

Nos. 03-334, 03-343

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**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

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SHAFIQ RASUL, ET AL.,

*Petitioners,*

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH, ET AL.,

*Respondents.*

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FAWZI KHALID ABDULLAH FAHAD AL ODAH, ET AL.,

*Petitioners,*

v.

UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

*Respondents.*

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**On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari  
to the United States Court of Appeals  
for the District of Columbia Circuit**

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**BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE  
OF RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS  
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS**

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## **INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE<sup>1</sup>**

Amici curiae are three retired military officers. Each one formerly served as the Judge Advocate General or the senior legal advisor for a branch of the United States military, and has extensive experience with U.S. military regulations and the Laws of War. Each dedicated his military career to the principle that the mission of the nation's Armed Forces must be consistent with the rule of law.

The principal purpose of this brief is to explain to the Court the profound ramifications, from a military point of view, of the government's position that no court can decide whether foreign prisoners at the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba may be held there without any charges being brought against them and without being afforded a hearing by a "competent tribunal" to determine their status, as required by U.S. military regulations and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Amici are concerned that foreigners capturing American forces in current or future conflicts will use the failure of the United States to follow the competent tribunal requirement in the Geneva Conventions at Guantanamo as justification for refusing to apply the Geneva Conventions to American captives.

Brigadier General David M. Brahms served in the Marine Corps from 1963 through 1988, with a tour of duty in Vietnam. During the 1970s, he served as the principal legal advisor for POW matters at Headquarters Marine Corps, and in that capacity, he was directly involved in issues relating to the return of American POWs from Vietnam. General Brahms

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the Rules of this Court, the parties have consented to the filing of this brief. The parties' letters of consent have been lodged with the Clerk. This brief was not written in whole or in part by counsel for a party, and no person or entity other than the amici curiae has made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief.



was the senior legal advisor for the Marine Corps from 1985 through 1988, when he retired from the military. General Brahms is currently in private practice in Carlsbad, California and is a member of the Board of Directors of the Judge Advocates Association. He also served as the Technical Advisor for the film *A Few Good Men*.

Rear Admiral Donald J. Guter was a line officer in the United States Navy from 1970 through 1974. After a break for law school, he returned to the Navy in 1977 and remained in the Navy until 2002, when he retired from the military. He served as the Navy's Judge Advocate General from June 2000 through June 2002. Rear Admiral Guter was in the Pentagon when it was attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001.

Rear Admiral John D. Hutson served in the United States Navy from 1973 to 2000. He was the Navy's Judge Advocate General from 1997 to 2000. He is presently the Dean and President of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, New Hampshire.

### **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

For more than 200 years, the United States has been at the forefront of international efforts to codify and safeguard the rights of prisoners captured in wartime. Those efforts resulted, after World War II, in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which the Senate ratified in 1955. Key provisions of those Conventions have been incorporated in American military regulations, including the requirement that the status of captured persons must be determined by a competent tribunal if there is any doubt that the captives are prisoners of war to whom the protections of the Geneva Conventions apply.

The requirement that prisoners' status be determined by a competent tribunal comports with the fundamental principle that the Constitution established a government of limited powers. The government should not be permitted, through

Executive fiat, to imprison persons indefinitely when no charges have been brought against them and the prisoners are barred from all access to courts and other tribunals to determine their status.

This principle is especially important to the members of the United States Armed Forces. American troops are dispatched regularly on a wide variety of missions around the globe. If any of them are captured, our government will undoubtedly insist that they be treated in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. But if the United States refuses to apply the competent tribunal requirement in the Geneva Conventions to the prisoners being held at Guantanamo, it increases the likelihood that foreign authorities holding American captives will decide to ignore the Geneva Conventions entirely—thereby putting the lives of American prisoners at risk.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. The United States Has Played A Leading Role In Developing International Standards To Safeguard The Rights Of Captured Prisoners.**

