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# The Symbionese Liberation Army in Los Angeles

**A report prepared by the  
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT  
JULY 19, 1974**

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## PREFACE

In the view of the Los Angeles Police Department, the 54th Street encounter in which six persons died, was a police action primarily designed to take heavily-armed criminal suspects into custody. In the eyes of the SLA, it was a war. But, if it was, the truest philosophical evaluation of the event is to be found in the lead paragraph of the Los Angeles Times editorial of May 23, 1974, entitled "The Police Did What They Had to Do":

"The first thing to be said about the shootout on E. 54th St. is that it was a war without victory. The death of those six young people, some of them with such promise for their lives, is a loss for society. But society already had lost them when they abandoned the opportunities for peaceful change and retreated into the extremes of hatred and violence, into nihilism."

## INTRODUCTION

On Friday, May 17, 1974, a violent encounter erupted between the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in a residential area of Southeast Los Angeles. Countless thousands viewed the event on television and many more heard it described on radio. As a result of the encounter, six members of the SLA died.

On Saturday, May 18, 1974, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley requested the President of the Police Commission to cause a full and complete report of the event to be prepared. This report is submitted in response to the Mayor's request.

The SLA first drew national attention in November, 1973, when it claimed responsibility for the assassination of Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster. Thereafter, the SLA engaged in a series of criminal acts in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst and the robbery of the Hibernia Bank. It proclaimed itself as a modern-day urban guerrilla organization bent on violence to inspire revolutionary activity against the "ruling class in the name of the oppressed people".

The SLA surfaced in the Los Angeles area on May 16, 1974, with a shoplifting incident and a shooting at an Inglewood sporting goods store. After firing fifty rounds of automatic weapon fire into the store front, the SLA members fled the scene. Thereafter, a series of car thefts, a kidnapping and an FBI-LAPD entry into an SLA hideout at 833 West 84th Street culminated in the incident at 1466 East 54th Street.

The report that follows documents LAPD activities leading up to, during and following the confrontation. Questions raised by the community have been examined and investigated. A total of more than 2,983 man-hours has gone into the preparation of this report. In determining exact time sequences of events, the Department had the benefit of the use of tapes furnished by KNXT and KTLA, pictures from the Los Angeles Times and Herald Examiner, and the tape of the on-scene radio broadcast by KFWB. The assistance of these organizations in providing this material is gratefully acknowledged.

Information contained in the portion of the report entitled "History of the Symbionese Liberation Army" is documented in Federal Bureau of Investigation reports and "The Study of the Symbionese Liberation Army" published by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security.

Information contained in the remaining sections of the report was gathered by members of the task force through personal interviews with involved parties to the SLA actions in Los Angeles.

The scope of this report is limited in certain areas because of pending criminal prosecutions and the continuing search for remaining SLA fugitives.

Certain facts established by the investigation should be noted:

1. Of the 410 LAPD officers engaged in the operation, only twenty-nine LAPD members, all SWAT personnel, discharged firearms (p. 109); seven FBI personnel discharged firearms (p. 47).
2. LAPD does not possess either incendiary or armor-piercing ammunition and no such ammunition was used during the encounter (p. 41).
3. SWAT team members made a total of twenty-nine surrender appeals during the incident by use of bullhorn loudspeakers; eighteen appeals preceded the firing of tear gas canisters (p. 43), nine appeals followed the commencement of shooting (p. 49) and two appeals were made after the fire started (p. 51) which also included the information that the house was on fire.
4. Although a SWAT team member requested permission to use fragmentation grenades (which LAPD does not have but which could be obtained), such request was promptly denied by the Director, Office of Operations (p. 49) which denial was reaffirmed by the Chief of Police (p. 49). The Assistant Director of the FBI, Los Angeles Office stated that the FBI personnel did not use fragmentation grenades. (p. 49)
5. The fire of unknown origin (p. 57) which started at 1841 hours (p. 51) had completely engulfed the house in just nine minutes (p. 53). Because of the automatic weapon fire coming from the house at this time, the Battalion Chief at the scene determined that his men could not safely extinguish the fire (p. 57). At 1858 hours, while the roof and walls of the house collapsed, live ammunition was still exploding inside the house (p. 57). At 1859 hours LAPD notified the Los Angeles Fire Department that hostile fire had ceased (p. 55). The Fire Department then quickly responded to the scene.



## HISTORY OF THE SYMBIONESE LIBERATION ARMY (SLA)

### SLA Profiles

Personal profiles of the more significant figures in the SLA movement have been compiled in order to establish their relationships to the group and to give a brief description of events leading to their association with the terrorist organization.

#### Angela Atwood

AKA: "Gelina"  
Sex: Female  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-five years  
Date of Birth: February 6, 1949  
Place of Birth: Patterson, New Jersey

Angela Atwood graduated from the University of Indiana in 1970, with a major in Speech and honors in Theater Arts. While attending the University of Indiana, she met and lived with William and Emily Harris, who were also students at that University. She was the estranged wife of Gary Dean Atwood.

She was a student teacher in Indianapolis, Indiana, prior to moving to the San Francisco Bay Area. While in the San Francisco Bay Area, she worked as a waitress in a restaurant. She dated both Russell Little and Joseph Remiro prior to their arrest.

Angela Atwood died on May 17, 1974, at 1466 East 54th Street, Los Angeles, California. According to the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, death was caused by burns and smoke inhalation.

#### Donald David DeFreeze

AKA: "Cinque"  
Sex: Male  
Race: Negro  
Age: Thirty years  
Date of Birth: November 16, 1943  
Place of Birth: Cleveland, Ohio

Donald DeFreeze was the oldest of eight children born to Mary DeFreeze of Cleveland, Ohio. He dropped out of

school at the age of 14 and engaged in criminal conduct. His first recorded contact with police occurred in Buffalo, New York, for burglary and grand larceny auto when he was 16 years old. In the 14 years that followed, he was arrested over 14 times for felonies in New York, New Jersey and California. Included in these felonies were charges for burglary, possession of pipe bombs, possession of fire bombs, and possession of firearms. He was arrested in Los Angeles in December, 1967, for robbery and eventually cooperated with Department investigators in the arrest of Ronald Coleman and the recovery of guns taken in a burglary. However, he has never been a paid informant of the Los Angeles Police Department.

Donald DeFreeze was last convicted for a 1969 shooting which occurred at a bank at 3600 Stocker Avenue in Los Angeles. While he was attempting to cash a \$1,000 stolen Cashier's check, a bank guard attempted to apprehend him. Donald DeFreeze fled from the bank firing seven shots at his pursuers from a .32 automatic weapon. He was apprehended by the bank guard and a Los Angeles Police sergeant. On May 18, 1970, after a jury trial, he was sentenced to six years in prison and transferred to the California Medical Facility at Vacaville for psychiatric evaluation and treatment. After showing signs of mental stability, Donald DeFreeze was transferred from the medical facility to Soledad Prison in early 1973. On March 5, 1973, he climbed a fence and walked away from a work assignment in an unguarded portion of the prison.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, he claimed leadership of the SLA as "General Field Marshal Cinque" and led the SLA in its criminal activities.

According to the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, Donald DeFreeze died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head on May 17, 1974, at 1466 East 54th Street, Los Angeles, California.

Camilla Christina Hall

AKA: "Gabby"  
Sex: Female  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-nine years  
Date of Birth: March 24, 1945  
Place of Birth: Minnesota

Camilla Hall was the daughter of a Lutheran minister. She was the only one of his three daughters and a son who survived childhood. She attended the University of Minnesota and majored in Humanities. After graduating from the University of Minnesota in 1967, she was employed in Duluth as a social worker and later worked in Minneapolis as a counselor to unwed mothers.

Camilla Hall arrived in Berkeley in 1970, and for a time worked as a gardener and park attendant. She met and lived with Patricia Soltysik.

According to the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, Camilla Hall died of a single gunshot wound on May 17, 1974, at 1466 East 54th Street, Los Angeles, California.

Emily Montague Harris

AKA: "Yolanda"  
Sex: Female  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-seven years  
Date of Birth: February 11, 1947  
Place of Birth: Baltimore, Maryland

Emily Harris is the daughter of Frederic W. Schwartz, a management consultant in Clarendon Hills, Illinois. She attended the University of Indiana where she majored in English. While at the University, she met William Harris and married him approximately two years later. They settled in the Oakland area in 1972. While in Oakland, she resided at 5939 Chabot Road. She took a job as a typist in the Social Research Office of the University of California at Berkeley. According to the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Office of the FBI, she became active in Venceremos and headed the Oakland-Chino Defense Committee to raise funds for the defense of Venceremos members accused of conspiracy and murder in a Chino Prison escape.

Emily Harris is currently a fugitive being sought on felony warrants issued by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office charging her with

kidnapping, robbery, driving without owner's consent, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder.

In addition, she is being sought on a Federal warrant for violation of the National Firearms Act.

The present whereabouts of Emily Harris is unknown.

William Taylor Harris

AKA: "Teko", Mganga"  
Sex: Male  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-nine years  
Date of Birth: January 22, 1945  
Place of Birth: Fort Sill, Oklahoma

William Harris is a Marine Corps veteran and is receiving a \$22 a month disability pension from the government. He graduated from the University of Indiana in 1968, where he majored in English. He taught for a short time in a public school in Bloomington, Indiana.

In 1972 he married Emily Schwartz, who took the name Emily Montague Harris. Sometime after their marriage, they settled in Oakland, California. While in Oakland, he resided at 5939 Chabot Road. William Harris worked part-time as a postal clerk.

William Harris is currently a fugitive being sought on felony warrants issued by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office charging him with kidnapping, robbery, driving without owner's consent, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder.

In addition, he is being sought on a Federal warrant for violation of the National Firearms Act.

The present whereabouts of William Harris is unknown.

Patricia Campbell Hearst

AKA: "Tania"  
Sex: Female  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty years  
Date of Birth: February 20, 1954  
Place of Birth: San Francisco, California

Patricia Campbell Hearst is the third oldest of five daughters born to Randolph and Catherine Hearst of Hillsborough, California. Patricia Hearst attended Crystal Springs Private School in Hillsborough, California. While attending this school, she met Steven Weed, an instructor. When Patricia was seventeen she moved to 2603 Benvenue Avenue, Berkeley. She enrolled in the University of California at Berkeley as an art student. Patricia and Steven Weed resided at the Benvenue Avenue address and planned to be married in June, 1974. Patricia Hearst has known Steven Weed for over two years.

After Patricia Hearst's kidnapping, a series of taped communiques were received from the SLA. In these communiques, Patricia Hearst asked her father to grant the SLA ransom demand of supplying food to the poor. According to Ludlow Kramer, who was selected by Randolph Hearst to direct the food distribution program, 2.3 million dollars of free food was distributed in the San Francisco and Oakland Bay Area. After this had been accomplished, the SLA announced that they would free Patricia Hearst. As the time for her release drew near, a tape recording was delivered to a Berkeley radio station. In this recording Patricia Hearst stated, "I have been given the choice of being released in a safe area or joining the forces of the Symbionese Liberation Army and fighting for my freedom and the freedom of all oppressed people. I have chosen to stay and fight."

Patricia Hearst is currently a fugitive being sought on felony warrants issued by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office charging her with kidnapping, robbery, driving without owner's consent, assault with intent to commit murder, and assault with a deadly weapon.

In addition, she is being sought on Federal warrants for violation of the National Firearms Act and robbery.

Russell Jack Little

AKA: "Osceola"  
Sex: Male  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-four years  
Date of Birth: September 20, 1949  
Place of Birth: California

According to school records, Russell Little graduated ninth in his high school class of 600. He went to Florida State University and graduated with a degree in Philosophy. He traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, where he worked in a gas station for an unknown period of time. He moved to San Francisco and settled in Oakland where he met Joseph Remiro.

According to the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Office of the FBI, Little resided at 5939 Chabot Road in Oakland; however, he had established at least one other residence. In August of 1973, Little used the name George Devoto and lived at 1560 Sutherland Court, Clayton Valley, Contra Costa County.

Little also attended the Black Cultural Association meetings which were held at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville.

At 0120 hours on January 10, 1974, Russell Little, accompanied by Joseph Remiro, was driving a Chevrolet van through the Clayton Valley area of Contra Costa County, California. The van was observed by a Concord Police officer and after a brief surveillance, the officer stopped the van in order to check the passengers and the vehicle. After obtaining a false driver's license from Little, the officer walked back to his police vehicle. At this point either Little or his passenger opened fire on the officer, missing him but striking the police car. The officer returned the gunfire, and was able to puncture a tire on the van and inflict a superficial wound in Little's shoulder. Little and Remiro were subsequently taken into custody. Ballistics tests of the guns found on both suspects revealed one of them to be the weapon used to assassinate Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster.

Little presently remains confined at the Oakland Courthouse Jail, Oakland, California.

Nancy Ling Perry

AKA: "Fahizah"  
Sex: Female  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-six years  
Date of Birth: September 19, 1947  
Place of Birth: Oakland, California

Nancy Ling Perry attended high school in Santa Rosa, California, graduating in 1965. She entered Whittier College after her graduation, but withdrew in 1966. From 1966 to 1971, she attended the University of California at Berkeley, taking a year off to work for a wholesale floor covering distributor. In 1971, she graduated from the University of California at Berkeley with a Bachelor's Degree in English Literature. Subsequently, she commenced graduate studies in Chemistry as part of a pre-med course.

In 1967, she married Gilbert Scott Perry, a musician. They separated in February, 1973. After the separation, she worked at a nightclub in the North Beach section of San Francisco and later was employed at Fruity Rudy's juice stand in Berkeley. Her employer at the juice stand had indicated that possibly \$130 of her \$140 weekly salary was given to inmates at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville.

Nancy Ling Perry became involved in the prison reform movement and had been associated with the United Prisoners Union in San Francisco. She made regular visits to convicts in the prisons at Vacaville and Folsom. At Vacaville, she visited Raymond Sparks, the reputed former Chief of Staff of the SLA.

Congressional and law enforcement investigations have established that in August, 1973, Nancy Ling Perry, using the name Nancy Devoto; and Russell Little, using the name George Devoto; rented a home at 1560 Sutherland Court, Clayton Valley, Contra Costa County. This home was used as an armory, bomb factory and headquarters for the SLA. On January 10, 1974, a fire was set in the house using gasoline and gunpowder. Witnesses observed Nancy Ling Perry and several other persons fleeing the house in an unidentified van. Evidence recovered at 1560 Sutherland Court included: Cyanide-tipped bullets, pipe bombs, ammunition, parts of weapons, maps and a

communique calling for the death of prison employees and their families.

Nancy Ling Perry adopted the name "Fahizah" after joining the SLA. On January 19, 1974, the San Francisco Examiner received a letter from "Fahizah" proclaiming that she, Remiro and Little were members of the SLA and were dedicated to violent revolution.

According to the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, Nancy Ling Perry died of gunshot wounds on May 17, 1974, at 1466 East 54th Street, Los Angeles, California.

Joseph Michael Remiro

AKA: "Bo"  
Sex: Male  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-seven years  
Date of Birth: September 11, 1946  
Place of Birth: San Francisco, California

Joseph Remiro served in Vietnam with the United States Army, 101st Airborne Division. He returned to the Oakland area after being discharged and became active in anti-war groups. While in Oakland, he is known to have resided at 5939 Chabot Road. It was during this period that he met Russell Little and Angela Atwood.

At 0120 hours on January 10, 1974, Joseph Remiro, accompanied by Russell Little, was riding in a Chevrolet van through the Clayton Valley area of Contra Costa County. The van was observed by a Concord Police officer and after a brief surveillance, the officer stopped the van in order to check the passengers and the vehicle. After obtaining a false driver's license from Little, the officer walked back to his police vehicle. At this point, either Little or his passenger opened fire on the officer, missing him but striking the police car. In the gunfight Russell Little, who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver, was wounded and captured. Joseph Remiro fled and was subsequently captured nearby. At the time of his arrest, Remiro was armed with a .380 automatic pistol. The van was registered to Nancy Devoto, a name used by Nancy Ling Perry. A search of the van revealed SLA literature, weapons and other evidence which linked Remiro and Little to the murder of Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster.



Joseph Remiro is currently confined at the Oakland Courthouse Jail, Oakland, California.

