

# Speculum animae

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## [Question 1: In what manner is the soul all things?]

“In some manner the soul is all things” [*De anima*, 430b20-21].

This is a concise saying of the Philosopher; it is not, however, sufficiently clear to everybody. Man of God, what do you ask of me regarding this subject? For you know that I am governed by logic, and this subject may require deep investigation. You ask, therefore, that I specify for you what I mean by “in some manner.” For in what way is the soul all things? You wish that I specify the manner [in which this is the case] to you: either in one concise phrase, or by explaining individual modes for individual entities.

It seems, therefore, that the Philosopher [*De anima*, 3.8.431b21-22] proves this proposition inductively, thus: ‘in some manner sense is [all] sensibles, in some manner the intellect is [all] intelligibles’, therefore [in some manner the soul is] all things, etc.

### [Objections]

Here you immediately make two objections.

The first [objection] is that the soul has three parts — the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective — [but] in this proof, the Philosopher does not claim that the vegetative part is identical with any entities. Therefore it seems that he should not say that the soul taken absolutely is in some manner all things, but only with respect to some of its parts.

Again, it seems that we ought to say that the intellective [soul] alone is in some manner all things. For all things whatsoever are intelligible, [both] universals and singulars. All natures are in themselves truly and absolutely intelligible, though the first and remotest principles are not comprehensible to us. For there is a flaw in us, just as in the eyes of the bat, which do not see the sun [*Metaph.*, 993b9-12].

Again, in what manner is our sense sensibles and our intellect intelligibles? For these assumptions are just as obscure as the conclusion. For the sensitive [soul] is a living thing, and a substance; sensibles, however, are non-living (dead) things, and are accidents, qualities of the third kind [*Praedic.*, 9a29]. In what way, therefore, are the former the same as the latter? For now it seems that they cannot be the same, except merely in being and entity. For they share no genus whatsoever. Therefore it seems

that it is useless to say 'in some manner sense is sensibles'. For if someone were to say, 'man is in some way an ass', he would be speaking more properly and correctly, for these share genus and genera.

Similarly, you ask about the intellective part and intelligibles. For intelligibles include both substances and accidents, living things and non-living things. But the intellect itself, however, is only a substance and a living thing.

*[First response of the Philosopher to the second objection]*

Man of God, you speak to me, drawing upon this same author, and you will respond to me when I ask in what manner sense itself is a sensible. You will answer with the Philosopher, in this manner, namely that 'sense is the same kind of thing potentially as the sensible is actually' [*De anima*, 418a3], and you will apply that to the individual senses and [their] sensibles. Thus sight is potentially the same kind of thing as a visible is actually, and similarly for the other [senses].

But I say against this: Man of God, if 'sense is potentially the same kind of thing, etc.', therefore something will actually be that kind of thing, etc.

[Reply] to the same [objection]: to sense is a certain alteration and to be acted upon in a certain way. For sense is in the genus of passive faculties, according to the same Philosopher [*De anima*, 416b32-35]. Agents and patients are, however, dissimilar at the outset; in the end, when acted upon, they are similar. Therefore the sensitive [faculty], because sensing is being acted upon, is passive. In the end, when it is acted upon, [the sensitive] will be similar to the active, namely the sensible. Then it will therefore be the case that 'sense is the same kind of thing actually as the sensible also is actually'.

But now I ask whether it is useless to say this, namely that sometimes 'the sensitive [soul] will actually be of the same kind of thing as the sensible itself'. What do you mean when you say 'of the same type'? I ask: if I actually see a color, is the visual faculty of my eye actually a color? Or do you not claim that color is such a thing? I ask, if that visual faculty will actually be assimilated in quality to the color. For just as it was said above, they seem not to be the same unless only in being and entity.

I confess, Man of God, that these objections [and my replies] are tentative. But they will be necessary to our project, however, if they are correctly resolved. Therefore through the grace of God and through your prayers, Man of God, I hope to return to these at some point.

*[Second response of the Philosopher to the second objection]*

But what we read seems not to suffice [to resolve] the problem we proposed for ourselves, Man of God: 'in some manner man is every created thing, and man is the world', a lesser [world] namely [*Phys.*, 252b25-26]: he shares with all created things, in

this way: 'existence with stones, living with plants, sensing with beasts, thinking with angels,' and finally man shares [something] with God. If I wanted to explain the aforesaid saying in this manner, man would not only be the world and all created things in some manner, but one part of man on its own would be, namely the soul. And the soul will be a lesser world. And according to that which was said earlier, man is more truly an ass in some manner than the soul is in some way stones, because the soul shares only being with stones according to the preceding explanation of the Gospel. Man and the ass, however, share in being, living, sensing, and genus and genera of genus. Whence many forms and natures are univocally [predicated] of them.

*[Third response of the Philosopher to the second objection: sense is a certain midpoint of sensibles]*

Perhaps you will respond to me in a different way: the sense is in some manner<sup>1</sup> sensibles according to the Philosopher himself — namely, that 'sense is a certain midpoint of sensibles' [*De anima*, 424a4]? Which is why the sense itself is corrupted by the intensity of external contrary sensibles [*De anima*, 429b1]. So you will say to me that sense is, as it were, sensibles, etc., as a midpoint is in some manner its extremes, for it is composed from them.