The United States has long “been a leader in the development of th[e] trend \* \* \* of bettering the humanitarian principles invoked in the treatment of prisoners of war.” Gen. J.V. Dillon, *The Genesis of the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, 5 *MIAMI L.Q.* 40, 41 (1950). A 1785 treaty between the United States and Prussia “probably constituted the first international attempt to provide in time of peace for the protection of prisoners of war.” Howard S. Levie, *PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT* 5-6 (1977). In 1863, Abraham Lincoln commissioned Dr. Francis Lieber to draft a code of conduct for the Union army in treating prisoners of war. *Id.* at 7. The Lieber Code, as it came to be known, “was perhaps the first formal codification of rules governing the treatment to be

accorded prisoners of war,” Dillon, 5 MIAMI L.Q. at 42, and it “had a significant influence on the attitude of nations and on the subsequent Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,” *ibid.*, which were “the first effective multilateral codification[s] of the law of war,” Levie, PRISONERS OF WAR, at 8. After World War I, the United States and Germany entered into an agreement concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. Dillon, 5 MIAMI L.Q. at 42. The subsequent 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed by the United States and more than 40 other nations, bore “a striking resemblance to the United States-German agreement.” *Id.* at 43.

The Geneva Convention of 1929 played a significant role during World War II. Scholars have concluded that “the fact that millions of prisoners of war from all camps, notwithstanding the holocaust, did return, is due exclusively to the observance of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.” Levie, PRISONERS OF WAR, at 10 n.44. “The American Red Cross attributed the fact of the survival of 99 percent of the American prisoners of war held by Germany during World War II to compliance with the 1929 Convention.” *Ibid.*

But the treatment of prisoners of war during World War II also indicated that the Geneva Convention of 1929 required substantial revision to broaden and clarify the circumstances under which its protections would apply. *Id.* at 10-11. Some countries had argued that the 1929 Convention did not apply to protect prisoners when the invading country had not formally declared war; Germany had claimed that the 1929 Convention did not apply to Polish prisoners because the Polish government ceased to exist; and Germany had contended as well that the 1929 Convention did not apply to French prisoners because France ceased to be a belligerent after signing an armistice with Germany. *Id.* at 11-12.

Following World War II, an American general suggested to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) that “a meeting of experts on prisoner of war affairs of the various belligerent nations be called with the view of recording for future reference, their experiences under the Convention of 1929.” Dillon, 5 MIAMI L.Q. at 43. The ICRC agreed, and sent invitations “to all of the belligerents of World War II.” *Ibid.* The United States went on to play “a major role both in the preparatory steps and in the conference proceedings.” *Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-4 (1955) (“Senate Hearing”) (statement of Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State). A series of meetings involving the United States and other nations resulted in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, including the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, commonly known as the “Third Geneva Convention.” Dillon, 5 MIAMI L.Q. at 43.

The Senate debate on ratification of the 1949 Conventions suggests that two basic principles animated the Senate’s eventual decision to ratify. First, there was a belief that it was critical for the United States to lend its moral authority to the Conventions and to provide a model for other nations to follow in treating prisoners of war. In urging Senate approval, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that American “participation is needed to enlist the authority of the United States in the[] interpretation and enforcement” of the Conventions. Senate Hearing at 61. Secretary Dulles went on to express the view that “United States ratification of the Geneva Conventions, by lending further support to their standards, should influence favorably future behavior toward prisoners of war.” *Id.* at 68.

Second, by treating prisoners of war in accordance with the 1949 Conventions, the United States believed that it would

encourage its enemies to reciprocate in their treatment of American prisoners of war. Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that although neither North Korea nor the United States had ratified the 1949 Conventions at the time of the Korean War, “the moral acceptance of the conventions as a general norm did have some effect on” North Korea’s treatment of American prisoners of war during the war. *Id.* at 5. Looking to the potential for future conflicts, Secretary Dulles explained that American “participation is needed to \* \* \* enable us to invoke them for the protection of our nationals.” *Id.* at 61. Similarly, Senator Mike Mansfield stated that “it is to the interest of the United States that the principles of these conventions be accepted universally by all nations.” 101 Cong. Rec. 9960 (July 6, 1955). Senator Mansfield explained that American “standards are already high. The conventions point the way to other governments. Without any real cost to us, acceptance of the standards provided for prisoners of war, civilians, and wounded and sick will insure improvement of the condition of our own people as compared with what had been their previous treatment.” *Ibid.* Senator Alexander Smith concurred: “I cannot emphasize too strongly that the one nation which stands to benefit the most from these four conventions is our own United States. \* \* \* To the extent that we can obtain a worldwide acceptance of the high standards in the conventions, to that extent will we have assured our own people of greater protection and more civilized treatment.” *Id.* at 9962.