Patricia Michele Soltysik

AKA: "Mizmoon"  
Sex: Female  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-four years  
Date of Birth: May 17, 1950  
Place of Birth: Goleta, California

Patricia Soltysik was a high school honor graduate from Goleta, California. She was the daughter of a pharmacist and was active in high school politics and 4-H Club activities. She went to the University of California at Berkeley on a scholarship and pursued courses in Sociology.

Patricia Soltysik met and lived with Camilla Hall. She was called "Mizmoon" by Camilla Hall, a name Patricia Soltysik later legally adopted. In 1971, she dropped out of school and became active in the prison reform movement. In November, 1973, she visited her parents in Santa Barbara, California, and asked her mother to destroy all photographs which could be used by police to identify her.

She was employed as a janitor in a Berkeley library prior to January, 1974.

On her 24th birthday, May 17, 1974, Patricia Soltysik died at 1466 East 54th Street, Los Angeles, California. According to the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, death was caused by a combination of burns, smoke inhalation and multiple gunshot wounds.

William Lawton Wolfe

AKA: "Cujo"  
Sex: Male  
Race: Caucasian  
Age: Twenty-three years  
Date of Birth: February 17, 1951  
Place of Birth: New Milford, Connecticut

William "Willie" Wolfe was the son of a Pennsylvania anesthesiologist. His parents are divorced and his

father, who subsequently remarried, lives in Emmaus, Pennsylvania.

After his arrival in California, William Wolfe attended the University of California at Berkeley where he was enrolled in a Black Studies program. He met Colston Westbrook in Berkeley in 1972, and became a tutor in the Black Cultural Association which held classes at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville. Records of the California State Penitentiary at Folsom showed that William Wolfe was an approved visitor of Clifford Jefferson. Early in 1974, he dropped out of the University of California at Berkeley.

According to the report of the House Committee on Internal Security, Wolfe had attended the same junior college as Russell Little and also shared the same Oakland rooming house at 5939 Chabot Road for an unknown period of time. From October to December, 1973, he shared a house with Joseph Remiro.

William Wolfe held the posts of Treasurer and Chief of Information for the Symbionese Liberation Army. While visiting his father in Pennsylvania, Wolfe was informed by telephone of the arrest of Russell Little and Joseph Remiro. On January 11, 1974, he disappeared.

According to the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, William Wolfe died of smoke inhalation and burns on May 17, 1974, at 1466 East 54th Street, Los Angeles, California.

#### Other SLA Members

It is alleged that others who constituted the SLA membership were Jean Wah Chan, Amanda de Normanville, David William Gunnell, Clifford Jefferson, Raymond R. Sparks, Robyn Sue Steiner, Christopher Brother Thompson and Thero Lavon Wheeler.

Some members of this group attended meetings of the Black Cultural Association held at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville. In addition to inmates Clifford Jefferson, Raymond Sparks, Thero Wheeler and Donald DeFreeze, the meetings at the medical facility were attended by Nancy Ling Perry, William Wolfe, Russell Little and Amanda de Normanville.

Another meeting place for the Black Cultural Association was a house at 5939 Chabot Road, Oakland, California, which was

the residence of Jean Wah Chan and David Gunnell. Nancy Ling Perry, William Wolfe, William and Emily Harris, Russell Little, Joseph Remiro, Robyn Steiner and Christopher Brother Thompson have all resided at this location in the past.

### SLA Goals

The basic philosophy and ideals of the SLA were rooted in terrorist revolutionary concepts. The intent behind the SLA actions was to create a revolutionary uprising from among "oppressed" peoples, first in the San Francisco area and eventually in the entire United States. They intended to draw attention to their cause and enlist supporters by committing crimes against the "Establishment", such as murder, kidnapping, and robbery.

The SLA distributed several communiques outlining their reasons for existence and declaring war on the "Establishment". They chose as their symbol a seven-headed cobra.

The SLA explained the seven-headed cobra in a leaflet as "one of the first symbols used by people to signify God and Life". The symbol can be traced to "Egyptian Temples and their seven pillars; the seven candles of the pre-Zionist North African religions; the Buddhist and Hindu religions; and to the religions of the North and South American Indian".

According to Dr. S. I. Hayakawa, nationally recognized semanticist, the use of the word "Symbionese" on the SLA letterhead is explained as the "root word". Symbionese means the partnership of dissimilar groups for their mutual benefit.

The SLA subscribes to seven principles. These principles are: Unity, Self Determination, Collective Work and Responsibility, Cooperative Production, Purpose, Creativity, and Faith. The principles were expressed in four languages. The languages were Bantu (spoken by the Swahili Tribe), Spanish, English and Chinese.

### SLA Development and Membership

According to Colston Westbrook, the civilian head of the Black Cultural Association at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville, the SLA originated at the medical facility in March, 1972. This facility is used for the psychiatric evaluation and treatment of California Department of Corrections inmates. Outside tutors were brought to the

medical facility in March, 1972, to conduct Wednesday classes and Friday night cultural meetings. One of the outside tutors, William Wolfe, reportedly recruited other outside people. The Black Cultural Association intended to help inmates prepare for life once they were released from prison.

It is not known who originally generated the idea of the SLA, but Clifford Jefferson, who was an inmate of the California Medical Facility at Vacaville, claims that he and William Wolfe were its first members. The formation of the SLA was accomplished inside the walls of the medical facility by those who attended the Black Cultural Association meetings. Other early members were inmates Raymond Sparks and Donald DeFreeze.

The small group later to become known as the SLA formed at the medical facility in 1972. They did not advertise their existence nor recruit outside a small circle of close friends.

In 1972 and 1973, within the Berkeley campus community there was a strong prison reform movement led by the "Venceremos Organization" and "The Revolutionary Union" which advocated attacks on the "Establishment". This movement brought Russell Little, Amanda de Normanville, Nancy Ling Perry, William and Emily Harris, David Gunnell and Jean Chan together at the Black Cultural Association meetings at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville.

Donald DeFreeze ran for the leadership of the Black Cultural Association after being involved in a philosophical split within the Black Cultural Association. He lost the election but was given leadership of the study group he called "Unisight", a class on the black family. Later, Thero Wheeler, an inmate, took over chairmanship of the study group when Donald DeFreeze was transferred to Soledad State Prison. Thero Wheeler escaped from the California Medical Facility at Vacaville on August 2, 1973. At Soledad, Donald DeFreeze was assigned to a work detail refurbishing boilers in an unused part of the facility. On March 5, 1973, while working in a minimum security area, Donald DeFreeze walked away from the detail, climbed a fence and escaped. After his escape, he made his way to the San Francisco area.

#### SLA Criminal Activity in the San Francisco Area

The first crime what was acknowledged by the SLA was the brutal assassination of Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster and the wounding of Robert Blackburn, Foster's

assistant, in November, 1973. Four days later, in Communique No. 1, the SLA stated that Foster was killed with cyanide-tipped bullets for "crimes against Oakland school children". The admission of the previously undisclosed use of cyanide convinced authorities that the SLA had indeed been responsible for the murder of Marcus Foster. That event commenced a manhunt which was unsuccessful until Russell Little and Joseph Remiro were arrested on January 10, 1974, after a traffic stop and shootout with Concord Police. Evidence found in the van consisted of SLA literature and a rifle purchased in Los Angeles. Ballistics tests of the guns found on both suspects revealed one of them to be the weapon used to assassinate Oakland School Superintendent Marcus Foster.

Using the name of an out-of-state friend, Nancy Ling Perry rented a cottage in Clayton Valley, California. This house became the SLA headquarters until January 10, 1974, when Russell Little and Joseph Remiro were arrested two blocks away. That same day, Nancy Ling Perry was seen running from the house as it burst into flames. Evidence revealed the fire was started by the ignition of spilled gasoline from bottles that were originally molotov cocktails. Quick response by fire units preserved a large quantity of evidence, including ammunition, propaganda and notebooks containing guerrilla warfare information.

The next crime that the SLA claimed responsibility for was the February 4th kidnapping of Patricia Campbell Hearst, daughter of Randolph and Catherine Hearst. Their ransom demands included providing \$70 food packages to a broad spectrum of California's population from welfare recipients to parolees. The total value would have amounted to more than 400 million dollars. After bargaining for several weeks through tape-recorded messages from Patricia Hearst to her father, a six million-dollar ransom demand was agreed upon. Food, valued at two million dollars, was to be distributed immediately and additional food, valued at four million dollars, was to be distributed after Patricia Hearst was released. According to Ludlow Kramer, who was selected by Randolph Hearst to direct the food distribution program, 2.3 million dollars in food was distributed in response to SLA demands. After this had been accomplished, the SLA announced its impending release of Patricia Hearst.

Suddenly a new tape was received. In that tape, Patricia Hearst said, "I have been given the choice of being released in a safe area or joining the forces of the Symbionese

Liberation Army and fighting for my freedom and the freedom of all oppressed peoples. I have decided to stay and fight."

On April 15, 1974, the SLA executed a well-planned bank robbery of the Hibernia Bank in the Sunset Beach district of San Francisco. Patricia Hearst, armed with a .30 caliber carbine was identified as one of the suspects. Other SLA members identified in the robbery were Donald DeFreeze, Nancy Ling Perry, Patricia Soltyzik and Camilla Hall. The robbery netted the SLA \$10,960. Two innocent bystanders were wounded by a burst of automatic weapon fire from Donald DeFreeze as the group left the bank.

### Extremist Tactics

The SLA was unlike any previous so-called urban guerrilla groups. From evidence uncovered in the San Francisco area and Los Angeles, it was apparent that the SLA had formed a well-organized and disciplined terrorist group.

Specific publications have been found with lists, notes and diagrams which indicate that the SLA drew heavily from published sources on guerrilla tactics and philosophy. Notebooks recovered in San Francisco show that the SLA members consistently trained in surveillance, security, field operations and political indoctrination. Also found was a list of chemicals used in the production of explosives and fire bombs.

According to the Special Agent in Charge of the San Francisco Office of the FBI, Joseph Remiro supervised combat training and armament. He regularly trained members of the SLA in shooting techniques on an Oakland pistol range. He also was capable of modifying the M-1 carbine to operate fully automatic. He was a machinist and was attending an auto shop class at a local community college where he had access to a machine shop.

Evidence at the scene of 1466 East 54th Street bears out the precepts of guerrilla warfare to which the SLA adhered. Sawed-off shotguns, automatic weapons and gas masks found at the scene are standard equipment in guerrilla operations.

During the closing minutes of the gun battle, heavy weapon fire came from air vents under the house. This indicated the group had shifted positions, and was taking advantage of the natural bunker provided by the concrete foundation.

## INTELLIGENCE

### Inglewood Shooting and Flight

The Symbionese Liberation Army surfaced in the Los Angeles area in a fashion that was uncharacteristic of its prior exploits.

On May 16, 1974, at 1610 hours, one male and one female Caucasian, later identified as William and Emily Harris, entered Mel's Sporting Goods Store at 11425 South Crenshaw Boulevard in the City of Inglewood. The couple browsed through the store for a period of time, collecting several items of clothing. During this time, a store security employee saw the male shopper place what appeared to be a pair of socks, wrapped in cellophane, inside his three-quarter length hunting jacket. The employee surmising that a shoplift might be taking place, went to the rear of the store and armed himself with a two-inch revolver and a pair of handcuffs.

The couple went to the cash register and purchased \$31.50 worth of heavy-duty clothing including socks, sweat pants, watch cap, and an ammunition pouch. The store clerk alerted other store employees of the possible shoplift and followed the couple out of the store to the sidewalk in front of the store.

The clerk approached the male suspect and asked him if he would step back into the store. The male refused and became violent. He and the store clerk became involved in a physical encounter, causing them both to fall to the sidewalk.

During the encounter, the female jumped on the clerk's back at which time the clerk called to other employees in the store for assistance. They responded and pulled the female off of his back and attempted to gain control of the male shoplifting suspect. During the struggle, the male suspect pulled a two-inch revolver from his waistband and pointed it at one of the store employees. The gun was wrested from the suspect's hand and an attempt was made to handcuff him. The clerk succeeded in placing one handcuff on the suspect's left wrist. While attempting to place the handcuff on the right wrist of the suspect, he heard the sound of gunfire.

The store employee looked across the street and saw a female Caucasian in a red and white Volkswagen van shooting an automatic rifle from the driver's window. Two of the employees ran back into the store seeking safety amid shattering glass and falling plaster.

The clerk, who had armed himself prior to leaving the store, released his hold on the male suspect and crawled to safety behind a cement light pole. The two suspects fled across the street and entered the waiting Volkswagen van. From the clerk's position he heard the impact of bullets around him and then heard the engine of the red and white Volkswagen van start. From his prone position behind the light pole, the clerk drew his revolver and fired two rounds at the van fleeing north on Crenshaw Boulevard.

The store clerk ran to his private car which was parked near the location where the suspects' van had been parked. He started his car and pursued the fleeing van north on Crenshaw Boulevard to Imperial Highway, east on Imperial Highway to Wilton Place, south on Wilton Place to 115th Street, east on 115th Street to Ruthelen Street, and then south to 11602 Ruthelen Street where the van pulled to the curb and stopped.

The store clerk, having followed the trio to this location, parked his vehicle several car lengths behind the van. The male occupant of the van and one female exited the vehicle both brandishing what appeared to be large caliber automatic weapons.

The suspects walked over to a couple who were seated in a black and yellow 1970 Pontiac parked at the curb. The male suspect stated, "We're SLA, we need your car". The couple exited their car and sought safety inside a nearby home. While the trio was changing vehicles the male suspect walked toward the store clerk seated in his parked car, and pointed an automatic weapon at him. The clerk, fearing he might be shot, backed his car to a point of safety and abandoned his efforts to follow the trio. The trio entered the black and yellow Pontiac and fled southbound on Ruthelen Street. The clerk later notified Inglewood Police of the incident and pointed out the abandoned Volkswagen van.

The fleeing trio next appeared three blocks away at 115th Street and Cimarron Avenue where the black and yellow Pontiac had stalled in the intersection. The male driver made several attempts to start the car, all of which failed. He exited the vehicle and approached a citizen and his son standing in front of their residence at 2049 West 115th



Street, Hawthorne. At this time, the two females exited the vehicle brandishing what appeared to be automatic weapons. The male suspect stated to the citizen, "We're from the SLA and we need your car, we need it right now". The citizen surrendered the keys to his light blue 1963 Chevrolet Nova station wagon to the male suspect. The trio entered the station wagon and fled east on 115th Street.

Responding investigators from the Inglewood Police Department took custody of the Volkswagen van and Pontiac. Evidence obtained from the vehicles included a woman's wig and scarf, several .30 caliber cartridges and miscellaneous clothing.

When the investigators learned that the suspects had identified themselves as members of the SLA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was notified and agents were dispatched to the scene. Investigation revealed that the two-inch revolver wrested from the hand of the male shoplifting suspect was registered to Emily Montague Harris. A search of the clothing found in the suspects' van revealed a violator's copy of a parking citation. The parking citation was issued by the Los Angeles Police Department on May 13, 1974, in front of 835 West 84th Street, Los Angeles. In addition, witnesses to the Inglewood shooting made a positive identification from photos of William and Emily Harris as the two with whom they had struggled outside of Mel's Sporting Goods Store.

At approximately 1900 hours, on May 16, 1974, a female Caucasian, later identified as Emily Harris, knocked on the front door at 10871 Elm Street, Lynwood. She informed Thomas Matthews, age 18, the owner of a blue 1969 Ford van on which a "For Sale" sign was posted, that she was interested in taking a ride in his vehicle. They both left the residence in the Ford van with Emily Harris driving and Thomas Matthews in the passenger seat. After driving a short distance, they stopped at Pine Street and Pendleton Avenue. Emily Harris said, "There's two of my friends. Maybe they want to come along". Thomas Matthews looked across the street and saw a male Caucasian and female Caucasian, (later identified as William Harris and Patricia Hearst) standing next to a 1963 light blue Chevrolet Nova station wagon. William Harris approached the passenger side of the van, displayed a .45 automatic weapon, and stated to Thomas Matthews, "We're from the SLA. Get in the back and do what you're told and you won't get hurt". Thomas Matthews climbed into the back of the van, got down on the floor, and a blanket was placed over his head. The van left the scene with Emily Harris in the front seat and Patty Hearst and William Harris in the back with Thomas Matthews.