But, Man of God, on the contrary I ask: what is the use of saying, 'sense is the midpoint of sensibles' [*De anima*, 424a4]? For this is troublesome in itself. For if we should understand that sight is a midpoint of colors in this way, such that the middle were the color composed from the extreme colors, then sight itself would not receive middle colors.<sup>2</sup> For it would itself contain them. And nothing that actually has something receives that same thing in such a manner. For every receiving [entity] lacks what it receives in such a manner, as these philosophers say.

Man of God, we noted at the outset that the name 'sense' is taken in many ways by the Philosopher: sometimes [it means] (1) the soul's sensitive power, sometimes (2) the habit of sensing, sometimes (3) the operation of sensing, and also sometimes (4) the organ itself, the member, namely, composed of body and the soul's living and sensing power. And the last [meaning] is less proper, but it is sometimes found in the Philosopher's [works], however. And this is perhaps because this sensing operation pertains only to the animate; namely, it is the organ's operation, [not the organ itself]. Nor does the sensitive power in itself drive the operation in the way its intellect does. For the sensitive soul neither lives nor apprehends, unless life and sense are present in the body.

Man of God, since you hear, therefore, that 'sense is a midpoint of sensibles', it seems that the sense should be taken according to the fourth meaning, and that this sensing must refer back most compellingly to the organ, and yet this is in a different manner for different senses. For in the sense of touch and taste it is the case that the organ of the senses themselves is a composite and a mixture of contraries, extreme tangibles;

<sup>1</sup> Reading "quodammodo" for "quomodo."

<sup>2</sup> Medievals held that red and green were composed of black and white.

and thus the sense, namely the organ, is a midpoint of sensibles. Whence the sense of touch does not apprehend tangibles correctly and well unless they are extreme; namely, it does not distinguish temperatures between hot and cold well, nor [tangibles] between wet and dry. Rather, it best [distinguishes] intense cases of extreme contraries. This is not, however, the case for the other senses — sight, namely, and the others — specifically, that the organ of sight is composed and mixed of contrary colors, white and black, etc.

And therefore we should note that this phrase, ‘a midpoint of sensibles’, is said in many [ways]. For in one manner it is called a medium generated from a mixture of contrary sensibles, as in touch and taste. In another manner the midpoint of sensibles is said to be a single shared nature, namely a sensible common to all sensibles, extreme or intermediate. And that, too, can be in two manners. First, as the genus can be called a medium nature between different contraries, and not because it is a mixture composed from different contraries. For it is more simple than each of the two differentia<sup>3</sup>, and yet is properly called their medium. Since contrariety is the greatest distance [*Metaph.*, 1055a9-10], and the extremes of this distance are the contrary differentiae, the genus itself is the interstice between these extremes. Which genus is extended between these endpoints as much as it is possible to be extended — so as to preserve its quiddity [id ipsum quod est] in nature, name and definition. And, therefore, if we were to imagine it to be more extended at either extreme, already the extension would not be in the genus of the animal. In another way quite similar to the one described immediately above, namely some nature which is not a genus of sensibles, but which shares [something] and is an original root material cause [is called a midpoint]. And when [this nature] is differently received in different matters, it generates diverse sensibles, as light is [related] to all sensibles, [but is] not perhaps properly their genus.

*[In what way sight is a midpoint of visibles]*

Let us say, therefore, regarding the sense of sight, that sight, or the organ of sight, is in some way a midpoint of visibles, namely colors. Or perhaps in this way, as a midpoint is said to be common — namely, a nature shared by all colors in the composition of the organ of sight, namely the pupil. For example: light mixed with the transparent, both of which play a major role in the composition of the eye. And these two [light and the transparent] are the original primitive causes, generating all colors; for by more or less light and transparency, and by different proportions in the final body, truly and properly mixed, they produce this color or that. For color is, as it is said elsewhere [*De sensu et sensato*, 439b11-14], ‘the limit of the transparent in a determinately bounded body.’ According to this [definition], therefore, there is no color in the body of the organ of sight absolutely speaking, either extreme or intermediate, since it is not a determinate bounded body, properly speaking. And yet in the pupil itself, the two aforementioned causes of the colors persist in their commonality. They are not mixed together by some special proportion in the dense matter, but they are lightly united to one another in a certain purity. And this is their commonality, and in some manner their immateriality and purity is called a the midpoint. For their commonality can, in

<sup>3</sup> Animal is a genus, and it is more simple than man (rational animal). Here rational is the differentia.

different matters and different compounds, generate diverse colors of every kind. I suppose it is evident why this common nature can be called a midpoint and how it is common.

Man of God, you will in no way find that in the intellect — namely, that it can be called a midpoint of intelligibles. But neither does it have an organ. And therefore if you want to find some common understanding in accordance with which the soul is called all things in some manner, you will have to go higher, perhaps transcending all such [considerations].

