


WORKSHOP REPORT
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Center of Excellence
for Stability Police Units



US Institute of Peace



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

**THE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR STABILITY POLICE UNITS:
EXPLORING THE WAY AHEAD**

December 2, 2004

The G-8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace and Support Operations issued at the Sea Island summit meeting in June 2004 called for the establishment, on a multinational basis, of an "...international training center that would serve as a Center of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations. The center will build on the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie and other similar forces to develop carabinieri/gendarme-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations." This has resulted in the creation of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vincenza, Italy. On December 2, 2004, USIP, the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and CoESPU conducted a workshop aimed at identifying crucial issues that need to be addressed to foster the development of CoESPU. These issues are described in this report, along with suggested courses of action to address them.

To facilitate action on these issues, USIP is continuing to work with PKSOI and CoESPU to organize an international conference on the role of stability police units. This conference will be held on March 17-18, one year after the riots in Kosovo. One of the purposes will be to examine the international response to those riots for the purpose of capturing lessons and ensuring they are reflected in doctrine and training. The other purpose will be to assess progress that CoESPU had made toward addressing critical issues discussed above and identifying areas where additional support is required.

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The Requirement for Stability Police Units

Security is the foundation upon which all other aspects of peace and stability operations (PSOs) must build. Nevertheless, these international interventions have routinely been plagued by serious gaps in public security. This can only be remedied effectively by robust policing organizations that are able to perform specialized missions involving disciplined group action. Police units with a military organization and capabilities, such as the Italian Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie, Spanish Guardia Civil, Portuguese Guardia Nacional Republicana, Dutch Marechaussee and similar forces are designed to precisely perform these specifications. Owing to the nature of the missions they perform when deployed internationally, these forces are referred to as Stability Police Units or SPUs. SPUs are required to address the following recurring gaps that arise during peace and stability operations:

The Deployment Gap: At the inception of most peace and stability operations, there is likely to be an immediate need to combat rampant lawlessness, revenge killings, and major civil disturbances. Initially, the military is often the only source of order due to the inherent delay in mobilizing individual policemen to serve as international civilian police, or CIVPOL. This is a time-consuming process because most domestic police forces do not have any surplus capacity available for prompt deployment of police for international peace missions. To develop a significant capability to mobilize qualified individuals to serve as international police officers, moreover, would require significant effort and major financial commitments by many nations. This is a major structural defect in the international capacity to respond to the policing requirements of peace and stability operations.

The lag time between the arrival of the military contingent and the fielding of civilian law enforcement capabilities creates a deployment gap that can have profound consequences. A peace mission is apt to be tested during the deployment phase, and a void in public security creates a crucial vulnerability. If a single soldier errs by using excessive force, the entire mission can be placed in jeopardy because local consent may be squandered. Inaction, on the other hand, risks the loss of credibility and can create the impression that the mission is incompetent and failing. In either case, the peace operation may confront a “defining moment” before it is well postured to respond.

To address the Deployment Gap, the capacity to field qualified law enforcement personnel rapidly in unit strength, as opposed to individuals, is the answer. Most police organizations do not possess this capacity-unless they are carabinieri/gendarmerie-like forces (i.e. Stability Police Units) with a military organizational structure and logistical support capability that allows them to be mobilized and deployed as efficiently as regular combat units to a crisis area.

The Enforcement Gap: An enforcement gap arises when there is a need to perform functions that fall between the lethal force at the disposal of military combat units and the minimal level of force available to individual policemen. Conventional military units are a blunt and unsatisfactory instrument when used alone to

meet the challenge of public disorder and lawlessness. Although they possess overwhelming force, this is of limited value in preventing loss of life and destruction of property. Military forces are generally not trained in the measured use of force, control of riots, negotiating techniques, or de-escalation of conflict. Individual CIVPOL are not capable of handling large-scale, strategic challenges, either.

Just as vital is the need to confront threats to the peace process in the form of political-criminal power structures, rogue intelligence organizations, warlords, fanatical religious groups, global terrorists, or some combination of the above. Orchestrated civil disturbances or “rent-a-mobs” are typically a symptom of this underlying source of resistance to the peace. Such obstructionism has repeatedly plagued international interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, and Iraq.

To confront these challenges effectively requires proficiency in the use of non-lethal force and a robust law enforcement capacity. This includes a sophisticated criminal intelligence, surveillance, evidence gathering, border patrol, close protection, and high-risk arrest capacity to cope with political violence and extremism. Organized police units such as the Carabinieri and Gendarmerie, specialize in these functions. In addition, due to their “hybrid” structure, these forces have the means to interact proficiently both with civilian authorities and the military chain of command, both local and international. SPUs, by their nature, can conduct both military operations as light infantry troops, when needed, and interact effectively with local populations and institutions. This stems from their “modus operandi” which seeks to establish a close, visible and accessible relationship with the public in the performance of their typical policing activities.

