiate which is free;
where such as were so disposed might give themselves to histories, modern
languages, books of policy and civil discourse, and other the like enablements
unto service of estate.
9. And
because Founders of Colleges do plant, and Founders of Lectures do water, it
followeth well in order to speak of the defect which is in public lectures;
namely, in the smallness and meanness of the salary or reward which in most
places is assigned unto them; whether they be lectures of arts, or of professions.
For it is necessary to the progression of sciences that Readers be of the most able
and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating and propagating
of sciences, and not for transitory use. This cannot be, except their condition
and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole
labour and continue his whole age in that function and attendance; and
therefore must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of
advancement, which may be expected from a profession or the practice of a
profession. So as, if you will have sciences flourish, you must observe David's
military law, which was, THAT THOSE WHICH STAID WITH THE CARRIAGE SHOULD HAVE EQUAL
PART WITH THOSE WHICH WERE IN THE ACTION, else will the carriages be ill
attended. So Readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and
provisions of sciences, whence men in active courses are furnished, and
therefore ought to have equal entertainment with them: otherwise if the fathers
in sciences be of the weakest sort, or be ill-maintained,
Et patrum
invalidi referent jejunia nati.
10. Another
defect I note, wherein I shall need some alchemist to help me, who call upon
men to sell their books, and to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva
and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it is,
that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study of many sciences, especially Natural
Philosophy and Physic, books be not the only instrumentals; wherein also the
beneficence of men hath not been altogether wanting: for we see spheres,
globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided as appurtenances to
astronomy and cosmography, as well as books: we see likewise that some places
instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all
sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for anatomies. But these
do respect but a few things. In general, there will hardly be any main proficience
in the disclosing of [24] nature, except there be some allowance for expenses
about experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or
Daedalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind: and therefore as secretaries
and spials of princes and states bring in bills for intelligence, so you must
allow the spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else
you shall be ill advertised.
11. And if
Alexander made such a liberal assignation to Aristotle of treasure for the
allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and the like, that he might compile a
History of Nature, much better do they deserve it that travail in Arts of
Nature.
12. Another
defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect in those which are governors
in universities, of consultation, and in princes or superior persons, of
visitation: to enter into account and consideration, whether the readings,
exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning, anciently begun, and
since continued, be well instituted or no; and thereupon to ground an amendment
or reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your
majesty's own most wise and princely maxims, THAT IN ALL USAGES AND PRECEDENTS,
THE TIMES BE CONSIDERED THEREIN THEY FIRST BEGAN; WHICH, IF THEY WERE WEAK OR
IGNORANT, IT DEROGATETH FROM THE AUTHORITY OF THE USAGE, AND LEAVETH IT FOR
SUSPECT. And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the
universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the more requisite they
be re-examined. In this kind I will give an instance or two, for example sake,
of things that are the most obvious and familiar. The one is a matter, which
though it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an error; which is, that
scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric,
arts fitter for graduates than children and novices: for these two, rightly
taken, are the gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for
judgment, the other for ornament: and they be the rules and directions how to
set forth and dispose matter; and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter,
and which have not gathered that which Cicero calleth SYLVA and SUPELLEX, stuff
and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to weigh, or to
measure, or to paint the wind), doth work but this effect, that the wisdom of
those arts, which is great and universal, is almost made contemptible, and is
degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further, the
untimely learning of them hath drawn on, by consequence, the superficial and
unprofitable teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of
children. Another is a lack I find in the exercises used in the Universities,
which do make too great a divorce between invention and memory; for their
speeches are either premeditate, IN VERBIS CONCEPTIS, where nothing is left to
invention, or merely extemporal, where little is left to memory: whereas in
life and action there is least use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures
of premeditation and invention, notes and memory; so as the exercise fitteth
not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true rule in
exercises, that they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for
otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, and not
prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars come to the
practices of professions, or other actions of civil life; which when they set
into, this want is soon found by themselves, and sooner by others. But this
part, touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of Universities, I
will conclude with the clause of Caesar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, HOC QMEMADMODUM
FIERI POSSIT, NONNULLA MIHI IN MENTEM VENIUNT, ET MULTA REPERIRI POSSUNT; DE
IIS REBUS ROGO VOS UT COGITATIONEM SUSCIPIATIS.
13. Another
defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher than the precedent: for as the
proficience of learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of
Universities in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet more advanced,
if there were more intelligence mutual between the Universities of Europe than
now there is. We see there may be many orders and foundations, which though they
be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they take
themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and correspondence one with
the other; insomuch as they have provincials and generals. And surely, as
nature createth brotherhood in families, and arts mechanical contract
brotherhoods in commonalties, and the anointment of God superinduceth a
brotherhood in kings and bishops; so in like manner there cannot but be a
fraternity in learning and illumination, relating to that paternity which is
attributed to God, who is called the Father of illuminations or lights.
14. The
last defect which I will note is, that there hath not been, or very rarely
been, any public designation of writers or inquirers concerning such parts of
knowledge as may appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or
undertaken; unto which point it is an inducement to enter into a view and
examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted, and what omitted: for
the opinion of plenty is among the causes of want, and the great quantity of
books maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack; which surcharge, nevertheless,
is not to be remedied by making no more books, but by making more good books,
which, as the serpent of Moses, might devour the serpents of the enchanters.
15. The
removing of all the defects formerly enumerated, except the last, and of the
active part also of the last (which is the designation of writers), are OPERA
BASILICA; towards which the endeavours of a private man may be but as an image
in a crossway, that may point at the way, but cannot go it: but the inducing
part of the latter, which is the survey of learning, may be set forward by private
travail. Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful
perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and
waste, and not improved and converted by the industry of man; to the end that
such a plot made and recorded to memory, may both minister light to any public
designation, and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours: wherein,
nevertheless, my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and
deficiencies, and not to make [25] any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecutions;
for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing
to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.
In the
handling and undertaking of which work I am not ignorant what it is that I do
now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my
purpose; but my hope is, that if my extreme love to learning carry me too far,
I may obtain the excuse of affection; for that IT IS NOT GRANTED TO MAN TO LOVE
AND TO BE WISE. But I know well I can use no other liberty of judgment than I
must leave to others; and I for my part shall be indifferently glad either to
perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of humanity; NAM QUI ERRANTI
COMITER MONSTRAT VIAM, ETC. I do foresee likewise that of those things which I
shall enter and register as deficiencies and omissions, many will conceive and
censure that some of them are already done and extant; others to be but
curiosities, and things of no great use; and others to be of too great
difficulty, and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected. But for the
two first, I refer myself to the particulars; for the last, touching impossibility,
I take it those things are to be held possible which may be done by some
person, though not by every one; and which may be done by many, though not by
any one; and which may be done in the succession of ages, though not within the
hour-glass of one man's life; and which may be done by public designation,
though not by private endeavour. [--] But, notwithstanding, if any man will
take to himself rather that of Salomon, DICIT PIGER, LEO EST IN VIA, than that
of Virgil, POSSUNT QUIA POSSE VIDENTUR, I shall be content that my labours be
esteemed but as the better sort of wishes: for as it asketh some knowledge to
demand a question not impertinent, so it required some sense to make a wish not
absurd.
I. 1. THE
parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's
understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his memory, poesy to
his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. Divine learning receiveth the
same distribution; for the spirit of man is the same, though the revelation of
oracle and sense be diverse: so as theology consisteth also of the history of
the church; of parables, which is divine poesy; and of holy doctrine or
precept: for as for that part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it
is but Divine History; which hath that prerogative over human, as the narration
may be before the fact as well as after.
[Pp.
25-27: Tables: THE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. MEMORY. IMAGINATION.
REASON.]
[28]
History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary; whereof the first
three I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath
propounded to himself the general state of learning to be described and
represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature, and the
state civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth
to me to be as the statua of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting
which doth most show the spirit and life of the person: and yet I am not
ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the
mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small
memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren
relations touching the invention of arts or usages.
2. But a
just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges
and their sects, their inventions, their traditions, their diverse
administrations and managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays,
depressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of them, and all
other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may truly
affirm to be wanting. [--] The use and end of which work I do not so much
design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning,
but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose; which is this in few words,
that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning. For
it is not St. Augustine's nor St. Ambrose's works that will make so wise a
divine, as ecclesiastical history, thoroughly read and observed; and the same reason
is of learning.
3. History
of nature is of three sorts; of nature in course, of nature erring or varying,
and of nature altered or wrought; that is, history of creatures, history of
marvels, and history of arts. [--] The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and
that in good perfection; the two latter are handled so weakly and unprofitably,
as I am moved to note them as deficient. [--] For I find no sufficient or
competent collection of the works of nature which have a digression and deflection
from the ordinary course of generations, productions, and motions; whether they
be singularities of place and region, or the strange events of time and chance,
or the effects of yet unknown properties, or the instances of exception to
general kinds. It is true, I find a number of books of fabulous experiments and
secrets, and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a substantial
and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars of nature, well
examined and described, I find not: especially not with due rejection of fables
and popular errors: for as things now are, if an untruth in nature be once on
foot, what by reason of the neglect of examination and countenance of
antiquity, and what by reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and
ornaments of speech, it is never called down.
4. The use
of this work, honoured with a precedent in Aristotle, is nothing less than to
give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of
Mirabilaries is to do; but for two reasons,
both of great weight; the one to correct the partiality of axioms and opinions,
which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar examples; the other
because from the wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence and passage
towards the wonders of art: for it is no more but by following, and as it were
hounding nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the
same place again. [--] Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels,
that superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations,
and the like, where there is an assurance and clear evidence of the fact, be
altogether excluded. For it is not yet known in what cases and how far effects
attributed to superstition do participate of natural causes: and therefore
howsoever the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from the
speculation and consideration of them light may be taken, not only for the
discerning of the offences, but for the further disclosing of nature. Neither ought
a man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth,
as your majesty hath showed in your own example; who with the two clear eyes of
religion and natural philosophy have looked deeply and wisely into these
shadows, and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth
through pollutions and itself remains as pure as before. [--] But this I hold fit,
that these narrations, which have mixture with superstition, be sorted by
themselves, and not be mingled with the narrations which are merely and
sincerely natural. [--] But as for the narrations touching the prodigies and
miracles of religions, they are either not true, or not natural; and therefore
impertinent for the story of nature.
5. For
history of nature wrought or mechanical, I find some collections made of
agriculture, and likewise of manual arts; but commonly with a rejection of
experiments familiar and vulgar. [--] For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour
unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical,
except they be such as may be thought secrets, rarities, and special
subtilities; which humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided
in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates,
a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where the subject being touching
beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of inductions, put first an
example of a fair virgin, and then of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well
glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said, MORE THAN FOR COURTESY'S SAKE,
HE DID THINK MUCH TO DISPUTE WITH ANY THAT DID ALLEGE SUCH BASE AND SORDID
SUBSTANCES: whereunto Socrates answered, YOU HAVE REASON, AND IT BECOMES YOU WELL,
BEING A MAN SO TRIM IN YOUR VESTMENTS, ETC., and so goeth on in an irony. [--]
But the truth is, they be not the highest instances that give the securest
information; as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher,
[29] that while he gazed upwards to the stars fell into the water; for if he
had looked down he might have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft he
could not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and
small things discover great, better than great can discover the small: and
therefore Aristotle noteth well, THAT THE NATURE OF EVERYTHING IS BEST SEEN IN
ITS SMALLEST PORTIONS. And for that cause he inquireth the nature of a
commonwealth, first in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and wife,
parent and child, master and servant, which are in every cottage. Even so
likewise the nature of this great city of the world, and the policy thereof,
must be first sought in mean concordances and small portions. So we see how
that secret of nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone towards
the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars of iron.
6. But if
my judgment be of any weight, the use of history mechanical is of all others
the most radical and fundamental towards natural philosophy; such natural
philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable
speculation, but such as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of
man's life: for it will not only minister and suggest for the present many
ingenious practices in all trades, by a connection and transferring of the observations
of one art to the use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries
shall fall under the consideration of one man's mind; but further, it will give
a more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto
attained. [--] For like as a man's disposition is never well known till he be
crossed, nor Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast;
so the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty
of nature, as in the trials and vexations of art.
II. 1. For
civil history, it is of three kinds; not unfitly to be compared with the three
kinds of pictures or images: for of pictures or images, we see some are
unfinished, some are perfect, and some are defaced. So of histories we may find
three kinds, memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities; for memorials are
history unfinished, or the first or rough draughts of history; and antiquities
are history defaced, or some remnants of history which have casually escaped
the shipwreck of time.
2.
Memorials, or preparatory history, are of two sorts; whereof the one may be
termed commentaries, and the other registers. Commentaries are they which set
down a continuance of the naked events and actions, without the motives or
designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions and other
passages of action: for this is the true nature of a commentary; though Caesar,
in modesty mixed with greatness, did for his pleasure apply the name of a
commentary to the best history of the world. Registers are collections of
public acts, as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations and
letters of state, orations and the like, without a perfect continuance or contexture
of the thread of the narration.
3.
Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said, TANQUAM TABULA
NAUFRAGII, when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous diligence and
observation, out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private
records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of books that concern not
story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat from the deluge of time.
4. In these
kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no deficience, for they are TANQUAM
IMPERFECTE MISTA; and therefore any deficience in them is but their nature. [--]
As for the corruptions and moths of history, which are EPITOMES, the use of
them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound judgment have confessed; as
those that have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent histories,
and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs.
5. History,
which may be called just and perfect history, is of three kinds, according to
the object which it propoundeth or pretendeth to represent: for it either
representeth a time, or a person, or an actions. The first we call chronicles,
the second lives, and the third narrations or relations. [--] Of these,
although the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history, and hath most
estimation and glory, yet the second excelleth it in profit and use, and the
third in verity and sincerity. For history of times representeth the magnitude
of actions, and the public faces and deportments of persons, and passeth over
in silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters. [--] But such
being the workmanship of God, as He doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest
wires, MAXIMA È MINIMIS SUSPENDENS, it comes therefore to pass, that such
histories do rather set forth the pomp of business than the true and inward
resorts thereof. But lives, if they be well written, propounding to themselves
a person to represent in whom actions both greater and smaller, public and
private, have a commixture, must of necessity contain a more true, native, and
lively representation. So again narrations and relations of actions, as the war
of Peloponnesus, the expedition of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline,
cannot but be more purely and exactly true than histories of times, because
they may choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions
of the writer: whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time, especially of
any length, cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces which he must be forced
to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture.
6. For the
History of Times, I mean of Civil History, the providence of God hath made the
distribution: for it hath pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar
states of the world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the
state of Graecia, and the state of Rome; the histories whereof occupying the
middle part of time, have more ancient to them, histories which may by one
common name be termed the antiquities of the world: and after them histories which
may be likewise called by the name of modern history.
7. Now to
speak of the deficiencies. As to the [30] heathen antiquities of the world, it
is in vain to note them for deficient: deficient they are no doubt, consisting
most of fables and fragments; but the deficience cannot be holpen; for
antiquity is like fame, CAPUT INTER NUBILA CONDIT, her head is muffled from our
sight. For the history of the exemplar states, it is extant in good perfection.
Not but I could wish there were a perfect course of history for Graecia from
Theseus to Philopoemen (what time the affairs of Graecia were drowned and
extinguished in the affairs of Rome); and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus,
who may be truly said to be ULTIMUS ROMANORUM. In which sequences of story the
text of Thucydides and Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius,
Sallustius, Caesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept
entire without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and continued. But
this is a matter of magnificence, rather to be commended than required: and we
speak now of parts of learning supplemental and not of supererogation.
8. But for
modern histories, whereof there are some few very worthy, but the greater part
beneath mediocrity, (leaving the care of foreign stories to foreign states,
because I will not be CURIOSUS IN ALIENA REPUBLICA,) I cannot fail to represent
to your majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in the main
continuance thereof, and the partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland in
the latest and largest author that I have seen: supposing that it would be honour for your Majesty, and a work
very memorable, if this island of Great Britain, as it is now joined in
monarchy for the ages to come, so were joined in one history for the times
passed; after the manner of the Sacred History, which draweth down the story of
the ten tribes, and of the two tribes, as twins, together. And if it shall seem
that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly performed, there is an
excellent period of a much smaller compass of time, as to the story of England;
that is to say, from the uniting of the Roses to the uniting of the kingdoms; a
portion of time, wherein, to my understanding, there hath been the rarest
varieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath
been known. For it beginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and
title: an entry by battle, an establishment by marriage, and therefore times
answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though
without extremity of storm; but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot,
being one of the most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the
reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much intermixture with
the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them variably; in whose time
also began that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical, an action which
seldom cometh upon the stage. Then the reign of a minor: then an offer of a
usurpation, though it was but as FEBRIS EPHEMERA. Then the reign of a queen
matched with a foreigner: then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried,
and yet her government so masculine, that it had greater impression and operation
upon the states abroad than it any ways received from thence. And now last,
this most happy and glorious event, that this island of Britain, divided from
all the world, should be united in itself: and that oracle of rest, given to
Aeneas, ANTIQUAM EXQUIRITE MATREM, should now be performed and fulfilled upon
the nations of England and Scotland, being now reunited in the ancient mother
name of Britain, as a full period of all instability and peregrinations. So
that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies, that they have certain
trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle; so it seemeth that by
the providence of God this monarchy, before it was to settle in your majesty
and your generations, (in which I hope it is now established for ever,) had
these prelusive changes and varieties.
9. For
lives, I do find it strange that these times have so little esteemed the
virtues of the times, as that the writing of lives should be no more frequent. For
although there be not many sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that
states are most collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy personages
that deserve better than dispersed report or barren elogies. For herein the invention
of one of the late poets is proper, and
doth well enrich the ancient fiction: for he feigneth that at the end of the
thread or web of every man's life there was a little medal containing the person's
name, and that Time waited upon the shears; and as soon as the thread was cut,
caught the medals, and carried them to the river of Lethe; and about the bank
there were many birds flying up and down, that would get the medals and carry
them in their beak a little while, and then let them fall into the river: only
there were a few swans, which if they got a name, would carry it to a temple
where it was consecrate. And although many men, more mortal in their affections
than in their bodies, do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and
ventosity,
Animi nil
magnae laudis egentes;
which
opinion cometh from that root, NON PRIUS LAUDES CONTEMPSIMUS, QUAM LAUDANDA
FACERE DESIVIMUS: yet that will not alter Salomon's judgment, MEMORIA JUSTI CUM
LAUDIBUS, AT IMPIORUM NOMEN PUTRESCET: the
one flourisheth, the other either consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth to
an ill odour. [--] And therefore in that style or addition, which is and hath
been long well received and brought in use, FELICIS MEMORIAE, PIAE MEMORIAE,
BONAE MEMORIAE, we do acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from
Demosthenes, that BONA FAMA PROPRIA POSSESSIO DEFUNCTORUM; which possession I cannot
but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and that therein there is a
deficience.
10. For
narrations and relations of particular actions, there were also to be wished a
greater diligence therein; for there is no great action but hath some good pen
which attends it. [--] And because it is an ability not common to write a good
history, as may well appear by the small number of them; yet if particularity
of actions memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass, the compiling of
a complete history of times might [31] be the better expected, when a writer
should arise that were fit for it: for the collection of such relations mought
be as a nursery garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately garden, when time
should serve.
11. There
is yet another portion of history which Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not
to be forgotten, especially with that application which he accoupleth it
withal, annals and journals: appropriating to the former matters of estate, and
to the latter acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For giving but a touch of
certain magnificent buildings, he addeth CUM EX DIGNITATE POPULI ROMANI REPERTUM
SIT, RES ILLUSTRES ANNALIBUS TALIA DIURNIS URBIS ACTIS MANDARE. So as there is
a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well as civil. And as nothing doth
derogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion of degrees; so it doth
not a little embase the authority of a history, to intermingle matters of
triumph, or matters of ceremony, or matters of novelty, with matters of state. But
the use of a journal hath not only been in the history of time, but likewise in
the history of persons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in ancient time
had, upon point of honour and policy both, journals kept of what passed day by
day: for we see the chronicle which was read before Ahasuerus, when he could
not take rest, contained matter of affairs indeed, but such as had passed in
his own time, and very lately before: but the journal of Alexander's house expressed
every small particularity, even concerning his person and court; and it is yet
a use well received in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of war,
navigations, and the like, to keep diaries of that which passeth continually.
12. I
cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some wise and grave men
have used, containing a scattered history of those actions which they have
thought worthy of memory, with politic discourse and observation thereupon: not
incorporate into the history, but separately, and as the more principal in
their intention; which kind of ruminated history I think more fit to place amongst
books of policy, whereof we shall hereafter speak; than amongst books of
history: for it is the true office of history to represent the events
themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and
conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment. But
mixtures are things irregular, whereof no man can define.
13. So also
is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed, and that is history of
cosmography: being compounded of natural history, in respect of the regions
themselves; of history civil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and
manners of the people; and the mathematics, in respect of the climates and
configurations towards the heavens: which part of learning of all others in
this latter time hath obtained most proficience. For it may be truly affirmed
to the honour of these times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that
this great building of the world had never through-lights made in it, till the
age of us and our fathers: for although they had knowledge of the Antipodes,
Nosque ubi
primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis, Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper:
yet that
mought be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, it requireth the
voyage but of half the globe. But to circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies
do, was not done or enterprised till these latter times: and therefore these
times may justly bear in their word, not only PLUS ULTRA, in precedence of the
ancient NON ULTRA, and IMITABILE FULMEN, in precedence of the ancient NON IMITABILE
FULMEN,
Demens qui
nimbos et non imitabile fulmen; etc.
but
likewise IMITABILE COELUM; in respect of the many memorable voyages after the
manner of heaven about the globe of the earth.
14. And
this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of
the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem
they are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the
prophet Daniel, speaking of the latter times, foretelleth PLURIMI
PERTRANSIBUNT, ET MULTIPLEX ERIT SCIENTIA: as if the openness and thorough
passage of the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same
ages; as we see it is already performed in great part; the learning of these
latter times not much giving place to the former two periods or returns of
learning, the one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans.
III. 1.
History ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with history civil: but
further, in the propriety thereof, may be divided into the history of the
church, by a general name; history of prophecy; and history of providence. The
first describeth the times of the militant church, whether it be fluctuant, as
the ark of Noah; or moveable, as the ark in the wilderness; or at rest, as the
ark in the temple: that is, the state of the church in persecution, in remove, and
in peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient; only I would that
the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity. But I
am not now in hand with censures, but with omissions.
2. The
second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of two relatives, the
prophecy, and the accomplishment; and therefore the nature of such a work ought
to be, that every prophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling
the same, throughout the ages of the world; both for better confirmation of
faith, and for the better illumination of the Church touching those parts of prophecies
which are yet unfulfilled: allowing nevertheless that latitude which is
agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies; being of the nature of their
Author, with whom a thousand years are but as one day; and therefore are not fulfilled
punctually at once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout
many ages; though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age. [--]
This is a work which I find deficient; but is to be done with wisdom, sobriety,
and reverence, or not at all.
