TRADE RESOURCE CENTER
Behind the Bush Administration's Missile Defense Revival
A World Policy Institute Special Report
by Michelle Ciarrocca and William D. Hartung
Table of Contents
II. Assessing Missile Defense: Cost, Feasibility,
Threat, and Strategic Impacts
II. A. How Much Will it Cost?
II. B. Will it Work?
II. C. How Urgent is the Ballistic Missile Threat?
II. D. How Will it Effect US Relations with Other
Nuclear Weapons States?
III. Inside the Missile Defense Lobby
IV. Defense Contractors: Cashing in on Missile Defense
IV. A. Inside Influence: Will Defense Industry Ties
Shape Missile Defense Policies?
V. Who Will Benefit? – Geographic Concentration of
Missile Defense Spending
VI. Bipartisan Support?
VI. A. Profiling Key Missile Defense Advocates
VI. B. Despite Lobbying Pressure, Critics in Congress
VII. What's Next for Missile Defense?
List of Tables and Appendices
Table I: Costs of Major Missile Defense Projects,
Table II: Ballistic Missile Defense Funding, FY
1998 – FY 2007
Table III: Defense Contractors Spending, Spending,
Spending - PAC Contributions, Soft Money, Lobbying Expenditures
Table IV: Top Ten Defense Companies Receiving Pentagon
Missile Defense Contracts 1998-2001
Table V: Top Ten States Receiving Missile Defense
Table VI: Top House Recipients of Defense Industry
Table VII: Top Senate Recipients of Defense Industry
Appendix A: Who's doing what in missile defense?
Appendix B: The "Nonpartisan" Think-Tanks
Appendix C: Who's Who in the Bush Administration
– Ties to missile defense contractors/think-tanks
This is the latest in a series of reports by the World Policy Institute’s
Arms Trade Resource Center on Peddlers of Proliferation, analyzing
the role of the arms lobby in shaping U.S. strategic policy. The
authors would like to thank Center Research Associate Jonathan Reingold
for carrying out primary research on ties between Bush administration
appointees and the arms and energy industries. This data was originally
featured in our May 2002 report on the evolution of the Bush nuclear
doctrine, About Face, and we drew upon it for the analysis
of the missile defense lobby presented in this report.
The Center would also like to thank the following foundations and
individuals who have provided support for our work on the arms trade,
military spending, missile defense and nuclear weapons issues: the
CarEth Foundation, the Compton Foundation, the Ford Foundation,
the HKH Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Ploughshares
Fund, Rockefeller Family Associates, the Samuel Rubin Foundation,
Margaret R. Spanel, the Town Creek Foundation, and Mary Van Evera
"I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today that
we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational
effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment."
President Clinton, September 1, 2000
"Every time the program seemed ready to expire, or collapse of
its own weight, something would happen to bring it to life again."
Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue
"I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the ABM
treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this
almost 30 year old treaty ... I cannot and will not allow the United
States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective
defenses." President Bush, December 13, 2001
Days before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Peter Stone
of the National Journal reported that a downturn in the economy
and an eroding federal surplus was causing concern for the defense
industry in general and the contractors involved in the Pentagon’s
costly missile defense program in particular. To ensure that the
President's $8.3 billion request for missile defense would be approved
by Congress, Pentagon contractors were "tapping veteran outside
defense consultants and new lobbying recruits - including grassroots
specialists and public relations firms." Raytheon hired former
House Appropriations Committee Chair Rep. Bob Livingston (R-LA),
while Boeing tapped another top K Street lobbying firm, Bonner &
Associates, to help build the case for missile defense. Boeing also
decided to go to the 'source' by employing Alan Myer, who helped
write President Reagan's famous 1983 Star Wars speech.
While President Bush had repeatedly pledged to deploy a missile
defense system, skeptics in Congress continued to question the technology,
costs and necessity of such a system, as well as the effect it would
have on US relations with Russia. However, in the days immediately
following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
those questions seemed irrelevant. Despite the fact that a missile
defense system could have done nothing to prevent the September
11th attacks, Senate Democrats agreed to a compromise
that allowed $800 million of $1.3 billion in proposed cuts in the
President’s funding request for missile defense to go through, bringing
approved spending to $7.8 billion. Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) explained
that he did not want to "create dissent where we need unity" by
forcing a floor fight over the proposed cuts. Sen. Levin also withdrew
an amendment that would have limited the administration’s ability
to conduct missile defense tests that violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty without consulting Congress. A few months later,
in December 2001, while still riding high in public opinion polls,
President Bush gave Russia six months' notice of the United States
intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
The post-September 11th "unity" that allowed the Pentagon to accelerate
missile defense spending continued into 2003 budget debates, with
authorization by the House of Representatives of the largest increase
in military spending in two decades, up to a total of $393 billion.
Much of this new spending has little or nothing to do with the war
Clearly, this temporary unity on missile defense could not last
indefinitely. Representative Martin Meehan (D-MA) noted, "After
September 11th, the Congress, especially Democrats, decided
to defer a number of contentious debates for the good of national
unity. Many of them related to missile defense ... It would be a
mistake to interpret the silence in the wake of Sep. 11th
as a sign of approval by all in Congress of these unprecedented
While missile defense critics in Congress have been tentative,
the missile defense lobby is still moving full speed ahead. In fact,
a domestic "axis of influence" – a small circle of conservative
think-tanks, corporate officials, and hard-line veterans of the
Pentagon and the uniformed military that have been pushing missile
defense for years – are playing an unprecedented role in crafting
US security policy in the Bush administration. With George W. Bush
in the White House and Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, the Star
Wars lobby no longer needs to rely on its ability to influence the
federal government from the outside - it has staged a friendly takeover
of the executive branch. Thirty-two major appointees of the administration
are former executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top
defense contractors. In addition, 22 former advisory board members
or close associates of the Center for Security Policy (CSP), an
energetic missile defense advocacy group funded in part by missile
defense contractors, have been appointed to key policymaking posts
in the Bush administration.
This report will take a detailed look at the role of conservative
ideologues and cash-hungry contractors in shaping the Bush administration’s
policy on missile defense, but first we need to provide some context
for the missile defense debate.
II. Assessing Missile Defense: Cost, Feasibility,
Threat, and Strategic Impacts
II. A. How Much Will it Cost?
During a hearing in February, Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) remarked,
"after 12 years on this committee, there are times when I feel like
some of our defense contractors feel like it is more profitable
for them to develop weapons than actually manufacture them. There's
not much money in making something. They get a lot of money to do
research." In fact, most industry analysts believe that the production
phase of a weapons project is far more lucrative than the R&D
phase, but given the vast sums that have been spent on missile defense
R&D in the last five decades, Rep. Taylor’s suspicions are certainly
While missile defense became prominent during the Reagan years,
its origins date back to shortly after the Second World War. Early
projects included the short-range Thumper and the longer-range Wizard.
In the mid-1950s, the army began work on Nike-Zeus, a ground-based
system. During the 1960's missile defense efforts continued under
the Nike-X program. Under the Nixon administration, a more modest
program called Safeguard was developed, and eventually deployed.
The system, using nuclear-tipped interceptors, became fully operational
on October 1, 1975. However, four months later, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Safeguard system was being terminated
because it was too costly to operate while offering a very limited
capability. Measured in terms of today’s purchasing power (constant
2002 dollars) the total cost of Nike-Zeus, Nike-X and Safeguard
programs combined is estimated at $37 billion.
In March of 1983, Ronald Reagan unveiled his Star Wars plan (later
known as the Strategic Defense Initiative - SDI), an ambitious research
program which sought to defend the US against a massive Soviet nuclear
attack; a program that Reagan envisioned would make nuclear weapons
"impotent and obsolete." With US-Soviet relations warming by the
end of Reagan's term, the program was reoriented to focus on limited
attacks against American forces. President George Herbert Walker
Bush called it GPALS, short for Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes. The Department of Defense official funding estimates for
ballistic missile defense for the period of FY 1984 to FY 1994 is
$32.6 billion. However, a Congressional Research Service report
from 1995 estimated the actual amount could be as much as $70.7
billion (in current, or then-year dollars) for that same time span.
In 1992, President Clinton continued with the idea of defending
against a limited ballistic missile attack, but gave precedence
to theater defenses capable of protecting deployed troops. Then,
in the later part of his term, Clinton bowed to congressional pressure
to develop a National Missile Defense (NMD) system based on the
perceived "rogue" threat facing the US. Missile defense funding
throughout the Clinton years averaged about $4 billion a year (see
Table II, below for exact year-by-year figures).
I: Costs of Major Missile Defense Projects,
(in inflation-adjusted, 2002 dollars)
Nike-X, Nike Zeus, Safeguard,
other R&D (1962-1983)
SDI, GPALS, NMD, THAAD,
other R&D (1983-2002)
Total Since 1962
$ 91 billion
Source: Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, building
on the estimate in Stephen Schwartz, et. al., editors, Atomic
Audit (Brookings, 1996).
Today, more than 20 years and $91 billion after Ronald Reagan’s
March 1983 "Star Wars" speech, President Bush is calling for a layered
missile defense system capable of defending the entire US, as well
as "our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas," from ballistic
missile attack. The layered approach would combine the ground-based
NMD system inherited from the Clinton administration with sea-,
air-, and space-based components to take out enemy missiles during
all three phases of a missile launch - boost phase, midcourse, and
terminal. Technically speaking, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) System, which forms one element of the Bush administration's
plan, is the same as Clinton's NMD system. The Bush plan envisions
a multi-layered system which would be designed to destroy nuclear
warheads in the boost phase, shortly after an enemy ballistic missile
is launched; in the midcourse phase, while they are traveling through
the weightless environment of space on their way towards targets
in the United States; and in the terminal phase, when the warheads
re-enter the earth’s atmosphere in their final phase of flight.
Other systems expected to play a role in the Bush administration’s
system include the Airborne Laser (ABL), the Space-Based Laser (SBL),
Navy Theater Wide, Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), and
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). All of these programs were
being funded by the Clinton administration as research and development
efforts, but the Bush administration is attempting to push them
towards deployment by increasing funding, accelerating testing,
and relaxing criteria as to what constitutes a capability worth
President Bush's FY 2002 missile defense budget came in at $7.8
billion, about $500 million less than the administration requested,
but still a hefty 43% increase over the levels obtained in the last
Clinton administration budget ($5.4 billion). An effort by the Senate
Armed Services Committee to cut $814 million from the administration’s
$7.8 million request for FY 2003 was reversed on the Senate floor
in an amendment sponsored by Sen. John Warner (R-VA), the former
chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a longstanding supporter
of missile defense expenditures. Spending on missile defense during
the four years of President George W. Bush’s term is projected at
$35.3 billion, nearly twice as much as the $18.7 billion that was
spent in the second term of the Clinton administration. Adjusting
for inflation, resources devoted to missile defense R&D in Clinton’s
second term amount to $17.7 billion in 2002 dollars, while projected
resources for the four years of the Bush term are projected to reach
$32.7 billion in 2002 dollars. This represents a cumulative increase
in missile defense spending of roughly 85% in the four years of
the Bush term over the four years of the second Clinton term. Looked
at another way, if current projections hold, proposed spending on
missile defense in the FY 2005 budget that will be put forward in
February 2004 will be 60% higher in real terms than the missile
defense budget for FY 2001 that was approved in the waning months
of the Clinton administration. As Table II demonstrates, the Pentagon
is projecting yearly missile defense funding to reach $11.5 billion
Ballistic Missile Defense Funding, FY 1998 – FY 2007:
From Clinton to Bush 
(in billions of current, then-year dollars, with inflation-adjusted,
2002 dollars in parenthesis)
While the Bush administration’s short-term missile defense spending
plans represent a substantial increase over the Clinton administration,
they represent only the down payment on the actual costs of deploying
a missile defense system. A spring 2002 analysis by Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggests that despite the substantial
increases in Pentagon spending that have been approved since September
11th, the missile defense program will continue to come
into conflict with other military priorities. The Wolfowitz memo
indicated that the Pentagon had $250 billion committed to major
weapons programs between now and 2007, including $46.4 billion for
missile defense, with an additional $600 billion committed after
2007 to complete these commitments. The post-2007 estimate did not
include an estimate for missile defense, which was listed as "TBD,"
for "To Be Determined." The Pentagon's huge financial commitment
to existing systems – before expenditures for new, so-called transformational
systems are taken into account – explains why Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld decided to cancel the Crusader artillery system,
and why programs like the F-22 fighter plane and the V-22 Osprey
may be in for large cuts or outright cancellation in next year's
budget. But even given these steps to trim a few big ticket items
from the Pentagon's shopping list, there is still a potential "procurement
train wreck" coming up in the next five to ten years unless there
are either deep cuts in Cold War era systems or steep increases
in Pentagon spending.
The Congressional Budget Office’s January 2002 report on the estimated
costs of various missile defense systems underscores the long-term
budgetary pressures posed by a large-scale missile defense deployment.
Depending on how many sites and interceptors are involved, CBO estimates
that a ground-based system will cost between $23 billion and $64
billion to deploy through 2015, with annual operating costs of between
$1 billion and $7 billion. For a sea-based mid-course system, CBO
estimates the costs to develop, deploy, and operate the stand-alone
system to be between $43 billion and $55 billion through 2015. Total
costs to develop, build, and launch a constellation of lasers in
low-earth orbit, a space-based laser system, could cost from $56
billion to $68 billion. However, since, the space-based laser won't
undergo its first integrated flight experiment until at least 2012,
it remains unclear when such a system would be available for deployment.
The CBO estimates that costs of the three major missile defense
programs could add up to as much as $238 billion over the next two
decades. However, the CBO's report suggested that the total cost
of an integrated system could be less than the sum of building each
part, due to synergies resulting from the sharing of certain equipment,
capabilities, and research findings among the land- and sea-based
systems. This may prove to be true, but on the other hand, the CBO
cost estimates do not take into account the billions of dollars
that have already been invested in these programs in previous
budgets (prior to 2002), nor do they include other missile defense
programs such as THAAD, the PAC-3, or a proposed sea-based boost-phase
In regard to the sea-based boost phase system, the CBO stated that,
"Sea-based boost-phase defenses are ... in the very early stages
of conceptual development. There are substantial uncertainties regarding
the needed capabilities, system architecture, technologies, and
schedule for developing and deploying such defenses. The Department
of Defense has not yet provided a description of such a system that
would be suitable for the purpose of estimating costs. Consequently,
CBO was unable to prepare a credible estimate of the costs of sea-based
boost-phase defenses." What is known about a sea-based boost phase
approach suggests that the costs could be substantial. The CBO report
also notes that the system would not benefit significantly from
"synergies" with other missile defense programs since "a new interceptor,
a new ship, and new sensors might all be required."