## **II. The Geneva Conventions And U.S. Military Regulations Implementing The Conventions Require That A Competent Tribunal Determine The Status Of Captured Prisoners.**

Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides:

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [defining POWs], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.

The same requirement has been adopted in American military regulations:

All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the protections of the GPW [1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War] until some other legal status is determined by competent authority.

United States Dep't of Army, Regulation 190-8, "Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees," § 1-5(a)(2) (Oct. 1, 1997).<sup>2</sup> The regulation further provides:

(a) In accordance with Article 5, GPW, if any doubt arises as to whether a person, having committed a belligerent act and been taken into custody by the US Armed Forces, belongs to any of the categories enumerated under Article 4, GPW, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

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<sup>2</sup> Regulations for the other branches of the military contain the same provisions discussed in the text. See OPNAVINST 3461.6 (Navy); AFJI 31-304 (Air Force); MCO 3461.1 (Marine Corps).

(b) A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.

*Id.* § 1-6.

Moreover, it is Department of Defense policy to comply with the Laws of War, including the Geneva Conventions, “in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, *however such conflicts are characterized.*” Judge Advocate General’s School, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 10 (O’Brien, ed. 2003) (emphasis added); see also Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.77, ¶ 5.3.1 (Dec. 9, 1998). Thus, the military instructs its Judge Advocates that they “should advise commanders that, regardless of the nature of the conflict, all enemy personnel should initially be accorded the protections of the GPW Convention (GPW), at least until their status may be determined.” OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK at 22.

### **III. These Cases Raise Issues Of Extraordinary Significance.**

#### **A. The Judicial Branch Has A Duty To Act As A Check On The Executive Branch, Even In Wartime.**

In times of war, this Court has deferred to a considerable extent—and properly so—to the military and to the Executive Branch. But this case poses an issue that this Court has never decided: whether foreigners captured by American forces may be imprisoned indefinitely, without charges, based simply on the government’s say-so, and without allowing the foreigners access to any court or “competent tribunal” to determine their status.

The D.C. Circuit's answer was that the courts have no role; the Executive Branch's indefinite imprisonment of petitioners cannot be challenged in any court or tribunal. But complete judicial deference on this point is at odds with the specific military regulations already discussed. It is irreconcilable, too, with the limited government that the Founding Fathers adopted.

The Constitution was designed to “guard[] the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power.” *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, 126 (1866). The Constitution must impose some limits on the authority of government officials to pronounce that detainees may be held indefinitely, without being charged and without any sort of hearing or judicial process. “Such a practice, once established with the best of intentions, will drift into oppression \* \* \* in this country as surely as it has elsewhere.” *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, 345 U.S. 206, 226 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). “[D]ifferences in the process of administration make all the difference between a reign of terror and one of law.” *Ibid.* Thus, although the courts “must accord great respect and consideration to the judgments of the military authorities,” it is “essential that there be definite limits to military discretion.” *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214, 233-234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also *Shaughnessy*, 345 U.S. at 218 (Black, J., dissenting) (no “governmental official, whatever his title, can put or keep people in prison without accountability to courts of justice”).

To be sure, this is a perilous time, as the President has stated. But that does not justify indefinite confinement without any type of hearing or judicial review. Indeed, in previous conflicts, the United States conducted Article 5 hearings to determine whether captured persons should be accorded POW status under the Geneva Conventions. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK at 22 n.2 (discussing hearings conducted during the first Gulf War); *Contemporary Practice of the United*



*States Relating to International Law*, 62 AM. J. INT'L. L. 754, 768-775 (1968) (hearings during the Vietnam war).

