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Nuclear Chronology

1995

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1995
An International Atomic Energy Agency delegation visits the Moallem Kalayeh facility located in the mountain near the city of Qazvin and reports that the facility is a recreational center for the nuclear industry staff and not a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.
—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, <http//www.meib.org>.

1995
Cyprus seizes zirconium destined for Iran, which could be used in the zirconium tube factory under construction by China in Iran.
—Steve Rodan, "Cyprus, US Team To Block Flow Of Nonconventional Arms To Iran," Defense News, 4 November 1996, p. 15.

1995
While in Russia for negotiations with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Revolutionary Guards General Sardar Shafaq defects to the United States. [Note: The Revolutionary Guards reportedly control Iran's nuclear weapons program.]
—Kenneth Timmerman, "Rev Guards General Defects," The Iran Brief, 1 June 1995, p. 11; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

1995
John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, says Iran might be able to produce a nuclear bomb by 2003. [Note: In March 1997, Holum says Iran might be able to produce a bomb by 2005-2007.]
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

1995
Iran's Atomic Energy Council (AEC), chaired by President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, renews interest in acquiring two 300MW reactors from China. Talks between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and China about the project are held, but "appeared to lapse" under strong US pressure.
—Alan George, "Revival Of Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Causes Alarm," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, April 1997, p. 6.

1995
According to Levan Kidzinidze, former aid to Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, four physicists are sent to Iran to help Iran develop nuclear weapons with Abashidze's assistance. [Note: On 26 February 2002, the Iranian embassy in Georgia issues a statement denying this; see 26 February 2002 entry.]
—"Iran Denies Former Georgian Official's Nuclear Program Claims," Kavkasia-Press (Tbilisi), 26 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020226000312, 26 February 2002.

1995
An unknown US source, reportedly with longtime connections to the Israeli government, gives both the CIA and Israel Iranian government documents on Iran's successful efforts to obtain nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. [Note: For more on this topic, see 9, 10 (2 entries), 11, 15, and 16 April 1998. 1991, 13 October, December, and 27 December 1991 entries may also be related.]
—Steve Rodan, "MK Elul Says Israel, US Have Known of Iranian Nukes for Years," The Jerusalem Post, <http://www.jpost.co.il>, 12 April 1998.

January 1995
Aleksei Yablokov, chairman of the Security Council commission for ecological security, says that Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov signed a protocol with Iran "which said that contracts will be written for the training of nuclear physicists for Iran and for the construction of a centrifuge plant."
—"Yablokov: Nuclear Technology Sale To Iran 'Dangerous'," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091, 5 May 1995; Michael Mihalka, "Continuing Saga Of Gas Centrifuges To Iran," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 97 Part I, 19 May 1995.

January 1995
Iranian President Rafsanjani inaugurates the site of the Bonab nuclear research center, but it is unclear if construction at the site is beginning or ending. [Note: See 11 September 1994.]
—"Blix Visits Iranian Nuclear Sites," The Iran Brief, 1 August 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

January 1995
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists releases a report on Iran's nuclear program. According to the report, US officials, such as James Woolsey, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency have put the timeframe for Iran's nuclear program to be weapon-capable by early next century. According to the report, Iran needs fissile material to build a nuclear weapon, and its prospects for manufacturing this material are not very high unless it overcomes certain logistical obstacles such as management issues, the lack of technological and technical skills, as well as the general lack of infrastructure. Although Iran has the money to acquire this material from illicit foreign sources, US intelligence officials say that dependence on foreign sources for this material is uncertain, and Iran's tactic is expected to contain plans to develop an indigenous facility to produce fissile materials as well. Iran has been in the market for the acquisition of dual-use material, but has so far not succeeded in acquiring fissile materials. Iran has several research reactors, one provided by the United States that runs on low-enriched uranium, and others provided by China; none of which are believed to be capable of weapons production. The United States had also provided 'hot cells,' which are "heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated arms used to chemically separate material irradiated in the research reactor, possibly including plutonium laden 'targets'." Additionally, according to sources in the US government "China has also helped Iran create nuclear fuel facilities for uranium mining, fuel fabrication, uranium purification, and zirconium tube production, and it may soon supply facilities to produce uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride." China also signed in 1992 a "preliminary agreement" for the supply of two 300MW electric light water reactors, without specified delivery dates. All of China's activities however are reportedly consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as being under IAEA safeguard. China is not thought to be helping Iran with weapons production. It is not clear according to US sources that Iran has made a choice about having an indigenous production of fissile material or whether to acquire it from illicit sources. According to Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, Iran has been in the market for "heavy water research reactors that are best suited to producing weapon-grade plutonium, not electricity." According to a senior US government official, Iran is now focusing on centrifuge designs and "looking toward a pilot plant, possibly large enough to produce enough highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons." Iran however still lacks the technical capability to manufacture these centrifuges and still has to rely on the import of technical skill as well as the hardware. [Note: The United States gave Iran hot cells in the 1960s; see 1960s.]
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Washington, DC) January 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org>, accessed 7 July 2002.

3 January 1995
Italian police seize "ultra-sonic equipment for the testing of nuclear reactors," which originated in Slovakia, passed through the port of Bari, and were destined for Iran via Greece. Iranian smuggling is also said to receive active support from Syria and Pakistan, who often transship items to Iran.
—Chris Hedges, "A Vast Smuggling Network Gets Advanced Arms To Iran," New York Times, 15 March 1995, p. A1; Bruce Johnson, "Iran-Bound N-Plant Parts," Daily Telegraph, 1 March 1995.

5 January 1995
US Defense Secretary William Perry says Iran may be closer than previously thought to getting a nuclear weapon. "How soon...depends how they go about getting it," he says. He says Iran could get a bomb from the former Soviet Union, which could happen in "a week, a month, five years." He says if Iran gets enough fissile material, "five years is on the high end," while otherwise it "will take them much longer than five years," though this time could be shortened by hiring experts from the former Soviet Union.
—Associated Press, 5 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

6 January 1995
A "senior official" [presumably American] says that Iran's resolve to produce nuclear weapons could result in an Israeli preemptive strike. The official says, "The date by which Iran will have nuclear weapons is no longer 10 years from now. If the Iranians maintain this intensive effort to get everything they need, they could have all their components in two years. Then it will be just a matter of technology and research. If Iran is not interrupted in this programme by some foreign power, it will have the device in more or less five years."
—Reuters, 6 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

6 January 1995
A Russian official arrives in Iran to conclude an agreement to repair and complete the nuclear power plant in Bushehr in southern Iran. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov says that he hopes that the contract to begin work on the power plant will be concluded within days.
—Associated Press, 6 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

7 January 1995
The deputy director of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant announces that Iran has signed an $800 million contract for Russia to complete construction of the plant. According to the Iranian official named only as Mr. Khabir, Russia agrees to complete the first of the plant's two units within four years. According to the official, the plant's first unit was 90% complete with 60% of its equipment installed before Kraftwerk Union halted construction. The plant's second unit was 50% complete when construction was stopped, the official says. He also mentions that forty Iranian companies will be involved in the project. Iran's permanent mission to the United Nations issues a press release regretting a 5 January New York Times article that quotes US Defense Secretary William Perry as saying Iran could build a nuclear bomb in five years. "Iran simply does not have the ambitions to become a nuclear weapon state and as a matter of national policy it has denounced nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction," the Iranian press release says. The IAEA has conducted routine and unannounced inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, the latest of which was done from 15 to 21 November 1993, the press release says. [Note: Khabir's statements come one day before the deal was actually signed. See 8 January 1995.]
—"Iranian-Russian Agreement for Bushehr Power Plant Accord Worth $800 Million to Complete Project," IRIB Television Third Program Network (Tehran), 7 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002901, 23 May 1997; "UN Mission Denies Times Nuclear Build-Up Allegations," IRNA (Tehran), 7 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002899, 25 May 1997.

8 January 1995
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, sign an $800 million contract that commits Russia to complete one of two nuclear reactors in Bushehr within four years. The contract formalizes a 1993 Russian agreement in principle to complete the facility. The contract calls for Russia to build a VVER-1,000MWe reactor at the site. German firm Siemens-Kraftwerke Union, began construction of the Bushehr plant in 1974, but failed to complete the project before the 1979 Islamic revolution. [Note: See November 1974 and March 1979 entries.] Germany has since prohibited the export of equipment vital to the project's completion. The bilateral meetings also included discussion of the construction of another 1000MW unit and two 440MW reactors at Bushehr, education of Iranian students and postgraduates at Russian institutes, and training for Iranian experts in the operation of nuclear power facilities in Russia. [Note: Some sources put the value of the deal at $1 billion rather than $800 million.]
—"Iran's Nuke Plant Deal With Russia Raises Fears," Washington Times, 10 January 1995, p. A13. "Russia Signs Deal For Iranian Nuclear Plant," Reuters, 8 January 1995, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1994; "Iran, Russia Agree On $800 Million Nuclear Plant Deal" Washington Post, 9 January 1995, p. A18; "Russia Has Agreed On The Terms . . ." Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 11, 16 January 1995; "Russian Visits Iran To Sign Nuclear Deal" Washington Post, 7 January 1995, p. A17; "Russian Minatom and the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA" ENS NucNet, 12 January 1995; Iran Warns Russia Not to Cancel Nuclear Deal," Xinhua (Beijing), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000069, 9 May 1995.

9 January 1995
Israeli television reports that Israeli experts are more worried about the help Russian training will give to Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program than would the supply of enriched uranium to operate the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Russia to Train 500 Iranians," Israel Television Channel 1, (Jerusalem), 9 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002903, 23 May 1997.

9 January 1995
In a joint press conference in Jerusalem with US Secretary of Defense William Perry, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says "without foreign aid, Iran will reach nuclear capability within seven to 15 years." Perry says that time could be even shorter if Iran gets fissile material from another country.
—"Rabin, Perry Address Iranian Threat," Israel Television Channel 1 Network (Jerusalem), 25 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002907, 23 May 1997.

9 January 1995
The Iran Brief reports that, according to US and Israeli intelligence officials, Iran will acquire a nuclear bomb "in more or less five years." [Note: See the other 9 January 1995 for a different estimate.] The report says US Department of Energy (DOE) officials have "almost no doubt" that Iran obtained nuclear material from the Central Asian Republics, and "if Iranians maintain this intensive effort to get everything they need, they could have all their components in two years. Then it will be just a matter of technology and research."
—"Iran Ever Closer To The Bomb," Iran Brief, 9 January 1995, p. 8.

10 January 1995
CIA Director James Woolsey tells the Senate intelligence committee that Iran is most likely to continue developing nuclear weapons through indigenous resources; in which case it might have a weapon by 2000. He also says "Iraq and Iran...have the basic technology to eventually develop [nuclear] weapons."
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html>; US Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Global Threat Assessment, Testimony of CIA Director James Woolsey, 10 January 1995; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

10 January 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov asserts that "the Russia-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power engineering has peaceful goals." He says that the "nuclear reactor to be finalized by Russian specialists in Iran cannot be used for war purposes since war plutonium is made by reactors of another type."
—"Iranian-Russian Agreement for Bushehr Power Plant Mikhailov Statement," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002905, 23 May 1997.

10 January 1995
The International Atomic Energy Agency says there is no evidence that Iran is constructing nuclear weapons. The report comes after recent allegations by the United States and Israel that Iran will have a nuclear bomb within 7-15 years.
—"Iran Gets Nuclear All-Clear," The Independent, 11 January 1995, p. 15; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

10 January 1995
Iranian First Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Hashemi dismisses US concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions saying that Iran has always declared its opposition to the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the region. He says the United States should force Israel to allow international inspection of its nuclear arsenal.
—Reuters, 10 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

11 January 1995
In response to speculations in the Western media that Israel is considering an attack on Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant, Iran warns Israel that such an attack would be a "blunder." According to the Iran News, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri's responds to rumors of an Israeli strike by saying, "Should Israel commit such a blunder, we will teach her a lesson not to ever attempt another aggression against Iran." Iran cautions Israel for the second time not to attack the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—Ralph Joseph, "Iran Warns Israel Not To Attack," UPI, 11 January 1995; in Executive News Service, 11 January 1995.

12 January 1995
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy issues a statement that it plans to establish a managerial office in Tehran and that currently 150 Russian specialists are working at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Russian Minatom;" in ENS NucNet, 12 January 1995.

19 January 1995
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Iran's President, says Iran does not have a nuclear arms program. The report comes from the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), which recently reported on the President's visit to a research center for agriculture and nuclear medicine where he denounced Western propaganda as an attempt "to deprive Iran of the enormous benefits of nuclear science."
—Ralph Joseph, "Rafsanjani: Iran has no Nuclear Program," United Press International, 19 January 1996; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 January 1995
Iranian President Rafsanjani inaugurates a nuclear medical research and production unit at Karaj that reportedly puts Iran in the filed of advanced medical scans. The facility is a cyclotron accelerator with a 30 million electron-volt power and will initially be used to produce radioactive materials used in medical scans. The cost of building the facility is reported at $9 million in foreign exchange funds in addition to $4.9 million (8.5 billion Rials). An Iranian scientific crew will be running the facility as part of the Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine, an affiliate of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The facility is located in Karaj, 35km (22 miles) northwest of Tehran. When fully operational, the facility will be a modern research and production facility making it an exporter of a range of products used in nuclear medicine.
—Reuters, 19 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

20 January 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher states that Iran is undertaking a "crash effort to develop nuclear weapons." He expresses concern that other countries are assisting Iran in developing nuclear technology. According to a US official, Christopher's comments are targeted at Russia, which recently concluded a contract with Iran for the completion of two nuclear reactors. US diplomats indicate that it will be more difficult to secure Congressional approval for Russian aid if the contract is implemented. Sources say the United States is intensifying its efforts on several fronts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons; including discouraging Russia and China from selling nuclear reactors to Iran.
—Steven Greenhouse, "US Seeks To Deny A-Plants To Iran," New York Times, 24 January 1995, p. A4;
Daniel Williams and Thomas W. Lippman, "Christopher Charges Iran Continues Nuclear Program," Washington Post, 21 January 1995, p. A11.

20 January 1995
Middle East International reports that Russia may have been secretly assisting Iran in basic nuclear research since the 1980s, when the Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq War led to a cutoff of Western nuclear technology. The reactor at Iran's Nuclear Research Center acquired "critical assembly capability" in 1990, which suggests that Iran, a state with little nuclear technology of its own, received assistance from Russia or Pakistan or both. Russia's December 1994 contract [signed 8 January 1995] to complete Iran's 1300MW pressurized water reactor (PWR) at Bushehr-1 would be a "logical follow-on" to such secret cooperation, although the deal is considered to be far more significant than any previous cooperation between the two countries.
—Marko Milivojevic, "Nuclear Deal," Middle East International, 20 January 1995, p. 14.

26 January 1995
Thomas Graham, a senior official at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency says that Iran has "no current program" for the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. However, Graham said that the US government has "reached the conclusion" that Iran intends to develop a nuclear weapon capability in the future. Graham also says that Iran is in full compliance with all of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, noting that the United States is more concerned with Iran's future intentions. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has repudiates European and US allegations that Iran has key chemicals to separate plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel. According to certain European and US sources, Iranian officials at AEOI seek a peaceful nuclear program and would like to build nuclear reactors with Russian and Chinese help. However, other non-AEOI officials in Iran believe that "Iran should have nuclear weapons capabilities."
—--Mark Hibbs and Neal Sandler "Iran Has 'No Program To Produce Fissile Materials,' US Envoy Says," Nucleonics Week, 2 February 1995, pp. 7-8; Anthony Goodman, "US Says Iran Abides By Pact But Seeks Nuke Option," Reuters, 26 January 1995 in Executive News Service.

28 January 1995
The Guardian reports that Iran is trying to garner support to prevent the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the United States is concurrently increasing its efforts to deny nuclear technology to Iran. Iran is annoyed that its efforts to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful use are being thwarted by nuclear suppliers following the US lead.
—"Middle East," International Security Digest, January 1995.

February 1995
Zhongguo Kexue Bao reports that the Azad University in Tehran reported to the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Plasma Physics that the HT-6B tokamak provided to it by the Institute performed a successful 20 millisecond discharge. This is China's first international transfer of nuclear fusion research technology. The tokamak, a small fusion research apparatus, was built in the mid-1980s by the Institute and was operated for 10 years before its installation in Tehran in 1994. China and Iran intend to conduct joint research in nuclear fusion.
—"Technology Transfer (China/Iran)," S&T Perspective, Vol. No. 5, 30 June 1995, p. 6.

February 1995
The White House indicates that the Russia-Iran nuclear deal could strain relations between Russia and the United States. The administration is seeking to deny Iran advanced technologies by intensifying efforts to dissuade Western nations from providing subsidized loans to Iran. The administration has been successful in persuading Western European nations and Japan not to supply nuclear technology to Iran, and is continuing to press the issue with these countries.
—Steven Greenhouse, "US Seeks To Deny A-Plants To Iran," New York Times, 24 January 1995, p. A4; "Clinton Said To Warn Russia On Selling Reactors To Iran," Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 14 February 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995.

11 February 1995
President Hashemi-Rafsanjani criticizes alleged American propaganda, stating that Iran's strict adherence to the tenets of Islam do not allow attempts to develop "destructive and antihuman nuclear weapons..." This exclamation comes as part of a report conducted by the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in which Rafsanjani reiterates Iran's cooperative relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
—"Rafsanjani Addresses Foreign Diplomats: Nuclear Weapons are Against Iranian Ideology," British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 February 1995
A Congressional Research Service report says that China provides nuclear reactor and technology assistance and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.
—Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "CRS Issue Brief. Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 12 February 1996, p. 15.

13 February 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher states that the Iranian-Russian nuclear deal should not go forward because Iran is a sponsor of international terrorism. He says that the United States might discontinue aid to Russia if the contract is implemented. According to US officials, Iran is now the "biggest potential nuclear threat in the developing world."
—"US State Secretary Christopher Stated...," Mainichi Shimbun, 14 February 1995.

15 February 1995
ITAR-TASS news agency reports that Russian reactors used in the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran cannot be used for military purposes. An anonymous ministry specialist says that the reactors are incapable of producing the fissionable material needed to produce a weapon.
—"Moscow Says Russian Reactors in Iran are not Military," British Broadcasting Corporation, 15 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 February 1995
Aleksei Yablokov, chairman of the Security Council commission for ecological security, says that the nuclear power plant Russia is planning to build at Bushehr will have the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. "Thanks to Russia, Iran will be in a position to get the nuclear bomb within a few years," Yablokov says.
—Penny Morvant, "Officials Say Reactors Are Capable Of Producing Plutonium," OMRI Daily Report, No. 38, Part I, 22 February 1995; "Russian Official Warns Of Iran's Nuclear Goal," Washington Times, 16 February 1995, p. A17; Andrey Serov, "Nuclear Reactors Exported To Iran Unfit For Military Use," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 14 February 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995; "Russia Spells Out Pact With Iran For A-Plant," New York Times 21 February 1995, p. A5; "Russia Might Build Four Reactors For Iran," Washington Times, 21 February 1995, p. A13.

17 February 1995
The New York Times reports there is no firm evidence indicating that Iran, Jordan, or Lebanon has attempted to acquire weapons grade nuclear material.
—Craig Whitney, "Smuggling Of Radioactive Material Said To Double In A Year," New York Times, 18 February 1995, p. A2.

17 February 1995
A Chinese official defends China's right to sell peaceful nuclear technology to Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
—Patrick E. Tyler, "China Warns Against 'Star Wars' Shield For US Forces In Asia," New York Times, 18 February 1995, p. A4.

18 February 1995
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy reports it will build three more nuclear reactors for Iran. The three reactors consist of one light water VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor and two VVER-440 [440MW light water] reactors, all of which would be built at Bushehr. A spokesman for the ministry says it has made further plans with Iran to construct a desalting installation with a nuclear reactor. Iran continues to refute claims by Western nations that Iran is striving to produce nuclear weapons. In particular Iran denies claims made by Aleksei Yablokov, a Russian government ecological safety officer, that Iran could use Russian-made reactors to produce a nuclear bomb.
—"Russia to Build Three More Nuclear Reactors for Iran: official," Agence France Presse, 18 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 February 1995
Georgiy Kaurov, a spokesman at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says spent fuel at Iran's nuclear power plants will be relocated to Russia in accordance with the contract signed between the two nations.
—"Iranian Nuclear Waste to be Processed in Russia," British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 February 1995
According to Israeli television, Turkish security authorities arrested members of a network involved in smuggling plutonium and osmium to be used in the production of nuclear weapons in Iran. Members of the network reportedly have been in contact with several key officials in Iran, possibly the Iranian defense minister.
—"Turkey Reportedly Uncovers Iranian Nuclear Smuggling Ring: Israeli TV Report," British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 February 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says his nation "respects efforts aimed at the elimination of atomic weapons in the region," but believes his nation must have room to make independent decisions. Reiterating Iran's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Amrollahi says Israel has not been in full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
—"Iranian Nuclear Energy Head Amrollahi Condemns NPT 'Discrimination'," British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 February 1995
US State Department Spokesperson Christine Shelly says that in spite of US opposition to Russia's agreement to sell nuclear reactors to Iran, the Clinton administration is committed to continued aid to Russia. According to Shelly, linking US aid to Russian actions would be "counterproductive" to accomplishing the main goal of US aid, which is "to support Russia's transition to a democratic government and to a market economy." Speaker of the US House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has stated that the United States should end aid to Russia if it follows through with supplying the nuclear reactors to Iran.
—Michael Mihalka, "Iran Nuclear Deal Won't Stop Russian Aid," OMRI Daily Report, No. 39, Part 1, 23 February 1995.