The CBO also chose not to estimate the costs of a "Brilliant Pebbles"
style space-based missile defense system modeled on the GPALS system
(Global Protection Against Limited Strikes) which was under consideration
during the presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush. Brilliant Pebbles
would involve the deployment of 500 to 1,000 space-based kinetic
kill vehicles (essentially small guided rockets), each based in
its own satellite "safety jacket." Since there has been no new system
architecture suggested for a Brilliant Pebbles system since 1992,
and since it is not yet known whether this approach will be embraced
as part of the new Bush administration plan, CBO decided that there
was not sufficient information available to make a credible estimate
of the costs of this approach.
Given the potential costs that are not covered in the CBO report,
and the Bush administration's clear preference for a multi-tiered
system, the cost savings/synergies suggested by the CBO could easily
be counterbalanced by the costs of additional elements of the multi-tiered
system. Taking into account the $91 billion that has already been
spent on missile defense R&D since Ronald Reagan's 1983 Star
Wars speech and the fact that spending on the program could exceed
$10 billion per year by 2007, realizing the Bush administration's
vision of a rapidly deployed, continually expanding missile defense
system could ultimately cost even more than the CBO's $238
billion estimate for building major elements of a multi-tiered missile
defense program. New missile defense expenditures alone could top
$200 billion over the next decade and one half.
II. B. Will it Work?
Despite the huge investment in missile defense over the past four
decades, the Pentagon has been unable to field a workable system,
and major hurdles remain. As former Pentagon testing official Philip
Coyle has repeatedly pointed out, "There is nothing that the DOD
has done that is as difficult" as ballistic missile defense.
With this in mind, President Bush's enthusiasm for fielding any
and all missile defense systems upon taking office was tempered
by the fact that none of the proposed systems were anywhere close
to being ready for deployment. So his administration opted instead
for a sharp expansion of funding for missile defense R&D with
an eye towards the earliest possible deployment of various elements
of a multi-tiered system, even if they offered only rudimentary
capabilities at first. As part of this accelerated development program,
the Pentagon scheduled 30 different tests of various missile defense
components in the eighteen-month period from December 2001 through
June 2003. Undersecretary of Defense Pete Aldridge noted that the
ground-based missile defense "test bed" being prepared in Alaska
could be used "as an emergency missile defense capability" once
ABM restrictions had been eliminated.
The ground-based system, which received the most attention during
the Clinton administration, is proving to be the furthest along.
A March 2002 intercept test marked the third consecutive success,
for a total of four out of six intercepts. Approximately 20 more
tests - each with increasing complexity - are scheduled to take
place over the next several years. But there are still many questions
about just how "successful" any of the interceptor tests have been,
given how simple and predictable they have been compared to the
uncertainties that would be involved in dealing with an actual ballistic
In all intercept tests to date, a beacon was placed on the mock
warhead to act in lieu of a functioning early warning radar, or
X-band radar. Defense Week reported in July 2001 that the
prototype interceptor was able to find the target warhead partly
because the target communicated its location to the interceptor
for much of the flight. The transmissions formed the basis of
the targeting orders, according to Pentagon officials and documents.
While the beacon did not guarantee success, a November 2001 report
from the Union of Concerned Scientists found that the beacon guides
the interceptor to within 400 meters of the mock warhead before
an intercept is attempted - a courtesy not likely to be provided
by an actual adversary. Pentagon officials claim that the transponder
had to be used because the X-band radar has not been built yet.
But for all the priority the Bush administration has given to deploying
a missile defense system, the money to build the radar has yet to
be requested by the President.
A number of technical problems have also plagued the prototype
booster, which launches the kill vehicle in tests of the ground-based
system. The temporary booster currently being used is slower than
the actual booster that will be used in the system. This, in turn,
raises questions about whether the kill vehicle will be able to
withstand the faster launch speed of the actual booster, once it
is completed. The booster, being developed by Boeing, is more than
a year behind schedule and won't be used in an intercept test until
– at the earliest – the twelfth intercept attempt, scheduled for
2003. Due to the troubling performance of the Boeing booster project,
the Pentagon announced that it is seeking proposals for alternative
There is also the critical question of whether the system will
be able to discriminate between actual nuclear warheads and decoys
designed to look like warheads. This problem is particularly challenging
during the midcourse part of the ballistic missile flight path,
when warheads and decoys are moving through the weightless environment
of space, where differences in speed and appearance are difficult
to determine. Two recent reports by the General Accounting Office
have confirmed that Boeing and TRW manipulated data from a 1997
test in order to overstate the capabilities of antimissile sensor
technology designed to tell the difference between nuclear warheads
and decoys for the ground based system. The reports reinforce longstanding
allegations of fraud in the testing program made by Professor Theodore
Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Another system designed to take out warheads in the mid-course
part of the flight path is the Sea-Based Midcourse System, previously
known as Navy Theater Wide. January 2002 marked the first intercept
test of the Navy system, which was successful. The most recent test,
conducted in June 2002, was also successful. However, an analysis
by the Union of Concerned Scientists pointed out that the target
used in the test was much larger than a typical missile would be
in a realistic attack. In addition, a much faster missile than the
one being used in current tests would be needed to provide national
coverage. As currently configured, the system would only be effective
against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Last but not
least, a Sea-Based Midcourse system would encounter the same problems
of discriminating between warheads and decoys in the weightless
environment of space faced by its ground-based counterpart.
The Pentagon's other sea-based system, Navy Area Wide, being developed
by Raytheon, was cancelled by Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition
Pete Aldridge due to cost overruns and poor performance. The short-range
system was supposed to be relatively easy, compared to the longer-range
systems, because it was to use the Navy's existing fleet of Aegis-equipped
cruisers and destroyers for anti-missile launchers and a modified
Standard missile as an interceptor. However, the program cost growth
exceeded 25%, and one study determined the costs had grown by 60%.
There were also problems with the interceptor missile not being
Despite killing the Navy Area program, the Pentagon is searching
for an alternative/replacement system. Defense Week reported,
"the military still has a requirement for a system to do what the
killed program did – launch ship-based interceptors at short-range
missiles – and most of the same contractors are vying to work on
a replacement program." Lt. Gen. Kadish, head of the Pentagon's
Missile Defense Agency (MDA - formerly the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization) remains skeptical about the program, in part because
the flight path of short-range missiles is so short the ships would
have to be very close to the enemy launching the missile, making
them vulnerable to attack.
As noted earlier, a sea-based boost phase interceptor, which is
favored by many missile defense advocates because it would be designed
to destroy long-range ballistic missiles in their boost phase, before
they could release independently-targeted warheads or decoys, is
little more than a concept at the moment. An appropriate interceptor
missile, which would have to be much larger and faster than current
prototype interceptors to hit a ballistic missile in its relatively
short boost phase of flight, has yet to be designed. Until there
is some sort of design for the interceptor, it will be impossible
to determine what size ship is needed, with what size launch tubes.
Nor is it clear that existing targeting and sensor systems could
be used to guide the new interceptor, or whether new sensors would
have to be developed as well.
Other missile defense systems the Pentagon is pursuing as parts
of a "layered defense" include the Airborne Laser (ABL), the Space-Based
Laser (SBL), the PAC-3, and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense
system (THAAD). The first test of the Airborne Laser, a chemical
laser affixed to a modified Boeing 747 jet, will take place in 2004.
The Space-Based Laser, intended to destroy a ballistic missile in
its boost phase, is barely off the drawing board at this stage –
only a handful of components of the system have been tested, a full-scale
testing facility hasn't even been built, and integrated flight experiments
are not expected to take place until 2012. However, according to
the Air Force, the Pentagon is now hoping to "field a rudimentary
capability around 2008-2020 with increasing sophistication added
in subsequent years."
Both the PAC-3 and THAAD systems could be part of the terminal
defense segment, which would be tasked with intercepting warheads
in the final phase of flight, as they re-enter the atmosphere and
head towards targets in the United States. The PAC-3 is the newest
version of the Patriot missile, designed to defend troops and fixed
assets against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Philip
Coyle, the DOD's former test evaluator noted that, "A number of
defense reporters have reported these 11 tests as all successful,
which they have not been. So-called Developmental Test Number Six,
and so-called Developmental Test (actually, there was some operational
test aspect of this test) Number Nine that was fired last July,
both had problems." The three operational tests conducted this
year have had problems too. A full-rate production decision on the
PAC-3 will be made in September 2002. However, Coyle has pointed
out that the PAC-3 was not designed to counter long-range threats,
and no flight intercept tests have been conducted to demonstrate
how it might be incorporated into a terminal defense layer.
THAAD is to be fielded in conjunction with the PAC-3 system. The
THAAD system failed the first six of eight intercept attempts conducted
between 1995 and 1999. Despite the six consecutive failures, the
Pentagon allowed the program to move onto the next phase of development
after its two successful intercepts in 1999. Since then no intercept
tests have taken place. The Pentagon report on testing and evaluation
for 2001 said the THAAD "testing was plagued with failures," primarily
due to "an urgency to develop and deploy" the system. Because
of reliability and performance problems, a new interceptor missile
is being designed for the THAAD program. No flight tests are scheduled
Faced with the ongoing technical hurdles associated with missile
defense, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reorganized the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization, and renamed it the Missile Defense Agency.
Rumsfeld said that the name change to an "agency" status recognizes
"the national priority and mission emphasis on missile defense."
However, all the change seems to have accomplished is exempting
missile defense development from the normal reporting procedures
on costs and schedule, and from the need to develop specific performance
requirements for the new system geared to the most likely ballistic
missile threats faced by the United States. Under the new regime,
not only will many missile defense tests be exempted from oversight
from the DOD's independent testing office, but important details
that are needed to determine how realistic the tests are –such as
the number and configuration of decoys used – may be classified
General Kadish disagrees with critics who argue that the new approach
to testing is designed to shield the program from necessary public
scrutiny, arguing that "we have changed our approach to development
and are moving more to a capabilities-based approach for this acquisition
... Some have interpreted this as doing away with requirements or
doing away with discipline in general. That is not the case."
General Kadish said the Pentagon is developing a long-term plan
for missile defense. However, that plan will be guided by studies
by the Defense Science Board, an advisory panel that reports to
the Secretary of Defense, and by a corporate team led by Boeing
and Lockheed Martin. The task of integrating the proposed array
of air-, land-, sea- and space-based missile defense technologies
into a workable system will be contracted out to Boeing and Lockheed
Martin as well. The two companies will head a team of engineers
handpicked from major weapons contractors. Aviation Week
reported that "the industry teams advising the MDA are expected
to identify what new projects are required, but they won't have
a hand in selecting the contractors to avoid conflicts of interest."
Despite the MDA’s pledge to avoid conflicts of interest, it’s fairly
clear which companies will benefit from accelerated spending on
missile defense. More than 65% of the missile defense contracts
awarded over the past five years have gone to only four contractors
– Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW – who often collaborate
on the various programs. If federal regulators approve Northrop
Grumman’s bid to takeover TRW, the Pentagon’s four largest defense
contractors will also be the companies with the lion’s share of
business in the missile defense field. Between the major role reserved
for Boeing and Lockheed Martin and the exclusion of the Pentagon's
independent testing office from a meaningful role in evaluating
the program, it now appears that no one without a vested interest
in seeing the missile defense program move forward will be involved
in evaluating its capabilities.
II. C. How Urgent is the Ballistic Missile Threat?
Despite the fact that a ballistic missile is the least likely method
a US adversary would choose for delivering a weapon of mass destruction
to US soil, a 1998 report of a Congressionally-mandated panel chaired
by Donald Rumsfeld managed to dramatically alter the debate on missile
defense and the ballistic missile threat facing the United States.
The Rumsfeld Commission's key finding was the assertion that "rogue
states" like North Korea or Iraq could acquire ballistic missiles
within "five years of a decision to do so," not the ten to fifteen
years suggested by previous US intelligence estimates.
As a result, the Rumsfeld panel gave missile defense boosters in
Congress the quasi-official endorsement they needed to push the
program forward. No matter that the report painted a worst case
scenario by systematically ignoring all of the real world obstacles
Third World countries face in trying to obtain a long-range ballistic
capability while playing up any factors (however remote) that might
increase their chances of getting usable ballistic missiles in a
shorter time frame. According to commission members, the five-year
estimate was based in significant part on briefings from missile
engineers at major US defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin
and Boeing – hardly unbiased sources, given the billions their firms
stand to gain from building a missile defense system to thwart the
alleged threat posed by Third World ICBMs. Many of the commission
members also had connections to the defense industry, or to missile
defense advocacy organizations such as the Center for Security Policy.
A recent piece in the Washington Post underscores the added
weight that the Rumsfeld Commission’s extreme worst case scenarios
have taken on since the commission’s namesake has taken charge at
the Pentagon: "Since the beginning of the Bush administration last
year, and Rumsfeld's reappointment as Defense Secretary, the conclusions
of the Rumsfeld Commission have been elevated to quasi-doctrinal
status within the government, according to several officials. Nobody
dares say a word against Rumsfeld, at least in public."
A September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic
missile threat contradicted the alarmism of the Rumsfeld report,
arguing that "We project that during the next 15 years the US most
likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea,
probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq," the missile threat
from other nations will "probably [be] a few to tens, constrained
to smaller payloads, and [be] less reliable and accurate." The Center
for Defense Information noted, "this language returned the threat
analysis to what has been the traditional approach of NIEs: what
is likely to happen (probability) rather than the much broader
criterion of what could happen (possibility), which was the
emphasis of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report to Congress."
Even the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate, released
during the first year of the avidly pro-missile defense Bush administration,
notes that "US territory is more likely to be attacked" with weapons
of mass destruction by countries or terrorist groups using "ships,
trucks, airplanes or other means" than by a long-range ballistic
missile. Those delivery systems are "less expensive than developing
and producing ICBMs," and unlike missiles, non-missile systems "can
be overtly developed and employed" with the source being "masked
in an attempt to evade retaliation." They can also be deployed in
ways that will evade ballistic missile defenses, rendering the costly
proposed investments in these systems irrelevant.
Despite continuing evidence that ballistic missiles are the least
likely delivery vehicle for attacking the United States with a weapon
of mass destruction, hard-liners in the Bush administration cannot
be swayed from their blind belief in the ballistic missile threat
facing the US. In a July 24th, 2001 interview, ABC Nightline's
Ted Koppel sternly questioned Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
on the missile threat facing the US:
Koppel: Your own Pentagon experts have put out a list of the
perceived threats. On a list of 10 perceived threats, they rank
this one ninth. The only one that they rank lower in terms of probability
is an all-out attack by Russia or by China.
Wolfowitz: Ted, we're gazing into a very fuzzy crystal ball
when you make those predictions. Any estimate of a war in Korea
shows that the North Korean ballistic missile threat would take
tens of thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands of casualties
just in the peninsula alone, and the North Koreans are working on
longer and longer-range ballistic missiles. We need to work against
both those threats. The point is we have some ability today to stop
trucks coming across our borders, in fact, we stopped quite a few
during the millennium event. We have zero capability to defend against
Koppel: We are, in the final analysis, going to have to make
decisions based upon the available resources and what you folks
over at the Pentagon perceive to be the greatest threats. Again,
I draw your attention to your own Pentagon's assessment of the rogue
nation nuclear threat as being ninth on a list of 10 in terms of
probability, and yet you are asking Congress, in effect, to put
up a huge chunk of the money that is going to be available for the
defense budget in general, for a program that may, in the final
analysis, work or not work.
