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Axis Of Influence:
Behind the Bush Administration's Missile Defense Revival

A World Policy Institute Special Report
by Michelle Ciarrocca and William D. Hartung
July 2002

Table of Contents

Executive Summary
I. Introduction
II. Assessing Missile Defense: Cost, Feasibility, Threat, and Strategic Impacts
II. A. How Much Will it Cost?
II. B. Will it Work?
II. C. How Urgent is the Ballistic Missile Threat?
II. D. How Will it Effect US Relations with Other Nuclear Weapons States?
III. Inside the Missile Defense Lobby
IV. Defense Contractors: Cashing in on Missile Defense
IV. A. Inside Influence: Will Defense Industry Ties Shape Missile Defense Policies?
V. Who Will Benefit? – Geographic Concentration of Missile Defense Spending
VI. Bipartisan Support?
VI. A. Profiling Key Missile Defense Advocates
VI. B. Despite Lobbying Pressure, Critics in Congress Speak Out
VII. What's Next for Missile Defense?

List of Tables and Appendices
Table I: Costs of Major Missile Defense Projects, 1962-2003
Table II: Ballistic Missile Defense Funding, FY 1998 – FY 2007
Table III: Defense Contractors Spending, Spending, Spending - PAC Contributions, Soft Money, Lobbying Expenditures
Table IV: Top Ten Defense Companies Receiving Pentagon Missile Defense Contracts 1998-2001
Table V: Top Ten States Receiving Missile Defense Contracts 1998-2001
Table VI: Top House Recipients of Defense Industry PAC Money
Table VII: Top Senate Recipients of Defense Industry PAC Money
Appendix A: Who's doing what in missile defense?
Appendix B: The "Nonpartisan" Think-Tanks
Appendix C: Who's Who in the Bush Administration – Ties to missile defense contractors/think-tanks


This is the latest in a series of reports by the World Policy Institute’s Arms Trade Resource Center on Peddlers of Proliferation, analyzing the role of the arms lobby in shaping U.S. strategic policy. The authors would like to thank Center Research Associate Jonathan Reingold for carrying out primary research on ties between Bush administration appointees and the arms and energy industries. This data was originally featured in our May 2002 report on the evolution of the Bush nuclear doctrine, About Face, and we drew upon it for the analysis of the missile defense lobby presented in this report.

The Center would also like to thank the following foundations and individuals who have provided support for our work on the arms trade, military spending, missile defense and nuclear weapons issues: the CarEth Foundation, the Compton Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the HKH Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Ploughshares Fund, Rockefeller Family Associates, the Samuel Rubin Foundation, Margaret R. Spanel, the Town Creek Foundation, and Mary Van Evera

"I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment."[1] President Clinton, September 1, 2000

"Every time the program seemed ready to expire, or collapse of its own weight, something would happen to bring it to life again."[2] Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue

"I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the ABM treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty ... I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses."[3] President Bush, December 13, 2001

I. Introduction

Days before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Peter Stone of the National Journal reported that a downturn in the economy and an eroding federal surplus was causing concern for the defense industry in general and the contractors involved in the Pentagon’s costly missile defense program in particular. To ensure that the President's $8.3 billion request for missile defense would be approved by Congress, Pentagon contractors were "tapping veteran outside defense consultants and new lobbying recruits - including grassroots specialists and public relations firms."[4] Raytheon hired former House Appropriations Committee Chair Rep. Bob Livingston (R-LA), while Boeing tapped another top K Street lobbying firm, Bonner & Associates, to help build the case for missile defense. Boeing also decided to go to the 'source' by employing Alan Myer, who helped write President Reagan's famous 1983 Star Wars speech.

While President Bush had repeatedly pledged to deploy a missile defense system, skeptics in Congress continued to question the technology, costs and necessity of such a system, as well as the effect it would have on US relations with Russia. However, in the days immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, those questions seemed irrelevant. Despite the fact that a missile defense system could have done nothing to prevent the September 11th attacks, Senate Democrats agreed to a compromise that allowed $800 million of $1.3 billion in proposed cuts in the President’s funding request for missile defense to go through, bringing approved spending to $7.8 billion. Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) explained that he did not want to "create dissent where we need unity" by forcing a floor fight over the proposed cuts. Sen. Levin also withdrew an amendment that would have limited the administration’s ability to conduct missile defense tests that violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty without consulting Congress. A few months later, in December 2001, while still riding high in public opinion polls, President Bush gave Russia six months' notice of the United States intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

The post-September 11th "unity" that allowed the Pentagon to accelerate missile defense spending continued into 2003 budget debates, with authorization by the House of Representatives of the largest increase in military spending in two decades, up to a total of $393 billion. Much of this new spending has little or nothing to do with the war on terrorism.

Clearly, this temporary unity on missile defense could not last indefinitely. Representative Martin Meehan (D-MA) noted, "After September 11th, the Congress, especially Democrats, decided to defer a number of contentious debates for the good of national unity. Many of them related to missile defense ... It would be a mistake to interpret the silence in the wake of Sep. 11th as a sign of approval by all in Congress of these unprecedented actions."[5]

While missile defense critics in Congress have been tentative, the missile defense lobby is still moving full speed ahead. In fact, a domestic "axis of influence" – a small circle of conservative think-tanks, corporate officials, and hard-line veterans of the Pentagon and the uniformed military that have been pushing missile defense for years – are playing an unprecedented role in crafting US security policy in the Bush administration. With George W. Bush in the White House and Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, the Star Wars lobby no longer needs to rely on its ability to influence the federal government from the outside - it has staged a friendly takeover of the executive branch. Thirty-two major appointees of the administration are former executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top defense contractors. In addition, 22 former advisory board members or close associates of the Center for Security Policy (CSP), an energetic missile defense advocacy group funded in part by missile defense contractors, have been appointed to key policymaking posts in the Bush administration.

This report will take a detailed look at the role of conservative ideologues and cash-hungry contractors in shaping the Bush administration’s policy on missile defense, but first we need to provide some context for the missile defense debate.

II. Assessing Missile Defense: Cost, Feasibility, Threat, and Strategic Impacts

II. A. How Much Will it Cost?

During a hearing in February, Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) remarked, "after 12 years on this committee, there are times when I feel like some of our defense contractors feel like it is more profitable for them to develop weapons than actually manufacture them. There's not much money in making something. They get a lot of money to do research."[6] In fact, most industry analysts believe that the production phase of a weapons project is far more lucrative than the R&D phase, but given the vast sums that have been spent on missile defense R&D in the last five decades, Rep. Taylor’s suspicions are certainly understandable.

While missile defense became prominent during the Reagan years, its origins date back to shortly after the Second World War. Early projects included the short-range Thumper and the longer-range Wizard. In the mid-1950s, the army began work on Nike-Zeus, a ground-based system. During the 1960's missile defense efforts continued under the Nike-X program. Under the Nixon administration, a more modest program called Safeguard was developed, and eventually deployed. The system, using nuclear-tipped interceptors, became fully operational on October 1, 1975. However, four months later, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Safeguard system was being terminated because it was too costly to operate while offering a very limited capability. Measured in terms of today’s purchasing power (constant 2002 dollars) the total cost of Nike-Zeus, Nike-X and Safeguard programs combined is estimated at $37 billion.[7]

In March of 1983, Ronald Reagan unveiled his Star Wars plan (later known as the Strategic Defense Initiative - SDI), an ambitious research program which sought to defend the US against a massive Soviet nuclear attack; a program that Reagan envisioned would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." With US-Soviet relations warming by the end of Reagan's term, the program was reoriented to focus on limited attacks against American forces. President George Herbert Walker Bush called it GPALS, short for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. The Department of Defense official funding estimates for ballistic missile defense for the period of FY 1984 to FY 1994 is $32.6 billion. However, a Congressional Research Service report from 1995 estimated the actual amount could be as much as $70.7 billion (in current, or then-year dollars) for that same time span.

In 1992, President Clinton continued with the idea of defending against a limited ballistic missile attack, but gave precedence to theater defenses capable of protecting deployed troops. Then, in the later part of his term, Clinton bowed to congressional pressure to develop a National Missile Defense (NMD) system based on the perceived "rogue" threat facing the US. Missile defense funding throughout the Clinton years averaged about $4 billion a year (see Table II, below for exact year-by-year figures).

Table I: Costs of Major Missile Defense Projects,

(in inflation-adjusted, 2002 dollars)

Nike-X, Nike Zeus, Safeguard,

other R&D (1962-1983)

$52 billion[8]


other R&D (1983-2002)

$91 billion[9]

Total Since 1962

$143 billion

Total, 1983-present

$ 91 billion

Source: Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, building on the estimate in Stephen Schwartz, et. al., editors, Atomic Audit (Brookings, 1996).

Today, more than 20 years and $91 billion after Ronald Reagan’s March 1983 "Star Wars" speech, President Bush is calling for a layered missile defense system capable of defending the entire US, as well as "our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas," from ballistic missile attack. The layered approach would combine the ground-based NMD system inherited from the Clinton administration with sea-, air-, and space-based components to take out enemy missiles during all three phases of a missile launch - boost phase, midcourse, and terminal. Technically speaking, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System, which forms one element of the Bush administration's plan, is the same as Clinton's NMD system. The Bush plan envisions a multi-layered system which would be designed to destroy nuclear warheads in the boost phase, shortly after an enemy ballistic missile is launched; in the midcourse phase, while they are traveling through the weightless environment of space on their way towards targets in the United States; and in the terminal phase, when the warheads re-enter the earth’s atmosphere in their final phase of flight. Other systems expected to play a role in the Bush administration’s system include the Airborne Laser (ABL), the Space-Based Laser (SBL), Navy Theater Wide, Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). All of these programs were being funded by the Clinton administration as research and development efforts, but the Bush administration is attempting to push them towards deployment by increasing funding, accelerating testing, and relaxing criteria as to what constitutes a capability worth deploying.

President Bush's FY 2002 missile defense budget came in at $7.8 billion, about $500 million less than the administration requested, but still a hefty 43% increase over the levels obtained in the last Clinton administration budget ($5.4 billion). An effort by the Senate Armed Services Committee to cut $814 million from the administration’s $7.8 million request for FY 2003 was reversed on the Senate floor in an amendment sponsored by Sen. John Warner (R-VA), the former chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a longstanding supporter of missile defense expenditures. Spending on missile defense during the four years of President George W. Bush’s term is projected at $35.3 billion, nearly twice as much as the $18.7 billion that was spent in the second term of the Clinton administration. Adjusting for inflation, resources devoted to missile defense R&D in Clinton’s second term amount to $17.7 billion in 2002 dollars, while projected resources for the four years of the Bush term are projected to reach $32.7 billion in 2002 dollars. This represents a cumulative increase in missile defense spending of roughly 85% in the four years of the Bush term over the four years of the second Clinton term. Looked at another way, if current projections hold, proposed spending on missile defense in the FY 2005 budget that will be put forward in February 2004 will be 60% higher in real terms than the missile defense budget for FY 2001 that was approved in the waning months of the Clinton administration. As Table II demonstrates, the Pentagon is projecting yearly missile defense funding to reach $11.5 billion by 2007.[10]

Table II: Ballistic Missile Defense Funding, FY 1998 – FY 2007:
From Clinton to Bush [11]
(in billions of current, then-year dollars, with inflation-adjusted, 2002 dollars in parenthesis)































While the Bush administration’s short-term missile defense spending plans represent a substantial increase over the Clinton administration, they represent only the down payment on the actual costs of deploying a missile defense system. A spring 2002 analysis by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggests that despite the substantial increases in Pentagon spending that have been approved since September 11th, the missile defense program will continue to come into conflict with other military priorities. The Wolfowitz memo indicated that the Pentagon had $250 billion committed to major weapons programs between now and 2007, including $46.4 billion for missile defense, with an additional $600 billion committed after 2007 to complete these commitments. The post-2007 estimate did not include an estimate for missile defense, which was listed as "TBD," for "To Be Determined."[12] The Pentagon's huge financial commitment to existing systems – before expenditures for new, so-called transformational systems are taken into account – explains why Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld decided to cancel the Crusader artillery system, and why programs like the F-22 fighter plane and the V-22 Osprey may be in for large cuts or outright cancellation in next year's budget. But even given these steps to trim a few big ticket items from the Pentagon's shopping list, there is still a potential "procurement train wreck" coming up in the next five to ten years unless there are either deep cuts in Cold War era systems or steep increases in Pentagon spending.

The Congressional Budget Office’s January 2002 report on the estimated costs of various missile defense systems underscores the long-term budgetary pressures posed by a large-scale missile defense deployment. Depending on how many sites and interceptors are involved, CBO estimates that a ground-based system will cost between $23 billion and $64 billion to deploy through 2015, with annual operating costs of between $1 billion and $7 billion. For a sea-based mid-course system, CBO estimates the costs to develop, deploy, and operate the stand-alone system to be between $43 billion and $55 billion through 2015. Total costs to develop, build, and launch a constellation of lasers in low-earth orbit, a space-based laser system, could cost from $56 billion to $68 billion. However, since, the space-based laser won't undergo its first integrated flight experiment until at least 2012, it remains unclear when such a system would be available for deployment.

The CBO estimates that costs of the three major missile defense programs could add up to as much as $238 billion over the next two decades. However, the CBO's report suggested that the total cost of an integrated system could be less than the sum of building each part, due to synergies resulting from the sharing of certain equipment, capabilities, and research findings among the land- and sea-based systems. This may prove to be true, but on the other hand, the CBO cost estimates do not take into account the billions of dollars that have already been invested in these programs in previous budgets (prior to 2002), nor do they include other missile defense programs such as THAAD, the PAC-3, or a proposed sea-based boost-phase intercept system.

In regard to the sea-based boost phase system, the CBO stated that, "Sea-based boost-phase defenses are ... in the very early stages of conceptual development. There are substantial uncertainties regarding the needed capabilities, system architecture, technologies, and schedule for developing and deploying such defenses. The Department of Defense has not yet provided a description of such a system that would be suitable for the purpose of estimating costs. Consequently, CBO was unable to prepare a credible estimate of the costs of sea-based boost-phase defenses." What is known about a sea-based boost phase approach suggests that the costs could be substantial. The CBO report also notes that the system would not benefit significantly from "synergies" with other missile defense programs since "a new interceptor, a new ship, and new sensors might all be required."[13]

The CBO also chose not to estimate the costs of a "Brilliant Pebbles" style space-based missile defense system modeled on the GPALS system (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes) which was under consideration during the presidency of George Herbert Walker Bush. Brilliant Pebbles would involve the deployment of 500 to 1,000 space-based kinetic kill vehicles (essentially small guided rockets), each based in its own satellite "safety jacket." Since there has been no new system architecture suggested for a Brilliant Pebbles system since 1992, and since it is not yet known whether this approach will be embraced as part of the new Bush administration plan, CBO decided that there was not sufficient information available to make a credible estimate of the costs of this approach.