**[Question 2: In what manner a sensible and the sense, and an intelligible and the possible intellect, become one]**

Before you ascend, however, you ask in what manner a sensible and the sense become one. Similarly, in what manner do I say that the possible intellect and a received intelligible become one? For it is certain that if they become one in some way, that they [become] one in number. But since this is said in many ways, and so is the phrase ‘the same in number,’ I ask: in what manner are these things made one in number?

*[What is the received sensible or species in the organ]*

It is certain that the received sensible or species is some form. Therefore it is either a substance or an accident.

If it were a substance, then since each of the two, [species] and sense, would be a substance, if they were truly made one, it would truly be one substance and one nature — an individual, namely, composed from matter and form. But that can be said neither in the case of the sense and a sensible, nor the intellect and an intelligible. Certainly not in the case of the sense and a sensible, because sensibles are accidents, and because what is always and in itself an accident is never a substance. Nor in the case of the intellect and an intelligible, because substances and accidents are understood in the same way; hence, so are the received species. And again, since so many varied and multifarious intelligible species of substances and accidents are received in one and the same possible intellect, it follows that none of them would be a substantial form, from which together with the intellect one individual, one substance, [or] one person is made.

By no means would it be an accident, because it neither proceeds nor arises from the principles of that in which it is received. It therefore will not be its accident. Yet if it were the accident of another subject, it would never go out from and beyond that [subject]; for accidental being is inhering [*Topics*, 102b4-7]. Now, therefore, it seems that neither this [thing] received in the sense, nor that received in the intellect, is a substance or an accident, nor is it altogether nothing.

Here you will respond to yourself, Man of God, noting at the outset what is substantial being and what is accidental being. The being of substance as such is multiple: For it may be the being of a composite substance existing in itself, namely [as] external matter outside the intellect. Or it may be the being of the parts of the same substance, namely of the matter and form existing in the composite substance. Or it may be the being of the simplest nature existing in itself, existing neither in matter nor beyond matter, and this is the being of the first cause only. Yet accidental being exists in only one way, namely belonging and inhering in the manner of an impression and of material inherence in that subject, from which it originates and arises.

You say, therefore, that a sensible in an external object has accidental being in the medium and the organ.

It is neither accidental nor substantial [being], because we distinguish being once more, namely between the being of a nature and the being of a species. And this distinction is very useful and necessary. Nature-being is that twofold being: substantial and accidental [being], that was noted previously. Species-being will be evident when it is evident what I am calling a species. I call the most express similitude of the form which is in the object a species, and I refer to it similarly in sensibles and intelligibles. For the moment, however, I will characterize it in terms of sensibles.

You say therefore that a species or similitude of a color received in the medium, organ and sense has a new [kind of] being, [but] not accidental being, in a certain way immaterial respectively — namely, with respect to the prior being it had in the external, colored matter. Just as it loses that first being, so it loses both the name of its form and its nature; and so it also acquires both the definition of the name and a more subtle being. For that reason, we should not call it color, because, as we said, it has lost the name and definition of color. It does not, however, remove itself so greatly as to transfer itself into the nature of another genus. But neither does [it move] into another species of the same genus, nor into some other individual of the same species. The identity of the similitude of whiteness to a given whiteness A is greater than [the identity] of some other whiteness B to that whiteness A. It is not, however, absolute numerical identity. As a result, you can reckon that the difference between the species of a sensible nature and the sensible form existing in the object is less than the difference between individuals of one most specific species, and the difference is greater, or the identity lesser, than complete numerical identity, as for example: Socrates' [relationship] to Socrates himself.

Suppose you ask, what is the species generated outside the object by complete formal predication, since it is neither a substance nor an accident nor nothing whatsoever — as you yourself say. I say that by formal predication it is as it were the species of a nature existing externally in the object, and this phrase, 'species or similitude', denotes its formal predication expressly enough. Whence the Philosopher names the species of color [*De anima*, 418b9-12], "quasi [ut] color," being able to assign nothing nearer, so it seems, or more properly, in naming it.

[To the second question]

You ask, therefore, at the outset 'in what manner will something one be made from these?' — for you know that it is numerically one, but [in] altogether nothing like the accustomed modes.

For you should understand that, commonly speaking, these modes in which something is called numerically one pertain to what is made from different natures or one from each of two substances, or from one substance and another accident, as from Socrates and white. Here, however, in the case under consideration, numerically one thing is made from the sense and the species of a sensible. (Similarly from the intellect and the species of an intelligible.) Not from a nature and a nature, but from a nature and a species. And therefore there is a great difference from other modes, just as species being is greatly different from natural being. And therefore whoever is ignorant of this diversity of being often falls into many errors and deceptive traps.

You say, therefore, that something numerically one is made from these, just as from a subject and a habit, not by a substantial form, nor by an accidental form, but by a habit-form. For you ought to distinguish form thrice: form which is a substance, form which is an accident, and form which is a species and a habit. And you can distinguish the first members, taken together as one, from species or habit being.

I say therefore that the species of a sensible is a form, namely a habit, in the medium and the organ and the sense. And light also, via the same manner, is a form in the medium of air and the organ and sight, but not a form having natural being — namely, substantial or accidental [being] — but species being and habit-form being. And I say "habit" correctly; for it has an opposite privation, namely some possible obscurity in that subject [*De anima*, 418b19].

