8th_Sept.

One of Many

Operation “Avalanche” Salerno, Italy

Detailed Account

The Day Before 8^th Sept.…

The Plan Unfolds.

The landing at Salerno was to be a surprise attack. However, early in the afternoon of 8^th September submarine H.M.S. Shakespeare waiting submerged in the bay observed a convoy of Landing ships coming into Salerno Bay 18 hours early. Following a frantic exchange of signals with a cruiser they again headed out to sea to await the 9^th.

In order to pinpoint the correct landing beaches for each division, a scout boat (LCS) was with the aid of a pilot on H.M.S. Shakespeare, to navigate to within 200 yards of the shore. Once there, they were to take a precise fix of position, and anchor in the exact centre of the designated beach. The craft when in their final positions were then to flash a coloured light back to the convoy, showing the appropriate colour of the landing beach.

A problem which appears overlooked at the time was that the Bay of Salerno of some 30 miles arc, was quite featureless south of the Sele river, with Monte Soprano, and Monte Soltane in the mountain ridge behind, and from the beach 7 miles of gentle farmland leading to the foothills. This was to prove totally inadequate for accurate reference points for shore line navigation, especially with the unsophisticated equipment provided, where half a degree of error meant the wrong landing beach.

Prior to the 9^th September the Italians surrendered, after the overthrow of Mussolini on the 25^th July. After long negotiations the Italians were convinced to surrender at 18:30 on September 8^th. This was at the time decided to give the Allies the maximum advantage, and delay any German reprisals on the Italians. The German high command had however anticipated the Italian turn around, and had the German divisions take over the defence positions.

In Salerno Bay, 16 Panzer took over from the 222 Italian Coastal Defence Division. However, the area was already on full alert as the Italian Chief of Staff of XIX Corp informed HQ Port Defence Salerno the following :

“ From 23:30 hrs 7^th September this zone is declared to be in ‘Coastal Alarm’ following the departure of enemy convoy from Sicily heading for Salerno”

General Mark Clark had decided with his staff that a surprise attack was the tactic to be followed, therefore no preliminary bombardments were to be used, and no provision for close in fire support was made. This policy was vehemently argued, by Vice Admiral Hewitt the Naval Task Force commander. It can be argued that the War College theory, studied by both Clark and his staff was to prove an error when applied in this theatre. Clark although in overall command of the Allied Army, relinquished on the insistence of the British Divisional commanders, for a preliminary bombardment of their sector landing beaches, as this had proved devastatingly effective in earlier engagements in this war.

To oppose the American 36 Division was the German 16 Panzer Division, this consisted of approximately 30% battle tried officers and men, with the remainder new recruits and reinforcements. The units were fully supplied and had sufficient for around 5 days. However, re-supply was difficult due to heavy Allied bombing in Northern Italy, and poor roads in the current area. The divisional commander of 16 Panzer divided the force into 4 groups, to cover the front of the Salerno Gulf, each approximately 6 miles apart and 3 to 6 miles inland.

Because the Americans adopted the surprise tactic, it meant that the German defences were left undisturbed until the moment of landing. German strong points were garrisoned with a platoon of light and heavy machine guns interspersed with 20mm anti aircraft guns depressed for infantry role. They also had 75mm and 88mm anti tank guns dug into emplacements in the sand dunes.

US 36 Division was to land south of the Sele River, with the British landing on the northern side of the Sele river, from this point towards Salerno town the coastal plain is bisected by a number of rivers.

The British 56 Division (Black Cats) 167 infantry brigade was to land at Roger sector on Amber and Green beaches between the Sele and Tusciano rivers. Once ashore the 8^th/ 9^th Royal Fusiliers would move rapidly for their objectives of road and rail junctions at Battipaglia so controlling a communications centre from Naples south. The 7^th Ox and Bucks brigade, 3^rd battalion was to land and be held as a reserve for this Battipaglia thrust. After taking Battipaglia the brigade would take the high ground beyond the town and swing right to link up with the Americans at Ponte Sele some seven miles inland. 169 Infantry Brigade was to land at Sugar sector, on Green and Amber beaches between the Tusciano and Asa rivers. 3 battalions 2/7^th, 2/5^th and Queens Regt. Would lead the attack on Montecorvino airfield with 2/6^th Queens Regt in reserve.

The second British division was the 46 Infantry Division (Oak Tree), they were charged with a more complicated battle plan. This required accurate timing, navigation, and strict time table adherence by succeeding waves of landing troops in order for the objectives to be completed. The detail was for 128 Infantry Brigade landing at Uncle Sector between the Asa and Picentino rivers, 2^nd Bn Hampshire Regt. On Green beach and 1/4^th Hampshire’s on Red Beach.

Shortly after daylight 3 battalions of 138 Brigade (6^th Linc, 2/4^th KOYLI, and 6^th Yorks. and Lancs.) would pass through the Uncle beach head and take the port of Salerno. The village of Cava lay about two miles North West of the port and the important La Molina Pass, through which ran the main road to Naples. The pass was the final objective for the 138 Brigade on the first day. During the night the divisions third brigade 139 Infantry Brigade would land with the 2/5^th Royal Leic, 5^th Sherwood Foresters, 16^th Durham Light Infantry and armour of the 40^th Royal Tank Regt., and begin the thrust towards Naples. It should be noted that the two British Divisions 46^th / 56^th had both seen action in North Africa, and had already learned that the Germans were a formidable force.