The trio drove their hostage around for approximately one hour, stopping at several stores. At one store, Emily Harris purchased a hacksaw in order to cut the handcuff off William Harris' left wrist. The trio continued to drive around until darkness.

At 2030 hours, they drove to a drive-in movie where, using the hacksaw, they removed the handcuffs from William Harris. During the time they were at the movie, William and Emily Harris made frequent trips to the snack bar for refreshments, and gave the impression to the hostage that they were attempting a rendezvous with someone.

Thomas Matthews later described to police how he was introduced to "Tania" (Patty Hearst). During a lengthy conversation with her he was told that she was a voluntary participant with the SLA, had been involved in the San Francisco Hibernia Bank robbery and had fired the automatic weapon at the sporting goods store.


After leaving the drive-in movie, the group drove around the Los Angeles area for a period of time and then stopped for several hours in the Hollywood Hills. During the time the van was stopped, Thomas Matthews went to sleep. Upon awakening at approximately 0630 hours on May 17, 1974, Thomas Matthews overheard the two females discussing how they would pose as hitchhikers in order to obtain another car. A few minutes later Emily Harris and Patty Hearst left the van.

A short time later, Thomas Matthews heard the sound of an approaching automobile. The automobile stopped nearby. William Harris wrapped the guns in a blanket and instructed Thomas Matthews to lie face down on the floor and remain there for ten minutes. Thomas Matthews then heard a vehicle drive off. A few minutes later he exited the van. The youth found himself on Outpost Drive, just off Mulholland Drive, in the Hollywood Hills. He drove home and notified Lynwood Police of the incident.

Information given to the police revealed that Emily Harris and Patty Hearst had posed as hitchhikers and were picked up by a citizen in a 1973 Lincoln Continental in the same area in which Thomas Matthews had been left.

The citizen, Frank Sutter, stated that both females pulled guns on him and said, "We need your car for a couple of hours. You're not going to get hurt if you do exactly what we tell you. We will hurt you if you don't". They told him to get

GREATER LOS ANGELES AREA



- ① Mel's Sporting Goods Store, Inglewood - SLA shootout 1615 hrs., May 16, 1974.
- ② 11602 Ruthelen St., L.A. County (Lennox) - Stole 1970 Pontiac 1630 hrs., May 16th.
- ③ 2049 W. 115th St., Hawthorne - Stole 1963 Chevrolet Nova station wagon 1635 hrs., May 16th.
- ④ 10871 Elm St., Lynwood - Kidnapped Thomas Matthews in 1969 Ford van 1900 hrs., May 16th.
- ⑤ Outpost Dr. and Mulholland, L.A. - Kidnapped Mr. Sutter 0640 hrs., May 17, 1974.
- ⑥ 833 W. 84th St., L.A. - FBI and LAPD enter abandoned SLA hideout 0850 hrs., May 17th.
- ⑦ Griffith Park - Mr. Sutter released 1315 hrs., May 17th.
- ⑧ 1468 E. 54th St. - SLA shootout 1750 hrs., May 17th.
- ⑨ 280 N. New Hampshire Ave. - Patty Hearst and two blacks allegedly attacked resident 2130 hrs., May 19th.

in the back seat and drove a short distance and stopped. William Harris got into the car, told the kidnapped Frank Sutter to get on the floor and placed a blanket over his head.

During the next six hours the trio drove around, stopping several times to make phone calls and ask directions. Frank Sutter remained on the floor with his head covered. At one point William Harris took Frank Sutter's wallet, removed \$250 and replaced the wallet in Sutter's pocket.

At 1315 hours, Frank Sutter was released in Griffith Park. He was told to stay where he was for ten minutes and that his car would be left a short distance away. He walked approximately a half mile, found his car with the keys on the floor, then drove to a phone booth where he called the FBI.

#### Activities at 833 West 84th Street

Sparked by mounting evidence of the SLA presence in the Los Angeles area, the FBI turned its investigation to the parking citation found in the van. The citation had been issued on May 13, 1974, in front of 835 West 84th Street. Acting on this evidence, the FBI set up a command post at Crenshaw Boulevard and Imperial Highway. The FBI strategically placed agents in the area surrounding the 800 block of West 84th Street.

At approximately 2200 hours on May 16, 1974, the Los Angeles Police Department was notified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the shooting in Inglewood involved members of the SLA and that the FBI had set up a command post at Crenshaw Boulevard and Imperial Highway. FBI personnel at the command post had concluded that a nighttime investigation was not feasible and, therefore, ordered an area surveillance maintained throughout the night.

A meeting was arranged for 0230 hours on May 17, 1974, at the Inglewood Police Department. The purpose of the meeting was to brief investigators from the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the Inglewood Police Department on the known activities of the SLA members. At the meeting, the Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Division of the FBI, related a chronology of the events which had focused FBI efforts on the 800 block of West 84th Street. A later meeting was scheduled to formulate specific plans to search the concerned area. Supervisors from the LAPD SWAT platoon were requested to attend the meeting.

At this meeting the FBI disclosed that:

1. The recovered Volkswagen van was registered to a Rickey Delgado at 911 Fillmore Street, San Francisco. This proved to be a non-existent address.
2. Clothing found in the van had been purchased at a store near Mel's Sporting Goods and a witness at that location had positively identified Emily and William Harris as the purchasers.
3. A parking citation, issued by the Los Angeles Police Department at 0840 hours on May 13, 1974, in front of 835 West 84th Street, was found in the Volkswagen van.

Primary Planning Meeting - 833 West 84th Street

On May 17, 1974, at 0400 hours, a meeting was held at the Inglewood Police Department to formulate a plan to effect the arrest of possible SLA members at 835 West 84th Street, Los Angeles, and coordinate the activity of a joint FBI and LAPD SWAT operation. This meeting was attended by members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the Inglewood Police Department.

Objective

The objective was to neutralize the offensive capabilities of the SLA members who were possibly at 835 West 84th Street and then to take them all into custody. Members of the planning group gave prime consideration to the safety of the residents in the area, the personnel on the task force who would actually carry out the mission, and emphasized the desirability of effecting the arrests of all persons inside the house with minimum force.

The Plan Included:

1. Establish a command post at 82nd Street and Vermont Avenue in order to coordinate the activities of the LAPD and FBI SWAT teams.
2. Seal off the involved area utilizing FBI agents and uniformed LAPD personnel. The boundaries of the involved area were 82nd

# 833 W. 84TH STREET




DIAGRAM DEPICTING PERIMETER ESTABLISHED FOR TACTICAL CONTROL

Street on the north, Vermont Avenue on the west, 85th Street on the south, and Hoover Street on the east.

3. The FBI would be responsible for protecting the north side of the 800 block of West 84th Street.
4. The LAPD would be responsible for protecting the south side of the 800 block of West 84th Street.
5. "Sniffer dogs" were to be used to identify the existence of SLA members on 84th Street.
  - a. The dogs possessed the scent of Emily Harris and Patty Hearst.
  - b. The dogs would be used in a block-by-block search of the sealed-off area.
  - c. FBI agents would control the dogs.
  - d. If the dogs failed to bring results, a house-to-house search by FBI agents would be undertaken.
  - e. LAPD and FBI SWAT personnel would provide necessary protective cover for the FBI agents handling the dogs.
6. The LAPD would provide a public address system to make announcements regarding surrender.
7. The LAPD and the FBI would provide tear gas.
8. If circumstances dictated, an evacuation would take place away from 835 West 84th Street. The evacuation would be accomplished by moving citizens northbound or southbound from 84th Street.

#### Tactics

1. Establish perimeter control.
2. Evacuate residents, except in suspected houses.

3. LAPD SWAT personnel would approach the front of the house from the west.
4. FBI SWAT personnel would approach the rear of the house from the west.
5. An announcement to surrender would be made by the LAPD over the public address system to the occupants of the house.
6. If no response, after a reasonable time, tear gas would be deployed into the house by FBI and LAPD SWAT personnel.
7. After tear gas was employed, additional announcements to surrender would be made and reasonable time given to effect the surrender.
8. Resistance by the occupants of the house, in the rear, would be met by FBI SWAT personnel.
9. Resistance by occupants of the house, in the front, would be met by LAPD SWAT personnel.

#### Second Planning Meeting

During the implementation of the initial plans, intelligence information was received that the wanted and armed SLA members were occupying the house located at 833 West 84th Street. By this time, the planning group had moved to the field command post at 82nd Street and Vermont Avenue. The tactical plans were changed.

#### The New Planning Included:

1. Disregard the planned use of "sniffer dogs".
2. A scouting party of LAPD SWAT personnel would be sent to reconnoiter locations and make a schematic drawing of 833 West 84th Street.
3. FBI SWAT personnel would form the neutralizing and arrest team to approach the house.



4. The FBI would continue to be responsible for protecting the north side of the 800 block of West 84th Street.
5. The LAPD would continue to be responsible for protecting the south side of the 800 block of West 84th Street.

At 0530 hours, May 17, 1974, a combined LAPD and FBI command post was established, under the overall direction of the FBI, in the Goodyear parking lot at 82nd Street and Vermont Avenue. Anyone leaving the area of the 800 block West 84th Street was to be stopped and questioned by FBI and LAPD personnel. Just prior to beginning the search, a male who lived in the area of 835 West 84th Street, was stopped on his way to work. He informed officers that he had observed two vans, one of which was red and white, parked on 84th Street.

The vans had been parked there on several occasions earlier in the week. He stated that he had observed the male and female Caucasian occupants of these vans enter and leave the residence at 833 West 84th Street.

This information pinpointed the suspected location of the SLA and the house-to-house search for them was aborted. Under the direction of the FBI, the LAPD and FBI SWAT teams surrounded the house located at 833 West 84th Street. The FBI SWAT team was deployed at the rear of the house and the LAPD SWAT team was deployed at the front of the house. At 0850 hours, an LAPD sergeant, using a bull horn, announced, "To those inside the house at 833 West 84th Street, this is the Los Angeles Police Department. We want you to come out the front door with your hands up. We want you to come out immediately. You will not be harmed." After a delay of approximately eight minutes, the FBI Officer-in-Charge ordered tear gas to be used. Seven gas rounds were fired into the front of the house by LAPD SWAT personnel. At 0855 hours, the FBI SWAT team entered the residence from the rear and discovered that the house was unoccupied. A search of the residence uncovered three suitcases containing gas masks, women's wigs and handbags, SLA literature, shotgun ammunition, a short-wave radio and medical supplies. FBI agents also found:

1. A want ad section of the Los Angeles Sentinel newspaper. There was an "X" marked in pencil next to the advertisement for 833 West 84th Street.

2. Handwritten notations of ways to exit the house.
3. A worksheet divided into nine two-hour work periods.
4. A grocery list and prices for dehydrated food. The dollar amount was divided by nine.

FBI agents and LAPD officers began to question neighbors seeking any clue that might narrow their pursuit of the SLA members. Fragmentary information was received from residents on West 84th Street concerning two vans, one red and white and the other faded blue with curtains in its windows and damage to its left front. Both vans had been parked on 84th Street during the week. This information was given to LAPD personnel at a debriefing shortly before the command post was deactivated at 0930 hours.

#### Activities at 54th Street and Compton Avenue

After the command post at 82nd Street and Vermont had been deactivated and officers had received the descriptions of the suspect vehicles, two SWAT team members returned to their regular uniformed crime suppression assignment in Newton Street Area. At approximately 1220 hours on May 17th, the officers observed two vans parked at the rear of 1451 East 53rd Street. Both vans matched the descriptions given at the debriefing earlier in the day.

In order to conceal police presence, two undercover officers were assigned to check the vans for identification numbers and registrations. While looking for the identification numbers, the officers discovered that the keys had been hidden in both vehicles.

The officers obtained the license plate and vehicle identification numbers from the vans. This information was compared with intelligence developed by the FBI during the evening of May 16th and the early morning of May 17th.

The license numbers of both vans that were parked on 84th Street had been discovered by the FBI. Before noon on May 17th, FBI agents had traced the ownership of the vans and learned the license number 463 GM0 was registered to a 1964 Volkswagen van, last purchased on May 7, 1974, by a Mr. Ali Bey for his brother, Roberto Bey. Roberto Bey's

address was listed as 911 Fillmore Street, San Francisco. This address was the same nonexistent address to which the impounded Inglewood van was registered. The other license number 84650V, was registered to a 1966 Chevy van, last purchased on May 1, 1974, by a Mary Lopez who gave the address 2121 Harrison Street, San Francisco. This address also proved nonexistent.

Comparison of the FBI intelligence with the information obtained by Metropolitan Division officers on the license and vehicle identification numbers, indicated that these vans had been identified as those from West 84th Street. Concerned Department and FBI personnel were notified that the vans had been located.

Officers were assigned to stake out the vehicles at 1451 East 53rd Street. They were instructed to notify other units if anyone attempted to leave the residence or leave in the vans. These units would then stop the individuals at a location away from the scene and conduct an investigation.

At 1310 hours, a Cadillac stopped in front of 1451 East 53rd Street. A male Negro was observed entering the apartment house and exiting moments later. Once outside the area, he was stopped and questioned. An investigation revealed that he had no connection with the SLA. He stated that he had first observed the vans parked at that location at 1000 hours on May 17, 1974.

Due to the developments in Newton Area, the Director, Office of Operations, appointed the Commanding Officer, Investigative Support Division, as the Field Commander and the Officer-in-Charge of SWAT as field tactician. At 1500 hours, a meeting was held with the FBI at Newton Area station to determine jurisdiction and areas of planning.

Diverse and conflicting pieces of intelligence had been received by police authorities since the initial sighting of the vans around noon on May 17th. Anonymous phone calls were received by the FBI and the LAPD at the Newton Area station. They were from a woman who said that several female and male Caucasians were staying at her house at 1462 East 54th Street and that they had numerous handguns and rifles. Another anonymous phone call to Newton Area station informed police that two female Caucasians had been seen working their way through backyards to 5311 South Compton Avenue, which was approximately one-half block from 1462 East 54th Street. As a result of this information and the fact that two SLA vans

were parked behind 1451 East 53rd Street, the Field Commander established a command post at 57th Street and Alba Street.

At 1700 hours, shortly after the command post was operational, a traffic officer at 55th Street and Compton Avenue was approached by Mary Carr, age 52, and an eleven-year-old male. Mary Carr informed the officer that a male Negro, a male Caucasian and three female Caucasians had offered her daughter, Minnie Lewis, \$120 to spend the night of May 16th at her daughter's residence which was located at 1466 East 54th Street.

On the afternoon of May 17th, Mary Carr had visited her daughter and had seen one of the female Caucasians wearing a revolver on her hip. Mary Carr then identified Donald DeFreeze, Camilla Hall and Patricia Hcarst from photographs. At that time Donald DeFreeze was wanted on two federal warrants; one for bank robbery and one for unlawful flight to avoid confinement. Camilla Hall was being sought on a federal warrant as a material witness. Mary Carr was taken to the command post to assist officers in pinpointing the residence.

This final piece of information, along with preceding intelligence, had narrowed the number of possible locations to:

1. 1451 East 53rd Street
2. 5311 Compton Avenue
3. 1462 East 54th Street
4. 1466 East 54th Street

Primary emphasis was given to 1466 East 54th Street.

The house at 1466 East 54th Street was located on the south side of the street. The house was a five-room yellow stucco-and-frame dwelling with a stone front porch. It had a pitched roof with grey composition-type covering. There were two steps on the east and west sides of the house leading from the sidewalk to the porch. The house was approximately 21 feet wide and 34 feet long with 714 square feet of floor space. It contained two bedrooms, a living room, kitchen and a bath. The house was on a raised concrete foundation approximately 18 inches from the ground. Air vents in the foundation were evenly spaced along the perimeter of the house.

The attic ran the length of the house with an air vent at the front on the roof under the eaves. The distance between the adjacent residences was ten feet on the east (1468 East 54th Street) and seven feet on the west (1462 East 54th Street).

The surrounding area was comprised of one-story frame and stucco dwellings and multi-unit two-story apartment houses. Many of the dwellings in the area were partially boarded-up and uninhabited. These buildings presented a tactical problem as the two-story apartment houses afforded high ground observation of police movements in and out of surrounding streets and alleys.