Whence, as I suppose, it is evident to you that it is not properly a property of an accident that it can "both inhere and not inhere" [*Topics*, 102b4-7]; or in another way, that [it can be] "present and absent apart from the corruption of the subject," because this also [is proper] to a 'habit-form' and its opposite privation, which inhere in respect to their recipient, and with a privation as its opposite.

Concerning corporeal light — the light which is diffused outside its origin, namely [light] in air — the Philosopher sufficiently agrees with what is said here. He says that light is "the presence of an intention" of light in the transparent [*De anima*, 418b16-20]. And you, converting this, speak as follows: 'light is an intention of light, present in the transparent'. And what is thereby said, except that light generated from its origin, namely by a luminous body, is received in external matter, namely in transparent air. This received [thing], I say, is the species and express similitude, not an illusory or imaginary similitude, but something verging on identity as much as possible, and approaching the form of the fountain of light, just as you heard above about the species of color and the color itself.

You should look elsewhere, however, about the question of corporeal light and the doubts about it and its comparison to colors, which are hardly mentioned here. But keep in mind that what I said about sense and sensibles, etc. similarly applies in the case of the intellect and intelligibles. Always be mindful of the being of received intelligible species, and how in some manner something numerically one is made from the intelligible species itself and the receiving possible intellect. Also keep in mind the many other distinctions we touched upon previously, and most of all the difference in form and being between natures and species.

*[That the species is a habit-form]*

According to the aforesaid you may say that grace in a just soul is neither a substantial form, which makes a this-something with matter, nor an accidental form, but rather is a habit-form that makes something one with the soul, just as the subject and the habit-form. Note this well! A certain corporeal light in transparent air is a material example for you, as stated earlier.

### **[Question 3: What is predicated and how?]**

Man of God, I am garrulous and talkative, and I don't know how to be efficient. I have detained you with these things a long while, and yet now I proceed to another. And I ask of you, what is predicated and how is it predicated?

*[In what manner a nature-form is predicated of matter]*

Therefore these Philosophers sometimes say, as you know, that [being] is predicated of an entity. Elsewhere they also say that 'form' is predicated of matter. But you marvel at this last, and ask: "How is form predicated of matter? Is matter form, and thus all things the same?" But they do indeed say, as I said, that being is predicated of an entity. Yet it is impossible for 'being' to be predicated of an entity unless by a mediate preposition, namely as in an oblique case. What do you think about these things? Or [do you think] that every predicate is naturally concrete and always concretely names, informs and qualifies the subject; and there is altogether nothing mediate between the predicate and the subject.

Learn from this that because the quality of a common appellative name is a quality, it has inhering being and an adjacent mode. Although it is not an accident, it can be predicated properly of a defined aggregate and of an individual, and it qualifies, names, informs and illuminates the matter of each of these. Moreover, a proper name like 'Socrates', because it designates a substance only in the manner of subsistence and as a foundation, and thus designates an entity as entity and not its being, is predicated of nothing except of itself, and this only accidentally. Whence you see that 'being' and 'it is' are concrete; but [entity] is abstract, and yet if 'entity' and 'man' are placed in the



predicate [position], they are understood concretely. For example, if I said, 'man is a man', 'entity is entity', 'man' and 'entity' in the subject [position] properly stand for the aggregate; in the predicate [position], [they stand] for the form and common quality for which the appellative name is imposed [by the users of the language] — 'the quality', I say, in the manner of quality and inhering disposition, related to the aggregate and its matter. For you ought to understand that the same nature of the form which, [combined] with matter, composes the aggregate, namely the thing defined, is also predicated of the defined aggregate and the individual.

But you say: therefore is the part predicated of the composite, or the part of a part, namely the form of the matter? Understand that the form also is a substance and it is the same. The principle of understanding and being is considered doubly, and has dual being. In the first manner, form in itself absolutely and in abstraction, as an entity and a this-something and a nature and a substance, from which a composite is made with another, namely matter. According to this mode [form] is in no way predicated of a composite or matter — just as, for example, we cannot say that man or flesh is a soul. In the second manner the nature of a form receives being and a concrete mode, a qualitative and adjacent and inhering and naming mode — namely, denoting matter by its name — and in this way it is predicated of its matter.

Perhaps what I say moves you [to ask]: if the form is an intellect separable from all matter and dimension, in what way can it receive the second mode of being? Because this seems to be the mode of passions and impressions, which are forms situated and divisible by accident through the division of the subject.

Understand that all forms receive the concrete mode, naming or qualifying (whether they are substantial or accidental). Thus substantials which either necessarily need to subsist in matter, or are designed and created to be in matter and truly perfecting matter, inform and name their matter (in the concrete predicate mode, namely), either in accordance with [their] being or [their] operation, namely, so that perhaps, in these material forms, the very substance of a form receives partition and extension by sustaining an accident, as, for example, the substantial, corporeal forms, inanimate and animate, namely the vegetative and sensitive souls. Yet in forms separable by magnitude, as is the rational soul, understand that, at least it names with respect to its operations, its proper matters.