3. The
third, which is history of providence, [32] containeth that excellent
correspondence which is between God's revealed will and His secret will: which
though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to the natural
man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the Tabernacle; yet at
some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the confuting of
those which are as without God in the world, to write it in such text and
capital letters, that as the prophet saith, HE THAT RUNNETH BY MAY READ IT, that
is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgments, and never bend or
fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race
urged to discern it. Such are the notable events and examples of God's
Judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings: and this is a work which
hath passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as
omitted.
4. There
are also other parts of learning which are appendices to history: for all the
exterior proceedings of man consist of words and deeds: whereof history doth
properly receive and retain in memory the deeds: and if words, yet but as
inducements and passages to deeds: so are there other books and writings, which
are appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only; which likewise are of
three sorts: orations, letters, and brief speeches or sayings. [--] Orations
are pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, inventives, apologies, reprehensions,
orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. [--] Letters are according to
all the variety of occasions, advertisements, advices, directions,
propositions, petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory, of
compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And
such as are written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment,
the best; for they are more natural than orations and public speeches, and more
advised than conferences or present speeches. So again letters of affairs from
such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of all others the best
instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in
themselves. [--] For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Caesar's; for as his history, and those few letters of
his which we have, and those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's
else, so I suppose would his collection of Apophthegms have done; for as for
those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such matters, or
else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these three kinds of writings I
do not insist, because I have no deficiencies to propound concerning them.
5. Thus
much therefore concerning history; which is that part of learning which
answereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of man: which
is that of memory.
IV. 1.
Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words for the most part restrained,
but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the
imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join
that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined; and so
make unlawful matches and divorces of things; PICTORIBUS ATQUE POETIS, ETC. It
is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter; in the first sense it is
but a character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent
for the present: in the latter it is, as hath been said, one of the principal portions
of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may be styled as
well in prose as in verse.
2. The use
of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the
mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the
world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is,
agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness,
and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore,
because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which
satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more
heroical: because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions
not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them
more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence: because
true history representeth actions and events more ordinary, and less interchanged,
therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and
alternative variations: so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to
magnanimity, morality, and to delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to
have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the
mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason
doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things. [--] And we see, that
by these insinuations and congruities with man's nature and pleasure, joined
also with the agreement and comfort it hath with music, it hath had access and
estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning stood
excluded.
3. The
division of Poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof (besides those
divisions which are common unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned
lives, and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations,
and the rest) is into poesy narrative, representative, and allusive. [--] The
Narrative is a mere imitation of history, with the excesses before remembered;
choosing for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure
or mirth. [--] Representative is as a visible history; and is an image of
actions as if they were present, as history is of actions in nature as they are
(that is) past. [--] Allusive or Parabolical is a Narrative applied only to
express some special purpose or conceit. Which latter kind of parabolical
wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Aesop,
and the brief sentences of the Seven, and the use of hieroglyphics may appear. And
the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason
which was more sharp or subtile than the vulgar in that manner, because men in
those [33] times wanted both variety of examples and subtility of conceit: and
as hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before arguments: and nevertheless
now, and at all times, they do retain much life and vigour; because reason
cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit.
4. But
there remaineth yet another use of Poesy Parabolical, opposite to that which we
last mentioned: for that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is
taught or delivered, and this other to retire and obscure it: that is, when the
secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in
fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized. In heathen
poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great
felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against
the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth Fame:
Illam terra
parens, irâ irritata Deorum, Extremam, ut perhibent, Coelo Enceladoque sororem
Progenuit:
Expounded,
that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open rebels, then the
malignity of the people, which is the mother of rebellion, doth bring forth
libels and slanders, and taxations of the states, which is of the same kind
with rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fable, that the rest of the gods
having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas
called Briareus with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded, that
monarchies need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects,
as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people, who will be sure to
come in on their side. So in the fable, that Achilles was brought up under Chiron
the Centaur, who was part a man and part a beast, expounded ingeniously but
corruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education and discipline of
princes to know as well how to play the part of the lion in violence, and the
fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and justice. [--] Nevertheless, in many
the like encounters, I do rather think that the fable was first, and the
exposition devised, than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable
framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled
himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions
of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets
were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. [--] Surely of those
poets which are now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made a
kind of Scripture by the latter schools of the Grecians), yet I should without
any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own
meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to
alarm; for he was not the inventor of many of them.
5. In this
third part of learning, which is poesy,
I can report no deficience, For being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the
earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any
other kind. But to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing of
affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more
than to the philosophers' works; and for wit and eloquence, not much less than
to orators' harangue. But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let
us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to
approach and view with more reverence and attention.
V. 1. The
knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above, and some
springing from beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, the other
inspired by divine revelation. [--] The light of nature consisteth in the
notions of the mind and the reports of the senses: for as for knowledge which
man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not original; as in a water
that besides his own spring-head is fed with other springs and streams. So
then, according to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is
first of all divided into divinity and philosophy.
2. In
Philosophy, the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, -- or are
circumferred to nature,-- or are reflected or reverted upon himself. Out of
which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, divine philosophy,
natural philosophy, and human philosophy or humanity. For all things are marked
and stamped with this triple character of the power of God, the difference of
nature and the use of man. But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge
are not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point;
but are like branches of a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension
and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it come to discontinue and
break itself into arms and boughs: therefore it is good, before we enter into
the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name
of PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, primitive or summary philosophy, as the main and common
way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science
whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful. [--] For I find a
certain rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that
part of natural philosophy which concerneth the principles, and of that other
part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit; all these strangely
commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a
depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms,
than anything solid or substantive of itself. [--] Nevertheless I cannot be
ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are handled
but in several respects. As for example, that logic considereth of many things
as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; the one in appearance,
the other in existence; but I find this difference better made than pursued. For
if they had considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those
extern characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries
must of force have been of a far other kind than they are. [34] [--] For doth
any of them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far
it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in nature are
so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth
any, in handling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron should not
move to iron, which is more like, but move to the lode-stone, which is less
like? Why in all diversities of things there should be certain participles in
nature, which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But there
is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those common
adjuncts of things, as in nature: and only a resuming and repeating of the
force and use of them in speech or argument. [--] Therefore, because in a
writing of this nature, I avoid all subtility, my meaning touching this
original or universal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by
negative: THAT IT BE A RECEPTACLE FOR ALL SUCH PROFITABLE OBSERVATIONS AND
AXIOMS AS FALL NOT WITHIN THE COMPASS OF ANY OF THE SPECIAL PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY
OR SCIENCES, BUT ARE MORE COMMON AND OF A HIGHER STAGE.
3. Now that
there are many of that kind need not to be doubted. For example: is not the
rule, SI INAEQUALIBUS AEQUALIA ADDAS, OMNIA ERUNT INAEQUALIA, an axiom as well
of justice as of the mathematics? and is
there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and
arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, QUAE IN EODEM
TERTIO CONVENIUNT, ET INTER SE CONVENIUNT, a rule taken from the mathematics,
but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the
observation, OMNIA MUTANTUR, NIL INTERIT, a contemplation in philosophy thus,
that the quantum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it
requireth the same Omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first
made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, DIDICI QUOD OMNIA OPERA,
QUAE FECIT DEUS, PERSERVERENT IN PERPETUA; NON POSSOMUS EIS QUICQUAM ADDERE NEC
AUFERRE. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth
concerning governments, that the way to establish and preserve them, is to
reduce them AD PRINCIPIA, a rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil
administration? Was not the Persian
magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of
nature to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a
musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet
accord, alike true in affection. Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide
from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving
expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same
with the playing of light upon the water?
--------------Splendet
tremulo sub lumine pontus.
Are not the
organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection, the eye with a
glass, the ear with a cave or strait determined and bounded? Neither are these
only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the
same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or
matters. [--] This science, therefore, as I understand it, I may justly report
as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits in handling some
particular argument will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well
for their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have
been visited; being of so excellent use, both for the disclosing of nature, and
the abridgment of art.
VI.1. This
science being therefore first placed as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia,
which had so much heavenly issue,
Omnes
Coelicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes,
we may
return to the former distribution of the three philosophies, divine, natural,
and human. [--] And as concerning divine philosophy or natural theology, it is
that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained
by the contemplation of His creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine
in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of
this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform
religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an
atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God: but
miracles have been wrought to convert idolators and the superstitious, because
no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. [--]
For as all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman, and not his
image; so it is of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom
of the Maker, but not His image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth
from the sacred truth; for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and
man to be an exact or compendious image of the world, but the Scriptures never
vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but
only the work of His hands neither do
they speak of any other image of God, but man: wherefore by the contemplation
of nature to induce and perforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate
His power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been
excellently handled by divers.
But on the
other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledge,
to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my
judgment not safe: DA FIDEI QUAE FIDEI SUNT. For the heathens themselves
conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: THAT
MEN AND GODS WERE NOT ABLE TO DRAW JUPITER DOWN TO THE EARTH; BUT CONTRARIWISE,
JUPITER WAS ABLE TO DRAW THEM UP TO HEAVEN. [--] So as we ought not to attempt
to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to
raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in this part of
knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience,
as I rather note an excess: whereunto I have digressed because of the extreme
[35] prejudice which both religion and philosophy have received and may
receive, by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an
heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.
2.
Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an appendix of
theology both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted;
for although the Scripture saith, LET NO MAN DECEIVE YOU IN SUBLIME DISCOURSE
TOUCHING THE WORSHIP OF ANGELS, PRESSING INTO THAT HE KNOWETH NOT, ETC., yet
notwithstanding, if you observe well that precept, it may appear thereby that
there be two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical
of them, either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a
creature, or to extol a man's knowledge of them further than he hath ground. But
the sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out of the passages of holy
Scriptures, or out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of
degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the employment of
them is prohibited, much more any veneration towards them; but the
contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their illusions, either
by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle
saith, WE ARE NOT IGNORANT OF HIS STRATAGEMS. And it is no more unlawful to inquire
the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or
the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels and
spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied themselves in
it; I may rather challenge it, in many of
the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.
VII. 1.
Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not Divinity or
inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and
sabbath of all man's contemplations), we will now proceed to natural
philosophy.
If then it
be true that Democritus said, THAT THE TRUTH OF NATURE LIETH HID IN CERTAIN
DEEP MINES AND CAVES, and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do so much
inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and
compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good
to divide natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace: and to make two professions
or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths;
some to dig, and some to refine and hammer: and surely I do best allow of a
division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms; namely,
that these be the two parts of natural philosophy, -- the inquisition of
causes, and the production of sects; speculative, and operable; natural science
and natural prudence. [--] For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse
and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request,
that for the latter, or at least for a part thereof, I may revive and
reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of natural magic, which, in the true
sense, is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to the
ancient acception, purged from vanity and superstition. Now although it be
true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects,
so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connection
between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a
double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascending from experiments to
the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new
experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be
severally considered and handled.
2. Natural
science or theory is divided into physique and metaphysique: wherein I desire
it may be conceived that I use the word metaphysique in a differing sense from
that that is received: and in like manner, I doubt not but it will easily
appear to men of judgment, that in this and other particulars, wheresoever my conception
and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep the ancient
terms. [--] For hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking, by the order and
perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am otherwise zealous and
affectionate to recede as little from antiquity, either in terms or opinions,
as may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge. [--] And herein I
cannot a little marvel at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a
spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity: undertaking not
only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but to confound and extinguish
all ancient wisdom: insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author
or opinion, but to confute and reprove;
wherein for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he took the
right course. [--] For certainly there cometh to pass and hath place in human
truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: VENI IN NOMINE
PATRIS, NEC RECIPITIS ME; SI QUIS VENERIT IN NOMINE SUO EUM RECIPIETIS. But in
this divine aphorism, (considering to whom it was applied, namely to
Antichrist, the highest deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming in a
man's own name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good sign of truth,
although it be joined with the fortune and success of an EUM RECIPIETIS. [--]
But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned
that humour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, he did emulate, the one to
conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations; wherein
nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men's hands that are of a bitter
disposition get a like title as his scholar did:
Felix
terrarum praedo, non utile mundo Editus exemplum, etc.
So
Felix
doctrinae praedo.
But to me,
on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a
sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep
way with antiquity USQUE AD ARAS; and therefore to retain the ancient terms,
though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions; according to [36] the
moderate proceeding in civil government; where although there be some alteration,
yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, EADEM MAGISTRATUUM VOCABULA.
3. To
return therefore to the use and acceptation of the term Metaphysique, as I do
now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been already said,
that I intend PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, Summary Philosophy, and Metaphysique, which
heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two distinct things. For the one
I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I
have now brought in as a branch or descendent of natural science. It appeareth
likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the common principles and
axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences: I have
assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative
and adventive characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity,
possibility, and the rest: with this distinction and provision; that they be
handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise
that Natural Theology, which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with
Metaphysique, I have inclosed and bounded by itself. [--] It is therefore now a
question which is left remaining for Metaphysique; wherein I may without
prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, that Physique should
contemplate that which is inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and
Metaphysique that which is abstracted and fixed. [--] And again, that Physique
should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving; and Metaphysique
should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason, understanding,
and platform. But the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and
sensible. [--] For as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry
of causes, and productions of sects: so that part which concerneth the inquiry of
causes we do subdivide according to the received and found division of causes;
the one part, which is Physique, inquireth and handleth the material and scient
causes; and the other, which is Metaphysique, handleth the formal and final
causes.
4.
Physique, taking it according to the derivation, and not according to our idiom
for medicine, is situate in a middle term or distance between Natural History
and Metaphysique. For natural history describeth the variety of things;
physique, the causes, but variable or respective causes; and metaphysique, the
fixed and constant causes.
Limus ut
hic durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit, Uno eodemque igni:
Fire is the
cause of induration, but respective to clay; fire is the cause of colliquation,
but respective to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of induration or
colliquation: so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter.
[--] Physique hath three parts; whereof two respect nature united or collected,
the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. [--] Nature is collected
either into one entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as
the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things, as DE
MUNDO, DE UNIVERSITATE RERUM. [--] The second is the doctrine concerning the
principles or originals of times. [--] The third is the doctrine concerning all
variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the differing substances,
or their differing qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration,
this part being but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of
natural history. [--] Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what
truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment; but they are
parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.
5. For
Metaphysique, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and final causes;
which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be nugatory and void;
because of the received and inveterate opinion that the inquisition of man is
not competent to find out essential Forms or true differences: of which opinion
we will take this hold, that the invention of Forms is of all other parts of knowledge
the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. [--] As for the
possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they
can see nothing but sea. [--] But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of
Ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry,
THAT FORMS WERE THE TRUE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE; but lost the real fruit of his
opinion, by considering of Forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined
and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith
all his natural philosophy is infected. [--] But if any man shall keep a
continual watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of
knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the Forms, the disclosures
whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the forms of
substances, man only except, of whom it is said, FORMAVIT HOMINEM DE LIMO
TERRE, ET SPIRAVIT IN FACIEM EJUS SPIRACULUM VITAE, and not as of all other creatures,
PRODUCANT AQUAE, PRODUCAT TERRA; the Forms of substances, I say, as they are
now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed, as they are
not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek
in gross the Forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and
transposition of letters are infinite. [--] But, on the other side, to inquire
the Form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible;
and being known, induceth and manifesteth the Forms of all words, which consist
and are compounded of them. In the same manner to inquire the Form of a lion,
of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire
the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity
and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and
[37] qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the
essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the
true Forms of these, is that part of metaphysique which we now define of. [--]
Not but that Physic doth make inquiry, and take consideration of the same
natures: but how? Only as to the material and scient causes of them, and not as
to the Forms. For example; if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be
inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and
water is the cause, it is well rendered; but, nevertheless, is this the form of
whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but VEHICULUM FORMAE. [--]
This part of Metaphysique I do not find laboured and performed: whereat I
marvel not; because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course of
invention which hath been used; in regard that men, which is the root of all
error, have made too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from
particulars.
6. But the
use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report as deficient, is of the rest
the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue
of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as
the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of VITA
BREVIS, ARS LONGA; which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of
sciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of
natural philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is
physique; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysique. As for the
vertical point, OPUS QUOD OPERATUR DEUS A PRINCIPIO USQUE AD FINEM, the summary
law of nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these
three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no
better than the giant's hills:
Ter sunt
conati imponere Pelio Ossam, Scilicet atque Ossae frondosum involvere Olympum.
But to
those who refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three
acclamations, SANCTE, SANCTE, SANCTE! holy in the description or dilatation of
His works; holy in the connection or concatenation of them: and holy in the
union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. [--] And therefore the
speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation
in them, that all things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that
knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity; which
appeareth to be metaphysique; as that which considereth the simple Forms or differences
of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof
make all this variety.
The second
respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysique, is that it
doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of
works and effects. For physique carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways,
subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous
courses of nature; but LATAE UNDIQUE SUNT SAPIENTIBOS VIAE: to sapience, which
was anciently defined to be RERUM DIVINARUM ET HUMANARUM SCIENTIA, there is
ever choice of means. For physical causes give light to new invention in SIMILI
MATERIA; but whosoever knoweth any Form, knoweth the utmost possibility of
super-inducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less
restrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of
the efficient; which kind of knowledge Salomon likewise, though in a more
divine sort, elegantly describeth: NON ARCTABUNTUR GRESSUS TUI, ET CURRENS NON
HABEBIS OFFENDICULUM. The ways of sapience are not much liable either to
particularity or chance.
7. The
second part of metaphysique is the inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to
report not as omitted, but as misplaced; and yet if it were but a fault in
order, I would not speak of it: for order is matter of illustration, but
pertaineth not to the substance of sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a
deficience, or at least a great improficience in the sciences themselves. For
the handling of final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted
the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men
the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great
arrest and prejudice of further discovery. [--] For this I find done not only
by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and
others which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. FOR
TO SAY THAT THE HAIRS OF THE EYELIDS ARE FOR A QUICKSET AND FENCE ABOUT THE
SIGHT; or that THE FIRMNESS OF THE SKINS AND HIDES OF LIVING CREATURES IS TO
DEFEND THEM FROM THE EXTREMITIES OF HEAT OR COLD; or that THE BONES ARE FOR THE
COLUMNS OR BEAMS, WHEREUPON THE FRAMES OF THE BODIES OF LIVING CREATURES ARE
BUILT: or that THE LEAVES OF TREES ARE FOR PROTECTING OF THE FRUIT; or that THE
CLOUDS ARE FOR WATERING OF THE EARTH; or that THE SOLIDNESS OF THE EARTH IS FOR
THE STATION AND MANSION OF LIVING CREATURES and the like, is well inquired and collected
in metaphysique, but in physique they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but
REMORAE, and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing; and
have brought this to pass, that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected,
and passed in silence. [--] And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus
and some others (who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things, but
attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or
proofs of nature, which they term FORTUNE) seemeth to me, as far as I can judge
by the recital and fragments which remain unto us, in particularities of
physical causes, more real and better inquired than that of Aristotle and
Plato; whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology,
and the other as a part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively
of both those persons. Not because those final causes are not true, and worthy
to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions
into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and [38] solitude in
that track. For otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are
extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all
between them. For the cause rendered, that THE HAIRS ABOUT THE EYE-LIDS ARE FOR
THE SAFEGUARD OF THE SIGHT, doth not impugn the cause rendered, that PILOSITY
IS INCIDENT TO ORIFICES OF MOISTURE; MUSCOSI FONTES, etc. Nor the cause rendered,
THAT THE FIRMNESS OF HIDES IS FOR THE ARMOUR OF THE BODY AGAINST EXTREMITIES OF
HEAT OR COLD, doth not impugn the cause rendered, THAT CONTRACTION OF PORES IS
INCIDENT TO THE OUTWARDEST PARTS, IN REGARD OF THEIR ADJACENCE TO FOREIGN OR
UNLIKE BODIES: and so of the rest: both causes being true and compatible, the
one declaring an intention, the other a consequence only. [--] Neither doth
this call in question, or derogate from Divine Providence, but highly confirm
and exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique,
that can make other men the instruments of his will and ends, and yet never
acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not know what
they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth; so is the
wisdom of God more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing, and Providence draweth
forth another, than if He communicated to particular creatures and motions the
characters and impressions of His Providence. And thus much for metaphysique:
the latter part whereof I allow as extant, but with it confined to his proper
place.
VIII. 1.
Nevertheless there remaineth yet another part of Natural Philosophy, which is
commonly made a principal part and holdeth rank with Physique special and Metaphysique,
which is Mathematique; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of things
and to the light of order to place it as a branch of Metaphysique: for the
subject of it being quantity (not quantity indefinite, which is but a relative,
and belongeth to PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA, as hath been said, but quantity determined
or proportionable) it appeareth to be one of the essential Forms of things; as
that that is causative in nature of a number of effects; insomuch as we see, in
the schools both of Democritus and of Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe
figure to the first seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be
the principles and originals of things: and it is true also that of all other
Forms, as we understand Forms, it is the most abstracted and separable from matter,
and therefore most proper to Metaphysique; which hath likewise been the cause
why it hath been better laboured and inquired than any of the other Forms,
which are more immersed in matter. [--] For it being the nature of the mind of
man, to the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in the spacious liberty
of generalities, as in a champain region, and not in the inclosures of
particularity; the Mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields
to satisfy that appetite. [--] But for the placing of this science, it is not much
material: only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to observe a kind of
perspective, that one part may cast light upon another.
2. The
Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the Pure Mathematics are those
sciences belonging which handle quantity determinate, merely severed from any
axioms of natural philosophy; and these are two, Geometry and Arithmetic; the
one handling quantity continued, and the other dissevered. [--] Mixed hath for
subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy, and considereth quantity determined,
as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. [--] For many parts of nature can
neither be invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demonstrated with sufficient
perspicuity, nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the
aid and intervening of the mathematics; of which sort are perspective, music,
astronomy, cosmography, architecture, enginery, and divers others.
In the
Mathematics I can report no deficience, except it be that men do not
sufficiently understand the excellent use of the Pure Mathematics, in that they
do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual. For if
the wit be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering, they fix it; if too
inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that as tennis is a game of no use
in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready
to put itself into all postures; so in the Mathematics, that use which is collateral
and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended. [--]
And as for the Mixed Mathematics, I may only make this prediction, that there
cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as nature grows further disclosed. Thus
much of Natural Science, or the part of nature speculative.
3. For
Natural Prudence, or the part operative of Natural Philosophy, we will divide
it into three parts, experimental, philosophical, and magical; which three parts
active have a correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative,
natural history, physique, and metaphysique: for many operations have been invented,
sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed
experiment: and of those which have been found by an intentional experiment,
some have been found out by varying or extending the same experiments, some by
transferring and compounding divers experiments the one into the other, which
kind of invention an empiric may manage.
Again, by
the knowledge of physical causes there cannot fail to follow many indications
and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keep one
eye upon use and practice. But these are but coastings along the shore, PREMENDO
LITTUS INIQUUM: for it seemeth to me
there can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations and
innovations in nature, either by the fortune and essays of experiments, or by
the light and direction of physical causes. [--] If therefore we have reported
Metaphysique deficient, it must follow that we do the like of natural Magic,
which hath relation thereunto. For as for the Natural Magic whereof now there
is mention in books, containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits
[39] and observations of sympathies and antipathies, and hidden properties, and
some frivolous experiments, strange rather by disguisement than in themselves;
it is as far differing in truth of nature from such a knowledge as we require,
as the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bordeaux, divers from Caesar's
Commentaries in truth of story. For it is manifest that Caesar did greater
things DE VERO than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do; but he did them
not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno,
the goddess of power; and instead of her had copulation with a cloud, of which
mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras. [--] So whosoever shall entertain
high and vaporous imaginations, instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of
truth, shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes.