Given the potential costs that are not covered in the CBO report, and the Bush administration's clear preference for a multi-tiered system, the cost savings/synergies suggested by the CBO could easily be counterbalanced by the costs of additional elements of the multi-tiered system. Taking into account the $91 billion that has already been spent on missile defense R&D since Ronald Reagan's 1983 Star Wars speech and the fact that spending on the program could exceed $10 billion per year by 2007, realizing the Bush administration's vision of a rapidly deployed, continually expanding missile defense system could ultimately cost even more than the CBO's $238 billion estimate for building major elements of a multi-tiered missile defense program. New missile defense expenditures alone could top $200 billion over the next decade and one half.

II. B. Will it Work?

Despite the huge investment in missile defense over the past four decades, the Pentagon has been unable to field a workable system, and major hurdles remain. As former Pentagon testing official Philip Coyle has repeatedly pointed out, "There is nothing that the DOD has done that is as difficult" as ballistic missile defense.[14]

With this in mind, President Bush's enthusiasm for fielding any and all missile defense systems upon taking office was tempered by the fact that none of the proposed systems were anywhere close to being ready for deployment. So his administration opted instead for a sharp expansion of funding for missile defense R&D with an eye towards the earliest possible deployment of various elements of a multi-tiered system, even if they offered only rudimentary capabilities at first. As part of this accelerated development program, the Pentagon scheduled 30 different tests of various missile defense components in the eighteen-month period from December 2001 through June 2003. Undersecretary of Defense Pete Aldridge noted that the ground-based missile defense "test bed" being prepared in Alaska could be used "as an emergency missile defense capability" once ABM restrictions had been eliminated.[15]

The ground-based system, which received the most attention during the Clinton administration, is proving to be the furthest along. A March 2002 intercept test marked the third consecutive success, for a total of four out of six intercepts. Approximately 20 more tests - each with increasing complexity - are scheduled to take place over the next several years. But there are still many questions about just how "successful" any of the interceptor tests have been, given how simple and predictable they have been compared to the uncertainties that would be involved in dealing with an actual ballistic missile attack.

In all intercept tests to date, a beacon was placed on the mock warhead to act in lieu of a functioning early warning radar, or X-band radar. Defense Week reported in July 2001 that the prototype interceptor was able to find the target warhead partly because the target communicated its location to the interceptor for much of the flight.[16] The transmissions formed the basis of the targeting orders, according to Pentagon officials and documents. While the beacon did not guarantee success, a November 2001 report from the Union of Concerned Scientists found that the beacon guides the interceptor to within 400 meters of the mock warhead before an intercept is attempted - a courtesy not likely to be provided by an actual adversary.[17] Pentagon officials claim that the transponder had to be used because the X-band radar has not been built yet. But for all the priority the Bush administration has given to deploying a missile defense system, the money to build the radar has yet to be requested by the President.

A number of technical problems have also plagued the prototype booster, which launches the kill vehicle in tests of the ground-based system. The temporary booster currently being used is slower than the actual booster that will be used in the system. This, in turn, raises questions about whether the kill vehicle will be able to withstand the faster launch speed of the actual booster, once it is completed. The booster, being developed by Boeing, is more than a year behind schedule and won't be used in an intercept test until – at the earliest – the twelfth intercept attempt, scheduled for 2003. Due to the troubling performance of the Boeing booster project, the Pentagon announced that it is seeking proposals for alternative booster systems.[18]

There is also the critical question of whether the system will be able to discriminate between actual nuclear warheads and decoys designed to look like warheads. This problem is particularly challenging during the midcourse part of the ballistic missile flight path, when warheads and decoys are moving through the weightless environment of space, where differences in speed and appearance are difficult to determine. Two recent reports by the General Accounting Office have confirmed that Boeing and TRW manipulated data from a 1997 test in order to overstate the capabilities of antimissile sensor technology designed to tell the difference between nuclear warheads and decoys for the ground based system. The reports reinforce longstanding allegations of fraud in the testing program made by Professor Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.[19]

Another system designed to take out warheads in the mid-course part of the flight path is the Sea-Based Midcourse System, previously known as Navy Theater Wide. January 2002 marked the first intercept test of the Navy system, which was successful. The most recent test, conducted in June 2002, was also successful. However, an analysis by the Union of Concerned Scientists pointed out that the target used in the test was much larger than a typical missile would be in a realistic attack. In addition, a much faster missile than the one being used in current tests would be needed to provide national coverage. As currently configured, the system would only be effective against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Last but not least, a Sea-Based Midcourse system would encounter the same problems of discriminating between warheads and decoys in the weightless environment of space faced by its ground-based counterpart.

The Pentagon's other sea-based system, Navy Area Wide, being developed by Raytheon, was cancelled by Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Pete Aldridge due to cost overruns and poor performance. The short-range system was supposed to be relatively easy, compared to the longer-range systems, because it was to use the Navy's existing fleet of Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers for anti-missile launchers and a modified Standard missile as an interceptor. However, the program cost growth exceeded 25%, and one study determined the costs had grown by 60%.[20] There were also problems with the interceptor missile not being fast enough.

Despite killing the Navy Area program, the Pentagon is searching for an alternative/replacement system. Defense Week reported, "the military still has a requirement for a system to do what the killed program did – launch ship-based interceptors at short-range missiles – and most of the same contractors are vying to work on a replacement program."[21] Lt. Gen. Kadish, head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA - formerly the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) remains skeptical about the program, in part because the flight path of short-range missiles is so short the ships would have to be very close to the enemy launching the missile, making them vulnerable to attack.

As noted earlier, a sea-based boost phase interceptor, which is favored by many missile defense advocates because it would be designed to destroy long-range ballistic missiles in their boost phase, before they could release independently-targeted warheads or decoys, is little more than a concept at the moment. An appropriate interceptor missile, which would have to be much larger and faster than current prototype interceptors to hit a ballistic missile in its relatively short boost phase of flight, has yet to be designed. Until there is some sort of design for the interceptor, it will be impossible to determine what size ship is needed, with what size launch tubes. Nor is it clear that existing targeting and sensor systems could be used to guide the new interceptor, or whether new sensors would have to be developed as well.

Other missile defense systems the Pentagon is pursuing as parts of a "layered defense" include the Airborne Laser (ABL), the Space-Based Laser (SBL), the PAC-3, and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD). The first test of the Airborne Laser, a chemical laser affixed to a modified Boeing 747 jet, will take place in 2004. The Space-Based Laser, intended to destroy a ballistic missile in its boost phase, is barely off the drawing board at this stage – only a handful of components of the system have been tested, a full-scale testing facility hasn't even been built, and integrated flight experiments are not expected to take place until 2012. However, according to the Air Force, the Pentagon is now hoping to "field a rudimentary capability around 2008-2020 with increasing sophistication added in subsequent years."[22]

Both the PAC-3 and THAAD systems could be part of the terminal defense segment, which would be tasked with intercepting warheads in the final phase of flight, as they re-enter the atmosphere and head towards targets in the United States. The PAC-3 is the newest version of the Patriot missile, designed to defend troops and fixed assets against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Philip Coyle, the DOD's former test evaluator noted that, "A number of defense reporters have reported these 11 tests as all successful, which they have not been. So-called Developmental Test Number Six, and so-called Developmental Test (actually, there was some operational test aspect of this test) Number Nine that was fired last July, both had problems."[23] The three operational tests conducted this year have had problems too. A full-rate production decision on the PAC-3 will be made in September 2002. However, Coyle has pointed out that the PAC-3 was not designed to counter long-range threats, and no flight intercept tests have been conducted to demonstrate how it might be incorporated into a terminal defense layer.[24]

THAAD is to be fielded in conjunction with the PAC-3 system. The THAAD system failed the first six of eight intercept attempts conducted between 1995 and 1999. Despite the six consecutive failures, the Pentagon allowed the program to move onto the next phase of development after its two successful intercepts in 1999. Since then no intercept tests have taken place. The Pentagon report on testing and evaluation for 2001 said the THAAD "testing was plagued with failures," primarily due to "an urgency to develop and deploy" the system.[25] Because of reliability and performance problems, a new interceptor missile is being designed for the THAAD program. No flight tests are scheduled until 2004.

Faced with the ongoing technical hurdles associated with missile defense, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld reorganized the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and renamed it the Missile Defense Agency. Rumsfeld said that the name change to an "agency" status recognizes "the national priority and mission emphasis on missile defense."[26] However, all the change seems to have accomplished is exempting missile defense development from the normal reporting procedures on costs and schedule, and from the need to develop specific performance requirements for the new system geared to the most likely ballistic missile threats faced by the United States. Under the new regime, not only will many missile defense tests be exempted from oversight from the DOD's independent testing office, but important details that are needed to determine how realistic the tests are –such as the number and configuration of decoys used – may be classified as secret.

General Kadish disagrees with critics who argue that the new approach to testing is designed to shield the program from necessary public scrutiny, arguing that "we have changed our approach to development and are moving more to a capabilities-based approach for this acquisition ... Some have interpreted this as doing away with requirements or doing away with discipline in general. That is not the case."[27]

General Kadish said the Pentagon is developing a long-term plan for missile defense. However, that plan will be guided by studies by the Defense Science Board, an advisory panel that reports to the Secretary of Defense, and by a corporate team led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin.[28] The task of integrating the proposed array of air-, land-, sea- and space-based missile defense technologies into a workable system will be contracted out to Boeing and Lockheed Martin as well. The two companies will head a team of engineers handpicked from major weapons contractors. Aviation Week reported that "the industry teams advising the MDA are expected to identify what new projects are required, but they won't have a hand in selecting the contractors to avoid conflicts of interest."[29]

Despite the MDA’s pledge to avoid conflicts of interest, it’s fairly clear which companies will benefit from accelerated spending on missile defense. More than 65% of the missile defense contracts awarded over the past five years have gone to only four contractors – Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW – who often collaborate on the various programs. If federal regulators approve Northrop Grumman’s bid to takeover TRW, the Pentagon’s four largest defense contractors will also be the companies with the lion’s share of business in the missile defense field. Between the major role reserved for Boeing and Lockheed Martin and the exclusion of the Pentagon's independent testing office from a meaningful role in evaluating the program, it now appears that no one without a vested interest in seeing the missile defense program move forward will be involved in evaluating its capabilities.

II. C. How Urgent is the Ballistic Missile Threat?

Despite the fact that a ballistic missile is the least likely method a US adversary would choose for delivering a weapon of mass destruction to US soil, a 1998 report of a Congressionally-mandated panel chaired by Donald Rumsfeld managed to dramatically alter the debate on missile defense and the ballistic missile threat facing the United States. The Rumsfeld Commission's key finding was the assertion that "rogue states" like North Korea or Iraq could acquire ballistic missiles within "five years of a decision to do so," not the ten to fifteen years suggested by previous US intelligence estimates.[30]

As a result, the Rumsfeld panel gave missile defense boosters in Congress the quasi-official endorsement they needed to push the program forward. No matter that the report painted a worst case scenario by systematically ignoring all of the real world obstacles Third World countries face in trying to obtain a long-range ballistic capability while playing up any factors (however remote) that might increase their chances of getting usable ballistic missiles in a shorter time frame. According to commission members, the five-year estimate was based in significant part on briefings from missile engineers at major US defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin and Boeing – hardly unbiased sources, given the billions their firms stand to gain from building a missile defense system to thwart the alleged threat posed by Third World ICBMs. Many of the commission members also had connections to the defense industry, or to missile defense advocacy organizations such as the Center for Security Policy.[31]

A recent piece in the Washington Post underscores the added weight that the Rumsfeld Commission’s extreme worst case scenarios have taken on since the commission’s namesake has taken charge at the Pentagon: "Since the beginning of the Bush administration last year, and Rumsfeld's reappointment as Defense Secretary, the conclusions of the Rumsfeld Commission have been elevated to quasi-doctrinal status within the government, according to several officials. Nobody dares say a word against Rumsfeld, at least in public."[32]

A September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic missile threat contradicted the alarmism of the Rumsfeld report, arguing that "We project that during the next 15 years the US most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq," the missile threat from other nations will "probably [be] a few to tens, constrained to smaller payloads, and [be] less reliable and accurate." The Center for Defense Information noted, "this language returned the threat analysis to what has been the traditional approach of NIEs: what is likely to happen (probability) rather than the much broader criterion of what could happen (possibility), which was the emphasis of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report to Congress."[33]

Even the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate, released during the first year of the avidly pro-missile defense Bush administration, notes that "US territory is more likely to be attacked" with weapons of mass destruction by countries or terrorist groups using "ships, trucks, airplanes or other means" than by a long-range ballistic missile.[34] Those delivery systems are "less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs," and unlike missiles, non-missile systems "can be overtly developed and employed" with the source being "masked in an attempt to evade retaliation." They can also be deployed in ways that will evade ballistic missile defenses, rendering the costly proposed investments in these systems irrelevant.[35]

Despite continuing evidence that ballistic missiles are the least likely delivery vehicle for attacking the United States with a weapon of mass destruction, hard-liners in the Bush administration cannot be swayed from their blind belief in the ballistic missile threat facing the US. In a July 24th, 2001 interview, ABC Nightline's Ted Koppel sternly questioned Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz on the missile threat facing the US:

Koppel: Your own Pentagon experts have put out a list of the perceived threats. On a list of 10 perceived threats, they rank this one ninth. The only one that they rank lower in terms of probability is an all-out attack by Russia or by China.

Wolfowitz: Ted, we're gazing into a very fuzzy crystal ball when you make those predictions. Any estimate of a war in Korea shows that the North Korean ballistic missile threat would take tens of thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands of casualties just in the peninsula alone, and the North Koreans are working on longer and longer-range ballistic missiles. We need to work against both those threats. The point is we have some ability today to stop trucks coming across our borders, in fact, we stopped quite a few during the millennium event. We have zero capability to defend against ballistic missiles.