Wolfowitz: Ted, if we deploy it, it's going to be something that
works. The PAC-3 we are convinced now is something that works, the
Navy Theater Wide system is something that works. There's over a
billion dollars in this budget to do it, and it is part of what
makes our overall defense posture effective. And the reason we invest
as much as we do in defense is because it makes a safer world, not
just for ourselves, but for our children and grandchildren. It costs
a lot of money, it is worth a lot of money, but we are, in fact,
working on systems that will protect us and protect the American
Interestingly, the Navy Theater Wide system that Wolfowitz described
as "something that works" during his July 2001 interview had not
even attempted an intercept test at that point, and didn't do so
until January 2002.
II. D. How Will it Effect US Relations with Other
Nuclear Weapons States?
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been a model of patience throughout
discussions with the Bush administration on the ballistic missile
defense issue. Putin has repeatedly pledged Russia's willingness
to discuss changes and/or amendments to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile
Treaty and move forward with nuclear reductions. The treaty specifically
bans the deployment of missile defense systems at sea or in space
– both components in Bush's vision for a layered missile defense
system. In the aftermath of President Bush's announcement of the
US withdrawal from the treaty, which became effective June 13th,
2002, Putin noted, "We asked to be given specific parameters that
stood in the way of US desires to develop defensive systems and
implement parameters," but "nothing specific was given to us." "To
this day I fail to understand this insistence, given our position,
which was fairly flexible," said Putin.
But for military hard-liners like Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense
Douglas Feith, destroying the ABM Treaty was a worthwhile goal in
its own right, because it sets the stage for making military/technical
dominance the centerpiece of US security policy. Republican Sen.
Jon Kyl of Arizona, another committed advocate of missile defense,
has dubbed this approach "peace through strength, not peace through
paper." But Kyl's sound bite ignores the fact that reality is at
odds with this popular conservative catch phrase. Many of the systems
required to build a multi-tiered defense system exist only
on paper at the moment, while many of the arms control treaties
that he derides as being "just paper" include detailed provisions
for the monitoring and destruction of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons stockpiles. These treaties offer far more promise in the
short-term of reducing the chances of an attack on the United States
involving a weapon of mass destruction than an undeployed, unproven
missile defense system.
In preparation for the May 2002 summit between Putin and Bush,
Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Russian counterpart Igor
Ivanov met in mid-April to work out an agreement on nuclear reductions
for the two leaders to sign, followed by meetings between Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. The
main sticking points in the negotiations were whether or not these
reductions should be in the form of a legally binding document,
such as a treaty, and whether the excess warheads should be destroyed
or stored. Ultimately, a political compromise was struck which left
many of the substantive issues up in the air.
On May 24, 2002, Bush and Putin signed a treaty to reduce each
nation's nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads
each. While the treaty marks the first nuclear reduction agreement
in more than a decade, it may in fact be another decade before any
of these weapons are actually destroyed. The agreement sets no schedule
for reductions, as long as the desired level is reached by 2012.
In theory, either side could even increase deployed weapons between
now and 2012, as long as they come back down to the agreed levels
by the end of the ten-year period of the agreement. Also, the weapons
withdrawn from active service do not have to be destroyed - thousands
may be saved as part of the "active response" force the Bush administration
wants to maintain so that it can redeploy weapons on short notice.
As Michael R. Gordon made clear in an analysis piece in the May
14th edition of the New York Times, the agreement
leaves the Bush administration free to do pretty much anything it
wants to do in the field of nuclear weapons. While Gordon gets credit
for the most detailed early analysis of the pact, Jon Stewart of
"The Daily Show" on Comedy Central got to the heart of the problem
when he said that the agreement will move us from a position where
"instead of being able to blow the world up 11 or 12 times over,
we'll only be able to do it 4 or 5 times."
III. Inside the Missile Defense Lobby
Against this backdrop it is clear that President Bush's rush to
deploy missile defenses, whether they have been adequately tested
or not, has little to do with how best to defend the US in the 21st
century and everything to do with special interest groups that stand
to benefit from the program. This network of contractors, conservative
think tanks, and weapons scientists make up a formidable lobbying
force in Washington, and key members of this lobby have landed positions
as major policy makers in the Bush administration.
As illustrated in our earlier report, Tangled Web: The Marketing
of Missile Defense, missile defense underwent a miraculous political
revival in the 1990s. Every major milestone, from its inclusion
in Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey's "Contract With America" in 1994,
to the Rumsfeld Commission's extreme "worst case" assessment of
the "rogue state" missile threat in 1998, to the passage of pro-NMD
legislation in both houses of Congress in the spring of 1999, has
been propelled forward by a highly disciplined and effective coalition
of conservative organizations. This pro-NMD network includes the
Heritage Foundation and Empower America, neo-Reaganite Republicans
like Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and cash hungry
defense contractors. All of these are sectors are represented on
the Board of Advisors of the Center for Security Policy (CSP), which
serves as the de facto nerve center of the missile defense lobby.
As one industry executive told this study's principal author at
a DC breakfast briefing sponsored by defense contractor TRW, "We're
a tight knit group."
Founded by former Reagan administration official Frank Gaffney
in 1988, CSP has received funding from conservative donors like
the Coors family, Richard Mellon Scaife, and the Krieble family,
along with a healthy injection from corporate donors like Lockheed,
Boeing, Northrop Grumman, TRW and other major defense contractors
that stand to benefit from deployment of a missile defense system.
The Center's 2001 annual report boasts of the extraordinary number
of members of its National Security Advisory Council (formerly known
as its board of advisors) that "are now on leave for government
service and look forward to working every bit as closely with them
in their new capacities." In addition to Vice President Dick
Cheney, who was an early board member, more recent members now in
the Bush administration include Douglas Feith, J.D. Crouch, Richard
Perle, William Schneider, James Roche, Robert Joseph, and Dov Zakheim.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was the recipient of the
Center's "Keeper of the Flame" Award in 1998, has been a longtime
associate and financial contributor to the Center. During the Center's
annual "Keeper of the Flame" award fundraising dinner last November,
Rumsfeld remarked on the large number of Center associates serving
in the Bush administration, saying "I was thinking of calling a
staff meeting, but I think I'll wait until tomorrow."
At any given point in time, CSP has as many as eight executives
on its advisory board from missile defense contractors such as Lockheed
Martin and Boeing, or companies that lobby on their behalf. Dr.
Charles Kupperman, Vice President of Space and Strategic Missiles
Sector at Lockheed Martin, serves on the Center's Board of Directors.
At least 13% of the Center's revenue in 2001 was specifically from
defense corporations. In all, CSP has received $3 million in corporate
donations since its founding in 1988, with much of that money coming
from major weapons contractors. Nonetheless, the Center describes
itself as a "non-partisan organization committed to stimulating
and informing the national and international debates about all aspects
of security policy." Ironically, even though Gaffney's organization
claims to be carrying on the work of Ronald Reagan, many of the
arms control treaties that it is trying to dismantle, including
the ABM treaty (which has now lapsed), the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) treaty, and the START accords, were implemented by
Republican presidents, namely Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and
George Herbert Walker Bush.
CSP's advisory council could be more aptly called the "Star Wars
Hall of Fame." In addition to representatives of the top missile
defense contractors, the Center's advisory body includes longtime
missile defense advocates such as weapons scientist Edward Teller,
former Reagan Science advisor George Keyworth, and Elliott Abrams,
a former Reagan State Department official. From the world of conservative
foundations and think-tanks, the CSP advisory council boasts such
key figures as Bill Bennett and Jeanne Kirkpatrick of Empower America,
Heritage Foundation President Edward Feulner, and Keith Payne, President
of the National Institute for Public Policy. Rounding out the CSP
council are sitting members of Congress such as Rep. Curt Weldon
(R-PA), Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and Sen.
Bob Smith (R-NH) who provide a strong core of leadership on missile
defense issues on Capitol Hill.
The creation of the allegedly objective, bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission
to assess the ballistic missile threat facing the US was carried
out pursuant to an amendment that was inserted into the FY 1997
defense authorization bill by staunch CSP supporter and advisor
Rep. Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania. In addition to defense contractors
briefing members of the commission, CSP board members William Graham
and William Schneider also served on the panel.
In the summer of 2000, before President Clinton was to make a deployment
decision, the Center for Security Policy joined forces with the
Heritage Foundation, Empower America, and the High Frontier Organization
to launch a new campaign called the Coalition to Protect Americans
Now. The Coalition, funded by Colorado heiress Helen Krieble, launched
television ads calling on the President to deploy "a strong missile
defense –now." In addition to the ads, the group also had a web
site with a customized "missile threat calculator" so one could
find out which countries had ballistic missiles pointed their way,
able to reach their neighborhood (or so the site implied). However,
if one punched in a zip code to get their "customized" missile threat
assessment, the fine print indicated that for a number of these
imminent threats, the "missile is not yet operational, but it is
widely expected that it will have the ability to hit the continental
US when it is deployed." So much for truth in advertising.
The "missile threat calculator" has since reappeared on the web
site of "Americans for a Strong Defense," a new organization that
includes the corporate-backed Safe Foundation along with all of
the members of the now defunct Coalition to Protect Americans Now. In addition to the threat calculator, the site is exploiting
the September 11th attacks to back its agenda, saying,
"As painful as it was to lose 7,000 innocent souls in these attacks,
what if the terrorists bought one of North Korea's missiles?" The
site goes on to list resources for "nonpartisan information" which
include only conservative, pro-missile defense groups – the Heritage
Foundation, the Center for Security Policy, High Frontier, and the
The reference to terrorists buying North Korean missiles is typical
of the sort of illogical and irresponsible scare-mongering that
is routinely engaged in by true believers in the missile defense
cause. The notion of terrorists armed with a ballistic missile is
a frightening image, but it also so far out of the realm of possibility
as to verge on the ludicrous. As noted earlier, a long-range ballistic
missile is the least likely method a nation state would choose to
deliver a weapon of mass destruction to the United States, because
such an attack would subject it to a devastating retaliatory attack.
Given this reality, what would possess any nation to sell
a long-range ballistic missile to a terrorist group? It’s not as
if a handful of operatives could pack up a 40 to 60 ton multi-stage
missile and move it to another location without being detected.
And no national leader that wanted to survive would allow a terrorist
group to launch a long-range missile at the United States from his
or her own territory.
Is there an even vaguely plausible scenario involving "terrorists
buying a North Korean missile?" If the "Americans for a Strong Defense"
web site is referring to a shorter-range, non-ballistic missile
– which would be more portable – then the existence of a multi-tiered
ballistic missile defense shield would not matter, since it would
be unable to protect against a shorter-range missile. The most important
priority with respect to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
is making sure no terrorist network gets its hands on a nuclear
weapon or the materials to make one, a task for which a multi-tiered
missile defense is irrelevant. One is left with the unavoidable
impression that the references to September 11th and
terrorists buying ballistic missiles are pure propaganda, not carefully
considered analysis. This is a sobering thought when one considers
that the organizations promoting these misleading arguments have
such close ties with top Bush administration policymakers.
In addition to its influence in the creation of the first Rumsfeld
commission and its role in disseminating pro-missile defense propaganda,
CSP was instrumental in the formation of another key panel that
promoted the weaponization of space. Center advisory board member
Sen. Robert Smith (R-NH) served as the primary sponsor of legislation
that produced a second Rumsfeld Commission concerned with US national
security missions in outer space. As the Wall Street Journal
explained it, the Commission examined "what's at stake and what
it will take to ensure that the US remains pre-eminent" in outer
The report stated that "an attack on elements of US space systems
during a crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable
act," and claimed the US is at risk of a "space Pearl Harbor." The
report made a number of recommendations, ranging from the need to
develop new technologies to defend US space assets, to ensuring
that the US acts to shape the international political and legal
environment to keep the option of deploying weapons in space open,
to forming a Space Corps within the Air Force. The Commission's
findings and recommendations back up the US Space Command Vision
for 2020 document, which lays out the overall goal of US domination
of space to "protect US interests and investments," of which deployment
of a missile defense system is but the first step.
The makeup of the space commission was strikingly similar to the
first commission chaired by Mr. Rumsfeld, with the notable exception
that corporate personnel not only briefed the commission on key
points, but also served as official members. Its heavy reliance
on representatives of corporations with interests in military space
ventures and conservative ideologues associated with pro-Star Wars
think tanks calls into question the objectivity of the panel's findings.
Two of the thirteen members on the panel served on the previous
panel on ballistic missile threats – Donald Rumsfeld and William
Graham. Three panel members – Graham, Charles Horner, and Malcolm
Wallop – are board members of the Center for Security Policy, while
a fourth, Donald Rumsfeld, is a long-time friend and associate of
CSP. Rumsfeld was also on the Board of Empower America - which ran
misleading pro-Star Wars radio ads against incumbent Democratic
Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) in the 1998 elections, just a few months
after Rumsfeld's allegedly non-partisan analysis of the Third World
missile threat was released. Rumsfeld has also provided financial
support to the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Security Policy,
while Wallop, a long-time booster of missile defenses based in space,
is a Senior Fellow at Heritage.
As for corporate connections, no fewer than eight Pentagon defense
contractors were represented on the space commission. Panel member
Duane Andrews is Corporate Executive Vice President and Director
of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), which
received $1.7 billion in Pentagon contracts in 2001 and ranked as
the Pentagon's ninth top contractor. SAIC is the integration contractor
for the Air Force's Space and Missile System Center's advanced programs,
and its website proudly explains, "We support the Defense Department
and Services' space system planning, including the National Security
Space Architect, in determining the space systems that will support
the warfighter into the 21st century." SAIC also
has a role in the Pentagon's missile defense programs.
Space Commission members Gen. Howell Estes and Gen. Thomas Moorman
serve as Vice Chairman and member on the Board of Trustees, respectively,
for the Aerospace Corporation, "a leader in the application of space
technology." The "private, nonprofit" Aerospace Corporation ranked
as the Pentagon's 33rd contractor in 2001, receiving
more than $443 million in DOD contracts that year. Moorman is also
a partner in Booz-Allen Hamilton, ranked as the DOD's 36th
top contractor in 2001. Booz-Allen Hamilton received close to $435
million in 2001 for work on everything from missile defense to the
Milstar program and numerous classified programs.
Both Estes and Moorman serve on the Board of Directors at the Space
Foundation, another key institutional beachhead for the Star Wars
lobby. The foundation describes itself as a non-profit institute
devoted to promoting the use of outer space for commercial, scientific,
and military purposes, but its heavy military tilt is evidenced
by the fact that it receives funding from a large number of missile
defense contractors including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon,
TRW, Northrop Grumman, Spectrum Astro, Orbital Sciences, Honeywell,
the Aerospace Corporation, and SAIC. In addition to Estes and Moorman,
the Space Foundation's board of directors is chock full of executives
from other corporations that are invested in military-space initiatives,
including James Albaugh of Boeing, William Ballhaus of the Aerospace
Corporation, Guion Bluford Jr. from Northrop Grumman, Albert Smith
of Lockheed Martin, Gen. John L. Piotrowski of SAIC, and, until
recently, the former CEO of the Aerospace Corporation and current
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Pete Aldridge.