## PLANNING

### Primary Planning Meeting - 1466 East 54th Street

On May 17, 1974, at 1500 hours, a planning meeting was held at Newton Street Station. The meeting was attended by staff members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Los Angeles Police Department. This meeting was conducted as a result of the discovery of two vans at the rear of 1451 East 53rd Street. It was decided at this meeting that:

1. The Commanding Officer of Investigative Support Division, Los Angeles Police Department, would be the Field Commander.
2. The LAPD SWAT Officer-in-Charge would be responsible for field tactics.
3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Los Angeles Police Department would coordinate the investigative aspects of the case.

### Objectives

The primary objectives were:

1. Locate SLA members in a possible three-block square area of Newton Street Area.
2. Establish command and control procedures for neutralizing the SLA members and to take them into physical custody.

### Second Planning Meeting

At approximately 1730 hours, a second planning meeting was held at the LAPD Field Command Post located at 57th Street and Alba Street. The meeting was attended by members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department.

The meeting was called because additional intelligence information was received regarding other locations in the area where SLA members might be hiding. The information indicated that SLA suspects could be at 1466 East 54th Street, 1462 East 54th Street or 5311 South Compton Avenue, in addition to the 1451 East 53rd Street address. With this additional information, the following plans were made:

1. Squads of LAPD SWAT personnel would move on 1451 East 53rd Street, 1462 East 54th Street and 1466 East 54th Street simultaneously. At the same time, LAPD SWAT personnel would provide high ground security at 5311 Compton Avenue.
2. Prior to the deployment of the neutralizing and arrest teams, the perimeter would be sealed off by officers on perimeter control duty. The boundaries of the involved area were 52nd Street on the north, Ascot Avenue on the west, 55th Street on the south, and Compton Avenue on the east.
3. LAPD SWAT teams would be deployed in the front and rear of 1466 East 54th Street, which had become the prime location, moving from the east side of the house.
4. Evacuate residents, except in suspected house (See Evacuation Plan).
5. After the evacuation was accomplished, an announcement to surrender would be given to the suspects in 1466 East 54th Street and 1462 East 54th Street from the SWAT squad leader at the front.
6. If, after a reasonable time, no response was received from either house, tear gas would be used.
7. After tear gas was employed, additional announcements to surrender would be made and reasonable time given to effect the surrender.
8. LAPD SWAT units would fire their weapons only upon order of their supervisor or in self-defense. Emphasis was placed on effecting an arrest with minimum force.
9. Information concerning police activities would be disseminated through the press officers to the news media representatives on the scene.

#### Evacuation Plan

Due to the fact that the positive location of the house or houses which sheltered the fugitives was unknown, out of

necessity, the general evacuation plan had to remain flexible. At one point, there were four known residences in the area which could have housed the terrorists. Prior to and during any planned neutralizing and arrest missions, all personnel were instructed to give prime consideration to their personal safety and to the safety of the residents in the area.

When all SWAT personnel were in their assigned positions, evacuation would commence.

The following actions would be taken:

1. The street would be cleared prior to any police action.
2. The immediate area would be sealed off from vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
3. The total effort would be coordinated through an established command post.
4. Residents of the houses adjacent to the suspected house would be evacuated.
5. Those residents who were physically unable to leave would be assisted by members of the Los Angeles Police Department.
6. Those residents who refused to leave would be advised to lie on the floor of their residence.



## OPERATIONS

### Field Command Post

On May 17, 1974, at 1600 hours, the Department established a command post at 57th Street and Alba Avenue in order to direct Department operations against suspected SLA locations and coordinate other activities that were connected with the apprehension of the SLA fugitives.

The command post staff established a personnel pool and initiated a Tactical Alert in order to provide sufficient manpower to control the crowd on the perimeter and deploy additional officers in response to the Field Commander's instructions.

SWAT personnel and other uniformed officers were deployed from the command post to designated locations to assist in the evacuation and perimeter control.

The Director, Office of Operations, appointed the Commanding Officer, Investigative Support Division, as the Field Commander. The Field Commander had responsibility for the overall operational and investigative phases of the incident.

The Officer-in-Charge of the SWAT platoon was directed to take charge of field tactics and was responsible for directing the SWAT effort to apprehend SLA members. The SWAT Officer-in-Charge took direct command of two SWAT teams. Each team consisted of eight men and a supervisor. These teams would eventually make contact with the SLA at 1466 East 54th Street.

At 1632 hours, investigative agents and SWAT team members of the FBI arrived at the command post. The FBI personnel were under the command of the Assistant Director of the FBI, Los Angeles Office. The agents assisted in the investigation and planning stages of the operation. During the operation a majority of the FBI agents were assigned to perimeter control while the Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Division, a Special Agent, two dog handlers, and a five man FBI SWAT team were called into action to assist the LAPD SWAT teams at 1466 East 54th Street.

### Perimeter

At approximately 1620 hours, a perimeter was established. The perimeter was bounded by 52nd Street on the north,

# 1466 E. 54TH STREET




DIAGRAM DEPICTING PERIMETER  
ESTABLISHED FOR TACTICAL CONTROL

55th Street on the south, Compton Avenue on the east and Ascot Avenue on the west. The perimeter was sealed at 1655 hours to prevent pedestrian and vehicular traffic from entering the area. Initially, LAPD personnel from Newton Street, 77th Street and Southwest Areas were sufficient to control the perimeter. Later, however, due to the unwillingness of the crowd to follow directions of the officers, it was necessary to deploy additional police personnel to perimeter control assignments to insure the safety of citizens and police. Eventually, 218 police personnel were deployed for perimeter control.

### Suspected Locations

The perimeter was established encompassing 5311 Compton Avenue, 1451 East 53rd Street, 1462 and 1466 East 54th Street. These locations had been previously described as possible SLA hideouts by anonymous informers and unsubstantiated reports that had been compiled by personnel of the Criminal Conspiracy Section of the Los Angeles Police Department and the FBI. All of these locations were under observation by SWAT personnel.

The aforementioned locations had been designated as suspected locations because of the following information:

At 1220 hours, two SLA vans were discovered behind the two-story complex located at 1451 East 53rd Street.

At 1400 hours, an anonymous caller telephoned the FBI and stated that the boarded-up one-story frame house located at 1462 East 54th Street might be the hiding place of SLA members and there might be a tunnel from there to 1466 East 54th Street.

At 1600 hours, two white females were observed running behind the house at 5311 Compton Avenue.

It was around these three locations that the original deployment was made. There was, in the original plan, the intent to search each of the three houses. If this failed, a house-to-house, block-by-block search would be made.


### Evacuation

At 1630 hours, the Field Commander was primarily concerned with locating the SLA members and evacuating the area surrounding the suspected locations. The evacuation operation had to be conducted carefully so that neighborhood residents and SWAT members would not be endangered.


COMPTON

AVENUE

E. 53rd ST.




E. 54th ST.







E. 55th ST.

ASCOT AVENUE



### EVACUATION OF AREA AROUND 1466 E. 54th STREET

-  OCCUPANTS EVACUATED
-  OCCUPANTS WARNED
-  VACANT



A mass evacuation could not be undertaken because the exact location of SLA members was unknown. A major evacuation would have placed many citizens in the streets. Had this occurred, SLA members could have mingled with the evacuees and escaped; or they could have directed automatic weapon fire into the crowd, resulting in injuries or death to citizens and officers alike.

At approximately 1730 hours, before the SWAT teams were to leave the command post, information had been developed that placed the SLA suspects at 1466 East 54th Street. At this point, the primary effort was directed at this location.

The original plan of evacuation was not implemented. After deploying at the suspected locations, it was decided that evacuation was to take place in a circle working away from 1462 and 1466 East 54th Street.

The following are residences that were subject to the evacuation either before or during the shooting:

SWAT team members contacted the residents of 1468 East 54th Street and 5409½ Compton Avenue. The occupants of these structures refused to leave. They were instructed to lie on the floor. During the gun battle, they decided to leave and were evacuated by SWAT members.

As officers attempted to evacuate the residences at 5411 and 5413 Compton Avenue, and 1445, 1447, 1455, 1457 and the rear of 1462 East 54th Street, it became evident they were abandoned or vacant.

SWAT team members evacuated residents from 1449, 1452, 1452½, 1456, 1462 and 1470 East 54th Street and 5415 Compton Avenue.

Despite warnings the residents of 1451 East 54th Street and 5337 Compton Avenue refused to leave their homes and were then directed by SWAT team members to lie on the floor. These people remained in their homes throughout the gunfight.

Many of the people who could have been evacuated earlier and refused were pinned down by heavy gunfire. As the battle progressed and during lulls in the gunfire, some of these people changed their minds and were then evacuated.



Policemen assisting women to escape possible danger zone.



A child is helped over a fence to safety.



An adult is evacuated by officer.



SWAT members prepare to enter 1451 East 53rd Street.

The evacuation was conducted in a rapid and prudent manner considering the extremely dangerous conditions which existed in the area.

### Crowd Control

Crowd control during the entire incident was a source of continual problems. The crowds on the perimeter increased from a few people at isolated locations at 1640 hours to thousands of curious onlookers during the height of the incident. As the crowds increased and became hostile at several locations, the Field Commander deployed greater numbers of police officers to secure the perimeter and control the crowds. A Department helicopter was utilized between 1702 hours and 1740 hours to relay information to the command post concerning crowd activity along the perimeter.


Between 1850 hours and 1930 hours, during and after the confrontation, crowd control became a major problem. Unidentified people in the crowds were throwing bottles and rocks at police personnel on perimeter control. At approximately 1855 hours, the Director, Office of Operations, ordered additional Department personnel assigned to perimeter control. During this time, there were requests for additional police units at 56th Street and Compton Avenue, 54th Street and Ascot Avenue, 53rd Street and Ascot Avenue, 53rd Street and Compton Avenue, 52nd Street and Compton Avenue and at 55th Street and Compton Avenue. There were many officers requesting assistance at these locations. It was during this time that a motor officer was struck by a thrown object and received minor injuries.

Because of crowd control problems along the perimeter, 218 Department personnel were deployed along the perimeter and an additional 105 Department personnel were held in reserve at the command post.

### Deployment

At approximately 1735 hours, 25 LAPD SWAT members left the command post at 56th Street and Alba Street and proceeded to preassigned locations.

At 1740 hours, four SWAT members were deployed at 1451 East 53rd Street, the location where the vans were discovered. They were armed with one 12-gauge shotgun, two AR15 semi-automatic weapons and a .243 caliber long rifle. Two members, armed with one AR180 semi-automatic weapon and one



# INITIAL SWAT DEPLOYMENT

•— Indicates one SWAT member



12-gauge shotgun, were deployed at 5311 Compton for high ground security and holding action.

During an operations briefing at 1730 hours, information regarding armed suspects at 1466 East 54th Street was given to SWAT members. Immediate action was taken to deploy SWAT teams to this location.

At 1740 hours, the squad leader of Team One deployed his eight men in front and to the east of 1466 East 54th Street. They were armed with two tear gas guns, two 12-gauge shotguns, four AR180 semi-automatic weapons, one AR15 semi-automatic weapon, one .243 caliber long rifle and .38 caliber sidearms.


The squad leader of Team Two deployed his eight men in the rear and to the southeast of 1466 East 54th Street. They were armed with two tear gas guns, three 12-gauge shotguns, one AR180 semi-automatic weapon, three AR15 semi-automatic weapons, one .243 caliber long rifle and .38 caliber sidearms.

The ammunition SWAT personnel carried and used against the SLA members was neither incendiary nor armor piercing. The Los Angeles Police Department does not possess or utilize this type of ammunition.


The LAPD SWAT Officer-in-Charge assumed a position approximately 40 feet south and to the rear of the location in order to direct the operations of both teams.

#### Surrender Announcements

The squad leader of Team One informed the squad leader of Team Two and the Officer-in-Charge that his team was in position and ready to give the surrender announcement. The Officer-in-Charge gave him approval to make the announcement. At 1744 hours, he used a bullhorn to broadcast, "Occupants of 1466 East 54th Street, this is the Los Angeles Police Department speaking. Come out with your hands up. Comply immediately and you will not be harmed." This announcement was then immediately rebroadcast. The squad leader of Team Two and the SWAT Officer-in-Charge could plainly hear both announcements from their positions at the rear of the location, which was approximately seventy feet south of Team One's position. After a minute, the squad leader of Team One broadcast, "People in the yellow frame house with the stone porch, address 1466 East 54th Street, this is the Los Angeles Police Department speaking. Come out with your hands up. Comply immediately and you will not be harmed."



A SWAT member approaches  
1451 East 53rd Street.



The SLA house on East 54th  
Street before the gun battle.



A child comes out of the  
SLA house and is shielded  
by a SWAT member.



After repeated announce-  
ments to surrender, a man  
exits the SLA house.

Shortly thereafter, a small male Negro child (8 years old) appeared at the front door and slowly came out of the house. The child was directed to walk towards Compton Avenue, but appeared confused. At this time, the squad leader of Team One exposed himself to possible gunfire from the residence and removed the child from in front of the house. The child was taken to 54th Street and Compton Avenue to be questioned, but it became apparent that at this time the child was too frightened to speak. The squad leader of Team One gave two more surrender announcements; a male Negro adult appeared at the front door and slowly walked out to the front of the house. The squad leader of Team one instructed him to walk towards Compton Avenue but the man did not comply. The squad leader again exposed himself to possible gunfire, approached the male and escorted him to safety on Compton Avenue. At this time, the squad leader of Team One questioned the male about the occupants of the house and the possibility of there being guns inside the house. The male indicated that there was a black lady in the house, but that he did not think there were any white women or guns.

The leader of Team One made several more surrender announcements. An investigation by Robbery-Homicide Division disclosed that a minimum of eighteen separate surrender announcements were made in the eight minutes preceding the initial gunfire (Robbery-Homicide Division conducts and independent investigation of all officer involved shootings). At this time, SWAT members both at the front and rear of the house heard the sound of rapid movement from within the house. It was learned by SWAT members both at the front and rear of the house that the child, after becoming calm, had stated that the people inside the house had guns and were wearing ammunition belts across their chests. At this point, the SWAT Officer-in-Charge evaluated the following considerations:

1. The occupants of the house were heavily armed.
2. The hours of darkness were quickly approaching, increasing the hazard since there would be no way to tightly contain the occupants.
3. There was evidence the SLA members had large quantities of food (p. 26).
4. Past experience with guerrilla groups has shown that a classic tactic is to dig tunnels for escape and to construct dirt bunkers for fortification.

5. To delay the use of tear gas would increase the hazard to persons in the area and to officers experiencing difficulty finding adequate cover.
6. The tactical use of tear gas would confuse the occupants and cause them to immediately surrender, allowing them to be taken into custody without the use of gunfire.

Based upon these considerations, the SWAT Officer-in-Charge determined that the SLA members had the capability for barricading themselves indefinitely. Additionally, with darkness, the danger of the armed occupants bursting from the location and spraying the area with automatic weapon fire would become imminent. Because these hazards would increase with the passing of time and because of the danger this heavily-armed group presented to the neighborhood and to officers being positioned to contain them over an extended period of time, the SWAT Officer-in-Charge decided to employ gas projectiles against the barricaded SLA members.

The SWAT Officer-in-Charge advised the squad leader of Team One to fire tear gas into the house. The squad leader of Team One ordered one of his team members, via a bullhorn, to fire gas projectiles into the west side of the house.

#### Gunfire Erupts

A member of SWAT Team One fired two 509 CS Flite-rite tear gas projectiles through the top of the west window. SWAT members, both at the front and rear could hear the projectiles striking the ceiling and wall and then dispersing. At 1753 hours, as soon as the second gas projectile dispersed, heavy bursts of automatic gunfire came from inside the front and rear of the house.

Numerous bullets struck 54th Street, the buildings on the north side of 54th Street and the area to the rear of the house. At this time, both SWAT teams returned fire and continued to shoot Flite-rite tear gas projectiles into the house.


The gun battle continued with very heavy automatic weapon fire coming from inside the house. The SWAT teams continued to respond to this fire with semi-automatic weapons, shotguns and tear gas. Heavy repressive fire was concentrated on the house in order to prevent SLA members from firing accurately




Tear gas is fired into the SLA stronghold.