Nor do the September 11 attacks and the ensuing war on terrorism mean that courts may abdicate their vital role in our constitutional system of checks and balances. As Benjamin Franklin cautioned long ago, “[t]hose who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” Benjamin Franklin, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, title page (1759) (Arno Press reprint 1972). This Court has made clear that “the duty \* \* \* rests on the courts, *in time of war as well as in time of peace*, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.” *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942) (emphasis added). “The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government.” *Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion). Indeed, this Court heard and decided *Quirin* in the summer of 1942, only eight months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, when the outcome of the Second World War was still very much in doubt. See also *Sterling v. Constantin*, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions”); *Milligan*, 71 U.S. at 121 (the “pernicious” idea that a Constitutional provision “can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government \* \* \* leads directly to anarchy or despotism”); *Brown v. United States*, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting) (although the President in wartime “has a discretion vested in him \* \* \* he cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among civilized nations. He

cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize proceedings which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims”). If courts do not “abide by the Constitution” in wartime, “they cease to be civil courts and become instruments of military policy.” *Korematsu*, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

Furthermore, “[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. \* \* \* The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” *Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (quoting *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Even assuming that the government now is acting out of the best of intentions, this Court has cautioned that “[t]his nation \* \* \* has no right to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers \* \* \*. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln.” *Milligan*, 71 U.S. at 125. If that ever happens, the “dangers to human liberty” from total judicial deference to the Executive Branch “are frightful to contemplate.” *Ibid.* A successful conclusion to the war on terror “will have been in vain” if “we discover that in the process we have destroyed the very freedoms for which we fought.” *Estep v. United States*, 327 U.S. 114, 132 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring).

**B. Failure To Provide Any Judicial Review Of The Government’s Actions Could Have Grave Consequences For U.S. Military Forces Captured In Future Conflicts.**

There is another reason why it is essential that the government follow American military regulations that incorporate the “competent tribunal” guarantee of the Geneva Conventions: American failure to provide foreign prisoners with the protections of the Geneva Conventions may well

provide foreign authorities, in current or future conflicts, with an excuse not to comply with the Geneva Conventions with respect to captured American military forces.

This Court has observed that “[t]he United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this country—over 200 times in our history—for the protection of American citizens or national security.” *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez*, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). See also Max Boot, *THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE* xiv (2002) (“Between 1800 and 1934, U.S. Marines staged 180 landings abroad”). In recent decades, American armed forces have been engaged somewhere abroad nearly every year. The historic pattern shows no sign of abating; “America’s strategic situation today presents more opportunities than ever before for \* \* \* entanglements” in “small wars.” *Id.* at xix-xx.

It is, unfortunately, inevitable that some American military personnel involved in future conflicts will be captured or taken prisoner. When that happens, the United States government and the families and friends of the detained service men and women will share a strong interest: ensuring that American personnel are treated humanely and fairly.

Indeed, in past conflicts the United States has insisted that American soldiers held by the enemy be accorded the basic protections of the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, *VIETNAM STUDIES, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973*, at 63 (Dep’t of the Army 1975); 64 *DEP’T OF STATE BULL.* 10 (Jan. 4, 1971) (White House statement announcing President Nixon’s call for application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to ease “the plight of American prisoners of war in North Viet-Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia”).

The United States has also demanded application of the principles codified in the Geneva Conventions to captured U.S. service personnel, even when they were taken prisoner under circumstances when the Conventions, technically, did

not apply. For example, following the capture of U.S. Warrant Officer Michael Durant by forces under the control of Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in 1993, the United States demanded assurances that Durant's treatment would be consistent with the broad protections afforded under the Conventions, even though, "[u]nder a strict interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention's applicability, Durant's captors would not be bound to follow the convention because they were not a 'state.'" Neil McDonald & Scott Sullivan, *Rational Interpretation in Irrational Times: The Third Geneva Convention and the "War On Terror,"* 44 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 301, 310 (Winter 2003).<sup>3</sup>

Invoking international human rights standards, the United States also has condemned foreign governments that have held detainees incommunicado, depriving them of the ability to seek judicial review of their confinements. The United States, for example, objected recently when the Liberian government arrested journalist Hassan Bility, and held him incommunicado on the purported ground that he was an "illegal combatant" involved in terrorist activity. AFRICA NEWS, Jan. 3, 2003 (available on Nexis). In a statement issued by our Ambassador in Monrovia, "[t]he United States call[ed] on the Government of Liberia to release those political and other prisoners, including those such as Hassan Bility \* \* \*, who are being held without access to lawyers, the civil courts or independent observers" in "violation of international standards of human rights and legal protection, and contrary to Liberia's basic legal principles." John W. Blaney, Nov. 21, 2002 Press

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<sup>3</sup> American invocation of the Geneva Conventions evidently had its desired effect. "Following these declarations by the United States, heavy-handed interrogations of Durant appeared to cease, the Red Cross was allowed to visit him and observe his treatment, and he was subsequently released by Aideed as a 'gesture of goodwill.'" 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. at 310.