24 February 1995
Despite rumors that Iran will be capable of producing a nuclear weapons in as little as three years, David Iriy, head of the Israeli delegation at multilateral arms control talks, says Iran will need at least five years to produce a nuclear weapon. But Iriy does believe Iran will be capable of producing weapons, stating "The Russians and Chinese are selling civilian nuclear reactors which will allow Iran to become a military nuclear power, all the more since North Korea is supplying Scuds as well as the technology to produce the missiles."
—"Iran will take five years or more to build the bomb: Israel," Agence France Presse, British Broadcasting Corporation, 24 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

25 February 1995
The Associated Press reports that a nuclear power plant will soon be connected to Iran electricity grid, which is the first indication that a nuclear facility is near completion. A deputy governor of Southern Bushehr Province says that the plant will come on stream during an "imminent" visit by President Hashemi Rafsanjani; this visit has not been announced.
—Associated Press, 25 February 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

Late February 1995
Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov justifies Russia's agreement to supply a light water reactor to Iran by noting that it is the same kind of reactor that the United States will supply to North Korea with the help of an international consortium. Mikhailov adds that cancellation of the Russian deal might cause Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at which point the United States would move to build nuclear facilities in Iran [to persuade it to remain a party to the Treaty, as it did with North Korea].
—Fred Hiatt, "US Efforts to Block Iran Reactor Sale Cause Anger in Moscow," Washington Post, 3 March 1995, p. A32.

February-March 1995
Russian officials say that discussions with Iran for the supply of additional reactors [to the one it agreed to build at Bushehr in January 1995] includes research reactors to be located at Iranian universities. Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy spokesman Georgi Kaurov says the total value of the contracts could reach $3 billion, although Western diplomats in Moscow have estimated that the value could be as high as $8 billion. Another report indicates that Russia will also assist Iran in the maintenance of its operating research reactors, and that 3,000 Russians will arrive at Bushehr in the near future to work on the construction of the nuclear power plant. A Minatom statement on 20 February says Russia is looking into the supply of desalination facilities to Bushehr and light water research reactors to universities in Iran. The head of the Russian Security Council's ecological safety committee, Alexei Yablokov says that the reactor deal involves a Russian commitment to recycle the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor and "return plutonium" to Iran.
—Fred Hiatt, "US Efforts to Block Iran Reactor Sale Cause Anger in Moscow," Washington Post, 3 March 1995, A32; Charles W. Holmes, Cox News Service; in Washington Times, 12 February 1995, pp. A1, A9; Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Russia Plans To Build Four N-reactors in Iran," Reuters, 20 February 1995; in Executive News Service, 20 February 1995.

Early March 1995
Russia and Iran sign an additional protocol to the contract for the supply of a VVER-1000 [1000MW light water reactor] to Iran. The protocol adds $140 million to the contract and calls for Russia to make changes to the foundations at Bushehr and redesign the turbine room so that the Russian reactor components can be fit into the modified structures. Iran had originally planned to undertake this work itself. The major work will begin in 1996.
—Aleksandr Koretskiy, Kommersant-Daily, 11 March 1995, p. 4; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-049 (FEDS Server), 11 March 1995.

March 1995
US Secretary of Defense William Perry says Russia is helping Iran build up its nuclear capabilities. Russian officials reply that Iran's nuclear technology is similar to that in 25 other states and is the same type of reactor the United States in selling to North Korea.
—Fahmi Huwaydi, "Drums of War Between Washington and Tehran," Al-Ahram (Cairo), 9 May 1995; in "Writer Rules Out US-Iran Military Clash," FBIS Document FTS19950509000330, 9 May 1995.

March 1995
US officials say that nuclear cooperation was discussed when South African Energy Minister Pik Botha led a delegation to Iran in March 1995, although intelligence sources have indicated that South Africa has not given Iran any nuclear technology or information. [Note: See 19 and 20 August 1995 entries for Botha's admission that discussions included a plan to supply Iran with uranium.]
—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology To Tehran," Sunday Times, 23 April 1995.

2 March 1995
A senior Israeli military official says that Iran tried to buy centrifuges, heavy water, and other parts needed to start a nuclear weapons program, from Argentina. A diplomat from the Argentine embassy in Tel Aviv confirms that Argentina was negotiating to sell such items, but agreement was never reached due to the "political situation." The Argentine diplomat would not confirm that Iran had an agreement to buy fuel rods and then negotiated for the heavy water. Iran also tried to obtain other components for uranium enrichment, including uranium hexafluoride; this pattern of acquisition and Iran's drive to self-sufficiency for nuclear production signals military intent, says the Israeli official. Iran has organized a network of front organizations throughout Europe to buy nuclear and missile technology. Purchases are often made in the name of Sharif and Amir Kabir universities. The Israeli official says, "We have to ask ourselves why Iran needs its own production of heavy water and an enrichment capability when it is provided by the supplier."
—"Iran Tried to Buy Nuclear Weapons Materials from Argentina," The Jerusalem Post, 2 March 1995, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; Daniel Blumenthal, "Syria Said to Keep Trying To Purchase Nuclear Reactor," Ambito Financiero (Buenos Aires), 16 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961216000408, 16 December 1996.

2 March 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Georgy Kaurov complains of US "double standards" concerning the Russian proposal to furnish Iran with a nuclear reactor. He says that the dispute may turn into a contentious issue at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in April 1995. Kaurov compares the $800 million Russian-Iranian deal with the US plan to supply North Korea with a light water reactor. He also claims that production of weapons-grade material from a light water reactor is not possible. US officials argue that no nuclear technology should be supplied to Iran on the grounds that it could aid Iran in becoming a "nuclear-armed terrorist state." According to a Western diplomat, Iran "has an extremely low level of technology. By giving them nuclear reactors, you are putting them a step up the ladder." Kaurov notes in response that many Iranian nuclear experts were trained in the United States.
—"Russia Attacks US Effort Against Reactor In Iran," Wall Street Journal, 2 March 1995, p. A10.

6 March 1995
Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's Foreign Minister, warns an arms race in the Middle East could precipitate a global war. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports Iran has remarked on its adherence to the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating it is Israel not Iran that is suspected of having a nuclear arsenal of 200 warheads, and it is Israel, because of its arsenal, that creates tension in the region.
—"Iran Warns Against Nuclear Arms in Region," The Jerusalem Post, 6 March 1995, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

6 March 1995
The Italian authorities intercept crates of "ultra-sonic equipment for the testing of nuclear reactors" on a ship believed bound for Iran. The ship carrying the crates is owned by the Milan-based freight forwarder, Rondine, and was stopped due to discrepancies regarding the ship's export licenses.
—"Nuclear Gear Seized in Italy," The Iran Brief, 6 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

8 March 1995
Israel threatens to impose sanctions on Russia if it does not halt plans to build a nuclear plant in Bushehr. Evet Liebermann, head of the Likud party of Israel, says, "Israel will prevent, by all means possible, Russia from building a nuclear plant in Iran." He further states correspondence between Israel and Russia is underway on what actions should be taken against Iran.
—"Israel Threatens Russia with Sanctions over Iran Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 8 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

10 March 1995
The Middle East Economic Digest reports that senior Russian officials say Russia will continue its relationship with Iran over nuclear reactors in Iran despite threats by the United States to halt economic aid to Russia. Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Russian Presidential Council, says the West need not be worried by the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran, which is something that can not be connected to arms manufacture.
—"Iran: Russian Nuclear Deal 'will go ahead'," Middle East Economic Digest, 10 March 1995, p. 10; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 March 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, calls "baseless" US accusations that Iran will use Russian help to develop nuclear weapons. Amrollahi points out that as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to receive assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear technologies. Amrollahi says that the first unit of a power plant at Bushehr will be completed in four years, and would have a generating capacity of 1,000MW. He said that 200 Russian and 500 Iranian experts and technicians are working to complete the plant.
—"Iran Stresses Peaceful Use Of Nuclear Plant," Executive News Service, 12 March 1995; Reuters, 12 March 1995.

15 March 1995
The New York Times reports that, according to Western intelligence officials, Iran uses dozens of locations in Europe to smuggle nuclear weapons-related technology into Iran. Iran seeks to obtain equipment from several sources, and then dismantles it into small pieces to be shipped on different circuitous routes to Iran. Iran uses small aircraft to ship parts to Poland and other Eastern European countries, sometimes via Vienna or Brussels, to be trucked to cargo ships or put on cargo planes to Iran. Pakistan and Syria also reportedly receive items to transship to the Iranian nuclear program. The officials indicate that Iran uses many of the same smuggling routes and contacts that Pakistan and Iraq used to develop their nuclear weapons programs. Intelligence officials believe the small Hartenholm airport, located north of Hamburg in Germany, is used by its Iranian owners as part of this Iranian nuclear smuggling network [Note: See 1993 entry.]
—Chris Hedges, "Nuclear TrailA special report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran's Arms Program," The New York Times, 15 March 1995, p. A1.

15 March 1995
The Iran Brief reports that, according to Iranfax, Iran is capable of producing uranium hexafluoride, or "hex," which can be used for fuel in the centrifuge uranium enrichment process that produces weapon-grade fuel. Hex is created by combining a fluorification agent and processed uranium, the fluorification agent in the case of Iran being hydrogen fluoride. The latter ingredient was supposedly obtained from German and China in large amounts. Iranfax reports that European export control officials have been investigating purchases of dual-purpose technologies by Iran that can be used in centrifuge enrichment programs. Semi-permeable membrane technology from European sources and Japan, Iranfax states, can be used to make uranium hexafluoride gas.
—"Iran Now Capable of Producing Nuclear Weapons Material," The Iran Brief, 15 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 March 1995
Alexei Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Security Council's commission on environmental security, says rumors of energy shortages are fabrications to justify the building of reactors such as the one at Bushehr. Yablokov asserts that Iran is rich with "immense oil and gas resources, so it could have only military reasons for wanting the power station."
—"Russian Official Warns Against Nuclear Cooperation with Iran, China," Agence France Presse, 16 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

16 March 1995
The US Senate votes 97-3 to cease funding a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia if Russia provides Iran with a nuclear reactor. The Senate bill will have to be harmonized with one already passed in the US House of Representatives.
—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

16 March 1995
Kenneth R. Timmerman, the Director of the Middle East Data Project, testifies before the US Senate that in 1993, US companies exported dual-use technologies to Iran, including "toxins, turbojet engines, air or vacuum pumps, machinery for liquefying gas, centrifuges and centrifuge parts, machine-tool holders, gas separation equipment, hydraulic presses, and laboratory furnaces," without proper Department of Commerce (DOC) licensing or inspection. An official from the Department of Commerce calls Timmerman's testimony "inaccurate and without foundation."
—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

17 March 1995
The International Atomic Energy Agency commends the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for its cooperation with inspections made by the IAEA. The IAEA's press office says, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's cooperation with those who had visited--and visit--Iran to inspect its atomic energy industries on behalf of the IAEA has been extraordinary and much more than expected of a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."
—"IAEA Praises Iran's Atomic Energy Organization for its Cooperation," British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

17 March 1995
Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee, states that the nuclear deal between Russia and Iran does not violate a single international law, but he says President Clinton's decision to prevent the US oil firm Conoco from implementing a deal with Iran will make it more difficult for Russia to go ahead with the lucrative contract.
—Michael Mihalka, "Harsh Russian Reaction To US Senate Vote To Block Russian- Iranian Deal," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 56, Part 1, 20 March 1995.

18 March 1995
Reuters reports that Yuri Kotov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry department that deals with Iran, said that Russia does not plan to concede to US pressures and will go ahead with the $1 billion nuclear reactor agreement with Iran. Kotov stresses that the Russian-Iranian deal is based on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, much like the US-North Korean agreement. The Russian contract includes one reactor, with the possibility of three additional reactors to be constructed at a later date.
—"Russia's Not Willing To Halt Deal With Iran," Washington Times, 18 March 1995, p. A6.

21 March 1995
According to a US government source, Iran is interested in setting up a consulate in Aktau (formerly Shevchenko), Kazakhstan. The United States is concerned about Iran's intentions, since Aktau houses Kazakhstan's fast breeder reactor, which can produce at least 110kg of plutonium a year. [Note: The Aktau reactor is used to generate electricity and to desalinate water. Russia was discussing the supply of a water desalinization reactor to Iran.]
—Information provided by William C. Potter from personal interview with a US government official (name withheld) 21 March 1995. For information on the Aktau reactor, see William C. Potter et al., Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States, Monograph No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993, pp. 17-18.

22 March 1995
Interfax reports that Russian experts have begun to examine the condition of the Bushehr nuclear power station. A spokesman for the Russian company that builds nuclear facilities abroad, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, says that some of the equipment that had been specially stored shows "almost no signs of corrosion" and adds that the "devices kept in zinc containers filled with nitrogen are in an ideal state and can be used at any moment." The Russian experts however say that the plant's "electrical equipment requires complete replacement 'because it doesn't function or meet the requirements of designers'." A complete report will be submitted to Iran in September.
—Interfax, 22 March 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

22-23 March 1995
Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher meet in Geneva to discuss US opposition to the pending Russian sale of two light water reactors (LWRs) to Iran. The only agreement reached during the meetings between two parties is a decision to meet again before Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton meet on 9 May 1995 in Moscow. US officials have admitted that the sale of Russian LWRs, worth between $800 million and $1 billion, would not directly assist the Iranians in building a nuclear bomb. The agreement would include the training of Iranian experts in Moscow. Russia has already sent 200 of its own experts to Iran. Iran will reportedly return spent fuel to Russia. The US has argued that the sale would be "counterproductive" to nonproliferation efforts and "could provide cover for Tehran to acquire other technology and materials useful in a weapons program." The US has pointed to a tightening of its trade embargo with Iran; including the cancellation of an agreement worth $1 billion between Iran and Conoco, as evidence of US willingness to accept economic loss.
—John J. Schulz, "Washington Unable To Derail Russian-Iranian Nuclear Accord," Arms Control Today, April 1995, p. 20; Michael Mihalka, "...And Presses Ahead With Reactor Deal," OMRI Daily Digest, 5 May 1995.

23 March 1995
Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Director, says the United States need not worry about Iran's supposed nuclear weapons program. According to Primakov, "After considering voluminous material, we have concluded that Iran at present does not possess nuclear weapons...nor any evidence of the existence in that country of a coherent military nuclear program." US concerns stem from growing reports of Iranian attempts to procure nuclear technology. Primakov counters such assertions by saying Iran would have great difficulty in developing a weapons program even if its supply to information went "unimpeded."
—"Russia Describes Iranian Nuclear Potential," United Press International, 23 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

23 March 1995
Reuters reports that Lieutenant-General Gennady Yevstafyev, a senior official of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), says that Russia will proceed with the nuclear reactor sale because the SVR officials "have no grounds for changing our assessment vis-a-vis Iran."
—"Russia's Not Willing To Halt Deal With Iran," Washington Times, 18 March 1995, p. A6; "Russia Dismisses US Fears Over Deal With Iran," Executive News Service, 23 March 1995; A. Peslyak, "Iran Reactor Cannot Produce Weapon-Grade Plutonium," Russian Television Network (Moscow), 16 April 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV- 95-082.

28 March 1995
In an effort to convince Russia to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran, the United States temporarily ends plans to sign an agreement with Russia on the peaceful use of nuclear power. Hazel O'Leary, the US Energy Secretary, believes the threat from Iran is serious, stating Washington is resolute in its desire for Russia to end its assistance to Iran. But Washington's action has not provided the desired response, and Russia continues to deal with Iran, adhering to a $1 billion contract with Iran to complete a nuclear reactor in Bushehr within four years, with stipulations for a further three in the future.
—Jim Mannion, "US Puts off Nuclear Agreement with Russia over Iranian Nuclear Deal," Agence France Presse, 28 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

30 March 1995
In response to US objections to Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, says that the nuclear cooperation between the Iran and Russia is in line with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that Iran's nuclear facilities has been inspected by the IAEA without any violations.
—"Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal Defended Atomic Energy Official Comments," Voice of Russia (Moscow), 30 March 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508000812, 30 March 1995.

April 1995
The United States says Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov is planning to sell Iran uranium-enriching gas centrifuges. Sometime afterward, perhaps in May, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says he did not know about a deal for gas centrifuges. [Note: For more on the alleged centrifuge deal see 4, 5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 May 1995 entries.]
—Vladimir Abarinov, "Moscow and Washington Have Held Their Own; The Presidents Have Managed Not to Worsen Relations," Segodnya (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Summit Said Successful Amid Modest Expectations," FBIS Document FTS1995051200350, 12 May 1995.

April 1995
While on a trip to the United States, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak says that Iranian nuclear weapons would threaten Arab security. But he says, "We do not think the Iranians are seeking that goal. We got clear assurances from the Russians, during the recent visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Cairo, that the nuclear reactors Iran wants to buy from Moscow would not be aiding Iran in the production of a nuclear bomb."
—Makram Muhammad Ahmad, "Daily Claims Relations With US Improved," Al-Musawwar (Cairo), 14 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950414000012, 14 May 1995.

3 April 1995
During a Moscow visit, US Secretary of Defense William Perry says the United States might be willing to compromise with Russia on the reactor deal with Iran. He suggests that if the deal must go through, several steps there could be taken to reduce proliferation risks, such as strict control over the type of fuel to be generated. Perry admits that the imposition of constraints on the reactor sale is "a very poor second choice," and states that the United States will continue to push Russia to abandon the deal. However, Perry says that aid to Russia, especially aid for defense conversion, should not be cut off regardless of the outcome of the Russian-Iranian reactor deal. At a meeting between Perry and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Russia rejects the US request that it cancel its contract to supply Iran with nuclear technology and equipment. US officials reveal that the United States has promised Russia "tens of millions of dollars" and a leading membership in the Korean Peninsula Development Organization if it suspends its nuclear agreement with Iran.
—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," Washington Times, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16; Fred Hiatt, "Perry Hints At Iran Compromise," Washington Post Foreign Service, 4 April 1995; in Executive News Service, 4 April 1995; "Although US Defence Secretary ...," Sankei Shimbun, 4 April 1995.

4 April 1995
An unattributed official of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says Russia will not cancel its contract to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, because it "will in no way enable that country to accumulate weapons-grade nuclear materials."
—"Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal Defended; Moscow to Proceed With Plans," Kommersant Daily (Moscow), 4 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508000816, 8 May 1997.

5 April 1995
News reports say Germany was unsuccessful in attempts to persuade the United States to reconsider its opposition to the Russian-Iranian reactor deal. A senior Western official revealed that in the past few months, the United States and Germany had been involved in "an informal exchange of views" on this matter, but the United States declined to openly renew consideration of the deal. One Executive Branch official contends that Secretary of State Warren Christopher is the driving force behind US opposition, and that there are US officials who "see virtue in holding nuclear talks with Teheran; in part because Washington is willing to provide power reactors to the DPRK." Although the United States and Israel have claimed that Iran has a secret nuclear program, an International Atomic Energy Agency official states that "no new information has come forth which would justify a return non-routine visit [to Iranian facilities]." Reshetnikov states that US opposition to the Russian reactor sale is based on "considerations of economic competition." A Western source indicates that Moscow will go through with the deal because the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Russia hopes to "exert some influence" in the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, Russia itself has 30 million Muslim citizens. Spain is reportedly also considering selling nuclear technology and supplies to Iran. An effort in the late 1980s by a Spanish Siemens' licensee to establish a supply link with Iran was unsuccessful.
—Mark Hibbs, "US Rebuffed German Initiative To Reconsider Iran Nuclear Deal," Nucleonics Week, 30 March 1995, pp. 10-11; Galina Penenkova, , "Sale Of Nuclear Reactors To Iran Assessed," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066; Veronika Romanenkova, "Iran Reactor 'Ballyhoo' Said Due To Competition" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066.

6 April 1995
A senior official from the South Korean government characterizes as "groundless" press reports in Japan and the United States that the United States was trying to include Russian participation in the North Korean project in an effort to persuade Russia to cancel its deal with Iran. The official says that the reports were meant to upset the system of cooperation that South Korea has with its allies on the nuclear reactor deal. Vyacheslav Sychev, an expert from the information department of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy says that "reports on Russia's possible participation in KEDO is a smokescreen for a large-scale operation to torpedo the Russo-Iranian contract on the delivery of Russian reactors to Tehran."
—Andrey Kirillov and Vladimir Solntse, "Panov Comments On Supplying Reactors To DPRK," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066, 5 April 1995.

10 April 1995
A Russian official says the United States opposes the Iran-Russia nuclear deal because the United States does not want commercial competition. "Americans are ready to strangle any potential competitors in the market of advanced technologies," says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. He notes that the reactors Russia plans to supply to Iran are the same type the United States plans to supply to North Korea.
—"Iran Nuclear Pullout Would Be 'Disgrace' Russian Ministry Says US Jealous of Competitors," RIA (Moscow), 10 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950410000009, 10 April 1995.

11 April 1995
The Islamic Republic News Agency reports that Boris Shikhmyradov, Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister, supports Iran-Russian nuclear cooperation. Shikhmyradov says the relationship between Iran and Russia would be beneficial for Turkmenistan, which he believes is ready "to play the role of transit territory between Russia and Iran."
—"Turkmenistan Backs Iran-Russia Nuclear Cooperation - IRNA," British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

11 April 1995
Russia denies that CIA-provided intelligence information proves that Iran's nuclear program has a military dimension, and says it will never give in to US pressure. The Iranian deal will be extremely profitable for Russia, and US pressure is regarded in Moscow as the result of economic competition, because the net profit from the nuclear deal with Iran can bring Russia $7 to $8 billion. Only the United States and Russia have capabilities to produce absolutely safe reactors, and Russia argues that the VVER-1000 [1000MW] light water reactors (LWRs) it will sell to Iran are safe and cannot be used for military purposes. Russia is afraid that there will be a repeat of the deal with North Korea, when US pressure led to the replacement of Russian contractors with US contractors. According to Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Relations Committee, there is a remote possibility that Russia will be allowed to join the North Korean project and sell nuclear reactors to North Korea.
—Sergey Tsekhmistrenko "Russians Do Not Listen To Americans," Kommersant, 11 April 1995, p. 11.