From the aforesaid, understand that [the proposition] 'Socrates is a man' [and] 'a man is a man' is the same as if I said 'Socrates or the matter of Socrates is humanified', [or] 'a man or the matter of a man is humanified'. And the word 'humanified' seems proper, since by this word 'humanified', which is concrete, the form itself is understood in the concrete and qualifying mode. Understand all predications in a similar way: 'a pearl is a stone', means a pearl or the matter of a pearl is stonified. But this is not a phrase in [common] use. So this defect in language, [failure to] impose words concretely designating these forms which are substances, impedes us greatly. From the few verbs [imposed], however, we may get a common rule for all. For example: 'light' and 'it is light' signify the same; 'understanding' and 'it understands' signify the same; 'the log is colored', 'the log and the matter of the log are colored'; 'man is an animal' [means] not

‘man is a soul’, [but rather] ‘the man and his matter are animated’. Light is in the air and illuminates, qualifies, [and] is predicated of it. Air is not, however, light, but [rather] lit. Observe [thus] the concrete mode. Similarly, [regarding] what you asked at the outset, ‘form is predicated of matter’, is true, and properly and exquisitely devised. Matter is not, however, form, but is formed and is something formed.

Along with this, you also see that, when you consider whether gifts from nature or from grace and the same or different, you can understand that those from grace are predicated of the natural, but only concretely. That is to say that grace itself, which makes natural goods in rational creations pleasing [to God], informs and is concretely predicated of the same [natural goods].

Does it not, therefore, seem to you that the truth which is one alone, and is God, by which all truths are true, namely that truth itself which is God, as St. Augustine has proved, is predicated of all truths? And similarly Augustine has proved of justice that it is the same and unique, which is God, by which all just things are called just; and this is predicated concretely of all just created things. What kind-heartedness, what generosity! The Creator allows Himself to be predicated in some way, namely concretely and through some names signifying Him, namely designating [His] quality. But such a name is predicated of the Creator himself, namely concretely and abstractly, because essentially. Yet [it is predicated] of created things only concretely — that is, through participation, and not essentially. For this being, which is the being of justice, [and] the being of truth, is not [the being] of created things. And therefore no created thing is called just and true essentially and abstractively, but [only] through participation and concretely.

Man of God, I think that you have heard enough, both in general and about the particulars, from what was said above: [you now know] that form is predicated of matter, and [you know] how. The form, I say, which is a nature and an object in matter existing outside the soul and the intellect.

*[In what manner a species is predicated of matter]*

Now I return to the form which is a species of an existing object. And [here] I say generally, whether [the form] is a sensible or an intelligible, that it acquires new being from its new matter by abstraction, namely [different] from the [form in a] gross, corporeal, external object. It is predicated similarly [and] proportionally concretely of it — namely, [its] more subtle matter — just as that object form, existing extrinsically in the gross matter [is predicated of its matter]. But this is a great impediment in the Latin language, namely that names are not imposed to signify species *per se* and according to species being, as distinct from the being of an external object. And I say this, we do not have simple names, by which species of sensible forms and intelligible natural objects are designated, neither with respect to abstraction nor concretion, but we note them through circumlocution in some manner. And you know that that is a problem for us in making known many truths. I say however that just as color is predicated of the corporeal, colored subject (and this is the force of predication [where we say] that the body is colorized, and is colored and [is] not color), so the species of color, in the

medium or as received in sight, is predicated of this or that matter concretely, not abstractly.

For we say, by circumlocution, 'the transparency of air is quasi [ut] colorized', [which] you understand as if one word, 'quasi [ut] colorized'. So it is necessary for me to borrow, and thus I say that the transparency itself is 'quasi [ut] color'. For here we have what designates the abstract nature of the species of color, which is thus not predicated of matter, but neither of some color, but only of some quasi [ut] color — that is, of some thing designated by the species of color. The species of color is therefore predicated of sight, but concretely. And some one [thing], namely numerically one, is made from these (sight and species), just as from light and air. Not as [one thing is made] from matter and a substantial form, nor from an accidental form, but a habit-form.

*[To the third question - That species are concretely predicated of sensibles]*

Understand from this in which way sensibles are in a certain manner, [namely] that manner according to which sensibles are in a certain manner predicated of the senses themselves. And how [is] this the case? The manner, namely, in which the ultimate species of sensibles, the more and more truly sensible, are concretely and truly predicated of the senses themselves.

Understand similarly in the case of the possible intellect and the species of intelligibles, namely that an intelligible species abstracted from an external object can be considered in two ways, abstractively and concretely, proportionally to the nature, existing externally, from which it is extracted. For the nature existing outside has two modes, and with respect to the first mode is predicated of its external material; with respect to the other mode, it is not. For example: the soul of an animal is being animated or is an animated [thing]. I do not say, therefore, that 'man is a soul', for this [is] said abstractively; I say, however, that [man] 'is an animal' and that [man] 'is being animated', and that [man] 'is an animated [thing]', for in all three of these, the nature is predicated, but concretely. Similarly I do not say that man is humanity, but that [man] is being humanified and that [man] is a humanified [thing].