And
therefore we may note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination and
belief, as this degenerate Natural Magic, Alchemy, Astrology, and the like,
that in their propositions the description of the mean is ever more monstrous
than the pretence or end. [--] For it is a thing more probable, that he that
knoweth well the natures of weight, of colour, of pliant and fragile, in
respect of the hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire and the
rest, may superinduce upon some metal the nature and Form of gold by such mechanique
as belongeth to the production of the natures afore rehearsed, than that some
grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea of
quicksilver or other material into gold: so it is more probable that he that
knoweth the nature of arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to
the thing nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits, the manner
of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and solid parts, shall
by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, motions, and the like,
prolong life, or restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be
done with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt. To
conclude, therefore, the true Natural Magic, which is that great liberty and
latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of Forms, I may report
deficient, as the relative thereof is.
To which
part, if we be serious, and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse,
besides the deriving and deducing the operations themselves from Metaphysique,
there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation,
the other by way of caution: the first is, that there be made a kalendar,
resembling an inventory of the estate of man, containing all the inventions,
being the works or fruits of nature or art, which are now extant, and whereof
man is already possessed; out of which doth naturally result a note, what things
are yet held impossible, or not invented: which kalendar will be the more
artificial and serviceable, if to every reputed impossibility you add what
thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that impossibility; to
the end that by these optatives and potentials man's inquiry may be more awake
in deducing direction of works from the speculation of causes: and secondly,
that those experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present
use, but those principally which are of most universal consequence for
invention of other experiments, and those which give most light to the
invention of causes; for the invention of the mariner's needle, which giveth
the direction, is of no less benefit for navigation than the invention of the
sails which give the motion.
4. Thus
have I passed through Natural Philosophy, and the deficiencies thereof; wherein
if I have differed from the ancient and received doctrines, and thereby shall
move contradiction; for my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not
to contend. If it be truth,
Non canimus
surdis, respondent omnia sylvae.
The voice
of nature will consent, whether the voice of man do or no. And as Alexander
Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the French for Naples, that they
came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons
to fight; so I like better that entry of truth which cometh peaceably, with
chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it, than
that which cometh with pugnacity and contention.'
5. But
there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according to the report of the
inquiry, and nothing concerning the matter or subject; and that is positive and
considerative; when the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a doubt. These
doubts or NON LIQUETS are of two sorts, particular and total. For the first, we
see a good example thereof in Aristotle's Problems, which deserved to have had
a better continuance; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning
is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts hath two excellent uses:
the one, that it saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods; when that which
is not fully appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might
draw error, but reserved in doubt: the other, that the entry of doubts are as
so many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge; insomuch as that which, if
doubts had not preceded, a man should never have advised, but passed it over without
note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts, is made to be attended and
applied. But both these commodities do scarcely countervail an inconvenience
which will intrude itself, if it be not debarred; which is, that when a doubt
is once received, men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to
solve it; and accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar example
in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they have once admitted a doubt, it
goeth ever after authorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is
to be allowed, which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not those
which labour to make certain things doubtful. [--] Therefore these calendars of
doubts I commend as excellent things; so that [40] there be this caution used,
that when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution, they be from
thenceforth omitted, decarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage men
in doubting. To which kalendar of doubts or problems, I advise be annexed
another kalendar, as much or more material, which is a calendar of popular
errors: I mean chiefly in natural history, such as pass in speech and conceit,
and are nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth: that man's
knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity.
As for the
doubts or NON LIQUETS general, or in total, I understand those differences of
opinions touching the principles of nature, and the fundamental points of the
same, which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and philosophies, as
that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For
although Aristotle, as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought he
could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren; yet to those that seek Truth and not
magistrality, it cannot but seem a matter of great profit, to see before them
the several opinions touching the foundations of nature: not for any exact
truth that can be expected in those theories; for as the same phenomena in
astronomy are satisfied by the received astronomy of the diurnal motion, and
the proper motions of the planets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, and
likewise by the theory of Copernicus, who supposed the earth to move (and the
calculations are indifferently agreeable to both), so the ordinary face and
view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies;
whereas to find the real truth requireth another manner of severity and
attention. For as Aristotle saith, that children at the first will call every
woman mother, but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth, so
experience, if it be in childhood, will call every philosophy mother, but when
it cometh to ripeness, it will discern the true mother. So as in the meantime
it is good to see the several glasses and opinions upon nature, whereof, it may
be, every one in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows: therefore I
with some collection to be made, painfully and understandingly, DE ANTIQUIS
PHILOSOPHIIS, out of all the possible light which remaineth to us of them:
which kind of work I find deficient. But here I must give warning, that it be
done distinctly and severally; the
philosophies of every one throughout by themselves; and not by titles packed
and fagotted up together, as hath been done by Plutarch. For it is the harmony
of a philosophy in itself which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be
singled and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as when I read
in Tacitus the actions of Nero, or Claudius, with circumstances of times,
inducements, and occasions, I find them not so strange; but when I read them in
Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and bundles, and not in order of
time, they seem more monstrous and incredible: so is it of any philosophy
reported entire, and dismembered by articles. Neither do I exclude opinions of
latter times to be likewise represented in this kalendar of sects of philosophy,
as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into a harmony by the
pen of Severinus the Dane: and that of Telesius and his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of sense,
but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who, though he pretended not
to make any new philosophy, yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon
the old; and that of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with some
alterations and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes: and any other
worthy to be admitted.
6. Thus
have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man's knowledge; that is,
RADIUS DIRECTUS, which is referred to nature; RADIUS REFRACTUS, which is
referred to God, and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the
MEDIUM. There resteth RADIUS REFLEXUS, whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth
himself.
IX. 1. We
come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us,
which is the KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES; which
deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This
knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of
man, so nothwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the
continent of nature: and generally let this be a rule, that all partitions of
knowledges be accepted; rather for lines and veins than for sections and separations;
and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For the
contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become barren, shallow, and
erroneous, while they have not been nourished and maintained from the common
fountain. So we see Cicero the orator complained of Socrates and his school
that he was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric; whereupon rhetoric became an empty and
verbal art. So we may see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation
of the earth, which astronomy itself cannot correct, because it is not repugnant
to any of the phenomena, yet natural philosophy may correct. So we see also
that the science of medicine, if it be destituted and forsaken by natural
philosophy, it is not much better than an empirical practice. [--] With this reservation
therefore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, which hath two parts: the
one considereth man segregate or distributively; the other congregate or in
society. So as human philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate
and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth;
that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and of knowledges which respect
the mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do
take the consideration in general and at large of human nature to be fit to be
emancipate and made a knowledge by itself: not so much in regard of those
delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man,
of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his [41] common
and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the
sympathies and concordances between the mind and body, which being mixed cannot
be properly assigned to the sciences of either.
2. This
knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues and amities consist of mutual
intelligence and mutual offices, so this league of mind and body hath these two
parts; how the one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon the other;
discovery and impression. [--] The former of these hath begotten two arts, both
of prediction or prenotion; whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle,
and the other of Hippocrates. And although they have of later time been used to
be coupled with superstitious and fantastical arts, yet being purged and
restored to their true state, they have both of them a solid ground in nature,
and a profitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, which discovereth the
disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the body: the second is the
exposition of natural dreams, which discovereth the state of the body by the imaginations
of the mind. In the former of these I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath
very ingeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body, but not the
gestures of the body, which are no less comprehensible by art, and of greater
use and advantage. For the lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition
and inclination of the mind in general; but the motions of the countenance and
parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present humour and state of the
mind and will. For as your majesty saith most aptly and elegantly, AS THE
TONGUE SPEAKETH TO THE EAR SO THE GESTURE SPEAKETH TO THE EYE. And therefore a
number of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of
men, do well know the advantage of this observation, as being most part of
their ability; neither can it be denied, but that it is a great discovery of
dissimulations, and a great direction in business.
3. The
latter branch, touching impression, hath not been collected into art, but hath
been handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the
former hath. For the consideration is double: either how, and how far the
humours and sects of the body do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and
how far the passions or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the
body. The former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix
of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition: for the
physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy passions;
and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the
courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory, and the like: but the
scruples and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect of
the Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mohomet,
do exceed. So likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial law, interdicting the
eating of the blood and the fat, distinguishing between beasts clean and
unclean for meat, are many and strict. Nay the faith itself being clear and
serene from all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the use of fastings,
abstinences, and other macerations and humiliations of the body, as things
real, and not figurative. The root and life of all of which prescripts is,
besides the ceremony, the consideration of that dependency which the affections
of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the body. And
if any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the mind from
the body doth either question the immortality, or derogate from the sovereignty
of the soul, he may be taught in easy instances that the infant in the mother's
womb is compatible with the mother and yet separable; and the most absolute
monarch is sometimes led by his servants and yet without subjection. As for the
reciprocal knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of
the mind upon the body, we see all wise physicians, in the prescriptions of
their regiments to their patients, do ever consider ACCIDENTIA ANIMI as of great
force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and more especially it is an
inquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination, how and how far it
altereth the body proper of the imaginant. For although it hath a manifest
power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help; no
more than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent airs able suddenly
to kill a man in health, therefore there should be sovereign airs able suddenly
to cure a man in sickness. But the inquisition of this part is of great use,
though it needeth, as Socrates said, A DELIAN DIVER, being difficult and
profound. But unto all this knowledge DE COMMUNI VINCULO, of the concordances
between the mind and the body, that part of inquiry is most necessary, which considereth
of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do take and
occupate in the organs of the body; which knowledge hath been attempted, and is
controverted, and deserveth to be much better inquired. For the opinion of
Plato, who placed the understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did
unfitly call anger, having a greater mixture with pride) w the heart, and concupiscence
or sensuality in the later, deserveth not to de despised; but much less to be
allowed. So then we have constituted, as in our own wish and advice, the
inquiry touching human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be
handled apart.
X.1. The
knowledge that concerneth man's body is divided as the good of man's body is
divided, unto which it referreth. The good of man's body is of four kinds,
Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleasure: so the knowledges are Medicine, or art
of Cure; art of Decoration, which is called Cosmetic; art of Activity, which is
called Athletic; and art Voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth ERUDITUS
LUXUS. This subject of man's body is of all other things in nature most susceptible
of remedy; but then that remedy is most susceptible of error. For the same
subtility of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing; and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact.
[42] 2. To
speak therefore of Medicine, and to resume that we have said, ascending a
little higher: the ancient opinion that man was MICROCOSMUS, an abstract or
model of the world, hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus' and the
alchemists, as if there were to be found in man's body certain correspondences
and parallels, which should have respect to all varieties of things, as stars, planets,
minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much is evidently true,
that of all substances which nature hath produced, man's body is the most
extremely compounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and
water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by the mesh of beasts,
birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water, and the manifold alterations,
dressings, and preparations of the several bodies, before they come to be his
food and aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a more simple order of life,
and less change of affections to work upon their bodies: whereas man in his
mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite variations: and it cannot be
denied but that the Body of man of all other things is of the most compounded
mass. The Soul on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well
expressed:
Purumque
reliquit Aethereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.
So that it
is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest, if that principle be
true, that MOTUS RERUM EST RAPIDUS EXTRA LOCUM, PLACIDUS IN LOCO. But to the
purpose: this variable composition of man's body hath made it as an instrument
easy to distemper; and therefore the poets did well to conjoin Music and
Medicine in Apollo, because the office of Medicine is but to tune this curious harp
of man's body and to reduce it to harmony. So then the subject being so variable,
hath made the art by consequence more conjectural; and the art being
conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture. For
almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts, or masterpieces, as I
may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the
virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause; the master of the
ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of
the voyage; but the physician, and perhaps the politique, hath no particular
acts demonstrative of his ability, but is judged most by the event; which is
ever but as it is taken: for who can tell if a patient die or recover, or if a
state be preserved or ruined, whether it be art or accident? And therefore many
times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see the
weakness and credulity of men is such, as they will often prefer a mountebank or
witch before a learned physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in
discerning this extreme folly, when they made Aesculapius and Circe brother and
sister, both children of the sun, as in the verses,
Ipse
repertorem medicine talis et artis Fulmine PHOEBIGENAM Stygias detrusit ad
undas:
And again,
Dives
inaccessos ubi SOLIS FILIA lucos, etc.
For in all
times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and old women and impostors
have had a competition with physicians. And what followeth? Even this, that
physicians say to themselves as Salomon expresseth it upon a higher occasion;
IF IT BEFALL TO ME AS BEFALLETH TO THE FOOLS, WHY SHOULD I LABOUR TO BE MORE
WISE? And therefore I cannot much blame
physicians, that they use commonly to intend some other art or practice, which
they fancy more than their profession. For you shall have of them antiquaries,
poets, humanists, statesmen, merchants, divines, and in every of these better
seen than in their profession; and no doubt upon this ground, that they find
that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit or
reputation towards their fortune; for the weakness of patients, and sweetness
of life, and nature of hope, maketh men depend upon physicians with all their
defects. But nevertheless, these things which we have spoken of, are courses
begotten between a little occasion, and a great deal of sloth and default; for
if we will excite and awake our observation, we shall see in familiar instances
what a predominant faculty the subtilty of spirit hath over the variety of
matter or form: nothing more variable than faces and countenances: yet men can
bear in memory the infinite distinctions of them; nay, a painter with a few
shells of colours, and the benefit of his eye and habit of his imagination, can
imitate them all that ever have been, are, or may be, if they were brought
before him: nothing more variable than voices; yet men can likewise discern
them personally: nay, you shall have a buffoon or PANTOMIMUS, who will express
as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the differing sounds of
words; yet men have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So
that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man's mind, but it is the
remote standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these mazes and
incomprehensions: for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking, but is exact
at hand, so is it of the understanding; the remedy whereof is, not to quicken
or strengthen the organ, but to go nearer to the object; and therefore there is
no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true approaches and
avenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet saith:
Et quoniam
variant morbi, variabimus artes; Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.
Which that
they should do, the nobleness of their art doth deserve; well shadowed by the
poets, in that they made Aesculapius to be the son of the sun, the one being
the fountain of life, the other as the second stream: but infinitely more
honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the body of man the object of
His miracles, as the soul was the object of His doctrine. For we read not that
ever He vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money, except that one for
giving tribute to Caesar; but only
about the preserving, sustaining, and healing the body of man.
3. Medicine
is a science which hath been, as we [43], more professed than laboured, and yet
more laboured than advanced; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather in
circle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but small addition. It considereth
causes of diseases, with the occasions or compulsions; the diseases themselves,
with the accidents; and the cares, with the preservations. The deficiencies
which I think good to note, being a few of many, and those such as are of a
more open and manifest nature, I will enumerate, and not place.
4. The
first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of
Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative of the special cases of his
patients, and how they proceeded, and how they were judged by recovery or
death. Therefore
having an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not need to allege
an example foreign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who are careful to report new
cases and decisions for the direction of future judgments. This continuance of
medicinal history I find deficient; which I understand neither to be so
infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so reserved as to admit none
but wonders: for many things are new in the manner, which are not new in the
kind; and if men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to
observe.
5. In the inquiry which is made by Anatomy, I find much deficience:
for they inquire of the parts, and their substances, figures, and collocations;
but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts, the secrecies of the
passages, and the seats or nestlings of the humours, nor much of the footsteps
and impressions of diseases: the reason of which omission I suppose to be,
because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of one or a few
anatomies: but the latter, being comparative and casual, must arise from the
view of many. And as to the diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture
or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and in
that is the CAUSE CONTINENT of many diseases; which not being observed, they
quarrel many times with humours, which are not in fault; the fault beings in
the very frame and mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine
alterative, but must be accommodate and palliate by diets and medicines
familiar. As for the passages and pores, it is true which was anciently noted, that
the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies, because they are shut and
latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in live: which being
supposed, though the inhumanity of ANATOMIA VIVORUM was by Celsus justly
reproved; yet in regard of the great
use of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been
relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual practices of surgery; but
mought have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive, which notwithstanding
the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry. And
for the humours, they are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments;
whereas it is most necessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and receptacles
the humours do find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour so
lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases and their
devastations of the inward parts, imposthumations, exulcerations,
discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, contractions, extensions,
convulsions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, together with all
preternatural substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the
like; they ought to have been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, and
the contribution of men's several experiences, and carefully set down, both historically,
according to the appearances, and artificially, with a reference to the
diseases and symptoms which resulted from them, in case where the anatomy is of
a defunct patient; whereas now, upon opening of bodies, they are passed over
slightly and in silence,
6. In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of many, some
as in their nature incurable, and others as past the period of cure; so that
Sylla and the Triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die, as they do by
their ignorant edicts: whereof numbers do escape with less difficulty than they
did in the Roman proscriptions. Therefore I will not doubt to note as a
deficience, that they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases, or
extremities of diseases; but pronouncing them incurable, do enact a law of
neglect, and exempt ignorance from discredit.
7. Nay, further, I esteem it the office of a physician not only to
restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only when such
mitigation may conduce to recovery, but when. it may serve to make a fair and
easy passage: for it is no small felicity which Augustus Cesar was wont to wish
to himself, that same Euthanasia; and which was especially noted in the death
of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kindly
and pleasant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged
desperate, he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and
ingurgitation of wine; whereupon the epigram was made, HINC STYGIAS EBRIUS
HAUSIT AQUAS, he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the Stygian
water. But the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion
to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored; whereas, in my
judgment, they ought both to inquire the skill and to give the attendances for
the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death.
8. In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a deficience
in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular cures and diseases: for
the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their
magistralities, in adding, and taking out, and changing QUID PRO QUO, in their
receipts at their pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as the medicine
cannot command over the diseases: for except it be treacle and MITHRIDATUM, and
of late DIASCORDIUM, and a few more, they tie themselves to no receipts
severely and religiously: for [44] as to the confections of sale which are in
the shops, they are for readiness and not for propriety; for they are upon
general intention of purging, opening, comforting, altering, and not much
appropriate to particular diseases: and this is the cause why empirics and old
women are more happy many times in their cures than learned physicians, because
they are more religious in holding their medicines. Therefore here is the deficience
which I find, that physicians have not, partly out of their own practice,
partly out of the constant probations reported in books, and partly out of the
traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain experimental
medicines for the cure of particular diseases, besides their own conjectural and
magistral descriptions. For as they were the men of the best composition in the
state of Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or being
tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we now handle, they be the
best physicians, which being learned incline to the traditions of experience,
or being empirics incline to the methods of learning.
9. In preparation of medicines, I do find strange, especially considering
how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that they are safer for the
outward than inward parts, that no man hath sought to make an imitation by art
of natural baths and medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to
receive their virtues from minerals: and not so only, but discerned and
distinguished from what particular mineral they receive tincture, as sulphur,
vitriol, steel, or the like; which nature, if it may be reduced to compositions
of art, both the variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will
be more commanded.
10. But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable either
to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this part with the note of
one deficience more, which seemeth to me of greatest consequence; which is,
that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end: for, to my
understanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be
so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great
effect upon the body of man. It were a strange speech, which spoken, or spoken
oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject: it is
order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mighty in
nature; which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing, and more
precise obedience in observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of
effects. And although a man would think, by the daily visitations of the physicians,
that there were a pursuance in the cure: yet let a man look into their prescripts
and ministrations, and he shall find them but inconstancies and every day's
devices, without any settled providence or project. Not that every scrupulous
or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than every straight way is the
way to heaven; but the truth of the direction must precede severity of observance.
11. For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate: for cleanness
of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to God, to society,
and to ourselves. As for artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the
deficiencies which it hath; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor to use,
nor wholesome to please.
12. For Athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to
say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought, whether
it be of activity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two parts, strength
and softness; and patience likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and
extremities, and endurance of paw or torment; whereof we see the practices in
tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer punishment: nay, if there be any
other faculty which falls not within any of the former divisions, as in those
that dive, that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the like,
I refer to it this part. Of these things the practices are known, but the
philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired; the rather, I think,
because they are supposed to be obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which
cannot be taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed: which
though it be not true, yet I forbear to note any deficiencies: for the Olympian
games are down long since, and the mediocrity of these things is for use; as
for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but for mercenary ostentation.
13. For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them is of
laws to repress them. For as it hath been well observed, that the arts which
flourish in times while virtue is in growth, are military; and while virtue is
in state, are liberal; and while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary; so I
doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the decent of the wheel. With
arts voluptuary I couple practices joculary; for the deceiving of the senses is
one of the pleasures of the senses. As for games of recreation, I hold them to belong
to civil life and education. And thus much of that particular human philosophy
which concerns the body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind. XI. 1. For Human Knowledge which concerns the
Mind, it hath two parts; the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of
the soul or mind, the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof.
[--] Unto the first of these, the considerations of the original of the soul,
whether it be native or adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws of
matter, and of the immortality thereof, and many other points, do appertain:
which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously reported; so as
the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way. But
although I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly
inquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the end it must
be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion: for
as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass
of heaven [45] and earth by the benediction of a PRODUCAT but was immediately
inspired from God: so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by accident)
subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of philosophy;
and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come
by the same inspiration that gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge
touching the soul there be two appendices; which, as they have been handled,
have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth, Divination and
Fascination.
2. Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into
artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, when the mind maketh a
prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and tokens; natural is when the mind
hath a presention by an internal power, without the inducement of a sign.
Artificial is of two sorts; either when the argument is coupled with a
derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only grounded upon a
coincidence of the effect, which is experimental: whereof the latter for the
most part is superstitious; such as were the heathen observations upon the
inspection of sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such
as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial divination, the
several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges. The
astronomer hath his predictions, as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the
like. The physician hath his predictions of death, of recovery, of the
accidents and issues of diseases. The Politique hath his predictions; O URBEM
VENALEM, ET CITO PERITURAM, SI EMPTOREM INVENERIT! which stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla first, and after
in Cesar. So as these predictions are now impertinent, and to be referred over.
But the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul, is
that which we now speak of; which hath been made to be of two sorts, primitive
and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon the supposition, that the mind, when
it is withdrawn and collected into itself, and not diffused into the organs of
the body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore appeareth
most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death, and more rarely in waking
apprehensions; and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and
observances which make the mind most to consist in itself By infixion, is
grounded upon the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take
illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits: unto which the same
regiment doth likewise conduce. For the retiring of the mind within itself, is the
state which is most susceptible of divine influxions; save that it is
accompanied in this case with fervency and elevation, which the ancients noted
by fury, and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the other.