The Institutional Sustainability Gap: Rather than becoming a surrogate for malfunctioning institutions of law enforcement and criminal justice, the international community aspires to foster their progressive development. A domestic legal system must be developed that operates reliably as a servant of all the people and avoids falling prey to exploitation as an instrument of state repression. The most serious institutional gaps are likely to be an inability to afford equal justice to politically disadvantaged groups and to confront the impunity associated with the use of political violence.

Closing the institutional gap in a sustainable manner requires more than reconstituting the local police force and judiciary. These newly formed and fragile institutions will not be capable of resisting efforts by former criminalized power structures or divisive political factions to capture them. To safeguard the rule of law over the medium term while these nascent institutions mature requires continuous international tutelage and assistance. One way to accomplish this, when conditions warrant, is to transition from a large-scale international military force to a more modest presence involving Stability Police Units. Their role ought to continue until the rule of law is fully self-sustaining. In addition to monitoring respect for internationally recognized police standards, SPUs should work to solidify international regimes of cooperation to sustain a permanent effort against transnational crime and global terrorism. These can accomplish this by training and assisting local law enforcement structures to convert criminal intelligence into admissible evidence.

SPUs are ideally suited to close this gap owing to their skill at working informally with local populations to build confidence and at establishing partnerships with local authorities, Their criminal intelligence gathering skills and crime prevention background help to buttress nascent local institutions in areas of greatest vulnerability, allowing them to take appropriate action against unlawful activities that could unravel the peace process.

The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU): These public security gaps have repeatedly confounded efforts by the international community to bring stability and lasting peace to war-ravaged societies. Experience derived from peace missions in the Balkans since the mid-1990s has shown that Stability Police Units can play an essential role in bridging these gaps. Closing this gap, however, requires the development of a far greater international capacity to deploy units that have been properly prepared for the rigors of peace and stability operations. For this to happen, common international doctrine for the use of SPUs must be developed and standardized, specialized training programs must be provided to nations willing and able to contribute these forces. This is the core mission of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units.

The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units: Exploring the Way Ahead

Staffing requirements for CoESPU

Discussion: If CoESPU is to serve its international clientele effectively, the staff must be drawn from those countries and organizations that it is intended to work with. This is an immediate requirement if CoESPU is to achieve its goal of inaugurating training programs in September 2005.

Suggested Action: The sponsors of this initiative should lead the way in staffing CoESPU. It is particularly important for CoESPU to receive support from the US and other G-8 members in this regard. This will assist in attracting secondments from relevant countries endowed with Carabinieri/Gendarme-type forces, which will be essential for the harmonization of doctrine, standardization of training, definition of interoperability requirements, and maintenance of mission readiness. International organizations that field SPUs should, at a minimum, establish liaisons or other forms of collaboration. CoESPU should identify to all its prospective clients the qualifications desired for faculty and staff.

Equipment for units trained by CoESPU

Discussion: Attendees at CoESPU courses will be trained to use riot-control equipment and command and control systems maintained at the Center. For this training to result in actual capacity for international missions, countries providing SPUs will need to equip their own units adequately and in a manner that ensures interoperability with other SPUs. At present, there is no mechanism to assist countries that have personnel with the requisite skills but which lack the resources to outfit them for such duties. To encourage less affluent countries to develop the capacity to provide SPUs for international service, alleviating the cost of equipping these forces will be an important incentive.

Suggested Action: Interoperability standards for SPU equipment should be based on lessons learned and experience acquired by users and be compatible with those set up by the United Nations. CoESPU should be empowered to work with international organizations that employ SPUs, countries providing SPUs, and other centers of excellence involved in the preparation of SPUs (as described below in "Building a Network") to establish common specifications for those items of equipment that are necessary to achieve interoperability. G-8 members should be encouraged to assist with the equipping of SPUs from countries lacking resources to do so. One "no-cost" option would be to provide the up-front funding to equip units committed to serve on UN missions. These funds would be reimbursed over time by the UN from peacekeeping assessments. The NATO-EU ad hoc group on capabilities may be another mechanism for addressing this critical aspect of capacity building.

Integration of military and Stability Police Unit operations

Discussion: Stability Police Units are intended to fill the *public security gap* between the lethal force at the disposal of combat units and the minimal level of force available to the individual policeman. For SPUs to fill this gap effectively, their operations must be integrated with and supported by military contingents. The consequences of the failure to

do this were on display in the response to the riots in Kosovo in March 2004. No contingency plan existed to guide the response to widespread civil disorder. There was no location where a comprehensive picture of the rapidly unfolding situation could be brought together. Depending on how particular KFOR Commanders interpreted their mandate, the reaction ranged from active collaboration with UNMIK Police to extreme reluctance or failure to respond.

Among the barriers to integrated effort that must be overcome are:

- The lack of military doctrine, training, and experience in working with Stability Police Units;
- The gray area between the police role in providing public order and safety and the military mission of establishing a safe and a secure environment (This includes vital command and control issues such as determining when and how “primacy” should shift from military commanders to police and vice versa);
- Military contingents follow “rules of war” while Stability Police Units may be under civilian authority exercising executive policing power subject to the laws of the existing state;
- “National caveats” imposed on military contingents by their National Command Authorities that preclude involvement in crowd and riot control activities.