Proportionally, therefore, you should understand that the species of the soul, or animality or humanity or stoniness and so on for other cases — the intelligible species, I say, abstracted namely from every position and corporeality — is predicated of the possible intellect concretely and truly. For example, you can say that the possible intellect, when it understands a stone, truly is stonified; when [it understands] a man, it is truly humanified. That is to say that it is truly perfected and formed, not by the form of man, but by the quasi form of man. And here again you see how much harm accrues to us on account of this impediment, the aforesaid defect of imposition of vocabulary.

[Note in Assisi only]<sup>4</sup>

In some way, therefore, all intelligibles are understood of the Creator himself as you heard earlier. That is, in some way He, who is by definition generosity, most generously allows that He himself be predicated of a rational creature employing some terminology. Yet, this is how you should understand intelligible creatures (which namely cannot immediately touch the possible intellect and be received by it). That is, I say, finally that the species of all such external intelligible objects, abstracted from all position and corporeality, are properly, even if concretively, predicated of the possible intellect which they inform and in which they are received; and further, they are more truly and more principally intelligible of the possible intellect. Therefore, the nature of this possible intellect, which is not situated, but apt to receive tangible species and forms, is adapted to and cognate with these species, namely the intelligibles so abstracted. Therefore, I say, [the nature of the possible intellect is] related and proportional to these species, just as external matter [is designed to receive] nature forms and forms having the being of nature. And you know that I distinguish species being from nature being. And you see also how something unified is made from the possible intellect and the species of a received intelligible, just as [we] frequently established previously.

From what I have said, I believe you can see [the answer to] what you asked at the outset, 'in what manner, namely, sense is potentially such a thing as a sensible is actually'. For this is because sense and the sensitive organ are, before they act, potential and capable of being qualified, named and formed through concrete predication by a sensible in act — that is, by a sensible species. For a sensible species made actual and abstracted is called an actual sensible; but the external form [is called] a potential sensible. However, when the sense or the organ actually receives the species, [it is similarly actual]. [This is] similar to a body that is able to receive corporeal light before it receives, is potentially similar to a projecting corporeal light source and its projected light; after it receives light, however, it is lit and actually is made similar to light and luminosity.

Understand altogether similarly in the case of the intellect and intelligibles, namely that the possible intellect before it actually receives intelligible species is potentially in some way an intelligible in act. That is, the intellect is potential and able to be named, informed and qualified, illuminated by infused light, namely by an abstracted intelligible species, which is indeed called an intelligible in act. The external nature, however, from which the species itself is abstracted, is called the potential intelligible. And the previously mentioned possible intellect, in virtue of its capacity to receive, is potentially similar. However, when it actually has received, it is made actually similar to both the infused species and the external projected [object].

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<sup>4</sup> The following text (translated here) begins the note: *So therefore an external intelligible nature is neither a substance nor an accident, whose species is not made to be abstractly received and understood. Taken separately or together by comparison and contrast, correlating, and inspecting, you distinguish between them, just as when you see the lights of the diverse stars simultaneously in the same part of the medium, both with the same organ and finally with the same sense.* This text appears somewhat out of place, so it is given here as a footnote. The note ends at the start of Question 4.

Note, however, that here it seems to me that the external object nature is not an infusing [thing], namely it is not a sufficiently potent [thing] to generate its species abstracted from it and outside of it. But rather I say it is the object nature (genus, subject, source and matter) from which some intellect in act abstracts and by which it distinguishes actual intelligible being from potential intelligible being. It is some such intellect as the philosophers call the agent intellect, either some power of the intellective soul, or some external intelligence, namely something created, [uncreated], or the first cause according to various opinions. [For] how the rational soul understands itself or an angel, and how an angel [understands] an angel or a soul, look elsewhere at the treatment in other questions.

#### [Question Four: What is intelligible?]

But what do you say, Man of God? Already you say the abstracted species of a sensible thing and the species of an intelligible are similar, and you distinguish and differentiate each species with respect to being, name, and definition from the nature of the external object. But how do you distinguish this species from that, and through what, and how is a sensible not an intelligible? Rather it seems that it is indeed [intelligible], for every creature truly is intelligible, both by the First intellect and by a created intellect, unless there is a defect on the part of our intellect, on account of which namely it would not be able to understand the first principles, which, as far as they themselves are concerned, are maximally intelligible. But because of this defect and corruptibility and worsening of our intellect, which is worsened by a corruptible body, the species themselves are understood less, just as the sun [is less seen] by the eye of a bat [*Metaph.*, 993b9-12]. Isn't it true, therefore, that color is truly intelligible? Indeed, because it is truly definable [*De sensu et sensato*, 439b11-14], therefore it is truly knowable, therefore etc. And so on in the case of all the other sensibles.

Or will, therefore, every sensible be truly and simply intelligible? Indeed, universally every creature will be intelligible. Whether [it is] universal or particular, it will truly be intelligible and knowable, for all principles whether common or proper, truly and simply are knowable and intelligible.

But on the contrary: sense is not the intellect, therefore a sensible is not an intelligible. What therefore do you want, Man of God? When will you stop? Or do you not see that an intelligible is spoken about in two ways? First, namely the remote external [intelligible]; [secondly] the ultimate, proximate and immediate thing touching the receiving intellect — the species, namely, itself abstracted from all location and corporeality and made actually intelligible.