3. Fascination is the power and act of imagination intentive upon other
bodies than the body of the imagination, for of that we spake in the proper
place: wherein the school of Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended Natural
Magic have been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the
imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working faith; others, that
draw nearer to probability, calling to their view the secret passages of
things, and specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive
it should likewise be agreeable to nature, that there should be some
transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the mediation of the
senses; whence the conceits have grown, now almost made civil, of the mastering
spirit, and the force of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the
inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination: for if the imagination
fortified have power, then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it. And
herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of
Ceremonial Magic. For it may be pretended that Ceremonies, Characters, and
Charms, do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits,
but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it: as images
are said by the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and raise the devotions of
them that pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be admitted that imagination
hath power, and that Ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they be used
sincerely and intentionally for that purpose;
yet I should hold them unlawful, as opposing to that first edict which God
gave unto man, IN SUDORE VULTUS COMEDES PANEM TUUM. For they propound those
noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of
labour, to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances. Deficiencies in
these knowledges I will report none, other than the general deficience, that it
is not known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.
XII. 1. The Knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind
of man is of two kinds; the one respecting his Understanding and Reason, and
the other his Will, Appetite, and Affection; whereof the former produceth
Position or Decree, the latter Action or Execution. It is true that the
Imagination is an agent or NUNCIUS, in both provinces, both the judicial and
the ministerial. For Sense sendeth over to Imagination before Reason have
judged: and Reason sendeth over to Imagination before the decree can be acted:
for Imagination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving that this Janus of
Imagination hath differing faces: for the face towards Reason hath the print of
Truth, but the face towards Action hath the print of Good; which nevertheless
are faces,
Quales decet esse sororum.
Neither is the Imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested
with, or at leastwise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty
of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, THAT THE MIND HATH OVER THE
BODY THAT COMMANDMENT, WHICH THE LORD HATH OVER A BONDMAN; BUT THAT REASON HATH
OVER THE IMAGINATION THAT COMMANDMENT WHICH A MAGISTRATE HATH OVER A FREE
CITIZEN; who may come also to rule in
his turn. For we see that, in matters of Faith and Religion, we raise our
Imagination above our Reason; which is the cause why Religion sought ever
access to the mind by similitude, types, parables, visions, dreams. And [46]
again, in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impressions
of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the
chief recommendation unto Reason is from the Imagination. Nevertheless, because
I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the Imagination,
I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a
pleasure or play of Imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a
work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the Imagination produceth,
but of such sciences as handle and consider of the Imagination; no more than we
shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all
philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire the faculty of
reason: so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the Imagination in
nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we have mentioned it in the
doctrine DE ANIMA, whereunto it most fitly belongeth. And lastly, for
Imaginative or Insinuative Reason, which is the subject of Rhetoric, we think
it best to refer it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content ourselves
with the former division, that human philosophy, which respecteth the faculties
of the mind of man, hath two parts, rational and moral.
2. The part of human philosophy which is rational, is of all knowledges,
to the most wits, the least delightful; and seemeth but a net of subtilty and
spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is PABULUM ANIMI, so in the
nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of
the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned AD OLLAS CARNIUM,
and were weary of manna; which, though it were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive
and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in
flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men's
affections, praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant; but this same LUMEN
SICCUM doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures. But to speak
truly of things as they are in worth, Rational Knowledges are the keys of all
other arts, for as Aristotle saith, aptly and elegantly, THAT THE HAND IS THE INSTRUMENT
OF INSTRUMENTS, AND THE MIND IS THE FORM OF FORMS: so these be truly said to be
the art of arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and
strengthen: even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a
nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.
3. The Arts intellectual are four in number; divided according to the
ends whereunto they are referred: for man's labour is to invent that which is
sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that
which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must
be four: Art of Inquiry or Invention: Art of Examination or Judgment: Art of
Custody or Memory: and Art of Elocution or Tradition.
XIII. 1. Invention is of two kinds, much differing: the one of
Arts and Sciences; and the other of Speech and Arguments. The former of these I
do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if in the
making of an inventory touching the estate of a defunct it should be set down
THAT THERE IS NO READY MONEY. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so
this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West
Indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle had not
been first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small
motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered, if
the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over.
2. That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment standeth
plainly confessed; for first, Logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the
axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a CUIQUE IN SUA ARTE CREDENDUM.
And Celsus acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the Empirical and dogmatical
sects of physicians, THAT MEDICINES AND CURES WERE FIRST FOUND OUT, AND THEN
AFTER THE REASONS AND CAUSES WERE DISCOURSED; AND NOT THE CAUSES FIRST FOUND
OUT, AND BY LIGHT FROM THEM THE MEDICINES AND CURES DISCOVERED. And Plato, in his
Theaetetus, noteth well, THAT PARTICULARS ARE INFINITE, AND THE HIGHER
GENERALITIES GIVE NO SUFFICIENT DIRECTION: AND THAT THE PITH OF ALL SCIENCES,
WHICH MAKETH THE ARTSMAN DIFFER FROM THE INEXPERT, IS IN THE MIDDLE
PROPOSITIONS, WHICH IN EVERY PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE ARE TAKEN FROM TRADITION AND
EXPERIENCE. And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inventions
and originals of things, refer them rather to chance than to art, and rather to
beasts, birds ashes, serpents, than to men.
Dictamnum genitrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem foliis et
flore comantem Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris Gramina, cum tergo
volucres haesere sagittae.
So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity being to consecrate
inventors, that the Egyptians had so few human idols in their temples, but
almost all brute.
Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, Contra Neptunum, et
Venerem, contraque Minervam, etc.
And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe
the first inventions to men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first
struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck
the flints he expected the spark: and therefore we see the West Indian
Prometheus had no intelligence with the
European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first
occasion. So as it should seem, that hitherto men are rather beholding to a
wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some
part of physic, or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to
chance, or anything else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and
sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other:
Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes Paulatim.
For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than that
which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual
intending [47] or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute
necessity of conservation of being; for so Cicero saith very truly, USUS UNI
REI DEDITUS ET NATURAM ET ARTEM SAEPE VINCIT. And therefore if it be said of
men,
Labor omnia vincit Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas!
it is likewise said of beasts,
Quis psittaco docuit suum < xai=re > ?
Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree,
where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it;
Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way
from a field in flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite
every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and
grow? Add then the word EXTUNDERE, which importeth the extreme difficulty, and
the word PAULATIM, which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were,
even amongst the Egyptians gods; there being little left to the faculty of
reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of invention.
3. Secondly, the Induction which the Logicians speak of, and which
seemeth familiar with Plato (whereby the Principles of Sciences may be
pretended to be invented, and so the middle propositions by derivation from the
Principles), their form of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and
incompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of Art
to perfect and exalt Nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and
traduced Nature. For he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather
this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of,
Aërei mellis coelestia dona,
distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial,
as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of herself by
nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For
to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory,
is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects, upon
those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary
side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of
Jesse which were brought before him,
and failed of David, which was in the field. And this form, to say truth, is so
gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things
to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and
dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful towards particulars; which their
manner was to use but as LICTORES and VIATORES, for sergeants and whifflers, AD
SUMMOVENDAM TURBAM, to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than
in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a
religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in
divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a
child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions whereof we speak,
as if it were a second infancy or childhood.
4. Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet
nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them
in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to
principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as
moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity, (because it pleaseth God to
apply himself to the capacity of the simplest,) that form may have use; and in
natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, QUAE ASSENSUM
PARIT, OPERIS EFFOETA EST: but the subtlety
of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for arguments consist
of propositions, and propositions of words; and words are but the current
tokens or marks of popular notions of
things; which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out
particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of consequence of arguments,
or of the truth of propositions, that can ever correct that error, being, as
the physicians speak, in the first digestion: and therefore it was not without
cause, that so many excellent philosophers became Sceptics and Academics, and
denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion that the
knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities. It is true
that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, SCIENTIAM DISSIMULANDO
SIMULAVIT, for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his
knowledge: like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but
would not acknowledge so much: and in
the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of ACATALEPSIA, I
doubt, was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in copie of
speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give glory
to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of
pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both
Academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity: but here was their chief
error; they charged the deceit upon the senses; which in my judgment,
notwithstanding all their cavilations, are very sufficient to certify and
report truth though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument,
and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense to
some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance. But they
ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers,
and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses.
This I speak, not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help:
for no man, be he never so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or
perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a
ruler or compass.
5. This part of invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I
purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it into
two parts; whereof the one I term EXPERIENTIA LITERATA, and the other
INTERPRETATIO NATURAE: the former being but a degree and rudiment of the
latter. But [48] I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.
6. The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention,
for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon
that which we already know: and the use of this invention is no other but out
of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed to draw forth or call
before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our
consideration. So as to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or
suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it
after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do
account it a chase as well of deer in an inclosed park as in a forest at large,
and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as
it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is
readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification
thereof.
7. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, Preparation
and Suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge,
consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein
Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the Sophists near his time,
saying, THEY DID AS IF ONE THAT PROFESSED THE ART OF SHOE-MAKING SHOULD NOT
TEACH HOW TO MAKE A SHOE, BUT ONLY EXHIBIT IN A READINESS A NUMBER OF SHOES OF
ALL FASHIONS AND SIZES. But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should
have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly
customed. But our Saviour speaking of divine knowledge, saith, THAT THE KINGDOM
OF HEAVEN IS LIKE A GOOD HOUSEHOLDER, THAT BRINGETH FORTH BOTH NEW AND OLD
STORE: and we see the ancient writers of Rhetoric do give it in precept: THAT PLEADERS SHOULD HAVE THE PLACES,
WHEREOF THEY HAVE MOST CONTINUAL USE, READY HANDLED IN ALL THE VARIETY THAT MAY
BE; as that, TO SPEAK FOR THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW AGAINST EQUITY,
AND CONTRARY; AND TO SPEAK FOR PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES AGAINST TESTIMONY,
AND CONTRARY. And Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience,
delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of,
if he will take the pains, he may have it in effect premeditate, and handled,
IN THESI; so that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do,
but to put to names and times and places, and such other circumstances of
individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard
of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good
impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches.
All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that
would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.
8. But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory
store, though it be common both to Logic and Rhetoric, yet having made an entry
to it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the
further handling of it to Rhetoric.
9. The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign
and direct us to certain marks, or places, which may excite our mind to return
and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may
make use thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to
dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to
conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these Places serve only to
apprompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating
is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, WHOSOEVER SEEKETH, KNOWETH THAT WHICH
HE SEEKETH FOR IN A GENERAL NOTION: ELSE HOW SHALL HE KNOW IT WHEN HE HATH
FOUND IT? and therefore the larger your
anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same
Places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will
also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or,
if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve;
so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the
schools call Topics, is deficient.'
10. Nevertheless, Topics are of two sorts, general and special.
The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some,
but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour
which hath reigned too much in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtle in a
few things which are within their command, and to reject the rest; I do receive
particular Topics, (that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in
every particular knowledge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of Logic
with the matter of sciences; for in these it holdeth, ARS INVENIENDI ADOLESCIT
CUM INVENTIS; for as in going of a way,
we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the better
sight of that part of the way which remaineth: so every degree of proceeding in
a science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if we strengthen
by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance
our pursuit.
XIV. 1. Now we pass unto the arts of Judgment, which handle the natures
of Proofs and Demonstrations; which as to Induction hath a coincidence with
Invention. For in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same
action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense. But
otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate, but
by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the
consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore
for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we
have spoken of interpretation of nature.
2. For the other judgment by Syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable
to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured; for
the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding
fixed and immovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as
Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all [49] motion there is some point
quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that
stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree
of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished; so assuredly men have a
desire to have an ATLAS or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation,
which is like to a perpetual peril of falling; therefore men did hasten to set
down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn.
3. So then this art of Judgment is but the reduction of propositions
to principles in a middle term: the principles to be agreed by all and exempted
from argument; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's
invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when
the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a PROBATION
OSTENSIVE; the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to
the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call PER INCOMMODUM,
or PRESSING AN ABSURDITY; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition
standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.
4. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way
of direction, the other by way of caution: the former frameth and setteth down
a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors
and inconsequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition and structure
of which form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are
propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words: and this
is that part of Logic which is comprehended in the ANALYTICS.
5. The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and
assurance sake; discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and illaqueations
with their redargutions, which is that which is termed ELENCHES. For although
in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the
comparison well, as in juggling feats, which, though we know not how they are
done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man beside
his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.
6. This part concerning ELENCHES is excellently handled by Aristotle
in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example, not only in the persons
of the Sophists, but even in Socrates himself; who, professing to affirm nothing,
but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all
the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. And although we have said
that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate
and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great
faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage: though the difference be good
which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound
which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare which hath her
advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.
7. But yet further, this doctrine of ELENCHES hath a more ample latitude
and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof
some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem
at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably referred, sometimes
to logic, sometimes to metaphysics, touching the common adjuncts of essences,
is but an ELENCH; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation, or ambiguity
of words and phrase, (especially of such words as are most general, and
intervene in every inquiry,) it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use,
leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of majority, minority,
priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts,
existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against the
ambiguities of speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes,
which we call categories or predicaments, are but cautions against the
confusion of definitions and divisions.
8. Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of
the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so much
perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this
part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.
9. But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound
kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at
all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth
most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or
snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and
inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from
the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should
reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted
glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced.
For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon
us by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as
first, in that instance which is the root of a superstition, namely, THAT TO
THE NATURE OF THE MIND OF ALL MEN IT IS CONSONANT FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE OR ACTIVE
TO EFFECT MORE THAN THE NEGATIVE OR PRIVATIVE. So that a few times hitting, or
presence, countervails oft-times failing or absence; as was well answered by
Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's temple the great number of
pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune,
saying, ADVISE NOW, YOU THAT THINK IT FOLLY TO INVOCATE NEPTUNE IN TEMPEST:
YEA, BUT, saith Diagoras, WHERE ARE THEY PAINTED THAT ARE DROWNED ? Let us
behold it in another instance, namely, THAT THE SPIRIT OF MAN, BEING OF AN EQUAL
AND UNIFORM SUBSTANCE, DOTH USUALLY SUPPOSE AND FEIGN IN NATURE A GREATER
EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY THAN IS IN TRUTH. Hence it cometh, that the
mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions of the
celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to
be discharged of [50] eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many
things in nature as it were MONODICA, SUI JURIS; yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives,
parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an
element of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay,
it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fancies
the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man
COMMUNIS MENSURA, have brought into natural philosophy; not much better than
the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks,
and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed
the Gods to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not
to have asked why God should have adorned the heavens with stars, as if he had
been an AEDILIS, one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or
plays. For if that great Workmaster had been of a human disposition, he would
have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the
frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square,
or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing a
harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature.
10. Let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by
every man's own individual nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that
Plato maketh of the cave: for certainly
if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age,
and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in
like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits
are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister
unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to
examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors, or
peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.
11. And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed
upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and
capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words, and
prescribe it well, LOQUENDUM UT VULGUS, SENTIENDUM UT SAPIENTES; yet certain it
is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the
wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. So as it is almost
necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians,
in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms
that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur
with us or no. For it cometh to pass for want of this that we are sure to end
there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences
about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed that it is not
possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances,
because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless
the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) doth
extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or
cautions against these three false appearances, I find altogether deficient.
12. There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency,
which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also
deficient; which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the
differing kinds of subjects; for there being but four kinds of demonstrations,
that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by
syllogism, and by congruity (which is that which Aristotle calleth
DEMONSTRATION IN ORB OR CIRCLE, and not A NOTIORIBUS;) every of these hath
certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have
chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be
excluded; and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in
some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more
remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and
hinderance to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations,
according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient.
XV. 1. The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or
memoir; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the
order of the entry; for the art of characters, or other visible notes of words
or things, it hath nearest conjugation with grammar; and therefore I refer it
to the due place: for the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which
we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of common-places;
wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of commonplace books,
as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory.
But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and
pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of commonplaces to be
a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copie of
invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of
the methods of common-places that I have seen, there is none of any sufficient
worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world;
and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or
respect to action.
2. For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which
is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to me
that there are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art
than those received. It is certain the art, as it is, may be raised to points
of ostentation prodigious: but in use, as it is now managed, it is barren, (not
burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren,) that
is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions.
And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or
words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth [51] of a number of verses or
rhymes, EX TEMPORE, or the making of a satirical simile of everything, or the turning
of everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of everything by
cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copie,
and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of
wonder,) than I do of the tricks of tumblers, FUNAMBULOES, BALADINES: the one being the same in the mind that the
other is in the body, matters of strangeness without worthiness.
3. This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one prenotion,
the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would
remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that
hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual
to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms may be
drawn much better practice than that in use; and besides which axioms, there
are divers moe touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the
beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only
ill managed.
XVI. 1. There remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge, which
is transitive, concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to
others; which I will term by the general name of tradition or delivery.
Tradition hath three parts; the first concerning the organ of tradition: the
second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning the
illustration of tradition.
2. For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing: for
Aristotle saith well, WORDS ARE THE IMAGES OF COGITATIONS, AND LETTERS ARE THE
IMAGES OF WORDS; but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed
by the medium of words. FOR WHATSOEVER IS CAPABLE OF SUFFICIENT DIFFERENCES,
AND THOSE PERCEPTIBLE BY THE SENSE, IS IN NATURE COMPETENT TO EXPRESS
COGITATIONS. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that
understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are
dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet
to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China, and
the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in characters real, which express
neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as
countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can
nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted
more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast
multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.
3. These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note
hath some similitude or congruity with the notion: the other AD PLACITUM,
having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are
hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use, and
embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most ancient nations, they are
but as continued impresses and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as
transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are written,
in that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an
affinity with the things signified; as Periander, being consulted with how to
preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw
him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers:
signifying, that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the
nobility and grandees. AD PLACITUM, are the characters real before mentioned,
and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt
feigning to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a
speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but
sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge,
touching the notes of things and cogitations in general, I find not inquired but
deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and
writings by letter do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part
concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens
current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit
men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver,) I
thought good to propound it to better inquiry.
4. Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced
the science of grammar: for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those
benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath
striven against the first general curse by the invention of all other arts, so
hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse, which was the
confusion of tongues, by the art of grammar; hereof the use in a mother tongue
is small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as have
ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty
of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect
attaining languages as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of
authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as
they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words
and reason is handled SPARSIM, brokenly, though not entirely; and therefore I
cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a
science by itself.
5. Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of
the accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and
the sweetness and harshness of them; whence hath issued some curious
observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it in respect of
the verse and not of the argument; wherein though men in learned tongues do tie
themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as
free to make new measures of verses as of dances: for a dance is a measured
pace, as a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better judge
than the art;
Coenae fercula nostrae Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.
[52] And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit
subject, it is well said, QUOD TEMPORE ANTIQUUM VIDETUR, ID INCONGRUITATE EST
MAXIME NOVUM.
6. For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets but may be
in words. The lands of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, with changes, and
intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, are many, according to the nature
or rule of the infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, etc. But the
virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not
laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some
cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write OMNIA
PER OMNIA; which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most
of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint
whatsoever. This art of ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by
supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that
ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the
decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through
which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.
7. In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be
thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for show
and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful
in them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that
which I speak of them, though in few marks, there be not some seed of
proficience. And this must be remembered, that as there be many of great
account in their countries and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat
of the estate, are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being
here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things; yet to
such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them, they seem
great matters.
XVII. 1. For the Method of Tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy
in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men fall at
words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding
at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times
little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of Method seemeth to me so weakly
inquired as I shall report it deficient.
2. Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in Logic, as a
part of Judgment; for as the doctrine
of Syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of Judgment upon that which is invented,
so the doctrine of Method containeth the rules of Judgment upon that which is
to be delivered; for Judgment precedeth Delivery, as it followeth Invention.
Neither is the Method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use
of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the
labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom
of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and
proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method, is of Method
referred to use, and Method referred to progression: whereof the one may be
termed Magistral, and the other of Probation.
3. The latter whereof seemeth to be VIA DESERTA ET INTERCLUSA. For
as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error between
the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to
deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best
examined; and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather present
satisfaction, than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to
err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the
disciple not to know his strength.
4. But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on,
ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method
wherein it was invented: and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in
this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to
the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, SECUNDUM MAJUS ET
MINUS, a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and
consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it
is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no
matter for the roots; but it you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured
to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges, as it is now
used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter,
but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter
for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the
roots: of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that
subject, hath some shadow: but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition: and therefore note
it for deficient.
5. Another diversity of Method there is, which hath some affinity with
the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced
since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as a false light
for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The
pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the
secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of
such sharpness as can pierce the veil.
6. Another diversity of Method, whereof the consequence is great, is
the delivery of knowledge in Aphorisms, or in Methods; wherein we may observe
that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations
upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some
discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible
Method. But the writing in Aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, where to the
writing in Method doth not approach.
7. For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid:
for Aphorisms, except they should be rediculous, cannot be made but of the pith
and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut [53] off: recitals
of examples are cut off; discourse of connection and order is cut off;
descriptions of practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the Aphorisms
but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in
reason will attempt to write Aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But
in Methods,
Tantum series juncturaque pollet, Tantum de medio sumptis accedit
honoris;
as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed,
would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief,
but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb
or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy; but
particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And
lastly, Aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire
further; whereas Methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they
were at farthest.
8. Another diversity of Method, which is likewise of great weight,
is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions
and their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately
followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the
proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if
the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things
will come in of themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece
enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of
sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations
and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.
9. Another diversity of methods is according to the subject or matter
which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery of the
mathematics, which are most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, which is the
most immersed: and howsoever contention hath been moved touching a uniformity
of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the
weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh
the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but
the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed
with the torture and press of the Method. And therefore as I did allow well of
particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular Methods
of tradition.
10. Another diversity of judgment
in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is according unto the light
and presuppositions of that which is delivered; for that knowledge which is
new, and foreign from opinions received, is to be delivered in another form
than that that is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he
thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, IF WE SHALL
INDEED DISPUTE, AND NOT FOLLOW AFTER SIMILITUDES, ETC. For those whose conceits
are seated in popular opinions, need only but to prove or dispute; but those
whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; the one to
make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate: so that it
is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to
express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times,
when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of
parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without
mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which was offered, before they had
understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and
tropes are: for it is a rule, that whatsoever science is not consonant to
presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes.
11. There be also other diversities of Methods vulgar and
received: as that of Resolution or Analysis, of Constitution or Systasis, of Concealment
or Cryptic, etc., which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those
which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this
purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry, which seems
to me deficient, touching the Wisdom of Tradition.
12. But unto this part of knowledge concerning Methods doth
further belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also
the several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their
quantity and figure. And therefore Method considereth not only the disposition
of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to their
truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ramus
merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of propositions, <
Kaqo/lov prowtov kata\ panto/s, > ETC., than he did in introducing the
canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is
the conduction of human things that, according to the ancient fables, THE MOST
PRECIOUS THINGS HAVE THE MOST PERNICIOUS KEEPERS) it was so, that the attempt
of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that
should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal circular,
and non-promovent, or incurring into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent.
13. The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are
chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of
sciences; for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity (which
is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid) to have a longitude and
a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude
towards action; that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular
precept. The one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the
province of another, which is the rule they call < Kaqauto\ >; the other giveth rule unto what degree of
particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed over in
silence, being in my judgment the more material; for certainly there must be
somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and
superficial generalities do but offer knowledge [54] to scorn of practical men;
and are no more aiding to practice than an Ortelius' universal map is to direct
the way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly
compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of
things, but first they must be filed: so the rules will help, if they be
laboured and polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the first,
and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question; the inquiry
whereof seemeth to me deficient.
