Texans for Public Justice recently launched a promising series of articles on the “misuse and abuse” of public funds called Watch Your Assets. Yesterday, episode 2 hit the web, focusing on the failures of privatization schemes so popular with the Texas Republican Party.
But we wanted to step back to the first offering in the series, which hasn’t gotten the attention it deserves. The exhaustive document is called “Gimme Shelter: Tax Shelter-Funded Affordable Housing.” It is a detailed, point-by-point rundown of how politically connected developers are milking the system that was intended to help low-income families find a decent place to live. The result is an astoundingly inefficient use of both state and federal resources.
The basic scheme goes down like this: The federal government hands down tens of millions in tax credits to the state, intended to finance the development of affordable housing projects (usually apartments). The Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, an agency headed by political appointees, decides which projects receive the credits.
Shocker Number 1:
TDHCA awarded $133 million in federal tax credits to private developers from 2004 through 2006. Because these credits can be used every year for a decade, their face value is a whopping $1.3 billion over their 10-year lifespan. While other federal taxpayers must cover the full cost of these tax breaks, the actual amount of money spent on affordable housing is considerably less.
The developers in turn sell the credits to private investors in order to generate the up-front cash they need to do the development.
Shocker Number 2:
As a result, the actual amount of money spent on low-income housing dwindles considerably as each person in the chain takes a bite out of this taxpayer asset. A recent study of Missouri’s tax credit system, for example, found that just 35 cents of every tax-credit dollar is used to develop affordable housing.
In addition to their expected cut, developers can also increase profits by hiring themselves or partner companies as contractors, taking that cut along the way, too.
To top all this off, studies have shown that the resulting developments, even when they work as intended, only provide a benefit to families making around 60 percent of their area’s median family income — in other words, the poorest of the population are not being served. Families that make 50 percent of the median or less, TPJ found, receive no benefit from these taxpayer-backed projects and are still forced to use more than half their income on housing costs.
And this is the cleaned-up system after the Lege reformed the agency in 2001 and 2003 — and after the FBI had been called in because of corruption in the ranks, documented in TPJ’s report.
Even after all that, we get Shocker Number 3:
Creating another appearance problem for Texas’ affordable-housing system, some TDHCA staff and board members who left the agency at the height of the 1990’s scandals have gone on to receive TDHCA tax credits of their own. After resigning under fire in 2001, former TDHCA tax-credit manager Cherno Njie received $11.2 million in tax credits in 2006 for the Langwick Senior Residences in Houston.
It’s all pretty complex to track, which is probably the point, making it easier for the politically connected to get the most from the system. The second half (yep, only halfway through) of the TPJ report goes through the litany of well-connected developers who have received the bulk of the tax credits, and who happen to make nice contributions to the campaigns of Mssrs Rick Perry, David Dewhurst, and Robert Talton.
My personal favorite example is R.L. Bobby Bowling of El Paso, who “helped craft the controversial Texas Residential Construction Commission in 2003.” That would be the state agency billed as a way for homebuyers to quickly resolve grievances with homebuilders — except it actually ended up helping builders simply ignore the aggrieved, as detailed in the Observer.
But wait, there’s more. An article last March in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram looked into the dealings of Texas State Affordable Housing Corp., another state affordable housing program, and found a similar pattern. The TSAHC offers state backing for bonds that non-profit developers use to renovate properties for low-income housing. But because the state is not financially liable for the bonds — it just helps developers get a low interest rate and more delicious tax breaks — it has no enforcement power to make developers follow through. On top of that, roughly 90 percent of the developers at the time of the paper’s investigation had defaulted on their bonds, leaving behind largely unfinished projects.
Reported Yamil Berard:
In addition, the apartment complexes created financial burdens for local governments and school districts because they were exempted from property taxes when nonprofit agencies bought them.
Not everyone suffered financially. A number of the complexes in the multifamily program were purchased at two to three times their appraised value, totaling tens of millions of additional dollars. In many of those cases, the seller was a company affiliated with Dallas’ Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst.
Many of the companies involved in defaults blame poor market conditions for the failures, but one constituency saw a bull market: the bondsmen. “In 2002, the financial advisers, rating agencies and experts who put together the bond packages for the state housing program racked up the highest fees for municipal bonds issued in the state that year. The state average was $9 per $1,000 of bonds issued; Texas State Affordable Housing Corp. bonds, on average, were $35.54 per $1,000 of bonds issued.”
Chalk it all up, and a good chunk of affordable housing money sure seems to be going toward making it easier for the well connected to afford better housing.
by Matthew C. Wright