The new Divisional commander Major General Hawkesworth gained command only days before Salerno, and was a battle proven commander having commanded the 4^th Indian Division in desert campaigns in North Africa. However, he had little time in order to ready himself with the overall plan, and familiarise himself with the strengths and weaknesses of his commander. Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Horrocks was to lead X Corps upon its formation at the end of the North African campaign, but was seriously injured by a AA shell at Bizerta in North Africa. He was replaced by Gen. Sir Richard Mc.Creery an acknowledged tank warfare expert, and chief of staff to General Alexander, when he was commander in chief of the Middle East in 1942. Alexander now a full General and commander in chief of the 15^th Army Group, comprising of the 8th and 5^th Armies, was instrumental in Mc.Creery’s appointment. Therefor Mc.Creery who was helping with the Normandy invasion planning was flown out for Salerno without delay.

Air attacks were opposed by a squadron of the British Mediterranean Fleet. Battleships Nelson, Rodney, Warspite, Valiant, plus Carriers Illustrious, and Formidable, and twenty modern destroyer class ships. Force H absorbed the attack of 30 torpedo bombers on the night of the 8^th/9^th September, with the fleet inflicting heavy damage to the Luftwaffe.

The Germans were convinced that after a small scale invasion of the 8^th Army in the south, a larger attack would be further north, but not beyond the scope of Allied air cover from Sicily. They had discounted originally the Bay of Salerno as a landing location, due to the poor exits from the beach area and towering hills behind, and had thought Naples would be the preferred Allied choice. However, Kesselring ordered Salerno and Gaeta to be ready to repel an invasion force. The German command further expected that if an invasion came it would be between the 6^th and 9^th Sept. as the moon was entering the second quarter. The surrender of Italy really appears to have given the plan away, as regard time and place, as it was the only beach predominately protected by Italians. Deduction only left THE BAY OF SALERNO for the surprise attack.The Germans received a message by radio at 15:40 on the 8^th , using code word Okran (Major Landing imminent), putting all German defences to battle readiness.

On the left of the British 46 Division were Special Forces units, US Rangers and British Commandos. The Rangers were commanded by Col. Bill Darby had already served with distinction in North Africa and were given a critical mission of landing at the fishing village of Maiori. One battalion (4^th Ranger Bn) was to secure the beach head, while the others (1^st/3^rd Ranger Bns) advanced 6 miles into the mountains to seize and hold the Nocera Pass thus guarding the entrance to the Plain of Naples.

This pass was the only main route for German supplies and reinforcements from Naples to the north. This would include the German Hermann Goring Luftwaffe Panzer Division at Naples and the 15^th Panzer Grenadiers in Gaeta. These along with the 16^th Panzer Division at Salerno represented some 45,000 troops. South of Salerno blocking Montgomery’s advance in Calabria was the 26 Panzer Regt. And the 29^th Panzer Grenadiers some 30,000 men. Across the mountains near Foggia were 17,000 men of the 1^st Parachute Division, guarding the Adriatic coast.

The US Rangers were to be relieved by the advance of the British 46 Division after 48 hours, adding further to the complicated timing constraints of 46 Divisions objective.

The British Commandos were to land at the marina at Vietri about 7 miles east of Maiori. Vietri a couple of miles north of Salerno was a small fishing village and immediately to its north is the town of Cava and the La Molina defile. Two complete commando units were to come ashore to take the defile, however first they had to take and hold the high ground on both sides of the valley. Secondly they had to prevent the Germans destroying the Pass with demolitions. This meant that they had to defend a road bridge spanning the gorge on the edge of Cava. If they failed and the bridge was destroyed or held the allies would be sealed into their beach head, isolating the US Rangers at Nocera. The Commandos were at a disadvantage and not suited to this type of warfare. Their units did not possess the heavy weaponry or have access to sufficient supplies of ammunition to withstand a sustained attack as they were designed as a quick strike unit, rather than the heavy infantry role. If they came under attack with a German armour unit they had no defence, and no means of countering the advance. This again made it vital for the infantry divisions to breakthrough with tanks and artillery, to take Salerno and break through to Vietri and Cava with all haste. The commando force was made up of No.2 Army Commandos (Churchill), 41 Commandos Royal Marine (Lt. Col Bertie Lumsden) they were commanded overall by Brigadier Bob Laycock, who incidentally outranked the American Bill Darby of the US Rangers.

The command control procedures between different nationality units was to prove a significant weakness in the Allied Fifth Army, and often resulted in different battles being fought by each nationality division rather than as a whole army force. This problem can still be witnessed in the Gulf War, and Yugoslavian combined operations in the late 20^th century.

The two defiles at Nocera and La Molina were the key to success at Salerno, and there was a further path out through the mountains behind Salerno, which lead along the road to Sanseverino. This route was to be important as the campaign progressed, as found by the Reccon Regt. And the Yorks. and Lancs. of British 46 Division.

The plan required the British to break out of their beach head and advance through encircling hills by use of these passes while they were still in friendly hands. After this it was good tank country and clear to Naples.


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