14. There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which
is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is to deliver
knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a show of learning
who have it not: such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art
which bears his name: not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been
made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men
countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the
art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath
ends of everything, but nothing of worth.
XVIII.1. Now we descend to that part which concerneth the illustration
of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric, or art of
eloquence; a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. For though in
true value it is inferior to wisdom, (as it is said by God to Moses, when he
disabled himself for want of this faculty, AARON SHALL BE THY SPEAKER, AND
THOSE SHALT BE TO HIM AS GOD:) yet with people it is the more mighty: so
Salomon saith, SAPIENS CORDE APPELLABITUR PRUDENS, SED DULCIS ELOQUIO MAJORA REPERIET;
signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or
admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as
to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his
time, and the experience of Cicero hath made them in their works of rhetorics
exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the
orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence,
hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiencies which
I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as hand-maids attend
the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.
2. Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this
science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of rhetoric is, to
apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. For we see
reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; by
illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or impression,
which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or auction, which pertains to
morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by
importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are
undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by impressions or
observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so
unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb
reason, and not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is, to teach
a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality
is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end of
rhetoric is, to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for
these abuses of art come in but EX OBLIQUO, for caution.
3. And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though springing
out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but
as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats,
and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we
see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in
colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly
than he can do or think: and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon,
that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he
was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech; knowing that no man can speak fair of courses
sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, THAT VIRTUE, IF SHE
COULD BE SEEN, WOULD MOVE GREAT LOVE AND AFFECTION; so seeing that she cannot
be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the
imagination in lively representation: for to show her to reason only in
subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the
Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and
conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.
4. Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient
to reason, it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and
insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in
regard of the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,
Video meliora, proboque; Deteriora sequor:
reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions
did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part, and
contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the
affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as
reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the
present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present
filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that
force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as
present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.
5. We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with
the colouring of the worse part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with
vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be
opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the
[55] fist from the palm, the one close, the other at large; but much more in
this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it
as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic
on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of
both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are towards all men indifferent
and the same; but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ
according to the auditors:
Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion.
Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that
if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to
them all respectively and several ways: though this politic part of eloquence
in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want: whilst by the
observing their well-graced forms of speech they leese the volubility of
application: and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better
inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth
policy.
6. Now therefore will I descend to the deficiencies, which, as I said,
are but attendances: and first, I do
not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make
a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and
comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before. For
example:
S O P H I S M A. Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum.
R E D A R G U T I O. Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
MALUM EST, MALUM EST, INQUIT EMPTOR: SED CUM RECESSERIT, TUM GLORIABITUR!
The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: one, that there be
but a few of many; another, that their elenches are not annexed; and the third,
that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in
probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification
which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing
of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion
be the same: for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it
said, YOUR ENEMIES WILL BE GLAD OF THIS:
Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae;
than by hearing it said only, THIS IS EVIL FOR YOU.
7. Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching
provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of
invention; which appearetn to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop
of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be
applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I
will call ANTITHETA, and the latter FORMULAE.
8. ANTITHETA are theses argued PRO ET CONTRA; wherein men may be more
large and laborious: but, in such as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of
entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief
and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread,
to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; supplying authorities and
examples by reference.
P R O V E R B I S L E G I S. Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio,
qua. recedit a literâ: Cum receditur a literâ, judex transit in legislatorem.
P R O S E N T E N T I
A L E G I S. Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus
sensus qui interpretatur singula.
9. FORMULAE are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech,
which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface,
conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, etc. For as in buildings, there
is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases, entries,
doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of
special ornament and effect.
A C O N C L U S I O
N I N A D E L I B E R A T I V
E. So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future.
XIX. 1. There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge,
the one critical, the other pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered
by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal
part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the
relative part thereof concerneth reading of books; whereunto appertain
incidently these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction
and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great
prejudice. For these critics have often presumed, that that which they
understand not is false set down: as the priest that, where he found it written
of St. Paul, DEMISSUS EST PER SPORTAM mended his book, and made it DEMISSUS EST
PER PORTAM; because SPORTA was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely
their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the
same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies
are commonly the least correct.
The second is concerning the exposition and explication of
authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries: wherein it is over usual
to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain. The third is concerning the times, which in
many cases give great light to true interpretations.
The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors;
that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read.
And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies;
that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.
2. For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition
which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of great
fruit.
[56] As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledges; as with
what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.
Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and
so proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more difficult,
and then to turn them to the more easy: for it is one method to practise
swimming with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes.
A third is the application of learning according unto the
propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but
seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies; as, for example, if a
child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the
mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit be caught away
but a moment, one is to begin anew. And as sciences have a propriety towards
faculties for cure and help, so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards
sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of
great wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.
Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence
to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero, men in exercising their
faculties, if they be not well advised, do exercise their faults and get ill
habits as well as good; so there is a great judgment to be had in the
continuance and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularize a
number of other considerations of this nature, things but of mean appearance,
but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young
plants is that that is most important to their thriving: (and as it was noted
that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in the
infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state
which followed:) so the culture and manurance of minds in youth, hath such a
forcible, though unseen operation, as hardly any length of time or contention
of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss to observe also
how small and mean faculties gotten by education, yet when they fall into great
men or great matters, do work great and important effects; whereof we see a notable
example in Tacitus of two stage
players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the
Pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there arising a
mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus Caesar, Blaesus the lieutenant
had committed some of the mutineers, which were suddenly rescued; whereupon
Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner: -- THESE POOR
INNOCENT WRETCHES APPOINTED TO CRUEL DEATH, YOU HAVE RESTORED TO BEHOLD THE
LIGHT; BUT WHO SHALL RESTORE ANY BROTHER TO ME, OR LIFE ONTO MY BROTHER, THAT
WAS SENT HITHER IN MESSAGE FROM THE LEGIONS OF GERMANY, TO TREAT OF THE COMMON
CAUSE ? AND HE HATH MURDERED HIM THIS LAST NIGHT BY SOME OF HIS FENCERS AND RUFFIANS,
THAT HE HATH ABOUT HIM FOR HIS EXECUTIONERS, UPON SOLDIERS. ANSWER, BLAESUS,
WHAT IS DONE WITH HIS BODY? THE MORTALEST ENEMIES DO NOT DENY BURIAL. WHEN I
HAVE PERFORMED MY LAST DUTY TO THE CORPSE WITH KISSES, WITH TEARS, COMMAND ME
TO BE SLAIN BESIDE HUE; SO THAT THESE MY FELLOWS, FOR OUR GOOD MEANING, AND OUR
TRY, HEARTS TO THE LEGIONS, MAY HAVE LEAVE TO BURY US. With which speech he put
the army into an infinite fury and uproar: whereas truth was he had no brother,
neither was there any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had been
upon the stage.
3. But to return: we are now come to a period of rational knowledges;
wherein if I have made the divisions other than those that are received, yet
would I not be thought to disallow all those divisions which I do not use. For
there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The one,
because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together those things which
are next in nature, and those things which are next in use. For if a secretary
of state should sort his papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he
would sort together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, etc., but in
his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those that he were like
to use together, though of several natures; so in this general cabinet of
knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of
things; whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would
have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, because the bringing
in of the deficiencies did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest. For
let the knowledge extant, for demonstration sake, be fifteen; let the knowledge
with the deficiencies be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty;
for the parts of fifteen are three and five; the parts of twenty are two, four,
five, and ten. So as these things are without contradiction, and could not
otherwise be.
XX. 1. We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite
and will of man: whereof Salomon saith, ANTE OMNIA, FILI, CUSTODI COR TUUM; NAM
INDE PROCEDUNT ACTIONES VITAE. In the handling of this science, those which
have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that professed to teach to
write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without
giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of
the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the
draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them
well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires. But
how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of
man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over
altogether, or slightly and unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that
moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the distinguishing
that generous spirits are won by doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort
by reward and punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches, that can
excuse the absence of this part.
2. The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden rock whereupon
both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away; which is, that
men have despised to be conversant in ordinary [57] and common matters, the
judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine, (for life
consisteth not in novelties or subtilties,) but contrariwise they have
compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of
matter, chosen to give glory either to the subtilty of disputations, or to the
eloquence of discourses. But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence;
NOCET ILLIS ELOQUENTIA, QUIBUS NON RERUM CUPIDIDATEM FACIT, SED SUI. Doctrine
should be such as should make men in love with the lesson, and not with the
teacher; being directed to the auditor's benefit, and not to the author's
commendation. And therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded
as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, QUAE SI FECERITIS, NON ORATOREM DUNTAXAT
IN PRAESENTIA LAUDABITIS, SED VOSMETIPSOS ETIAM NON ITA MULTO POST STATU RERUM VESTRARUM
MELIORE. 3. Neither needed men of so
excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised
himself, and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and
learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroical
acts of Aeneas: --
Nec sum animi debius, verbis ea vincere magnum Quam sit, et
angustis his addere rebus honorem.
And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure
that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action
and active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and
tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue,
duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge
seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or
culture of the mind: the one describing the nature of good, the other
prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.
4. The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good
considereth it either simple or compared; either the kinds of good, or the degrees
of good; in the latter whereof those infinite disputations, which were touching
the supreme degree thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest
good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity, are by the
Christian faith discharged. And as Aristotle saith, THAT YOUNG MEN MAY BE
HAPPY, BUT NOT OTHERWISE BUT BY HOPE, so we must all acknowledge our minority, and
embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world.
5. Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher's
heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man's nature than was, (for
we see in what a height of style Seneca writeth, VERE MAGNUM, HABERE
FRAGILITATEM HOMINIS, SECURITATEM DEI,) we may with more sobriety and truth
receive the rest of their inquiries and labours. Where in for the nature of
good positive or simple, they have set it down excellently, in describing the
forms of virtue and duty, with their situations and postures; in distributing them
into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like:
nay further, they have commended them to man's nature and spirit, with great
quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and
entrenched them, as much as discourse can do, against corrupt and popular
opinions. Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have also
excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in the comparison between a
contemplative and an active life, in the distinction between virtue with
reluctation and virtue secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit,
in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like; so as this part
deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.
6. Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular and received
notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, they had stayed a
little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil, and the
strings of those roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that
which followed; and specially if they had consulted with nature, they had made
their doctrines less prolix and more profound; which being by them in part
omitted and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume
and open in a more clear manner.
7. There is formed in every thing a double nature of good: the
one, as every thing is a total or substantive in itself; the other, as it is a
part or member of a greater body; whereof the latter is in degree the greater
and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general
form. Therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the lodestone;
but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection to the
lodestone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region and
country of massy bodies: so may we go forward, and see that water and massy
bodies move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a divulsion
in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards from the centre of the
earth, forsaking their duty to the earth in regard to their duty to the world.
This double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven
upon man, if he degenerate not: unto whom the conservation of duty to the
public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being:
according to that memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission
of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency
and instance by his friends about him that he should not hazard himself to sea
in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, NECESSE EST UT EAM, NON UT
VIVAM. But it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy,
religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which
is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the
Holy Faith; well declaring that it was the same God that gave the Christian law
to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spoke of
before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves
anathematized and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and
infinite feeling of communion.
8. This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge and determine
most of the controversies [58] wherein moral philosophy is conversant. For
first, it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or
active life, and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the reasons which he
bringeth for the contemplative are private, and respecting the pleasure and
dignity of a man's self, (in which respects, no question, the contemplative
life hath the pre-eminence) not much unlike to that comparison, which Pythagoras
made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation: who being
asked what he was, answered, THAT IF HIERO WERE EVER AT THE OLYMPIAN GAMES, HE
KNEW THE MANNER, THAT SOME CAME TO TRY THEIR FORTUNE FOR THE PRIZES, AND SOME
CAME AS MERCHANTS TO UTTER THEIR COMMODITIES, AND SOME CAME TO MAKE GOOD CHEER
AND MEET THEIR FRIENDS, AND SOME CAME TO LOOK ON; AND THAT HE WAS ONE OF THEM
THAT CAME TO LOOK ON. But men must know, that in this theatre of man's life it
is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on: neither could the like
question ever have been received in the church (notwithstanding their PRETIOSA
IN OCULIS DOMINI MORS SANCTORUM EJUS, by which place they would exalt their
civil death and regular professions,) but upon this defence, that the
monastical life is not simply
contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications,
which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing
or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when
he abode so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch the seventh from Adam, who
was the first contemplative, and walked with God, yet did also endow the church
with prophecy, which St. Jude citeth. But for contemplation which should be
finished in itself, without casting beams upon society, assuredly divinity
knoweth it not,
9. It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and Socrates, and
their schools and successions, on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue
simply or attended, the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and
concern society; and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who
placed it in pleasure, and made virtue, (as it is used in some comedies of
errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change habits,) to be but as a
servant, without which pleasure cannot be served and attended, and the reformed
school of the Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation,
(as if they would have deposed Jupiter again, and restored Saturn and the first
age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one
air and season,) and Herillus, who placed felicity in extinguishment of the
disputes of the mind, making no fixed nature of good and evil, esteeming things
according to the clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; which opinion
was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things according to the
motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wavering of belief: all which are
manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point of
society.
10. It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which presupposeth
that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be
liable to fortune and disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to
fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can
wish to ourselves in our proper fortune; as Gonsalvo said to his soldiers,
showing them Naples, and protesting, HE HAD RATHER DIE ONE FOOT FORWARDS, THAN
TO HAVE HIS LIFE SECURED FOR LONG BY ONE FOOT OF RETREAT. Whereunto the wisdom
of that heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that A GOOD CONSCIENCE
IS A CONTINUAL FEAST; showing plainly that the conscience of good intensions,
howsoever succeeding, is a more continual joy to nature, than all the provision
which can be made for security and repose.
11. It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy, which grew general
about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into an occupation or profession;
as if the purpose had been, not to resist and extinguish perturbations, but to
fly and avoid the causes of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of
life to that end; introducing such a health of mind, as was that health of body
of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all his life long but
intend his health: whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as
that health of body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and
extremities; so likewise that health of mind is most proper, which can go
through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes' opinion is
to be accepted, who commended not them which abstained, but them which
sustained, and could refrain their mind IN PRAECIPITIO, and could give unto the
mind, as is used in horsemanship, the shortest stop or turn.
12. Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of application in
some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men, that
did retire too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations:
whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same Consalvo
said the honour of a soldier should be, E TELÂ CRASSIORE, and not so fine as
that everything should catch in it and endanger it.
XXI. 1. To resume private or particular good; it falleth into the division
of good active and passive: for this difference of good, not unlike to that
which amongst the Romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of
PROMUS and CONDUS, is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed in the
two several appetites in creatures; the one to preserve or continue themselves,
and the other to dilate or multiply themselves; whereof the latter seemeth to
be the worthier: for in nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the
agent; and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the
pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than that of food;
in divine doctrine, BEATIUS EST DARE QUAM ACCIPERE, and in life, there is no
man's spirit so soft, but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath
fixed in his desire, more than sensuality; which priority of the active good,
is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune.
For if we might have a [59] perpetuity and certainty in our pleasures, the
state of them would advance their price: but when we see it is but MAGNI
AESTIMAMUS MORI TARDIUS, and NE GLORIERIS DE CRASTINO, NESCIS PARTUM DIEI, it
maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from time; which are
only our deeds and works: as it is said OPERA EORUM SEQUUNTUR EOS. The
pre-eminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is
natural in man towards variety and proceeding; which in the pleasures of the
sense, which is the principal part of passive good, can have no great latitude:
COGITA QUAMDIU EADEM FECERIS; CIBUS, SOMNUS, LUDUS; PER HUNC CIRCULUM CURRITUR;
MORI VELLE NON TANTUM FORTIS, AUT MISER, AUT PRUDENS, SED ETIAM FASTIDIOSUS
POTEST. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there is much
variety; whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions,
progressions, recoils, reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their ends:
so as it was well said VITA SINE PROPOSITO LANGUIDA ET VAGA EST. Neither hath
this active good any identity with the good of society, though in some case it
hath an incidence into it; for although it do many times bring forth acts of
beneficence, yet it is with a respect private to a man's own power, glory,
amplification, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary
subject. For that gigantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the
world, such as was Lucius Sylla, and infinite other in smaller model, who would
have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and would give
form to the world, according to their own humours, (which is the true
Theomachy,) pretendeth and aspireth to active good, though it recedeth farthest
from good of society, which we have determined to be the greater.
2. To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of conservative
and perfective. For let us take a brief review of that which we have said: we
have spoken first of the good of society, the intention whereof embraceth the
form of human nature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our own
proper and individual form: we have spoken of active good, and supposed it as a
part of private and particular good: and rightly, for there is impressed upon
all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves; one of
preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing and perfecting their
form; and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things;
whereof the multiplying, or signature of it upon other things, is that which we
handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth the conserving of it,
and perfecting or raising of it; which latter is the highest degree of passive
good. For to preserve in state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the
greater. So in man,--
Igneus est ollis vigor, et caelestis origo.
His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection
of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the
tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of an advancement formal
and essential is carried to seek an advancement local. For as those which are
sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a
remove local they could obtain a remove internal; so is it with men in
ambition, when failing of the means to exalt their nature, they are in a
perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said,
either conservative or perfective.
3. To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which consisteth
in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures; it seemeth to be the
most pure and natural of pleasures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And
this also receiveth a difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor
well inquired: for the good of fruition or contentment is placed either in the
sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness and vigour of it; the one
superinduced by equality, the other by vicissitude; the one having less mixture
of evil, the other more impression of good. Which of these is the greater good
is a question controverted; but whether man's nature may not be capable of
both, is a question not inquired.
4. The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist,
Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the
sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill
words: the sophist saying that Socrates' felicity was the felicity of a block
or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of
one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these
opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld
by the general consent even of the Epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a
great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in
clearing perturbations than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is
much favoured by the assertion we last spoke of, that good of advancement is
greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath
a show of advancement, as motion though in a circle has a show of progression.
5. But the second question, decided the true way, maketh the
former superfluous. For can it be doubted but that there are some who take more
pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other, and yet nevertheless are less
troubled with the loss or leaving of them ? so as this same, NON UTI UT NON
APPETAS, NON APPETERE UT NON METUAS, SUNT ANIMI PUSILLI ET DIFFIDENTIS. And it
seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful
and cautionary than the nature of things requireth. So have they increased the
fear of death in offering to cure it. For when they would have a man's whole
life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs make men
think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing.
Better saith the poet: --
Qui spatium vitae extremum inter munera ponat Naturae.
So have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and
harmonical, by not breaking them [60] sufficiently to contrary motions: the reason
whereof I suppose to be, because they themselves were men dedicated to a
private, free, and unapplied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or
like instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of many changes,
yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages as a set
song or voluntary; much after the same manner was the diversity between a
philosophical and a civil life. And therefore men are to imitate the wisdom of
jewellers; who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice, which may be ground
forth without taking too much of the stone, they help it; but if it should
lessen and abate the stone too much, they will not meddle with it: so ought men
so to procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity.
6. Having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and particular,
as far as seemeth fit; we will now return to that good of man which respecteth
and beholdeth society, which we may term duty; because the term of duty is more
proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of virtue
is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself: though neither can a
man understand virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without an
inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and
politic: but not if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and
government of every man over himself, and not over others. And as in
architecture the direction of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of
building, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the
building; and in mechanicals, the direction how to frame an instrument or
engine, is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it,
(and yet nevertheless in expressing of the one you incidentally express the aptness
towards the other;) so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth
from that of their conformity thereunto.
7. This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the common duty
of every man, as a man or member of a state; the other, the respective or
special duty of every man, in his profession, vocation, and place. The first of
these is extant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second likewise I may
report rather dispersed than deficient; which manner of dispersed writing in
this kind of argument I acknowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to
write of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every several
vocation, profession, and place ? For although sometimes a looker on may see more
than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, THAT THE VALE
BEST DISCOVERETH THE HILL; yet there is small doubt but that men can write
best, and most really and materially, in their own professions; and that the
writing of speculative men of active matter, for the most part, doth seem to
men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be
but dreams and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them that
write in their own professions, that they magnify them in excess. But generally
it were to be wished, as that which would make learning indeed solid and
fruitful, that active men would or could become writers.
8. In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your Majesty's
excellent book touching the duty of a king;
a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great
aspersion of all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most sound
and healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention,
nor in the coldness of negligence; not sick of dizziness, as those are who
leese themselves in their order; nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in
matters impertinent; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do who
seek to please the reader more than nature beareth; and chiefly well disposed
in the spirits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far
removed from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that write in their
own professions to be subject, which is, that they exalt it above measure: for
your majesty hath truly described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their
extern glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can I
ever leese out of my remembrance, what I heard your majesty, in the same sacred
spirit of Government, deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, THAT KINGS
RULED BY THEIR LAWS AS GOD DID BY THE LAWS OF NATURE; AND OUGHT AS RARELY TO
PUT IN USE THEIR SUPREME PREROGATIVE, AS GOD DOTH HIS POWER OF WORKING
MIRACLES. And yet notwithstanding, in your book of a free monarchy, you do well
give men to understand that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a
king, as well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege
this excellent writing of your majesty, as a prime or eminent example of
tractates concerning special and respective duties: wherein I should have said as
much, if it had been written a thousand years since: neither am I moved with
certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise in presence; no,
it is Battery to praise in absence; that is, when either the virtue is absent,
or the occasion is absent; and so the praise is not natural, but forced, either
in truth or in time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, which
is nothing but an excellent table of Cesar's virtue, and made to his face; besides
the example of many other excellent persons, wiser a great deal than such
observers; and we will never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises
to present or absent.
9. But to return: there belongeth further to the handling of this part,
touching the duties of professions and vocations, a relative or opposite,
touching the frauds, cautels, impostures, and vices of every profession, which
hath been likewise handled: but how? rather in a satire and cynically than
seriously and wisely: for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce
much of that which is good in professions, than with judgment to discover and
sever that which is corrupt. For, as Salomon saith, he that cometh to seek
after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter
for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: QUAERENTI DERISORI SCIENTIAM
IPSA SE [61] ABSCONDIT; SED STUDIOSO FIT OBVIAM. But the managing of this
argument with integrity and truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to
be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted.
For, as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for
it; but if you see him first, he dieth: so it is with deceits and evil arts;
which, if they be first espied they leese their life; but if they prevent, they
endanger. So that we are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what
men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join
serpentine wisdom with columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the
conditions of the serpent: his baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility
and lubricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; that is, all forms and natures
of evil: for without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. Nay, an honest man
can do no good upon those that are wicked to reclaim them, without the help of
the knowledge of evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty
groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers,
schoolmasters, and men's exterior language: so as, except you can make them
perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they
despise all morality; NON RECIPIT STULTUS VERBA PRUDENTIAE, NISI EA DIXERIS
QUAE VERSANTUR IN CORDE EJUS.
10. Unto this part, touching Respective Duty, doth also appertain the
duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so
likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bond of companies,
colleges, and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate
duties; not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the framing
of the mind of particular persons.