Space commission panel member Gen. Jay Garner is president of SY
Technology, located in Huntsville, Alabama – headquarters of the
Army's missile defense programs. SY Technology, a small business,
describes itself as having "unique expertise in space and missile
defense technologies, systems engineering and integration." Panel
member Admiral David Jeremiah is the president of Technology Strategies
& Alliances Corporation, which works on missile defense, space
launch systems, technology transfer, and battlespace management.
Admiral Jeremiah has also served on the Board of Directors for number
of Pentagon contractors, including Litton Industries (#6 on the
DOD's top contractors in FY 2000 - now part of Northrop Grumman)
and Alliant Techsystems (#27). Jeremiah also has a seat on Northrop
Grumman's Advisory Board.
It seems apparent that the numerous members of the Rumsfeld Space
Commission who are employed by and/or associated with defense contractors
have a serious and direct conflict of interest. The panel's
members and their affiliated companies stand to make millions –
if not billions – if their recommendations are carried out. But
as Charles Pena and Edward Hudgins from the Cato Institute point
out, the Space Commission received far less media attention than
the first Rumsfeld Commission. However, "it's conclusions and recommendations
could have a greater and broader impact now that Rumsfeld is Secretary
In October of 2001, the Bush administration echoed some of the
Space Commission findings in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review:
"A key objective ... is not only to ensure US ability to exploit
space for military purposes, but also as required to deny an adversary's
ability to do so." Rumsfeld also did some reorganizing. Aviation
Week reported, "In the bid to raise the profile for space issues,
the Policy Coordinating Committee for Space was created within the
White House National Security Council. That committee, to be chaired
by the NSC's Frank Miller, "will help to coordinate the civil and
commercial and defense-related aspects of space,'' Rumsfeld said.
He also created a small organization focused on developing and operating
highly classified systems, to be named the Office of Space Reconnaissance,
which will reside within the National Reconnaissance Office.
The NRO director will also serve as the Undersecretary of the Air
Force and be the Pentagon's top acquisition official for space projects.
That job went to former president/chief operating officer of Lockheed
Martin, Peter B. Teets, who was sworn in as Undersecretary of the
US Air Force and director of the National Reconnaissance Office
in January 2002.
As Theresa Hitchens of the Center for Defense Information has pointed
out, "Emerging Bush administration plans and policies are clearly
aimed at making the US the first nation to deploy space-based weapons
... Unfortunately the Bush administration has done little thinking
- at least publicly - about the potential for far-reaching military,
political and economic ramifications of a US move to break the taboo
against weaponizing space."
Like the two Rumsfeld Commissions, the Bush administration's Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), released in January 2002, reflects the thinking
of far-right conservative organizations and nuclear weapons contractors.
The NPR drew many of its findings from a report released in January
2001 by the National Institute for Public Policy, entitled, "Rationale
and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control." Nuclear
warfighting strategist and former Hudson Institute researcher Keith
Payne founded NIPP in the early 1980s, and served as a director
for the January 2001 study.
In general, the NIPP report calls future security threats to the
US unknown and unpredictable. Therefore, the report concludes that
the US must maintain its nuclear arsenal, and the ability to design,
build and test new nuclear weapons. The report asserts that conventional
weapons are inadequate replacements for nuclear weapons because
they do not have the same "destructive power." As a solution the
report recommends the development of "low-yield, precision-guided
nuclear weapons" – in other words, a nuclear weapon the US can actually
The NIPP panel frowns on arms control treaties because, "US policymakers
today cannot know the strategic environment of 2005, let alone 2010
or 2020. There is no basis for expecting that the conditions that
may permit deep nuclear reductions today will continue in the future."
Not surprisingly, NIPP has a similar make-up to the Center for
Security Policy. In fact, nearly half of the members of NIPP's
board of directors – 6 out of 13 – are also on the advisory council
or Board of Directors of the Center for Security Policy. However,
less is known about the corporate connections of NIPP. The Institute
notes on its web site that "the National Institute research and
educational program is supported by government, corporate, and private
foundation grants and contracts," but no breakdown is provided and
no donors are listed.
Three of the members who worked on the NIPP report contributed
to the administration's Nuclear Posture Review and now serve in
the Bush administration. These are Stephen Cambone, who now serves
as Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation at
the Pentagon; Stephen Hadley, the Deputy National Security Advisor
in the Bush White House; and Robert Joseph, who deals with counterproliferation
issues at the National Security Council. In October 2001, Keith
Payne was appointed chairman of the Pentagon's Deterrence Concepts
Advisory Panel, which will have a role in helping the Bush administration
decide how to implement the guidance provided in the Nuclear Posture
Review. Most recently, Payne was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Forces and Policy.
Beyond funding and sitting on boards of think-tanks and organizations
that promote its agenda, the defense industry pushes its priorities
the old fashioned way as well – through political contributions
and well-paid, well-connected lobbyists.
IV. Defense Contractors: Cashing in on Missile
During the past decade, the major weapons makers have made generous
campaign contributions to key members of Congress and invested tens
of millions of dollars in their Washington, DC lobbying operations.
Since 1995, shortly after the Republicans took control of the House,
weapons industry Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions
have favored Republicans over Democrats by a two-to-one margin.
From 2000 to the present, the defense industry as a whole has given
more than $10 million in PAC contributions, with the "Big 4" – Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and TRW – accounting for $3.9 million.
The defense industry gave out more than $6 million in soft money
contributions in the 2000 and 2002 election cycle, with the Big
4 accounting for $3.5 million of the total. The Big 4 contractors
also receive more than 65% of the missile defense contracts doled
out each year (see Table III, below).
As the 2000 presidential campaign entered its final lap, the contractors
were busy courting both parties, but they showed a decided "tilt"
towards Republican candidates, and for good reason. Candidates on
both the Republican and Democratic tickets supported increased defense
spending, but Republicans were far more likely to support early
deployment of an ambitious and costly missile defense system. Although
the industry's $190,000 in contributions to George W. Bush were
a "drop in the bucket" compared to the tens of millions of dollars
he raised in his drive for the presidency, the fact that Bush received
more than four and one-half times as much defense industry money
as Al Gore suggests that the industry had a clear preference for
the Republican standard bearer. Since candidate Gore actually promised
to spend more overall on the Pentagon than candidate Bush, Bush's
pro-missile defense stance appeared to be a major distinguishing
feature from the standpoint of his supporters in the weapons industry.
Lockheed Martin – the nation's largest defense contractor with
a hand in multiple missile defense projects – donated $100,000 to
both the GOP and the Democratic conventions. The company has also
worked overtime to endear itself to former Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott, R-Mississippi, kicking in $60,000 for a "Lott Hop" fundraiser
at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia and pledging
$1 million to the "Trent Lott Leadership Institute" at the University
of Mississippi. At the Democratic convention, Lockheed was one of
two dozen companies sponsoring Senator John Breaux's (D-LA) "Mardi
Gras Goes Hollywood" party.
Table III: Defense Contractors Spending, Spending,
Spending - PAC Contributions, Soft Money, Lobbying Expenditures
PAC Contributions from the top 4 missile defense contractors
election (%R - %D)
election (%R - %D)
$706,926 (58% - 42%)
$394,215 (56% - 44%)
$1,017,719 (64% - 36%)
$607,050 (62% - 38%)
$493,925 (63% - 37%)
$324,500 (60% - 40%)
$267,174 (70% - 30%)
$127,150 (67% - 33%)
Soft Money Contributions from the top 4 missile defense contractors
2000 election (%R - %D)
2002 election (%R - %D)
$828,498 (56% - 44%)
$404,032 (58% - 44%)
$1,152,350 (60% - 40%)
$436,950 (60% - 40%)
$324,140 (62% - 38%)
$219,890 (54% - 46%)
$193,425 (95% - 5%)
$15,700 (100% - 0%)
Lobbying Expenditures for the top 4 missile defense contractors
Source: All data compiled from the website of the Center for Responsive
Politics in Washington, DC.
Boeing, currently in charge of a $2.2 billion contract for the
Lead Systems Integrator for the GMD program, donated $100,000 to
the Democratic National Convention. In total, Boeing has supplied
more $2.3 million in PAC and soft money to candidates and the parties
in the 1999/2000 and 2002/2002 election cycles. During the 2000
elections James Albaugh, president of Boeing's Space and Communications
Group, told the Washington Post, "We're going to be running
some ads very soon, and we've had some discussions with the customer
[the Pentagon] on how we can go out and try to educate a lot of
folks about national missile defense." Loren Thompson, a defense
analyst at the Lexington Institute, and several ardent supporters
such as Rep. Curt Weldon and Frank Gaffney, thought that was a good
thing. Thompson said, "The defense contractors and the government
have to do a better job of explaining the technology and the mission
of national missile defense. What's happening is that critics are
taking advantage of all the secrecy about missile defense to drive
the public debate."
The smaller of the Big 4 have also been cultivating good relations
with both parties. Together, Raytheon and TRW have dished out almost
$2 million in campaign contributions in recent election cycles.
During the Democratic convention in Los Angeles, Raytheon, presently
developing the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (the weapon part) of
the ground-based system, co-hosted a fundraiser on Santa Monica
pier for members of the conservative Democrat "Blue Dog" caucus.
Each sponsor reportedly donated $50,000 for the bash. TRW threw
a luncheon at the Philadelphia Union Club during the Republican
Convention for Senator John Warner (R-VA) who at the time was the
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Eighty-five percent
of TRW's campaign contributions during the last two election cycles
have been targeted at the GOP.
Like many major campaign contributors, missile defense contractors
give donations to candidates who are in a position to do the most
good for them. According to the Center for Responsive Politics,
five of the top six donors to members of the House Armed Services
Committee during the 1999/2000 election cycle were major nuclear
weapons and missile defense contractors: Lockheed Martin, $212,834
(1st); General Dynamics, $201,707 (2nd); Raytheon,
$129,150 (4th); Boeing, $122,753 (5th); and
Northrop Grumman, $108,350 (6th). A similar pattern emerged
in the Senate Armed Services Committee, where five of the top seven
donors were major nuclear or missile defense contractors: Lockheed
Martin, $203,388 (1st); General Dynamics, $120,700 (2nd);
Raytheon, $115,401 (3rd); Boeing, $93,255 (5th);
and Northrop Grumman, $68,100 (7th).
The Bush-Cheney 2001 Inauguration committee took in a record $40
million. Of that Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon gave a total
of $425,000. These figures could increase, as some of the donations
have yet to be disclosed.
Political Action Committee contributions and soft money donations
that flow to the candidates and parties have caps, but lobbying
expenditures have no limits. In fact, in 2000, the most recent year
for which full statistics are available, the top four missile defense
contractors spent more than $25 million on lobbyists. From 1997
to 2000, these four defense contractors racked up $74 million in
lobbying expenditures. While 2001 lobbying figures are not yet available,
reports indicate a huge surge in spending. One source suggests that
military contractors may spend nearly $60 million on lobbying between
2001 and 2002 alone, because a number of "big" weapons decisions
are expected to be made by the Bush administration.
Lockheed Martin, hoping to get a greater role in missile defense
and corner the market on next generation fighter jets, increased
its lobbying expenditures by $10 million from 1999 to 2000. It looks
like their investment paid off: last October the Pentagon awarded
Lockheed what could turn out to be the largest military contract
in history - a contract with the potential value of $200 billion
for the Joint Strike Fighter. In an effort to recover their losses,
Boeing, the losing bidder in the JSF competition, has stepped up
the activities of its Washington office, which is headed by Rudy
F. de Leon, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the final years of
the Clinton administration, and coordinates the activities of 34
in-house and more than 50 outside lobbyists working on the company's
Boeing also enlisted the help of Bonner & Associates to help
build the case for missile defense, and went to the "source" by
employing Alan Myer, who helped write Reagan's famous 1983 Star
Wars speech. One of Myer's assignments was to coach five pro-Star
Wars scientists in how to deal with the media more effectively.
Those scientists appeared at a May 2001 Washington news conference
organized by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Rep. Bud Cramer (D-AL),
in conjunction with the SAFE Foundation, to address the technical
questions about the Pentagon's missile defense programs. Weldon
proclaimed, "The testimony of these top-notch scientists should
put to rest any hesitations that skeptics have tried to pin on our
technological capability ... too often, we only hear from one side
of the debate in the science community - the left side." Weldon
continued, "Now the American people can hear the truth from men
who actually know the scientific progress we have made. These scientific
leaders can refute - chapter and verse - the Chicken Little views
of the liberal scientific community."
In addition to hiring former House Appropriations Committee Chair
Rep. Bob Livingston (R-LA), Raytheon was one of a handful of defense
firms to support the "Defending the Northeast, America and Our Allies
from Ballistic Missile Attack" symposium held in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania
in June 2001. The conference was organized by Representative Curt
Weldon and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). World
Policy Institute Senior Research Associate Frida Berrigan attended
the conference and counted over 70 participants from Boeing, Lockheed
Martin, Raytheon to smaller missile defense companies like Alliant
Missile Products and Science Applications International Corporation,
out of a list of 200 or so. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing and
a local defense company all had elaborate displays in the basement
of the conference, which was dubbed "Independence Hall" for the
occasion. Raytheon even brought a half-size model of its exoatmospheric
kill vehicle (EKV).
Speakers at the Valley Forge event included Lt. General Ronald
Kadish, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; Ambassador Henry
Cooper, the Chairman of the Board of High Frontier; Baker Spring
of the Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of Center for Security
Policy; Lee Wilbur from Boeing; and Douglas Graham from Lockheed
More recently, in April 2002, a number of missile defense contractors
co-sponsored events at the Space Foundation's 18th National
Space Symposium attended by "top leaders from industry, government,
NASA and the military," in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Lockheed
Martin co-sponsored the "festive" opening ceremony, Spectrum Astro
co-sponsored the concluding gala "Space Technology Hall of Fame
Dinner," and Orbital Sciences Corporation co-sponsored the Space
Foundation's Corporate Partnership Dinner. Missile defense contractors
are already lining up to sponsor next year's event. TRW will do
the Hall of Fame Dinner, Boeing will again sponsor the Exhibit Center,
and Spectrum Astro will co-sponsor the opening ceremony.
Speakers at this year’s space symposium included Undersecretary
of the Air Force Peter Teets; Jeff Harris of Lockheed Martin's Space
Systems Company; NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe; Dr. William Ballhaus,
Jr., president and CEO of the Aerospace Corporation; Tim Hannemann
of TRW; Brewster Shaw of Boeing; and Carl Fisher of Northrop Grumman.