Koppel: We are, in the final analysis, going to have to make decisions based upon the available resources and what you folks over at the Pentagon perceive to be the greatest threats. Again, I draw your attention to your own Pentagon's assessment of the rogue nation nuclear threat as being ninth on a list of 10 in terms of probability, and yet you are asking Congress, in effect, to put up a huge chunk of the money that is going to be available for the defense budget in general, for a program that may, in the final analysis, work or not work.

Wolfowitz: Ted, if we deploy it, it's going to be something that works. The PAC-3 we are convinced now is something that works, the Navy Theater Wide system is something that works. There's over a billion dollars in this budget to do it, and it is part of what makes our overall defense posture effective. And the reason we invest as much as we do in defense is because it makes a safer world, not just for ourselves, but for our children and grandchildren. It costs a lot of money, it is worth a lot of money, but we are, in fact, working on systems that will protect us and protect the American people.

Interestingly, the Navy Theater Wide system that Wolfowitz described as "something that works" during his July 2001 interview had not even attempted an intercept test at that point, and didn't do so until January 2002.

II. D. How Will it Effect US Relations with Other Nuclear Weapons States?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has been a model of patience throughout discussions with the Bush administration on the ballistic missile defense issue. Putin has repeatedly pledged Russia's willingness to discuss changes and/or amendments to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and move forward with nuclear reductions. The treaty specifically bans the deployment of missile defense systems at sea or in space – both components in Bush's vision for a layered missile defense system. In the aftermath of President Bush's announcement of the US withdrawal from the treaty, which became effective June 13th, 2002, Putin noted, "We asked to be given specific parameters that stood in the way of US desires to develop defensive systems and implement parameters," but "nothing specific was given to us." "To this day I fail to understand this insistence, given our position, which was fairly flexible," said Putin.[36]

But for military hard-liners like Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, destroying the ABM Treaty was a worthwhile goal in its own right, because it sets the stage for making military/technical dominance the centerpiece of US security policy. Republican Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona, another committed advocate of missile defense, has dubbed this approach "peace through strength, not peace through paper." But Kyl's sound bite ignores the fact that reality is at odds with this popular conservative catch phrase. Many of the systems required to build a multi-tiered defense system exist only on paper at the moment, while many of the arms control treaties that he derides as being "just paper" include detailed provisions for the monitoring and destruction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons stockpiles. These treaties offer far more promise in the short-term of reducing the chances of an attack on the United States involving a weapon of mass destruction than an undeployed, unproven missile defense system.

In preparation for the May 2002 summit between Putin and Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell and his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov met in mid-April to work out an agreement on nuclear reductions for the two leaders to sign, followed by meetings between Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. The main sticking points in the negotiations were whether or not these reductions should be in the form of a legally binding document, such as a treaty, and whether the excess warheads should be destroyed or stored. Ultimately, a political compromise was struck which left many of the substantive issues up in the air.

On May 24, 2002, Bush and Putin signed a treaty to reduce each nation's nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads each. While the treaty marks the first nuclear reduction agreement in more than a decade, it may in fact be another decade before any of these weapons are actually destroyed. The agreement sets no schedule for reductions, as long as the desired level is reached by 2012. In theory, either side could even increase deployed weapons between now and 2012, as long as they come back down to the agreed levels by the end of the ten-year period of the agreement. Also, the weapons withdrawn from active service do not have to be destroyed - thousands may be saved as part of the "active response" force the Bush administration wants to maintain so that it can redeploy weapons on short notice.

As Michael R. Gordon made clear in an analysis piece in the May 14th edition of the New York Times, the agreement leaves the Bush administration free to do pretty much anything it wants to do in the field of nuclear weapons. While Gordon gets credit for the most detailed early analysis of the pact, Jon Stewart of "The Daily Show" on Comedy Central got to the heart of the problem when he said that the agreement will move us from a position where "instead of being able to blow the world up 11 or 12 times over, we'll only be able to do it 4 or 5 times."

III. Inside the Missile Defense Lobby

Against this backdrop it is clear that President Bush's rush to deploy missile defenses, whether they have been adequately tested or not, has little to do with how best to defend the US in the 21st century and everything to do with special interest groups that stand to benefit from the program. This network of contractors, conservative think tanks, and weapons scientists make up a formidable lobbying force in Washington, and key members of this lobby have landed positions as major policy makers in the Bush administration.

As illustrated in our earlier report, Tangled Web: The Marketing of Missile Defense, missile defense underwent a miraculous political revival in the 1990s. Every major milestone, from its inclusion in Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey's "Contract With America" in 1994, to the Rumsfeld Commission's extreme "worst case" assessment of the "rogue state" missile threat in 1998, to the passage of pro-NMD legislation in both houses of Congress in the spring of 1999, has been propelled forward by a highly disciplined and effective coalition of conservative organizations. This pro-NMD network includes the Heritage Foundation and Empower America, neo-Reaganite Republicans like Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and cash hungry defense contractors. All of these are sectors are represented on the Board of Advisors of the Center for Security Policy (CSP), which serves as the de facto nerve center of the missile defense lobby. As one industry executive told this study's principal author at a DC breakfast briefing sponsored by defense contractor TRW, "We're a tight knit group."

Founded by former Reagan administration official Frank Gaffney in 1988, CSP has received funding from conservative donors like the Coors family, Richard Mellon Scaife, and the Krieble family, along with a healthy injection from corporate donors like Lockheed, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, TRW and other major defense contractors that stand to benefit from deployment of a missile defense system.

The Center's 2001 annual report boasts of the extraordinary number of members of its National Security Advisory Council (formerly known as its board of advisors) that "are now on leave for government service and look forward to working every bit as closely with them in their new capacities."[37] In addition to Vice President Dick Cheney, who was an early board member, more recent members now in the Bush administration include Douglas Feith, J.D. Crouch, Richard Perle, William Schneider, James Roche, Robert Joseph, and Dov Zakheim. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who was the recipient of the Center's "Keeper of the Flame" Award in 1998, has been a longtime associate and financial contributor to the Center. During the Center's annual "Keeper of the Flame" award fundraising dinner last November, Rumsfeld remarked on the large number of Center associates serving in the Bush administration, saying "I was thinking of calling a staff meeting, but I think I'll wait until tomorrow."[38]

At any given point in time, CSP has as many as eight executives on its advisory board from missile defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, or companies that lobby on their behalf. Dr. Charles Kupperman, Vice President of Space and Strategic Missiles Sector at Lockheed Martin, serves on the Center's Board of Directors. At least 13% of the Center's revenue in 2001 was specifically from defense corporations. In all, CSP has received $3 million in corporate donations since its founding in 1988, with much of that money coming from major weapons contractors. Nonetheless, the Center describes itself as a "non-partisan organization committed to stimulating and informing the national and international debates about all aspects of security policy." Ironically, even though Gaffney's organization claims to be carrying on the work of Ronald Reagan, many of the arms control treaties that it is trying to dismantle, including the ABM treaty (which has now lapsed), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and the START accords, were implemented by Republican presidents, namely Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Herbert Walker Bush.

CSP's advisory council could be more aptly called the "Star Wars Hall of Fame." In addition to representatives of the top missile defense contractors, the Center's advisory body includes longtime missile defense advocates such as weapons scientist Edward Teller, former Reagan Science advisor George Keyworth, and Elliott Abrams, a former Reagan State Department official. From the world of conservative foundations and think-tanks, the CSP advisory council boasts such key figures as Bill Bennett and Jeanne Kirkpatrick of Empower America, Heritage Foundation President Edward Feulner, and Keith Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy. Rounding out the CSP council are sitting members of Congress such as Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and Sen. Bob Smith (R-NH) who provide a strong core of leadership on missile defense issues on Capitol Hill.

The creation of the allegedly objective, bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission to assess the ballistic missile threat facing the US was carried out pursuant to an amendment that was inserted into the FY 1997 defense authorization bill by staunch CSP supporter and advisor Rep. Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania. In addition to defense contractors briefing members of the commission, CSP board members William Graham and William Schneider also served on the panel.

In the summer of 2000, before President Clinton was to make a deployment decision, the Center for Security Policy joined forces with the Heritage Foundation, Empower America, and the High Frontier Organization to launch a new campaign called the Coalition to Protect Americans Now. The Coalition, funded by Colorado heiress Helen Krieble, launched television ads calling on the President to deploy "a strong missile defense –now." In addition to the ads, the group also had a web site with a customized "missile threat calculator" so one could find out which countries had ballistic missiles pointed their way, able to reach their neighborhood (or so the site implied). However, if one punched in a zip code to get their "customized" missile threat assessment, the fine print indicated that for a number of these imminent threats, the "missile is not yet operational, but it is widely expected that it will have the ability to hit the continental US when it is deployed." So much for truth in advertising.

The "missile threat calculator" has since reappeared on the web site of "Americans for a Strong Defense," a new organization that includes the corporate-backed Safe Foundation along with all of the members of the now defunct Coalition to Protect Americans Now.[39] In addition to the threat calculator, the site is exploiting the September 11th attacks to back its agenda, saying, "As painful as it was to lose 7,000 innocent souls in these attacks, what if the terrorists bought one of North Korea's missiles?" The site goes on to list resources for "nonpartisan information" which include only conservative, pro-missile defense groups – the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Security Policy, High Frontier, and the Safe Foundation.

The reference to terrorists buying North Korean missiles is typical of the sort of illogical and irresponsible scare-mongering that is routinely engaged in by true believers in the missile defense cause. The notion of terrorists armed with a ballistic missile is a frightening image, but it also so far out of the realm of possibility as to verge on the ludicrous. As noted earlier, a long-range ballistic missile is the least likely method a nation state would choose to deliver a weapon of mass destruction to the United States, because such an attack would subject it to a devastating retaliatory attack. Given this reality, what would possess any nation to sell a long-range ballistic missile to a terrorist group? It’s not as if a handful of operatives could pack up a 40 to 60 ton multi-stage missile and move it to another location without being detected. And no national leader that wanted to survive would allow a terrorist group to launch a long-range missile at the United States from his or her own territory.

Is there an even vaguely plausible scenario involving "terrorists buying a North Korean missile?" If the "Americans for a Strong Defense" web site is referring to a shorter-range, non-ballistic missile – which would be more portable – then the existence of a multi-tiered ballistic missile defense shield would not matter, since it would be unable to protect against a shorter-range missile. The most important priority with respect to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is making sure no terrorist network gets its hands on a nuclear weapon or the materials to make one, a task for which a multi-tiered missile defense is irrelevant. One is left with the unavoidable impression that the references to September 11th and terrorists buying ballistic missiles are pure propaganda, not carefully considered analysis. This is a sobering thought when one considers that the organizations promoting these misleading arguments have such close ties with top Bush administration policymakers.

In addition to its influence in the creation of the first Rumsfeld commission and its role in disseminating pro-missile defense propaganda, CSP was instrumental in the formation of another key panel that promoted the weaponization of space. Center advisory board member Sen. Robert Smith (R-NH) served as the primary sponsor of legislation that produced a second Rumsfeld Commission concerned with US national security missions in outer space. As the Wall Street Journal explained it, the Commission examined "what's at stake and what it will take to ensure that the US remains pre-eminent" in outer space.[40]

The report stated that "an attack on elements of US space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable act," and claimed the US is at risk of a "space Pearl Harbor." The report made a number of recommendations, ranging from the need to develop new technologies to defend US space assets, to ensuring that the US acts to shape the international political and legal environment to keep the option of deploying weapons in space open, to forming a Space Corps within the Air Force. The Commission's findings and recommendations back up the US Space Command Vision for 2020 document, which lays out the overall goal of US domination of space to "protect US interests and investments," of which deployment of a missile defense system is but the first step.[41]

The makeup of the space commission was strikingly similar to the first commission chaired by Mr. Rumsfeld, with the notable exception that corporate personnel not only briefed the commission on key points, but also served as official members. Its heavy reliance on representatives of corporations with interests in military space ventures and conservative ideologues associated with pro-Star Wars think tanks calls into question the objectivity of the panel's findings. Two of the thirteen members on the panel served on the previous panel on ballistic missile threats – Donald Rumsfeld and William Graham. Three panel members – Graham, Charles Horner, and Malcolm Wallop – are board members of the Center for Security Policy, while a fourth, Donald Rumsfeld, is a long-time friend and associate of CSP. Rumsfeld was also on the Board of Empower America - which ran misleading pro-Star Wars radio ads against incumbent Democratic Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) in the 1998 elections, just a few months after Rumsfeld's allegedly non-partisan analysis of the Third World missile threat was released. Rumsfeld has also provided financial support to the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Security Policy, while Wallop, a long-time booster of missile defenses based in space, is a Senior Fellow at Heritage.

As for corporate connections, no fewer than eight Pentagon defense contractors were represented on the space commission. Panel member Duane Andrews is Corporate Executive Vice President and Director of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), which received $1.7 billion in Pentagon contracts in 2001 and ranked as the Pentagon's ninth top contractor. SAIC is the integration contractor for the Air Force's Space and Missile System Center's advanced programs, and its website proudly explains, "We support the Defense Department and Services' space system planning, including the National Security Space Architect, in determining the space systems that will support the warfighter into the 21st century."[42] SAIC also has a role in the Pentagon's missile defense programs.

Space Commission members Gen. Howell Estes and Gen. Thomas Moorman serve as Vice Chairman and member on the Board of Trustees, respectively, for the Aerospace Corporation, "a leader in the application of space technology." The "private, nonprofit" Aerospace Corporation ranked as the Pentagon's 33rd contractor in 2001, receiving more than $443 million in DOD contracts that year. Moorman is also a partner in Booz-Allen Hamilton, ranked as the DOD's 36th top contractor in 2001. Booz-Allen Hamilton received close to $435 million in 2001 for work on everything from missile defense to the Milstar program and numerous classified programs.[43]

Both Estes and Moorman serve on the Board of Directors at the Space Foundation, another key institutional beachhead for the Star Wars lobby. The foundation describes itself as a non-profit institute devoted to promoting the use of outer space for commercial, scientific, and military purposes, but its heavy military tilt is evidenced by the fact that it receives funding from a large number of missile defense contractors including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, TRW, Northrop Grumman, Spectrum Astro, Orbital Sciences, Honeywell, the Aerospace Corporation, and SAIC. In addition to Estes and Moorman, the Space Foundation's board of directors is chock full of executives from other corporations that are invested in military-space initiatives, including James Albaugh of Boeing, William Ballhaus of the Aerospace Corporation, Guion Bluford Jr. from Northrop Grumman, Albert Smith of Lockheed Martin, Gen. John L. Piotrowski of SAIC, and, until recently, the former CEO of the Aerospace Corporation and current Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Pete Aldridge.