Conference statement (available at <http://usembassy.state.gov/monrovia/www112102.html>). The Ambassador explained that “our reasons” for seeking the release of Bility—who had “been held in prison for many months without ever having been charged with any crime”—did “not revolve around whether we thought Mr. Bility was or was not guilty of any crime. That is not the point. An honest and competent civil court should have judged that question, not any individual or official.” John W. Blaney, Jan. 2, 2003 Statement (available at <http://usembassy.state.gov/monrovia/wwwhsp010203.html>).

Yet even as American officials condemn other nations for detaining people indefinitely without access to a court or tribunal, authoritarian regimes elsewhere are pointing to U.S. treatment of the Guantanamo prisoners as justification for such actions. Eritrea’s Ambassador to the United States defended his own government’s roundup of journalists by claiming that their detention without charge was consistent with the United States’ detention of material witnesses and aliens suspected by the United States of terrorist activities. Fred Hiatt, *Truth-Tellers in a Time of Terror*, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2002, at A15. See also Shehu Sani, *U.S. Actions Send a Bad Signal to Africa: Inspiring Intolerance*, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 15, 2003, at 6 (“indefinite detention in Guantanamo Bay \* \* \* helps justify Egypt’s move to detain human rights campaigners as threats to national security, and does the same for similar measures by the governments of Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Burkina Faso”).

If American detention of the Guantanamo prisoners—indefinite confinement without any type of review by a court or tribunal—is regarded as precedent for similar actions by countries with which we are at *peace*, it is obvious that it may be similarly regarded by *enemies* who capture American soldiers in an existing or future conflict. As a result, the lives of captured American military forces may well be endangered

by the United States' failure to grant foreign prisoners in its custody the same rights that the United States insists be accorded to American prisoners held by foreigners.

The importance of reciprocal treatment of a country's own citizens and the citizens of foreign lands has an ancient pedigree. Nearly 800 years ago, the Magna Carta provided that foreign merchants from countries at war with England

“shall be attached without harm of body or goods, until it be known unto us, or our chief justice, how our merchants be entreated who are then found in the land making war against us; and if our merchants be well intreated there, theirs shall be likewise with us.”

*Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763, 783 n.11 (1950) (quoting Magna Carta, chapter 30, in 3 THE COMPLETE STATUTES OF ENGLAND 27 (Halsbury's Laws of England 1929)).

Reciprocity has been especially significant in the context of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. As noted earlier, the Eisenhower administration, when urging Senate ratification of the Conventions, stressed that American accession to the Conventions would redound to the benefit of captured American soldiers. Senators recognized the same thing. See p. 5, *supra*. In Vietnam, the American decision to apply the Geneva Conventions' principles to captured enemy soldiers was driven in part by the desire to obtain “reciprocal benefits for American captives.” Prugh, VIETNAM STUDIES at 62-63. And American insistence that the enemy apply the Geneva Conventions to American POWs in Vietnam saved American lives:

[A]pplying the benefits of the Convention to those combat captives held in South Vietnam did enhance the opportunity for survival of U.S. service members held by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. While the enemy never officially acknowledged the applicability

of the Geneva Convention, and treatment of American POWs continued to be brutal, more U.S. troops were surviving capture. Gone were the days when an American advisor was beheaded, and his head displayed on a pole by the Viet Cong. On the contrary, the humane treatment afforded Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army prisoners exerted constant pressure on the enemy to reciprocate, and the American POWs who came home in 1973 survived, at least in part, because of [that].

Col. Fred L. Borch, Review of *Honor Bound*, 163 MIL. L. REV. 150, 152 (2000).