17 April 1995
During Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani's state visit to India; Indian officials say that a 1975 India-Iran agreement lays the groundwork for future nuclear cooperation between the countries, although India recently gave in to US pressure and refused to sell Iran a nuclear reactor.
—Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," Guardian (London), 18 April 1995.

17 April 1995
The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher calls for a cancellation of a Chinese plan to sell two 300MW reactors to Iran. Iran has reportedly sent an initial payment to China, while China has done seismic surveys of the Esteqlal site, located near the Bushehr complex. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen tells US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that China's decision to sell Iran two 300MW pressurized water reactors (PWRs) was consistent with international law.
—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23; Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," Guardian (London), 18 April 1995.

17 April 1995
Russia's ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says Russia will continue to cooperate with Iran in the nuclear field despite US pressure. He says, "Moscow will not accept any advice from the United States about its relations with other countries; in particular with the Islamic Republic of Iran."
—"Envoy to Iran Comments," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 17 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003069, 17 April 1995.

18 April 1995
The Guardian reports that Republicans leaders in the United States "suspect the Russian deal includes providing Iran with reprocessing facilities." [Note: It is likely that the article is referring to enrichment facilities, not reprocessing facilities.]
—Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," Guardian (London), 18 April 1995.

18 April 1995
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says, "We know...[Iran] works very hard in various ways to attain a nuclear option. That not only means that it will attain a nuclear capability, but it says publicly that it plans or demands the destruction of another people."
—"Peres on NPT, Talks with Syria," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 18 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950418000033, 18 April 1995.

19 April 1995
On a trip to Washington, DC, a Russian official hints that Russia might reconsider its nuclear deal with Iran if the United States were to buy Russian uranium. "If the issue of uranium shipments is solved, then the Russian-Iranian agreement can be considered from another point of view," says Oleg Davydov, foreign trade minister and deputy premier. "We are strategic partners of the United States and therefore can hold talks on the 'nuclear deal' issue," he says, adding "one may understand the US concern over the possibility that Russia can provide technologies for Iran which would allow it to accelerate the creation of nuclear weapons." He adds that Russia is committed to non-proliferation, and says "we are not going to transfer nuclear technologies to anyone; including Iran."
—Andrey Surzhanskiy, "Official Links Deal to US Uranium Purchase," ITAR-TASS, 19 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003065, 19 April 1995.

19 April 1995
Iranian President Rafsanjani reiterates Iran's determination to develop nuclear power capabilities despite US opposition. He adds that he believes Russia will follow through with its deal to supply reactors to Iran. Rafsanjani also says he supports what he called "a conditional extension" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
—"Iranian Chief Adamant On Russian Atom Deal," New York Times, 20 April 1995, p. A6.

20 April 1995
Nucleonics Week reports that Arab diplomatic sources do not believe the United States can substantiate its accusation that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Arab officials noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency has found no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The officials add that because the Arab states could be threatened by Iran, they cannot support US efforts to isolate Iran.
—Mark Hibbs, "Iran's Arab Neighbors Don't Believe US has Proof Of Weapons Ambitions," Nucleonics Week, 20 April 1995, p. 10.

20 April 1995
Sabah Al-Khayr of Cairo reports that according to secret documents allegedly smuggled out of Iran and obtained by the United States, Iran has secretly obtained nuclear material that could be used for a nuclear weapon. The documents allege that Iran imported the material through a nearby country with the cover story that the uranium would be used for medical purposes. Instead, however, it was intended to be "chemically processed" for use in a nuclear weapon, according to the secret documents. The documents also allege that Iran has secretly cooperated with Pakistan on nuclear issues. [Note: According to Sabah Al-Khayr, the documents were reportedly smuggled out of Iran by six defecting Iranian intelligence officials; reportedly including intelligence Chief Ali Fallahian. See July 1995 entry on the reported defection of Fallahian. Fallahian ran against President Khatami for the presidency of Iran in 2001 and as of 9 August 2002 was still in Iran.]
—Ahmad Nasr, "Intelligence Chief Reportedly Defects to US," Sabah Al-Khayr (Cairo), 20 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950420000066, 20 April 1995.

21 April 1995
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports Iran will not sign an indefinite extension to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless the five nuclear powers agree to reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear arsenals. The treaty ends in a year, and Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister, demands the nuclear states end production of weapons-grade nuclear material, and make accommodations to allow the transfer of nuclear energy technology to other states in need of other forms of energy production.
—"Iran Reject NPT Unless all Nuclear Weapons are Scrapped," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 April 1995
London-based Arabic periodical Al-Majallah publishes a report based on an interview with an unnamed former Iranian nuclear scientist, offering an insider's look at Iran's nuclear program. According to the scientist, who reportedly lives in Europe and held an "important position" in Iran's Nuclear Energy Organization prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran needs at least 10 years to build a nuclear weapon because construction of the Bushehr and Darkhovin reactors has been dormant for so long--17 years. According to the scientist, in 1979 Iran had a plan to create the technology to build nuclear weapons. Iran expected to have a weapon within ten years of completion of the reactors--the late 1980s. The scientist, however, says reports that Iran has acquired or attempted to acquire nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics and other countries are not true and are part of the US-led propaganda campaign against Iran. But the scientist says Iran has large amounts of uranium, enriched uranium, and plutonium, obtained from sellers in Sierra Leone and Chad. [Note: This seems to corroborate part of a report in Sabah Al-Khair that Iran illicitly brought nuclear material into the country. [Note: See 20 April 1995. The Al-Majallah report does not clearly state if the scientist worked for Iran's nuclear program after the Iranian Revolution, and if so, for how long, which raises the question of what he knows first-hand about Iran's nuclear program versus what he is conjecturing based on his past experience.]
—"Ali Nuri Zadah, "Khomeyni Abolished Nuclear Reactor Projects and Considered Them Idolatrous; Iranian Nuclear Capability: Reality or Propaganda," 22 April 1995; in "Article Views Quest for Nuclear Power;" FBIS Document FTS19950422000078, 22 April 1995.

23 April 1995
The Sunday Times of London reports that, according to US intelligence sources, Iran may be seeking nuclear information and assistance from South Africa. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) says a delegation of South Africans led by Pik Botha, South Africa's Energy Minister, visited Tehran in March, and Iran is believed to have asked about establishing a relationship between the two nations to provide Iran with nuclear technology. South Africa's now defunct nuclear program is reported to have produced at least six nuclear weapons, and its now unemployed nuclear scientists may find Iran to be financially attractive. The Sunday Times reports South Africa has continued to seek new arenas of profit to halt its financial downturn and has aggressively pursued the export of munitions and small arms.
—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology to Tehran," Sunday Times, 23 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

23 April 1995
In New York for the Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Conference, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says, "We are prepared to discuss the Iranian issue," referring to Russia's nuclear deal with Iran.
—"Kozyrev 'Prepared to Discuss' Supply of Reactors to Iran," Russia Public Television First Channel Network, 24 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003064, 22 April 1997.

25 April 1995
At a meeting of ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Indonesia, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be extended indefinitely without conditions, but only if the treaty is completely implemented, presumably a reference to Israel's nonparticipation in the treaty. Velayati calls on NAM to "take necessary measures against those governments which allowed Tel Aviv to develop and keep nuclear weapons." He says the only way to achieve a nuclear-free world is by expanding nuclear-weapon-free zones.
—"Velayati Comments on Implementation of NPT," IRNA (Tehran), 27 April 1995, FBIS Document FTS19950427000048, 27 May 1995; "Velayati on NPT Expansion," Kyodo (Tokyo), 25 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950425000040, 25 April 1995.

27 April 1995
The United States accuses Russia of initiating talks with Iran about the sale of weapons-grade uranium to Iran, despite assurances from Russia that it has no plans to provide Iran with uranium for nuclear weapons manufacture. Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian minister of atomic energy, is reported to be responsible for starting the rumor of a uranium sale to Iran, an admission Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's Foreign Minister, says was not within the purview of Mikhailov to make. Russia asserts it will not "back down" to US pressure to end its dealing with Iran in the field of nuclear technology, though it provides assurance that no uranium deal will be made. US pressure includes Russia's exemption from a deal that will provide Russia with a share of $4.5 billion US-North Korea nuclear deal.
—Robin Wright, "US Report Casts New Doubt on Russia-Iran Deal," Los Angeles Times, 29 April 1995, p. 13; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

28 April 1995
Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says that, with respect to nonproliferation, it would be safer for Iran to purchase a nuclear reactor from Russia than to seek nuclear technology from another source. Kozyrev reiterates that Russia will not assist Iran in manufacturing nuclear weapons, but will build the reactor for peaceful purposes. In a speech at the Johns Hopkins International Research Center, Kozyrev says, "I do not see any reasons why we should abandon the sale of reactors which is being conducted in compliance with international guarantees." It will take Russia 55 months to bring the reactor on line.
—"Further Reportage On Kozyrev Visit To Washington" FBIS-SOV-95-083, 28 April 1995;
Vladimir Kikilo, Viktor Khrekov and Vitaliy Chukseyev, "Further Reportage On Kozyrev Visit To Washington" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 29 April 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083; Gennadiy Yezhov and Andrey Serov, "'Absolutely No Changes' To Contract With Iran" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091; "Russian Official Defends Reactor Sale To Iran." Xinhua (Beijing), 29 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-083.

29 April 1995
US newspapers report Russia has promised to provide Iran with a centrifuge that will allow it to make nuclear weapons. The New York Times and Washington Post report that an agreement was reached in January 1995 in which Russia will sell Iran a centrifuge plant. Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, says such allegations are completely false, stating, "We will not give Iran or any country nuclear weapons capability or technology." The Washington Post reports that the United States is strongly opposed to all aspects of the secret protocol between Russia and Iran, but is especially concerned about the inclusion of uranium enrichment technology. Reports say that meetings on the subject with high-level Russian diplomats, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, have revealed that the centrifuge plant sale was still under consideration in Moscow. According to US officials, the Russian government seems divided between the Atomic Energy Ministry, which expects a large profit from the roughly $1 billion sale, and the Foreign Ministry, which is anxious to improve US-Russian relations.
—"Russia Promised Iran Centrifuge, Useful in Making Nuclear Weapons," Agence France-Presse, 29 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Michael Dobbs, "Russia Promised To Sell Centrifuge Plant To Iran," Washington Post, 29 April 1995, p. A8.

29 April 1995
Komsomolskaya Pravda reports that Russian officials claim to have drafted the reactor agreement with Iran only after reviewing Iran's nuclear capabilities and finding them non-threatening. Potential profits from the deal exceed proposed US economic assistance to Russia.
—"Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton...," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

30 April 1995
In an address to the World Jewish Congress, US President Bill Clinton announces that he will ban all US trade with Iran, including purchases of Iranian oil by US firms, which last year accounted for over 20% of Iran's oil exports and totaled almost $4 billion. Also banned will be $326 million of direct US exports to Iran. The executive order is to take effect in the first week of June. Clinton also said he would press US allies to impose similar sanctions. In his speech, Clinton cites Iranian agreements with Russia to buy nuclear reactors and gas centrifuge equipment as proof that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The embargo is reportedly a demonstration of US determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and is imposed on the basis that Iran is a terrorist state and is seeking weapons of mass destruction.
—Ann Devroy, "President Will Ban All Trade With Iran," Washington Post, 1 May 1995, p. A1; Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton To Order A Trade Embargo Against Teheran," New York Times, 1 May 1995, p. A1; Martin Walker, "US Draws Up Tough Sanctions On Iran," The Guardian, 6 April 1995; Fahmi Huwaydi, "Drums of War Between Washington and Tehran," Al-Ahram (Cairo), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000330; "Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton...," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

Early May 1995
Russian officials were sending mixed signals on the question of whether Russia will provide the Iranians with gas centrifuges. Lev Ryabev, the First Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, denies that Russia will provide centrifuges to Iran. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin says, "Moscow will not risk any steps which could facilitate the development of technology for the production of nuclear weapons by Tehran," but added that the question of selling the centrifuges was a "separate issue."
—Michael Mihalka, "Russia Sends Mixed Messages On Centrifuges To Iran," OMRI Daily Digest, 5 May 1995.

May 1995
In an interview with a US television station, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that Iran "neither had nuclear weapons nor was it seeking to acquire or develop them."
—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," Jane's International Defense Review, September 1997, pp. 29-31.

1 May 1995
US News and World Report reports that, according to Iranian exiles residing in Europe, Iran has constructed a clandestine site to develop nuclear weapons inside a mountain tunnel, close to the city of Chalus on the Caspian Sea. The exiles claim that Iran has employed technicians from the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea at the site. [Note: The article contains a small map indicating the location of the alleged nuclear weapons facility.]
—"Tehran's Magic Mountain," US News and World Report, 1 May 1995, p. 24.

1 May 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, "Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons." He says that in the "organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons which has been followed by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability."
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html>.

2 May 1995
In an interview with a Swiss news outlet, an Iranian nuclear official says Iran wants to develop its nuclear sector "for the production of energy, not for bombs." "Our power is not based on nuclear weapons," says Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. "We do not want them [nuclear weapons] because we believe that they are no longer useful in today's world," he says. Asked why Iran needs nuclear energy with its vast oil reserves, Amrollahi says, "It is nothing but reasonable to develop all possible energy sources: water, solar energy, and wind....We cannot burn all our fossil fuel reserves in power plants. This would cause additional environmental pollution. In 20 years we want to produce 20% of our energy by nuclear means. There is something else: Why were the Americans not against it when the Shah built the nuclear power plant of Bushehr in those days? He was able to complete 85% of it without any objection....Why is the United States putting pressure on Russia, while it spares no effort to help North Korea get new nuclear reactors?." Amrollahi says 200 Russian engineers and 500 Iranian experts have been working on the Bushehr plant since last year. Amrollahi calls "absolutely wrong" reports that Iran sought from Russia a heavy water reactor, which would be more useful than light water reactors for weapons production. As for US assertions that Iran has tried to buy plutonium from Central Asian republics, Amrollahi responds: "What for? The Americans like to assert wrong things. If they have proof, I call on them to submit it to the IAEA. The IAEA has also called on the Americans, but so far without success." Amrollahi denies that Iran has recruited nuclear experts in the former Soviet Union. "Russia is our contracting party," he says. "It is its task to take scientists and engineers to Iran. We do not interfere there." Amrollahi says Iran has a 5MW research reactor in Tehran and a "small research reactor" in Isfahan, which he says is used for the training of staff. As for nuclear contracts with China, Amrollahi says China is to build two nuclear power plants, each with a capacity of 300MW. "We are in the final stage of the technical preparation," Amrollahi says of the Chinese deal. "We have not yet started with the work on the spot." [Note: The date of the interview is not known.]
—"Iranian Official Denies Existence of Nuclear Weapons Program," Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950502000035, 2 May 1995.

2 May 1995
White House spokesman Mike McCurry stated that the strengthened US embargo against Iran will help to persuade Russia to cancel the reactor deal. Moreover, McCurry says that since the announcement of the trade embargo, other G-7 nations have begun reviewing their policies toward Iran.
—"Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

2 May 1995
The Washington Post reports that President Clinton's call for a multilateral trade embargo against Iran fell on deaf ears in Europe and received a lukewarm reception from Japan. Many European countries have refused to participate, arguing that political dialogue is the only way to influence Iranian behavior. Japan may consider again suspending its loans to Iran, but its dependence on Iranian oil is likely to keep Japan from going much farther. Without the cooperation of other major trading nations, the US embargo is unlikely to have much effect on Iran.
—Fred Barbash, "Clinton's Call For Boycott Of Iran Drawing Little Support Abroad," Washington Post, 3 May 1995, p. A27.

4 May 1995
A Russian official denies reports that Russia has agreed to sell Iran a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge facility. "No contracts or agreements on this question have been signed," says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. "And you can have discussions on any subject, and in this instance these are just empty words." Another Russian nuclear official says Russia is discussing with Iran the training of Iranian nuclear physicists, but no agreement has been signed. "Most of the Iranian nuclear physicists have undergone training in the West," explains Lev Ryabev, Russia's first deputy minister for atomic energy. "It would be natural if they learned to operate Russian-made equipment which will be installed in Bushehr. Ryabev says Russia has started no construction yet at the unfinished nuclear power plant: "We have not laid a single brick in Bushehr yet."
—"4 May Russian TV Commentary," Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003038, 22 April 1997; "No Dual-Purpose Nuclear Equipment for Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003054, 22 April 1997.

4 May 1995
A Russian official refutes the suggestion of US ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright that Russia might forgo the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. "Russia will not cancel its decision, even in the face of threats from foreign countries," says Grigoriy Karasin, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry.
—"Russia Will Not Cancel Nuclear Deal With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003044, 22 April 1997.

4 May 1995
Uzbek President Islam Karimov says he disapproves of Russia's deal to sell nuclear reactors to Iran.
—Vilor Niyazmatov, "Uzbek President Opposes Sale," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003058, 22 April 1997.

4 May 1995
Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency affirms Iran's intention to return spent fuel to Russia. This prompts speculation that Iran is willing to compromise on some aspects of its nuclear deal with Russia in order to soften US resistance. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher welcomes the Iranian statement, which was made at the New York conference on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Christopher adds, however, that the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal would be a major topic of discussion at the upcoming Clinton-Yeltsin summit meetings in Moscow, and that Clinton would share "very sensitive information concerning Iran's true intentions" with his counterpart in hopes of convincing Yeltsin to cancel the agreement. Evgenii Mikerin, head of the Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities Directorate at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, says that the plutonium from the Bushehr type of light water reactor does not readily lend itself to such applications. Although Iran has expressed an interest in acquiring centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment, Russia has never considered delivery of such technology, Mikerin says.
—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23; Steven Greenhouse, "Iran Says It Would Return Nuclear Fuel To Russia," New York Times, 5 May 1995, p. A4.

5 May 1995
Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, says Russia had agreed to deliver gas centrifuges to Iran in a protocol to the Russian-Iranian agreement to build a nuclear power station. "According to the protocol, delivery of centrifuges to Iran is not an immediate task but will happen in six months or so," Yablokov says. But another Russian official, Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, contradicts Yablokov on the centrifuge deal. Kaurov says "there is nothing about the installation of centrifuges or the transfer of centrifugal technology" in the Russian-Iran nuclear agreement. [Note: Yablokov refers to the protocol to the agreement, not the agreement itself, while Kaurov is speaking about the actual agreement, so both could be speaking correctly.] Yablokov says a centrifuge deal would raise many questions about Iran's intentions: "It is the military atom that Iran wants to develop....If Iran has a nuclear station, it won't need a uranium enrichment [gas centrifuge] facility at all. It is a thousand times cheaper to buy fuel, which is necessary for the power station, from the same country which is building the station." Yablokov also raises questions about why Iran needs nuclear energy at all: "According to the protocol to the agreement, we will train 20 Iranian scientists in our classified facilities. But why does Iran need so many specialists for one power station? Iran, with its enormous supplies of gas and oil, should also explain to the world community why it needs to develop nuclear power engineering at all, as it is much cheaper to obtain energy from gas and oil. The enrichment of uranium, large-scale training of scientists, modern nuclear technologies which Russia will inevitably pass on to Iran together with the power station--this is very dangerous."
—"Nuclear Technology Sale to Iran 'Dangerous'," Informatsionnoye Agentsvo Ekho Moskvy (Moscow), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950505000132, 5 May 1995; Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russian Ministry Denies Gas Centrifuge Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS, 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003034, 22 April 1997.

5 May 1995
A Russian atomic energy official says Russia intends to sign contracts to build another three reactors at Iran's Bushehr nuclear energy plant. One would be the 1000MW VVER-1000 light water reactor and the other two would be the 440MW VVER-440 reactors, says the unnamed official of Russia's Ministry for Nuclear Energy. The official also says there is an understanding between Iran and Russia to train Iranian nuclear experts to use the Russian-made reactors at Bushehr, but he says "the understanding is only verbal and no documents have been signed on this score." [Note: See 4 May 1995.]
—"Russian Official Claims More Energy Units to be Built For Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003040, 22 April 1997.

5 May 1995
In a television interview, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says Russia has received about $5 million so far for its work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The work has consisted of inspecting the equipment left by the German contractor that stopped construction in 1979 and reviewing what reconstruction needs to be done to the cement foundation. Mikhailov says this stage should be finished by the end of October.
—"Russian Officials Interviewed," Russian Public Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 15 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003032, 22 April 1997.

5 May 1995
The Egyptian newspaper al-Akhbar criticizes US pressure on its allies to join it in on imposing a trade ban on Iran. The United States is further criticized by the newspaper for exercising a double standard in the Middle East by condemning and isolating Iran for possible nuclear aspirations without taking any actions against Israel.
—"Paper: US 'Double Standards' On Iran, Israel," MENA, 5 May 1995 [based on an article in Al-Akhbar]; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-087, 5 May 1995; "Paper: Clinton 'Wrong Decision' On Iran Embargo," Agence France Presse (Paris), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-087, 4 May 1995.

7 May 1995
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev tells Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi that Russia will honor its commitments to Iran, including the deal for the Bushehr nuclear power station. Chernyshev says Russia opposes sanctions against Iran. The Russian official also says US President Bill Clinton is expected to raise US opposition to the Bushehr deal in a pending visit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, but that Russia intends "to remain as assertive as before."
—"Official Says Moscow Respects Its Commitments to Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 7 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003030, 7 May 1995.

8 May 1995
US President Clinton signs an executive order imposing an even tighter embargo against Iran, "banning virtually all US trade and investment" with Iran. [Note: See 30 April 1995 entry for Clinton's announcement of the embargo.]
—"Iran Warns Russia Not to Cancel Nuclear Deal," Xinhua (Beijing), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000069, 9 May 1995.