Space commission panel member Gen. Jay Garner is president of SY Technology, located in Huntsville, Alabama – headquarters of the Army's missile defense programs. SY Technology, a small business, describes itself as having "unique expertise in space and missile defense technologies, systems engineering and integration." Panel member Admiral David Jeremiah is the president of Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation, which works on missile defense, space launch systems, technology transfer, and battlespace management. Admiral Jeremiah has also served on the Board of Directors for number of Pentagon contractors, including Litton Industries (#6 on the DOD's top contractors in FY 2000 - now part of Northrop Grumman) and Alliant Techsystems (#27). Jeremiah also has a seat on Northrop Grumman's Advisory Board.

It seems apparent that the numerous members of the Rumsfeld Space Commission who are employed by and/or associated with defense contractors have a serious and direct conflict of interest. The panel's members and their affiliated companies stand to make millions – if not billions – if their recommendations are carried out. But as Charles Pena and Edward Hudgins from the Cato Institute point out, the Space Commission received far less media attention than the first Rumsfeld Commission. However, "it's conclusions and recommendations could have a greater and broader impact now that Rumsfeld is Secretary of Defense."[44]

In October of 2001, the Bush administration echoed some of the Space Commission findings in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review: "A key objective ... is not only to ensure US ability to exploit space for military purposes, but also as required to deny an adversary's ability to do so."[45] Rumsfeld also did some reorganizing. Aviation Week reported, "In the bid to raise the profile for space issues, the Policy Coordinating Committee for Space was created within the White House National Security Council. That committee, to be chaired by the NSC's Frank Miller, "will help to coordinate the civil and commercial and defense-related aspects of space,'' Rumsfeld said. He also created a small organization focused on developing and operating highly classified systems, to be named the Office of Space Reconnaissance, which will reside within the National Reconnaissance Office.[46] The NRO director will also serve as the Undersecretary of the Air Force and be the Pentagon's top acquisition official for space projects. That job went to former president/chief operating officer of Lockheed Martin, Peter B. Teets, who was sworn in as Undersecretary of the US Air Force and director of the National Reconnaissance Office in January 2002.

As Theresa Hitchens of the Center for Defense Information has pointed out, "Emerging Bush administration plans and policies are clearly aimed at making the US the first nation to deploy space-based weapons ... Unfortunately the Bush administration has done little thinking - at least publicly - about the potential for far-reaching military, political and economic ramifications of a US move to break the taboo against weaponizing space."[47]

Like the two Rumsfeld Commissions, the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in January 2002, reflects the thinking of far-right conservative organizations and nuclear weapons contractors. The NPR drew many of its findings from a report released in January 2001 by the National Institute for Public Policy, entitled, "Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control." Nuclear warfighting strategist and former Hudson Institute researcher Keith Payne founded NIPP in the early 1980s, and served as a director for the January 2001 study.

In general, the NIPP report calls future security threats to the US unknown and unpredictable. Therefore, the report concludes that the US must maintain its nuclear arsenal, and the ability to design, build and test new nuclear weapons. The report asserts that conventional weapons are inadequate replacements for nuclear weapons because they do not have the same "destructive power." As a solution the report recommends the development of "low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons" – in other words, a nuclear weapon the US can actually use.

The NIPP panel frowns on arms control treaties because, "US policymakers today cannot know the strategic environment of 2005, let alone 2010 or 2020. There is no basis for expecting that the conditions that may permit deep nuclear reductions today will continue in the future."

Not surprisingly, NIPP has a similar make-up to the Center for Security Policy.[48] In fact, nearly half of the members of NIPP's board of directors – 6 out of 13 – are also on the advisory council or Board of Directors of the Center for Security Policy. However, less is known about the corporate connections of NIPP. The Institute notes on its web site that "the National Institute research and educational program is supported by government, corporate, and private foundation grants and contracts," but no breakdown is provided and no donors are listed.

Three of the members who worked on the NIPP report contributed to the administration's Nuclear Posture Review and now serve in the Bush administration. These are Stephen Cambone, who now serves as Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation at the Pentagon; Stephen Hadley, the Deputy National Security Advisor in the Bush White House; and Robert Joseph, who deals with counterproliferation issues at the National Security Council. In October 2001, Keith Payne was appointed chairman of the Pentagon's Deterrence Concepts Advisory Panel, which will have a role in helping the Bush administration decide how to implement the guidance provided in the Nuclear Posture Review. Most recently, Payne was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces and Policy.

Beyond funding and sitting on boards of think-tanks and organizations that promote its agenda, the defense industry pushes its priorities the old fashioned way as well – through political contributions and well-paid, well-connected lobbyists.

IV. Defense Contractors: Cashing in on Missile Defense

During the past decade, the major weapons makers have made generous campaign contributions to key members of Congress and invested tens of millions of dollars in their Washington, DC lobbying operations. Since 1995, shortly after the Republicans took control of the House, weapons industry Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions have favored Republicans over Democrats by a two-to-one margin. From 2000 to the present, the defense industry as a whole has given more than $10 million in PAC contributions, with the "Big 4" – Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and TRW – accounting for $3.9 million. The defense industry gave out more than $6 million in soft money contributions in the 2000 and 2002 election cycle, with the Big 4 accounting for $3.5 million of the total. The Big 4 contractors also receive more than 65% of the missile defense contracts doled out each year (see Table III, below).

As the 2000 presidential campaign entered its final lap, the contractors were busy courting both parties, but they showed a decided "tilt" towards Republican candidates, and for good reason. Candidates on both the Republican and Democratic tickets supported increased defense spending, but Republicans were far more likely to support early deployment of an ambitious and costly missile defense system. Although the industry's $190,000 in contributions to George W. Bush were a "drop in the bucket" compared to the tens of millions of dollars he raised in his drive for the presidency, the fact that Bush received more than four and one-half times as much defense industry money as Al Gore suggests that the industry had a clear preference for the Republican standard bearer. Since candidate Gore actually promised to spend more overall on the Pentagon than candidate Bush, Bush's pro-missile defense stance appeared to be a major distinguishing feature from the standpoint of his supporters in the weapons industry.

Lockheed Martin – the nation's largest defense contractor with a hand in multiple missile defense projects – donated $100,000 to both the GOP and the Democratic conventions. The company has also worked overtime to endear itself to former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Mississippi, kicking in $60,000 for a "Lott Hop" fundraiser at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia and pledging $1 million to the "Trent Lott Leadership Institute" at the University of Mississippi. At the Democratic convention, Lockheed was one of two dozen companies sponsoring Senator John Breaux's (D-LA) "Mardi Gras Goes Hollywood" party.

Table III: Defense Contractors Spending, Spending, Spending - PAC Contributions, Soft Money, Lobbying Expenditures

PAC Contributions from the top 4 missile defense contractors


2000 election (%R - %D)

2002 election (%R - %D)



$706,926 (58% - 42%)

$394,215 (56% - 44%)


Lockheed Martin

$1,017,719 (64% - 36%)

$607,050 (62% - 38%)



$493,925 (63% - 37%)

$324,500 (60% - 40%)



$267,174 (70% - 30%)

$127,150 (67% - 33%)






Soft Money Contributions from the top 4 missile defense contractors


2000 election (%R - %D)

2002 election (%R - %D)



$828,498 (56% - 44%)

$404,032 (58% - 44%)


Lockheed Martin

$1,152,350 (60% - 40%)

$436,950 (60% - 40%)



$324,140 (62% - 38%)

$219,890 (54% - 46%)



$193,425 (95% - 5%)

$15,700 (100% - 0%)






Lobbying Expenditures for the top 4 missile defense contractors











Lockheed Martin















Yearly total





1997-2000 total


Source: All data compiled from the website of the Center for Responsive Politics in Washington, DC.[49]

Boeing, currently in charge of a $2.2 billion contract for the Lead Systems Integrator for the GMD program, donated $100,000 to the Democratic National Convention. In total, Boeing has supplied more $2.3 million in PAC and soft money to candidates and the parties in the 1999/2000 and 2002/2002 election cycles. During the 2000 elections James Albaugh, president of Boeing's Space and Communications Group, told the Washington Post, "We're going to be running some ads very soon, and we've had some discussions with the customer [the Pentagon] on how we can go out and try to educate a lot of folks about national missile defense." Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute, and several ardent supporters such as Rep. Curt Weldon and Frank Gaffney, thought that was a good thing. Thompson said, "The defense contractors and the government have to do a better job of explaining the technology and the mission of national missile defense. What's happening is that critics are taking advantage of all the secrecy about missile defense to drive the public debate."[50]

The smaller of the Big 4 have also been cultivating good relations with both parties. Together, Raytheon and TRW have dished out almost $2 million in campaign contributions in recent election cycles. During the Democratic convention in Los Angeles, Raytheon, presently developing the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (the weapon part) of the ground-based system, co-hosted a fundraiser on Santa Monica pier for members of the conservative Democrat "Blue Dog" caucus. Each sponsor reportedly donated $50,000 for the bash. TRW threw a luncheon at the Philadelphia Union Club during the Republican Convention for Senator John Warner (R-VA) who at the time was the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Eighty-five percent of TRW's campaign contributions during the last two election cycles have been targeted at the GOP.

Like many major campaign contributors, missile defense contractors give donations to candidates who are in a position to do the most good for them. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, five of the top six donors to members of the House Armed Services Committee during the 1999/2000 election cycle were major nuclear weapons and missile defense contractors: Lockheed Martin, $212,834 (1st); General Dynamics, $201,707 (2nd); Raytheon, $129,150 (4th); Boeing, $122,753 (5th); and Northrop Grumman, $108,350 (6th). A similar pattern emerged in the Senate Armed Services Committee, where five of the top seven donors were major nuclear or missile defense contractors: Lockheed Martin, $203,388 (1st); General Dynamics, $120,700 (2nd); Raytheon, $115,401 (3rd); Boeing, $93,255 (5th); and Northrop Grumman, $68,100 (7th).

The Bush-Cheney 2001 Inauguration committee took in a record $40 million. Of that Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon gave a total of $425,000. These figures could increase, as some of the donations have yet to be disclosed.[51]

Political Action Committee contributions and soft money donations that flow to the candidates and parties have caps, but lobbying expenditures have no limits. In fact, in 2000, the most recent year for which full statistics are available, the top four missile defense contractors spent more than $25 million on lobbyists. From 1997 to 2000, these four defense contractors racked up $74 million in lobbying expenditures. While 2001 lobbying figures are not yet available, reports indicate a huge surge in spending. One source suggests that military contractors may spend nearly $60 million on lobbying between 2001 and 2002 alone, because a number of "big" weapons decisions are expected to be made by the Bush administration.[52]

Lockheed Martin, hoping to get a greater role in missile defense and corner the market on next generation fighter jets, increased its lobbying expenditures by $10 million from 1999 to 2000. It looks like their investment paid off: last October the Pentagon awarded Lockheed what could turn out to be the largest military contract in history - a contract with the potential value of $200 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter. In an effort to recover their losses, Boeing, the losing bidder in the JSF competition, has stepped up the activities of its Washington office, which is headed by Rudy F. de Leon, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the final years of the Clinton administration, and coordinates the activities of 34 in-house and more than 50 outside lobbyists working on the company's behalf.[53]

Boeing also enlisted the help of Bonner & Associates to help build the case for missile defense, and went to the "source" by employing Alan Myer, who helped write Reagan's famous 1983 Star Wars speech. One of Myer's assignments was to coach five pro-Star Wars scientists in how to deal with the media more effectively. Those scientists appeared at a May 2001 Washington news conference organized by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Rep. Bud Cramer (D-AL), in conjunction with the SAFE Foundation, to address the technical questions about the Pentagon's missile defense programs. Weldon proclaimed, "The testimony of these top-notch scientists should put to rest any hesitations that skeptics have tried to pin on our technological capability ... too often, we only hear from one side of the debate in the science community - the left side." Weldon continued, "Now the American people can hear the truth from men who actually know the scientific progress we have made. These scientific leaders can refute - chapter and verse - the Chicken Little views of the liberal scientific community."[54]

In addition to hiring former House Appropriations Committee Chair Rep. Bob Livingston (R-LA), Raytheon was one of a handful of defense firms to support the "Defending the Northeast, America and Our Allies from Ballistic Missile Attack" symposium held in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania in June 2001. The conference was organized by Representative Curt Weldon and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). World Policy Institute Senior Research Associate Frida Berrigan attended the conference and counted over 70 participants from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon to smaller missile defense companies like Alliant Missile Products and Science Applications International Corporation, out of a list of 200 or so. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing and a local defense company all had elaborate displays in the basement of the conference, which was dubbed "Independence Hall" for the occasion. Raytheon even brought a half-size model of its exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV).

Speakers at the Valley Forge event included Lt. General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; Ambassador Henry Cooper, the Chairman of the Board of High Frontier; Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of Center for Security Policy; Lee Wilbur from Boeing; and Douglas Graham from Lockheed Martin.

More recently, in April 2002, a number of missile defense contractors co-sponsored events at the Space Foundation's 18th National Space Symposium attended by "top leaders from industry, government, NASA and the military," in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Lockheed Martin co-sponsored the "festive" opening ceremony, Spectrum Astro co-sponsored the concluding gala "Space Technology Hall of Fame Dinner," and Orbital Sciences Corporation co-sponsored the Space Foundation's Corporate Partnership Dinner. Missile defense contractors are already lining up to sponsor next year's event. TRW will do the Hall of Fame Dinner, Boeing will again sponsor the Exhibit Center, and Spectrum Astro will co-sponsor the opening ceremony.[55]

Speakers at this year’s space symposium included Undersecretary of the Air Force Peter Teets; Jeff Harris of Lockheed Martin's Space Systems Company; NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe; Dr. William Ballhaus, Jr., president and CEO of the Aerospace Corporation; Tim Hannemann of TRW; Brewster Shaw of Boeing; and Carl Fisher of Northrop Grumman. Former Lockheed Martin executive Teets has openly advocated the weaponization of space. At a March 6, 2002 conference in Washington, DC, he asserted that "weapons will go into space. It's a question of time. And we need to be at the forefront of that."[56]

Each August for the past four years, missile defense experts and industry representatives have met in August in Huntsville, Alabama for the "Space and Missile Defense Conference and Exhibition," sponsored by the weapons industry's largest trade association the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA). Other sponsors include the US Army Space and Missile Defense Association and the Air Defense Artillery Association, with the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command participating. This year's theme is "Space and Missile Defense – Key to Global Security."