Former Lockheed Martin executive Teets has openly advocated the
weaponization of space. At a March 6, 2002 conference in Washington,
DC, he asserted that "weapons will go into space. It's a question
of time. And we need to be at the forefront of that."
Each August for the past four years, missile defense experts and
industry representatives have met in August in Huntsville, Alabama
for the "Space and Missile Defense Conference and Exhibition," sponsored
by the weapons industry's largest trade association the National
Defense Industrial Association (NDIA). Other sponsors include the
US Army Space and Missile Defense Association and the Air Defense
Artillery Association, with the US Army Space and Missile Defense
Command participating. This year's theme is "Space and Missile Defense
– Key to Global Security."
The defense industry has also helped finance a series of pro-missile
defense breakfasts on Capitol Hill in conjunction with the National
Defense University Foundation and the NDIA. Each fall and spring,
approximately 20 "breakfast briefings" are held for defense industry
representatives, Hill staffers, lobbyists and an occasional reporter
or two. Not only does the arms industry's largest trade association,
NDIA, support the series, but each breakfast receives support from
a specific corporation like Bechtel, TRW or Lockheed Martin. Speakers
are primarily missile defense supporters, with an occasional skeptic
like Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) to give the illusion of balance. Past
briefings have featured prominent missile defense boosters such
as Rep. Curt Weldon, Sen. Jon Kyl, Steve Cambone and John Bolton.
Obviously, the defense industry's spending on campaign contributions,
lobbying, and networking has reaped substantial dividends. Through
privileged access and inside connections that are reinforced by
the kinds of exclusive conferences and briefings described above,
the major weapons makers are positioning themselves to receive the
greatest possible benefits from increases in missile defense spending
and an expanded nuclear weapons complex under the Bush administration.
(For more information about the beneficiaries of Bush's new nuclear
policy see our May 2002 report: About Face: The Role of the Arms
Lobby In the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades
of US Nuclear Policy)
Listed below (see next page) are the top ten recipients of federal
prime contracts clearly related to missile defense programs. These
figures are a conservative estimate based on CD-roms from Eagle
Eye Publishers. In some cases, contracts related to missile defense
are not identified as such in the Pentagon's contracting database
which serves as the basis for the Eagle Eye data. In addition, the
chart does not include subcontracts given out by the prime contractors
Table IV: Top Ten Defense Companies Receiving
the Largest Dollar Amounts of Pentagon Missile Defense Contracts
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTL
In addition to the figures cited in Table IV, the following long-term
contracts have been awarded in recent years for major components
of the missile defense system. Many of the obligations cited here
will be spent out over a number of years, so they are not reflected
in the Top Ten Contractors table (see appendix for additional details):
- Bechtel Corporation was awarded a $60 million contract
from Boeing for construction of missile interceptor silos at Fort
Greely, Alaska. The work will begin mid-June.
- Alliant Techsystems is the solid propulsion supplier
on a team led by Orbital Sciences Corp for the ground-based system.
The value of Alliant's work on the program could be $300 million.
- Computer Sciences Corp was awarded a contract modification
for continued scientific and engineering technical assistance
support to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Joint Program Office.
The continued effort is estimated at
- Flour Alaska, Incorporated was awarded a contract, which,
if certain options are exercised, could exceed $250 million. Awarded
by the Army Corps of Engineers, the contract is for construction
of a base for operationally realistic missile defense testing,
including four buildings at Fort Greely to house electronics,
communications, and maintenance equipment associated with the
- Lockheed Martin received a contract totaling $326.6 million
for the continued production of the PAC-3 missile, Lockheed has
received production orders totaling more than $850 million.
- TRW was named the prime contractor for the Pentagon's
Space-Based Infrared System Low program and signed an initial
contract worth $665 million with the MDA. The system is expected
to cost more than $6 billion over the next decade.
- Boeing and SAIC were awarded a $13.5 million contract
for a feasibility study to develop architecture solutions that
fully integrate NATO capabilities into an effective, affordable,
theater ballistic missile defense. SAIC will serve as the prime
contractor, Boeing will lead the team as prime contractor in subsequent
- Lockheed Martin was awarded a $420 million contract modification
to develop a prototype tactical radar, called SPY-1E, as a critical
component of the nation's sea-based midcourse missile defense
- Boeing was awarded "a $268,552,697 contract modification
to implement changes as a result of a program transition to the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and directed schedule risk assessment.
The contract is renamed from 'Program Definition and Risk Reduction'
to 'Block 2004,' and the program is restructured to a capabilities-based,
spiral development, block upgrade approach. The program is extended
one year based on the MDA-approved schedule risk assessment. This
action provides additional integration and flight test activity,
laser test tool simulation, Battle Management-c41 interoperability
- Raytheon has been awarded a $38.6 million US Army contract
to develop the laser radar (LADAR) technology base for the next
generation of interceptors for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
- Boeing and Lockheed Martin will both work as systems
integrators for the Bush administration’s multi-tiered missile
defense system, with Boeing working on overall systems
integration and Lockheed Martin working on integrating
"battle management, command, control, and communications capabilities."
Each company received an initial contract of $23 million in February
of 2002, with major follow-on contracts expected (such as the
$268 million "risk reduction" contract to Boeing cited above).
IV. A. Inside Influence: Will Defense Industry
Ties Shape Missile Defense Policies?
In addition to the influence they are able to exert through campaign
spending and lobbying, major missile defense contractors have an
even more immediate form of leverage over Bush administration military
policies resulting from the large number of former defense industry
executives that have been appointed to major policymaking positions
in the administration. In our May 2002 report, About Face,
the World Policy Institute documented the presence of 32 former
executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top defense contractors
in policymaking positions in the White House and cabinet-level agencies.
By comparison, our analysis of administration ties to major energy
companies -- an area of policy in which the issue of potential conflicts
of interest has been raised consistently in the media and in Congress
-- found 21 appointees who had been executives, consultants, or
major shareholders in this sector.
For purposes of gauging the potential clout of the missile defense
lobby within the Bush administration, it is important to note that
17 of the defense-related appointees serving in the White House
or key agencies were linked to major missile defense contractors
like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, which is poised
to dramatically increase its presence in the missile defense sector
if its takeover of TRW is approved.
As befits its status as the nation’s largest defense contractor,
Lockheed Martin has more connections with the Bush administration
than any of the other major missile defense contractors. Officials
with indirect connections to the company include Vice President
Dick Cheney, whose wife Lynne V. Cheney served on the Lockheed Martin
board of directors from 1994 until January 2001, accumulating more
than $500,000 in deferred director’s fees in the process; Deputy
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who worked at Shea and
Gardner, a DC law firm that represents Lockheed Martin (along with
numerous other corporate clients); and Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson, who had Lockheed Martin as a client when he was a partner
at the Atlanta-based law firm King and Spalding. Administration
officials with more direct links to Lockheed Martin include Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Otto Reich, who worked
as a paid lobbyist for the company when it was seeking to reverse
the U.S. ban on sales of high tech weapons to Latin America; and
the top two officials at the Department of Transportation, Norman
Mineta and Michael Jackson, both of whom served as Vice-Presidents
at Lockheed Martin before coming to the department.
The ex-Lockheed Martin executives with the most direct connections
to nuclear weapons and missile defense policy are former company
Chief Operating Officer Peter B. Teets, who is now Under Secretary
of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), a post that includes making decisions on everything from
the acquisition of reconnaissance satellites to space-based elements
of missile defense; and Everet Beckner, who served as the chief
executive of Lockheed Martin’s division that helped run the United
Kingdom’s Atomic Weapons Establishment under contract to the British
government, and is now Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs
at the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration,
in charge of the maintenance, development, and production of nuclear
Northrop Grumman, which has a growing interest in missile defense
now that it is in the process of taking over TRW, also has multiple
links to the Bush administration. The company’s most important connection
is Secretary of the Air Force James Roche, a former company Vice
President. Joining Roche in the Air Force hierarchy is fellow Northrop
Grumman alumnus Nelson F. Gibbs, who served as corporate comptroller
at the company from 1991-1999 and is now Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Logistics. Other
key company connections include Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, Pentagon Comptroller Dov Zakheim, Vice-Presidential Chief
of Staff I. Lewis Libby, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration
director Sean O’Keefe, all of whom had consulting contracts or served
as paid advisory board members for Northrop Grumman prior to joining
the administration. In addition, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith’s law firm, Feith and Zell, represented defense industry
clients, including Northrop Grumman and Loral Space.
Other administration officials with ties to missile defense contractors
include Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a former member
of Raytheon’s board of directors; and White House Chief of Staff
Karl Rove, who owned between $100,000 and a quarter of a million
dollars of stock in Northrop Grumman prior to joining the administration.
In addition to these widespread connections throughout the White
House and key agencies, defense corporations have particularly useful
ties to decisionmakers who will be involved in shaping and monitoring
the missile defense program at the Pentagon. As part of what one
Pentagon insider has described as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
"Department of Defense, Inc.," approach to management, he has established
a "Senior Executive Committee" that will "function as a business
board of directors for the department." Members of the committee
include Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under
Secretary of Defense Edward "Pete" Aldridge, Secretary of the Air
Force James Roche, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, and Secretary
of the Army Thomas White, with input as appropriate from Pentagon
Comptroller Dov Zakheim. While there have been some questions
about how well Rumsfeld has been able to implement the "business
board of directors" concept, one area in which his executive council
has been given important authority is in the oversight of the missile
defense program. As part of the "Freedom to Manage" initiative under
which the programs of the Missile Defense Agency have been exempted
from normal rules regarding the development of performance requirements,
cost control, and independent technical scrutiny, the executive
council will assume oversight responsibilities. Aside from Rumsfeld,
the other six members of the council all served as executives or
consultants to defense contractors prior to coming to the Pentagon.
Three of those six – Wolfowitz, Zakheim, and Roche – had ties to
With principal oversight provided by a council composed almost
entirely of former associates of Pentagon contractors, and questions
of how to design the testing program delegated to designated "system
integrators" Lockheed Martin and Boeing -- working with teams of
engineers draw from Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General Dynamics,
and TRW – the potential for conflicts of interest in the Bush administration’s
missile defense program is enormous.
V. Who Will Benefit? – Geographic Concentration
of Missile Defense Spending
Despite contractor claims of the potential economic stimulus provided
by missile defense spending, contracts to date have benefited only
a handful of states and communities. For the four years from 1998-2001,
91% of missile defense contract awards went to just four states
– Alabama, California, Virginia, and Colorado. Even allowing
for subcontracting and the geographic expansion of the missile defense
network once key systems move into the production stage, missile
defense will by and large be a "boutique" program in which relatively
small numbers of highly sophisticated systems are produced in a
few key areas (for example, the $11 billion Airborne Laser Program
is thus far slated to produce only 7 aircraft). The vast majority
of states that help foot the bill for missile defense will see little
or nothing in the way of jobs or income flowing from the program.
Table V: Top Ten States Receiving Missile Defense
VI. Bipartisan Support?
VI. A. Profiling Key Missile Defense Advocates
Missile defense, an issue which split the Republican and Democratic
parties during the Reagan era, achieved broad bipartisan support
inside the Beltway by the end of the Clinton administration. But
it seems clear that this increased support had more to do with short-term
politics – i.e., Democrats not wanting to be viewed as "soft on
defense" – than it did with any strong belief in the technological
promise of NMD. On the Republican side of the aisle, a core group
of Reaganite true believers has managed to impose a remarkable level
of party unity on the missile defense issue, which has become a
virtual litmus test for Republican Congressional and Presidential
The most vocal supporter in Congress, by far, is Representative
Curt Weldon (R-PA). As noted earlier in this report, Weldon was
instrumental in the creation of the first Rumsfeld Commission, and
is a board member of the Center for Security Policy and the Safe
Foundation. He's been a featured speaker (numerous times) at the
breakfast briefings sponsored by the National Defense University.
During the 2000 Republican convention, Weldon created a "Congressional
Village" at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, at which 100 Republican
House members and their families stayed for the duration of the
meeting. The site included a weapons display that was transported,
set up, and maintained at Pentagon expense. Weapons on display included
a Boeing V-22 Osprey, a Lockheed Martin Theater High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) missile, and a Northrop Grumman Predator unmanned
aerial vehicle. The "village" was financed in part by defense contractors
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Litton.
In June of 2000, Weldon served as the keynote speaker at an industry-backed
"Year 2000 Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition" that was
held downtown at the Wyndham Franklin Plaza Hotel in Philadelphia.
The event was sponsored by Lockheed Martin and co-chaired by the
President of the company's Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems
Unit, which is based in Moorestown, New Jersey, a few towns east
of Philadelphia in southern New Jersey, commuting distance from
Weldon's exploits on behalf of missile defense contractors have
not gone unrewarded. During both the year 2000 and 2002 election
cycles, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon were among Weldon's
top 20 donors. In all, Rep. Weldon received donations totaling more
than $157,000 from defense contractors during the 1999/2000 and
2001/2002 election cycles. These contributions represented roughly
one out of every five dollars received by Weldon during these two
election cycles. Weldon also received substantial funding from missile
defense contractors and their employees working on missile defense
projects near the Army's missile defense command in Huntsville,
Alabama. While most House members raise the majority of their money
in their home states, Weldon's second most lucrative source of funds
in the 1999/2000 election cycle was Huntsville, Alabama, which generated
$31,925 in donations for his campaign from executives and employees
of missile defense contractors. Many of these donations were from
employees of smaller missile defense firms like Colsa, Inc., which
depend on missile defense spending for a much larger share of their
overall revenue than do defense behemoths like Lockheed Martin or
Despite his close working relationship with missile defense contractors
and his lead role in missile defense advocacy organizations, Weldon
apparently views himself as an unbiased participant in missile defense
debates. This became apparent in a July 10, 2000 appearance on "The
Newshour with Jim Lehrer," when he repeatedly interrupted missile
defense critic Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT and accused him of having
"somewhat of a bias" because he "is adamantly against missile defense."
It apparently didn't occur to Weldon that given his close working
relationship with missile defense lobbying groups, his energetic
embrace of pork barrel politics, and his acceptance of tens of thousands
of dollars of contributions from missile defense contractors, most
people would assume the he was the one with the bias, not
Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), is another ardent supporter of missile defense.
Kyl's most notable accomplishment to date has been his role as the
lead organizer in the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
in October 1999. In conjunction with Senators Paul Coverdell of
Georgia, Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas, and Jeff Sessions of Alabama,
Kyl distributed briefing books with materials slanted against the
treaty. As Stephen Schwartz of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
states, these materials were "no doubt supplied or recommended by
the Center for Security Policy." Kyl also brought former senior
officials from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to meet
with the senators. The Senator from Arizona acknowledged at a February
2001 CSP conference on the blocking of the test ban treaty in the
Senate that he "gave so many briefings that some of my colleagues
were sick of seeing me by the end." Despite the overwhelming public
support for the treaty, Kyl was successful in quietly lining up
his most conservative colleagues against the treaty in the spring
of 1999 before proceeding to cajole, pressure and threaten moderate
Republican Senators to vote against the treaty as well. Many commented
at the time that the CTBT defeat was just a warm up for taking on
the ABM Treaty.