The 1400 block East 54th Street during the encounter.



Newspeople on the scene obtaining the news live.



Newspeople on the scene taking cover.



A woman and children hurry away from the gunfight  
as a SWAT officer covers their flight to safety.

at officers and also create the psychological effect that further resistance was useless.

When the tear gas failed to work, the SWAT Officer-in-Charge assumed that the SLA members inside the house were equipped with the same modern army gas masks that were found that morning at 833 West 84th Street. Firing of gas projectiles into the house was continued in order to overload the filtering system on the masks, rendering them useless. The persons within the residence would then be forced to leave the house and surrender.


### FBI Logistical Support

At 1800 hours, Team One and Team Two were running low on ammunition and gas projectiles. A runner was sent to the SWAT logistical truck on Compton Avenue between 54th and 55th Streets for additional ammunition.

When the request was made by the SWAT Officer-in-Charge for additional tear gas and ammunition, the Assistant Director of the FBI, Los Angeles Office, advised the Field Commander, who was located approximately 300 feet west of 1466 East 54th Street, that he could provide additional gas. The Field Commander accepted the offer and the gas projectiles were loaded onto an LAPD motorcycle and transported to the SWAT ammunition truck on Compton Avenue. It was determined by SWAT personnel at the truck that the FBI 40mm tear gas projectiles could not be fired from the LAPD's 37mm tear gas guns. The gas projectiles were returned to the Field Commander. When the Assistant Director of the FBI, Los Angeles Office, learned of this, he volunteered his seven men and their M-79 tear gas guns to fire gas projectiles into the house. The Field Commander gave his approval and the FBI SWAT team took up positions on the north side of 54th Street between 1447 and 1449 East 54th Street. By 1830 hours, they had fired 16 gas projectiles and approximately 60 rounds of ammunition into the residence. At this time, they withdrew from their position and ended their involvement in the tactical operation.

### Communication Interruption

At 1802 hours, communication between SWAT units at 1466 East 54th Street and the Department Field Command Post were interrupted. This interruption lasted until 1830 hours. During this period of time, runners were used to relay messages between the SWAT personnel and the command post. Other messages were relayed via the helicopter, which was acting as a communications platform over the scene of the incident. Because



# DEPLOYMENT DURING CONFRONTATION

• — Indicates one SWAT member



of the communications problem, the Command Post was relocated 500 feet north of its original position to 5535 Alba Avenue where communications were restored. Technicians from the Department of Public Utilities and Transportation indicate that an open key on a hand-held radio receiver in the area or interference caused by vans of radio and television equipment are two possible reasons for this break in communications.

### Continued Resistance

The SWAT Officer-in-Charge determined that the SWAT teams were unable to match the automatic weapon fire coming from within 1466 East 54th Street. If the suspects had shot their way out of the house and through the SWAT line of defense, many residents and police officers in the area would have possibly been killed or injured. Considering this, the SWAT Officer-in-Charge ordered four Department automatic weapons and ammunition from Metropolitan Division Headquarters. Shortly after this decision, at 1801 hours the SWAT Officer-in-Charge made a request for fragmentation grenades. This request was denied in the field by the Director, Office of Operations, subsequently this denial was confirmed by the Chief of Police at 1828 hours. The Los Angeles Police Department does not have fragmentation grenades. Had such ordnance been authorized, a request through proper military channels would have been initiated. The Assistant Director of the FBI, Los Angeles Office, stated that the FBI did not use fragmentation grenades at the incident.

During the shootout, sporadic automatic weapon fire continued to be emitted from within the house. SWAT responded with semi-automatic fire. The hostile fire would cease for periods of 30 to 40 seconds at which time the squad leader of Team One would continue to make surrender broadcasts. A minimum of eleven such broadcasts were made during the encounter.

At 1830 hours the squad leader of Team One, armed with a gas gun and Flite-rite projectiles, climbed to the roof at 1468 East 54th Street. He crawled to a position that would enable him to fire tear gas into a window on the east side of 1466 East 54th Street. The first attempt to fire a round resulted in a misfire. When he raised his head to fire another round, he immediately came under heavy machine gun fire from inside 1466 East 54th Street. Bullets hit just in front of his face, which caused him to fall back approximately ten feet. The Department helicopter, overhead, broadcast that there was a possible wounded officer on the roof at 1468 East 54th Street.



SWAT Team members deployed at 1466 East 54th St.  
return fire in the gunfight with SLA members.



Police field commander  
evaluates the incident.



As fire erupts, Christine  
Johnson exits the SLA  
stronghold.

The leader of Team One, uninjured, climbed down from the roof, ran to the rear of 1468 East 54th Street, and fired one round of tear gas into a window at the southeast corner of 1466 East 54th Street. At approximately 1835 hours, the leader of Team One and two of his men broke a window on the east side of 1468 East 54th Street with the intention of entering the house to fire another round of tear gas into the east side of 1466 East 54th Street. Upon breaking the window, they encountered three women inside the house. The women, who had earlier refused to leave, were evacuated by Team One members by exiting a small window on the east side of the house. After firing one gas projectile from the west side of 1468 East 54th Street into the southeast corner window of 1466 East 54th Street, the leader of Team One was forced from the house by the effects of the tear gas.

The SWAT Officer-in-Charge determined that any further delay in capturing the suspects would allow them time to tunnel out of the house and endanger the lives of many people in the community. He then ordered the squad leader of Team Two to put more tear gas into the house in an attempt to force the suspects to surrender.

At 1840 hours, the squad leader of Team Two ordered one of his team members, who was near the southeast corner of the house at 1466 East 54th Street, to throw two tear gas canisters (Federal 555 Riot Canisters) through a broken window on the east side of the house.

#### Fire Breaks Out

At 1841 hours, the squad leader of Team Two noted black smoke coming out of the window at the rear of 1466 East 54th Street. At this time, the squad leader of Team One also observed the smoke and he broadcast over the bullhorn, "Come on out. The house is on fire. You will not be harmed."

There was no response to this broadcast. Upon receiving information from the Department that the residence at 1466 East 54th Street was on fire, the Fire Department delivered breathing apparatus to 57th Street and Compton Avenue to be used for smoke inhalation victims.

At 1845 hours, the rear portion of the roof of the house was in flames and the fire quickly spread to the rest of the house. At this time, a black woman appeared at the front door of the house. The squad leader of Team One announced over the bullhorn, "Okay, we got one coming out."



Christine Johnson is carried to an ambulance by LAPD investigators after she fled the burning house.

Cease fire." Immediately, all firing ceased. The woman, later identified as Christine Johnson, came out of the house and was directed by a SWAT member to walk east along the sidewalk towards Compton Avenue. A SWAT team member then exposed himself to gunfire and led her out of the line of fire.

Once out of the line of SLA weapon fire she was handcuffed, led to Compton Avenue, placed in a felony search position and searched for possible weapons. It was not known at that time whether she was one of the SLA suspects. She was hysterical and hyperactive. When it appeared that she would not remain in the prone position voluntarily, the SWAT Officer-in-Charge placed his foot firmly but lightly on her back to stop her voluntary and involuntary movement. After the search, she was placed in a plain clothes vehicle. When investigators noticed her condition she was placed in an ambulance where she regained some of her composure. At this time, she was shown mug shots of known SLA members and she positively identified Camilla Hall and tentatively identified Donald DeFreeze as occupants of the house.

Christine Johnson was then removed from the scene and transported to California Hospital where she was treated for shotgun wounds to the back and right leg, a lineal laceration to the left arm, minor burns and bruises, and the after-effects of tear gas. Christine Johnson was later booked at the University of Southern California Medical Center for 32 P.C. (accessory to a felony).

At approximately 1845 hours, the four automatic weapons from the Metropolitan Division facility arrived at the SWAT positions to the east of 1466 East 54th Street. The two M16 .223 caliber automatic weapons were assigned to Team One at the front and the two 9mm MP-40 Schmeisser guns were assigned to Team Two at the rear of the house.

At 1847 hours, during a lull in the gunfire, the leader of Team One broadcast over the bullhorn, "Come out, you will not be harmed. The house is on fire. It's all over. Throw your guns out the windows. You will not be harmed." This appeal was answered by automatic weapon fire from within the house.

#### Crawl Hole

At 1850 hours, the house was totally engulfed in flames and the members of SWAT Team Two were receiving automatic weapon fire from air vents in the foundation of the house. A person,



Despite intense heat and flames weapon fire continued from inside the house. Note officers seeking cover behind cement pillar at lower right.

later identified as Nancy Ling Perry, wearing military fatigues and a hunting knife attached to a web belt, came out of a crawl hole at the southwest portion of the house. She crawled away from the house in a westerly direction. When she was approximately ten feet from the crawl hole, a second female, with short blonde hair, later identified as Camilla Hall, started to emerge from the crawl hole. She was firing an automatic pistol toward members of SWAT Team Two. At this time, automatic weapon fire was still coming from the crawl hole behind Camilla Hall. Members of SWAT Team Two fired in the direction of Camilla Hall and she dropped to the ground. She was then dragged back through the crawl hole out of the view of the SWAT team members. SWAT Team Two continued to receive automatic weapon fire from the crawl hole. Nancy Ling Perry then turned to her right and fired a revolver toward members of SWAT Team Two. Members of Team Two returned weapon fire toward the crawl hole and Nancy Ling Perry. She fell to the ground approximately ten feet from the crawl hole. Members of SWAT Team Two continued to return weapon fire toward the crawl hole until the automatic weapon fire ceased. At this point, there was no further weapon fire coming from the house. At 1858 hours, the walls and roof of the house collapsed and ammunition could be heard exploding within the gutted residence.

At 1859 hours, the squad leader of Team One informed the Fire Department that the hostile fire from 1466 East 54th Street had ceased. He requested that the Fire Department move their equipment to the scene of the incident.

At this time, a rope was used to cordon off an area from the front of 1462 East 54th Street, across the street to the north sidewalk of 54th Street, east along the sidewalk to a point directly across from 1468 East 54th Street, and then south to the front of 1468 East 54th Street. This cordon was used to keep pedestrians and sightseers from destroying evidence and interfering with the Department's investigators at the scene.

#### Fire Department

The Fire Department had been called by the Los Angeles Police Department to the scene prior to the beginning of the gunfight. They arrived at 1730 hours, with four fire trucks and four ambulances under the command of a Battalion Chief. The plan was for the Fire Department to care for any injuries that might occur during the incident and to suppress any fires that might develop.



Fire engulfs the SLA hideout as SWAT Team leader with bullhorn withdraws.



SWAT members ensure security of firemen at the blaze.



Battalion Chief issues commands to firemen.



t approximately 1841 hours, when the fire broke out at 1466 East 54th Street, automatic weapon fire was still emanating from the residence. Because of the weapon fire coming from within 1466 East 54th Street, the Battalion Chief determined that his men could not safely extinguish the fire at that time. Several alternatives were discussed between the Fire and Police Department command. Included in these discussions was the possible use of a water drop by a Fire Department helicopter.

The Fire Department helicopters with water-carrying capabilities were not called to the scene by the Battalion Chief because a water drop is generally ineffective for a structural fire. When the water hits the roof, it pours off rather than getting to the source of the fire. The Fire Department helicopters with these capabilities were at Van Nuys Airport and if called up, would have taken approximately ten minutes to reach this location. Additionally, various ways were examined whereby a water stream could be trained on the house from behind a protective barricade. No acceptable method of positioning fire equipment and hoses could be found which would have been effective.

At 1901 hours, after hostile fire had ceased and while ammunition was still exploding inside 1466 East 54th Street, the Los Angeles City Fire Department began extinguishing the fire at 1466 East 54th Street and three adjacent residences. These fires were extinguished from a distance by pumper trucks because of information that there might be bombs in the gutted structure.

A later interview with the Battalion Chief indicated he had questioned the firemen who had been at the scene and did not find anyone who had been ordered away from the fire by Los Angeles Police Department personnel.

While the fire was being extinguished, SWAT members searched 1462 East 54th Street for a possible tunnel to 1466 East 54th Street. No tunnels were located.

The fires were extinguished by 1930 hours. The Los Angeles Fire Department later reported that:

1. The fire probably started in the north or northeast portion of the house.
2. The cause of the fire was undetermined.
3. The heavy black smoke that was present and the rapid spread of the fire is indicative of a flammable liquid.



Artificial lighting lends an eerie glow to the charred remains of the house at 1466 East 54th St. in the immediate aftermath of the gunfire.

Note: A two-gallon metal gasoline can, with a perforation in its side, was found in the northeast portion of the house (see page 67). This gasoline can was similar to a gasoline can found in the abandoned van at 1451 East 53rd Street earlier in the day.

Both Jane Smith #1 and Jane Smith #3 (see "SLA - Within The House", page 61) stated to Los Angeles Police Department investigators that they saw a white female SLA member walking around the house holding bottles filled with gasoline. Due to the nature of the information contained in this paragraph, the names of the witnesses have been changed.

#### Crime Scene Secured

At 1935 hours, the Los Angeles Police Department Explosives Unit was requested. This unit arrived at the scene of the incident at 2053 hours. A bomb search of the burned residence and surrounding area was conducted by members of the unit. Two pipe bombs, two blasting caps and a homemade explosive device were located and removed from the house. This concluded the tactical operation at 1466 East 54th Street and readied the scene for the investigative follow-up.

At 2015 hours, security for the area was turned over to Newton Street Uniformed Division and SWAT personnel returned to their headquarters for debriefing.

At 2030 hours, the command post reported that the perimeter was fully controlled. The Tactical Alert was cancelled at 2105 hours.

At 2300 hours, Metropolitan Division assumed responsibility for crime scene protection.

## SLA - WITHIN THE HOUSE

### Inside 1466 East 54th Street

While great emphasis has been placed on the tactical operations surrounding the small frame house on 54th Street on May 17, 1974, a more complete understanding of the incident can be obtained by reviewing the events that were occurring inside the house on that day.

This sequence of events was developed from the voluntary statements of witnesses who were inside the house on the day of the occurrence. These statements were made during taped interviews with Los Angeles Police Department investigators. Due to the nature of the information contained in this section the names of the witnesses have been changed.

Between 0400 and 1700 hours on the 17th day of May, occupants of the house participated in casual conversation while snacking on food, and drinking beer and wine. This is verified by recorded statements of the individuals who were present at various times during that 13-hour period. The adults present, Jane Smith #1, Jane Smith #2, Jane Smith #3, and John Smith #1 had been drinking for most of the evening and admitted to being intoxicated when they were confronted by Cinque's (Donald DeFreeze) knock at the door at 0400 hours. Each of the adults has stated that all four responded to the knock on the door. Each adult has stated that one of the other occupants admitted Cinque into the house. In any event, when the door was opened the occupants observed a male Negro standing at the door. Cinque told them that he had seen the lights on in the house and felt that as "sisters" they would help him.

Cinque stated that he and his friends were stranded and that they needed a place to stay. He offered \$100 to let them stay in the house. One of the four accepted the money. The male introduced himself as "Cinque" and told them that his friends were white. He was assured that color made no difference and that he and his friends were welcome at the house.

Cinque then asked John Smith #1, who was the only adult male present in the house, to help him. Both men went outside and joined five SLA members waiting near two vans parked on the north side of 54th Street. Learning that they could stay at the house, the SLA members parked the vans on the south side of 54th Street directly in front of 1466 East 54th Street.

John Smith #1 observed that there were four white females and one white male in the vans and, with his help, they began to unload the vans. It took the group about 20 minutes to move the various types of weapons and ammunition into the house. Most of the ordnance was stored in the kitchen. The group then turned their attention toward concealing the vans.

At this point, John Smith #1 volunteered to show Cinque where to hide the vans. It was approximately 0545 hours, when John Smith #1 and Cinque parked the vans in the rear of a partially boarded-up, two-story apartment house located at 1451 East 53rd Street. Unknown to Cinque, this location was a well-known drop spot for stolen cars.

At approximately 0600 hours, Cinque and John Smith #1 returned to the house. A conversation ensued regarding the possibility of Cinque and his friends renting a house in the neighborhood for two weeks. Jane Smith #2 informed Cinque that there was a house for rent at the corner of 54th Street and Compton Avenue. At approximately 0630 hours, John Smith #1 and Cinque looked at the house that Jane Smith #2 had mentioned. They asked about the rent and were told that the manager was out and that he was the only one who knew the price. Both men then returned to the East 54th Street address.