The defense industry has also helped finance a series of pro-missile defense breakfasts on Capitol Hill in conjunction with the National Defense University Foundation and the NDIA. Each fall and spring, approximately 20 "breakfast briefings" are held for defense industry representatives, Hill staffers, lobbyists and an occasional reporter or two. Not only does the arms industry's largest trade association, NDIA, support the series, but each breakfast receives support from a specific corporation like Bechtel, TRW or Lockheed Martin. Speakers are primarily missile defense supporters, with an occasional skeptic like Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) to give the illusion of balance. Past briefings have featured prominent missile defense boosters such as Rep. Curt Weldon, Sen. Jon Kyl, Steve Cambone and John Bolton.

Obviously, the defense industry's spending on campaign contributions, lobbying, and networking has reaped substantial dividends. Through privileged access and inside connections that are reinforced by the kinds of exclusive conferences and briefings described above, the major weapons makers are positioning themselves to receive the greatest possible benefits from increases in missile defense spending and an expanded nuclear weapons complex under the Bush administration. (For more information about the beneficiaries of Bush's new nuclear policy see our May 2002 report: About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby In the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades of US Nuclear Policy)

Listed below (see next page) are the top ten recipients of federal prime contracts clearly related to missile defense programs. These figures are a conservative estimate based on CD-roms from Eagle Eye Publishers. In some cases, contracts related to missile defense are not identified as such in the Pentagon's contracting database which serves as the basis for the Eagle Eye data. In addition, the chart does not include subcontracts given out by the prime contractors

Table IV: Top Ten Defense Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Amounts of Pentagon Missile Defense Contracts 1998-2001


Total $























In addition to the figures cited in Table IV, the following long-term contracts have been awarded in recent years for major components of the missile defense system. Many of the obligations cited here will be spent out over a number of years, so they are not reflected in the Top Ten Contractors table (see appendix for additional details):

  • Bechtel Corporation was awarded a $60 million contract from Boeing for construction of missile interceptor silos at Fort Greely, Alaska. The work will begin mid-June.[57]
  • Alliant Techsystems is the solid propulsion supplier on a team led by Orbital Sciences Corp for the ground-based system. The value of Alliant's work on the program could be $300 million.[58]
  • Computer Sciences Corp was awarded a contract modification for continued scientific and engineering technical assistance support to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Joint Program Office. The continued effort is estimated at
    $43 million.[59]
  • Flour Alaska, Incorporated was awarded a contract, which, if certain options are exercised, could exceed $250 million. Awarded by the Army Corps of Engineers, the contract is for construction of a base for operationally realistic missile defense testing, including four buildings at Fort Greely to house electronics, communications, and maintenance equipment associated with the GMD system.[60]
  • Lockheed Martin received a contract totaling $326.6 million for the continued production of the PAC-3 missile, Lockheed has received production orders totaling more than $850 million.[61]
  • TRW was named the prime contractor for the Pentagon's Space-Based Infrared System Low program and signed an initial contract worth $665 million with the MDA. The system is expected to cost more than $6 billion over the next decade.[62]
  • Boeing and SAIC were awarded a $13.5 million contract for a feasibility study to develop architecture solutions that fully integrate NATO capabilities into an effective, affordable, theater ballistic missile defense. SAIC will serve as the prime contractor, Boeing will lead the team as prime contractor in subsequent phases.[63]
  • Lockheed Martin was awarded a $420 million contract modification to develop a prototype tactical radar, called SPY-1E, as a critical component of the nation's sea-based midcourse missile defense segment.[64]
  • Boeing was awarded "a $268,552,697 contract modification to implement changes as a result of a program transition to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and directed schedule risk assessment. The contract is renamed from 'Program Definition and Risk Reduction' to 'Block 2004,' and the program is restructured to a capabilities-based, spiral development, block upgrade approach. The program is extended one year based on the MDA-approved schedule risk assessment. This action provides additional integration and flight test activity, laser test tool simulation, Battle Management-c41 interoperability and spares."[65]
  • Raytheon has been awarded a $38.6 million US Army contract to develop the laser radar (LADAR) technology base for the next generation of interceptors for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.[66]
  • Boeing and Lockheed Martin will both work as systems integrators for the Bush administration’s multi-tiered missile defense system, with Boeing working on overall systems integration and Lockheed Martin working on integrating "battle management, command, control, and communications capabilities." Each company received an initial contract of $23 million in February of 2002, with major follow-on contracts expected (such as the $268 million "risk reduction" contract to Boeing cited above).[67]

IV. A. Inside Influence: Will Defense Industry Ties Shape Missile Defense Policies?

In addition to the influence they are able to exert through campaign spending and lobbying, major missile defense contractors have an even more immediate form of leverage over Bush administration military policies resulting from the large number of former defense industry executives that have been appointed to major policymaking positions in the administration. In our May 2002 report, About Face, the World Policy Institute documented the presence of 32 former executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top defense contractors in policymaking positions in the White House and cabinet-level agencies.[68] By comparison, our analysis of administration ties to major energy companies -- an area of policy in which the issue of potential conflicts of interest has been raised consistently in the media and in Congress -- found 21 appointees who had been executives, consultants, or major shareholders in this sector.

For purposes of gauging the potential clout of the missile defense lobby within the Bush administration, it is important to note that 17 of the defense-related appointees serving in the White House or key agencies were linked to major missile defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, which is poised to dramatically increase its presence in the missile defense sector if its takeover of TRW is approved.[69]

As befits its status as the nation’s largest defense contractor, Lockheed Martin has more connections with the Bush administration than any of the other major missile defense contractors. Officials with indirect connections to the company include Vice President Dick Cheney, whose wife Lynne V. Cheney served on the Lockheed Martin board of directors from 1994 until January 2001, accumulating more than $500,000 in deferred director’s fees in the process; Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who worked at Shea and Gardner, a DC law firm that represents Lockheed Martin (along with numerous other corporate clients); and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, who had Lockheed Martin as a client when he was a partner at the Atlanta-based law firm King and Spalding. Administration officials with more direct links to Lockheed Martin include Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Otto Reich, who worked as a paid lobbyist for the company when it was seeking to reverse the U.S. ban on sales of high tech weapons to Latin America; and the top two officials at the Department of Transportation, Norman Mineta and Michael Jackson, both of whom served as Vice-Presidents at Lockheed Martin before coming to the department.[70]

The ex-Lockheed Martin executives with the most direct connections to nuclear weapons and missile defense policy are former company Chief Operating Officer Peter B. Teets, who is now Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), a post that includes making decisions on everything from the acquisition of reconnaissance satellites to space-based elements of missile defense; and Everet Beckner, who served as the chief executive of Lockheed Martin’s division that helped run the United Kingdom’s Atomic Weapons Establishment under contract to the British government, and is now Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, in charge of the maintenance, development, and production of nuclear warheads.[71]

Northrop Grumman, which has a growing interest in missile defense now that it is in the process of taking over TRW, also has multiple links to the Bush administration. The company’s most important connection is Secretary of the Air Force James Roche, a former company Vice President. Joining Roche in the Air Force hierarchy is fellow Northrop Grumman alumnus Nelson F. Gibbs, who served as corporate comptroller at the company from 1991-1999 and is now Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Logistics. Other key company connections include Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Pentagon Comptroller Dov Zakheim, Vice-Presidential Chief of Staff I. Lewis Libby, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration director Sean O’Keefe, all of whom had consulting contracts or served as paid advisory board members for Northrop Grumman prior to joining the administration. In addition, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith’s law firm, Feith and Zell, represented defense industry clients, including Northrop Grumman and Loral Space.

Other administration officials with ties to missile defense contractors include Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a former member of Raytheon’s board of directors; and White House Chief of Staff Karl Rove, who owned between $100,000 and a quarter of a million dollars of stock in Northrop Grumman prior to joining the administration.

In addition to these widespread connections throughout the White House and key agencies, defense corporations have particularly useful ties to decisionmakers who will be involved in shaping and monitoring the missile defense program at the Pentagon. As part of what one Pentagon insider has described as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s "Department of Defense, Inc.," approach to management, he has established a "Senior Executive Committee" that will "function as a business board of directors for the department." Members of the committee include Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense Edward "Pete" Aldridge, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, and Secretary of the Army Thomas White, with input as appropriate from Pentagon Comptroller Dov Zakheim.[72] While there have been some questions about how well Rumsfeld has been able to implement the "business board of directors" concept, one area in which his executive council has been given important authority is in the oversight of the missile defense program. As part of the "Freedom to Manage" initiative under which the programs of the Missile Defense Agency have been exempted from normal rules regarding the development of performance requirements, cost control, and independent technical scrutiny, the executive council will assume oversight responsibilities. Aside from Rumsfeld, the other six members of the council all served as executives or consultants to defense contractors prior to coming to the Pentagon.[73] Three of those six – Wolfowitz, Zakheim, and Roche – had ties to Northrop Grumman.

With principal oversight provided by a council composed almost entirely of former associates of Pentagon contractors, and questions of how to design the testing program delegated to designated "system integrators" Lockheed Martin and Boeing -- working with teams of engineers draw from Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and TRW – the potential for conflicts of interest in the Bush administration’s missile defense program is enormous.[74]

V. Who Will Benefit? – Geographic Concentration of Missile Defense Spending

Despite contractor claims of the potential economic stimulus provided by missile defense spending, contracts to date have benefited only a handful of states and communities. For the four years from 1998-2001, 91% of missile defense contract awards went to just four states – Alabama, California, Virginia, and Colorado. Even allowing for subcontracting and the geographic expansion of the missile defense network once key systems move into the production stage, missile defense will by and large be a "boutique" program in which relatively small numbers of highly sophisticated systems are produced in a few key areas (for example, the $11 billion Airborne Laser Program is thus far slated to produce only 7 aircraft). The vast majority of states that help foot the bill for missile defense will see little or nothing in the way of jobs or income flowing from the program.

Table V: Top Ten States Receiving Missile Defense Contracts 1998-2001


Total $

















New Mexico






VI. Bipartisan Support?

VI. A. Profiling Key Missile Defense Advocates

Missile defense, an issue which split the Republican and Democratic parties during the Reagan era, achieved broad bipartisan support inside the Beltway by the end of the Clinton administration. But it seems clear that this increased support had more to do with short-term politics – i.e., Democrats not wanting to be viewed as "soft on defense" – than it did with any strong belief in the technological promise of NMD. On the Republican side of the aisle, a core group of Reaganite true believers has managed to impose a remarkable level of party unity on the missile defense issue, which has become a virtual litmus test for Republican Congressional and Presidential candidates.

The most vocal supporter in Congress, by far, is Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA). As noted earlier in this report, Weldon was instrumental in the creation of the first Rumsfeld Commission, and is a board member of the Center for Security Policy and the Safe Foundation. He's been a featured speaker (numerous times) at the breakfast briefings sponsored by the National Defense University. During the 2000 Republican convention, Weldon created a "Congressional Village" at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, at which 100 Republican House members and their families stayed for the duration of the meeting. The site included a weapons display that was transported, set up, and maintained at Pentagon expense. Weapons on display included a Boeing V-22 Osprey, a Lockheed Martin Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile, and a Northrop Grumman Predator unmanned aerial vehicle. The "village" was financed in part by defense contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Litton.

In June of 2000, Weldon served as the keynote speaker at an industry-backed "Year 2000 Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition" that was held downtown at the Wyndham Franklin Plaza Hotel in Philadelphia. The event was sponsored by Lockheed Martin and co-chaired by the President of the company's Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems Unit, which is based in Moorestown, New Jersey, a few towns east of Philadelphia in southern New Jersey, commuting distance from Weldon's district.

Weldon's exploits on behalf of missile defense contractors have not gone unrewarded. During both the year 2000 and 2002 election cycles, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon were among Weldon's top 20 donors. In all, Rep. Weldon received donations totaling more than $157,000 from defense contractors during the 1999/2000 and 2001/2002 election cycles. These contributions represented roughly one out of every five dollars received by Weldon during these two election cycles. Weldon also received substantial funding from missile defense contractors and their employees working on missile defense projects near the Army's missile defense command in Huntsville, Alabama. While most House members raise the majority of their money in their home states, Weldon's second most lucrative source of funds in the 1999/2000 election cycle was Huntsville, Alabama, which generated $31,925 in donations for his campaign from executives and employees of missile defense contractors. Many of these donations were from employees of smaller missile defense firms like Colsa, Inc., which depend on missile defense spending for a much larger share of their overall revenue than do defense behemoths like Lockheed Martin or Boeing.[75]

Despite his close working relationship with missile defense contractors and his lead role in missile defense advocacy organizations, Weldon apparently views himself as an unbiased participant in missile defense debates. This became apparent in a July 10, 2000 appearance on "The Newshour with Jim Lehrer," when he repeatedly interrupted missile defense critic Dr. Theodore Postol of MIT and accused him of having "somewhat of a bias" because he "is adamantly against missile defense."[76] It apparently didn't occur to Weldon that given his close working relationship with missile defense lobbying groups, his energetic embrace of pork barrel politics, and his acceptance of tens of thousands of dollars of contributions from missile defense contractors, most people would assume the he was the one with the bias, not Dr. Postol.

Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), is another ardent supporter of missile defense. Kyl's most notable accomplishment to date has been his role as the lead organizer in the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999. In conjunction with Senators Paul Coverdell of Georgia, Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas, and Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Kyl distributed briefing books with materials slanted against the treaty. As Stephen Schwartz of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states, these materials were "no doubt supplied or recommended by the Center for Security Policy." Kyl also brought former senior officials from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to meet with the senators. The Senator from Arizona acknowledged at a February 2001 CSP conference on the blocking of the test ban treaty in the Senate that he "gave so many briefings that some of my colleagues were sick of seeing me by the end." Despite the overwhelming public support for the treaty, Kyl was successful in quietly lining up his most conservative colleagues against the treaty in the spring of 1999 before proceeding to cajole, pressure and threaten moderate Republican Senators to vote against the treaty as well. Many commented at the time that the CTBT defeat was just a warm up for taking on the ABM Treaty.