8 May 1995
Iran's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Kamal Kharazi, says many countries in the Middle East are watching whether at a summit between the two leaders Russian President Boris Yeltsin "will succumb to US President Bill Clinton's demands or fulfill his country's commitment to Iran," referring to US pressure on Russia to cancel the deal for the nuclear energy plant at Bushehr. Kharrazi says he believes Russia will "honor" the deal. Kharrazi goes on to say that "Iran supports one of the groups which believes the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] should be extended subject to the condition that there be a built-in mechanism which will ensure a review of the commitments made by the five major nuclear powers....This mechanism should be able to eradicate deadly weapons from the globe forever."
—"Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation Envoy on Commitment, Regional Issues," Tehran Times (Tehran), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000328, 9 May 1995.

8 May 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says Russian President Boris Yeltsin does not know the details of the agreement between Russia and Iran for construction of a nuclear power plant. Christopher says Yeltsin has been misled by his advisors about the deal. [Note: Christopher may be referring to the additional protocol to the agreement, which included provisions besides construction of the plant.]
—"Press Officials Consider Relations with Russia, Radio Views Christopher's Remarks," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 8 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950508000255, 8 May 1995.

8 May 1995
Russian Ambassador to Iran, Sergey M. Tretyakov, says Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran is peaceful, reiterating that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been monitored by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
—"Russian Ambassador on Relations with Tehran," IRNA (Tehran), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003028, 22 April 1997.

9 May 1995
In a Kremlin meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin tells German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that Russia will supply equipment to Iran for its nuclear power station, but that it can be used only for peaceful purposes. [Note: Yeltsin's statement that it can be used only for peaceful purposes may refer to his imminent "cancellation" of the "military elements" of the nuclear deal with Iran. See 11 May 1995.]
—"Yeltsin Confirms Delivery of Equipment," Interfax (Moscow), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19970422003024, 22 April 1997.

10 May 1995
US President Bill Clinton tells Russian President Boris Yeltsin that Iran is following a blueprint for acquiring nuclear weapons provided by Pakistan more than four years ago.
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 1995, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html>.

10 May 1995
The Natural Resources Defense Council discloses details of the secret protocol between Russia and Iran, which calls for 10 to 20 Iranian nuclear technicians to be trained in Russia each year.
—"Russia-Iran Protocol Provides Evidence of Discussions, But No Firm Agreement On Sale Of Centrifuge Plant For Uranium Enrichment," Natural Resources Defense Council News Release, 10 May 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

10 May 1995
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says Israel believes Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons as soon as possible by importing scientists and technology.
—"Peres Discusses Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000349, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
The Russian ambassador to the United States, Yuliy Vorontsov, says Russia will most likely not sell uranium-enriching centrifuges to Iran, nor will it train Iranian nuclear scientists. He says such a deal could be seen as a "military program" contrary to Russian policy. According to Vorontsov, the deal was not authorized by the Kremlin, but rather was set up by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. By cancelling these portions of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran, the $1 billion deal will lose half of its value, he says. The sales of the light water reactors to Iran, however, are "intended for peaceful purposes," he says. "I have repeatedly told the Americans, pay us $500 million and we will cancel the supplies of light water reactors to Iran," he says. "They only smiled." [See 4 and 5 May 1995.]
—"Russia May Call Off Training Iranian Physicists," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19970422003022, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
An unnamed high-ranking Russian diplomat says Russia's nuclear deal with Iran does not pose a military threat. "This deal is being strictly controlled by the Russian special services, whose duty is to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons," he says. "Naturally, Moscow does not intend to tolerate any loopholes for the spreading of nuclear threat."
—"Iran Deal Strictly Controlled by Special Services," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000373, 10 May 1995; "Moscow To Leave No Loophole for Nuclear Spread," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000416, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy will not cease work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant while the deal is reviewed by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, says ministry spokesman Georgiy Kaurov. [See 11 May 1995 for more information on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.] The commission "will thoroughly analyze the contract details and not find a single rotten thing in it," Kaurov says. "The contract on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran does not violate either international or Russian-US agreements."
—"No Plans to Halt Iran Deal During Commission Talks," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000372, 10 May 1995.

10 May 1995
A Russian delegation led by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and a US delegation lead by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher begin discussions on Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Russian National Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev are also members of the Russian delegation. Foreign Economic Relations Minister Oleg Davydov says that Russia is compelled to cooperate with Iran because of its geographic location and because it is not in Russia's interest to have another "unfriendly neighbor in the vicinity of its southern border." Davydov denies reports that the United States had shown Russian officials an Iranian "blueprint" for nuclear weapons development. Instead, Davydov characterizes the report as an analysis which points toward Iran's intentions to "be closer to development of nuclear weapons." A senior Russian Foreign Ministry official said that there was no substantiated evidence that Russian nuclear reactors in Iran were going to be used for non-peaceful purposes. The official said that Russian agencies "in charge of nuclear nonproliferation have the deal under their firm control" and that Russia has resolved "to leave no loophole for proliferation of nuclear weapons." The Russian-Iranian reactor deal calls for the completion of a nuclear power plant with a 1,880MW capacity. The Bushehr facility will likely have four reactors, the first with a 1,000MW capacity, the second with an unspecified capacity, the third and fourth reactors each with a 440MW capacity.
—"Moscow 'Determined To Leave No Loophole'," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in "No Plans To Suspend Deal During US-Russian Commission Discussions," JPRS Document JPRS-TAC-95-002, 10 May 1995.

11 May 1995
At a joint press conference with US President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces that Russia will not sell a gas centrifuge to Iran and will eliminate all "military" aspects of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Yeltsin says the "military element" includes "the creation of nuclear weapons-grade fuel and a centrifuge and the construction of silos" [presumably for uranium storage]. The Russian-American Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation (Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) will review the military components of the nuclear deal, as well as other matters of Iranian-Russian military relations. In particular, the commission will review the protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear agreement, which, among other things, deals with how to handle spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from the reactors. [Note: For more information on the secret additional protocol, see 5, 11, 17, and 18 May and 2 June 1995.] Iranian deputy foreign minister Mahmud Vaezi says: "Since this [Gore-Chernomyrdin] committee will deal with military issues, it is not likely to be at odds with our agreement with the Russians." Vaezi also says Russian officials gave him "definite assurances" that the contract for the construction of the Bushehr plant will be fulfilled. "Clinton has achieved no success," Vaezi says, in convincing Russia not to go ahead with "the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran." Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov refuses to rule out the sale of a centrifuge to Iran in the future, but says the agreement signed with Iran does not include a centrifuge. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says in a radio interview that Iran did not seek centrifuges and they are not part of the agreement with Russia. [Note: See 17 and 18 May and 2 June for apparently contrary reports.] Amrollahi says, "Anyone who knows about these things knows there can be no centrifuge in the nuclear power plant agreement....In our agreement, we made no mention of centrifuge, and have never sought this. I think this is nothing but childish hostility started by the United States." Amrollahi also denies that Iran seeks nuclear energy for military purposes; the International Atomic Energy Agency agrees with this assessment. Iran has spent $10 to $12 billion on the Bushehr power plant, according to Amrollahi, and could produce electricity from it if it spends less than $800 million more. "It is logical," Amrollahi says, "for our country to complete this plant as soon as possible so that we do not waste the investment and so that we can end the energy shortage in the country, giving us a reliable source of energy for at least 30 years, the lifespan of a power plant, and making the most of our investment." In a separate interview, Amrollahi denies that Iran bought 500kg of uranium--or any uranium--from Kazakstan.
—Stanislav Kucher and Ravil Zaripov, "Deal Which Never Was," Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 12 May 1005; in "Clinton Stand on Iran Seen as Gesture to Republicans," in FBIS Document FTS19950512000306, 12 May 1995; "Views on US-Russian Talks on Ties to Iran Envoy Stresses No Military Motives," IRNA (Tehran), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000292, 11 May 1995; "Clinton Achieved No Success," Agence France Presse (Paris), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000290, 11 May 1995; "Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Said Committed to Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000271, 12 May 1995; Vladimir Abarinov, "Moscow and Washington Have Held Their Own; The Presidents Have Managed Not to Worsen Relations," Segodnya (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Summit Said Successful Amid Modest Expectations," in FBIS Document FTS19950512000350, 12 May 1995; "Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation Interview With Atomic Energy Head," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000316, 11 May 1995; "Russia Withstands US Pressure on Nuclear Deal," 11 May 1995, IRNA; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002977, 22 April 1997; Bernard Cohen, "Bite-Sized Concession From Yeltsin to Clinton," 11 May 1995, Liberation (Paris); in "Articles Review Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Meeting Seen 'Hardly Reassuring'," 11 May 1995; Gennadiy Yezhov and Andrey Serov, "Russian Minister Explains Tasks of Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission," 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002979, 22 April 1997; "Iran's Vaezi Gives Statement in Almaty," IRNA, 1 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002994, 22 April 1997.

11 May 1995
Georgiy Kaurov, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says there were never plans to sell centrifuges to Iran. Nor has a decision been reached as to whether Iranian spent fuel will be transferred to Russia or left in Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. Mikhail Kokeev, a deputy in the Russian Foreign Ministry, adds that Russia would not advocate projects which would improve Iran's military posture, but admitted that several entities within the Russian bureaucracy had contemplated supplying dual-use technologies to Iran.
—"Yablokov: Nuclear Technology Sale To Iran 'Dangerous'," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091, 5 May 1995; Michael Mihalka, "The Mysterious Case Of The Centrifuge Concession," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 92 Part I, 12 May 1995.

11 May 1995
Iran's ambassador to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York calls for a nuclear-free Middle East and calls for international pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear arms. "Every effort should be made," says Ambassador Sirus Nasseri, "to implement the treaty in all its aspects to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. This, of course, should by no means hamper the peaceful use of nuclear energy."
—"Naseri Address UN Conference on NPT Issues," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000507, 12 May 1995.

12 May 1995
Dr. Gerald Steinberg, Director of Research in Arms Control at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, writes that the cancellation of a centrifuge deal will greatly impede Iran's ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Steinberg asserts Iran will have difficulty is securing an alternate source for gas centrifuge technology, and this reversal is an "important victory" for the US administration. According to Steinberg, though this represents a major setback for Iran it is unlikely Iran will halt its nuclear program.
—Gerald Steinberg, "Yeltsin Decision Slows Iranian Nuclear Effort," The Jerusalem Post, 12 May 1995, p. 22; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1995
Mahmud Vaezi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, says despite the recent agreement reached between the United States and Russia, Iran believes the latter will not sway from its commitment to Iran. Vaezi states, "My impression from Yeltsin's news conference (Wednesday), is that Russia will carry out the agreement it has signed with Iran in this regard."
—"The Nuclear Deal with Russia; Vaezi says he Expects Russia to Implement Bushehr Agreement," British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 May 1995
The first deputy speaker of Russia's State Duma, Mikhail Mityukov, says the details of the nuclear cooperation agreement between Russia and Iran will not be subject to review by the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission and no changes will be made to the agreement. Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announces Russia will uphold its obligations to Iran for the "peaceful use of nuclear energy." [Note: See 11 May 1995.]
—"Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Said Committed to Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000271, 12 May 1995; "The Russian Federation Did Not Plan the Delivery of Uranium-Enrichment Centrifuges," Segodnya (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Russian Official Clarifies Nature of Nuclear Deal With Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970422002963, 22 April 1997; "Mityukov Tells Iran No Change in Nuclear Cooperation Accord," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002967, 22 April 1997.

12 May 1995
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says "hundreds of experts from Russia and China, who can smell hundreds of millions of dollars, will help Iran gain the technological know-how to convert its nuclear reactors for military use."
—"Iranian Threat Persists; US Efforts Fail," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000260, 12 May 1995.

12 May 1995
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives approves a bill that would bar financial aid to any country that sells nuclear technology and weapons to Iran. The bill would affect about 25% of aid to Russia, but would not affect aid to dismantle Russia's nuclear weapons. Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee, calls the move "not very wise" and says in trying to persuade Russia the committee's math does not add up: "The entire aid the US is giving to Russia totals $400 million, while Russia's deal with Iran is estimated at $1 billion."
—Aleksandr Sychev, "Russian Given Yellow Card by US Congressman," Izvestiya, 13 May 1995; in "US Congress Vote 'Warning Signal' on Iran Deal," FBIS Document FTS19950513000202, 13 May 1995; Pavel Kuznetsov, "Lukin Calls US Congress Resolution 'Not Very Wise'," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002973, 22 April 1997.

13 May 1995
Iran's embassy in Germany releases a statement that says Russian President Boris Yeltsin's agreement to cancel the military element of the Iran-Russia nuclear deal was a "face-saving move" for the United States. [Note: See 11 and 12 May 1995.] "Since Clinton's hasty action in cancelling [the] Tehran-Moscow nuclear deal has produced no results, Washington, in a bid to regain its lost prestige, claimed that Russia has agreed to drop [the] military part of its nuclear deal with Tehran," the statement says.
—"Embassy Refutes US Claims on Russian Deal," IRNA (Tehran), 13 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950513000180, 13 May 1995.

Mid-May 1995
Iranian officials say Iran has paid between $800 and $900 million as a down payment to China for construction of two 300MW pressurized water reactors, one of which is reported to be installed in the Esteqlal facility, near Bushehr.
—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

15 May 1995
The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will review the issue of a potential deal for Iranian nuclear experts to be trained in Russia, says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. [See 11 May 1995 for more on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. See 4 May 1995 for more on the possibility of Russia training Iranian nuclear experts.] Kaurov says the Iranian experts would be trained to operate the Russian-made reactors to be installed at Bushehr. Kaurov also mentions the possibility of a deal for building more reactors: "Specialists will have to be trained to operate Russian-made equipment anyway, bearing in mind the nuclear ministry is planning to conclude more contracts with Iran on the construction of another three power units with light water reactors." [See 5 May 1995 for more on the additional reactors.] The Commission, Kaurov says, will also decide what should be done with spent nuclear fuel from the Iranian reactors, whether it should be sent to Russia for processing or stored in Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision.
—"Gore-Chernomyrdin to Discuss Iranian Specialist Training," Interfax (Moscow), 15 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002960, 22 April 1997.

15 May 1995
Russia must honor its nuclear agreement with Iran, says Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma's Security Committee. "Russia is a sovereign state and it has the right to choose who to do business with and what to sell," he says.
—"Agreement 'Must Be Honored'," Interfax (Moscow), 15 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002962, 22 April 1997.

15 May 1995
A senior US State Department official suggests that there was evidence within the Bushehr contract that Russia intended to provide Iran with plutonium separation technology, but noted that Russia promised not to deliver such technology. [Note: This probably refers to the gas centrifuge in the secret additional protocol.]
—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23.

15 May 1995
Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, tells the New York Times that Iran is planning to build about ten nuclear reactors within the next 20 years. Further plans include training Iranian researchers by Chinese nuclear physicists and nuclear engineers.
—"Iran wants to build ten nuclear reactors," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 May 1995, p. 3; via Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. [CNS Translation]

16 May 1995
Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani rejects US accusations that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. "We have repeatedly announced, and this has been confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency," he says, "that Iran's aim in obtaining nuclear energy is to use it for peaceful purposes and meet its energy requirements."
—"President Interviewed on US Television Network Says US, Israel 'Supporters of Terrorism'," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 16 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950516000338, 16 May 1995.

16 May 1995
Following closed hearings with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Chairman of the Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin says any undesirable aspects of the nuclear deal with Iran are because the "Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), while negotiating with Iran on the sale of light water nuclear reactors, did not consult either with the President or with the Government of Russia. As a result, it looked as if we signed the deal on behalf of Russia, though in fact it was signed on behalf of a specific ministry....I would like Minatom to sell as much of its products as possible, but so that our grandchildren don't have a group of nuclear states around Russian borders." According to an anonymous Duma member, Kozyrev says the deal for the centrifuge was secret outside of Minatom and was not known to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [Note: See 8 May 1995 entry for an indication that US Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed Yeltsin did not know of the deal.]
—"Lukin Reviews Kozyrev's Responses to Duma Questions on Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 16 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002958, 22 April 1997; Georgiy Bovt, "Regarding the Russian-Iranian Nuclear Deal," Kommersant Daily (Moscow), 18 May 1995; in "Iran Deal Pending Until Gore-Chernomyrdin Talks," FBIS Document FTS199505180003456, 18 May 1995.

17 May 1995
In an interview on Russian radio, Russian politician Ala Yaroshenskaya says a protocol signed by the heads of the Russian and Iranian atomic energy ministries called for signing a contract within six months to build a uranium mine and a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge in Iran. [Note: Yaroshenskaya's title is not given. If Yaroshenskaya's assertion of the existence of this protocol is true, the Russian and Iranian atomic energy ministries lied or were incorrect when they said they never discussed the sale of a gas centrifuge. It would also mean that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's agreement to cancel the sale of the centrifuge was not an empty gesture as Iran has alleged. See 11 and 12 May 1995.]
—"Official on Cancellation of Centrifuge Sale," Moscow Mayak Radio Network (Moscow), 17 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950517000377, 17 May 1995.

18 May 1995
Despite recent pressure asserted by the United States on Russia to halt the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran, China says it still plans to discuss delivery of a two-unit nuclear reactor to Iran. Chinese officials say they see no reason not to sell Iran or any other signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear energy equipment and technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency, China asserts, has not provided evidence to sway China from its obligations.
—Steve Mufson, "Chinese Nuclear Officials See No Reason to Change Plans to Sell Reactor to Iran," The Washington Post, 18 May 1995, p. A22; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

18 May 1995
Vitaliy Konovalov, First Deputy Minister of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says Minatom has not signed any secret contracts with Iran for the sale of a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge. But he says Iran asked Russia to sell "nuclear high-technology" and to build a factory for producing nuclear fuel. "This request was specified in the protocol, which was signed by Minatom Minister Viktor Mikhailov following the result of one of his visits to Iran," Konovalov says. "This was merely Iran's request, and Russia did not assume any commitments." Konovalov says Russia does not intend to sell a gas centrifuge to Iran nor build a factory for producing nuclear fuel. "A country with one nuclear power station does not need such a factory," he says, adding that such a factory would only make economic sense if Iran had at least ten nuclear power plants. An unnamed Russian diplomat says Mikhailov did not secretly sign an agreement without permission of the Russian government, but rather merely signed the record of his January 1995 talks with Iranian officials in Tehran. But the diplomat says Mikhailov "displayed some autonomous actions because the issue of delivery of gas centrifuges, contrary to the issue of preparing [training] [nuclear] specialists, goes beyond the scope of the basic agreements signed with Iran in 1992." The diplomat says Mikhailov probably did not have the approval of the Russian government for such an agreement. [The existence of such a protocol seems to contradict the 11 May 1995 statement by Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that Iran never sought a gas centrifuge. It also seems to contradict the 12 May 1995 statement by Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy that Russia was never going to sell a centrifuge to Iran. See also 17 May 1995 entry for more on the protocol.] In an interview on Iranian television, Amrollahi says "there was no such thing called a centrifuge....What they have made such a hue and cry about is a pure lie and is merely a propaganda clamor to pretend that Clinton did not return empty-handed from Moscow....[Note: This is the same explanation given by the Iranian embassy in Germany. See 13 May 1995 entry.] Our agreement, which is about a power station, includes the fuel as well. Therefore, there was no fuel requirement for us to seek to enrich uranium....Our contract never included a centrifuge system." Amrollahi also says Iran plans to buy two 300MW reactors from China, the first of which will take seven years to build and install and the second eight years. [Note: See 21 and 30 May 1995 for more information on Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.]
—"Russian Ministry Denies Secret Nuclear Deal With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 18 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002956, 22 April 1997; "Diplomat on Factory Contract With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 18 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508002693, 8 May 1997; "Atomic Energy Head on Nuclear Program," IRIB Television Second Program Network (Tehran), 18 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950518000560, 18 May 1995.

18 May 1995
Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Ekho Moskvy (Moscow) reports that a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official said the Russian government would have prevented the transfer to centrifuges if the United States had not done so.
—"Yablokov: Nuclear Technology Sale To Iran 'Dangerous'," FBIS-SOV-95-091, 5 May 1995; Michael Mihalka, "Continuing Saga Of Gas Centrifuges To Iran," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 97 Part I, 19 May 1995.

18 May 1995
An Azeri news outlet, quoting "credible sources" in Moscow, says the reactors for Bushehr will be shipped from Russia to Iran through Armenia.
—"Nuclear Alliance Russia-Armenia-Iran," Turan (Baku), 18 May 1995; in "Nuclear Parts Said Shipped to Iran via Armenia," FBIS Document FTS19950518000454, 18 May 1995.

19 May 1995
US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns says the 100 Russian advisers provided to Iran to develop its nuclear technology capabilities could be used to build nuclear weapons.
—"US Voices Extreme Concern Over Russian Engineers in Iran," Agence France Presse, 19 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 May 1995
A Pakistani foreign office spokesman denies that Pakistan secretly cooperated with Iran in the nuclear field. "We had been cooperating with Iran just like with any other country under the aegis of International Atomic [Energy] Agency for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology," the spokesman says.
—"Spokesman Denies Reports of Nuclear Ties With Iran," The Frontier Post (Peshawar), 19 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950519000320, 19 May 1995.

21 May 1995
According to information from the Israeli embassy in India, India and Iran have agreed to cooperate in nuclear research and development, and India has sent nuclear experts to Iran.
—"Ben Kaspit and Hemi Shalev, "Israeli Paper Alleges Indo-Iran Nuclear Ties," Maariv (Tel Aviv), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000175, 21 May 1995.