At approximately 0650 hours, John Smith #7, John Smith #1's boss, and John Smith #8, a friend, came to the house to pick up John Smith #1 for work. John Smith #7 blew his horn several times and John Smith #1 came out of the house and told them he was not going to work. He told John Smith #7 that members of the SLA were inside and that he had an opportunity to earn some money from them. John Smith #7 and John Smith #8 left for work and John Smith #1 went back into the house.

Inside the house Jane Smith #1, Jane Smith #2 and Jane Smith #3 were beginning to worry about the arsenal of guns, the bottles filled with gasoline, and the ammunition that surrounded them. As their anxiety grew, they went into the kitchen where most of the weaponry was stashed and consumed "nerve pills". The three women admitted to drinking and taking "nerve pills" throughout the day. Jane Smith #2's anxiety stemmed from the fact that her children, Jane Smith #4 and John Smith #2, would soon awaken and get prepared for school. Jane Smith #2's other three children, John Smith #3, John Smith #4, and Jane Smith #5, lived with their grandmother, Jane Smith #6.

At approximately 0700 hours, Jane Smith #3 was given money by Cinque and a shopping list by one of the female SLA members.



1466 E. 54TH STREET



SCALE:  $\frac{3}{16}'' = 1'$

FLOOR PLAN

Jane Smith #3, joined by Jane Smith #1, went to the store. Upon their return, one of the female SLA members took the groceries and made sandwiches. Jane Smith #3 became upset because she felt that the girl had begun to act as if she were the "woman of the house".

During the early morning hours, Jane Smith #1 and Jane Smith #2 slept for short intervals, only awakening to have something more to drink or to take more pills. Jane Smith #1 and Jane Smith #3 related that prior to 1000 hours, the SLA members talked mostly among themselves and constantly walked about the house. Frequently, the white male (William Wolfe) or Cinque looked toward the street from one of the front windows.

At approximately 0930 hours, Cinque asked John Smith #1 if he would buy a van or station wagon for them. John Smith #1 agreed and Cinque gave him \$500. John Smith #1 went to a nearby phone and called his employer, John Smith #7, and asked if he could borrow John Smith #8's car. John Smith #7 asked John Smith #1 why he wanted the car and he related his agreement with Cinque. John Smith #7 promptly refused. John Smith #1 then offered him \$40 if he could use a customer's car. John Smith #7 again refused and John Smith #1 returned to the house. John Smith #1 left the house again about 1300 hours, allegedly still seeking a vehicle for the SLA. He did not return to the house.

Between 1000 and 1300 hours, a number of visitors entered the East 54th Street house, visited with those present and left. Among these visitors were John Smith #5, Jane Smith #7, Jane Smith #8, and Jane Smith #9. They observed the SLA lying about the house asleep or talking and drinking with Jane Smith #1, Jane Smith #2, and Jane Smith #3. This fact was verified through statements of Jane Smith #1, Jane Smith #2, Jane Smith #3, and Jane Smith #2's 10-year-old son, John Smith #3. While in the house, Jane Smith #9 asked Cinque what he was doing in Los Angeles. Cinque stated that he and his followers had come to Los Angeles to start a revolution and "get the police". While talking to Jane Smith #9, Cinque was issuing guns and ammunition to the others.

Jane Smith #7 arrived at the house about 1300 hours, and saw John Smith #1 leave. She observed numerous guns and noticed that all of the white girls were armed. She left and returned about 1430 hours. During this visit she heard Cinque remark, "Trish, we got to get out of here, it's getting too hot". He

also said to a male black, John Smith #6, "The station wagon should be here by now". Jane Smith #7 stated she could sense the nervous tension among the SLA members and became convinced that they really were members of the SLA. She left the house, went home and called the police. When she mentioned the SLA to the operator, she was put through to the FBI at 1400 hours.

Around 1450 hours, Jane Smith #2's children began arriving home from school. Ordinarily they would have gone to their grandmother's house, but their grandmother, Jane Smith #6, was visiting the hospital. Eleven-year-old John Smith #4 arrived home first and was confronted by Cinque. Cinque was holding a gun and ordered him to sit down. After he sat down, John Smith #4 recognized Cinque from television and newspapers. When he asked Cinque if he was Donald Defreeze, Cinque replied that he was not. John Smith #4 observed strangers in the house, some putting ammunition into machine guns and others lying on the floor. Cinque told him to go into the bathroom and get into the bathtub if he did not want to get killed. Instead, John Smith #4 made his way to the rear of the house and fled out the back door and down the alley.

At approximately 1515 hours, Jane Smith #5 and John Smith #3 arrived home from school. Just after they entered the house, they saw Jane Smith #3 pushing Jane Smith #1 down on the bed. One of the white women grabbed Jane Smith #3 in order to separate them. At this time, Jane Smith #3 was asked to join the SLA because the SLA members liked the way she fought.

At approximately 1530 hours, Jane Smith #6 arrived at the East 54th Street address. Upon entering the house she saw strangers sitting in the kitchen. She asked for her daughter, Jane Smith #2, and was told by Jane Smith #3 that Jane Smith #2 was in the bedroom.

Jane Smith #6 entered the darkened bedroom and found Jane Smith #1 asleep. Unable to arouse her, Jane Smith #6 asked Jane Smith #1 if all the people in the house were drunk and who the strangers were. Jane Smith #3 told Jane Smith #6 that there were white girls in Jane Smith #1's bedroom and that they had guns, bombs and ammunition. Jane Smith #6 asked those persons assembled in the kitchen to leave, but she was told by Cinque that they should all stick together. Jane Smith #6 returned to the bedroom and observed a white girl lying on the bed wearing a gun. Jane Smith #6 asked the girl what was going on, but the girl only smiled and patted the gun on her hip. At approximately 1611 hours, Jane Smith #6 took her grandchildren, Jane Smith #5 and John Smith #3, from the house and looked for the police in order to report what she had seen.



Shortly after Jane Smith #6 left the house, Jane Smith #3 was given \$20 and sent on another shopping trip. Jane Smith #3 never returned to the house. At this time, Jane Smith #2 awoke and went to the house on the corner of 54th Street and Ascot Avenue in search of a drink. Jane Smith #2 never returned to the house.

At this time, Jane Smith #1, John Smith #6, and eight-year-old John Smith #2 remained inside the house on East 54th Street. John Smith #2's presence was unknown to Jane Smith #6.

In this same time span, Jane Smith #10 arrived at the house. She had heard from her brother that members of the SLA were at Jane Smith #1's house and decided to go there because of her curiosity and sympathy for the SLA. Jane Smith #1 met her at the door, took her into the kitchen and introduced her to Cinque. Cinque told her that his real name was Donald DeFreeze and that he was the leader of the SLA. Jane Smith #10 began to discuss the mission of the SLA with Cinque. Cinque told her that he was here to fight for the rights of needy people and to help them exist in this world. Cinque stated that he wanted to utilize whites and blacks to fulfill his mission. Cinque explained that by using rich white girls he could convince them to seek financial help from their fathers and the SLA would use the money. He stated that he had used Patty Hearst in this manner. He stated that Patty Hearst was a member of his army and one of his children, as were all the white girls fighting with him. Cinque stated that he knew the police were in the neighborhood but that he and his children would fight to the death. Cinque expressed a desire to take a number of "pigs" with him. In a quotation attributed to him by Jane Smith #10, Cinque stated, "I know I am going to die and all my people know that they will also, but we are going to take a lot of m----- f----- pigs with us". According to Jane Smith #10, Cinque drank Boone's Farm wine during her talk with him, but that he appeared sober and in full control of his faculties. During Jane Smith #10's conversation with Cinque, Jane Smith #1 came stumbling into the kitchen and fell to the floor. Cinque picked her up and helped her into the living room where she collapsed into a deep sleep. In the living room, Cinque continued the discussion with Jane Smith #10 and showed her the arsenal of weapons. Finally, Cinque said that one of the reasons he came to Los Angeles was to search for his wife and six children. Jane Smith #10 left the house and never returned.

John Smith #2 and John Smith #6 sat in the living room. John Smith #2 watched television and John Smith #6 drank liquor. John Smith #2 later told police that he had come out of the front door of the house when he heard the police calling over a loudspeaker. He was guided along the sidewalk by a policeman (SWAT Team One leader). He told the policeman that John Smith #6 was still in the house and that he had been unable to rouse Jane Smith #1. John Smith #6 came out of the house moments later.

Soon after John Smith #2 and John Smith #6 had exited the house, the gunfire commenced. Sometime during the battle, the noise awakened Jane Smith #1 and she got up shouting, "They got me, they got me". When she stumbled around inside the house, one of the white females pulled her into the kitchen and down onto the floor. After the fire started, Jane Smith #1 inched her way to the front door, opened it and escaped.

## AFTERMATH

After the shooting had ceased and the fire had been extinguished, investigators from the Department's Scientific Investigation Division and Criminal Conspiracy Section, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office began their tasks of locating evidence and removing bodies from the burned residence at 1466 East 54th Street.

### Evidence Search

Under the direction of the Field Commander, a grid was superimposed on the perimeter of the house located at 1466 East 54th Street. The grid search is a search procedure used at bomb sites. An extension of the grid was made just outside the southwest portion of the house to include the area in which Nancy Ling Perry was found. The evidence which was discovered at the scene was boxed according to its location within the grid. The finding of evidence was reported to a single control officer before it was removed from its location. The purpose of this procedure was to establish control and maintain continuity of evidence.


The locating, collecting and identifying of evidence at 1466 East 54th Street began immediately after the removal of the fifth body on May 17th, and continued until May 19th. Tons of debris had to be sifted and every possible area searched in order to recover evidence. A visual search was also conducted several yards outside of the grid area because the pressure of the water used to extinguish the fire knocked pieces of evidence away from the burned residence.

As the search progressed it became evident that the SLA members had armed themselves with a veritable arsenal of weapons. Nineteen firearms, including rifles, pistols, and shotguns, were recovered from the burned structure. The rifles were M-1 carbines converted to operate fully automatic. Several of the serial numbers were obliterated by the fire. In the section on the grid labeled B-4, two pipe bombs were found with two blasting caps nearby. A two-gallon gasoline can was found in grid section C-2. This can had a perforation in its side and was similar to one found in the abandoned van on 53rd Street.

### Rifles

One M-1 carbine, .30 caliber, converted to operate fully automatic, make and serial # unknown (grid A-5)

# 1466 E. 54th STREET



GRID SYSTEM FOR EVIDENCE SEARCH

One M-1 carbine, .30 caliber, converted to operate fully automatic, partial serial #7G (grid C-2)

One M-1 carbine, .30 caliber, converted to operate fully automatic, serial #6608261 (grid B-4)

One M-1 carbine, .30 caliber, converted to operate fully automatic, serial #1248504 (grid B-2)

One rifle, Browning, .30-06 caliber, auto loading sports model, serial #13015M72 (grid C-3)

One rifle, Remington, semi-automatic, caliber .244, serial # unknown (grid A-5)

#### Handguns

One pistol - automatic, Mauser HSc double-action model, .38 auto/9mm k caliber, serial #0124493 (grid A-5)

One pistol - automatic, Mauser HSc double-action model, .38 auto/9mm k caliber, with magazine, with live round in chamber, serial #012 6377 (grid A-5)

One pistol, automatic, .45 caliber, Colt government model, serial # removed (grid A-2)

One pistol, automatic, 9mm, Browning Hy-Power, serial #71036517 (grid A-3)

One revolver, Rossi, .38 caliber, 3" blue steel, serial #96622 (grid A-5)

One revolver .38 caliber, Smith & Wesson, 2" barrel, blue steel "Chief's Special," serial # removed (grid C-5)


#### Shotguns

One shotgun, 12-gauge, Ithaca, model 37, slide action, sawed-off, serial #371320357 (grid A-1)

One shotgun, 12-gauge, Mossberg, model 500, 3" chamber, slide action, sawed-off, serial #G036407 (grid B-5)

One shotgun, 12-gauge, Mossberg, 3" chamber, slide action, sawed-off, no serial # (receiver melted) (grid B-5)

One shotgun, 12-gauge, Mossberg, slide action, sawed-off, serial #930709 (grid A-4)



Aerial view on the day following encounter.  
SLA hideout can be identified by grid.



Aerial view showing detailed sifting  
for evidence in the charred remains.

One shotgun, 12-gauge, Mossberg, slide action, sawed-off, no serial # (receiver melted) (grid A-4)

One shotgun, 12-gauge, make unknown, serial # unknown (barrel only) (grid A-4)

One shotgun, 12-gauge, Winchester pump, model 1897, sawed-off, serial #567744 (grid C-5)

In grids A-5 and A-5X, adjacent to the bodies of Nancy Ling Perry, Angela Atwood, and Camilla Hall, the following weapons were found: a .30 caliber M-1 carbine, converted to operate fully automatic, a .244 caliber semi-automatic Remington rifle, a .38 caliber Rossi revolver, a 9-millimeter automatic Mauser pistol and numerous rounds of ammunition (spent and unspent) that were compatible with these weapons. Three 12-gauge slide action shotguns, a .30 caliber M-1 carbine, converted to operate fully automatic, and a 9-millimeter .380 Mauser automatic pistol were found in grids A-4, B-4 and B-5. Within the same area numerous rounds of ammunition were found which were compatible with their respective weapons.

In grid C-5, the area where the bodies of Donald DeFreeze, William Wolfe and Patricia Soltysik were found, the following weapons were recovered: a .38 caliber 2" Smith & Wesson revolver, a 12-gauge Winchester slide action shotgun and numerous shell and ammunition pouches.

The location of the bodies in relation to the weapons indicated that the group of suspects had shifted their position to the sub-floor level in the rear of 1466 East 54th Street. This tactic is consistent with many guerrilla manuals depicting defenses when trapped in a building. The concrete foundation of a house provides a bunker and the crawl hole and vents supply air.

### Ammunition

There were 4,247 cartridges recovered from the remains of the house. Four hundred and seventy-five of these were unexpended rounds, the remaining 3,772 cartridges had been expended. Ballistics experts from the Department's Scientific Investigation Division indicated that 668 of the 3,772 cartridges had primers bearing firing-pin marks. Ballistics experts stated that they were unable to determine how many of the remaining 3,772 cartridges had actually been fired by SLA members within the house. The primers of these cartridges were missing and had either melted or popped-off due to the heat of the fire.

Items of evidence recovered from 1466 East 54th Street.



Charred remains of gas mask



9mm automatic pistol, with  
live round in chamber



Home-made pipe bomb




Charred remains of an  
automatic rifle with 30  
round clip in magazine



## Weapons Cache



Left to Right - Handguns, rifles, sawed-off shotguns, knife, automatic rifles, ammo clips, pipe bombs, SLA literature.



Another view of SLA arsenal.



Note expended rounds in foreground.

Following are listings of cartridges that had primers with firing pin marks, cartridges without primers, and unexpended live rounds:

Cartridges that had primers with firing pin marks:

Shotgun - 12-gauge	97
Carbine - .30 Caliber	494
Rifle - .30-06 Caliber	52
Rifle - .244 (6mm) Caliber	11
Pistol - .38 Caliber	10
Pistol - 9mm (.380) Caliber	3
Pistol - .45 Caliber	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	668

Cartridges without primers:

Shotgun - 12-gauge, expended	786
Miscellaneous caliber expended shell casings	2284
Miscellaneous expended slugs	<u>702</u>
TOTAL	3772

Unexpended rounds:

Shotgun - 12-gauge	48
Miscellaneous Caliber	364
Miscellaneous hollow points	<u>63</u>
TOTAL	475

All the evidence from the scene was booked at Central Property Division by investigators from Criminal Conspiracy Section, Investigative Support Division.

## Firearms Evaluation

Ballistics experts of the Los Angeles Police Department and the Federal Government indicated that the modification of the machine gun used by members of the SLA was not a military conversion, but one performed by a person who had some basic knowledge of machine shop operations and an above average knowledge of the M-1 carbine.

Due to the modification of the M-1 carbine, it could only be fired in the "full automatic" position. This alteration increased the firepower of the weapons from 750-800 rounds per minute to 1,100 rounds per minute. With this modification and short barrel the M-1 carbine became an inaccurate weapon, but capable of tremendous firepower.