Sen. Kyl has been a long time advisor to Frank Gaffney's Center
for Security Policy and was even awarded the Center's prestigious
"Keeper of the Flame" in September of 1994. During Kyl's acceptance
speech at the gala dinner he touched on many of the Center's most
important themes, including the need to "adopt strong national security
policies," the absence of "any defense against the growing threat
of ballistic missile attack," and the Clinton Administration's "dangerous
effort to 'denuclearize' the United States – a program that is comprehensively
eliminating the personnel, facilities and capabilities necessary
to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent."
In maintaining his commitment to CSP, Kyl is an avid supporter
of the sea-based missile defense option. During a Senate debate
in June of 1998 Kyl addressed the issue saying:
Mr. President, many of us believe that the AEGIS Option is
most expeditious, capable and cost-effective way to begin providing
ballistic missile defense – not only for our forces and allies
but for the American people, as well. This is the case because
Nation has already spent nearly $50 billion building and deploying
virtually the entire infrastructure we need to field the first
stage of a
world-wide anti-missile system.
In an April 2000 letter, Senator Kyl and other Republican signatories
urged President Clinton and Defense Secretary William Cohen not
to give away too much in negotiations with Russia over the ABM Treaty
amendments. The letter also encouraged the US to keep all options
open for a more extensive, multi-tiered missile defense system that
would use air-, sea-, and land-based assets in ballistic missile
defense that they "believe are necessary to achieve a fully-effective
defense against the full range of possible threats." Congressional
Quarterly depicts Kyl as standing out "for his unblinking devotion
to reducing spending on the federal government's domestic functions
while pouring dollars into defense."
Kyl is not alone in his advocacy of the missile defense cause in
the Senate. In an expose on Huntsville, Alabama in Mother Jones,
investigative reporter Ken Silverstein points out that the Space
and Missile Defense Working Group - an association of some 150 business,
military, and civic officials in Huntsville, Alabama - "coordinates
its efforts with Alabama's congressional delegation, whose members
include vocal missile defense advocates like Republican Senator
Richard Shelby. In return for political support, local companies
contribute generously to the campaigns of missile defense boosters;
they also frequently hire alumni of the Pentagon agencies that oversee
the program. It's the military-industrial complex writ small, or,
in [Joe] Fitzgerald's apt one-word description, a 'circle.'"
Fitzgerald is a member, consultant, or officer of some two dozen
local organizations, from the executive committee of the local Republican
Party to the Space and Missile Defense Working Group.
During Donald Rumsfeld's May 21, 2002 testimony before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, Sen. Shelby assured Rumsfeld that he would
work with his colleagues to restore the $814 million missile defense
funding cut from the budget. According to the Center for Responsive
Politics, for the 1997-2002 election cycle, weapons makers ranked
#2 among major industries in overall contributions to Sen. Shelby,
with total donations of $288,150. Sen. Shelby also gains clout with
his colleagues by running the Defend America PAC, which draws its
donations largely from missile defense contractors centered around
the Army's missile and space command in Huntsville.
A top recipient of funds from Shelby's Defend America PAC has been
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), the ranking Republican on the Senate
Appropriations Committee and a staunch advocate of missile defense
projects in his home state ($10,000). Stevens' top contributors
are virtually all defense contractors, topping the list is Boeing
which gave $32,400 for the 1997-2002 election cycle, followed by
$17,000 from Northrop Grumman, $14,000 from General Dynamics, $12,500
from SAIC, and $10,000 from both Lockheed Martin and TRW. Total
defense industry contributions to Stevens for the most recent election
cycle total $208,450.
Not so coincidentally, four of the top five Senate recipients of
weapons industry donations for 1997-2002 have been major missile
defense advocates: Republican Senators Richard Shelby (#1 at $288,150)
and Jeff Sessions (#5 at $160,000) of Alabama, Senator Ted Stevens,
the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee (#3, at 208,450),
and Senator John Warner, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services
Committee (#2 at $276,999). Shelby, Sessions, and Stevens all have
major missile defense facilities either in place or under construction
in their states (the Huntsville, Alabama missile defense R&D
complex and the Fort Greely and Shemya Island radar and ground-based
interceptor "test bed" facilities being built in Alaska). For his
part, Senator Warner has been a key player in major legislative
battles over missile defense. He led the fight to defeat an FY 2001
amendment by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) that would have required
more realistic testing in the missile defense program. Warner was
also the key player in the recent, successful effort on the Senate
floor to restore $814 million in ballistic missile defense funding
which had been cut by the Senate Armed Services Committee. For
further details on defense industry campaign contributions, see
Tables VI and VII, below.
Although defense industry contributions have tilted Republican
since they took control of the House of Representatives in 1994,
key Democrats also receive large contributions from major contractors.
For example, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), a vocal supporter
of increased military spending and one of the first Democrats to
co-sponsor the pro-missile defense "Defend America Act" in the mid-1990s,
received $92,700 from Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop
Grumman, Boeing, and other major defense contractors in the 1999/2000
election cycle, according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive
VI. B. Despite Lobbying Pressure, Critics in
Congress Speak Out
In addition to the reorganization of the Missile Defense Agency,
the removal of procurement procedures and budget constraints, and
changes in the required reporting procedures for missile defense
programs, the Bush administration has taken it one step further
- they will now withhold information on flight tests on some of
the long-range programs. The Pentagon announced it will continue
to give one week notice before tests, and publicize whether or not
they were successful, but it will not provide data on decoys and
the test targets.
But this time, there are signs of life in Congress. As Senator
Jack Reed (D-RI), chairman of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee
that oversees the project noted, "They're attempting to avoid the
usual oversight by Congress, the media ... and the larger scientific
In mid-May the Senate Armed Services Committee cut more than $800
million from the administration's missile defense plan and eliminated
the $15.5 million in funding for the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator."
These issues were taken up on the floor of the Senate in early July,
as administration supporters tried to restore funding for these
programs. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld threatened that the
President would veto any version of the authorization bill that
did not restore the cuts made in the Missile Defense Agency's budget
and eliminate a provision inserted by Sen. Reed that would require
the Pentagon's Office of Testing and Evaluation to conduct an independent
review of every missile defense test, as had been the practice until
Rumsfeld and MDA Director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish proposed to limit
scrutiny of missile defense tests earlier this year.
When the full Senate acted on the FY 2003 defense authorization
bill on June 27th of this year, the administration achieved
its major objective – restoring the $814 million that had been cut
from missile defense spending by the Senate Armed Services Committee,
pending availability of funds pursuant to a recalculation of inflation
in Pentagon programs and the President’s decision to use those funds
for missile defense rather than anti-terrorism efforts. Because
the restoration of funding is conditional, administration officials
have threatened that President Bush may still veto the defense authorization
bill if it emerges from a House-Senate conference with the missile
defense formula laid out by the Senate (the House fully funded the
administration’s request without conditions).
While it appears that the administration will get the funding it
requested for missile defense, critics of the administration’s nuclear
and missile defense policies won a number of interim victories on
the floor of the Senate. An Armed Services Committee decision to
eliminate $15.5 million for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
(a proposed low-yield, "bunker busting" nuclear bomb) was not challenged
on the Senate floor, nor was the committee’s decision not to approve
funds requested to speed preparations for a resumption of nuclear
testing. On the issues of missile defense oversight and transparency,
the armed services committee’s call for independent operational
assessments and budgetary analyses, and detailed cost and schedule
reporting on missile defense programs was allowed to stand in the
final Senate version of the bill. An amendment by Senators Jack
Reed and Carl Levin to limit the Pentagon’s ability to impose a
veil of secrecy over missile defense tests also remains in the final
Senate bill, as does an amendment by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
and Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK) to bar any spending on nuclear warheads
for use on possible "nuclear-tipped" interceptors for missile defense.
These issues will be fought out in an upcoming House-Senate conference
on the defense authorization bill which is expected to occur either
later this month or in September.
In a move that may split the opponents of missile defense, MDA
Director Ronald Kadish's suggested that his agency may move rapidly
toward the deployment of a limited sea-based missile defense system
that could be fielded as early as 2004. The move, which could be
finalized as early as the end of this summer once the results of
the next test of a sea-based interceptor are reviewed, would involve
a major increase in the $3.3 billion currently set aside for sea-based
defenses over the next five years. In an interview with the Wall
Street Journal, Kadish suggested that the deployment plan could
involve spending $5 billion to equip up to half a dozen existing
Aegis cruisers for the missile defense role, plus perhaps $10 billion
more if the Pentagon decides to build new, additional ships to carry
The contractors that would benefit from a move towards sea-based
defenses include Lockheed Martin, which makes the radar systems
for the system at its Moorestown, New Jersey facility, and Raytheon,
which will build the interceptor missiles. If new ships are built,
there could well be a battle among major military shipyards in Maine
(General Dynamics), Pascagoula, Mississippi (Northrop Grumman's
Litton Division), Virginia (Newport News Shipbuilding), and Louisiana
(Avondale Shipbuilding). The Senate Armed Services Committee vote
to cut $814 million from the administration's FY 2003 missile defense
request was based in part on support from members from states with
major shipyards who chose to transfer some of the funds from missile
defense to shipbuilding projects. Likewise, key House critics of
missile defense like Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) have military shipyards
in their states, and might be less likely to oppose full funding
for missile defense if it involved a shift of funding within the
MDA budget towards sea-based defenses, which could stimulate demand
for new military ships.
While the move towards sea-based defenses may provide short-term
political advantages by giving President Bush a tangible program
to point to heading into the 2004 presidential elections and possibly
garnering support from key Democrats with shipbuilding interests,
it offers little in the way of concrete security benefits. The system
that would be deployed in the short-term would aim to intercept
ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight, when it would
be necessary to distinguish actual warheads from decoys, a task
which the Pentagon has made no demonstrable progress on in the past
decade. A sea-based system aimed at hitting long-range missiles
in their boost phase, before warheads or decoys are separated from
the missile, would require new missiles, new ships, and new sensors,
none of which have been designed yet, much less tested. Given the
marginal capacity and relatively high cost of moving towards an
interim sea-based capacity, one has to question whether this suggested
rush towards deploying such a system is primarily a political maneuver
designed to give the illusion of progress for domestic consumption,
rather than a serious effort to put the first component of a viable
missile defense system in place. The picture is further clouded
by more recent statements by Lt. General Kadish and Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld suggesting that there is no set timetable for deployment
of any element of the administration’s proposed missile defense
system. As with recent promises of Russian and European participation
in missile defense, it appears that part of the administration’s
strategy is to keep as many constituencies as possible convinced
that they too can get a substantial "piece of the action" on missile
defense without making any definitive commitments that would rule
out any constituency.
Table VI: Top House Recipients of Defense Industry
PAC Money from 1997-2002 (multiple election cycles)
1. Duncan Hunter (R-CA)
2. John P. Murtha (D-PA)
3. Randy "Duke" Cunningham (R-CA)
4. James P. Moran (D-VA)
5. Ike Skelton (D-MO)
6. Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA)
7. Jerry Lewis (R-CA)
8. Curt Weldon (R-PA)
9. Henry Bonilla (R-TX)
10. Norm Dicks (D-WA)
11. Bud Cramer (D-AL)
12. C. W. Bill Young (R-FL)
13. H. James Saxton (R-NJ)
14. Peter J. Visclosky (D-IN)
15. John M. Spratt Jr (D-SC)
16. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-CA)
17. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)
18. Jim Maloney (D-CT)
19. Bob Stump (R-AZ)
20. Heather A. Wilson (R-NM)
Table VII: Top Senate Recipients of Defense
Industry PAC Money from 1997-2002 (full election cycle)
1. Richard C. Shelby (R-AL)
2. John W. Warner (R-VA)
3. Ted Stevens (R-AK)
4. Christopher S. Bond (R-MO)
5. Jeff Sessions (R-AL)
6. Rick Santorum (R-PA)
7. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)
8. George Allen (R-VA)
9. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)
10. Max Cleland (D-GA)
11. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT)
12. Conrad Burns (R-MT)
13. Jack Reed (D-RI)
14. Arlen Specter (R-PA)
15. John Kerry (D-MA)
16. Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT)
17. Mary L. Landrieu (D-LA)
18. Carl Levin (D-MI)
19. Robert C. Smith (R-NH)
20. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME)
Source: Data supplied by the Center for Responsive Politics in
VII. What's Next for Missile Defense? -- More
Beyond the battles in the Senate over the program's budget and
oversight mechanisms, other signs of opposition to the Bush administration's
missile defense plans are emerging as well. In early June, Rep.
Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) was joined by 30 colleagues in filing a lawsuit
arguing that the Bush administration has no right to abrogate the
ABM Treaty without Senate approval. Meanwhile, veteran anti-nuclear
activists Randall Forsberg, David Cortright, and Jonathan Schell
have launched an "Urgent Call" for verifiable nuclear reductions
and increased diplomacy that is designed to serve as a vehicle to
galvanize grassroots support for an alternative to the Bush administration
policy of pursuing a multi-tiered missile defense system and a new
generation of nuclear weapons (for details see www.urgentcall.org).
Despite the Bush administration's all out push for missile defenses,
the fate of the program may still hinge on the same kinds of factors
that led President Clinton to put a deployment decision on hold
in September of 2000: 1) Is a missile defense system technically
feasible?; 2) Is it affordable relative to other defense priorities?;
3) What impact will deployment have on the ability of the United
States to achieve reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and
other nuclear-armed states?; and 4) Does the threat of attack by
a nuclear-armed ballistic missile justify a crash missile defense
program at this time?
The feasibility issue has been dealt with already. None of the
"successful" tests in the program to date have been realistic enough
to demonstrate whether the United States can field a missile defense
system that would have any worthwhile capabilities in a real world
situation, in which an adversary would attack in secret, from an
unknown direction, utilizing decoys. Even worse, many of the elements
of the proposed multi-tiered system don't exist yet: some of them
aren't even on the drawing board yet, while others have suffered
so many cost overruns and scheduling delays that less capable (and
less realistic) "surrogate" components have had to be used for major
tests. And now that the Pentagon is trying to limit information
about future tests, either by withholding budget data, classifying
test results, or prohibiting independent analysis, it is not clear
that the Congress or the public will be in a position to judge if
key elements of the proposed system work before the administration
opts to deploy them.