Sen. Kyl has been a long time advisor to Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy and was even awarded the Center's prestigious "Keeper of the Flame" in September of 1994. During Kyl's acceptance speech at the gala dinner he touched on many of the Center's most important themes, including the need to "adopt strong national security policies," the absence of "any defense against the growing threat of ballistic missile attack," and the Clinton Administration's "dangerous effort to 'denuclearize' the United States – a program that is comprehensively eliminating the personnel, facilities and capabilities necessary to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent."

In maintaining his commitment to CSP, Kyl is an avid supporter of the sea-based missile defense option. During a Senate debate in June of 1998 Kyl addressed the issue saying:

Mr. President, many of us believe that the AEGIS Option is the
most expeditious, capable and cost-effective way to begin providing
ballistic missile defense – not only for our forces and allies overseas
but for the American people, as well. This is the case because the
Nation has already spent nearly $50 billion building and deploying
virtually the entire infrastructure we need to field the first stage of a
world-wide anti-missile system.

In an April 2000 letter, Senator Kyl and other Republican signatories urged President Clinton and Defense Secretary William Cohen not to give away too much in negotiations with Russia over the ABM Treaty amendments. The letter also encouraged the US to keep all options open for a more extensive, multi-tiered missile defense system that would use air-, sea-, and land-based assets in ballistic missile defense that they "believe are necessary to achieve a fully-effective defense against the full range of possible threats." Congressional Quarterly depicts Kyl as standing out "for his unblinking devotion to reducing spending on the federal government's domestic functions while pouring dollars into defense."

Kyl is not alone in his advocacy of the missile defense cause in the Senate. In an expose on Huntsville, Alabama in Mother Jones, investigative reporter Ken Silverstein points out that the Space and Missile Defense Working Group - an association of some 150 business, military, and civic officials in Huntsville, Alabama - "coordinates its efforts with Alabama's congressional delegation, whose members include vocal missile defense advocates like Republican Senator Richard Shelby. In return for political support, local companies contribute generously to the campaigns of missile defense boosters; they also frequently hire alumni of the Pentagon agencies that oversee the program. It's the military-industrial complex writ small, or, in [Joe] Fitzgerald's apt one-word description, a 'circle.'"[77] Fitzgerald is a member, consultant, or officer of some two dozen local organizations, from the executive committee of the local Republican Party to the Space and Missile Defense Working Group.

During Donald Rumsfeld's May 21, 2002 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Sen. Shelby assured Rumsfeld that he would work with his colleagues to restore the $814 million missile defense funding cut from the budget.[78] According to the Center for Responsive Politics, for the 1997-2002 election cycle, weapons makers ranked #2 among major industries in overall contributions to Sen. Shelby, with total donations of $288,150. Sen. Shelby also gains clout with his colleagues by running the Defend America PAC, which draws its donations largely from missile defense contractors centered around the Army's missile and space command in Huntsville.

A top recipient of funds from Shelby's Defend America PAC has been Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), the ranking Republican on the Senate Appropriations Committee and a staunch advocate of missile defense projects in his home state ($10,000). Stevens' top contributors are virtually all defense contractors, topping the list is Boeing which gave $32,400 for the 1997-2002 election cycle, followed by $17,000 from Northrop Grumman, $14,000 from General Dynamics, $12,500 from SAIC, and $10,000 from both Lockheed Martin and TRW. Total defense industry contributions to Stevens for the most recent election cycle total $208,450.

Not so coincidentally, four of the top five Senate recipients of weapons industry donations for 1997-2002 have been major missile defense advocates: Republican Senators Richard Shelby (#1 at $288,150) and Jeff Sessions (#5 at $160,000) of Alabama, Senator Ted Stevens, the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee (#3, at 208,450), and Senator John Warner, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee (#2 at $276,999). Shelby, Sessions, and Stevens all have major missile defense facilities either in place or under construction in their states (the Huntsville, Alabama missile defense R&D complex and the Fort Greely and Shemya Island radar and ground-based interceptor "test bed" facilities being built in Alaska). For his part, Senator Warner has been a key player in major legislative battles over missile defense. He led the fight to defeat an FY 2001 amendment by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) that would have required more realistic testing in the missile defense program. Warner was also the key player in the recent, successful effort on the Senate floor to restore $814 million in ballistic missile defense funding which had been cut by the Senate Armed Services Committee.[79] For further details on defense industry campaign contributions, see Tables VI and VII, below.

Although defense industry contributions have tilted Republican since they took control of the House of Representatives in 1994, key Democrats also receive large contributions from major contractors. For example, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), a vocal supporter of increased military spending and one of the first Democrats to co-sponsor the pro-missile defense "Defend America Act" in the mid-1990s, received $92,700 from Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and other major defense contractors in the 1999/2000 election cycle, according to data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics.[80]

VI. B. Despite Lobbying Pressure, Critics in Congress Speak Out

In addition to the reorganization of the Missile Defense Agency, the removal of procurement procedures and budget constraints, and changes in the required reporting procedures for missile defense programs, the Bush administration has taken it one step further - they will now withhold information on flight tests on some of the long-range programs. The Pentagon announced it will continue to give one week notice before tests, and publicize whether or not they were successful, but it will not provide data on decoys and the test targets.

But this time, there are signs of life in Congress. As Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), chairman of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee that oversees the project noted, "They're attempting to avoid the usual oversight by Congress, the media ... and the larger scientific community."[81]

In mid-May the Senate Armed Services Committee cut more than $800 million from the administration's missile defense plan and eliminated the $15.5 million in funding for the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator." These issues were taken up on the floor of the Senate in early July, as administration supporters tried to restore funding for these programs. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld threatened that the President would veto any version of the authorization bill that did not restore the cuts made in the Missile Defense Agency's budget and eliminate a provision inserted by Sen. Reed that would require the Pentagon's Office of Testing and Evaluation to conduct an independent review of every missile defense test, as had been the practice until Rumsfeld and MDA Director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish proposed to limit scrutiny of missile defense tests earlier this year.

When the full Senate acted on the FY 2003 defense authorization bill on June 27th of this year, the administration achieved its major objective – restoring the $814 million that had been cut from missile defense spending by the Senate Armed Services Committee, pending availability of funds pursuant to a recalculation of inflation in Pentagon programs and the President’s decision to use those funds for missile defense rather than anti-terrorism efforts. Because the restoration of funding is conditional, administration officials have threatened that President Bush may still veto the defense authorization bill if it emerges from a House-Senate conference with the missile defense formula laid out by the Senate (the House fully funded the administration’s request without conditions).

While it appears that the administration will get the funding it requested for missile defense, critics of the administration’s nuclear and missile defense policies won a number of interim victories on the floor of the Senate. An Armed Services Committee decision to eliminate $15.5 million for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (a proposed low-yield, "bunker busting" nuclear bomb) was not challenged on the Senate floor, nor was the committee’s decision not to approve funds requested to speed preparations for a resumption of nuclear testing. On the issues of missile defense oversight and transparency, the armed services committee’s call for independent operational assessments and budgetary analyses, and detailed cost and schedule reporting on missile defense programs was allowed to stand in the final Senate version of the bill. An amendment by Senators Jack Reed and Carl Levin to limit the Pentagon’s ability to impose a veil of secrecy over missile defense tests also remains in the final Senate bill, as does an amendment by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK) to bar any spending on nuclear warheads for use on possible "nuclear-tipped" interceptors for missile defense.[82] These issues will be fought out in an upcoming House-Senate conference on the defense authorization bill which is expected to occur either later this month or in September.

In a move that may split the opponents of missile defense, MDA Director Ronald Kadish's suggested that his agency may move rapidly toward the deployment of a limited sea-based missile defense system that could be fielded as early as 2004. The move, which could be finalized as early as the end of this summer once the results of the next test of a sea-based interceptor are reviewed, would involve a major increase in the $3.3 billion currently set aside for sea-based defenses over the next five years. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Kadish suggested that the deployment plan could involve spending $5 billion to equip up to half a dozen existing Aegis cruisers for the missile defense role, plus perhaps $10 billion more if the Pentagon decides to build new, additional ships to carry sea-based interceptors.[83]

The contractors that would benefit from a move towards sea-based defenses include Lockheed Martin, which makes the radar systems for the system at its Moorestown, New Jersey facility, and Raytheon, which will build the interceptor missiles. If new ships are built, there could well be a battle among major military shipyards in Maine (General Dynamics), Pascagoula, Mississippi (Northrop Grumman's Litton Division), Virginia (Newport News Shipbuilding), and Louisiana (Avondale Shipbuilding). The Senate Armed Services Committee vote to cut $814 million from the administration's FY 2003 missile defense request was based in part on support from members from states with major shipyards who chose to transfer some of the funds from missile defense to shipbuilding projects. Likewise, key House critics of missile defense like Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) have military shipyards in their states, and might be less likely to oppose full funding for missile defense if it involved a shift of funding within the MDA budget towards sea-based defenses, which could stimulate demand for new military ships.

While the move towards sea-based defenses may provide short-term political advantages by giving President Bush a tangible program to point to heading into the 2004 presidential elections and possibly garnering support from key Democrats with shipbuilding interests, it offers little in the way of concrete security benefits. The system that would be deployed in the short-term would aim to intercept ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight, when it would be necessary to distinguish actual warheads from decoys, a task which the Pentagon has made no demonstrable progress on in the past decade. A sea-based system aimed at hitting long-range missiles in their boost phase, before warheads or decoys are separated from the missile, would require new missiles, new ships, and new sensors, none of which have been designed yet, much less tested. Given the marginal capacity and relatively high cost of moving towards an interim sea-based capacity, one has to question whether this suggested rush towards deploying such a system is primarily a political maneuver designed to give the illusion of progress for domestic consumption, rather than a serious effort to put the first component of a viable missile defense system in place. The picture is further clouded by more recent statements by Lt. General Kadish and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld suggesting that there is no set timetable for deployment of any element of the administration’s proposed missile defense system. As with recent promises of Russian and European participation in missile defense, it appears that part of the administration’s strategy is to keep as many constituencies as possible convinced that they too can get a substantial "piece of the action" on missile defense without making any definitive commitments that would rule out any constituency.[84]

Table VI: Top House Recipients of Defense Industry PAC Money from 1997-2002 (multiple election cycles)


Grand Total




1. Duncan Hunter (R-CA)





2. John P. Murtha (D-PA)





3. Randy "Duke" Cunningham (R-CA)





4. James P. Moran (D-VA)





5. Ike Skelton (D-MO)





6. Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA)





7. Jerry Lewis (R-CA)





8. Curt Weldon (R-PA)





9. Henry Bonilla (R-TX)





10. Norm Dicks (D-WA)





11. Bud Cramer (D-AL)





12. C. W. Bill Young (R-FL)





13. H. James Saxton (R-NJ)





14. Peter J. Visclosky (D-IN)





15. John M. Spratt Jr (D-SC)





16. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (R-CA)





17. Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)





18. Jim Maloney (D-CT)





19. Bob Stump (R-AZ)





20. Heather A. Wilson (R-NM)





Table VII: Top Senate Recipients of Defense Industry PAC Money from 1997-2002 (full election cycle)


Grand Total




1. Richard C. Shelby (R-AL)





2. John W. Warner (R-VA)





3. Ted Stevens (R-AK)





4. Christopher S. Bond (R-MO)





5. Jeff Sessions (R-AL)





6. Rick Santorum (R-PA)





7. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)





8. George Allen (R-VA)





9. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)





10. Max Cleland (D-GA)





11. Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT)





12. Conrad Burns (R-MT)





13. Jack Reed (D-RI)





14. Arlen Specter (R-PA)





15. John Kerry (D-MA)





16. Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT)





17. Mary L. Landrieu (D-LA)





18. Carl Levin (D-MI)





19. Robert C. Smith (R-NH)





20. Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME)





Source: Data supplied by the Center for Responsive Politics in Washington, DC.

VII. What's Next for Missile Defense? -- More Controversy

Beyond the battles in the Senate over the program's budget and oversight mechanisms, other signs of opposition to the Bush administration's missile defense plans are emerging as well. In early June, Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) was joined by 30 colleagues in filing a lawsuit arguing that the Bush administration has no right to abrogate the ABM Treaty without Senate approval. Meanwhile, veteran anti-nuclear activists Randall Forsberg, David Cortright, and Jonathan Schell have launched an "Urgent Call" for verifiable nuclear reductions and increased diplomacy that is designed to serve as a vehicle to galvanize grassroots support for an alternative to the Bush administration policy of pursuing a multi-tiered missile defense system and a new generation of nuclear weapons (for details see www.urgentcall.org).

Despite the Bush administration's all out push for missile defenses, the fate of the program may still hinge on the same kinds of factors that led President Clinton to put a deployment decision on hold in September of 2000: 1) Is a missile defense system technically feasible?; 2) Is it affordable relative to other defense priorities?; 3) What impact will deployment have on the ability of the United States to achieve reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and other nuclear-armed states?; and 4) Does the threat of attack by a nuclear-armed ballistic missile justify a crash missile defense program at this time?

The feasibility issue has been dealt with already. None of the "successful" tests in the program to date have been realistic enough to demonstrate whether the United States can field a missile defense system that would have any worthwhile capabilities in a real world situation, in which an adversary would attack in secret, from an unknown direction, utilizing decoys. Even worse, many of the elements of the proposed multi-tiered system don't exist yet: some of them aren't even on the drawing board yet, while others have suffered so many cost overruns and scheduling delays that less capable (and less realistic) "surrogate" components have had to be used for major tests. And now that the Pentagon is trying to limit information about future tests, either by withholding budget data, classifying test results, or prohibiting independent analysis, it is not clear that the Congress or the public will be in a position to judge if key elements of the proposed system work before the administration opts to deploy them.

As for costs, as was noted earlier, the long-term costs of missile defense aren't even included in the Pentagon's long-term budget plans. With $850 billion in weapons spending already committed to major programs ($250 billion through 2007, and $600 billion thereafter), it will not be possible to deploy a multi-tiered missile defense system without massive increases in Pentagon spending that go well beyond current levels of almost $400 billion per year, or major cuts in other proposed weapons programs. The ongoing issue of budget tradeoffs within the Pentagon budget may be the most important "Achilles heel" of the Bush administration's missile defense plan at this point.