11. The knowledge concerning good respecting Society doth handle
it also, not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongeth the weighing
of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public: as
we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so
much extolled; yet what was said?
Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.
So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides Again, we see
when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they
meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made their associates, and cast
forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were
divided in opinion; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils, and
others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a number of the like cases
there are of comparative duty; amongst which that of all others is the most frequent,
where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice.
Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the truth: ALIQUA SUNT INJUSTE
FACIENDA, UT MULTA JUSTE FIERI POSSINT. But the reply is good, AUCTOREM
PRAESENTIS JUSTITIAE HABES, SPONSOREM FUTURAE NON HABES. Men must pursue things
which are just in present, and leave the future to the divine Providence. So
then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of
good.
XXII. 1. Now therefore that we have spoken of this fruit of life, it
remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto; without which
part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image, or statua, which is
beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle
himself subscribeth in these words: NECESSE EST SCILICET DE VIRTUTE DICERE, ET
QUID SIT, ET EX QUIBUS GIGNATUR. INUTILE ENIM FERE FUERIT VIRTUTEM QUIDEM
NOSSE, ACQUIRENDAE AUTEM EJUS MODOS ET VIAS IGNORARE: NON ENIM DE VIRTUTE TANTUM,
QUA SPECIE SIT, QUAERENDUM EST, SED ET QUOMODO SUI COPIAM FACIAT: UTRUMQUE ENIM
VOLUMUS, ET REM IPSAM NOSSE, ET EJUS COMPOTES FIERI: HOC AUTEM EX VOTO NON
SUCCEDET, NISI SCIAMUS ET EX QUIBUS ET QUOMODO. In such full words and with
such iteration doth he inculcate this part. So saith Cicero in great
commendation of Cato the second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, NON
ITA DISPUTANDI CAUSA, SED ITA VIVENDI. And although the neglect of our times,
wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their
life, (as Seneca excellently saith) DE PARTIBUS VITAE QUISQUE DELIBERAT, DE SUMMÂ
NEMO, may make this part seem superfluous; yet I must conclude with that
aphorism of Hippocrates, QUI GRAVI MORBO CORREPTI DOLORES NON SENTIUNT, IIS
MENS AEGROTAT, they need medicine, not only to assuage the disease, but to
awake the sense. And if it be said, that the cure of men's minds belongeth to
sacred divinity, it is most true: but yet moral philosophy may be preferred
unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, THAT
THE EYES OF THE HANDMAID LOOK PERPETUALLY TOWARDS THE MISTRESS, and yet no
doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid, to discern of the
mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the
doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due
limits, many sound and profitable directions.
2. This part therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I
cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry: the
rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is
often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men, (which is rare, but
yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser than their books. It is reasonable therefore
that we propound it in the more particularity, both for the worthiness, and
because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient; which seemeth
almost incredible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves
that have written. We will therefore enumerate some heads or points thereof,
that it may appear the better what it is, and whether it be extant.
3. First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are
practical, we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and what not;
for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of
application only. The husbandman cannot command neither the nature of the
earth, nor the [62] seasons of the weather; no more can the physician the
constitution of the patient, nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture
and cure of the mind of man, two things are without our command; points of
nature, and points of fortune. For to the basis of the one, and the conditions
of the other, our work is limited and tied. In these things therefore it is
left unto us to proceed by application;
Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:
and so likewise,
Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo.
But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull and
neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering, which draweth and
contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary;
which is that property which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom
of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the
precedent state or disposition, unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment,
except we first take measure of the body.
4. So then the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound
and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers
of men's natures and dispositions; especially having regard to those
differences which are most radical in being the fountains and causes of the
rest, or most frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not the
handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe the mediocrities
of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For if it deserve to be
considered, that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters, and
others to small, (which Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the name
of magnanimity;) doth it not deserve as well to be considered, that there are
minds proportioned to intend many matters, and others to few? So that some can
divide themselves: others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be in few
things at once: and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a
pusillanimity. And again, that some minds are proportioned to that which may be
dispatched at once, or within a short return of time; others to that which
begins afar off, and is to be won with length of pursuit:
Jam tum tenditque fovetque.
So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is commonly
also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further deserved it to be considered
by Aristotle; THAT THERE IS A DISPOSITION IN CONVERSATION (SUPPOSING IT IN
THINGS WHICH DO IN NO SORT TOUCH OR CONCERN A MAN'S SELF,) TO SOOTHE AND
PLEASE; AND A DISPOSITION CONTRARY TO CONTRADICT AND CROSS: and deserveth it
not much better to be considered, THAT THERE IS A DISPOSITION, NOT IN
CONVERSATION OR TALK, BUT IN MATTER OF MORE SERIOUS NATURE, (AND SUPPOSING IT
STILL IN THINGS MERELY INDIFFERENT,) TO TAKE PLEASURE IN THE GOOD OF ANOTHER:
AND A DISPOSITION CONTRARIWISE, TO TAKE DISTASTE AT THE GOOD OF ANOTHER? which
is that property which we call good
nature or ill nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I cannot
sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several
characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both in morality and policy;
considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both. A man
shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of
men's natures, according to the predominances of the planets; lovers of quiet,
lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure,
lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. A man shall find in the wisest sort
of these relations which the Italians make touching conclaves, the natures of
the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth: a man shall meet
with in every day's conference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, formal,
real, humorous, certain, HUOMO DI PRIMA IMPRESSIONE, HUOMO DI ULTIMA
IMPRESSIONE and the like: and yet nevertheless this kind of observation
wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are
found, many of them, but we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein our fault
is the greater; because both history, poesy, and daily experience are as goodly
fields where these observations grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in
our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that receipts might
be made of them for use of life.
5. Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed
upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by
beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and
again, those which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility,
obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity,
constant fortune, variable fortune, rising PER SALTUM, PER GRADUS, and the
like. And therefore we see that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent,
BENIGNITAS HUJUS UT ADOLESCENTULI EST. St. Paul concludeth that severity of
discipline was to be used to the Cretans, INCREPA EOS DURE, upon the
disposition of their country, CRETENSES SEMPER MENDACES, MALAE BESTIAE, VENTRES
PIGRI. Sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories:
SED PLERUMQUE REGIAE VOLUNTATES, UT VEHEMENTES SUNT, SIC MOBILES, SAEPEQUE
IPSAE SIBI ADVERSAE. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune
mendeth the disposition: solus Vespasianus mutatus in melius. Pindarus maketh an
observation, that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men QUI
MAGNAM FELICITATEM CONCOQUERE NON POSSUNT. So the psalm showeth it is more easy
to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase of fortune:
DIVITIAE SI AFFLUANT, NOLITE COR APPONERE. These observations, and the like, I
deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle, as in passage in his Rhetorics,
and are handled in some scattered discourses: but they were never incorporated
into moral philosophy, to which they do essentially appertain; as the knowledge
of the diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and the knowledge
of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician; except
we mean to follow the [63] indiscretion of empirics, which minister the same medicines
to all patients.
6. Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections;
for as in medicining of the body, it is in order first to know the divers
complexions and constitutions; secondly, the diseases; and lastly, the cures:
so in medicining of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men's
natures, it followeth, in order, to know the diseases and infirmities of the
mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the
affections. For as the ancient politiques in popular states were wont to
compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea
would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so
the people would be peaceable and tractable, if the seditious orators did not
set them in working and agitation: so it may be fitly said, that the mind in
the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds,
did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find strange, as before,
that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of ethics, and never handled
the affections, which is the principal subject thereof; and yet in his
Rhetorics, where they are considered but collaterally, and in a second degree,
as they may be moved by speech, he findeth place for them, and handleth them
well for the quantity; but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them.
For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry,
no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to
handle the nature of colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular
affections as light is to particular colours.
Better travails, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument,
as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet, it is
like, it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions, (which in a
subject of this nature are but curiosities,) than in active and ample
descriptions and observations. So likewise I find some particular writings of
an elegant nature, touching some of the affections; as of anger, of comfort
upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other.
But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of
this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections
are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again
contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how they
work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; how they are inwrapped one
within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other
the like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in moral
and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to
master one by another; even as we use to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird
with bird, which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover: upon which
foundation is erected that excellent use of PRAEMIUM and POENA, whereby civil
states consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing
and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes
necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government
within.
7. Now come we to those points which are within our own command, and
have force and operation upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and to
alter manners: wherein they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit,
education, example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof,
exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies: these as they have determinate use in
moralities, from these the mind suffereth; and of these are such receipts and
regiments compounded and described, as may seem to recover or preserve the health
and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine: of which
number we will insist upon some one or two, as an example of the rest, because
it were too long to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and habit
to speak of.
8. The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion,
that of those things which consist by nature nothing can be changed by custom;
using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up, it will not
learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing, we do not learn to see or
hear the better. For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is
peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is
otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that
a strait glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use
bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and
stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better,
and the like: which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of
manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth. But allowing his
conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more
to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts
of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is of ordering the
exercises of the body; whereof we will recite a few.
9. The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either
too high a strain, or too weak: for if too high, in a diffident nature you
discourage, in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility, and so a
sloth; and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can hold out,
and so an insatisfaction in the end: if too weak on the other side, you may not
look to perform and overcome any great task.
10. Another precept is, to practise all things chiefly at two several
times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst
disposed; that by the one you may gain a great step, by the other you may work
out the knots and stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy
and pleasant.
11. Another precept is, that which Aristotle mentioneth by the
way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are
by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the [64] stream, or making a
wand straight by bending him contrary
to his natural crookedness.
12. Another precept is, that the mind is brought to anything better,
and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not
first in the intention, but TANQUAM ALIUD AGENDO, because of the natural hatred
of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other axioms there are
touching the managing of exercise and custom; which being so conducted doth
prove indeed another nature; but being governed by chance doth commonly prove
but an ape of nature, and bringing forth that which is lame and counterfeit.
13. So if we should handle books and studies, and what influence and
operation they have upon manners, are there not divers precepts of great
caution and direction appertaining thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy, VINUM
DAEMONUM, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions?
Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, THAT
YOUNG MEN ARE NO FIT AUDITORS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SETTLED
FROM THE BOILING HEAT OF THEIR AFFECTIONS, NOR ATTEMPERED WITH TIME AND
EXPERIENCE. And doth it not hereof come, that those excellent books and
discourses of the ancient writers, (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue
most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and popular
opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned and
derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not
read and revolved by men in their mature and settled years, but confined almost
to boys and beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men are
fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly seasoned in
religion and morality; lest their judgments be corrupted, and made apt to think
that there are no true differences of things, but according to utility and
fortune, as the verse describes it,
Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur;
and again,
Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic diadema:
which the poets do speak satirically, and in indignation on virtue's
behalf; but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively; for so it
pleaseth Machiavel to say, THAT IF CAESAR HAD BEEN OVERTHROWN, HE WOULD HAVE
BEEN MORE ODIOUS THAN EVER WAS CATILINE; as if there had been no difference but
in fortune, between a very fury of lust and blood, and the most excellent
spirit (his ambition reserved) of the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise
to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves, (some kinds of them,)
lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible; as Cicero saith of
Cato, IN MARCO CATONE HAEC BONA QUAE VIDEMUS DIVINA ET EGREGIA, IPSIUS SCITOTE
ESSE PROPRIA; QUAE NONNUNQUAM REQUIRIMUS, EA SUNT OMNIA NON A NATURÂ, SED A
MAGISTRO ? Many other axioms and
advices there are touching those proprieties and effects which studies do
infuse and instil into manners. And so likewise is there touching the use of
all those other points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited
in the beginning in the doctrine of morality.
14. But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more
accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built upon this ground; that the
minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect, and at other times
in a state more depraved. The purpose therefore of this practice is to fix and
cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil.
The fixing of the good hath been practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions,
and observances or exercises; which are not to be regarded so much in
themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual obedience. The
obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means, some kind of
redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account DE
NOVO, for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and
justly; for all good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to
religion.
15. Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which is of all
other means the most compendious and summary, and again, the most noble and
effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is the
electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life,
such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain. For if these
two things be supposed, that a man set before him honest and good ends, and
again, that he be resolute, constant, and true unto them; it will follow that
he shall mould himself into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work
of nature; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand. For as when a
carver makes an image, he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh, (as if he
be upon the face, that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still,
till such time as he comes to it;) but, contrariwise, when nature makes a
flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time:
so in obtaining virtue by habit, while a man practiseth temperance, he doth not
profit much to fortitude, nor the like: but when he dedicateth and applieth
himself to good ends, look, what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards
those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested of a precedent disposition to
conform himself thereunto. Which state of mind Aristotle doth excellently
express himself that it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine: his words
are these: IMMANITATI AUTEM CONSENTANEUM EST OPPONERE EAM, QUAE SUPRA HUMANITATEM
EST, HEROICAM SIVE DIVINAM VIRTUTEM: and a little after, NAM UT FERAE NEQUE
VITIUM NEQUE VIRTUS EST, SIC NEQUE DEI: SED HIC QUIDEM STATUS ALTIUS QUIDDAM
VIRTUTE EST, ILLE ALIUD QUIDDAM A VITIO. And therefore we may see what
celsitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in his funeral
oration; where he said, THAT MEN NEEDED TO MAKE NO OTHER PRAYERS TO THE GODS,
BUT THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE AS GOOD LORDS TO THEM AS TRAJAN HAD BEEN; as if he
had not been only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these
be [65] heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow of that divine state
of mind, which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting
upon their souls charity, which is excellently called the bond of perfection,
because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together. And as it is
elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false imitation of
divine love, AMOR MELIOR SOPHISTA LAEVO AD HUMANAM VITAM, that love teacheth a
man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor; which he calleth left-handed,
because, with all his rules and precepts, he cannot form a man so dexterously,
nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself, as love can do: so
certainly, if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him
suddenly into a greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do,
which is but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay further, as Xenophon observed
truly, that all other affections, though they raise the mind, yet they do it by
distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt
the mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it; so
in all other excellencies, though they advance nature, yet they are subject to excess;
only charity admitteth no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in
power, the angels transgressed and fell; ASCENDAM, ET ERO SIMILIS ALTISSIMO: by
aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell; ERITIS SICUT
DII, SCIENTES BONUM ET MALUM: but by
aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever
transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that imitation we are called:
DILIGITE INIMICOS VESTROS, BENEFACITE EIS QUI ODERUNT VOS, ET ORATE PRO
PERSEQUENTIBUS ET CALUMNIANTIBUS VOS, UT SITIS FILII PATRIS VESTRI QUI IN
COELIS EST, QUI SOLEM SUUM ORIRI FACIT SUPER BONOS ET MALOS, ET PLUIT SUPER
JUSTOS ET INJUSTOS. So in the first platform of the divine nature itself, the
heathen religion speaketh thus, OPTIMUS MAXIMUS: and the sacred Scriptures
thus, MISERICORDIA EJUS SUPER OMNIA OPERA EJUS.
16. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning
the culture and regimen of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the parts
thereof which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into
an art of science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matter of
common sense and experience, he judgeth well, But as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes,
YOU MAY NOT MARVEL, ATHENIANS, THAT DEMOSTHENES AND I DO DIFFER; FOR HE
DRINKETH WATER, AND I DRINK WINE; and like as we read of an ancient parable of
THE TWO GATES OF SLEEP,
Sunt geminae somni portae: quarum altera fertur Cornea, qua veris facilis
datur exitus umbris: Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, Sed falsa ad
coelum mittunt insomnia manes:
so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure
maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of wine is the more vaporous,
and the braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams.
17. But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy,
which contemplateth man segregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit.
Wherein we may further note, that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity
between the good of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the
good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure; so the good of
the mind, inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, to make
the mind sound, and without perturbation; beautiful, and graced with decency; and
strong and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so in the
mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy to observe, that many
have strength of wit and courage, but have neither health from perturbations,
nor any beauty or decency in their doings; some again have an elegancy and
fineness of carriage, which have neither soundness of honesty, nor substance of
sufficiency: and some again have honest and reformed minds, that can neither
become themselves nor manage business: and sometimes two of them meet, and rarely
all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined that the mind ought not
to be reduced to stupid, but to retain pleasure; confined rather in the
subject of it, than in the strength and vigour of it.
XXIII. 1. CIVIL knowledge is conversant about a subject which of
all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. Nevertheless,
as Cato the Censor said, THAT THE ROMANS WERE LIKE SHEEP, FOR THAT A MAN MIGHT
BETTER DRIVE A FLOCK OF THEM, THAN ONE OF THEM; FOR IN A FLOCK, IF YOU COULD
BUT GET SOME FEW TO GO RIGHT, THE REST WOULD FOLLOW: so in that respect moral
philosophy is more difficile than policy. Again, moral philosophy propoundeth
to itself the framing of internal goodness; but civil knowledge requireth only an
external goodness; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore it cometh
oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments: for so we find in the
holy story, when the kings were good, yet it is added, SED ADHUC POPULUS NON
DIREXERAT COR SUUM AD DOMINUM DEUM PATRUM SUORUM. Again, states, as great
engines, move slowly, and are not so soon put out of frame: for as in Egypt the
seven good years sustained the seven bad, so governments for a time well
grounded, do bear out errors following; but the resolution of particular
persons is more suddenly subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme
difficulty of civil knowledge.
2. This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary
actions of society; which are conversation, negotiation, and government. For
man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms
of divers natures, which do often sever: wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom of
business, and wisdom of state.
3. The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected, but
much less despised; for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence
also into business and government. The poet saith,
Nec vultu destrue verbo tuo:
a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may
he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his [66] brother affability and
easy access; NIL INTEREST HABERE OSTIUM APERTUM, VULTUM CLAUSUM; it is nothing
won to admit men with an open door, and to receive them with a shut and
reserved countenance. So, we see, Atticus, before the first interview between
Caesar and Cicero, the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the
composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of
the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other
carriage appertaining to conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me
well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: NE AUT ARROGANS
VIDEAR, AUT OBNOXIUS; QUORUM ALTERUM EST ALIENAE LIBERTATIS OBLITI, ALTERUM
SUAE: The sum of behaviour is to retain
a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others. On the other
side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass
into affectation, and then QUID DEFORMIUS QUAM SCENAM IN VITAM TRANSFERRE (to
act a man's life)? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it
consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to
advise young students from company keeping, by saying, AMICI FURES TEMPORIS: so
certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of
meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that hour of urbanity please themselves in it, and
seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it do seek
comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost everything becometh;
but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos, and compliments. Again,
there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious observance of
decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Salomon
saith, QUI RESPICIT AD VENTOS, NON SEMINAT; ET QUI RESPICIT AD NUBES, NON
METET: a man must make his opportunity, as oft as find it. To conclude,
behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of
a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious;
it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide
any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or restrained for
exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly
handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient.
4. The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto
collected into writing, to the great derogation of learning, and the professors
of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which
by us is expressed in adage to this effect, that there is no great concurrence
between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to
pertain to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour it is by learned men for the
most part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation; for
wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well, when they are called to it,
but that happeneth to few; but for the wisdom of business, wherein man's life
is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scattered
advertisements, that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject. For
if books were written of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with
mean experience, would far excel men of long experience without learning, and
outshoot them in their own bow.
5. Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should
be so variable as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less infinite
than science of government, which, we see, is laboured and in some part
reduced. Of this wisdom, it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in the saddest
and wisest times were professors; for Cicero reporteth that it was then in use for senators that
had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Laelius, and
many others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give audience to
those that would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would
resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of
the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and
every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel
and advice even in private causes, arising out of a universal insight into the affairs
of the world; which is used indeed upon particular causes propounded, but is
gathered by general observation of cases
of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his
brother, DE PETITIONE CONSULATUS, (being the only book of business that I know
written by the ancients,) although it concerned j a particular action set on
foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms,
which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in the case of popular
elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place among
divine writings, composed by Salomon the king, (of whom the Scriptures testify
that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly
matters,) we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts,
positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay
awhile, offering to consideration some number of examples.
6. SED ET CUNCTIS SERMONIBUS QUI DICUNTUR NE ACCOMMODES AUREM
TUAM, NE FORTE AUDIAS SERVUM TUUM MALEDICENTEM TIBI. Here is concluded the provident
stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great
wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius' papers unperused.
VIR SAPIENS, SI CUM STULTO CONTENDERIT, SIVE IRASCATUR, SIVE RIDEAT,
NON INVENIET REQUIEM. Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man
hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself; which is such an engagement
as, whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he
change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it.
QUI DELICATÈ A PUERITIÂ NUTRIT SERVUM SUUM, POSTEA SENTIET EUM CONTUMACEM.
Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth
commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness.
[67] VIDISTI VIRUM VELOCEM IN OPERE SUO ? CORAM REGIBUS STABIT,
NEC ERIT INTER IGNOBILES. Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to
honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to
have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent.
VIDI CUNCTOS VIVENTES QUI AMBULANT SUB SOLE, CUM ADOLESCENTE SECUNDO
QUI CONSURGIT PRO EO. Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first,
and after him by Tiberius; Plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel
meridianum.
SI SPIRITUS POTESTATEM HABENTIS ASCENDERIT SUPER TE, LOCUM TUUM NE
DEMISERIS; QUIA CURATIO FACIET CESSARE PECCATA MAXIMA. Here caution is given,
that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man
leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make them better.
ERAT CIVITAS PARVA, ET PAUCI IN EA VIRI: VENIT CONTRA EAM REX MAGNUS,
ET VADAVIT EAM, INSTRUXITQUE MUNITIONES PER GYRUM, ET PERFECTA EST OBSIDIO;
INVENTUSQUE EST IN EA VIR PAUPER ET SAPIENS, ET LIBERAVIT EAM PER SAPIENTIAM
SUAM; ET NULLUS DEINCEPS RECORDATUS EST HOMINIS ILLIUS PAUPERIS. Here the
corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than
they have use of it.
MOLLIS RESPONSIO FRANGIT IRAM. Here is noted that silence or rough
answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth.
ITER PIGRORUM QUASI SEPES SPINARUM. Here is lively represented how
laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred till the last
instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or an
impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.
MELIOR EST FINIS ORATIONIS QUAM PRINCIPIUM. Here is taxed the vanity
of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than upon
the conclusions and issues of speech.
QUI COGNOSCIT IN JUDICIO FACIEM, NON BENE FACIT; ISTE ET PRO BUCELLA
PANIS DESERET VERITATEM. Here is noted, that a judge were better be a briber
than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile.
VIR PAUPER CALUMNIANS PAUPERES SIMILIS EST IMBRI VEHEMENTI, IN QUO
PARATUR FAMES. Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions,
figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horseleech.
FONS TURBATUS PEDE, ET VENA CORRUPTA, EST JUSTUS CADENS CORAM IMPIO.
Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the
world, doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries
passed over by connivance.
QUI SUBTRAHIT ALIQUID A PATRE ET A MATRE, ET DICIT HOC NON ESSE PECCATUM,
PARTICEPS EST HOMICIDII. Here is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best
friends use to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon
them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from
injury to impiety.
NOLI ESSE AMICUS HOMINI IRACUNDO, NEC AMBULATO CUM HOMINE FURIOSO.
Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally
avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions
and quarrels.
QUI CONTURBAT DOMUM SUAM, POSSIDEBIT VENTUM. Here is noted, that
in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of
their mind and contentment; but still they are deceived of their expectation,
and it turneth to wind.
FILIUS SAPIENS LAETIFICAT PATREM: FILIUS VERO STULTUS MAESTITIA
EST PATRI SUAE. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the
good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof,
because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune.
QUI CELAT DELICTUM, QUAERIT AMICITIAM; SED QUI ALTERO SERMONE REPETIT,
SEPARAT FOEDERATOS. Here caution is given, that reconcilement is better managed
by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, than by apologies and
excusations.
IN OMNI OPERE BONO ERIT ABUNDANTIA; UBI AUTEM VERBA SUNT PLURIMA, IBI
FREQUENTER EGESTAS. Here is noted, that words and discourse abound most where
there is idleness and want.
PRIMUS IN SUA CAUSA JUSTUS; SED VENIT ALTERA PARS, ET INQUIRET IN EUM.
Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale possesseth much; in sort
that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some abuse or
falsity in the information be detected.
VERBA BILINGUIS QUASI
SIMPLICIA, ET IPSA PERVENIUNT AD INTERIORA VENTRIS. Here is distinguished, that
flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far;
but that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity.
QUI ERUDIT DERISOREM, IPSE SIBI INJURIAM FACIT; ET QUI ARGUIT IMPIUM,
SIBI MACULAM GENERAT. Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to
arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and
accordingly to return it.
DA SAPIENTI OCCASIONEM, ET ADDETUR EI SAPIENTIA. Here is distinguished
the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal, and swimming only
in conceit; for the one upon occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the
other is amazed and confused.
QUOMODO IN AQUIS RESPLENDENT VULTUS PROSPICIENTIUM, SIC CORDA HOMINUM
MANIFESTA SUNT PRUDENTIBUS. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass,
wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented;
from which representation proceedeth that application,
Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.
7. Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic
of Salomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example; led with a desire
to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so
excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations,
such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I know they
may be applied to a more divine use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that
some interpretations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle than others;
but taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large [68]
discourse, if I would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and
examples.
8. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it is generally
to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out any
observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it, and
express it in parable, or aphorism, or fable. But for fables, they were
vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound with
history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of
writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation
and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government;
namely, discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly, and
in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again; and
it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the
example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no
point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the example
is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all
circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and
sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged
for the discourse' sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and
carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make
good.
9. But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history
of Times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel
handleth, so history of Lives is the most proper for discourse of business, as
more conversant in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for
this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters, such as
are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero AD ATTICUM, and others. For letters
have a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles
or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil
knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient.
10. But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as
much from that whereof we have spoken as SAPERE and SIBI SAPERE, the one moving
as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom
of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune; and
they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many are wise in their own ways
that are weak for government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature
for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take
much knowledge of: NAM POL SAPIENS, saith the comical poet, FINGIT FORTUNAM
SIBI; and it grew to an adage, FABER QUISQUE FORTUNAE PROPRIAE; and Livy
attributed it to Cato the first, IN HOC VIRO TANTA VIS ANIMI ET INGENII INERAT,
UT QUOCUNQUE LOCO NATUS ESSET SIBI IPSE FORTUNAM FACTURUS VIDERETUR.
11. This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and professed,
hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus
the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the estate in his
government, and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner was, did
conclude every particular with this clause, and in this fortune had no part.
And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards:
for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of
Pharaoh, DICIS, FLUVIUS EST MEUS ET EGO FECI MEMET IPSUM: or of that which
another prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares:
and that which the poet expresseth,
Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro, Nunc adsint!
for these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed: and therefore
those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their successes to their
felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself
Felix, not Magnus: so Caesar said to the master of the ship, CAESAREM PORTAS ET
FORTUNAM EJUS.
12. But yet nevertheless these positions, FABER QUISQUE FORTUNAE SUAE:
SAPIENS DOMINABITUR ASTRIS: INVIA
VIRTUTI NULLA EST VIA, and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry,
and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for presumption or
outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are, no
question, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion,
as they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Caesar, (who was
rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior in virtue,) how when he died, he
desired his friends about him to give him a PLAUDITE, as if he were conscient
to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of
knowledge we do report also as deficient: not but that it is practised too
much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should seem
to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in
the former, that we set down some heads or passages of it.
13. Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument
to teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every man
perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the
difficulty; for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as
hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral. But the
handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance:
in honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that
learning is like a lark, that can mount, and sing, and please herself, and
nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar
aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey: in substance, because it
is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that nothing be in the globe of matter,
which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form; that is, that
there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and
collected into contemplation and doctrine. [69] Neither doth learning admire or
esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an inferior work:
for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being; and many times the
worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but
nevertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and merit, deserveth the
consideration.
14. First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary
towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did
require: who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles and recesses, found
fault that there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good
informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and
ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly
stand: so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most
open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependencies; and again their
opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times,
Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras;
their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this not
only of persons, but of actions; what are on foot from time to time, and how
they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like. For
the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it
also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for men change with the
actions; and whiles they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to
their nature they are another. These informations of particulars, touching
persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism; for
no excellency of observations, which are as the major propositions, can suffice
to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.
15. That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our surety; who saith,
CONSILIUM IN CORDE VIRI TANQUAM AQUA PROFUNDA; SED VIR PRUDENS EXHAURIET ILLUD.
And although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is of
individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may.
16. We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the ancient
opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; that
more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words: and in words
rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and purposed words.
Neither let that be feared which is said, FRONTIS NULLA FIDES: which is meant of a general outward behaviour,
and not of the private and subtile motions and labours of the countenance and
gesture; which as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is ANIMI JANUA, THE GATE OF THE
MIND. None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, ETENIM
VULTU OFFENSIONEM CONJECTAVERAT. So again, noting the differing character and
manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith,
touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; MAGIS
IN SPECIEM ADORNATIS VERBIS, QUAM UT PENITUS SENTIRE CREDERETUR: but of Drusus thus:
PAUCIORIBUS, SED INTENTIOR, ET FIDA ORATIONE: and in another place, speaking of
his character of speech, when he did any thing that was gracious and popular,
he saith, that in other things he was VELUT ELUCTANTIUM VERBORUM; but then
again, SOLUTIUS VERO LOQUEBATOR QUANDO SUBVENIRET. So that there is no such
artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance, VULTUS JUSSUS,
that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight
and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or
coming from a man more drily and hardly.
17. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted
without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: FRAUS SIBI IN
PARVIS FIDEM PRAESTRUIT, UT MAJORE EMOLUMENTO FALLAT: and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and
sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause.
For small favours, they do but lull men asleep, both as to caution and as to
industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, ALIMENTA SOCORDIAE. So again we
see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus
practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement
which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of
Antonius: SIMUL AMICIS EJUS PRAEFECTURAS ET TRIBUNATUS LARGITUR: wherein, under
pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his
dependences.
18. As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full
of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised, especially with
the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging
and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation, when
he said, YOU ARE HURT BECAUSE YOU DO NOT REIGN; of which Tacitus saith, AUDITA
HAEC RARAM OCCULTI PECTORIS VOCEM ELICUERE; CORREPTAMQUE GRAECO VERSU ADMONUIT,
IDEO LAEDI, QUIA NON REGNARET. And therefore the poet doth elegantly call
passions, tortures that urge men to confess their secrets:
Vino tortus et ira.
And experience showeth, there are few men so true to themselves
and so settled, but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes
upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open
themselves; especially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,
according to the proverb of Spain, DI MENTIRA, Y SACARAS VERDAD (Tell a lie and
find a truth).
19. As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from
reports; men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues
and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants,
their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they
discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors
or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more masked: VERIOR FAMA E
DOMESTICIS EMANAT.
20. But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their natures
and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their
natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both [70] pleasantly and
wisely said, though I think very untruly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning
from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion being asked
touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished that in any case they
did not send one that was too wise; because no very wise man would ever imagine
what they in that country were like to do. And certainly it is an error
frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends and more
compass-reaches than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and for the most
part true: --
Di danari, di senno, e di fede, Ce ne manco che non credi.
There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith
than men do account upon.
21. But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their
natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top of
human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto they
aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest
of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that maketh their
hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's ends
and natures, of the variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what
humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so we see, when
Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humours
of pleasures, METUS EJUS RIMATUR, he wrought upon Nero's fears, whereby he
brake the other's neck.
22. But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth
in three things: the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with
those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and
especially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of
persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least which
is perfect and well intelligenced in every several kind. The second is, to keep
a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secresy; in most things liberty; secresy
where it importeth; for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be
used again, and so bringeth much to a man's knowledge; and secresy, on the
other side, induceth trust and inwardness. The last is, the reducing of a man's
self to this watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in
every conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would
have a philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, ET HOC VOLO,
ET ETIAM INSTITUTUM SERVARE, so a politic man in everything should say to
himself, ET HOC VOLO, AC ETIAM ALIQUID ADDISCERE. I have stayed the longer upon
this precept of obtaining good information, because it is a main part by
itself, which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things, caution must be
taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves, and that this much
knowledge do not draw on much meddling; for nothing is more unfortunate than
light and rash intermeddling in many matters. So that this variety of knowledge
tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a better and freer choice of those
actions which may concern us, and to conduct them with the less error and the
more dexterity.
23. The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for men to take
good information touching their own person, and well to understand themselves:
knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet they do
suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass is the word of God, so
the politic glass is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the
which we are to behold ourselves.
24. For men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities
and virtues; and again of their wants and impediments; accounting these with
the most, and those other with the least; and from this view and examination to
frame the considerations following.
25. First, to consider how the constitution of their nature
sorteth with the general state of the times; which if they find agreeable and fit,
then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty; but if differing
and dissonant, then in the whole course of their life to be more close,
retired, and reserved: as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, and
came not into the Senate in twelve of his last years; whereas Augustus Caesar
lived ever in men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth, ALIA TIBERIO MORUM VIA.
26. Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with
professions and courses of life, and accordingly to make election, if they be free;
and, if engaged, to make the departure at the first opportunity: as we see was
done by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal
profession, but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination;
being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for
a prince or for a priest.
27. Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom they are like
to have competitors and concurrents; and to take that course wherein there is
most solitude, and themselves like to be most eminent: as Caesar Julius did,
who at first was an orator or pleader; but when he saw the excellency of
Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for eloquence, and saw there was no
man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the state was forced to
rely, he forsook his course begun towards a civil and popular greatness and transferred
his designs to a martial greatness.
28. Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependences, to proceed
according to the composition of their own nature: as we may see in Caesar; all
whose friends and followers were men active and effectual, but not solemn, or
of reputation.
29. Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples,
in thinking they can do as they see others do; whereas perhaps their natures
and carriages are far differing. In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom
Cicero saith, that he was wont often to say, SYLLA POTUIT --- EGO NON POTERO
? Wherein he was much abused, the [71]
natures and proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the
world; the one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn,
and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore the less effectual. But
this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves, bath many other branches,
whereupon we cannot insist.
30. Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man's self,
there followeth the well opening and revealing a man's self; wherein we see
nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show. For there is
a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man's virtues, fortunes,
merits; and again, in the artificial covering of a man's weaknesses, defects,
disgraces; staying upon the one, sliding from the other; cherishing the one by
circumstances, gracing the other by exposition, and the like: wherein we see
what Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of his time,
OMNIUM QUAE DIXERAT FECERATQUE ARTE QUÂDAM OSTENTATOR: which requireth indeed some art, lest it
turn tedious and arrogant; but yet so as ostentation, though it be to the first
degree of vanity, seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy: for as
it is said, AUDACTER CALUMNIARE, SEMPER ALIQUID HAERET: so, except it be in a ridiculous
degree of deformity, AUDACTER TE VENDITA, SEMPER ALIQUID HAERET. For it will
stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men, though men of wisdom and
rank do smile at it, and despise it; and yet the authority won with many doth
countervail the disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and
government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious fashion; or at times
when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety, as in military persons; or at times
when others are most envied; or with easy and careless passage to it and from
it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious; or with an equal freedom
of taxing a man's self, as well as gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling
or putting down others' injury or insolence; it doth greatly add to reputation:
and surely not a few solid natures, that want this ventosity, and cannot fail
in the height of the winds, are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by
their moderation.
31. But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue, as they are
not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue be not
disvalued and imbased under the just price; which is done in three manners: by
offering and obtruding a man's self; wherein men think he is rewarded when he
is accepted; by doing too much, which will not give that which is well done
leave to settle, and in the end induceth satiety; and by finding too soon the
fruit of a man's virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if
a man be pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said: CAVE NE
INSUETUS REBUS MAJORIBUS VIDEARIS, SI HAEC TE RES PARVA SICUTI MAGNA DELECTAT.
32. But the covering of defects is of no less importance than the valuing
of good parts; which may be done likewise in three manners, by caution, by
colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly
avoid to be put into those things for which they are not proper: whereas,
contrariwise, bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters
without difference, and so publish and proclaim all their wants. Colour is,
when men make a way for themselves, to have a construction made of their faults
or wants, as proceeding from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose:
for of the one it is well said,
Saepe latet vitium proximitate boni,
and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that he pretend
the virtue that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he must affect gravity; if a
coward, mildness; and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some
probable cause why he should not do his best, and why he should dissemble his
abilities; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are
notorious in him, to give colour that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations.
For confidence, it is the last but
surest remedy; namely, to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot
attain; observing the good principle of the merchants, who endeavour to raise the
price of their own commodities, and to beat down the price of others. But there
is a confidence that passeth this other; which is to face out a man's own
defects, in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is
failing; and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath least
opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it
commonly in poets, that if they show their verses, and you except to any, they will
say, THAT THAT LINE COST THEM MORE LABOUR THAN ANY OF THE REST; and presently
will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line, which they know well
enough to be the best in the number. But above all, in this righting and
helping of a man's self in his own carriage, he must take heed he show not
himself dismantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulceness,
goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles of liberty, spirit,
and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a man's
self from scorns, is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in
their person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good felicity.
33. Another precept of this knowledge is, by all possible
endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion; for nothing hindereth
men's fortunes so much as this: IDEM MANEBAT, NEQUE IDEM DECEBAT, men are where
they were, when occasions turn: and therefore to Cato, whom Livy maketh such an
architect of fortune, he addeth, that he had VERSATILE INGENIUM. And thereof it
cometh that these grave solemn wits, which must be like themselves, and cannot
make departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is nature to
be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and not easy to turn; in some it is a
conceit, that is almost a nature, which is, that men can hardly make themselves
believe that they ought to change their course, when they have found good by it
in former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely, how Fabius Maximus would have
been temporizing [72] still, according to his old bias, when the nature of the
war was altered and required hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and
penetration in their judgment, that they do not discern when things have a
period, but come in too late after the occasion; as Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellows,
when they play in a fence school, that if they have a blow, then they remove
their weapon to that ward, and not before. In some other it is a lothness to
leese labours passed, and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to
their ply; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then they come to
it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part of Sibylla's
books the treble price, when he might at first have had all three for the simple.
But from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a
thing most prejudicial; and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of
our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune.
34. Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with
that we last spake of, but with difference, is that which is well expressed,
FATIS ACCEDE DEISQUE, that men do not only turn with the occasions, but also
run with the occasions, and not strain their credit or strength to over hard or
extreme points; but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for
this will preserve men from foal, not occupy them too much about one matter,
win opinion of moderation, please the most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity
in all they undertake; which cannot but mightily increase reputation.
35. Another part of this
knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I
understand it; and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; ET
QUEMADMODUM RECEPTUM EST, UT EXERCITUM DUCAT IMPERATOR, SIC ET A CORDATIS VIRIS
RES IPSAE DUCENDAE; UT QUAE IPSIS VIDENTUR, EA GERANTUR, ET NON IPSI EVENTUS TANTUM
PERSEQUI COGANTUR. For, if we observe, we shall find two differing kinds of
sufficiency in managing of business; some can make use of occasions aptly and
dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue their own plots well,
but cannot accommodate nor take in;
either of which is very imperfect without the other.
36. Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity
in the declaring, or not declaring a man's self: for although depth of secrecy,
and making way, QUALIS EST VIA NAVIS IN MARI, (which the French calleth SOURDES
MENÉES, when men set things in work without opening themselves at all,) be
sometimes both prosperous and admirable; yet many times DISSIMULATIO ERRORES
PARIT, QUI DISSIMULATOREM IPSUM ILLAQUEANT; and therefore, we see the greatest politiques
have in a natural and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of
profession, that he wished all men happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends
or enemies. So Caesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to profess
THAT HE HAD RATHER BE FIRST IN A VILLAGE, THAN SECOND AT ROME. So again, as
soon as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero saith of him, ALTER (meaning
of Caesar) NON RECUSAT, SED QUODAMMODO POSTULAT, UT, UT EST, SIC APPELLETUR
TYRANNUS. So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar,
in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling of the senate, yet in
his harangues to the people would swear, ITA PARENTIS HONORES CONSEQUI LICEAT,
which was no less than the tyranny; save that, to help it, he would stretch
forth his hand towards a statua of Caesar's that was erected in the place: and
men laughed, and wondered, and said, Is it possible? or, Did you ever hear the
like? and yet thought he meant no hurt; he did it so handsomely and
ingenuously. And all these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended to the
same end, but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as Tacitus saith of him,
OCCULTIOR, NON MELIOR, wherein Sallust concurreth, ORE PROBO, ANIMO
INVERECUNDO, made it his design, by infinite secret engines, to cast the state
into an absolute anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into
his arms for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power be put upon him,
and he never seen in it: and when he had brought it, as he thought, to that
point, when he was chosen consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no
great matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain, in the end,
to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, by colour of the doubt
of Caesar's designs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate are these deep
dissimulations: whereof it seemeth Tacitus made his judgment, that they were a cunning
of an inferior form in regard of true policy; attributing the one to Augustus,
the other to Tiberius; where speaking of Livia, he saith, ET CUM ARTIBUS MARITI
SIMULATIONE FILII BENE COMPOSITA: for surely
the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and
not greatly politic.
37. Another precept of this architecture of fortune is, to
accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things, as they conduce
and are material to our particular ends: and that to do substantially, and not
superficially. For we shall find the logical part, as I may term it, of some
men's minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous; that is, they can well
judge of consequences, but not of proportions and comparisons, preferring
things of show and sense before things of substance and effect. So some fall in
love with access to princes, others with popular fame and applause, supposing
they are things of great purchase: when in many cases they are but matters of
envy, peril, and impediment. [--] So some measure things according to the
labour and difficulty, or assiduity, which are spent about them; and think, if
they be ever moving, that they must needs advance and proceed; as Caesar saith
in a despising manner of Cato the second, when he describeth how laborious and
indefatigable he was to no great purpose; HAEC OMNIA MAGNO STUDIO AGEBAT. So in
most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to
be best, when it should be the fittest.
[73] 38. As for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their
fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to stand thus: first
the amendment of their own minds. For the remove of the impediments of the mind
will sooner clear the passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove
the impediments of the mind. In the second place, I set down wealth and means;
which I know most men would have placed first, because of the general use which
it beareth towards all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn
with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that moneys were the sinews of
the wars; whereas, saith he, the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of
men's arms, that is, a valiant, populous, and military nation: and he voucheth
aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Croesus showed him his treasury of
gold, said to him, that if another came that had better iron, he would be
master of his gold. In like manner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not moneys
that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds,
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the like. In the
third place I set down reputation, because of the peremptory tides and currents
it hath; which, if they be not taken in their due time, are seldom recovered,
it being extreme hard to play an after game of reputation. And lastly, I place
honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three, much more by all, than
any of them can be purchased by honour. To conclude this precept, as there is
order and priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing
whereof is one of the commonest errors: while men fly to their ends when they
should intend their beginnings, and do not take things in order of time as they
come on, but marshal them according to greatness, and not according to instance;
not observing the good precept, QUOD NUNC INSTAT AGAMUS.
39. Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any
matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but to have that sounding
in a man's ears,
Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus:
and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by
professions of burden, as lawyers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are
not commonly so politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary
way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wait occasions, and to
devise plots.
40. Another precept of this knowledge is, to imitate nature, which
doth nothing in vain; which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his
business, and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally
intendeth. For a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions
of his mind, and so to have one thing under another, as if he cannot have that
he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a third;
and if he can have no part of that which he purposed, yet to turn the use of it
to somewhat else; and if he cannot make anything of it for the present, yet to
make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if he can contrive no effect
or substance from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, or the like. So that
he should exact an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and
not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for
nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that
doth so leeseth infinite occasions which intervene, and are many times more
proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards, than for that
which he urgeth for the present; and therefore men must be perfect in that
rule, HAEC OPORTET FACERE, ET ILLA NON OMITTERE.
41. Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a man's
self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable to accident; but ever
to have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: following the wisdom in the
ancient fable of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry
whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into a pit, because it was
not likely the water would dry there; but the other answered, TRUE, BUT IF IT
DO, HOW SHALL WE GET OUT AGAIN ?
42. Another precept of this knowledge is, that ancient precept of Bias,
construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but only to caution and
moderation, ET AMA TANQUAM INIMICUS FUTURUS, ET ODI TANQUAM AMATURUS; for it utterly betrayeth all utility for men
to embark themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, troublesome spleens,
and childish and humorous envies or emulations.
43. But I continue this beyond the measure of an example; led, because
I would not have such knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be thought
things imaginative or in the air, or an observation or two much made of, but
things of bulk and mass, whereof an end is hardlier made than a beginning. It
must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I mention and set down,
they are far from complete tractates of them, but only as small pieces for
patterns. And lastly, no man, I suppose, will think that I mean fortunes are not
obtained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling into some men's
laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way, little
intermeddling, and keeping themselves from gross errors.
44. But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator,
doth not mean that every pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a prince
or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects, the
mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art, and not
according to common practice: so I understand it, that it ought to be done in
the description of a politic man, I mean politic for his own fortune.
45. But it must be remembered all this while, that the precepts which
we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called BONAE ARTES.
As for evil arts, if a man would set down for himself that principle of
Machiavel, THAT A MAN SEEK NOT TO ATTAIN VIRTUE ITSELF, BUT THE APPEARANCE ONLY
THEREOF; BECAUSE THE CREDIT OF VIRTUE IS A HELP, BUT THE USE OF IT IS CUMBER:
or that other of his principles, THAT HE PRESUPPOSE, THAT MEN ARE NOT FITLY TO
BE WROUGHT OTHERWISE BUT BY FEAR; AND THEREFORE [74] THAT HE SEEK TO HAVE EVERY
MAN OBNOXIOUS, LOW, AND IN STRAIT, which the Italians call SEMINAR SPINE, to
sow thorns: or that other principle, contained in the verse which Cicero
citeth, CADANT AMICI, DUMMODO INIMICI INTERCIDANT, as the triumvirs, which
sold, every one to other, the lives of their friends for the deaths of their
enemies: or that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble
states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap their fortunes, EGO
SI QUID IN FORTUNIS MEIS EXCITATUM SIT INCENDIUM, ID NON AQUA SED RUINA RESTINGUAM: or that other principle of Lysander, THAT
CHILDREN ARE TO BE DECEIVED WITH COMFITS, AND MEN WITH OATHS: and the like evil
and corrupt positions, whereof, as in all things, there are more in number than
of the good: certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity and
integrity, the pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and compendious.