As for costs, as was noted earlier, the long-term costs of missile
defense aren't even included in the Pentagon's long-term budget
plans. With $850 billion in weapons spending already committed to
major programs ($250 billion through 2007, and $600 billion thereafter),
it will not be possible to deploy a multi-tiered missile defense
system without massive increases in Pentagon spending that go well
beyond current levels of almost $400 billion per year, or major
cuts in other proposed weapons programs. The ongoing issue of budget
tradeoffs within the Pentagon budget may be the most important "Achilles
heel" of the Bush administration's missile defense plan at this
For the moment, it appears that the Bush administration has quieted
concerns about how other countries will react to US missile defense
deployment plans by coming to an arms reduction agreement with Russia
that assumes that the United States will move forward with missile
defenses. But this victory may be short-lived. In conjunction with
the Bush-Putin accord, Russia has decided to pull out of the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a move which will allow Moscow to
resume building multi-warhead missiles (or adding warheads to existing
missiles) in response to any demonstrable US progress in the missile
defense field. And China, with just 20 long-range missiles capable
of reaching the United States, is likely to react to a US missile
defense deployment by increasing the size and capability of its
own nuclear forces substantially. In turn, this is likely to spur
India and Pakistan to increase the size of their nuclear arsenals,
as well as influencing the decisions of non-nuclear states like
Japan about whether to develop their own nuclear weapons. The Bush
administration has yet to make a persuasive case as to why deployment
of a missile defense system will not lead to a world with more nuclear
proliferation, not less.
Last but not least, there is the question of whether a missile
defense system is needed at all, when there are other ways of responding
to the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Since September 11th,
Bush administration officials have tried to make missile defense
an emotional issue by posing the ultimate "what if" question – would
terrorists attack the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles if they had access to these deadly weapons? As Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it in early November 2001, "On Sept.
11 terrorists took civilian airliners and turned them into missiles,
killing thousands. Does anyone doubt for a moment that if they had
real missiles and weapons of mass destruction, capable of killing
not just thousands but hundreds of thousands, they wouldn't hesitate
to use them?"
Instead of scaring the public with this extremely unlikely "what
if" scenario, the Bush administration should be asking a different
question: are we implementing a balanced, comprehensive program
that can drastically reduce the possibility that the United States
will be attacked with a nuclear weapon? Given the difficulties of
acquiring a ballistic missile and producing a nuclear weapon small
enough to be launched on such a missile, the likelihood of a transient
terrorist network being able to develop such a capability is so
small that it does not deserve to be a priority. As for a "rogue"
regime, even dictators value survival, and would therefore be extremely
unlikely to launch a nuclear-armed ballistic missile at US territory
knowing that they risked the destruction of their society in return.
There are plenty of tools available for limiting the spread of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that could have a far greater
effect in the short-term than a crash missile defense program. A
case in point is the 1994 framework agreement with North Korea,
which established the notion that the Pyongyang regime would cap
its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in exchange for US economic
assistance and political recognition. Rather than building on the
progress made by the Clinton administration on this front, as Secretary
of State Powell wanted to do shortly after the Bush administration
took office in 2001, the Pentagon has managed to sidetrack the talks
by postponing them for over a year and then loading them up with
secondary issues (like North Korea's conventional weapons capabilities
designed to undermine the accords). A verifiable bilateral agreement
with North Korea to end their production of nuclear weapons and
their production and export of ballistic missiles would go a long
way towards limiting future ballistic missile threats to the United
States, but it would go against the grain of the unilateralist approach
favored by the majority of the president's advisors, it would also
undermine the rationale for a multi-billion dollar missile defense
program which can serve to solidify the administration's conservative
base while offering a bonanza to the defense industry.
Similarly, rather than leaving the issue of the destruction of
US and Russian strategic and tactical weapons up in the air in the
Bush-Putin nuclear arms agreement, the Bush administration should
be pushing to nail down a binding commitment to destroy these weapons
and neutralize the huge stockpiles of bomb grade nuclear materials.
If a terrorist group were to get its hands on a nuclear weapon,
it would most likely occur as a result of buying or stealing a finished
weapon or the needed materials from an existing nuclear state. Given
the size of Russia's nuclear stockpile and the concerns about the
security of its nuclear bombs and weapons-grade materials, common
sense dictates that the United States move to eliminate or secure
these dangerous leftovers from the Cold War as soon as is practically
possible. But again, such a move would probably only be possible
if the United States agreed to limit its own nuclear options, which
would run counter to the unilateralist approach advocated in the
administration's Nuclear Posture Review. And it would deprive major
contractors of billions of dollars worth of business involved in
upgrading the US nuclear weapons production and testing complex.
Finally, strengthening multilateral arms control agreements like
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban (which the United States
has not ratified) would make it far harder for hostile states or
terrorist organizations to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
This would require a 180-degree turn from the current anti-arms
control stance of the Bush administration, but this diplomatic approach
offers far more hope of preventing a nuclear, chemical, or biological
attack on the United States than trusting in unproven technologies
designed to deal with an unlikely threat, as the current missile
defense program is doing. In fact, at this stage, it would be fair
to argue that moving full speed ahead with a costly but marginally
capable missile defense system is the real world equivalent of the
"peace through paper" approach that has been ridiculed by conservative
hard-liners like Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), in the sense that deploying
a poorly conceived, inadequately tested missile defense program
in the next few years will at best result in the illusion of protection
against a nuclear attack without reducing the odds of such an attack.
Appendix A: Who's doing what in missile defense?
While President Clinton agreed, in principle, to deploying a limited
national missile defense system to protect the US from accidental
or rogue ballistic missile attacks, the Bush administration has
greatly expanded the mission of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile
Defense programs. Today, the Pentagon no longer differentiates between
theater and national defense. Instead, the Pentagon is focusing
on missile defense as a single integrated BMD system, capable of
defending the forces and territories of the United States, its Allies,
and friends against all classes of ballistic missile threats, in
all phases of the missiles flight - boost, midcourse, and terminal.
Boost Phase Systems - The Pentagon is currently reviewing
more than 50 proposals on boost phase missile defense system, which
it received from defense contractors since early this year.
- Airborne Laser - A chemical laser affixed to a modified
Boeing 747 jet focused on medium and short-range threats.
The first test will take place in 2004. TRW is working
on the laser technology. Lockheed Martin is developing
the equipment to direct the laser beam. The three companies have
shared about $1.5 billion in research funds over the past three
years. Boeing is the lead contractor.
- Navy Area Theater - A modified Navy Aegis cruiser being
developed by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics and
Northrop Grumman. After spending $2.4 billion over the past
decade in research and development, the program was canceled in
December 2001 due to delays and cost overruns.
- Space-Based Laser - Being developed by Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, and TRW, with an integrated flight test
not expected to take place until 2012
- Ground Based Midcourse Defense System - Boeing is the
prime contractor and overall systems integrator for the ground-based
system. Lockheed Martin is a subcontractor responsible
for the payload launch vehicle, which is serving as a surrogate
ground-based interceptor that delivers the kill vehicle, being
developed by Raytheon. TRW is in charge of the battle
management command, control, and communications (BMC3) products
which helps the interceptor locate and destroy the target. Raytheon
is also developing the ground-based radar, which provides
the kill vehicle and the BMC3 real-time operational data for target
- Sea-Based Midcourse System (previously known as Navy
Theater Wide) - Lockheed Martin is making the ship-based
radar and Raytheon is making the booster and interceptor.
- PAC-3 - The latest version of the Patriot air-defense
system. Managed by the MDA, Lockheed Martin is the prime
contractor responsible for the PAC-3 missile segment. Raytheon
is the system integrator for the PAC-3 missile segment.
- Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) - A land-based
system designed to destroy the full range of theater ballistic
missile threats to troops, military assets and allied territories.
Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor.
Other Missile Defense Related Technologies/Programs
- Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-low) - TRW is
Prime Contractor of a combined team for the Pentagon's Space-Based
Infrared System Low. TRW and subcontractor Spectrum Astro
will develop spacecraft, while Raytheon and Northrop
Grumman will develop sensor payloads under competitive subcontracts
to TRW. The budget request for FY 2003-2007 is $3.63 billion,
launch of first satellites in expected in 2006/7. SBIRS-low is
designed to provide end-to-end infrared tracking of missiles throughout
- Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-high) - Prime
Contractor is Lockheed Martin. SBIRS-high satellite constellation,
being developed to replace existing satellites from the 1970s,
has been deemed "essential" to US national security by the Secretary
of Defense and can continue to receive funding despite cost overruns
of approximately $2 billion.
Appendix B: The "Nonpartisan" Think-Tanks
- The National Defense University Foundation and the National
Defense Industrial Association are continuing their ongoing
series of Congressional Seminar Series "breakfast briefings" on
missile defense on Capitol Hill. Each fall and spring the NDU
holds approximately 20 breakfast briefings. Not only does the
arms industry's largest trade association, NDIA, support the series,
but each breakfast receives support from a specific corporation
like Bechtel or Lockheed Martin. Attendees are primarily defense
industry representatives, Hill staffers, lobbyists, and an occasional
reporter or two. Speakers are primarily missile defense supporters.
Past briefings have featured Rep. Curt Weldon, Sen. Jon Kyl, Steve
Cambone, and John Bolton. NDIA claims to provide "a forum for
the interchange of ideas and technology between government and
industry." And goes on to note it's "key position to shape issues
and influence defense policies through its chapters, committees,
and divisions covering key facets of defense." NDIA holds eighty
annual symposiums, publishes the National Defense Magazine, and
maintains a membership of more than 950 corporations.
- The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is headed
by project directors William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard;
Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, a contributing editor at the Weekly Standard, and a columnist
for the Washington Post; and Bruce Jackson, Vice President of
Strategy and Planning, Corporate Strategic Development for Lockheed
Martin who also serves on the Board of Directors of the Center
for Security Policy. PNAC's goal is to promote American global
leadership by significantly increasing defense spending, strengthening
ties to democratic allies while challenging regimes hostile to
our interests, and promoting the cause of political and economic
freedom abroad. The groups Statement of Principles concludes by
saying, "Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral
clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the
United States is to build on the successes of this past century
and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next." Signatories
from the Bush administration include Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld,
and Paul Wolfowitz.
- The American Conservative Union describes itself as "the
nation's oldest conservative lobbying organization." The ACU launched
a project called Americans for Missile Defense (AMD) last summer.
The ACU sent a letter to President Bush, co-signed by more than
fifty conservative leaders, in support of missile defense. Signatories
included Frank Gaffney of CSP, Robert Maginnis of the Family
Research Council, Maj. Gen. J. Milnor Roberts of High Frontier,
and Bob Livingston of the Livingston Group. Weeks later, in conjunction
with CSP, the ACU held a press conference at the Senate "Swamp"
on the grounds of the US Capitol to show their support for President
Bush's missile defense efforts. American Conservative Union Chairman
David Keene officially launched AMD's drive to accumulate one
million online signatures through the coalition's website at www.americansformissiledefense.org.
In addition to Rep. Weldon and Frank Gaffney, Senators Jim Inhofe
(R-OK) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) also spoke at the event.
- The corporate-backed SAFE Foundation (Safeguarding America
For Everyone) has accelerated its National Missile Defense education
campaign in the wake of September 11, even going so far as to
put a picture of the charred ruins of the World Trade Center front
and center on its web site as an attention-getter for its pro-missile
defense propaganda. Board members of the foundation include Representative
Weldon and Dean J. Garritson, a vice president of the National
Association of Manufacturers. Last year the foundation, along
with Rep. Weldon, organized a press conference featuring 5 "leading
scientists" in support of missile defense.
- The Heritage Foundation mission statement reads: Founded
in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational
institute - a think tank - whose mission is to formulate and promote
conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise,
limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values,
and a strong national defense." Directed by Edwin J. Feulner,
Ph.D., Heritage has been a leading advocate of deployment of sea-based
missile defenses and the abandonment of the ABM Treaty. In addition
to publications such as Defending America: A Plan to Meet the
Urgent Missile Threat and America
At Risk: The Citizen's Guide to Missile Defense, Heritage
runs another website, NationalSecurity.org.
- Empower America was founded by Bill Bennett, Jeanne Kirkpatrick,
and Jack Kemp. This organization ran misleading pro-Star Wars
radio ads against incumbent Democratic Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)
is the 1998 elections. Empower.org (Empower America's education
and research arm) launched its newest project in March called
Americans for Victory Over Terrorism (AVOT). AVOT's stated
mission is "to sustain and strengthen American public opinion
as the war on terrorism moves forward. AVOT will promote the democratic
ideals of freedom, liberty, equality, and human rights-the very
virtues terrorist groups and terrorist states wish to eradicate-and
answer those who seek to erode our nation's resolve and commitment
to fight and defeat the evil of terrorism." AVOT plans to
host meetings and lectures at college campuses around the nation,
and to use various media outlets to promote their campaign. In
addition to William Bennett, other AVOT senior advisors include
Frank Gaffney and James Woolsey.
Appendix C: Who's Who in the Bush Administration
– Ties to missile defense contractors/think-tanks
Dick Cheney, Vice President - Dick Cheney was an early member
of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Advisors. His wife,
Lynne Cheney, sat on the Board of Directors of Lockheed Martin until
February of 2000, and was compensated $120,000 a year for attending
Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary - Longtime associate
and contributor to the Center for Security Policy, Rumsfeld chaired
both the commission which assessed the ballistic missile threat
facing the US and the commission which looked at future military
uses of space. Both commissions were heavily influenced by self-interested
corporations. The Space Commission had no fewer than eight representatives
of companies working on space technology and missile defense for
the Pentagon. And the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission's findings
were based in large part on briefings from defense contractors.
Rumsfeld was the recipient of CSP's "Keeper of the Flame" award
in 1998. Rumsfeld was also on the board of Empower America.
Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor - Before
joining the Bush administration, Hadley was a partner in the Washington
law firm of Shea & Gardner, which represents Lockheed Martin.
Hadley was a co-author of the National Institute for Public Policy
report, the blueprint for the Bush Nuclear Policy Review.
Pete Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics - Prior to his appointment by President Bush,
Mr. Aldridge was the Chief Executive Officer of the Aerospace Corporation,
which ranked #33 on the Pentagon's list of top defense contractors
for 2001. He came to that position from McDonnell Douglas Electronic
Systems Company where he served as President from 1988 to 1992.
Mr. Aldridge serves on the Board of Directors of United Industrial
Corporation (#87 on the Pentagon's contractor list). He also serves
as a director of the US Space Foundation, which is heavily funded
by all the major missile defense contractors.
Robert Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland
Defense - Mr. Joseph previously served as a Professor of National
Security Studies and Director of the Center for Counterproliferation
Research at the National Defense University. He held positions in
the previous Bush administration, and various positions within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration.
Mr. Joseph was a co-author of the NIPP study, and is a member of
CSP's advisory council.
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary for Defense - Mr. Wolfowitz
was Dean and professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced
International Studies. From 1982 through 1986, he was Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. From 1986
to 1989 Wolfowitz was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia.
During the Bush administration, Wolfowitz was Dick Cheney's Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the principal civilian official
responsible for strategy, plans and policy.Mr. Wolfowitz also served
as a consultant for defense contractor Northrop Grumman, and earned
speaking fees from groups such as the Hudson Institute and the Heritage
Stephen Cambone, Director of the Office of Program Analysis
and Evaluation - Mr. Cambone served as Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy until July when Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed him to his new position. Rumsfeld
said, "He is well-suited to take the lead in translating our policies
into budgets that can transform the Defense Department." Cambone
has served as special assistant to Rumsfeld (part of NIPP study
group), and before his appointment in the Bush administration he
served as Staff Director for the Commission to Assess US National
Security Space Management and Organization. Mr. Cambone also served
as the Director of Research for the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University. Cambone held the position
of staff director for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States in 1998 and was a Senior Fellow of Political-Military
Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies from
1993 to 1998.
Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy - Former
chair of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Directors. Prior
to his appointment, Mr. Feith was for fifteen years the managing
attorney of the Washington, DC law firm of Feith & Zell, P.C.
His biography says that he specializes in "technology transfer,
joint ventures and foreign investment in the defense and aerospace
industries." Mr. Feith also represented the Loral Corp., which the
Pentagon accused of selling sensitive technology to China. Mr. Feith
argued Loral's case before the Senate. From March 1984 until
September 1986, Mr. Feith served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Negotiations Policy. Prior to assuming that position,
he served as Special Counsel to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard
Perle. Mr. Feith transferred to the Pentagon from the National Security
Council at the White House, where he worked from 1981 to 1982 as
a Middle East specialist.
Richard Perle, Chairman, Defense Policy Board, Department of
Defense - The Defense Policy Board is an advisory panel to the
Pentagon made up of leading figures in national security and defense
which backs laying the groundwork for overthrowing Saddam through
military means. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy in the Reagan Administration.
Reagan's "Prince of Darkness" for his distaste of disarmament treaties,
important role in the defense policy board, a Pentagon think-tank,
Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, CSP advisor
John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security - John Bolton is Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's point man
in the State Department. Bolton was forced on Secretary of State
Powell despite his objections. The Washington Post reported,
"He serves as senior adviser to the president on non-proliferation
and disarmament - a role which causes grim amusement in the state
department as he opposes multilateral arms agreements on principle."
In January 2001, Jesse Helms endorsed Bolton: "John Bolton is the
kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon, if it
should be my lot to be on hand for what is forecast to be the final
battle between good and evil in this world."
Peter B. Teets, Undersecretary of the Air Force - Mr. Teets
is the retired President and Chief Operating Officer of Lockheed
Martin Corp., a position he held from 1997 through 1999. He began
his career with Martin Marietta, Denver, Colo., in 1963, and held
various positions with Martin Marietta until the merger with Lockheed
Martin in 1995. After the Lockheed Martin merger in 1995 and until
1997, Mr. Teets served as President and Chief Operating Officer
of the Information and Services Sector. Teets remains on the
Board at Lockheed Martin and also sits on the Board of Directors
at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. Teets has openly advocated
the weaponization of space. At a March 6, 2002 conference in Washington,
DC, he asserted that "weapons will go into space. It's a question
of time. And we need to be at the forefront of that."
Dov Zakheim, Undersecretary for Comptroller - Mr.
Zakheim previously served as Corporate Vice President of Systems
Planning Corporation International, a major defense contractor that
specializes in technology and research as well as political and
military consulting. Zakheim also sits on the advisory board for
Northrop Grumman and is an adjunct scholar at the Heritage Foundation.
Keith Payne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces
and Policy Dr. Keith Payne -Chairman of the Pentagon's Deterrence
Concepts Advisory Panel - Payne serves as the Director of the
National Institute for Public Policy, and is now helping the Bush
administration implement the recommendations in the Nuclear Posture
James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force - Before his
appointment, Mr. Roche was Corporate Vice President and President
of the Electric Sensors and Systems Sector of the Northrop Grumman
Corporation. He's been with Northrop since 1984. Mr. Roche
is also a Member of the Center for Security Policy's advisory council.
Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy - Mr. England served
as executive vice president of General Dynamics Corporation from
1997 until 2001 and was responsible for two major sectors of the
corporation: Information Systems and International. Previously he
had served as executive vice president of the Combat Systems Group,
president of General Dynamics Fort Worth aircraft company (later
Lockheed), President of General Dynamics Land Systems company producing
land combat vehicles and as the principal of a mergers and acquisition
consulting company. According to the Washington Times,
England will be helping his branch to carry out orders such as "developing
futuristic weapons to counter new types of threats emerging in the
Thomas White, Secretary of the Army - From 1990 to 2001,
Mr. White was employed by Enron Corporation and held various senior
2 Way Out There In The Blue: Reagan,
Star Wars and the End of the Cold War, By Frances Fitzgerald,
Simon & Schuster, 2000.
White House Press Release, President Discusses National Missile
Defense, December 2001.
4 "The Missile Defense Brigade," by Peter
Stone, National Journal, September 8, 2001.
5 The House of Armed Services Committee
Joint Hearing of the Military Procurement and Research and Development
Subcommittees, February 27, 2002. http://www.clw.org/nmd/hearing0202.html
6 Statement during Kadish Hearing, February
7 Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit:
The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998) page 290.
8 Figures on the costs of the Nike-Zeus,
Nike-X, Safeguard and other specific missile defense projects can
be accessed in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) data base,
accessible on the web site of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study
Project, which was responsible for compiling Atomic Audit,
op. cit. The FYDP data base can be accessed at
9 Figures for 1996 to the present were
calculated by Steve Kosiak of the Center on Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, utilizing Pentagon budget data and adjusting for inflation
so that all figures are in 2002 dollars.
10 "Spending for Defense (A Special Report),"
by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2002.
11For 2003 through 2007, figures are
from an internal memorandum by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz that were first published by National Journal NewsService
and are reproduced in Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,
"Briefing Book on Ballistic Missile Defense," June 19, 2002, Chapter
1, available at www.armscontrolcenter.org/nmdbriefbook02/chapt1.html.
For 1998 through 2002, figures are from Department of Defense, Program
Acquisition Costs by Weapons System, annual volumes for FY 2000
through FY 2003. Deflators used to adjust figures to 2002 dollars
were taken from U.S. Department of Defense, Comptroller, National
Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2003, Table 5-6, p. 48.
12 "Is Crusader the Beginning, or End,
of Reform?," by George C. Wilson, National Journal, May 11,
13 For quotes and summary material cited in the
prior two paragraphs, see Congressional Budget Office, "Estimated
Costs and Technical Capabilities of Selected National Missile Defense
Systems," Washington, DC, CBO, January 2002 (available on the web
14 "Kill Vehicle Scores a Hit with Proponents
of Missile Defense," by Peter Pae, Los Angeles Times, March
15 "Green Light Ahead for Missile Defense
Program," by Linda D. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Service, March
16 Defense Week, by John Donnelly,
July 30, 2001
17 An Assessment of the Intercept Test
Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System,
Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper, November 2001.
18 "A Setback for Missile Shield as Booster
Rocket Fails Test," by James Dao, New York Times, December
19 "Postol vs. the Pentagon: Missile
Defense," By Gary Taubes, Technology Review, April 2002,
20 "Aldridge Speaks --On Osprey, Missile
Defense, More" by Ron Laurenzo, Defense Week Jan. 2, 2002.
21 "Killed Programs Limp On, Costing
Millions," by John M. Donnelly and Ann Roosevelt, Defense Week,
Feb. 19, 2002.
22 "Pentagon Eyes Additions to Anti-Missile
Arsenal," By Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology,
June 10, 2002.
23 The Current Status of Missile Defense
24 "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense
Under Bush," Philip Coyle, Arms Control Today, May 2002.
25 DOT&E FY 2001 Annual Report -
DOD ESTABLISHES MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY No. 008-02 IMMEDIATE
RELEASE January 4, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/b01042002_bt008-02.html
27 " Missile Agency Head Details Progress
to Congress," by Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, WASHINGTON,
Feb. 28, 2002.
28 "Pentagon Optimistic About Missile
Shield," by James Dao, New York Times, April 15, 2002.
29 "Missile Defense's New Look to Emerge
this Summer," by Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology,
March 25, 2002.
30 Tangled Web, June 2000
31 Washington Post, Michael Dobbs,
January 14, 2002, A1. On the pivotal role of Boeing and Lockheed
Martin engineers in shaping the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission,
see Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill, (New York: Public Affairs,
32 Washington Post, Michael Dobbs,
January 14, 2002, A1.
33 "NMD, What does it all mean?," CDI
Issue Brief, September 2000
35 "US Alters Estimate of Threats," by
Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 2002.
36 "Putin Sees Continued Alliance Despite
the End of ABM Pact," by Michael Wines, New York Times, Dec
38 From Esquire, February 2002, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=events
40 "Rumsfeld II," Wall Street Journal;
New York, N.Y.; Jan 12, 2001, Editorial
click on "Vision 2020"
TABLE 3 100 COMPANIES LISTED ACCORDING TO NET VALUE OF PRIME CONTRACT
AWARDS AND CATEGORY OF PROCUREMENT, Department of Defense, FISCAL
44 "Should the US 'Weaponize' Space?
Military and Commercial Implications," by Charles V. Pena and Edward
L. Hudgins, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, March 18, 2002.
46 "Rumsfeld Revamps Space, Pushes `Black'
Projects," by Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology,
May 14, 2001.
47 "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or
Russian Roulette?," www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
48 See "About Face: The Role of the Arms
Lobby in the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades
of US Nuclear Policy," William Hartung, May 2002,www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/reportaboutface.html
49 Center for Responsive Politics www.opensecrets.org
50 "Boeing Plans Ads to Promote Missile
Defense," by Greg Schneider, Washington Post, June, 16, 2000.
51 Center for Responsive Politics www.opensecrets.org
52 "Dogfight for Dollars on Capitol Hill,"
by James Dao, The New York Times, September 2, 2001.
53 "Lobbyists are Boeing's Army, Washington
Its Battlefield," By James Dao and Laura M. Holson, The New York
Times, December 12, 2001.
54 Read the press release announcing
this "blue ribbon" panel at www.safefoundation.org/press/pr5-9-2001_pressconference.asp
55 "Top Space Leaders Lined Up As National
Space Symposium is Set to Start," Press Release, April 1, 2002,
contact information: Julie Howell,email@example.com
56 Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily,
March 7, 2002.
57 "Missile Defense test Site Contracts
Awarded," Arms Control Today, May 2002.
58 "ATK Selected to Supply Propulsion
System For Ground Based Missile Defense Booster Vehicle Program,"
ATK Alliant Techsystems; release issued March 8, 2002.
59 CONTRACTS from the United States Department
of Defense, No. 298-02, FOR RELEASE AT, (703)697-5131(media), 5
p.m. ET, June 11, 2002.
60 See Note 44
61 "Lockheed martin receives $326 million
PAC-3 production contract," Defence Systems Daily, March
62 "Satellite Contract Awarded to TRW,"
By Peter Pae, Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2002, C2.
63 "SAIC/Boeing Win NATO Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense Feasibility Study Contract," Boeing News Release,
July 19, 2001.
64 Lockheed Martin News Release - http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/articles/022002_1.html
65Web version: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/c06122002_ct301-02.html]
66 Raytheon News Release -http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?
67 U.S. Department of Defense, "Contract
Listing," February 20, 2002, p. 1.
68 See William D. Hartung (with Jonathan
Reingold), About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush
Administration’s Radical Reversal of Two Decades of U.S. Nuclear
Policy (New York: World Policy Institute, May 2002), available
at Documentation on corporate ties of key administration officials
in provided in Appendix A, "Through the Revolving Door: Corporate
Connections of Bush Administration Officials to the Arms and Energy
69 For a detailed review of the connections
of major defense firms to the Bush administration, see About
Face, op. cit., pp. 13-16.
70 On Lynne Cheney’s Lockheed Martin
connection see "Lynne V. Cheney Resigns from Lockheed Martin Board,"
Lockheed Martin press release, January 5, 2001; and on Otto Reich’s
role see Center for International Policy, "The Otto Reich Nomination,"
briefing paper, August 2001. Most other data on corporate ties is
drawn from Center for Public Integrity, "The Bush 100: Snapshot
of Professional and Economic Interests Reveals Close Ties Between
Government, Business," available at For full background on sources,
see Hartung, About Face, p. 40, note 55, and Appendix A.
71 On Peter B. Teets responsibilities
in his new post, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Under Secretary
of the Air Force Peter Teets Briefs on Space Transformation," news
transcript, February 7, 2002, available at For more on Everet Beckner’s
position, see U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, "Everet Beckner Sworn-in as Deputy Administrator
for Defense Programs," February 5, 2002.
72 For the "Department of Defense, Inc."
quote see Rowan Scarborough, "Rumsfeld’s ‘Department of Defense
Inc.’ Reasserts Civilian Control," Washington Times, April
24, 2001; on the composition of the Senior Executive Council see
U.S. Department of Defense, "Rumsfeld Creates Two Management Councils,"
news release, June 18, 2001.
73 Bradley Graham, "Rumsfeld Pares Oversight
of Missile Defense Agency," Washington Post, February 16,
74 Graham, op. cit., "Rumsfeld Pares
Oversight," and Anne Marie Squeo, "Boeing, Lockheed Martin Get Lead
Role on Missile-Defense Integration," Wall Street Journal,
January 11, 2002.
75 See "About Face: The Role of the Arms
Lobby in the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades
of US Nuclear Policy," William Hartung, May 2002,www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/reportaboutface.html
76 "Missile Mishap," The Newshour
with Jim Lehrer, July 10, 2000, transcript.
77 "Huntsville's Missile Payload," by
Ken Silverstein, Mother Jones, July/August 2001.
78 "Stage Set for Missile Defense Funding
Feud," Arms Control Today, June 2002.
79 On Warner’s ongoing role in beating
back restrictions on missile defense funding and the imposition
of higher standards for missile defense testing, see "What, Me Worry?’
Approach to National Missile Defense," Council for a Livable World,
July 13, 2000 (on the rejection of the Durbin amendment calling
for more realistic tests and independent assessment of missile defense
programs); and Helen Dewar, "Missile Defense Funding Increased,"
Washington Post, June 27,. 2002.
81 "Missile Data To Be Kept Secret,"
By Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2002.
82 For analysis of the Senate version
of the Department of Defense Authorization bill for FY 2003, see
"Victories in Senate on DOD Authorization Bill," Council for a Livable
World, June 28, 2002.
83 Greg Jaffe, "Pentagon Agency Hopes
to Speed Deployment of Missile Defenses," Wall Street Journal,
June 18, 2002.
84 See, for example, Bill Gertz, "Missile
Defense System Has No Target Date" Washington Times - July 2, 2002,
in which Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave no timeline for deployment
and refused to indicate which elements of the system might be readied
for deployment first.
85 "Budget meets needs," by Donald H.
Rumsfeld, USA Today, Nov 5, 2001.
86 "Still Playing: Star Wars" Special
Report: Spending for Defense, by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal,
March 28, 2002.
87 "Contractors Detail Role In Missile
March 18, 2002.
88 "TRW to lead restructured SBIRS Low
missile defense program," Defense Systems Daily, April 19, 2002
95 New Director of the Office of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, NEWS RELEASE from the United States Department
of Defense, [Web version: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/b07012002_bt341-02.html]
99 "Washington hawks get power boost,"
by Julian Borger, Guardian, December 17, 2001.
102 Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily,
March 7, 2002.
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