According to the ballistics experts, the modification was similar to that used by Che Guevera and Fidel Castro in their early revolutionary days.

## SLA Activities After May 17, 1974

Since the shootout of May 17, 1974, there have been numerous reported sightings of William and Emily Harris and Patricia Hearst.

On the night of May 19, 1974, Anita Alcalá told police that a woman, she believed to be Patty Hearst, and two black men tried to rent an apartment from her. Anita Alcalá, the manager of an apartment house at 260 North New Hampshire Avenue, stated that the trio approached her at 2130 hours, and offered to pay her \$500 for a place to stay. When the landlady told them that no apartment was available, Patty Hearst pointed a gun at her and said, "You want to die?" One of the males then swung a knife at her, cutting her dress. The trio then left hurriedly in a red vehicle with a black top.

In another sighting, William Walls, age 83, who lives in Placerita Canyon in the Newhall area identified photographs of Patty Hearst and William and Emily Harris as the trio who drove up to his home and asked if they could spend the night. When William Walls explained he did not have room they asked for directions to Los Angeles. The trio specifically asked how they could get to the city without traveling on a freeway. William Walls stated the three did not offer any money and did not display any weapons.

At 0630 hours, on June 7, 1974, Los Angeles FM radio station KPFK allegedly received an anonymous telephone call informing

them that an SLA tape was under a mattress in a woodpile behind the station.

The 33-minute tape was recovered by KPFK personnel and contained what appeared to be statements from William and Emily Harris and Patty Hearst.

The following statements are quotes from the tape:

"The SLA is not dead and will not die as long as there is one living, fighting member of any oppressed class, race, sex or group left on the face of the earth."

"The pig has won a battle but the war of the flea is not over."

Tico (William Harris)

"When we say revolution, we do not use the word loosely. When we say revolution, we mean the violent fight for freedom."

"Cinque knew that to live was to shoot straight."

"There is no surrender. No one in that house was suicidal; just determined and full of love."

Yolanda (Emily Harris)

"I died in the fire on 54th Street but out of the ashes I was reborn."

"The pig lies about the advisability of surrender have only made me more determined. I renounced my class privilege when Cin and Cujo gave me the name Tania."

"Life is very precious to me but I have no delusions that going to prison would keep me alive and I would never choose to live the rest of my life surrounded by pigs like the Hearsts."

"The pigs think they can deal with a handful of revolutionaries, but they know they cannot defeat the incredible power which the people once united represent."

Tania (Patty Hearst)

The tape ends with the words ...

"Death to the fascist insect that preys upon the life of the people."

## INJURIES AND DEATHS

Four agencies were contacted to determine if any of their personnel sustained an injury as a result of their involvement in the incident at 54th Street and Compton Avenue on May 17, 1974. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles City Fire Department, the California Highway Patrol and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department reported that none of their personnel had been injured.

At 1805 hours, while responding Code Three (red lights and siren) to an Officer Needs Help Call at 54th Street and Compton Avenue, a unit of the California Highway Patrol became involved in a traffic accident with two other vehicles at the intersection of Florence and Compton Avenues. The driver of the Highway Patrol vehicle was not injured. However, the drivers of the second and third vehicles both complained of pain. One driver was removed from the scene to Southeast Doctors Hospital; the other driver decided to see her own physician.

At 1845 hours, on May 17, 1974, a woman, later identified as Christine Johnson, was observed exiting the front door of 1466 East 54th Street. She had remained in the residence throughout the gun battle and emerged at the time that the entire upper section of the structure became involved in flames.

Christine Johnson was removed from the scene and transported to California Hospital where she was treated for minor shotgun wounds to the back and right leg, a lineal laceration to the left arm, minor burns and bruises, and the aftereffects of tear gas. Christine Johnson was later booked at the University of Southern California Medical Center for 32 P.C. (accessory to a felony).

### Los Angeles Police Department Personnel

Five injuries were sustained by Los Angeles Police Department officers.

Sergeant B. Altizer, #13062, Central Uniformed Division, injured his back while carrying a wooden gas case and running in a crouched position due to heavy gunfire. On May 18, 1974, he contacted his doctor and was placed in the hospital for five days for a severe lumbar sacro strain. After he was released from the hospital, he remained home for two weeks. On June 6, he returned to his assignment and was placed on light duty status for one month.

Officer S. Lynn, #17436, 77th Street Uniformed Division, pulled a muscle in his left thigh while attempting to restrain an arrestee at 55th Street and Compton. He was treated at Orthopedic Hospital for a torn hamstring and placed off duty for three days.

Officer J. Stier, #12490, Metropolitan Division, strained his lower back and injured his right shoulder while evacuating citizens from the residences adjacent to 1466 East 54th Street during the gun battle. He was treated at White Memorial Hospital and placed off duty for two days.

Officer G. Strollo, #17417, 77th Street Uniformed Division, while attempting to restrain and handcuff a prisoner, struck his right arm on the concrete at 55th Street and Compton Avenue. He was treated at Orthopedic Hospital for a fractured ulmars tyliod and placed off duty for two weeks.

Sergeant R. Studdard, #10579, Central Traffic Division, while attempting to control a crowd north of Ascot on 54th Street, was struck on his upper right leg by a block of concrete (8" in diameter and 3" thick) thrown from the crowd by an unknown suspect. He was treated at California Hospital and continued on duty.


### Deaths

The Los Angeles County Coroner and five deputy coroners arrived on the scene at 2020 hours, May 17, 1974. Five badly charred bodies were initially located, pronounced dead, and removed to the Los Angeles County Morgue for examination and identification.

Subsequently, on May 19, 1974, at 0945 hours, investigators sifting through the ashes and rubble at the southwest corner of the burned-out structure discovered a sixth body. The Los Angeles County Coroner arrived at the location at 1100 hours, and confirmed the findings of the investigators. This body, also badly charred, was then removed by the Coroner and transported to the Los Angeles County Morgue for examination and identification.

The following is a detailed narrative of the preliminary report of the Los Angeles County Coroner, with respect to the six decedents.

1466 E. 54th STREET



**GRID SYSTEM FOR EVIDENCE SEARCH  
BODY LOCATION**

- ① NANCY LING PERRY
- ② ANGELA ATWOOD
- ③ WILLIAM WOLFE
- ④ DONALD DE FREEZE
- ⑤ PATRICIA SOLTYSIK
- ⑥ CAMILLA HALL

Nancy Ling Perry

Jane Doe #1 (CC#74-6761) was found lying in a prone position, south of the southwest corner (A5X) of the burned-out structure. The body was facing in a northeasterly direction and was badly charred.

Found on the ground beneath the decedent were remnants of burned clothing and what appeared to be a .30 caliber magazine containing an unknown amount of ammunition. The burned remnants of a gas mask were also found next to the body.

On May 17, 1974, at 2305 hours, the body was removed by the Coroner and brought to the Los Angeles County Morgue. A detailed examination revealed the body to be that of a female Caucasian in her early twenties, approximately 57 inches in height and 91 pounds in weight. The following personal property was found on the decedent:

1. Yellow metal ring, no stones.
2. Yellow metal wrist watch with leather band, burned.
3. Parts of burned currency.
4. One quarter.
5. Notebook page with handwriting.
6. One medal with design.

A dental examination and comparison established the identity of the decedent as Nancy Ling Perry, age 26. Death resulted from two gunshot wounds to the back, one severing the spinal cord and the other penetrating the right lung.

Angela Atwood

Jane Doe #2 (CC#74-6762) was found lying in a prone position just inside the southwest corner (A5) of the burned-out structure. The body was facing in a southwesterly direction and was badly charred. The burned remnants of a gas mask were found next to the decedent.

On May 17, 1974, at 2305 hours, the body was removed by the Coroner and brought to the Los Angeles County Morgue. A detailed examination revealed the body to be that of a



female Caucasian in her early twenties, approximately 56 inches in height and 72 pounds in weight. The following personal property was found on the decedent:

1. Yellow metal ring, no stones.
2. Three scraps of paper with handwriting.
3. Miscellaneous U.S. currency and coins amounting to \$1.86.
4. Remnants of an ammunition pouch, burned.

In addition, the following evidence was found on the decedent:

1. Four bullets.
2. knives.
3. Four expended casings
4. One live round of ammunition.

A dental examination and comparison established the identity of the decedent as Angela Atwood, age 25. Death occurred as a result of smoke inhalation and burns.

#### William Wolfe

John Doe #3 (CC#74-6763) was found lying in a prone position inside of the southeast corner of the structure (C5) just to the right of John Doe #4. The body was facing south near an air vent in the foundation and was also badly charred.

On May 17, 1974, at 2305 hours, the body was removed by the Coroner and brought to the Los Angeles County Morgue. A detailed examination revealed the body to be that of a male Caucasian in his early twenties, approximately 66 inches in height and 121 pounds in weight. The following personal property was found on the decedent:

1. Miscellaneous U.S. currency and coins amounting to \$127.28.
2. Wallet with miscellaneous cards and papers showing identification of a Robert Owen Murphy.
3. Two keys.

4. Three U.S. postage stamps.
5. One peso note.
6. One photograph.
7. One driver's license, Hawaii #015 2621.

In addition, the following evidence was found on the decedent:

1. One bullet, undetermined caliber.
2. Six rounds of 9mm ammunition.
3. Two rounds .38 caliber ammunition.
4. One round of 6mm ammunition.
5. Two 12-gauge rounds and one 12-gauge casing.
6. Two .30 caliber rounds of ammunition and six .30 caliber casings.
7. Eleven rounds .45 caliber ammunition.
8. One homemade bomb in a 35mm film can.

A dental examination and comparison established the identity of the decedent as William Wolfe, age 23. Death occurred as a result of smoke inhalation and burns.

Donald DeFreeze

John Doe #4 (CC#74-6764) was found lying partially on his right side between John Doe #3 and Jane Doe #5 in the south-east corner (C5) of the burned structure. The body was facing to the south near an air vent in the foundation and was badly charred. A .38 caliber, snub nose revolver was found lying under the decedent.

On May 17, 1974, at 2305 hours, the body was removed by the Coroner and brought to the Los Angeles County Morgue. A detailed examination revealed the body to be that of a male Negro, approximately 67½ inches in height and 159 pounds in weight. The following personal property was found on the decedent:

1. Thirty-six cents.

2. Remnants of charred currency.
3. White metal ring with 13 green stones.
4. White metal wrist watch, Timex.
5. White metal wrist watch, possible Whitnauer.
6. Four pieces of paper with handwriting.

In addition, the following evidence was found on the decedent:

1. Two .30 caliber rounds of ammunition.
2. Three 9mm rounds of ammunition.
3. One 9mm casing.
4. Two blasting caps.

A fingerprint examination and comparison established the identity of the decedent as Donald DeFreeze, age 30. Death occurred as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. The bullet entered the right temple on a slightly upward trajectory and exited the left temple area. Microscopic examinations of this bullet wound indicated the presence of gun powder in the tissues around the entrance wound in the right temple. Based upon scientific evidence, the pattern of this wound is consistent with self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

Patricia Soltysik

Jane Doe #5 (CC#74-6765) was found in a kneeling position, partially lying across John Doe #4 in the southeast corner (C5) of the burned structure. The body was facing to the south near an air vent in the foundation and was badly charred.

On May 17, 1974, at 2305 hours, the body was removed by the Coroner and brought to the Los Angeles County Morgue. A detailed examination revealed the body to be that of a female Caucasian, approximately 63 inches in height and 123 pounds in weight. The following personal property was found on the decedent:

1. \$320.00.
2. Three 8½ X 11 notebook papers with writing.

3. One 5 X 8½ letter.
4. One 5 X 8½ notebook paper.
5. One selective service registration card (4-62-47-1970) in the name of Steven Andrew Weed, born June 3, 1947, in New York. The card was cut into two pieces.
6. One social security card (564-74-4767) in the name of Steve A. Weed, cut into three pieces.
7. Personalized check in the name of Steven A. Weed, 2603 Benvenue, No. 4, Berkeley, California from the Telegraph at Russell Branch of the Bank of America, Berkeley. The check was cut into two pieces.
8. One registration card, University of California, Berkeley (KO 71845) in the name of Patricia Campbell Hearst, cut into two pieces.
9. One University of California School of Optometry receipt (44498) in the name of Steven Weed, cut into two pieces.
10. One buyer's pass, Dahnken (74198) in the name of Steven Weed, cut into two pieces.

In addition, the following evidence was found on the decedent:

1. Four .30 caliber magazines, 15 rounds each.
2. One .30 caliber magazine, 31 rounds.
3. One .380 caliber magazine, 7 rounds.
4. Five rounds of .38 caliber ammunition.
5. One magazine, 6 rounds, unknown caliber.

A dental examination and comparison established the identity of the decedent as Patricia Soltysik, age 24. Death resulted from a combination of smoke inhalation, burns, and multiple gunshot wounds.

## Camilla Hall

Jane Doe #6 (CC#74-6828) was discovered on May 19, 1974, lying in a prone position at the southwest corner (A5) of the burned structure approximately 18 inches east of Jane Doe #2. The body was facing south and was badly charred. A packet of possibly undischarged but destroyed shotgun shells were found between the ground and the abdomen of the decedent.

On May 19, 1974, at 1215 hours, the body was removed by the Coroner and brought to the Los Angeles County Morgue. A detailed examination revealed the body to be that of a female Caucasian, approximately 66 inches in height and 90 pounds in weight. The following personal property was found on the decedent:

1. \$1.95.
2. One knife.
3. White metal ring with stone.
4. One compass.

In addition, the following evidence was found on the decedent:

1. One .380 automatic casing.

A dental examination and comparison established the identity of the decedent as Camilla Hall, age 29. The decedent received a gunshot wound in the center of the forehead which caused instantaneous death.

On May 24, 1974, it was established that detailed toxicological studies conducted on all six deceased did not detect the presence of any alcohol, sedatives, hypnotics, stimulants or narcotics. According to pathologists at the Coroner's office, this does not mean that the decedents did not ingest alcohol during that day. For example, beer metabolizes at the rate of one 12-ounce can an hour. In a greatly excited state, adrenalin increases the metabolic rate and it is possible to dissipate two 12-ounce cans of beer in one hour.

In addition, tests were conducted on each of the bodies to determine the presence of CS and CN tear gases. The results were negative confirming that the six decedents were wearing gas masks up until the time of their deaths.

On May 18, 1974, all personal property and evidence was released to Scientific Investigation Division, Los Angeles Police Department. Camilla Hall's property was released on May 19, 1974.

## PROPERTY DAMAGE

As a result of the resistance offered by the Symbionese Liberation Army members who had barricaded themselves within 1466 East 54th Street, extensive property damage, real and personal, was realized by property owners in the immediate area.


The discharge of automatic weapons and the subsequent structural fires were the primary sources of the damage to property. Some damage such as the partial removal of a picket fence, the breaking of a window and the removal of doors was incurred due to police action. The urgency of the situation called for positions of advantage to be assumed by law enforcement personnel. As a result of the gun battle, 23 structures and two vehicles received damage. Damage to the interior contents of the structures is not included in the following figures. Personal property damage is listed separately.

### Estimate of Structural Damage

Estimates of repair or replacement costs have been provided by inspectors from the Los Angeles City Building and Safety Department. Additionally, all claims and estimates of damage resulting from the 54th Street incident have been investigated and verified by the Civil Liabilities Section, Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney.


### Property Damage - Real

1460 E. 53rd - Damaged fence	\$ 100.00
1438 E. 54th - Broken window	50.00
1441 E. 54th - Damaged screen door	15.00
1443 E. 54th - Bullet holes	200.00
1445 E. 54th - Bullet holes	200.00
1447 E. 54th - Bullet holes	700.00
1449 E. 54th - Bullet holes	1,000.00
1451 E. 54th - Bullet holes	200.00
1452 E. 54th - Damaged door	100.00
1455 E. 54th - Bullet holes	250.00
1456 E. 54th - Bullet holes	100.00



Vehicle strafed by gunfire from occupants of 1466 East 54th St.  
was parked across the street in front of 1449 East 54th St.





Front wall of 1449 East 54th Street. Some bullets passed through the wall into the occupied interior of the upper apartment.