In the current debate about the Guantanamo prisoners, commentators have pointed out that “[t]he Geneva Conventions operate on the principle of reciprocity,” Joan Fitzpatrick, *Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law*, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 317 (2002), and that if the United States does not apply the Geneva Conventions, it heightens the risk that captured Americans will be denied the protection of the Conventions by foreigners. See Manoocher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “*Unlawful Combatants*” or “*Prisoners of War*”: *The Law and Politics of Labels*, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 59, 90 (2003) (“Interpolating unrecognized exceptions into the contours of prisoner of war status \* \* \* undermines the Geneva Conventions as a whole,” and could easily “boomerang to haunt U.S. or allied forces: enemy forces that might detain U.S. or allied troops would undoubtedly follow the U.S. lead and devise equally creative reasons for denying prisoner of war status. By flaunting international law at home, the United States risks undermining its own authority to demand implementation of international law abroad”); Steven W. Becker, “*Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .*”: *Assessing the Aftermath of September 11th*, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 572 (2003) (American failure to grant POW status under the Geneva Convention “is placing U.S. military

personnel abroad in danger, as we have troops in many parts of the world, and it is reasonable to assume that at some time some of them may be captured. If the same treatment is applied to them, we would be hard put to argue otherwise”); Harold Hongju Koh, *The Case Against Military Commissions*, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 337, 340 (2002) (it “seriously disserves the long-term interests of the United States—whose nonuniformed intelligence and military personnel will conduct extensive armed activities abroad in the months ahead—to assert that any captive who can be labeled an ‘unlawful combatant’ should be denied prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conventions”).<sup>4</sup> As one commentator has observed:

What if another country were to arrest U.S. citizens, take them to a location over which that country had control, but no technical sovereignty, and then argue that the country’s own law did not apply in that territory—so that our citizens would not have a right to counsel, or even to know what the charges against them might be? We would be distressed.

Anupam Chander, *Guantanamo and the Rule of Law: Why We Should Not Use Guantanamo Bay to Avoid the Constitution*, FindLaw’s Legal Commentary ([http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020307\\_chander.html](http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020307_chander.html)).

In 1950, the *Eisentrager* Court was concerned that permitting German nationals to seek habeas relief—after

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<sup>4</sup> The danger that captured Americans might be mistreated is increased for those American forces overseas, some in Afghanistan for example, who do not always wear military uniforms. See Mary McGrory, *Bungling on the 9-11 Prisoners*, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2002, at B7; John Mintz & Mike Allen, *Bush Shifts Position on Detainees*, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1; Jess Bravin et al., *Status of Guantanamo Bay Detainees is Focus of Bush Security Team’s Meeting*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A16.



having received both a trial and post-conviction review by a military reviewing authority (339 U.S. at 766)—would “purchase no equivalent for benefit of our citizen soldiers.” *Id.* at 779. The concern about equivalent benefit is different today. In the last half-century, nearly every country on the planet has adopted the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which, among other things, guarantees access to a “competent tribunal” when there is doubt about whether a detainee is a prisoner of war. It is the United States, which has incorporated the Geneva Conventions’ competent tribunal guarantee into American military regulations, that is presently deviating from international norms. Denying the Guantanamo prisoners access to a competent tribunal increases the danger that captured American forces will receive *that* “equivalent” treatment.

Seventy-five years ago, Justice Brandeis eloquently warned:

Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. \* \* \* If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that \* \* \* the end justifies the means \* \* \* would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.

*Olmstead*, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The United States still serves as an example to the world. Our concern is that, in this instance, the government is setting an example that is not only fundamentally at odds with the rule of law, but that puts American troops in peril.

\* \* \*

The questions posed by these cases are momentous. This Court has never held whether foreigners captured abroad by

the United States may be held indefinitely—perhaps for the rest of their lives—without bringing any charges against them and without ever providing the prisoners with some sort of hearing to determine their status. The importance of this question is magnified because the Guantanamo detentions could last a very long time indeed. The war on terror may go on for decades, and we will not know, at the time, when it is finally over. This war will not end with a surrender ceremony on the deck of the *Missouri*.

The issues in these cases are especially significant to the members of American military forces, who may be denied the protections of the Geneva Conventions in the future by foreign captors using American treatment of the Guantanamo detainees as precedent. If there is a “new paradigm” of warfare following September 11, as some contend, these cases will determine the rules, or lack of rules, that apply to captured prisoners in this new type of war—and potentially to Americans taken captive. Given the importance of the issues and the potentially grave practical consequences of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, this Court’s review is undoubtedly warranted.

**CONCLUSION**

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be granted.  
Respectfully submitted.

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