Similarly you distinguish on the part of a sensible that "sensible" is [understood] in two ways: first the remote, external sensible, and finally the proximate sensible, namely the species. Respond therefore and say that every sensible, whether primary or ultimate, is intelligible; the primary [is] remote and external. However, no sensible as such is

altogether an ultimate intelligible, entering, namely, and immediately touching the intellect itself.

Do you want to know the cause of this, Man of God? Because every sensible, whether primary or ultimate, is situated; and the sense itself is situated. For [it is] both an actual organic body and a perfection and a natural form [*De anima*, 412b5]. An ultimate intelligible, however, is a form and a species abstracted from all location and corporeality. Hence it is more abstract than the abstraction of any sensible.

Therefore you should say that a sensible and an ultimate intelligible are distinguished as sense and intellect [are]. And [some] argue: sense is not intellect, therefore a sensible is not an intelligible, but [this is] not [the case for the] primary sensible and intelligible. For this too, namely a primary intelligible, can be corporeal and situated. The Philosopher says: every sensible is in a place [*Phys.*, 209a26]. What is this except what you are hearing now, namely that every sensible is situated? This pertains to it, namely to a sensible, being in a place. I get this division, namely [between] primary and ultimate intelligibles and sensibles, from what is commonly established by the Philosopher in [cases of] acting and moving, namely that the agent and the mover are spoken about in two ways, namely primary and ultimate. Hence universally you know that ultimate moving and primary motion are together, and there is nothing between them [*Phys.*, 243a3-6]. But between the primary mover and motion, whether primary or ultimate, there can be something intermediate.

### [Question Five: Of the cause of the immortality of the soul]

But you still do not allow me to pause, [but] rather you want to wrench a great deal out of me, although you know that I am inadequate to the task. And [you want to know from me] the cause of the immortality of the rational soul, on account of which, namely, [the soul] is not corruptible. For this is what you call its mortality here. For you know well that every creature is reducible to nothing, as far as it is concerned in itself, unless it is sustained and governed by the First himself and the Word of his power, and favored by the Spirit, from whose goodness and generosity it receives being in all ways. This then we do not call corruption, properly speaking, nor mortality. You also know that there is mortality of grace and there is mortality of nature. Mortality of grace is a privation, namely of grace and morals and of good life and — as I may say in summary — mortality of grace is a privation of [all] graces. Mortality of nature, however, is subdivided: either of the conjoint human,<sup>5</sup> and that is the separation of the soul from the body; or an extinction of the soul in itself, namely of life in itself — of natural life, I say — namely, that it should cease to be a spirit, [but] not, however, altogether go out of existence. That is, the light that was in it would be extinguished, [but] there would remain, however, some original constituents into which it would be dispersed.

You know, however, that the life of the soul is a first act — it is the first act of the soul, I say, not the second act, as the Philosopher distinguishes [it] [*De anima*, 412a22-23]: first

<sup>5</sup> “Conjoint human” refers to the soul bound to a mortal body.

act and second, knowledge and reflecting, namely, habit and act, namely the usual operation. Thus, Man of God, you live [even when] sleeping [*De anima*, 417a9-12]. And according to the Philosopher, 'In all apprehending beings, life is apprehension' [*Eth. Nicom.*, 1170a15-16] — I call 'apprehension' a first act, not necessarily a second. In plants, however, what is life except animation or vivification; a habit in fact, not a usual act? These are difficult [things] which you go through quickly here, Man of God, but I think it pleases you in this abridged form.

In addition, it doesn't remain obscure to you that a corruptible is spoken of in two ways: either *per se*, or *per accidens*. A corruptible *per se* has an active or passive contrary, or [is] composed of contraries.

Hot and cold [have a contrary] in the first way, [but] a mixture of the four [elements has a contrary] in the second way. However, a material form is called a corruptible *per accidens*, necessarily requiring a subject and constituted in being through the subject, [and] is divisible *per accidens* through the division of the subject. [As] I said above, a corruptible *per se* has an active or passive contrary. I added this because not every contrary is corruptible. For every division of any univocal genus is by contraries — namely, essential divisive differentia. For as the Philosopher establishes [in Book] ten of the so-called First Philosophy, all difference is contrariety in forms. And you know that he intends by what he calls 'difference' the primary diversity of those [contraries] which primarily divide a univocal genus. And these are contraries, namely essential divisive differentia. But they are not active or passive, and thus not corruptible.

From this you see that the rational soul cannot be corruptible *per se*. For it is not composed of contraries; but [also], even though it is a form, [neither] does it have an active or passive contrary. For even though it is a distinct species and hence has its essential constitutive differentia divisive of its genus (and so there is another contrary differentia to it, condividing the same genus essentially), it does not, however, have an active or passive contrary. And thus gather summarily from the aforesaid the cause on account of which [the rational soul] itself is not corruptible *per se*. You know concerning the first corruptibles made that the first Goodness does not will, nor is it appropriate for nature itself or entity or goodness to return to pure nothing. Nor can any creature [annihilate], since the [creature has] only a finite power, but [annihilation], however, pertains to infinite power.