But it is in life as it is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest,
and surely the fairer way is not much about.
46. But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and
sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition,
ought, in the pursuit of their own fortune, to set before their eyes not only
that general map of the world, THAT ALL THINGS ARE VANITY AND VEXATION OF
SPIRIT, but many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly that --
that being without well-being is a curse -- and the greater being the greater
curse; and that all virtue is most rewarded, and all wickedness most punished
in itself: according as the poet saith excellently:
Quae vobis, quae digna, viri, pro laudibus istis Praemia posse
rear solvi? pulcherrima primum Dii moresque dabunt vestri.
And so of the contrary. And, secondly, they ought to look up to
the eternal providence and divine judgment, which often subverteth the wisdom
of evil plots and imaginations, according to that Scripture, HE HATH CONCEIVED
MISCHIEF, AND SHALL BRING FORTH A VAIN THING. And although men should refrain
themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant and Sabbathless
pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth not the tribute which we owe to God of our
time; who we see demandeth a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is
more strict, of our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face
towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth, eating dust, as doth
the serpent,
Atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae.
And if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well,
though he should obtain it ill, as was said concerning Augustus Cesar, and
after of Septimius Severus, THAT EITHER THEY SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN BORN, OR
ELSE THEY SHOULD NEVER HAVE DIED, they did so much mischief in the pursuit and
ascent of their greatness, and so much good when they were established; yet
these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be
purposed. And lastly, it is not amiss for men in their race toward their
fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed
by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in his instructions to the king his son, THAT
FORTUNE HATH SOMEWHAT OF THE NATURE OF A WOMAN, THAT IF SHE BE TOO MUCH WOOED,
SHE IS THE FARTHER OFF. But this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes
are corrupted: let men rather build upon that foundation which is a cornerstone
of divinity and philosophy, wherein they join close, namely, that same PRIMUM
QUAERITE. For divinity saith, PRIMUM QUAERITE REGNUM DEI, ET ISTA OMNIA
ADJICIENTUR VOBIS: and philosophy
saith, PRIMUM QUAERITE BONA ANIMI; CAETERA AUT ADERUNT, AUT NON OBERUNT. And
although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see in M.
Brutus, when he brake forth into that speech,
Te colui, Virtus, ut rem; at tu nomen inane es;
yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But this may serve for
a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.
47. Concerning Government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired,
in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are
secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to
utter. We see all governments are obscure and invisible:
Totamque infusa per artus Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore
miscet.
Such is the description of governments. We see the government of God
over the world is hidden, inasmuch as it seemeth to participate of much
irregularity and confusion: the government of the soul in moving the body is
inward and profound, and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to
demonstration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity, (the shadows whereof are in the
poets,) in the description of torments and pains, next unto the crime of
rebellion, which was the giants' offence, doth detest the offence of futility,
as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But this was meant of particulars: nevertheless
even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is
due a reverent and reserved handling.
48. But contrariwise, in the governors toward the governed, all things
ought, as far as the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest and revealed.
For so it is expressed in the Scriptures touching the government of God, that
this globe, which seemeth to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as
crystal: ET IN CONSPECTU SEDIS TANQUAM MARE VITREUM SIMILE CRYSTALLO. So unto
princes and states, especially towards wise senates and councils, the natures
and dispositions of the people, their conditions and necessities, their factions
and combinations, their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of
the variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations, and the
height of their station where they keep sentinel, in great part clear and
transparent. Wherefore, considering that I write to a King that is a master of
this science, and is so well assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part
in silence, as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers
aspired unto; [75] who being silent, when others contended to make
demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it might be certified for
his part, THAT THERE WAS ONE THAT KNEW HOW TO HOLD HIS PEACE.
49. Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which
is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those
which have written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers,
and none as statesmen. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for
imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give
little light, because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according
to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be
law: for the wisdom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there
are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived
but as streams: and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils
through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and
governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same
fountains. Again, the wisdom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in a platform of
justice, but in the application thereof; taking into consideration by what
means laws may be made certain, and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness
and incertainty of law; by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be
executed, and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws;
what influence laws touching private right of MEUM and TUUM have into the
public state, and how they may be made apt and agreeable; how laws are to be
penned and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief or large, with preambles,
or without; how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and what
is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volumes, or too full of
multiplicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when upon causes
emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon responses and conferences
touching general points or questions; how they are to be pressed, rigorously or
tenderly; how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and
whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts, or kept
apart in several courts; again, how the practice, profession, and erudition of
law is to be censured and governed; and many other points touching the
administration, and, as I may term it, animation of laws. Upon which I insist
the less, because I purpose, if God give me leave, (having begun a work of this
nature in aphorisms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it in the meantime for deficient.
50. And for your Majesty's laws of England, I could say much of their
dignity, and somewhat of their defect; but they cannot but excel the civil laws
in fitness for the government: for the civil law was NON HOS QUAESITUM MUNUS IN
USUS; it was not made for the countries which it governeth: hereof I cease to
speak because I will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general
learning.
XXIV. THUS have I concluded this portion of learning touching
civil knowledge; and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and
with human philosophy, philosophy in general. And being now at some pause,
looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me, SI
NUNQUAM FALLIT IMAGO, (as far as a man can judge of his own work,) not much
better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are tuning
their instruments: which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why
the music is sweeter afterwards: so have I been content to tune the instruments
of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely, when I set
before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third
visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof -- as the excellency and
vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by
the travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books
to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed
multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith
these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil business, as the
states of Graecia did, in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome,
in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the present disposition of these
times at this instant to peace; the consumption of all that ever can be said in
controversies of religion, which have so much diverted men from other sciences;
the perfection of your Majesty's learning, which as a Phoenix may call whole
volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is
ever more and more to disclose truth -- I cannot but be raised to this
persuasion that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Grecian
and Roman learning: only if men will know their own strength, and their own weakness
both; and take one from the other, light of invention, and not fire of
contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and
not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of
worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation. As
for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension
of them, they shall make that ancient and patient request, VERBERA, SED AUDI;
let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them: for the appeal is lawful,
though it may be it shall not be needful, from the first cogitations of men to
their second, and from the nearer times to the times further off. Now let us
come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to
know, sacred and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men's labours
and peregrinations.
XXV. 1. THE prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey
His law, though we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe His
word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if we believe only that
which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to the
author; which is no more than we would do towards a suspected [76] and
discredited witness; but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for
righteousness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an
image of natural reason.
2. Howbeit, if we will truly consider it, more worthy it is to believe
than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind suffereth from sense;
but in belief it suffereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more
authorized than itself, and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise it
is of the state of man glorified; for then faith shall cease, and we shall know
as we are known.
3. Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology, (which in our idiom
we call divinity,) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon
the light of nature: for it is written, COELI ENARRANT GLORIAM DEI; but it is
not written, COELI ENARRANT VOLUNTATEM DEI: but of that it is said, AD LEGEM ET
TESTIMONIUM: SI NON FECERINT SECUNDUM VERBUM ISTUD, etc. This holdeth not only
in those points of faith which concern the mysteries of the Deity, of the
Creation, of the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the moral law
truly interpreted: LOVE YOUR ENEMIES: DO GOOD TO THEM THAT HATE YOU; BE LIKE TO
YOUR HEAVENLY FATHER, THAT SUFFERETH HIS RAIN TO FALL UPON THE JUST AND UNJUST.
To this it ought to be applauded, NEC VOX HOMINEM SONAT: it is a voice beyond the light of nature. So
we see the heathen poets, when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate
with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to nature;
Et quod natura remittit, Invida jura negant.
So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander's messengers, THAT HE HAD
HEARD SOMEWHAT OF PYTHAGORAS, AND SOME OTHER OF THE WISE MEN OF GRAECIA, AND
THAT HE HELD THEM FOR EXCELLENT MEN: BUT THAT THEY HAD A FAULT, WHICH WAS THAT
THEY HAD IN TOO GREAT REVERENCE AND VENERATION A THING WHICH THEY CALLED LAW
AND MANNERS. So it must be confessed, that a great part of the law moral is of
that perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire: how then is it
that man is said to have, by the light and law of nature, some notions and
conceits of virtue and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus, because
the light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, that which springeth
from reason, sense, induction, argument, according to the laws of heaven and
earth; the other, that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward
instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity
of his first estate; in which latter sense only he is participant of some light
and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law. but how? sufficient to
check the vice, but not to inform the duty. So then the doctrine of religion,
as well moral as mystical, is not to be attained but by inspiration and
revelation from God.
4. The use, notwithstanding, of reason in spiritual things, and
the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is not for nothing that
the apostle calleth religion OUR REASONABLE SERVICE OF GOD; insomuch as the
very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of reason and
signification, much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that are
full of non-significants and surd characters. But most especially the Christian
faith, as in all things, so in this deserveth to be highly magnified; holding
and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen
and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced the two extremes. For the religion
of the heathen had no constant belief or confession, but left all to the
liberty of argument; and the religion of Mahomet, on the other side,
interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very face of error, and
the other of imposture: whereas the faith doth both admit and reject
disputation with difference.
5. The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts: the
former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed;
the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon.
The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of
illustration, and not by way of argument: the latter consisteth indeed of
probation and argument. In the former, we see, God vouchsafeth to descend to
our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible
unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our
reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of
the key to the ward of the lock: for the latter, there is allowed us a use of
reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and
absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted
from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations
and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction.
In nature this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by
induction, though not by a medium or syllogism; and besides, those principles
or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and
deduceth the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but
in many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature, namely, wherein there
are not only POSITA but PLACITA; for in such there can be no use of absolute reason.
We see it familiarly in games of wit, as chess, or the like: the draughts and
first laws of the game are positive, but how? merely AD PLACITUM, and not
examinable by reason; but then how to direct our play thereupon with best
advantage to win the game, is artificial and rational. So in human laws, there
be many grounds and maxims which are PLACITA JURIS, positive upon authority,
and not upon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: but what is most just,
not absolutely but relatively, and according to those maxims, that affordeth a
long field of disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason, which hath
place in divinity, which is grounded upon the PLACETS of God.
6. Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath not
been, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits
and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for
that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true
conceiving that which [77] is revealed, to search and mine into that which is
not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine
that which is positive: the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus,
demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them,
QUOMODO POSSIT HOMO NASCI CUM SIT SENEX ?
the other sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalized
at a show of contradiction, QUID EST HOC QUOD DICIT NOBIS ? MODICUM, ET NON VIDEBITIS
ME; ET ITERUM MODICUM, ET VIDEBITIS ME, etc.
7. Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed
use thereof; for this point, well laboured and defined of, would in my judgment
be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations,
wherewith the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, wherewith the
church laboureth. For it cannot but open men's eyes, to see that many
controversies do merely pertain to that which is either not revealed, or
positive; and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or
derivations: which latter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that
great doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, EGO, NON DOMINUS; and again,
SECUNDUM CONSILIUM MEUM, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and
oppositions. But men are now over-ready to usurp the style, NON EGO, SED
DOMINUS; and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of
curses and anathemas, to the terror of those which have not sufficiently
learned out of Salomon, that THE CAUSELESS CURSE SHALL NOT COME.
8. Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter informed or revealed,
and the nature of the information or revelation: and with the latter we will
begin, because it hath most coherence with that which we have now last handled.
The nature of the information consisteth of three branches; the limits of the
information, the sufficiency of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining
the information. Unto the limits of the information belong these considerations;
how far forth particular persons continue to be inspired; how far forth the
Church is inspired; how far forth reason may be used: the last point whereof I
have noted as deficient. Unto the sufficiency of the information belong two
considerations; what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective,
being matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same
foundation; and again, how the gradations of light, according to the
dispensation of times, are material to the sufficiency of belief.
9. Here again I may rather give it in advice, than note it as deficient,
that the points fundamental, and the points of further perfection only, ought
to be with piety and wisdom distinguished: a subject tending to much like end
as that I noted before; for as that other were like to abate the number of
controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat of many of them. We see
Moses when he saw the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, he did not say, WHY
STRIVE YOU? but drew his sword and slew the egyptian: but when he saw the two Israelites
fight, he said, YOU ARE BRETHREN, WHY STRIVE YOU ? If the point of doctrine be an Aegyptian, it must be slain by the
sword of the spirit, and not reconciled; but if it be an Israelite, though in
the wrong, then, WHY STRIVE YOU ? We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour
penneth the league thus, HE THAT IS NOT WITH US, IS AGAINST US; but of points not fundamental, thus, HE THAT
IS NOT AGAINST AS, IS WITH US. So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire
without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment
of the Church was of divers colours, and yet not divided: we see the chaff may
and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear, but the tares may not be
pulled up from the corn in the field. So as it is a thing of great use well to
define what, and of what latitude those points are, which do make men merely
aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.
10. For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon the true
and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are the fountains of the
water of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts;
methodical, and solute or at large. For this divine water, which excelleth so
much that of Jacob's Well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as natural
water useth to be out of wells and fountains; either it is first forced up into
a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived for use; or else it is drawn and
received in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth. The former sort
whereof, though it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more
subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited unto us the
scholastical divinity; whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art, as into
a cistern, and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from
thence.
11. In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity, a compacted
strength, and a complete perfection; whereof the two first they fail to find,
and the last they ought not to seek. For as to brevity we see, in all summary
methods, while men purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum
or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure; the obscurity requireth
exposition, and the exposition is diduced into large commentaries, or into
common places and titles, which grow to be more vast than the original
writings, whence the sum was at first extracted. So, we see, the volumes of the
schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the
Master of the Sentences made his sum or
collection. So, in like manner, the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil
law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian compileth the digest. So as this course of
sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences
more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.
12. And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced into
exact methods have a show of strength, in that each part seemeth to support and
sustain the other; but this is more satisfactory than substantial: like unto
buildings which stand by architecture and compaction, which are more subject to
ruin than those which are built more strong in their several [78] parts, though
less compacted. But it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds, the
weaker do you conclude: and as in nature, the more you remove yourself from particulars,
the greater peril of error you do incur: so much more in divinity, the more you
recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weak and
dilute are your positions.
13. And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is not
to be sought; which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect.
For he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will make it round and uniform:
but in divinity many things must be left abrupt, and concluded with this: O
ALTITUDO SAPIENTIAE ET SCIENTIAE DEI! QUAM INCOMPREHENSIBILIA SUNT JUDICIA
EJUS, ET NON INVESTIGABILES VIAE EJUS!
So again the apostle saith, EX PARTE SCIMUS: and to have the form of a total, where there is but matter for a
part, cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore
I conclude, that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions
or introductions preparatory unto knowledge: but in them, or by deducement from
them, to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge, is in all sciences
prejudicial, and in divinity dangerous.
14. As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at
large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised; some of them rather
curious and unsafe than sober and warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much must be
confessed, that the Scriptures being given by inspiration, and not by human
reason, do differ from all other books in the author: which, by consequence,
doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor. For the Inditer of
them did know four things which no man attains to know; which are, the
mysteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the
secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all ages. For as to the
first it is said, HE THAT PRESSETH INTO THE LIGHT, SHALL BE OPPRESSED OF THE
GLORY. And again, NO MAN SHALL SEE MY FACE AND LIVE. To the second, WHEN HE
PREPARED THE HEAVENS I WAS PRESENT, WHEN BY LAW AND COMPASS HE INCLOSED THE
DEEP. To the third, NEITHER WAS IT NEEDFUL THAT ANY SHOULD BEAR WITNESS TO HIM
OF MAN, FOR HE KNEW WELL WHAT WAS IN MAN. And to the last, FROM THE BEGINNING
ARE KNOWN TO THE LORD ALL HIS WORKS.
15. From the former two have been drawn certain senses and expositions
of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety; the
one anagogical, and the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not
to prevent his time: VIDEMUS NUNC PER SPECULUM IN AENIGMATE, TUNC AUTEM FACIE
AD FACIEM: wherein nevertheless there
seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this glass,
or some moderate explication to this aenigma. But to press too far into it,
cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man. For in the
body there are three degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, medicine, and
poison; whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and
overcome: medicine is that which is partly converted by nature, and partly
converteth nature; and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature, without
that, that nature can in any part work upon it. So in the mind, whatsoever
knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication,
and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding.
16. But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of late
time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that have pretended to find
the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures; scandalizing and
traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane. But there is no such
enmity between God's word and His works; neither do they give honour to the
Scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase them. For to seek heaven and earth
in the word of God, (whereof it is said, HEAVEN AND EARTH SHALL PASS, BUT MY
WORD SHALL NOT PASS,) is to seek temporary things amongst eternal: and as to
seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek
philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living: neither are the
pots or lavers, whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought
in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And
again, the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to express matters of
nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to
man's capacity, and to matters moral or divine. And it is a true rule, AUCTORIS
ALIUD AGENTIS PARVA AUCTORITAS; for it were a strange conclusion, if a man
should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from nature
or history according to vulgar conceit, as of a Basilisk, an Unicorn, a
Centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, or the like, that therefore he must needs be
thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true. To conclude, therefore,
these two interpretations, the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other
philosophical or physical, which have been received and pursued in imitation of
the rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined with a NOLI ALTUM SAPERE, SED
TIME.
17. But the two latter points, known to God and unknown to man, touching
the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time, do make a just and sound
difference between the manner of the exposition of the Scriptures and all other
books. For it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers
of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him,
how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded; the reason
whereof is, because, not being like man, which knows man's thoughts by his
words, but knowing man's thoughts immediately, he never answered their words,
but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which
being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a
foresight of all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the church, yea
and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the
latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectively towards that
present occasion whereupon the words [79] were uttered, or in precise congruity
or contexture with the words before or after, or in contemplation of the
principal scope of the place; but have in themselves, not only totally or
collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite springs and
streams of doctrine to water the church in every part. And therefore as the
literal sense is, as it were, the main stream or river; so the moral sense
chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the church hath
most use; not that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent or light
in allusions: but that I do much condemn that interpretation of the Scripture
which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book.
18. In this part, touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I can
report no deficience; but by way of remembrance this I will add: in perusing
books of divinity, I find many books of controversies; and many of commonplaces
and treaties; a mass of positive divinity, as it is made an art; a number of
sermons and lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scriptures, with
harmonies and concordances: but that form of writing in divinity which in my
judgment is of all others most rich and precious, is positive divinity,
collected upon particular texts of Scriptures in brief observations; not
dilated into commonplaces, not chasing after controversies, not reduced into method
of art; a thing abounding in sermons, which will vanish, but defective in books
which will remain; and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded,
(and I may speak it with an ABSIT INVIDIA VERBO, and no ways in derogation of
antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and the olive,) that if
the choice and best of those observations upon texts of Scriptures, which have been
made dispersedly in Sermons within this your Majesty's island of Britain by the
space of these forty years and more, leaving out the largeness of exhortations
and applications thereupon, had been set down in a continuance, it had been the
best work in divinity which had been written since the Apostles' times.
19. The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds; matter of belief
and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adoration; which is also judged
and directed by the former: the one being as the internal soul of religion, and
the other as the external body thereof. And therefore the heathen religion was
not only a worship of idols, but the whole religion was an idol in itself; for
it had no soul, that is, no certainty of belief or confession: as a man may well
think, considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets: and the
reason was, because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad to be
admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did they respect the pureness
of heart, so they might have external honour and rites.
20. But out of these two do result and issue four main branches of
divinity; faith, manners, liturgy, and government. Faith containeth the
doctrine of the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and of the works of
God. The nature of God consisteth of three persons in unity of Godhead. The
attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or respective to the persons.
The works of God summary are two, that of the creation and that of the
redemption: and both these works, as in total they appertain to the unity of
the Godhead, so in their parts they refer to the three persons: that of the
creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father; in the disposition of the form,
to the Son; and in the continuance and conservation of the being, to the Holy
Spirit. So that of the redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father;
in the whole act and consummation to the Son; and in the application, to the
Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ conceived in flesh, and by the
Holy Ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit. This work likewise we consider
either effectually, in the elect; or privatively in the reprobate; or according to appearance, in the visible
church.
21. For Manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the law, which
discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according to the edition thereof,
into the law of nature, the law moral, and the law positive; and according to
the style, into negative and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments. Sin,
in the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to the commandments; in
the form thereof, it referreth to the three persons in Deity: sins of infirmity
against the Father, whose more special attribute is power; sins of ignorance
against the Son, whose attribute is wisdom; and sins of malice against the Holy
Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In the motions of it, it either moveth
to the right hand or to the left; either to blind devotion, or to profane and
libertine transgression; either in imposing restraint where God granteth liberty,
or in taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and progress
of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or act. And in this part I
commend much the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I
take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life.
But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the
elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation,
holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.
22. For the Liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal acts
between God and man; which, on the part of God, are the preaching of the word,
and the sacraments, which are seals to the covenant, or as the visible word;
and on the part of man, invocation of the name of God; and under the law,
sacrifices; which were as visible prayers or confessions: but now the adoration
being IN SPIRITU ET VERITATE, there remaineth only VITULI LABIORUM; although the use of holy vows of
thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.
23. And for the Government of the church, it consisteth of the patrimony
of the church, the franchises of the church, and the offices and jurisdictions
of the church, and the laws of the church directing the whole; all which have
two considerations, the one in themselves, the other how they stand compatible
and agreeable to the civil estate.
24. This matter of divinity is handled either in form [80] of instruction
of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood. The declinations from
religion, besides the privative, which is atheism, and the branches thereof,
are three; Heresies, Idolatry, and Witchcraft; heresies, when we serve the true
God with a false worship; idolatry, when we worship false gods, supposing them
to be true: and witchcraft, when we adore false gods, knowing them to be wicked
and false: for so your Majesty doth excellently well observe, that witchcraft
is the height of idolatry. And yet we see though these be true degrees, Samuel
teacheth us that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from
the word of God; for so he saith, QUASI PECCATUM ARIOLANDI EST REPUGNARE ET
QUASI SCELUS IDOLOLATRIAE NOLLE ACQUIESCERE.
THUS have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world,
as truly and faithfully as I could discover: with a note and description of
those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate, or not well converted by
the labour of man. In which, if I have in any point receded from that which is
commonly received, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not
in aliud; a mind of amendment and proficience, and not of change and
difference. For I could not be true and constant to the argument I handle, if I
were not willing to go beyond others; but yet not more willing than to have
others go beyond me again: which may the better appear by this, that I have
propounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the
liberty of men's judgments by confutations. For in anything which is well set
down, I am in good hope, that if the first reading move an objection, the
second reading will make an answer. And in those things wherein I have erred, I
am sure I have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly
have this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority to error, and
destroy the authority of that which is well invented: for question is an honour
and preferment to falsehood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But
the errors I claim and challenge to myself as mine own: the good, if any be, is
due TANQUM ADEPS SACRIFICII, to be incensed to the honour, first of the Divine
Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom on earth I am most bounden.
DEO GLORIA
Dr. Hartmut Krech
D-28215 Bremen
Germany
eMail
kr538@uni-bremen.de
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