Suggested Action: The G-8 Action Plan specifically foresees CoESPU “Providing interoperability training with the relevant military forces”. It is crucial to empower and resource CoESPU to fulfill this goal. Although doctrine for SPU-like units has developed along similar paths at NATO and the EU to date, there is no guarantee that it will remain that way or to that any inconsistencies will be properly resolved.

Among the activities that CoESPU could undertake, in liaison with relevant actors, are the following:

- Contributing to the development of doctrine for the use of military units for crowd and riot control in support of SPUs, in particular the definition of coordination mechanisms in joint activities (e.g. “green box/blue box” concepts);
- Identifying and helping to resolve differences between military and police conceptions of the most effective command and control arrangements, managing the transfer of primacy from one to the other, and similar civil-military issues;
- Conducting deliberate planning exercises for senior leaders in coordination with the EU Police College (CEPOL) which has already developed a strategic planning course for police operations;
- Participating in the development of pre-deployment training and exercise programs for military units;
- Providing training at the operational level, perhaps using mobile teams to organize and conduct exercises in-theater after military contingents and SPUs rotate into field missions

Building a network to integrate CoESPU efforts with its clients

Discussion: To promote interoperability among the countries that provide SPUs and among the international organizations that field them, doctrine for their use must be

harmonized. To expand national and regional capacity to train SPUs for peace and stability operations, moreover, CoESPU will need to cooperate with and work through training centers located around the world. Since CoESPU is the result of a G-8 initiative, it has no automatic linkages or recognized status with the entities that ought to be its clients, including:

- International organizations that are capable of fielding these units (e.g., the UN, NATO, EU and AU);
- Countries that provide them;
- Other organizations and centers that play a role in doctrinal development and national and regional training.

Suggested Action: A network needs to be created linking CoESPU with its intended clients. CoESPU has already established linkages with the UN Staff College (Turin), the George Marshall Center (Garmish), the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo), S. Anna Institute (Pisa), and Johns Hopkins SIAS (Bologna). Participants in the December 2 workshop should assist CoESPU in identifying the other entities that should be included in this network (e.g. other centers of excellence that can play a role in doctrinal and training development, such as the training center of the French Gendarmerie). USIP should explore the potential to exploit the Internet portal being developed for the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (currently involving the UN, EU, and OSCE) as one of the means of communication with network members and for developing a lessons-learned database. Annual conferences would be another means of establishing and vitalizing a CoESPU client network. USIP and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute will work with CoESPU to initiate this process with an international conference scheduled for March 2005 that will address the doctrinal implications of the response to the March riots in Kosovo.

Selection criteria for CoESPU trainees

Discussion: Minimum standards will need to be established for selection of personnel to attend CoESPU training. Among the factors that will need to be taken into consideration are the following:

- Active service as a member of the contributing state's police forces;
- Minimum period of service;
- Proficiency with firearms and the ability to drive, use communications equipment and computers;
- Language ability in the CoESPU training language (initially English);
- Physical and mental suitability;
- Professional competence and integrity.

Suggested Action: CoESPU will need to propose minimum standards for trainees and collaborate with international organizations that field SPUs to establish a universal standard. It might also be necessary to explore, on a case-by-case basis, whether CoESPU should offer additional or remedial training in certain areas, such as English, use of firearms, driving, and use communications equipment and computers in order to bring certain groups of trainees up to minimum standards.

Measures of Effectiveness for CoESPU training programs

Discussion: CoESPU is designing training courses for senior commanders and staff officers as well as mid-grade officers and NCOs in direct command of troops. These courses will be offered at the Center, but the intention is to “train the trainers” who will return to their home countries to conduct the same training for their own forces. For this process to work effectively, measures of effectiveness will be essential to determine if in-country training is being conducted according to CoESPU standards and whether the units that are trained meet a universally acceptable level of SPU readiness. The ultimate measure of effectiveness will be whether international capacity to provide SPUs is increased and whether their operational performance in field missions is enhanced.

Suggested Action: The CoESPU will develop its own set of metrics to determine if the training programs it generates in SPU-providing countries meet its standards. To evaluate the readiness of units trained, however, the Center will need to be empowered to work with the network of SPU users and providers and other centers of excellence to define an internationally acceptable standard. To assess the level of improvement in international capacity to provide SPUs, CoESPU should establish and maintain a database of units that are qualified to serve in peace and stability operations. The UN may be the most competent body to evaluate whether international capacity has actually resulted in improved capacity to meet international demands, both in a quantitative and qualitative sense.

Regional division of labor for training (by language)

Discussion: Courses at CoESPU will be offered in English. Although this is the predominant mission language, French, Spanish, and Portuguese have also been used. Since the Global Peace Operations Initiative seeks to develop African peacekeeping capacity, in particular, and given that Francophone countries of Africa are the primary pool from which these units are likely to be drawn, the ability to offer classes in French would be highly beneficial. Depending on the region, the same could apply to Spanish, Portuguese, and other mission languages.

Suggested Action: After development of courses in English, CoESPU could explore the modalities for offering its courses in other mission languages (e.g. French, Spanish, etc.).