21 May 1995
The Russian ambassador to Iran, Sergey M. Tretyakov, says Iran must pay 10% of the $1 billion Bushehr deal by the end of the year. "This is not a credit deal but a cash deal," Tretyakov says. "If the Iranians pay 10%, we will deliver 10% of the nuclear power plant." He says about 150 Russian scientists are doing feasibility studies at the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "It's a more difficult project because we have to finish the project on the basis of Germans," he says, referring to the German contractor that halted work on the plant in 1979.
—Chen Ming, "Russian Envoy Interviewed on Iran Reactor Sale," Xinhua (Beijing), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000015, 21 May 1995.

21 May 1995
Nuclear cooperation plans between Iran and China are near collapse, according to "an Iranian source." According to the source, "the recent talks in Beijing showed that the positions of the two sides were far apart." Iran and China had an understanding to sign an agreement this summer for the construction of two or three nuclear power stations, the source says, but that now seems unlikely, the source says. China cannot guarantee it can provide all the parts needed for the power plants, as some are made in Germany, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic. China is modifying its reactors to work without the foreign parts, but this will take four years. Also, Iran failed to give China detailed plans on how it would pay the 1.2 billion Pounds Sterling for China to begin work on the first two plants. China reportedly was not interested in payment with Iranian crude oil. Iranian sources say US opposition to Iran's nuclear program may also be a factor in delaying a deal. [Note: See 30 May 1995.]
—"Nuclear Plans With China Near Collapse," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000165, 21 May 1995.

22 May 1995
The Independent reports that Israel is considering whether to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Diplomacy thus far via the United States has failed to achieve what Israel believes is an appropriate response to Iran's increasing nuclear abilities. Israel conducted an attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1982, which was where Iraq had centralized its nuclear program. According to Israeli sources, security officials in Israel do not believe a similar attack to the one on Osirak would be successful, citing Iran's dispersed nuclear technology.
—Patrick Cockburn, "Israel Targets Iranian Nuclear Plants for Raids," The Independent, 22 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

22 May 1995
Agence France Presse reports that Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says Moscow and Iran have concluded a new nuclear accord that provides for plans to construct a pressurized water research reactor. Mikhailov says, "Moscow has no intention of reducing its cooperation with Iran in the area of the use of civilian nuclear energy and on the contrary will honor inter-governmental accords." Mikhailov says Russia plans to sign a contract by the end of the year to build a 40MW light water research reactor in Iran. Reports also indicate that the Iranian Majlis has allocated $700 million for the first stage of a contract for the construction of the research reactor.
—"Russia Announces New Nuclear Accord with Iran," Agence France Presse, 22 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Plans for Second Contract With Iran Revealed," Interfax (Moscow), 22 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950522000335, 22 May 1995; RIA News Agency, 22 May 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

23 May 1995
Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, says 20 to 40 Iranians will be trained in Russia.
—Michael Mihalka, "Russia To Continue Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Omri Daily Digest, 23 May 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

24 May 1995
A top German official says Iranian nuclear power plants would not be a threat to peace. "Plants placed at the disposal of Iran are not capable of producing atomic weapons," says Rainer Funke, parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Justice and member of the Bundestag.
—"German Official Holds Talks With Velayati; States Eagerness for 'Friendly Relations'," IRNA (Tehran), 24 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19950524000289, 24 May 1995.

24 May 1995
A Russian Foreign Ministry official says Russia will not recall its nuclear experts from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, despite fears expressed by US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns that they could be a source of "leaks of information on nuclear military technology." The unnamed diplomat says such leaks are prevented by the procedure Russia uses to select nuclear experts to send to Iran as well as the peaceful nature of their work in Iran. "It is more in the interest of Russia than...the United States that no new nuclear states should appear along the borders of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States," he says.
—Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, "Diplomatic Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 24 May 1995; in "Nuclear Specialists Not to Return From Iran," FBIS Document FTS19950524000371, 24 May 1995.

30 May 1995
The Russian ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says "we are convinced that Iran has no ambitions in the nuclear field." "Even if they had, I think it would take them 50 years," he says.
—Robert Fisk, "Russian Envoy Downplays Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," The Independent (London), 30 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002946, 22 April 1997.

30 May 1995
Asked by a Russian reporter why Iran needs a nuclear power plant when it is a major exporter of gas and oil, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, responds, "We are a developing country; we need to expand our energy base. You can't rely entirely on oil and gas alone." He says Iran is also building hydroelectric and thermal power stations, and hopes to get one-fifth of its energy from nuclear energy.
—Leonid Mlechin, "Iran is Happy That Yeltsin and Clinton Could Not Agree, and Offers Moscow Alliance and Friendship," Izvestiya (Moscow), 30 May 1995; in "Iran Hails Russian-US 'Confrontation,'" FBIS Document FTS19970422002948, 22 April 1997.

30 May 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says China has supplied Iran with one small research reactor and will supply another. [Note: Iran's planned nuclear cooperation with China seems to have been scaled back in recent days. On 18 May 1995, Amrollahi said Iran hoped to buy two or three nuclear power plants from China. See 21 May 1995 entry for a report that Iran's nuclear cooperation with China was near collapse. See 1 June 1995 for a report that Iran signed a deal for two new Chinese reactors.]
—Leonid Mlechin, "Iran is Happy That Yeltsin and Clinton Could Not Agree, and Offers Moscow Alliance and Friendship," Izvestiya (Moscow), 30 May 1995; in "Iran Hails Russian-US 'Confrontation'," FBIS Document FTS19970422002948, 22 April 1997.

1 June 1995
The Iran Brief reports that Iran has signed an agreement with China for the sale of nuclear power reactors, according to Iranian news sources. The two new reactors are expected to cost between $800 million and $900 million. Referring to previous oppositional sentiment expressed by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister, says, "There is no international law or international regulation or international agreement that prohibits such cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy." China has helped Iran in the past with construction of mining, milling, and enrichment facilities for Iran's uranium supplies, and began construction of a 27MW research reactor in Isfahan. [This probably refers to a 27kWt reactor that China built at Isfahan. The 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan by China but never realized should not be confused with the 27kWt Chinese-supplied reactor at Isfahan that went critical March 1994. For entries on the 27 kWt reactor, see 1991, September 1991, March 1994, and 7 September 1995. For entries on the 27MW reactor, see 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, and November 1991. See 30 May 1995 entry for a report that Iran was going to buy only one additional reactor from China.]
—"Chinese Reactor Sale Goes Forward," The Iran Brief, 1 June 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

1 June 1995
An Iranian radio station reports that Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Iran would open three more yellowcake milling facilities in addition to the one at Saghand. Two sites were identified as Bandar-e Abbas and Bandar-e Langeh.
—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," Jane's International Defense Review, September 1997, pp. 29-31.

2 June 1995
A report by Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, quotes the additional protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear contract of January 1995, showing that the two sides had in fact discussed the sale of a centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment and called for the signing of a contract within six months for the construction of a uranium silo. The protocol, signed by the heads of Iran's and Russia's atomic energy agencies, Reza Amrollahi and Viktor Mikhailov, also calls for a contract to be signed in the first quarter of 1995 for the delivery of 2,000 tons of natural uranium. [Note: The protocol contradicts Amrollahi's previous statement that Iran never sought a centrifuge. See 11 May 1995. Also, the uranium silos are probably the silos whose sale Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to cancel on 11 May 1995 because they represent a military aspect of the nuclear deal.] Yablokov also asserts that the Russia nuclear deal violates the 1992 framework agreement with Iran (Decree No. 592 of 17 August 1992), because that agreement called for the supply to Iran of two medium reactors VVER-440 [440MW], not the 1000MW VVER-1000 reactors.
—Aleksey Yablokov, "Atomic Energy Ministry Confused Its Own Interests With National Interests in Signing the Protocol with Iran," Izvestiya (Moscow), 2 June 1995; in "Iran Nuclear Deal Not in 'National Interest'," FBIS Document FTS19970423001537, 23 April 1997.

8-9 June 1995
Al-Sharq of Doha reports that during the Shah's rule, Iran "conducted studies and research in the nuclear field in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty." The report assumes "remnants" of past nuclear weapons design activity are still present in Iran, and says "it is possible that Iran has unassembled equipment, radioactive materials, and other devices it had bought." The report also states the 1991 Persian Gulf war may have convinced Iran of the need to obtain nuclear weapons for deterring any future aggression against it. However, because Iran gives the development and modernization of its army a higher priority than its nuclear weapons program, future nuclear weapons production will be "difficult to achieve." The report concludes: "Allowing Iran to obtain the technology for the production of nuclear weapons will not serve Russia's interests."
—"Iranian Nuclear Project, US-Russian Factors Analyzed," Al-Sharq (Doha), 8 June 1995-6 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 10 August 1995.

12 June 1995
At a meeting with leaders of the Group of Seven (G-7) Russian President Boris Yeltsin says the international community should be watchful of Iran's nuclear research activities. The leaders at the meeting agree to stop any assistance to Iran's civilian nuclear needs if Iran attempts to develop nuclear weapons.
—"G-7, Russia Concerned about Iran's Nuclear Intentions," Xinhua News Agency, 17 June 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

12 June 1995
Evgenii Mikerin, head of the Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities Directorate at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, says that the US opposition to the Russian-Iranian reactor deal stems from a desire to secure the Iranian market for itself. In support of his argument, Mikerin points to US intercession in North Korea, which resulted in the cancellation of a previously existing Russian-North Korean reactor deal. Mikerin stresses the particular importance of the Iranian deal as a means to keep Russian nuclear scientists, designers, and equipment manufacturers employed. According to Mikerin, Russia hopes to provide Iran with additional reactors and a complete fuel cycle in the future. According to Mikerin, Russia is to provide Iran with reactor fuel and reprocessing services, but Iran must accept the return of reprocessed materials, including waste products. The United States is threatening to terminate "certain bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements" and block Russian participation in the G-7 industrial forum unless Russia abandons the Bushehr deal. The United States is also warning Moscow that the deal could jeopardize current negotiations aimed at reaching a "broad nuclear cooperation agreement" for the creation of joint ventures to finance new Russian reactors. The cooperation agreement could also lead to the sale of up to $100 million in Russian nuclear equipment in the United States. Mikerin says that Russia would not work toward the implementation of disarmament agreements until the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission firmly settles issues surrounding the Iran deal. Once this has been achieved, Mikerin expects "an upswing in disarmament activities."
—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," Arms Control Today, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," Arms Control Today, May 1995, p. 23.

15 June 1995
Foreign Report reports that Russia and Iran are negotiating a "nuclear powered desalination plant" as part of the complex at Bushehr. The project, included in the January 1995 Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation agreement, would be the first of its kind outside of the former Soviet Union. Officials from the two countries have discussed the Russian APWS-40 desalination system and BN-350 reactor, produced by Russia's OKMB Mechanical Engineering.
—"Iran's Odd Reactor," Foreign Report, 15 June 1995, p. 24.

17 June 1995
The chairman's statement from the Group of Seven meeting in Halifax, Canada, which included Russian President Boris Yeltsin, calls "on all states to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability."
—"Reportage Continues on G-7 Halifax Summit; 'Text' of Chairman's Statement," Kyodo (Tokyo), 17 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970604001688, 4 June 1997.

17 June 1995
Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, says Russia will consider at the 29-30 June meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission a US recommendation that nuclear fuel supplied for the Bushehr nuclear power plant be no more than 20% enriched uranium. [See 11 May 1995 for more information on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.] He also says there are plans for Russia to conduct inspections anytime at the plant. He denies that Russia plans to build a plant for extracting uranium, but confirms that Iran asked for this, as recorded in the protocol of the talks in January 1995. [Note: This may contradict a statement by Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, on 11 May 1995 that Iran did not seek a gas centrifuge.] Mikhailov also says Iran has asked Russia to sell it 2,000 tons of natural uranium, but the two sides could not agree on a price. [Note: See 2 June 1995.]
—"Russia, US to Consider Nuclear Material Use," Interfax (Moscow), 17 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950617000072, 17 June 1995.

22 June 1995
Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani marks the completion of the first phase of a nuclear research center in Bonab, East Azerbaijan province, which reportedly can be used for radiating agricultural products. It was paid for with 306 billion Rials and $200,000 in foreign exchange disbursements.
—"Reportage on Iranian President Rafsanjani Visit; Nuclear Research Center Opened," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 22 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950622000242, 22 June 1995.

22 June 1995
Russian nuclear experts say it would be easier in some ways to build a new nuclear power plant at Bushehr than to finish the one left partially built by a German contractor. Russian experts inspecting the site say the main problem is the lack of documentation on the site, as the German contractor did not leave it all with Iran. As many as 220 Russian experts have been inspecting the site and collecting data for further design. This stage of work should be finished in June, says one Russian working at the site, after which about 50 to 60 Russian experts will remain at the site. Another problem, Russian experts say, is the plant's 1970s design does not meet current safety standards.
—Boris Konovalov, "Maybe Iran Does Want to Develop a Nuclear Bomb. But It Will Hardly Be Able to Do So in the Foreseeable Future," Izvestiya (Moscow), 22 June 1995; in "Iran Nuclear Details Not Yet Finalized."

22 June 1995
V.V. Krotov, general director of Atomredmetzoloto, says Iran asked his company to study Iran's potential for mining uranium. Krotov says Iran has two uranium deposits, but they would require a 300-meter-deep mine and would not be worth mining anywhere else in the world. This would only produce about 50 tons of uranium a year, he says, while the Bushehr plant would need three times that. Krotov says his company agreed to modify Iranian designs for a mine and a uranium-enrichment plant. "But there was no contract," he says, "only a protocol of intent to conduct negotiations." [Note: For more information on the protocol, see 5, 11, 17, and 18 May and 2 June 1995.]
—Boris Konovalov, "Maybe Iran Does Want to Develop a Nuclear Bomb; But It Will Hardly Be Able to Do So in the Foreseeable Future," Izvestiya (Moscow), 22 June 1995; in "Iran Nuclear Details Not Yet Finalized."

22 June 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, refutes Western allegations that assistance from Russia will result in the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. Amrollahi says Iran is "completely open to international monitoring" and will place "any facility" at the International Atomic Energy Agency's disposal for inspections at "any time."
—Boris Konovalov, "Paper: Iran Nuclear Deal Details Not Yet Finalized," Izvestiya (Moscow), 22 June 1995, p. 3; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 22 June 1995; Vadim Markushin, "Mehdi Safari: 'Iran Has An Abhorrence Of Nuclear Weapons'," Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 September 1995, p. 3; in "Iranian Envoy Comments On Bushehr Nuclear Agreement," FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-176, 12 September 1995.

26 June 1995
An unnamed high-ranking Russian diplomat denies that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which will meet 29-30 June, will make a secret agreement for when Russia will end military cooperation with Iran.
—Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, "Diplomatic Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 26 June 1995; in "Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Not to Sign Document on Iran," FBIS Document FTS19950626000230, 26 June 1995.

29 June 1995
At a meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin decide that Russia's nuclear deal with Iran will be discussed only in one-on-one meetings between the two. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says "an atomic power station with two or four units will be constructed and there is going to be no wavering about this."
—Igor Barsukov and Pavel Vanichkin, "Further on Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Meeting 'No Wavering' Over Iran Nuclear Deal," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 29 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950629000346, 29 June 1995.

30 June 1995
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and US Vice President Al Gore announce that they discussed in detail today the issue of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Chernomyrdin says many issues need to be discussed further and that Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran will not lead to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Gore says the United States will give Russia confidential information that shows why the United States is concerned with the deal.
—Igor Barsukov and Pavel Vanichkin, "Further on Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Meeting; Chernomyrdin, Gore Discuss Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 30 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950630000433, 30 June 1995.

30 June 1995
The Financial Times reports that in July 1995, the International Institute of Strategic Studies will release a research paper by Ahmed Hashim on the Iranian government's capability to gain and keep support for nuclear weapons development. Hashim, a senior official at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC claims "intense political factionalism" reduces Iran's capacity to develop nuclear weapons, because government must have the "ability to reach a consensus on the need for nuclearisation."
—Bruce Clark, "Divided Iran 'In Political And Economic Crisis'," Financial Times, 30 June 1995, p. 4.

July 1995
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy reports that four senior officials of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Information, including Minister Ali Fallahian, defect from Iran. [Note: Fallahian ran against President Khatami for the presidency of Iran in 2001 and as of 9 August 2002 was still in Iran. See 20 April 1995.]
—"Iran, Confronting Internal Chaos, Strengthens Defenses and Forges New Strategic Links," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, July-August 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

2 July 1995
Iranian President Rafsanjani says Iran does not have a nuclear weapon program and that this was verified by International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Rafsanjani believes that Russia should proceed with the sale of nuclear technology to Iran despite the "inappropriate" opposition from the United States.
—"US Vice President Leaves Russia After Visit," Reuters (Moscow), 1 July 1995; in Executive News Service, 1 July 1995; "Iran Expects Russian Nuclear Deal To Go Ahead," Reuters (Washington), 2 July 1995; in Executive News Service, 3 July 1995.

3 July 1995
At a press conference in Moscow, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix says that IAEA inspections did not detect any evidence of nuclear-military programs in Iran. Blix says that he does not view US opposition to the Russian-Iranian agreement as interference in the internal affairs of the two countries, and that "such contracts must be open to the public, since it is the matter of nuclear safety for many countries." According to Blix, new restrictions "on selling nuclear materials or technologies for their production" are complicating current discussions between Russia and the US on Russian sales of enriched uranium and the Russian-Iranian deal. The restrictions did not exist when Russia and Iran signed the agreement in early 1995. Under the Russian-Iranian agreement, the first VVER-1000 type [1000MW] reactor should be activated by the year 2000.
—Yuri Kozlov, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 4 July 1995; Veronika Romanenkova, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, Offers To Supervise Iran Construction," ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, No Traces Of 'Military Programs' In Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; Anna Bakina, "Nuclear Energy Minister On Talks With Blix," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-131, 7 July 1995.

4 July 1995
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix meets with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Moscow. Kozyrev states that Russia welcomes IAEA supervision of Russian programs to construct nuclear reactors in Iran, India, and elsewhere. Blix says that the IAEA is ready to oversee implementation of the Russian-Iran agreement on the completion of the nuclear power station in Bushehr. According to Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, Russian supervision of the construction of "two to four sets" at Bushehr may be increased.
—Yuri Kozlov, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 4 July 1995; Veronika Romanenkova, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, Offers To Supervise Iran Construction," ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, No Traces Of 'Military Programs' In Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; Anna Bakina, "Nuclear Energy Minister On Talks With Blix," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-131, 7 July 1995.

5 July 1995
ITAR-TASS reports that Iranian and Russian nuclear experts are scheduled to meet this week to discuss fuel options for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The experts will choose between two Russian nuclear fuel plants, one at Elektrostal and the other at Novosibirsk. The provision of fuel is part of Russia's January nuclear deal with Iran.
—Veronika Romanenkova, "Russian, Iranian Nuclear Experts To Discuss Fuel Supplies," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970417001361, 17 April 1997.

7 July 1995
China plans to supply Iran with nuclear reactors, scientific and technical training, expertise and components for missile production, and materials relevant to chemical weapons production. According to Western intelligence sources, China already supplies Iran with its "strongest and biggest nuclear backing."
—Aluf Ben, "Maneuvering Between Giants," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 7 July 1995, p. B1; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-133, 7 July 1995.

8 July 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says the United States is welcome to submit a proposal for control of nuclear activity at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Mikhailov, Iranian Official Discuss Reactor Further on Mikhailov Comments," IRNA (Tehran), 8 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950708000330, 8 July 1995.

9 July 1995
Kazakhstani and US officials report that in 1992-1993 Iran was seeking an agreement with Kazakhstan on purchases of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and beryllium metal from the Ust-Kamenogorsk fuel fabrication facility. According to Ergali Bayadilov, Director General of the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency, Iran wanted to purchase safeguarded LEU to fuel the soon-to-be supplied Russian VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor. The Ust-Kamenogorsk facility produces UO2 pellets for Soviet-design VVER-1000 reactors. Kazakstan's "chief official for nuclear materials accounting and control" and US officials says that there was no substance to media reports that Iran had sought to smuggle or steal over 500kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Ust-Kamenogorsk, material that was later transferred to the United States in "Project Sapphire" [also referred to as Operation Sapphire]. According to a US official, the HEU, which had been intended for use as fuel in Soviet submarines, remained in storage at the Ust-Kamenogorsk site because the facility does not have the capacity to process HEU into LEU. US officials also say that Iran was interested in purchasing beryllium from a metal processing plant located near the Ust-Kamenogorsk fuel fabricating facility. Iran might have used the beryllium in research reactors to be supplied later by Russia. However, the Ust-Kamenogorsk beryllium is pure enough to be utilized in nuclear and missile programs as well. [Note: See 1992 entry.]
—Mark Hibbs, "Kazakhs Say Iran Sought LEU For VVER, Not 'Sapphire' HEU," Nuclear Fuel, 17 July 1995, pp. 11-12.

11 July 1995
Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says, "The American people should rest assured that we are not pursuing, not on the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. The benefits of nuclear technology, of course, are numerous, and we cannot forgo other uses of peaceful nuclear technology."
—"Rafsanjani Views US, Other Issues," IRNA (Tehran), 11 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950711000440, 11 July 1995.

13 July 1995
The Russian Federal Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk makes public that it has developed a technique using environmental monitoring that can expose clandestine nuclear weapons manufacturing around the world. According to Snezhinsk nuclear scientists, the new method has a "100% certainty of detection," and allows them to "distinguish between peaceful and military activities." The new technique will reportedly help identify whether or not countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea maintain undeclared nuclear weapons programs.
—Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), 8 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-131, 8 July 1995, "IAEA Delegation Visits Center in Snezhinsk."; "Unique Method Will Identify Nuclear Weapons," Russian Television Network (Moscow), 13 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-142, 13 July 1995.