For the moment, it appears that the Bush administration has quieted concerns about how other countries will react to US missile defense deployment plans by coming to an arms reduction agreement with Russia that assumes that the United States will move forward with missile defenses. But this victory may be short-lived. In conjunction with the Bush-Putin accord, Russia has decided to pull out of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), a move which will allow Moscow to resume building multi-warhead missiles (or adding warheads to existing missiles) in response to any demonstrable US progress in the missile defense field. And China, with just 20 long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States, is likely to react to a US missile defense deployment by increasing the size and capability of its own nuclear forces substantially. In turn, this is likely to spur India and Pakistan to increase the size of their nuclear arsenals, as well as influencing the decisions of non-nuclear states like Japan about whether to develop their own nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has yet to make a persuasive case as to why deployment of a missile defense system will not lead to a world with more nuclear proliferation, not less.

Last but not least, there is the question of whether a missile defense system is needed at all, when there are other ways of responding to the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Since September 11th, Bush administration officials have tried to make missile defense an emotional issue by posing the ultimate "what if" question – would terrorists attack the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles if they had access to these deadly weapons? As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it in early November 2001, "On Sept. 11 terrorists took civilian airliners and turned them into missiles, killing thousands. Does anyone doubt for a moment that if they had real missiles and weapons of mass destruction, capable of killing not just thousands but hundreds of thousands, they wouldn't hesitate to use them?"[85]

Instead of scaring the public with this extremely unlikely "what if" scenario, the Bush administration should be asking a different question: are we implementing a balanced, comprehensive program that can drastically reduce the possibility that the United States will be attacked with a nuclear weapon? Given the difficulties of acquiring a ballistic missile and producing a nuclear weapon small enough to be launched on such a missile, the likelihood of a transient terrorist network being able to develop such a capability is so small that it does not deserve to be a priority. As for a "rogue" regime, even dictators value survival, and would therefore be extremely unlikely to launch a nuclear-armed ballistic missile at US territory knowing that they risked the destruction of their society in return.

There are plenty of tools available for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that could have a far greater effect in the short-term than a crash missile defense program. A case in point is the 1994 framework agreement with North Korea, which established the notion that the Pyongyang regime would cap its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in exchange for US economic assistance and political recognition. Rather than building on the progress made by the Clinton administration on this front, as Secretary of State Powell wanted to do shortly after the Bush administration took office in 2001, the Pentagon has managed to sidetrack the talks by postponing them for over a year and then loading them up with secondary issues (like North Korea's conventional weapons capabilities designed to undermine the accords). A verifiable bilateral agreement with North Korea to end their production of nuclear weapons and their production and export of ballistic missiles would go a long way towards limiting future ballistic missile threats to the United States, but it would go against the grain of the unilateralist approach favored by the majority of the president's advisors, it would also undermine the rationale for a multi-billion dollar missile defense program which can serve to solidify the administration's conservative base while offering a bonanza to the defense industry.

Similarly, rather than leaving the issue of the destruction of US and Russian strategic and tactical weapons up in the air in the Bush-Putin nuclear arms agreement, the Bush administration should be pushing to nail down a binding commitment to destroy these weapons and neutralize the huge stockpiles of bomb grade nuclear materials. If a terrorist group were to get its hands on a nuclear weapon, it would most likely occur as a result of buying or stealing a finished weapon or the needed materials from an existing nuclear state. Given the size of Russia's nuclear stockpile and the concerns about the security of its nuclear bombs and weapons-grade materials, common sense dictates that the United States move to eliminate or secure these dangerous leftovers from the Cold War as soon as is practically possible. But again, such a move would probably only be possible if the United States agreed to limit its own nuclear options, which would run counter to the unilateralist approach advocated in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review. And it would deprive major contractors of billions of dollars worth of business involved in upgrading the US nuclear weapons production and testing complex.

Finally, strengthening multilateral arms control agreements like the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban (which the United States has not ratified) would make it far harder for hostile states or terrorist organizations to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This would require a 180-degree turn from the current anti-arms control stance of the Bush administration, but this diplomatic approach offers far more hope of preventing a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack on the United States than trusting in unproven technologies designed to deal with an unlikely threat, as the current missile defense program is doing. In fact, at this stage, it would be fair to argue that moving full speed ahead with a costly but marginally capable missile defense system is the real world equivalent of the "peace through paper" approach that has been ridiculed by conservative hard-liners like Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), in the sense that deploying a poorly conceived, inadequately tested missile defense program in the next few years will at best result in the illusion of protection against a nuclear attack without reducing the odds of such an attack.

Appendix A: Who's doing what in missile defense?

While President Clinton agreed, in principle, to deploying a limited national missile defense system to protect the US from accidental or rogue ballistic missile attacks, the Bush administration has greatly expanded the mission of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense programs. Today, the Pentagon no longer differentiates between theater and national defense. Instead, the Pentagon is focusing on missile defense as a single integrated BMD system, capable of defending the forces and territories of the United States, its Allies, and friends against all classes of ballistic missile threats, in all phases of the missiles flight - boost, midcourse, and terminal.

Boost Phase Systems - The Pentagon is currently reviewing more than 50 proposals on boost phase missile defense system, which it received from defense contractors since early this year.

  • Airborne Laser - A chemical laser affixed to a modified Boeing 747 jet focused on medium and short-range threats. The first test will take place in 2004. TRW is working on the laser technology. Lockheed Martin is developing the equipment to direct the laser beam. The three companies have shared about $1.5 billion in research funds over the past three years.[86] Boeing is the lead contractor.
  • Navy Area Theater - A modified Navy Aegis cruiser being developed by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. After spending $2.4 billion over the past decade in research and development, the program was canceled in December 2001 due to delays and cost overruns.
  • Space-Based Laser - Being developed by Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and TRW, with an integrated flight test not expected to take place until 2012

Midcourse Systems

  • Ground Based Midcourse Defense System - Boeing is the prime contractor and overall systems integrator for the ground-based system. Lockheed Martin is a subcontractor responsible for the payload launch vehicle, which is serving as a surrogate ground-based interceptor that delivers the kill vehicle, being developed by Raytheon. TRW is in charge of the battle management command, control, and communications (BMC3) products which helps the interceptor locate and destroy the target. Raytheon is also developing the ground-based radar, which provides the kill vehicle and the BMC3 real-time operational data for target discrimination.[87]
  • Sea-Based Midcourse System (previously known as Navy Theater Wide) - Lockheed Martin is making the ship-based radar and Raytheon is making the booster and interceptor.

Terminal Systems

  • PAC-3 - The latest version of the Patriot air-defense system. Managed by the MDA, Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor responsible for the PAC-3 missile segment. Raytheon is the system integrator for the PAC-3 missile segment.
  • Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) - A land-based system designed to destroy the full range of theater ballistic missile threats to troops, military assets and allied territories. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor.

Other Missile Defense Related Technologies/Programs

  • Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-low) - TRW is Prime Contractor of a combined team for the Pentagon's Space-Based Infrared System Low. TRW and subcontractor Spectrum Astro will develop spacecraft, while Raytheon and Northrop Grumman will develop sensor payloads under competitive subcontracts to TRW. The budget request for FY 2003-2007 is $3.63 billion, launch of first satellites in expected in 2006/7. SBIRS-low is designed to provide end-to-end infrared tracking of missiles throughout their trajectories.[88]
  • Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-high) - Prime Contractor is Lockheed Martin. SBIRS-high satellite constellation, being developed to replace existing satellites from the 1970s, has been deemed "essential" to US national security by the Secretary of Defense and can continue to receive funding despite cost overruns of approximately $2 billion.

Appendix B: The "Nonpartisan" Think-Tanks

  • The National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association are continuing their ongoing series of Congressional Seminar Series "breakfast briefings" on missile defense on Capitol Hill. Each fall and spring the NDU holds approximately 20 breakfast briefings. Not only does the arms industry's largest trade association, NDIA, support the series, but each breakfast receives support from a specific corporation like Bechtel or Lockheed Martin. Attendees are primarily defense industry representatives, Hill staffers, lobbyists, and an occasional reporter or two. Speakers are primarily missile defense supporters. Past briefings have featured Rep. Curt Weldon, Sen. Jon Kyl, Steve Cambone, and John Bolton. NDIA claims to provide "a forum for the interchange of ideas and technology between government and industry." And goes on to note it's "key position to shape issues and influence defense policies through its chapters, committees, and divisions covering key facets of defense." NDIA holds eighty annual symposiums, publishes the National Defense Magazine, and maintains a membership of more than 950 corporations.[89]
  • The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) is headed by project directors William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard; Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a contributing editor at the Weekly Standard, and a columnist for the Washington Post; and Bruce Jackson, Vice President of Strategy and Planning, Corporate Strategic Development for Lockheed Martin who also serves on the Board of Directors of the Center for Security Policy. PNAC's goal is to promote American global leadership by significantly increasing defense spending, strengthening ties to democratic allies while challenging regimes hostile to our interests, and promoting the cause of political and economic freedom abroad. The groups Statement of Principles concludes by saying, "Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next." Signatories from the Bush administration include Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.[90]
  • The American Conservative Union describes itself as "the nation's oldest conservative lobbying organization." The ACU launched a project called Americans for Missile Defense (AMD) last summer. The ACU sent a letter to President Bush, co-signed by more than fifty conservative leaders, in support of missile defense. Signatories included Frank Gaffney of CSP, Robert Maginnis of the Family Research Council, Maj. Gen. J. Milnor Roberts of High Frontier, and Bob Livingston of the Livingston Group. Weeks later, in conjunction with CSP, the ACU held a press conference at the Senate "Swamp" on the grounds of the US Capitol to show their support for President Bush's missile defense efforts. American Conservative Union Chairman David Keene officially launched AMD's drive to accumulate one million online signatures through the coalition's website at www.americansformissiledefense.org. In addition to Rep. Weldon and Frank Gaffney, Senators Jim Inhofe (R-OK) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) also spoke at the event.[91]
  • The corporate-backed SAFE Foundation (Safeguarding America For Everyone) has accelerated its National Missile Defense education campaign in the wake of September 11, even going so far as to put a picture of the charred ruins of the World Trade Center front and center on its web site as an attention-getter for its pro-missile defense propaganda. Board members of the foundation include Representative Weldon and Dean J. Garritson, a vice president of the National Association of Manufacturers. Last year the foundation, along with Rep. Weldon, organized a press conference featuring 5 "leading scientists" in support of missile defense.[92]
  • The Heritage Foundation mission statement reads: Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute - a think tank - whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense." Directed by Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D., Heritage has been a leading advocate of deployment of sea-based missile defenses and the abandonment of the ABM Treaty. In addition to publications such as Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat and America At Risk: The Citizen's Guide to Missile Defense, Heritage runs another website, NationalSecurity.org.[93]
  • Empower America was founded by Bill Bennett, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Jack Kemp. This organization ran misleading pro-Star Wars radio ads against incumbent Democratic Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) is the 1998 elections. Empower.org (Empower America's education and research arm) launched its newest project in March called Americans for Victory Over Terrorism (AVOT). AVOT's stated mission is "to sustain and strengthen American public opinion as the war on terrorism moves forward. AVOT will promote the democratic ideals of freedom, liberty, equality, and human rights-the very virtues terrorist groups and terrorist states wish to eradicate-and answer those who seek to erode our nation's resolve and commitment to fight and defeat the evil of terrorism."[94] AVOT plans to host meetings and lectures at college campuses around the nation, and to use various media outlets to promote their campaign. In addition to William Bennett, other AVOT senior advisors include Frank Gaffney and James Woolsey.

Appendix C: Who's Who in the Bush Administration – Ties to missile defense contractors/think-tanks

Dick Cheney, Vice President - Dick Cheney was an early member of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Advisors. His wife, Lynne Cheney, sat on the Board of Directors of Lockheed Martin until February of 2000, and was compensated $120,000 a year for attending quarterly meetings.

Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary - Longtime associate and contributor to the Center for Security Policy, Rumsfeld chaired both the commission which assessed the ballistic missile threat facing the US and the commission which looked at future military uses of space. Both commissions were heavily influenced by self-interested corporations. The Space Commission had no fewer than eight representatives of companies working on space technology and missile defense for the Pentagon. And the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission's findings were based in large part on briefings from defense contractors. Rumsfeld was the recipient of CSP's "Keeper of the Flame" award in 1998. Rumsfeld was also on the board of Empower America.

Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Advisor - Before joining the Bush administration, Hadley was a partner in the Washington law firm of Shea & Gardner, which represents Lockheed Martin. Hadley was a co-author of the National Institute for Public Policy report, the blueprint for the Bush Nuclear Policy Review.

Pete Aldridge, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics - Prior to his appointment by President Bush, Mr. Aldridge was the Chief Executive Officer of the Aerospace Corporation, which ranked #33 on the Pentagon's list of top defense contractors for 2001. He came to that position from McDonnell Douglas Electronic Systems Company where he served as President from 1988 to 1992. Mr. Aldridge serves on the Board of Directors of United Industrial Corporation (#87 on the Pentagon's contractor list). He also serves as a director of the US Space Foundation, which is heavily funded by all the major missile defense contractors.

Robert Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense - Mr. Joseph previously served as a Professor of National Security Studies and Director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University. He held positions in the previous Bush administration, and various positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration. Mr. Joseph was a co-author of the NIPP study, and is a member of CSP's advisory council.

Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary for Defense - Mr. Wolfowitz was Dean and professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. From 1982 through 1986, he was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. From 1986 to 1989 Wolfowitz was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. During the Bush administration, Wolfowitz was Dick Cheney's Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the principal civilian official responsible for strategy, plans and policy.Mr. Wolfowitz also served as a consultant for defense contractor Northrop Grumman, and earned speaking fees from groups such as the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation.

Stephen Cambone, Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation - Mr. Cambone served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy until July when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed him to his new position. Rumsfeld said, "He is well-suited to take the lead in translating our policies into budgets that can transform the Defense Department."[95] Cambone has served as special assistant to Rumsfeld (part of NIPP study group), and before his appointment in the Bush administration he served as Staff Director for the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization. Mr. Cambone also served as the Director of Research for the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Cambone held the position of staff director for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States in 1998 and was a Senior Fellow of Political-Military Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies from 1993 to 1998.

Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy - Former chair of the Center for Security Policy's Board of Directors. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Feith was for fifteen years the managing attorney of the Washington, DC law firm of Feith & Zell, P.C. His biography says that he specializes in "technology transfer, joint ventures and foreign investment in the defense and aerospace industries." Mr. Feith also represented the Loral Corp., which the Pentagon accused of selling sensitive technology to China. Mr. Feith argued Loral's case before the Senate.[96] From March 1984 until September 1986, Mr. Feith served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy. Prior to assuming that position, he served as Special Counsel to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. Mr. Feith transferred to the Pentagon from the National Security Council at the White House, where he worked from 1981 to 1982 as a Middle East specialist.[97]

Richard Perle, Chairman, Defense Policy Board, Department of Defense - The Defense Policy Board is an advisory panel to the Pentagon made up of leading figures in national security and defense which backs laying the groundwork for overthrowing Saddam through military means. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in the Reagan Administration.[98] Reagan's "Prince of Darkness" for his distaste of disarmament treaties, important role in the defense policy board, a Pentagon think-tank, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, CSP advisor

John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security - John Bolton is Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz's point man in the State Department. Bolton was forced on Secretary of State Powell despite his objections. The Washington Post reported, "He serves as senior adviser to the president on non-proliferation and disarmament - a role which causes grim amusement in the state department as he opposes multilateral arms agreements on principle."[99] In January 2001, Jesse Helms endorsed Bolton: "John Bolton is the kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon, if it should be my lot to be on hand for what is forecast to be the final battle between good and evil in this world."[100]

Peter B. Teets, Undersecretary of the Air Force - Mr. Teets is the retired President and Chief Operating Officer of Lockheed Martin Corp., a position he held from 1997 through 1999. He began his career with Martin Marietta, Denver, Colo., in 1963, and held various positions with Martin Marietta until the merger with Lockheed Martin in 1995. After the Lockheed Martin merger in 1995 and until 1997, Mr. Teets served as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Information and Services Sector.[101] Teets remains on the Board at Lockheed Martin and also sits on the Board of Directors at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. Teets has openly advocated the weaponization of space. At a March 6, 2002 conference in Washington, DC, he asserted that "weapons will go into space. It's a question of time. And we need to be at the forefront of that."[102]

Dov Zakheim, Undersecretary for Comptroller - Mr. Zakheim previously served as Corporate Vice President of Systems Planning Corporation International, a major defense contractor that specializes in technology and research as well as political and military consulting. Zakheim also sits on the advisory board for Northrop Grumman and is an adjunct scholar at the Heritage Foundation.

Keith Payne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces and Policy Dr. Keith Payne -Chairman of the Pentagon's Deterrence Concepts Advisory Panel - Payne serves as the Director of the National Institute for Public Policy, and is now helping the Bush administration implement the recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review.

James G. Roche, Secretary of the Air Force - Before his appointment, Mr. Roche was Corporate Vice President and President of the Electric Sensors and Systems Sector of the Northrop Grumman Corporation. He's been with Northrop since 1984.[103] Mr. Roche is also a Member of the Center for Security Policy's advisory council.

Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy - Mr. England served as executive vice president of General Dynamics Corporation from 1997 until 2001 and was responsible for two major sectors of the corporation: Information Systems and International. Previously he had served as executive vice president of the Combat Systems Group, president of General Dynamics Fort Worth aircraft company (later Lockheed), President of General Dynamics Land Systems company producing land combat vehicles and as the principal of a mergers and acquisition consulting company.[104] According to the Washington Times, England will be helping his branch to carry out orders such as "developing futuristic weapons to counter new types of threats emerging in the post-Soviet world."[105]

Thomas White, Secretary of the Army - From 1990 to 2001, Mr. White was employed by Enron Corporation and held various senior executive positions.[106]


1 http://www.clw.org/nmd/nmddelay.html September 2000

2 Way Out There In The Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War, By Frances Fitzgerald, Simon & Schuster, 2000.

3http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html White House Press Release, President Discusses National Missile Defense, December 2001.

4 "The Missile Defense Brigade," by Peter Stone, National Journal, September 8, 2001.

5 The House of Armed Services Committee Joint Hearing of the Military Procurement and Research and Development Subcommittees, February 27, 2002. http://www.clw.org/nmd/hearing0202.html

6 Statement during Kadish Hearing, February 27, 2002

7 Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998) page 290.

8 Figures on the costs of the Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, Safeguard and other specific missile defense projects can be accessed in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) data base, accessible on the web site of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, which was responsible for compiling Atomic Audit, op. cit. The FYDP data base can be accessed at www.brook.edu/fp/project/nucwcost/weapons.htm.

9 Figures for 1996 to the present were calculated by Steve Kosiak of the Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, utilizing Pentagon budget data and adjusting for inflation so that all figures are in 2002 dollars.

10 "Spending for Defense (A Special Report)," by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2002.

11For 2003 through 2007, figures are from an internal memorandum by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that were first published by National Journal NewsService and are reproduced in Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, "Briefing Book on Ballistic Missile Defense," June 19, 2002, Chapter 1, available at www.armscontrolcenter.org/nmdbriefbook02/chapt1.html. For 1998 through 2002, figures are from Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapons System, annual volumes for FY 2000 through FY 2003. Deflators used to adjust figures to 2002 dollars were taken from U.S. Department of Defense, Comptroller, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2003, Table 5-6, p. 48.

12 "Is Crusader the Beginning, or End, of Reform?," by George C. Wilson, National Journal, May 11, 2002.

13 For quotes and summary material cited in the prior two paragraphs, see Congressional Budget Office, "Estimated Costs and Technical Capabilities of Selected National Missile Defense Systems," Washington, DC, CBO, January 2002 (available on the web at www.cbo.gov).

14 "Kill Vehicle Scores a Hit with Proponents of Missile Defense," by Peter Pae, Los Angeles Times, March 26, 2002.

15 "Green Light Ahead for Missile Defense Program," by Linda D. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Service, March 22, 2002.

16 Defense Week, by John Donnelly, July 30, 2001

17 An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System, Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper, November 2001.

18 "A Setback for Missile Shield as Booster Rocket Fails Test," by James Dao, New York Times, December 14, 2001.

19 "Postol vs. the Pentagon: Missile Defense," By Gary Taubes, Technology Review, April 2002, http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/taubes0402.asp

20 "Aldridge Speaks --On Osprey, Missile Defense, More" by Ron Laurenzo, Defense Week Jan. 2, 2002.

21 "Killed Programs Limp On, Costing Millions," by John M. Donnelly and Ann Roosevelt, Defense Week, Feb. 19, 2002.

22 "Pentagon Eyes Additions to Anti-Missile Arsenal," By Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 10, 2002.

23 The Current Status of Missile Defense Programs http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/coyle030802.cfm

24 "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush," Philip Coyle, Arms Control Today, May 2002.

25 DOT&E FY 2001 Annual Report - http://www.dote.osd.mil/reports/FY2001/index.html

26 DOD ESTABLISHES MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY No. 008-02 IMMEDIATE RELEASE January 4, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/b01042002_bt008-02.html

27 " Missile Agency Head Details Progress to Congress," by Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 2002.

28 "Pentagon Optimistic About Missile Shield," by James Dao, New York Times, April 15, 2002.

29 "Missile Defense's New Look to Emerge this Summer," by Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 25, 2002.

30 Tangled Web, June 2000

31 Washington Post, Michael Dobbs, January 14, 2002, A1. On the pivotal role of Boeing and Lockheed Martin engineers in shaping the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission, see Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) p.43-44.

32 Washington Post, Michael Dobbs, January 14, 2002, A1.

33 "NMD, What does it all mean?," CDI Issue Brief, September 2000


35 "US Alters Estimate of Threats," by Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 2002.

36 "Putin Sees Continued Alliance Despite the End of ABM Pact," by Michael Wines, New York Times, Dec 18, 2001.

37 http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=nsac

38 From Esquire, February 2002, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=events

39 http://www.americansfordefense.com/showzipinfo.cfm

40 "Rumsfeld II," Wall Street Journal; New York, N.Y.; Jan 12, 2001, Editorial

41 http://www.spacecom.mil/_private/about_space.htm click on "Vision 2020"

42 http://www.saic.com/natsec/

43 http://www.dior.whs.mil/peidhome/procstat/p01/fy2001/tab3_01.htm TABLE 3 100 COMPANIES LISTED ACCORDING TO NET VALUE OF PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS AND CATEGORY OF PROCUREMENT, Department of Defense, FISCAL YEAR 2001

44 "Should the US 'Weaponize' Space? Military and Commercial Implications," by Charles V. Pena and Edward L. Hudgins, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, March 18, 2002.

45 http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/updates/101301.html#4

46 "Rumsfeld Revamps Space, Pushes `Black' Projects," by Robert Wall, Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 14, 2001.

47 "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?," www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm

48 See "About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades of US Nuclear Policy," William Hartung, May 2002,www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/reportaboutface.html

49 Center for Responsive Politics www.opensecrets.org

50 "Boeing Plans Ads to Promote Missile Defense," by Greg Schneider, Washington Post, June, 16, 2000.

51 Center for Responsive Politics www.opensecrets.org

52 "Dogfight for Dollars on Capitol Hill," by James Dao, The New York Times, September 2, 2001.

53 "Lobbyists are Boeing's Army, Washington Its Battlefield," By James Dao and Laura M. Holson, The New York Times, December 12, 2001.

54 Read the press release announcing this "blue ribbon" panel at www.safefoundation.org/press/pr5-9-2001_pressconference.asp

55 "Top Space Leaders Lined Up As National Space Symposium is Set to Start," Press Release, April 1, 2002, contact information: Julie Howell,julie@spacefoundation.org

56 Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily, March 7, 2002.

57 "Missile Defense test Site Contracts Awarded," Arms Control Today, May 2002.

58 "ATK Selected to Supply Propulsion System For Ground Based Missile Defense Booster Vehicle Program," ATK Alliant Techsystems; release issued March 8, 2002.

59 CONTRACTS from the United States Department of Defense, No. 298-02, FOR RELEASE AT, (703)697-5131(media), 5 p.m. ET, June 11, 2002.

60 See Note 44

61 "Lockheed martin receives $326 million PAC-3 production contract," Defence Systems Daily, March 27, 2002.

62 "Satellite Contract Awarded to TRW," By Peter Pae, Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2002, C2.

63 "SAIC/Boeing Win NATO Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility Study Contract," Boeing News Release, July 19, 2001.

64 Lockheed Martin News Release - http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/articles/022002_1.html

65Web version: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/c06122002_ct301-02.html]

66 Raytheon News Release -http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?

67 U.S. Department of Defense, "Contract Listing," February 20, 2002, p. 1.

68 See William D. Hartung (with Jonathan Reingold), About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush Administration’s Radical Reversal of Two Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy (New York: World Policy Institute, May 2002), available at Documentation on corporate ties of key administration officials in provided in Appendix A, "Through the Revolving Door: Corporate Connections of Bush Administration Officials to the Arms and Energy Industries."

69 For a detailed review of the connections of major defense firms to the Bush administration, see About Face, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

70 On Lynne Cheney’s Lockheed Martin connection see "Lynne V. Cheney Resigns from Lockheed Martin Board," Lockheed Martin press release, January 5, 2001; and on Otto Reich’s role see Center for International Policy, "The Otto Reich Nomination," briefing paper, August 2001. Most other data on corporate ties is drawn from Center for Public Integrity, "The Bush 100: Snapshot of Professional and Economic Interests Reveals Close Ties Between Government, Business," available at For full background on sources, see Hartung, About Face, p. 40, note 55, and Appendix A.

71 On Peter B. Teets responsibilities in his new post, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Under Secretary of the Air Force Peter Teets Briefs on Space Transformation," news transcript, February 7, 2002, available at For more on Everet Beckner’s position, see U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, "Everet Beckner Sworn-in as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs," February 5, 2002.

72 For the "Department of Defense, Inc." quote see Rowan Scarborough, "Rumsfeld’s ‘Department of Defense Inc.’ Reasserts Civilian Control," Washington Times, April 24, 2001; on the composition of the Senior Executive Council see U.S. Department of Defense, "Rumsfeld Creates Two Management Councils," news release, June 18, 2001.

73 Bradley Graham, "Rumsfeld Pares Oversight of Missile Defense Agency," Washington Post, February 16, 2002.

74 Graham, op. cit., "Rumsfeld Pares Oversight," and Anne Marie Squeo, "Boeing, Lockheed Martin Get Lead Role on Missile-Defense Integration," Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2002.

75 See "About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades of US Nuclear Policy," William Hartung, May 2002,www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/reportaboutface.html

76 "Missile Mishap," The Newshour with Jim Lehrer, July 10, 2000, transcript.

77 "Huntsville's Missile Payload," by Ken Silverstein, Mother Jones, July/August 2001.

78 "Stage Set for Missile Defense Funding Feud," Arms Control Today, June 2002.

79 On Warner’s ongoing role in beating back restrictions on missile defense funding and the imposition of higher standards for missile defense testing, see "What, Me Worry?’ Approach to National Missile Defense," Council for a Livable World, July 13, 2000 (on the rejection of the Durbin amendment calling for more realistic tests and independent assessment of missile defense programs); and Helen Dewar, "Missile Defense Funding Increased," Washington Post, June 27,. 2002.

80 http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?

81 "Missile Data To Be Kept Secret," By Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2002.

82 For analysis of the Senate version of the Department of Defense Authorization bill for FY 2003, see "Victories in Senate on DOD Authorization Bill," Council for a Livable World, June 28, 2002.

83 Greg Jaffe, "Pentagon Agency Hopes to Speed Deployment of Missile Defenses," Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2002.

84 See, for example, Bill Gertz, "Missile Defense System Has No Target Date" Washington Times - July 2, 2002, in which Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave no timeline for deployment and refused to indicate which elements of the system might be readied for deployment first.

85 "Budget meets needs," by Donald H. Rumsfeld, USA Today, Nov 5, 2001.

86 "Still Playing: Star Wars" Special Report: Spending for Defense, by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2002.

87 "Contractors Detail Role In Missile Test," www.defense-aerospace.com/data/communiques/data/2002Mar9500/index.htm March 18, 2002.

88 "TRW to lead restructured SBIRS Low missile defense program," Defense Systems Daily, April 19, 2002

89 www.ndia.org


91 www.conservative.org



94 http://www.avot.org/stories/storyReader$53

95 New Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, NEWS RELEASE from the United States Department of Defense, [Web version: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/b07012002_bt341-02.html]



98 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/perle.html

99 "Washington hawks get power boost," by Julian Borger, Guardian, December 17, 2001.



102 Sharon Weinberger, Aerospace Daily, March 7, 2002.

103 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010424-2.html

104 http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/england-bio.html

105 http://www.fpif.org/republicanrule/profiles.html



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