You know well about the corruption which is called mortality of grace, how things are related in such [cases]. However, you can gather from the aforesaid, concerning the corruption which is the extinction of light and life in [the soul], that although it has a contrary, it [does] not, however, [have] an active or passive [contrary]. It can, however, at least mentally, be resolved and reduced into its original constituents, that is, the genus or genera or subject matter of its genera. But because its essential differentia does not have an active or passive contrary, the corruption of its differentia — i.e., the reduction into substance of its genus by [something] possibly persisting and remaining — does not necessarily posit the actual existence of some opposite species under its genus, so that the corruption of one is generation of another. And therefore, although it is possible mentally to reduce its differentia into the substance of its genus, because that

imperfect genus, namely entity, is a diminished being, it is unable to exist outside the mind except when joined to some species. And from this reduction of differentia into its genus, as said above, it does not follow that contrary opposite differences of the species are posited in actual existence. Therefore, I say, understand very neatly from these [things] the cause on account of which [the rational soul] itself is not corruptible *per se*, and consider the aforesaid well.

But now you expect [from me], the last thing necessary in this question, namely whether it is corruptible *per accidens*. You know therefore from the aforesaid what [it means] for a form to be or be said to be corruptible *per accidens*.

You also know that this argument of Averroes has great credibility among the moderns, namely that because the intellect receives all material forms, and “every receiver lacks what is received or to be received,” the intellect is none of these material forms. The rational soul is not a material form, therefore it is not divisible through the division of [its] subject, nor is it constituted in being by [its] subject. Or in another way, if it pleases [you], that [the soul] “is not a body nor a power in a body.” And I call “a power in a body” that which you heard about before, namely [something] material and divisible and constituted in being by [its] subject. You know well, however, that there are two kinds of objections to this argument.

First: because just as the intellect receives all material forms, so it also receives all immaterial [forms], and much more properly as it seems; and every recipient is denuded of the received. Therefore according to the aforesaid argument: just as it is no material form, thus neither is it an immaterial [form], therefore it is no form at all.

Second, that speaking *per se* the intellect receives no material form as such, insofar as [it has] material being. On the contrary, [it is received] insofar as [its] being is abstracted from matter and from material being. Hence speaking *per se* it does not receive a material form as such, because this is proper to prime matter. On the contrary, it receives intelligible species, spiritual ideas as such. So how [can it receive] material species? Or is this rather only *per accidens*?

I do not know whether it would please you to go through things in this way. For you have already seen enough above [to the effect that] an intelligible in act is an abstractible and made abstracted from every position and corporeality, and beyond every abstraction of sensible being, so that it is intelligible in act, and altogether not situated. But any sensible, whether it be remote or ultimate, abstracted in its particular way, is altogether situated and is in no way removed from [its] position. Argue from this as from principles, that the intellect is not a situated form. From [this] conclusion God leads you to this, namely that the intellect is not a material form.

Just the same, Man of God, you say [that] because it is not situated, therefore it is not materially divisible, namely by division of the subject. Therefore it is not corruptible *per accidens*. What has just been shown to you now was all you had in mind in the question [originally] proposed. For it is firm, solid and appropriate. Moreover, that which you heard above about that famous argument, if you accept it, embrace it. If, however, [you



do] not, you will be able to say — just as you have heard — that it altogether does not receive material [forms] as such.

But how do you feel, however, about the other case? For since [the rational soul] itself is an immaterial form, it cannot as such receive all immaterial [forms], since every receiver lacks the received, and it can never lack itself. Understand therefore that what [the rational soul] is in itself is an immaterial nature form, and not situated. But it receives species-forms, not nature-forms, among which you have already heard enough to distinguish, and unless you distinguish [them], you will often be vulnerable to blunder. Whether therefore it understands itself or an angel or corporeal natures, it receives nothing except abstracted species-forms, and not nature-forms. Hence it is an immaterial form — it is true — namely a nature-form. It receives, however, all immaterial forms — it is [also] true — [but] species-forms, not natures. See what you can conclude: [that] therefore it is true that it is not [one] of the immaterial forms, namely of [immaterial] species. But for [more detail on] how it understands and receives its species, and is abstracted from itself, look elsewhere, namely in the aforementioned Sixteen Questions, and [you have] an example appropriate to this thing in a corporeal mirror — namely just as an image of the mirror itself can be represented [and reflected] in a corporeal mirror, and not just once, but many times and again.

You see, therefore, how these species forms received in the intellect, although they are called immaterial [forms], are yet more material than the soul or the angel from which they are abstracted. For they cannot exist in themselves, according to this abstracted being, but necessarily require matter appropriate to them, in which they too can be received, namely non-situational [matter]. These abstracted species, however, when they are abstracted from corporeal natures, are less material and more spiritual than the natures from which they are abstracted. Nonetheless, both these and those, just as you have heard, are material [forms] and require only non-situational matter.

Man of God: the peace of the Lord between you and me, and may you be at peace, and free from disturbance. I do not know whether in perpetuity. But pray for me without ceasing.

*[Colophon]:*

[Here ends the Mirror of the Soul, discovered theologically and best understood according to the sense of Aristotle, in which all we Christians, faithful to Christ, should assent, and by no means resist, etc.]