29 July 1995
The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard division, identified as H. Tanei, says in a letter to Iran's IAEA mission that there is no evidence Iran has received nuclear materials.
—"IAEA Said Unable to Verify Nuclear Material," IRNA (Tehran), 29 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950729000407, 29 July 1995.

August 1995
Russia signs a contract with Iran to sell two VVER 440MW reactors that use enriched uranium, which Iran needs for nuclear weapons development. [Note: ITAR-TASS reports that a deal is signed on 5 September 1995 for two 440MW reactors. See 5 September 1995 entry. See 29 August 1995 for the denial by Russian and Iranian officials of a deal for additional reactors.] The reactors will probably be installed at the Neka complex, which was unknown to the International Atomic Energy Agency before now. Iran and Russia insist that there are no illicit activities involved in the reactor transactions. The IAEA maintains that Iran's recent activities do not signal a move in a dangerous direction, but others contend that the IAEA is repeating the same error it made with Iraq. The deal is made after a visit to Moscow by an Iranian delegation, and it is signed during a reciprocal visit by a Russian delegation to Tehran later in August. [Note: This probably refers to the Russian delegation to Iran led by Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov. See 17 August 1995 entry.] The Iranian delegation, which included Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, and Sayyid Mohammed Rasuli, head of the Isfahan Nuclear Center, went to Moscow to work out details concerning the Iranian-Russian deal for the completion of two reactors at Iran's Bushehr power plant. [Note: See 7 August 1995 entry for more on the meeting.] The Sunday Telegraph of London reports that the Neka facility, located in an underground bunker, "is one of a network of highly sensitive Iranian nuclear research establishments," and a part of Iran's nuclear weapons program, dubbed "The Great Secret Project." US State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns says the State Department cannot confirm reports about the Neka deal, stating that "We have seen the reports...We can't confirm them; we don't have independent verification of them." According to an unnamed US official, the Clinton administration was unaware of the Neka deal, but will conduct an investigation.
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1995-August 1995, pp. 21-26; Con Coughlin, "Unveiled: Iran's Bomb Plans," Sunday Telegraph, 24 September 1995; Con Coughlin, "Russia Set To Sell 2 Nuclear Reactors To Iranian Regime," Washington Times, 28 August 1995, pp. A1, A18; Martin Sieff, "Report Of Reactor Sale Leads To Probe," Washington Times, 29 August 1995, p. A7.

August 1995
South African Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo announces South Africa has concluded a bilateral agreement with Iran to establish nuclear technology assistance "for peaceful purposes." Nzo says South Africa's cooperation with Iran is "within the scope" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General Zvi Mazael says he will inform Nzo that the South African agreement constitutes a violation of the US embargo on Iran.
—"South African FM To Visit Israel," UPI, 12 September 1995; in Executive News Service, 12 September 1995; "Sale Of Nuclear Secrets To Iran Denied, "SAFM Radio Network (Johannesburg), 22 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 22 August 1995.

August 1995
After quarterly International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iranian nuclear complexes over the past year, IAEA spokesman David Kyd reports that the inspectors "haven't seen anything to indicate" Iran has a nuclear weapons program. According to one US official, "there has been no material breach of the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] treaty per se." However, Kyd notes, "We don't give the Iranians a clean bill of health; we just haven't seen anything to indicate otherwise." The IAEA intends to implement new, "stronger" inspection measures, called the "93+2" program. Under the new program, the IAEA will ask countries for more detailed nuclear import and export reports and the authorization to install "special monitoring equipment...that would trigger an alarm in Vienna" in case of nuclear activity at a site. The program will be used only at nuclear facilities the IAEA has permission to inspect. Kyd says Iran is expected to accept the new program if it is approved by the Board of Governors and if all other countries are subject to the same safeguards.
—"IAEA Seeks Enhanced Inspections In Iran," Risk Report, August 1995, p. 5.

August 1995
US officials say Iran needs eight to ten years to develop a nuclear bomb
—"A Nuclear Race Between Iraq, Iran and Libya?," Risk Report, August 1995, p. 5.

August 1995
Priroda of Moscow publishes an interview with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov in which he discusses in detail Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Mikhailov says Russia's nuclear contract with Iran does not violate the 1992 framework agreement. He says the agreement refers to "average-capacity" reactors, not any specific wattage, "so we have no violation of the agreement." [Note: Mikhailov's comments on this matter appear to be in response to an article by Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety. See 2 June 1995.] According to Mikhailov, the German Siemens firm completed 70% of the work on the first reactor at Bushehr and 45% of the second reactor. [Note: In January, an Iranian official said the reactors were 90 and 60% complete, respectively. See 7 January 1995.] Mikhailov says there are two research reactors operating in Iran, one built by the Chinese and the other built by the United States. He also says Iran has four nuclear facilities that produce isotopes for agriculture and medicine. Mikhailov asserts it would be economical for Iran to extract its own uranium, but its ore reserves are complex with little uranium content. He says Iran approached Russia about building a uranium mine, and Russia replied that the establishment of a fuel cycle including extraction and enrichment of uranium should be discussed after at least two of the reactors at Bushehr are finished. Russia has a $1 million contract with Iran, he says, to examine how Iranian uranium can be best processed. The contract expires at the end of the month, he says, and he expects it to be terminated. Mikhailov says the Russian government authorized the sale of 2,000 tons of uranium to Iran, but the authorization expires at the end of the year and Russia and Iran have not been able to agree on a price. "It is unfortunate that we could not conclude a contract," Mikhailov says. "They insisted on their low prices. Perhaps because they do not have any special need for uranium at present." [Note: It is not clear from the interview when the Russian government authorized the sale of uranium, perhaps as part of the framework agreement in 1992 or as part of the 1995 contract.] Russia asked Iran why it needed that amount of uranium, Mikhailov says, to which Iran replied that "they wanted to have customer-supplied raw materials to supply research reactors with fuel."
—I.N. Arutyunyan, "Nuclear Cooperation with Iran: The View From Ordynka," August 1995, Priroda (Moscow); in "Mikhailov Interview on Iran Nuclear Deal," FBIS Document FTS19970326001456, 26 March 1997.

1 August 1995
At a meeting of the ASEAN security forum in Brunei, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher tells Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev that the United States sees no changes in Iran's policy that lessen concerns about its possible work on nuclear arms. Kozyrev responds that Russia understands the US concerns and that the issue should be reviewed further in talks between the United States and Russia. But he says Russia has no proof Iran is creating nuclear arms.
—"Further on Kozyrev, Christopher Talks in Brunei; US Urges Halting Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 1 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950801000496, 1 August 1995.

5 August 1995
Janes Defence Weekly reports that more than 25 nations, including the United States, Russia, and Eastern European countries, are scheduled to meet in Paris under the umbrella organization, New Forum, to discuss military and dual-use export regulations and related topics such as pre-notification. The United States has made pre-conference proposals calling for a ban on sales of nuclear related items to Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and for multilateral negotiations regarding sensitive dual-use items. Russia's membership in the New Forum, the successor organization to COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), was recently approved after Russia agreed to conclude arms sales to Iran currently in progress, but not to undertake any further trade with Iran. Membership in the New Forum demands accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as agreement to abide by chemical and biological weapons accords, but does not allow states a unilateral right to veto a given export.
—Barbara Starr, "Nations Meet To Discuss New Forum For COCOM," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 August 1995, p. 5.

7 August 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov meets with an Iranian delegation. Both sides agree that a plan for funding construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant should be concluded as soon as possible. A survey of the site by Russian experts will be finished in August or September. A Russian official says Russia and Iran will soon sign amendments to the January 1995 nuclear contract. The most significant amendment, says Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Lev Ryabev, is a provision for used nuclear fuel to be returned to Russia, where it will be processed at the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region, and temporarily stored at the ore-dressing plant in Krasnoyarsk-26.
—Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, "Diplomatic Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 7 August 1995; in "Nuclear Energy Ministry Delegation to Visit Iran; Project to Proceed After Amendments," FBIS Document FTS19950807000360, 7 August 1995; "Talks Move Onto Practical Level," Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 9 August 1995; in "Atomic Energy Minister, Iranian Team Discuss Bushehr Plans," FBIS Document FTS19950809000010, 9 August 1995.

8 August 1995
A Belarusian Foreign Ministry senior official refutes charges that Belarus may participate in nuclear deals with Iran. The senior official says, "The sales of nuclear arms components or technological cooperation in that area have never been mentioned." [Note: See similar statements in Late 1997 and 13 March 1998 and contradictory information in December 2001.]
—"Chyhir On Arms Supply For Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 8 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 8 August 1995.

9 August 1995
Israeli television reports that Iran has been attempting to infiltrate Israel's Dimona nuclear complex in order to obtain information about the facility. The Iranians reportedly "recruit people and infiltrate them as innocent workers in the nuclear reactor."
—Roni Daniye, "Iran 'Trying to Recruit' Assassins To Kill Rabin," Channel 2 Television Network (Jerusalem), 9 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-154, 9 August 1995.

9 August 1995
The Jerusalem Post reports that Russia will continue with plans to construct a nuclear power station in Iran, but will require that Iran return spent fuel from the light water reactors it will use in the plant at Bushehr.
—"Russia, Iran Talk Nukes," The Jerusalem Post, 9 August 1995, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

15 August 1995
At a George Washington University forum entitled "Preventing Super-Terrorism," leading Israeli nuclear physicist Yuval Neeman recommends that Israel "should abandon its present stance and explicitly go nuclear" if Tehran obtains a nuclear bomb. Asserting that an Iranian nuclear capability would place the world "on the brink of a new holocaust," Neeman argues that Israel would need a credible and effective second strike capability in order to deter the nuclear threat from Iran.
—"Neeman Ponders Iranian Nuclear Threat," Iran Brief, 9 October 1995, p. 3.

17 August 1995
A Russian delegation led by Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov visits Tehran to partially renegotiate the January 1995 contract providing for the construction of Bushehr nuclear power station's first unit in Iran. In particular, Minatom seeks to guarantee that Russian nuclear fuel burned in Iranian reactors will be returned to Russia as spent fuel for reprocessing. According to the contract, Russia will begin supplying fuel when the power station is completed in 2001, and will continue for 30 years. The installation of the Russian VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor, shipment of the fuel, and loading the fuel into the reactor will be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Intending to develop closer relations with Russia, Iran expresses interest in building a second unit at Bushehr using another 1,000MW VVER-1000 light water reactor (LWR), and a third and fourth unit employing 440MW VVER-440 reactors. Successful talks may prompt amendments to the original contract, potentially raising the contract's estimated cost to over $800 million.
—"Minatom Tries To Raise The Cost Of The Deal With Iran," Segodnya, 18 August 1995, p. 3; Interfax, Aleksei Kondratyev, "'Repercussions' of Nuclear Deal With Iran Viewed," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 8 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-153, 8 August 1995; Anna Bakina, "Nuclear Energy Ministry Delegation To Visit Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-152, 7 August 1995; Segodnya, "Russian Minatom Delegation Will Visit Iran," 15 August 1995, p. 1.

18 August 1995
Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is planned to begin in November or December. [Note: He may be referring to the beginning of construction on two additional proposed reactors, not the original reactor. See 5 September 1995 entry for a similar statement by a Russian official.] Nearly 200 Russian scientists have been working on the reactor since January, and 3,000 additional workers are to be part of the contingency as well.
—Oleg Kuzmin, "Team to Discuss 'Peaceful' Nuclear Use With Iran Power Plant Construction in November," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950818000196, 18 August 1995; "Russian: Nuclear Plant Construction to Begin within Three Months," The Associated Press, 20 August 1995, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

19 August 1995
South African Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha says that March 1995 talks with Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, had covered a previously discarded scheme for South Africa to sell enriched uranium to Iran. [Note: See March 1995 entry.]
—Edyth Bulbring, "US Concerns Over Nuclear Links With Iran Viewed," Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 20 August 1995, p. 2; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 20 August 1995.

20 August 1995
The United States urges the South African government not to share nuclear-related information with Iran. The United States concern was raised by a March 1995 meeting on nuclear issues between South African Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Acting on British and German information regarding Iran's military ambitions, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo wrote in an unsent 13 April 1995 letter to Botha, "I believe any cooperation in the nuclear field between Iran and South Africa has the potential to damage our international reputation as a responsible possessor of advanced technologies." The letter was never sent because of the belief that talks focused only on nuclear medical isotopes. [Note: On 19 August 1995, Botha said that talks with Amrollahi had also covered a previously discarded scheme for South Africa to sell enriched uranium to Iran.]
—Edyth Bulbring, "US Concerns Over Nuclear Links With Iran Viewed," Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 20 August 1995, p. 2; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 20 August 1995.

21 August 1995
South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo denies reports that his country is giving nuclear secrets to Iran, but that the cooperation is within the scope of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. "What was at stake was isotopes for peaceful purposes," he says. The two countries concluded a nuclear technology deal involving isotopes for the use of peaceful purposes. [Note: See March, 19 August, and 20 August 1995 entries for more on Iran-South African nuclear cooperation.]
—"First Shipment of Iranian Oil to Arrive in Aug; Nzo Denies RSA Selling Nuclear Secrets," SAFM Radio Network (Johannesburg), 22 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950822000239, 22 August 1995; Reuters, 21 August 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

24 August 1995
Atomic Energy Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov signs an extension to a January 1995 contract with Iran. The contract is amended to include the supply of Russian nuclear fuel to Iran for 10 years. The amendment adds $300 million to the $800 million Russian- Iranian nuclear power contract. The nuclear fuel will be provided by the Novobinsk nuclear plant and returned for reprocessing and storage at the RT-2 nuclear facility in Zhelenogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26). In response to allegations that Russia may secretly provide Iran with nuclear technologies, Russian Nuclear Power Minister Viktor Mikhailov explains that there is only one contract, signed between Russia and Iran for sale of one VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor and the provision of its nuclear fuel supply. [Note: See 29 August 1995 entry for a similar statement by Mikhailov and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that only one contract exists.] Mikhailov adds that the contract includes "the eventual supply of up to four reactors for the Bushehr site." [Note: On 29 April 1995, Mikhailov says there is only one contract for the construction of the first reactor at Bushehr.] Mikhailov, however, is uncertain about a time frame for the signing of contracts for the additional units.
—"Russian Contract Extended To Fuel," 1 October 1995, Nuclear News, October 1995, p. 47; "Delegation In Iran Signs Contract on Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 24 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950824000462, 24 August 1995.

28 August 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says Iran will pay the ministry $20 million this year for the work of Russian experts at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—"Iran to Pay $20 Million For Bushehr Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 28 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950828000405, 28 August 1995.

29 August 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov deny a report of a secret deal to build two nuclear reactors in Iran. "There is in face just one contract," Mikhailov says, "to finish the construction of the first reactor unit at Bushehr--and the work is scheduled to be completed in four-and-one-half years." [Note: See August and 5 September 1995 entries for reports that a deal was signed for two 440MW reactors.]
—Anna Bakina, "Moscow Denies Secret Nuclear Deals With Iran; Minister Calls Report 'Disgraceful,'" 29 August 1995, ITAR-TASS; in FBIS Document FTS19950829000226, 29 August 1995; "Nuclear Energy Official Denies Deal With Russia," IRNA (Tehran), 29 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950829000219, 29 August 1995.

30 August 1995
Waldo Stumpf, of the South African Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), assures a US delegation led by Hazel O' Leary, US Energy Secretary, that South Africa will not provide nuclear weapons technology to Iran.
—"South Africa; Atomic Energy Body Tells USA Nuclear Weapons Know-How will not by Sold to Iran," British Broadcasting Corporation, 30 August 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.

September 1995
Risk Report states that pro-Israeli lobbying organizations such as the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) view the United States as the key to halting Iranian nuclear development, and have been urging legislation to penalize foreign companies trading with Iran. In April 1995, AIPAC supported a bill by US Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) to ban trade between US companies and firms abroad known to export sensitive technology to Iran and Libya. One Pentagon official observes that this legislation "scared the White House to death," prompting a ban on trade with Iran. [Note: See 30 April 1995.] Fearing a nuclear-capable Iran, an anonymous Israeli government analyst explains that "in strategic terms, Iran has become the most important threat" to Israeli security. Efraim Kam, a political observer at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for International Studies, contends that the threat from Iran will grow in the near future due to the end of the Iran-Iraq War and because "Iran is run by a radical regime that desires to change the status quo."
—"Israelis See Iran As A Nuclear Menace," Risk Report, September 1995, p. 9.

September 1995
Eduard Akopyan, the director of the All-Russian Industrial Association Zarubezhatomenergostroy (company for nuclear power engineering abroad), states that Russia will provide Iran with the results of an assessment of the incomplete Bushehr nuclear station and construction designs of Unit 1. In October 1995, a $800 million contract for the completion of the first 1,000MW reactor will officially enter into force. Russia will have 55 months to complete the construction of Unit 1. Spent fuel from the reactor will be returned to Russia for reprocessing, with the vitrified waste returned to Iran. If the project is successful, the contract will be extended to include the completion of Bushehr-2. [Note: This may conform with a 7 September 1995 statement by a Russian official that a second and third reactor will be built at Bushehr only after the completion of the first reactor. Also, on 24 August 1994, Viktor Mikhailov, Russian minister of atomic energy, said the amended Iranian-Russian nuclear contract may call for the eventual construction of up to four reactors.] Due to seismological instability, Russia and Iran decided to relocate to Bushehr two VVER-440 [440MW light water] nuclear reactors originally planned for a site in northern Iran. He adds that Russia has not signed a secret contract for military nuclear cooperation with Iran and all contracts are for strict peaceful use and that they are all under strict IAEA control.
—Boris Konovalov, Nucleonics Week, "Russia On Track To Restart Work On Iran's Bushehr-1 In October," 7 September 1995, pp. 7-8; Interfax, 5 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

September 1995
Risk Report reports that Western intelligence sources said Iran has obtained gas centrifuge design data and is now seeking component technology that will enable its military to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapons program. Particularly worrying, said senior US officials, according to the report, is a potential deal between China and Iran which would see the transfer of a "turnkey" facility to convert uranium to hexafluoride gas. Centrifuges use hexafluoride gas to enrich uranium. Iran has already received Chinese assistance in mining, purification, and fuel fabrication. US officials said that given the fact that reactor-grade uranium is easily obtainable in the world market there is no rationale for Iran's efforts to build or acquire centrifuges other than a nuclear weapons program. "Foreign officials" said Iran has been trying to buy a fluorine production plant from France. Hexafluoride gas production requires fluorine. Iran is said to have attempted, without success, to purchase fluorine in 1991 for the Sharif University of Technology. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran disclosed that Iran is trying to exploit its own uranium sources in the Saghand region of Yazd province, although a February 1992 inspection revealed there were fewer than two dozen workers operating drilling rigs at the site. Also, it is reported that Iran wants to buy 2,000 tons of Russian natural uranium, ostensibly for the Bushehr reactor project. As the Bushehr reactors are not expected to use natural uranium, US officials express concern that the uranium is actually destined to be enriched and used in bombs. The US officials raised similar concerns in connection with the visits of Iranians to Kazakhstan during 1992-93 to buy low-enriched uranium.
—"Iran's Phantom Bomb," Risk Report, September 1995, vol. 1, No. 7, pp. 1, 3-4.

3 September 1995
Israeli television reports that Israel and Russia secretly reached an agreement "on restricting Iran's nuclear option." Russia pledged to monitor the reactors it will export to Iran in order to prevent the use of the installations for military purposes. Russia also agreed to "keep Israel briefed" about the issue.
—Qobi Marenk, "'Secret' Accord With Russia On Iranian Nuclear Options," Channel 2 Television Network (Jerusalem), 3 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-171, 3 September 1995.

5 September 1995
Russia and Iran sign a contract for the construction of two additional reactors at Bushehr. According to an official of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, they will be light water VVER-440 [440MW] nuclear reactors, and construction will begin in November. [Note: Other sources report that the deal was signed in August 1995. See August 1995 entry. Russian and Iranian officials have made and will make several confusing remarks about the deal. See 24, 29 August, 7, and 12 September 1995 entries.]
—"Veronika Romanenkova, "Daily Views 'New Details' of Iranian Nuclear Deal; Plans for Two More Reactors Noted," ITAR-TASS, 5 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950905000370, 5 September 1995.

5 September 1995
Eduard Akopyan, head of the Zarubezhatomenergostroy company for nuclear power engineering abroad, says that "all contracts will Iran are exclusively peaceful and do not differ from dozens of contracts with other states."
—Interfax, 5 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

5 September 1995
Mikhail Fedorov, the chairman of the Ministry of Atomic Energy committee for international relations, says that Russia will have to open a scientific research center in Iran in order to realize the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Reportedly, the center will have a model reactor to train Iranian specialists. Negotiations for this center are in progress.
—Interfax, 5 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

6 September 1995
Russia confirms that work is to begin on a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. [Note: A Russian official said on 18 August 1995 that construction would begin in November or December.]
—"Russia Confirms Bushehr Construction Commencement," IRNA, 6 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950906000388, 6 September 1995.

6 September 1995
US officials say Russia has notified the United States that it will go ahead with the export of up to four nuclear reactors to Iran, ignoring US requests to cancel the deal because of proliferation concerns. US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns says Russian leaders could not "have failed to understand our position...[that any sale would] be a very serious issue." An aide to Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman Mitch McConnell says McConnell is "actively considering" preventing approval for a proposed $250 million in economic aid to Russia for FY 1996 on account of the reactor agreement. However, the Nunn-Lugar program, whereby the United States provides funding for the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons, would not be affected by the move. The Clinton administration opposes linking the reactor deal with economic aid, arguing that the reactor deal promises much greater economic rewards [to Russia] ($1 billion) than the aid package.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Russia Tells US It's Going ahead With Sale To Iran Of Up To 4 Nuclear Reactors," Washington Post, 7 September 1995, p. A33.

7 September 1995
A report released today by the Natural Resources Defense Council says Iran has two operating reactors that are suitable for plutonium production: the 5MWt reactor at Teheran University and the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. The Teheran University reactor can produce 600g of plutonium per year. Although the reactor's highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, the spent fuel derived from it is low in plutonium content and therefore is not of proliferation concern. To produce sufficient plutonium for a nuclear weapon, Iran would have to set aside several years' worth of spent fuel, which is in violation of its commitments under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Isfahan research reactor is only 27kW, and its output is insignificant. Three Iranian plants are suspected of conducting uranium enrichment research: the Sharif University of Technology, the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, and the Karaj Nuclear Medical Research Center. IAEA inspectors believe that a calutron at Karaj is a 1 milliampere device, suitable only for medical purposes; including zinc separation. In contrast, Iraq employed 600 milliampere calutrons for its nuclear weapons program. The Karaj calutron could be comparable to the China Institute of Atomic Energy's (CIAE's) F1 separator, which "has a beam operating in the range of hundreds of microamperes to several milliamperes." The F1 can enrich uranium to 36%, and is capable of separating lithium, potassium, rubidium, silver, neodymium, samarium, gadolinium, and erbium. Although the F1 is unsuitable for the separation of zinc, the CIAE's F2 and F3 versions, with "tens to hundreds of milliamperes of beam current," are believed to be capable of conducting zinc separation.
—David A. Schwarzbach, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Energy Or Weapons," Iran's Nuclear Program: Energy Or Weapons, Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 7 September 1995.

7 September 1995
Izvestigya of Moscow reports that work is to begin on the second and third reactors at Bushehr (the type VVER-440 [440MW] reactors) only after the first reactor (the type VVER-1000 [1000MW light water] reactor) is complete. [Note: This contradicts a Russian official who said work would begin on the second and third reactors in November 1995. See 5 September 1995.]
—Aleksey Portanskiy, "First Nuclear Contract With Iran Designed to Run for 55 Months," Izvestiya (Moscow), 7 September 1995; in "No 'Military Orientation' in Iran Nuclear Projects," FBIS Document FTS19950907000208, 7 September 1995.

10 September 1995
The Iranian ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, says "Tehran will sign no other contracts to build nuclear stations" after the 8 January 1995 contract with Russia to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says Iran is "firmly opposed to atomic and other destructive weapons," and that its nuclear program is only because of "limited oil resources."
—Agence France Presse, 10 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

11 September 1995
Michael Eisenstadt, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy testifies before the US House International Relations Committee that despite the widespread belief that Iran's nuclear program is "in its early stages," US, Russian, German, and Israeli intelligence services are convinced that Iran is attempting to obtain nuclear weapons. He testifies that Iran may need approximately five to seven years to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. However, CIA officials estimate that if Iran has access to fissile material and assistance from abroad, it is likely to achieve a nuclear weapons capability in eight to ten years. Assistance from China and Russia in obtaining fissile materials and nuclear technologies may very likely accelerate an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, a 1993 estimate by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service states that Iran could not acquire a nuclear weapons capability in less than ten years, even with the necessary funds and foreign assistance.
—"Prepared Testimony of Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Before The House International Relations Committee. Iran's Military Capabilities and Intentions: An Assessment," Congressional Hearing, 11 September 1995.

12 September 1995
South Africa's Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha denies the existence of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran.
—"Minister Says No Nuclear Accord with Iran," SAPA (Johannesburg), 12 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950912000066, 12 September 1995.

12 September 1995
A foreign assistance budget that would prohibit any future US aid to countries which agree to assist Iran in developing nuclear related capabilities was passed by a US Senate Appropriations subcommittee. On 8 June 1995, the US House of Representatives passed a similar amendment to the American Overseas Interests Act (H.R. 1561) stipulating an automatic cut-off of foreign assistance to any state that supplies Iran with nuclear reactor technology. The Clinton administration has said it would veto the bill. The foreign assistance budget also allocates $16.5 million to the FBI to "counter" nuclear smuggling in the former Soviet Union.
—David Rogers, "GOP Proposes Halting Aid To Russia If Moscow Keeps Nuclear Ties To Iran," Wall Street Journal, 13 September 1995, p. A5.

12 September 1995
Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Safari declares to Russian journalists that Iran does not intend to build nuclear weapons, and added that the Bushehr nuclear power station will be Iran's "first and last." [Note: See 10 September 1995 entry for a similar statement by Safari.]
—Boris Konovalov, "Paper: Iran Nuclear Deal Details Not Yet Finalized," Izvestiya (Moscow), 22 June 1995, p. 3; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 22 June 1995; Vadim Markushin, "Mehdi Safari: 'Iran Has An Abhorrence Of Nuclear Weapons'," Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 September 1995, p. 3; in "Iranian Envoy Comments On Bushehr Nuclear Agreement," FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-176, 12 September 1995.

12 September 1995
Chinese ambassador to Iran, Huali Ming, says that China and Iran are negotiating the financial terms for the sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran. The total cost of the project is estimated at $800 million, but according to Chinese sources, Iran's economic difficulties are preventing it from covering the costs.
—Agence France Presse, 12 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

13 September 1995
Work will begin on the first reactor at Bushehr in one month, according to the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry. [Note: A report on 6 September 1995 said work had already begun, but have been only feasibility studies and assessments of the site.]
—"Bushehr Nuclear Plant to Begin Construction," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950913000348, 13 September 1995.

13 September 1995
The Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, while in Kiev, is assured that Ukraine is not selling Iran nuclear technology or equipment.
—Shim'on Schiffe, "Rabin On Extradition, Iranian Nuclear Ties," Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 13 September 1995, pp. 1, 19; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-177, 13 September 1995.

14 September 1995
In a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in Moscow, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin criticizes the sale of Russian reactors to Iran. In response, Kozyrev explains that the "peaceful" Russian-Iranian agreement complies with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requirements, and pointed out that, unlike Israel, Iran has signed the NPT. Consequently, Russian-Iranian cooperation poses no threat to Israeli security. "We have reliable information that Iran is not planning to make nuclear weapons," a Russian Atomic Energy Ministry senior official says in an interview with Interfax. After meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Rabin says if the United States could not convince Russia to drop the deal with Iran, Israel had very little chance to do so. Israel is ready to make economic concessions if Russia cancels its nuclear contract with Iran, but Russian officials rejected this possibility.
—"Reactor Is For Peaceful Use By Iran, Russians Tell Rabin," International Herald Tribune, 15 September 1995; "Rabin Fails To Sway Russia On Reactors For Iran," Financial Times, 15 September 1995; "Moscow Bridles Against Accusations," Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 September 1995, p. 1; "Rabin Has Not Closed Nuclear Plant In Bushehr," Aleksei Chukurov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 16 September 1995, p. 1.

14 September 1995
South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo states that South Africa "has not entered into any agreement concerning nuclear cooperation with Iran." The Israeli newspaper Maariv reports that a "high-ranking South African source" said South African nuclear assistance to Iran would not be of "military use."
—"South African 'Source' On Nuclear Aid To Iran," David Makovsky, Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem), 14 September 1995, p. 1; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-178, 14 September 1995.

15 September 1995
In a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin says, "We understand Iranian nuclear aspirations, and I can assure you that we are aware of everything because Iran is our neighbor. That is why we will not allow our know-how and technology to be used for the production of nuclear weapons."
—"Rabin Fears of Iran Nuclear Ambitions 'Groundless' Vows Not to 'Neutralize' Nuclear Site," Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 15 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950915000163, 15 September 1995.

15 September 1995
The Washington Times reports that the US government fears that new relations between the Russian intelligence services and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) may involve "disclosures" of classified CIA information on Iran's nuclear weapons program that was presented to Russia in spring 1995. US intelligence about Iranian attempts to obtain technologies and equipment for its nuclear weapons program was shared with Russian officials in an attempt to persuade those officials to halt Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. The Senate Intelligence Committee, at the request of Senator Jon Kyl, is investigating possible leaks of US-held information on Iranian nuclear activities. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, when asked about the Russia-Iran intelligence connection, says: "I better not comment on that because what I know is classified. I don't know why it's classified... I'm not anti-Yeltsin, but I think he's wrong as hell on this."
—Bill Gertz, "Congressional Panels Probe Use Of US Data In Russia-Iran Deal," Washington Times, 15 September 1995, p. A12.

18 September 1995
During a meeting at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Vienna, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Chairman Reza Amrollahi discuss four amendments to the Russian-Iranian nuclear contract concerning financial compensation. According to Russian officials, the financial agreement between Minatom and AEOI involves some barter trade, with the remainder to be paid by Iran in hard currency. A Russian official noted, "Iran wants to have the countertrade share as large as possible, and we want it to be as small as possible." Also at the conference, Mikhailov meets with US Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Hazel O'Leary. Mikhailov assures O'Leary that "unconfirmed reports" on Russian assistance to Iran in building underground nuclear installations are unsubstantiated. Mikhailov also rejects the suggestion that Iran could make use of expertise provided by the Russians during training to develop nuclear weapons. The security measures designed to block information leaks from Minatom "impress" DOE officials, but do not change the US opposition to Russia's nuclear agreement with Iran. One US official says: "The meeting made clear that we are not going to change Mikhailov's mind on Iran." The AEOI declares Iran's readiness to take additional measures to assure that the Iranian nuclear program is only used for peaceful purposes in exchange for "greater international cooperation" and the end of the US "uncompromising campaign" to restrict any international nuclear technologies or scientific exchange with Iran. The United States tried to convince Russia to include the obligatory use of "enhanced safeguards" in its nuclear contract with Iran. According to a Russian diplomat, if Iran decides to abandon the production of enriched uranium or plutonium separation, "that would have to be a step Iran alone would have to take."
—Mark Hibbs, "Iran, Russia Still Settling Countertrade Terms For PWRs," Nucleonics Week, 5 October 1995, pp. 9-10.

20 September 1995
Goergiy Kaurov, the head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's public relations department, says that Russia is taking every measure to prevent misuse of Russian technology for military purposes.
—ITAR-TASS, 20 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, <http://www1.columbia.edu>.

24 September 1995
The Chinese Ambassador to Iran say uranium enrichment and other nuclear technologies that China is supplying to Iran are intended only for peaceful uses and are a part of an agreement signed ten years ago. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring Iran's nuclear facilities regularly and has said the agreement poses no proliferation threat.
—Martin Walker, "US Fears Beijing May Be Split Over Mending Fences," Guardian, 25 September 1995.

24 September 1995
The Sunday Telegraph of London reports that China has installed a calutron system for enriching uranium at a nuclear research facility at Karaj, about 100 miles northwest of Tehran. This technology is similar to that used by Iraq to make weapons-grade uranium.
The Sunday Telegraph article quotes a report by Dr. Abbas-Pur, a top nuclear adviser to the Iranian president, in which he said Iran has "concluded the first phase necessary to make an atom bomb." The same report by Abbas-Pur allegedly also praises the help Russian experts have given in developing Iran's nuclear arsenal.
—Con Coughlin, "Unveilved: Iran's Bomb Plans," The Sunday Telegraph (London), 24 September 1995; in "Article on PRC's 'Final Piece' for 'Islamic Bomb'," FBIS Document FTS19970602002238, 2 June 1997.

24 September 1995
The Sunday Telegraph reports that Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, was criticized by "many top brass in Moscow" for negotiating the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. According to a senior defense official, Mikhailov is "a law unto himself and not even the President can control him." Despite Foreign Ministry support for Mikhailov's view that the agreement with Iran is "purely [a] commercial deal," Russian military officers disapprove of Mikhailov's efforts. These military officers fear Russian nuclear deals with Iran may contribute to an Iranian nuclear weapons program. With the Russian military stretched thin battling internal strife, Russian military officials are concerned about the prospects of a nuclear-armed Iran, saying, "That's all we need--mad mullahs with nukes." However, Russian concerns about NATO expansion and about appearing to yield to US pressure strengthened the pro-deal faction's position within the Russian Defense Ministry, the Sunday Telegraph reports.
—Carey Schofield, "All We Need- Mad Mullahs With Nukes," Sunday Telegraph (London), 24 September 1995; Carey Schofield, "All We Need--Mad Mullahs With Nukes," Sunday Telegraph (London), 24 September 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998; Con Coughlin, "Chinese Help Iran Join The Nuke Club," Washington Times, 25 September 1995, pp. A1, A8.

25 September 1995
Experts in the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry say they doubt China is supplying Iran with uranium-enriching centrifuges. [Note: See 24 September 1995 entry for a report of China supplying Iran with uranium-enriching centrifuges.] Russian officials insist that the Chinese do not have the technology to build the centrifuges. Russia exported first-generation centrifuges to China several decades ago. In 1993, Russia agreed to build a centrifuge plant in China to enrich uranium for use in a nuclear power plant. Under the term of this contract, China is not allowed to export the centrifuges to a third country or to use it to produce materials for nuclear weapons.
—"Ministry Doubts China Supplying Centrifuges to Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 25 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950925000313, 25 September 1995; "Iran-Russian Nuclear Experts Deny Reports On Chinese Arms Supplies," Reuters Insurance Briefing, 27 September 1995.

25 September 1995
The Washington Times reports that only 5 out of 11 nuclear facilities in Iran are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Though the Isfahan nuclear complex was inspected by the IAEA in 1992, with no discrepancies noted, half of the complex is reported to be built underground, while the other half is hidden by camouflage, the report says. Isfahan is the focus of Iran's nuclear weapons program, manned by personnel trained in China and Russia, the report says. The article says that, until the Russians agreed to sell Iran two VVER 440 reactors in August 1995, the IAEA, the United States, and Britain knew nothing of the Neka complex, the reactors' destination. Neka is 100 miles northeast of Tehran.
—Con Coughlin, "Chinese Help Iran Join The Nuke Club," Washington Times, 25 September 1995, pp. A1, A8.

26 September 1995
Russian ambassador to Iran Sergey Tretyakov announces Russia will not sell nuclear power plants to Iran.
—Amir Taheri, "Russian and Chinese Eagerness to Please Washington Takes Iranian Nuclear Program to Dead End," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 30 September 1995; in "Nuclear Program Said on 'Verge of Collapse'," FBIS Document FTS19950930000338, 30 September 1995.

26 September 1995
Chen Jian, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of China, says that China is not building an enrichment plant in Iran. Chen says, "[T]here isn't any nuclear cooperation between China and Iran that is not under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency." Chen also said that China has never exported any sensitive reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production technology or equipment. Iran denies that China sold it uranium enrichment technology.
—"Foreign Ministry Holds Regular News Conference," Xinhua (Beijing), 26 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-186, 26 September 1995; "Nuclear Cooperation With Iran: A Confused Picture," Nuclear Proliferation News, 12 October 1995, p. 14; "Foreign Ministry Holds Regular News Conference Denies Nuclear Work in Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 26 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950926000112, 26 September 1995.

27 September 1995
In a meeting with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reportedly says China is cancelling a deal to sell two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran. According to Iran's Foreign Minister Spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi, China is still interested in selling reactors to Iran, but the deal is suspended because of problems with the site's suitability. Qian says that the decision was made by China unilaterally, not because of US pressure. Russia expresses its concern that the United States may use China's decision in order to push Russia to also cancel its deal with Iran.
—Amir Taheri, "Russian and Chinese Eagerness to Please Washington Takes Iranian Nuclear Program to Dead End," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 30 September 1995; in "Nuclear Program Said on 'Verge of Collapse'," FBIS Document FTS19950930000338, 30 September 1995; Amir Taheri, "Beijing Cancels Deal to Build Two Nuclear Stations for Iran," 29 September 1995; in "China Reportedly Cancels Nuclear Project Deal," FBIS Document FTS1995050929000186, 29 September 1995; "Spokesman Comments on Nuclear Nonproliferation," IRNA (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950930000187, 30 September 1995; Elaine Sciolino "China Cancels Deal For Selling Iran 2 Reactors" New York Times, 28 September 1995, pp. A1, A3; John M. Goshko, "China Drops Reactor Deal With Iran," Washington Post, 28 September 1995, p. A22; Vladimir Skosyrev, "China Broke Off The Nuclear Deal With Iran," Izvestia, 29 September 1995, p. 4; Amir Taheri, "Nuclear Program Said on 'Verge of Collapse'," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 30 September 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-193, 30 September 1995; Tillie K. Fower, "China's Nuclear Arms Bazaar," Washington Times, 16 October 1995, p. A1.

27 September 1995
Though there has been discussion of the possible construction of two additional nuclear power plants in Iran, Sergei Tretyakov, Russia's Ambassador to Iran, says Russia will focus on the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran for the time being. He states, "The (old) project still stands but there have been no recent negotiations on the subject. It could be undertaken one day, but not before the completion of the other plant."
—"Russian Official Denies Sale of Two New Nuclear Reactors to Iran," Agence France Presse, 27 September 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 September 1995
US officials say they "accepted China's word" that China has discontinued a 1992 deal to supply two 300MW reactors to Iran. [Note: See 27 September 1995.] According to Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project On Nuclear Arms Control, suppliers often include additional "sweeteners," such as uranium enrichment technology, plutonium processing technology, or small research reactors in a contract for nuclear reactors, but now the United States can be certain Iran will not receive such technology from China. Milhollin says China had also considered exporting a 30 to 50MW research reactor to Iran that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. Milhollin theorizes that China's cancellation indicated that Iran could not pay for the deal and that it got a better offer from Russia.
—Carol Giacomo, "US Takes China's Word On Iran Deal," Executive News Service, 28 September 1995 Reuters.

28 September 1995
The Islamic Republic News Agency says that Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi says there has been no change in "peaceful nuclear cooperation" between Iran and China. Iranian diplomat Husayn Aminian Tossi says in Beijing that he had seen reports of the cancellation of the deal between Iran and China for two 300MW reactors, but the reports had not been confirmed.
—China Reportedly Cancels Nuclear Project Deal FBIS-NES-95-190, 28 September 1995; "Spokesman Comments on Nuclear Nonproliferation." IRNA (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-190, 30 September 1995; "China Softens Stance against Iranian Reactors," Washington Post, 30 September 1995, p. A9; Jeffrey Parker, "China Puts Iran Nuclear Genie Back in Bottle," Reuters Insurance Briefing, 29 September 1995; Arms Control Today, "China's Reactor Sale To Iran Now in Doubt," October 1995, p. 24.

29 September 1995
At the United Nations, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says China has suspended its nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran because of the site's unsuitability. He rejects the US statement that the sale of two 300MW reactors to Iran had been cancelled, and says the deal has been "suspended for the time being," because of a disagreement between the two sides over the final site selection. But he says Russia is threatened with being "left alone in the international arena," if it proceeds with its Iranian nuclear contract. The Chinese chose a site near Darkhovin, the intended location for French reactors, which were also left unfinished after a construction project was undertaken during the 1970s. Iran considers the Darkhovin site unsuitable because of its close proximity to the border with Iraq. [Note: See 27 September 1995.]
—Mark Hibbs "Iran, China Said To Disagree Only On Site Selection For New PWRs" Nucleonics Week, 5 October 1995, pp. 1, 8-9; "Iran's Hidden Nuclear Card." Intelligence Newsletter, 12 October 1995, p. 1; "US Remarks on Tehran-Chinese Nuclear Ties Viewed Radio Addresses 'Backfired' Efforts," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950930000186, 30 September 1995; Yaderniy Kontrol, "China Has Terminated Its Contract With Iran. Will Russia Follow Suit?," September 1995, p. 5; "China Softens Stance Against Iranian Reactors," Washington Post, 30 September 1995, p. A9.

30 September 1995
A spokesman for the Chinese delegation at the United Nations says China has not abrogated its peaceful nuclear deal with Iran. A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Tehran stated that there is no reason that the China-Iran nuclear deal should be halted, because it is under IAEA safeguards and consistent with Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows peaceful nuclear cooperation. Fifteen Chinese nuclear experts are reportedly working at Iran's Isfahan secret nuclear facility
—"No Reason to Stop Nuclear Deal Further On Chinese Stand," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950930000183, 30 September 1995; "China Softens Stance against Iranian Reactors," Washington Post, 30 September 1995, p. A9; "No Reason To Stop Nuclear Deal IRNA (Tehran), 30 September 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-190; Con Coughlin, "China Drops Iran Atom Deal," Sunday Telegraph (London), 1 October 1995.

30 September 1995
At a conference sponsored by the Union of Scientists for Disarmament in Castiglioncello (Italy), Iranian representative to the Chemical Weapons Convention at the Hague Hassan Mashadi declares that Iran is "keeping its nuclear options open." Mashadi adds, "Iran does not believe it should renounce that [nuclear weapons] option if its survival is at stake." According to Mashadi, Iran fears an attack by Israel, which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and believes that for the sake of security it has to have long-range missiles. "You cannot expect a nation with legitimate security concerns to sit idly by in the face of a threat. If you tell them not to go nuclear, then what option do you leave open for them?" Mashadi adds, "Iran is not a country to be ignored. If these pressures continue, there will be an explosion, and the whole region will be on fire." Independent Iranian analyst Shahram Chubin contradicts his colleague, saying that Israel is a "political problem, not a national security issue." However, Chubin says there are "clear signs" that Iran is keeping open a nuclear weapons option and claims that Iran has legitimate reasons to think it necessary to do this. He notes, however, that the possession of two or three weapons "will only generate concern." Mashadi qualifies his declarations, saying that his opinions were his own and not those of the Iranian government. However, according to former New York Times journalist Leon Siegel, Mashadi "was giving a clear message. He was obviously comfortable with what he was saying and authorized to say it."
—"Iran 'Keeping Its Nuclear Options Open'," Official Says," Iran Brief, 9 November 1995, pp. 1-2.

Late September 1995
Chinese specialists are working at the Karaj complex, where China has installed a uranium-enrichment calutron system that some nuclear experts say will enable Iran to produce weapons-grade uranium. Some sources say the Chinese system resembles one the Iraqis used in their attempt to build a nuclear bomb. A top US official says that in addition to supplying uranium-processing facilities, the Chinese have also assisted Iran in developing uranium mining, fuel fabrication, and zirconium tube production, and may provide uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride manufacturing plants in the near future. China's contribution to Iran's nuclear development is thought to be confined to the transfer of technological information, and has not included actual weapons-related assistance. Chinese facilities in Iran are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, and thus far China's assistance seems to be in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 1995-8/95, pp. 21-26; Con Coughlin, "Chinese Sell Iran Vital Link To Build Bomb." Sunday Telegraph, 24 September 1995; Con Coughlin, "Unveiled: Iran's Bomb Plans," Sunday Telegraph, 24 September 1995.

October 1995
Nuclear Engineering International reports that Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov said that by the end of 1995, Iran will make an initial payment of about $20 million on its $800 million contract for the completion of the first nuclear reactor at Bushehr. The payments are being arranged by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), Russia's Alta Bank, Iran's Melli Bank, and the Iranian government.
—"Iran Begins Paying For Bushehr," Nuclear Engineering International, October 1995, p. 12.

2 October 1995
Eduard Akopyan, director of the Russian Industrial Association Zarubedzatomenergostroy, an organization that builds nuclear power plants abroad, says "Russia's accords with all partners, with Iran and China; in particular, on the delivery of light water VVER nuclear reactors remain in effect."
—Veronkia Romanenkova, "Moscow to Proceed With Nuclear Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 2 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951002000257, 2 October 1995

2 October 1995
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, "With respect to the Iran nuclear situation, the Chinese foreign minister indicated they were not going forward with that particular transaction for various reasons, and that seems to be where the matter now rests."
—Susan Cornwell, "Clinton, China's Jiang To Meet October 24th," Reuters, 2 October 1995.

2 October 1995
The Iranian press says China should have a more firm and clear position on its nuclear cooperation with Iran.
—"Nuclear Cooperation With Iran: A Confused Picture," Nuclear Proliferation News, 12 October 1995, p. 14.

3 October 1995
In a speech at the London Royal Institute of International Relations, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says that China's sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran has not been cancelled. Qichen's statement refutes the US claim that the deal had been terminated. [Note: See 27 September and 2 October 1995 for US statements that the deal had been cancelled.] Qichen reiterates China's support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and emphasizes that China will not help other countries develop nuclear weapons. According to the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US officials misinterpreted Qichen's statement that the deal had been suspended; Qichen only meant that a suitable site for the reactors had not yet been found. [Note: See 29 September for a similar statement by Qichen.]
—"Nuclear Ties With China, US Reaction Discussed," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 4 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-196, 4 October 1995.

3 October 1995
Komsomolskaya Pravda reports that a Russian nuclear expert said it is unlikely that China could provide Iran with a uranium enrichment facility. China utilizes the oldest and least efficient method of uranium enrichment (gaseous diffusion) and needs the fuel it produces for its reactors. Even though China bought new technology from Russia, the centrifuge plant in Shangsi will produce only four percent uranium for use as reactor fuel. As the gas centrifuge plant is still being built, there is nothing China could have sold to Iran which could help it enriches uranium, the Russian experts said. [Note: Other news sources report similar statements by Russian officials on 25 September 1995. It is not clear if this is report is based on the same statement.]
—Andrei Kabannikov, "In Iranian Bombs There Is American Filling And Chinese Spices," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 3 October 1995, p. 7.

7 October 1995
Iranian President Rafsanjani says that the cost, method of payment, and payment schedule for the two 300MW Chinese reactors are still being discussed.
—"China 'Has Not Cancelled' Nuclear Reactor Deal," IRNA (Tehran), 9 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-195, 9 October 1995.

9 October 1995
Iranian Ambassador to China Husayn Mir-Fakhr says China's sale of two nuclear reactors to Iran has not been terminated.
—"China 'Has Not Cancelled' Nuclear Reactor Deal," IRNA (Tehran), 9 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-195, 9 October 1995.

15 October 1995
The Sunday Times of London reports China will go ahead with a deal to provide Iran with uranium processing technology used for making nuclear weapons. The announcement comes despite a recent agreement between the United States and China over cancellation of the Chinese sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran. [Note: See 27 September and 2 October 1995 for US statements that China cancelled the deal.] Leonard Spector, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, says that Iran's desire to have a uranium hexafluoride plant may mean Iran is moving towards building a nuclear weapon. The plant in question can be used to convert uranium into metal or gas that in turn could be enriched to make either fuel for nuclear weapons or to power reactors. Spector notes that Iran is likely to state it is using the converted uranium to power reactors, but "it would be totally uneconomic to use it to feed power plants, so you have to say what else would they want it for." International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, experts say, only provide a modicum of protection against misuse of nuclear technology, citing the agency's frequent visits to Iraq that did not prevent Saddam Hussein from developing a nuclear weapons program.
—Nick Rufford, "China Defies US with Iran Nuclear Deal," Sunday Times (London), 15 October 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 October 1995
Skoda Plzen management states that while the Czech company is increasing commercial cooperation with Iran, "it ruled out the possibility that Skoda would like to conduct business in Iranian weapons and nuclear technology."
—"Reports View Skoda Plzen's Dealings With Iran," Mlada Fronta Dnes (Prague), 21 October 1995, pp. 1-2; in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-95-206, 25 October 1995.

23 October 1995
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says China had assured him that its export of nuclear reactors to Iran "would not create any security risks to Israel."
—"China Reassures Israel On Iran Nuclear Deal," Reuters, 24 October 1995.

25 October 1995
Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov says the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry will train Iranian nuclear experts in Russia. They will probably be trained at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant, 42 kilometers from Voronezh, he says. The training of the Iranian experts will be to ensure the safe operation of the nuclear power plant to be constructed at Bushehr. He also says a delegation from the atomic energy ministry will go to Iran 26 October to submit a feasibility study of the equipment and site at Bushehr and to discuss problems with construction. He says Russian construction at Bushehr is expected to commence in November 1995.
—"Atomic Ministry to Train Iran Nuclear Specialists," Interfax (Moscow), 25 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951025000401, 25 October 1995.

25 October 1995
Czech company Skoka Plzen says it would like to do business with Iran, but will not sell weapons or nuclear technology.
—"Report Views Skoda Plzen's Dealings With Iran," Mlada Fronta Dnes, 25 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970416000956, 16 April 1997.

31 October 1995
Russia and Iran agree on a timetable for payments for construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant after a meeting in Tehran between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Bolshakov and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Reza Amrollahi. The first payment will be before the end of 1995.
—Oleg Kuzmin, "Iran To Pay Russia for Nuclear Powerplant in 1995," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 31 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951031000531, 31 October 1995.

4 November 1995
Jane's Defence Weekly reports that, according to Russian and Iranian sources, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev will soon visit Iran "to discuss military cooperation." Iranian defense officials insist that Grachev's visit is unrelated to the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal. Jane's reports that a growing number of Russian military officials who share US concerns about Iran's attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and who feel threatened by Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia have expressed opposition to the Russian-Iranian nuclear contract. NATO's perceived eastward expansion and increasing rancor between the Russian military and Western policymakers, however, have muted domestic Russian opposition to the nuclear deal.
—"Grachev To Visit Iran To Discuss Co-operation," Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 November 1995, p. 4.

6 November 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says 25% of the $780 million cost of construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be paid by the supply of goods to Russia. Also, Iran will pay Russia in rials for "local work," he says. [Note: The price of the contract has variously stated as $800 million and $1 billion, most often $800 million. See 7 and 8 January 1995.]
—"Work Said to Begin on Bushehr Nuclear Plant," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 6 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951106000244, 6 November 1995.

6 November 1995
After visiting several nuclear facilities in Iran, two experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency say they witnessed no violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. IAEA experts Vlado Valkovich and Frank Watt say the Iranian nuclear program is "entirely for peaceful purpose[s]." Valkovich, a "specialist in precise devices of the IAEA in Australia," claims that Iran has progressed in its use of the Karaj research center's accelerators and cyclotrons.
—"IAEA Reportedly Confirms 'Peaceful Efforts'," IRNA (Tehran), 6 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951106000410, 6 November 1995.

6 November 1995
Iran Brief reports that, according to Iranian journalist Fereydun Sahebjam, Iran has constructed several secret nuclear weapons facilities with North Korean assistance. The report says Iran has built two underground reactors and possibly an underground calutron uranium enrichment facility. The two underground reactors were built with the help of North Korean Air Force Commander General Cho Myong Rok. Iran built one of the reactors in the desert near Tabas in a nuclear complex constructed with Chinese and North Korean assistance. The report says that in February 1994, North Korea and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, according to South Korean and Arab media sources. Iran has also tested North Korean missiles in the region between Shahrud and Damghan, east of Tehran.
—"Secret Nuclear Sites Detailed," Iran Brief: Policy, Trade, & Strategic Affairs, 6 November 1995.

8 November 1995
Haaretz of Tel Aviv reports that the deal for Russia to supply Iran two additional 440MW nuclear reactors has been canceled because of financing difficulties. The Israeli daily further reports that as many as 1,400 Russians will work on construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
—Aluf Ben, "Information Received on Russians Building Iran's Reactor," Haaretz, 8 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS199511080000396, 8 November 1995.

13 November 1995
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani says that because Germany refused to finish construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iran has sought to build another nuclear reactor valued at $300 million. Larijani said that Iran has China's help on the construction of a nuclear reactor, and that Russia will finish the Bushehr reactor. Larijani says Iran has no reason to want nuclear weapons, since it has sufficient conventional capabilities to deter an attack. According to Larijani, Iran has the right to build nuclear weapons but would receive no benefit from doing so. Larijani explains that Iran needs to build new nuclear reactors to meet its energy requirements.
—Zaki Shihain, "Minister Larijani Addresses Nuclear Issues," Al-Wasat (London), 9 October 1995-15 October 1995, pp. 20-21; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-198, 13 October 1995.

17 November 1995
Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor reports that, according to Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis, the United States continues to try to persuade Russia not to provide Iran with four nuclear reactors for the Bushehr nuclear facility, arguing that "such technology is dangerous in the hands of Iran." Thus far, Russia has refused to cancel its $1 billion nuclear contract despite a law passed by the US Congress withholding $195 million in aid to Russia for weapons dismantlement. The Russian journal Novaya Yezhednevnaya called the sanctions "unfair considering that the US provided the same light water reactor technology to North Korea."
—"Russian Firm On Iran Reactor Sale: Could Mean Loss Of US Aid," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 17 November 1995, pp. 4-5.

20 November 1995
The Russian ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says financing problems may delay the start of construction on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "The Russian side," he says, "confirmed Moscow's political will for cooperation with Iran in the area of nuclear energetics when Russian Deputy Premier Aleksey Bolshakov was on his recent visit in Iran and conducted negotiations with Reza Amrollahi, president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran." He says, however, "the financial problems that emerged are a hindrance to the implementation of the agreements reached." After the visit, Iran gave Russia documents to open bills of credit, he says. Iran is to pay Russia $20 million for completed survey and design work and open bills of credit worth $60 million. "The Russian side could not work without funds," Tretyakov says. "Bills of credit and ready money are different things." [Note: See 22 November 1995 for his statement that the financing problems are solved.]
—Oleg Kuzmin, "'Financial Problems' Check Iran's Work on Powerplant," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 20 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951120000761, 20 November 1995.

22 November 1995
Russian Ambassador Iran Sergey Tretyakov says the financing problems with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant have been solved. [Note: See 20 November 1995 for his statement that financing problems were hindering construction.]
—"Russian Envoy's Comments on Nuclear Ties Reported," IRNA (Tehran), 22 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951122000773, 22 November 1995.

24 November 1995
In a meeting in Tehran with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov says Russia will complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant "in due time."
—"Minister Promises Completion of Iranian Nuclear Plant," IRNA (Tehran), 24 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951124000082, 24 November 1995.

30 November 1995
Russian Atomic Energy Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov says Russia has begun implementing its contract to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says the ground is now being cleared prior to installing equipment and water and power lines, which is to start in April. He also says Iran and Russia have agreed to train Iranian nuclear experts at a Russian nuclear power plant 42 kilometers from Voronezh. [Note: According to another report, they will be trained at the Novovoronezh power plant, 42 kilometers from Voronezh. See 25 October 1995.]
—"Moscow Begins Work on Iranian Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 30 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951130000187, 30 November 1995.

30 November 1995
The Russian "right-wing" daily paper Segodnya publishes a "high-level leaked document" that includes plans for aggressive reactions to NATO expansion, including the threat to sell nuclear weapons to Iran and Iraq.
—Russia's "Secret Plans" Foreign Reporter, 30 November 1995.

December 1995
The US Congress passes new economic sanctions against Iran and President Clinton signs them. The new legislation draws upon the "D'Amato Bill," a set of strict sanctions against Iran. According to the new law, any foreign company investing over $40 million that "significantly and materially contribute[s] to the development of petroleum resources in Iran" will be subject to economic sanctions. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, sponsor of the bill, says, "Our intention is to let Iran know that if they continue to export revolution, support terrorism, and develop weapons of mass destruction, we will keep the pressure on."
—Thomas W. Lippman, "White House, Hill Agree On New Iran Sanctions," Washington Post, 13 December 1995, p. A34; "AIPAC Joins The Fray," Iran Brief, 4 December 1995, pp. 3-4.

2 December 1995
Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says $780 million has been allocated for completion of the Bushehr power plant, $200 million of which will be paid in rials.
—"Nateq-Nurei Continues Visit to Bushehr Province, Derides US Criticism," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 2 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951202000122, 2 December 1995.

6 December 1995
In an interview on Iranian television, Mr. Dust-Mohammadi, technical affairs deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says the planned location of two 300MW nuclear reactors to be built by China has been moved from Darkhovin to Bushehr. "The reason for choosing Bushehr," he says, "is its potential and plentiful water resources. This issue has delayed the implementation phase of the agreement." He says the primary reason for the delay in Iran's contract with China for the reactors was the question of location. [Note: See 29 and 30 September 1995 for more on the proposed location of the reactors. US officials have said China agreed to cancel the deal, but Chinese officials and Iranian officials have said it is on hold because of problems with choosing a site. See 27 September 1995.]
—"TV Panel Discussion Views Nuclear Power Plant Construction," IRIB Television First Program Network, 6 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951206000573, 6 December 1995.

13 December 1995
Washington Times columnist Stephen Green writes that Iran is close to acquiring a uranium enrichment capability because of Chinese assistance. With Chinese help, Green writes, Iran reportedly built a cyclotron uranium enrichment facility in Karaj, 25 miles south of Tehran, according to information from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (the Mojahedin-e Khalq). Iran has 10 locations devoted to nuclear activities, and may be building an eleventh site south of Tabriz with Chinese help, Green writes.
—Stephen Green, "Nuclear Helping Hand for Iran," Washington Times, 13 December 1995, p. A18.

18 December 1995
Nuclear Fuel reports that Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Mikerin declares that Russia and Iran "have made no agreements" regarding the future of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power station. The report says the issue concerns whether the spent fuel will remain in Iran or will be returned to Russia for reprocessing. In Mikerin's words, "both sides have left open spent fuel management options." Mikerin adds that although both countries are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), neither of them has signed a contract to place Iranian spent fuel under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The United States wants Russia to require that Iran not reprocess the spent fuel, the report says. A senior Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy official considers such a requirement "beyond NPT safeguards requirements" and claims that Russia "would not initiate" discussions on Iran not reprocessing spent fuel after commercial agreements with Iran have been completed. Mikerin notes that only the front end of the fuel cycle for the two VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactors is addressed under the Russo-Iranian nuclear agreement. Furthermore, Mikerin says Russian environmental law mandates that if Iran chooses to return the spent fuel to Russia, Iran would have to return the fuel after 25-30 years of storage or reprocess it in Russia. Under those conditions, Iran must take back vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW), reprocessed uranium, and separated plutonium, which would be placed under IAEA safeguards. Russian specialists analyzed the possibility of shipping the spent fuel from Bushehr to Krasnoyarsk-26 through the Caspian Sea and concluded that because of inadequate transport conditions in Iran, the shipment cannot be delivered. Russian specialists, however, suggest that the fuel can be shipped from Iran to Krasnoyarsk via Shevchenko, Kazakstan. Minatom's nuclear contract with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) states that Russia is to provide the Bushehr station with the first core of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which will be produced at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant. The Novosibirsk Plant is expected to produce reloads for the Iranian reactors.
—Mark Hibbs, "Iran May Keep Russian Spent Fuel Or Take Plutonium, Reprocess Waste," Nuclear Fuel, 18 December 1995, pp. 1, 10.

18 December 1995
Jozef Sucha, press secretary for the Slovak Ministry of Economy, says on a recent visit to Russia by Slovak Minister of Economy Jan Ducky, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov offered to have Slovak companies provide equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Ducky did not respond to the proposal, but considers it serious enough to report at the next cabinet meeting, says the press secretary. Sucha says the offer must be carefully considered because of US opposition to construction of the Bushehr plant. In Mikhailov's words, "the Slovak Republic could gain up to $20 million annually for supplies of boiler room and other equipment for the Iranian nuclear power plant." Sucha said Ducky will probably raise the issue at a future Slovak cabinet meeting. Concerned about US opposition to the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal, Sucha noted that Slovakia would only participate in the project if it did not involve political repercussions. Mikhailov adds, "From my point of view, cooperation with Slovak partners on the projects in Iran and Cuba is even more important than the construction of one unit in Mochovce."
—"Russia Offers Aid For Iranian Nuclear Project," 19 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-95-245; Ivan Drabek, "Moscow Proposes That We Earn Money For Mochovce In Iran," Pravda (Bratislava), 18 December 1995, pp. 1, 6 in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-95-245.

19 December 1995
A press release from the Iranian embassy in Pakistan "categorically" rejects allegations printed in the Pakistani press that Iran offered to buy nuclear technology from Pakistan. According to the Iranian press release, unnamed Pakistani officials verified "the falsehood of such claims." In December 1992, Iran allegedly offered Pakistan $3.5 billion to share "nuclear know-how." According to reports in the Pakistani press, during Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's visit to Tehran, Iranian leaders reiterated the offer. Pakistan once again rejected the proposal, saying that "whatever little capability [Pakistan] has, that it was for peaceful purposes and could not be transferred to any third country." The US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel confirmed that Pakistan rejected the proposal. [Note: See December 1992].
—"Tehran: Not Seeking Pakistani Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FIBS-NES-95-246, 21 December 1995; IRNA (Tehran), 21 December 1995; Istashamul Haque, "Iran Offer of Money for Nuclear Technology Rejected," Dawn (Karachi), 20 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951220000165, 20 December 1995.

21 December 1995
In an interview with Beijing-based new outlet Xinhua, Georgiy Matchitidze, counselor of the Russian Embassy in Iran, says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant has been postponed until next year because of financial problems and elections in Russia. Iran has given Russia only $60 million, he says, the cost of the feasibility study. "We should need at least $50 million more to start construction of the project because we have to purchase equipment and related facilities of the plant," he says. Most of the Russian experts working at Bushehr have returned home after completing the feasibility study. According to an anonymous source, Iran had opened two letters of credit for Russia worth a total of $80 million. Russia had threatened to send home its 160 experts if Iran did not extend the letters of credit, according to the source. [Note: According to a previous report, Iran paid Russia $20 million for the feasibility study and opened letters of credit worth $60 million, a total of $80 million. This may be the $80 million mentioned above as the total of two letters of credit. See 20 November 1995. A report on 22 June 1995 said as many as 220 Russian experts were working on the site.]
—"Russian Source on Iran's Nuclear Plant Project," Xinhua (Beijing), 21 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951221000521, 21 December 1995.

21 December 1995
Georgiy Matchitidze, an official in the Russian Embassy in Iran, says due to financial problems in Iran and the imminent Russian elections, construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station will begin in 1996, not December 1995 as originally scheduled. Although Iran has paid Russia $60 million to conduct a feasibility study, Matchitidze says Iran has to pay at least $50 million more for Russia to begin construction. A Xinhua report says that only seven or eight Russian experts are working in Iran, with the rest returned to Russia, having completed the study on technical conditions for the plant. However, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran disputes the report.
—"Russian Source On Iran's Nuclear Plant Project," in Xinhua (Beijing), 21 December 1995; FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-245, 21 December 1995.

23 December 1995
Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak states that a regional peace including Iran would be required before Israel would discuss the future of its nuclear program.
—Serge Schmemann, "Peres Says Israel, With Regional Pact, Would End Atom Effort," New York Times, 23 December 1995, p. 5; Imanuel Rosen, "Ministers, Officials React To Peres' Comments; Ministers Criticize Remarks," Channel 2 Television Network (Jerusalem), 24 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-247, 24 December 1995; "Official Statement Denies Change In Nuclear Stance," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 24 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-247, 24 December 1995; "Baraq: Nuclear Issue Addressed Only After Peace," Qol Yisrael (Jerusalem), 27 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-249, 27 December 1995.

29 December 1995
Shimon Peres, Israel's prime minister, receives assurances from Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan that his country is looking to reduce Iran's influence in the region. Because of its voluntary forfeiture of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan is reticent of any neighboring country's attempts to procure weapons of mass destruction.
—Michael Sheridan, "Israel Finds New Ally to Stop Iran N-Bomb," The Independent, 29 December 1995, p. 10; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 December 1995
After a recent trip to Iran, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov says Iran and Russia have reached an agreement for Iran to pays its debt to Russia with $230 million worth of oil and $150 million in cash. [Note: It is not clear if this agreement directly affects the construction by Russia of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.]
—"Davydov Ends Iran Visit; Nuclear Cooperation Reported Iran Ready to Buy Russian Equipment," Interfax (Moscow), 29 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951229000108, 29 December 1995.



 

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A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences (2004)
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
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