1462 E. 54th - Totally destroyed	15,000.00
1466 E. 54th - SLA House - Totally destroyed	14,000.00
1468 E. 54th - Totally destroyed	6,600.00
1469 E. 54th - Bullet holes	250.00
1465 E. 55th - Bullet holes	250.00
5311 S. Compton - Damaged doors	200.00
5325 S. Compton - Bullet holes	500.00
5337 S. Compton - Bullet holes	250.00
5400½ S. Compton - Bullet holes	300.00
5409 S. Compton - Bullet holes	35.00
5411 S. Compton - Fire damage	2,500.00
5415 S. Compton - Damaged doors	100.00
5501 S. Compton #4 - Damaged door/ window screen	35.00
5416 Ascot - Broken window	75.00
TOTAL	\$43,010.00

#### 1462 East 54th Street

The one story, Type V, approximately 32' 6" X 49' 6", wood frame and wood sided dwelling, had extensive fire damage to the floors, walls, ceilings, rafters, roofing, windows, doors and cabinets. The plumbing, electrical and heating systems have also been damaged. The estimated cost of repair for the dwelling is \$14,500. Repair to fencing and landscaping will be \$500.

#### 1466 East 54th Street

The one story, Type V, 20' X 40', wood frame and wood sided dwelling, had extensive fire damage (100%) to the underpinning, floor joist, flooring, windows, cabinets, doors, walls, ceiling and roof. The plumbing, electrical and heating systems have been totally destroyed. The dwelling contains approximately 758 square feet. The estimated replacement cost is \$13,600 for the dwelling and \$400 for fencing and landscaping.




The remains of 1466 East 54th Street on the morning after the incident. View is to the southeast.



Front view of 1462 East 54th St., the house adjacent to  
1466 East 54th St. This structure was gutted by fire.

COMPTON AVENUE




E. 53rd ST.

E. 55th ST.

E. 54th ST.

ASCOT AVENUE



 INDICATES REAL PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM CONFRONTATION

1468 East 54th Street

The one story, Type V, approximately 24' X 30' 6", wood frame and plastered dwelling, had fire damage to the walls, ceilings, roof, electrical system and plumbing fixtures. The estimated cost to repair the dwelling is \$6,600. There was no fencing or landscaping.


5411 Compton Avenue

The one story, Type V, 22' X 29', wood frame and plastered dwelling, had fire damage to the windows, doors and ceilings. The estimated cost of repairs is \$2,500.

Property Damage - 833 West 84th Street

At approximately 0900 hours, on May 17, 1974, information received by Los Angeles Police Department necessitated tactical operations in the vicinity of 833 West 84th Street. This action consisted of securing positions of advantage (efforts were coordinated with FBI personnel) and the subsequent taking of the house believed to contain suspected SLA members. A damage survey of this address revealed the front windows and doors of the structure were damaged due to the use of Flite-rite projectiles fired by LAPD personnel, and the rear door and window were damaged as a result of FBI actions. The below figures were taken from a claim of damages submitted by the property owner to the City Attorney.

<u>Damage</u>	<u>Claimant's Estimate</u>
Damaged windows and frames	\$ 500.00
Damaged doors	100.00
Damaged floors	1,000.00
Damaged walls	1,000.00
Damaged screens	100.00
Damaged carpeting	100.00
Damaged electrical wiring	100.00
Damaged wall heater	200.00
Damaged plumbing	400.00
Fumigating	200.00
Vacancy factor	<u>open</u>
TOTAL	\$3,700.00



Looking east from the kitchen of 1462 East 54th Street. Holes in walls are from bullets fired into the residence by SLA members.

### Personal Property Damage

The following claims of personal property damage have been made to the City of Los Angeles. All claims listed have been investigated by the City Attorney's Office to verify authenticity.

#### Personal Property

1438 East 54th Street	\$ 200.00
1447 East 54th Street	291.00
1449 East 54th Street, Apt. #3	935.00
1455 East 54th Street	172.12
1458 East 54th Street	35.00
1462 East 54th Street	3,612.35
5411 South Compton Avenue	<u>587.00</u>
TOTAL	\$ 5,832.47

Occupants of 1466 East 54th and 1468 East 54th Street have filed suit through private attorneys seeking compensation for damage realized to personal property. Estimates are unavailable.

### Los Angeles Police Department

Regular training and practice provide for the successful attainment of two essential principles of the SWAT concept: (1) efficiency of tactical operations; and (2) the well disciplined control of firepower. Prior to the 54th Street incident, SWAT members had fired 45,000 rounds of ammunition through their weapons during training sessions held over an eight-year period. This quantity of rounds was sufficient in itself to put considerable wear on the barrel riflings of many of these weapons. Cleaning also added to the wear of the barrels. The prolonged gunfire at 1466 East 54th Street caused the barrel riflings of some of the weapons to completely wear out and the magazine springs to become unserviceable.



Metropolitan Division

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1. 37 mm gas gun - broken firing mechanism	1	\$ 20.00
2. M16 rifle - receiver/ barrel damage	2	250.00
3. AR15 rifle - receiver/ barrel damage	10	1,200.00
4. Gas masks XM28 - E - excessive exposure	25	25.00
5. .223 cal. 20 round magazines for AR15 - spring damage	36	108.00
6. 9mm magazine for MP-40 - spring damage	1	20.00 *
	TOTAL	<u>\$1,623.00</u>

\* Estimated cost

The following agencies provided services as a result of actions taken to effect the arrest of SLA suspects. Reported damage is as follows:

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department

No losses or damage to equipment

Los Angeles City Fire Department

No losses or damage to equipment

Vernon Police Department

No losses or damage to equipment

Secret Service

No losses or damage to equipment

Federal Bureau of Investigation

No losses or damage to equipment

California Highway Patrol

At 1805 hours, May 17, 1974, a California Highway Patrol unit, responding to an "Officer Needs Help" call, 54th Street and Compton Avenue, was involved in a traffic accident at the intersection of Compton Avenue and Florence Avenue. Injury was claimed at the scene, however, no estimate of medical costs have been made.

Vehicular Damage

\$850.00

Department of Water and Power

1462 East 54th Street - removal of meter S/3#8  
Meter 6-606709R34758

1466 East 54th Street - removal of meter and service

1468 East 54th Street - removal of meter S/2#8  
Meter 103134148

55th & Compton Avenue - Cut wires from pole as  
per Fire Department  
request. Pole 51993M  
Cut 2-S3#4  
1-S2#8, 1-S3#8, 1-#8

Estimate cost to  
replace damaged  
property

\$500.00

TOTAL

\$500.00

Summary of Damage

Totals of damage costs are listed below by category:

Damage to structures on  
54th Street

\$43,010.00

Damage to structure at  
833 West 84th Street

3,700.00

Personal property damage

5,832.47

Equipment damage or loss

(1) Los Angeles Police Department	1,623.00
(2) California Highway Patrol	850.00 *
(3) Department of Water & Power	500.00

TOTAL	<u>\$55,515.47</u>
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\* Includes damage to two privately-owned vehicles

## SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS

### Background of Urban Violence

As the incidence of urban violence increased during the last decade, the tactical problems facing police agencies in American cities increased accordingly. During the late 1960's, riots in major metropolitan areas forced the police into crowd control situations for which they found themselves minimally prepared. The emergence of the sniper as a threat to police and fire department operations presented a further challenge to effective curtailment of civil disorders. A still more volatile symptom of the escalation of violence in our cities during the same period was the appearance of the political assassin. More recently, the threat of urban guerrilla warfare by certain militant organizations has become a reality in other parts of the country.

By virtue of increased training, planning, and exchange of information, most large law enforcement agencies are now equipped to handle the crowd control and containment aspects of a civil disturbance in a more sophisticated and professional manner. However, the sniper, the potential assassin, and the urban guerrilla reflect one unique characteristic which makes them an enigma to law enforcement. Each of these perpetrators of violence employs tactics which conventional police personnel and procedures are not geared to handle. The unpredictability of the sniper and his anticipation of normal police response increases the chances of death or injury to officers. To commit conventionally trained officers to a confrontation with a guerrilla-trained militant group would likely result in a high number of casualties among the officers and the escape of the guerrillas.

### Formation of SWAT

It was obvious that the need existed for the Los Angeles Police Department to develop the capability to successfully combat urban violence. The Department formulated a special unit committed to the control of tactical situations which were beyond the scope of the conventionally trained and equipped police officer. The unit, called Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), has earned a particularly impressive reputation for its performance in a variety of tactical situations.

The Department's SWAT program was initiated in late 1967, as a unit under Metropolitan Division. The original unit consisted of fifteen teams of four men each and had the capability of becoming operational within a minimal time period. Since then, the team configuration has been increased to five men to maximize operational efficiency. The mission of SWAT has been expanded as tactical needs have increased.


### Purpose and Functions

In general, the purpose of SWAT is to provide protection, support, security, firepower, and rescue to police operations in high personal risk situations where specialized tactics are necessary to minimize casualties. SWAT provides a pool of highly trained personnel capable of coping with such situations in the most efficient manner. Duties of SWAT teams include:

1. Providing for the non-violent apprehension of desperate barricaded suspects.
2. Supporting and protecting police units and other emergency personnel under direct attack or threatened attack by snipers.
3. Providing anti-sniper high ground and perimeter security for visiting dignitaries.
4. Providing controlled assault firepower in certain non-riot situations, e.g., barricaded suspects.
5. Rescuing officers or citizens captured, isolated, or endangered by gunfire or the possibility of gunfire.
6. Neutralizing guerrilla or terrorist operations directed against government personnel, property, or the general populace.

In each of these or similar situations, the role of SWAT remains constant ... to protect the lives and property of those endangered by the lawbreaker. In this regard, SWAT is uniquely capable of successfully completing its mission. The organization and tactics employed by SWAT teams allow their leaders to realistically assess and evaluate the magnitude of the problem. The threat of real or potential violence dictates the measure of response which will be committed to solving the problem. This ability to balance the degree of police response against the danger inherent in tactical situations is one of the major advantages of deploying a specialized unit. Deployment of a selective force, directed with skill and restraint against its objective, is infinitely more desirable than the use of conventional police units.

# ORGANIZATION CHART OF SWAT



## Organization

SWAT is a part of the Department's Metropolitan Division, a complement of officers who are deployed throughout the City in small task forces to combat special crime problems. SWAT personnel function as a part of Metropolitan Division until called upon to respond to a tactical situation requiring their expertise. SWAT consists of one platoon commanded by a lieutenant. The platoon is divided into six ten-man squads, each of which is led by a sergeant. Two five-man teams comprise each squad and these teams are normally the basic unit deployed on a particular mission (See Organization Chart).

Each SWAT team consists of a team leader, a marksman, an observer, a scout, and a rear guard. The team trains and functions as a complete self-sufficient unit. Each team member is trained to perform all team assignments. Whether at home or engaged in daily police functions, each team member has his equipment readily available so that he may respond immediately to the scene of the emergency.

## Equipment

The equipment used by SWAT teams is designed to aid in the accomplishment of their mission. Their uniform and personal equipment are designed to allow them to perform with mobility and low visibility. Each SWAT team member is equipped with a dark military-type uniform, first aid kit, gloves and gas mask. The weapons used by SWAT personnel provide sufficient firepower to suppress or neutralize resistance. Each team is armed with one high-powered, anti-sniper rifle, two .223 caliber semi-automatic rifles, and two shotguns. Each officer carries a service revolver in a shoulder holster. Specialized equipment is also available to facilitate the approach or entry to objectives inaccessible by normal means due to either difficult terrain or danger from adversaries. The special equipment includes rope, hooks, pry bars, rappelling gear, communications equipment, ladders and binoculars.

## Personnel Selection

SWAT applicants undergo an extensive screening process prior to assignment to a team. An applicant is required to have at least three years of police experience, the bulk of which must be in a patrol assignment. He must have received performance ratings among the top twenty-five percent of

Department personnel for a period of one year prior to assignment to SWAT. The applicant's service record must reflect a limited amount of sick time, a good driving record, and a low incidence of personnel complaints. It is also imperative that the officer be in exceptional physical condition due to the rigorous demands of SWAT assignments. Prior military experience is not mandatory, but highly desirable because of the para-military nature of SWAT functions. Finally, the applicant must have demonstrated positive personality traits, such as initiative, job interest, and dedication to duty. Applicants are investigated by SWAT supervisory personnel and critiqued by officers of the unit prior to selection. Only by meeting these criteria and surviving the selection process will an officer be accepted into SWAT.

### Training

The training of SWAT personnel is an ongoing process. It is geared to ensure that each officer is physically and mentally prepared to cope with the demands of an emergency situation requiring specialized tactical knowledge and abilities. This training is necessary to minimize the risk of injury or death to each officer and to those persons whom they are called upon to protect. The emphasis is focused upon the training of the SWAT team as a permanent, self-sufficient unit whose members function as a single, coordinated entity. Each individual team member is aware of what the other members of the team will do in response to a given set of circumstances.

Each team member receives intensive training in guerrilla warfare tactics, scouting and patrolling techniques, night operations, camouflage and concealment, counter ambush techniques, rappelling, first aid, and chemical agents. The subjects which are taught in the classroom are tested in field exercises. There is a three-day basic SWAT training school at the Los Angeles Police Academy, designed to develop the new SWAT officers' skills in tactics and theory. SWAT platoon training days are conducted on the average of once a month to refine these skills. Additionally, a week-long Secret Service School and a three-day International Association of Chiefs of Police seminar are available to educate SWAT team leaders in methods of protecting dignitaries.



## Accomplishments

SWAT personnel have not only provided protection for officers engaged in crowd control activities, but have successfully rescued wounded officers and citizen hostages under emergency conditions. Since 1967, SWAT has frequently responded to incidents involving barricaded suspects and in every instance has captured the suspect without injury to victims or bystanders.

In 1969, SWAT teams were activated on three occasions. During the Black Panther Warrant Service at 41st Street and Central Avenue, three suspects and three SWAT officers were wounded.

During 1970 and the early months of 1971, SWAT teams were not activated because uniformed divisions were responsible for handling armed and barricaded suspects. In October, 1971, SWAT was given the task of handling barricaded suspects.

In 1972, SWAT teams responded to 17 incidents involving barricaded suspects. In eight of the 17 incidents, armed suspects fired shots; SWAT personnel did not fire any shots in the 17 incidents. There were no injuries to suspects or officers.

In 1973, SWAT teams responded to 49 incidents involving barricaded suspects. In 23 of these 49 incidents, armed suspects fired shots; SWAT personnel did not fire any shots. There were no injuries to suspects or officers.

From January 1, 1974, to June 26, 1974, SWAT responded to 30 incidents involving barricaded suspects. In nine of these 30 incidents, armed suspects fired shots; in only four of these 30 incidents, SWAT fired shots. In these 30 incidents, one suspect was wounded and seven suspects were killed, six of the seven were from the SLA encounter on May 17, 1974.

The only fatality which resulted from SWAT action, other than the SLA deaths, occurred in a residential area of the San Fernando Valley. The other two incidents in which shots were fired occurred when officers returned fire and wounded a barricaded robbery suspect at 2914 West Jefferson Boulevard; and when officers returned fire against a suspect while attempting to serve a search warrant at 1581 West 51st Place. In the latter case, the suspect was not wounded.

The 96 incidents of barricaded suspects to which SWAT teams responded, occurred in every area of the City. Many were in

neighborhoods similar to that in which the SLA shooting occurred. The majority of them were resolved without SWAT firing a shot. SWAT tactics, and the degree of force used, are dictated solely by the situation.

Although most often mobilized for a situation involving some type of barricaded suspect, SWAT units have performed a variety of functions. They have augmented Secret Service and State Department security forces during the visits of the President of the United States to the Los Angeles area. They have also accepted responsibility for the safety of visiting foreign diplomats, ambassadors, heads of state, and political candidates.

### Summary

The Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT has proven to be an effective means of controlling high-risk emergency situations which present a particular problem to conventionally trained police units. SWAT teams provide a pool of highly trained, disciplined support units to assist field resource for restoring order at the site of an unusual occurrence or civil disturbance.

The SWAT concept allows the merger of police and military strategies under those conditions which require specialized tactics. The primary advantage of the SWAT team is the flexibility which it can exercise to control and contain an emergency situation. The team can infiltrate an area, attack an objective or defend a position depending upon its particular mission. The SWAT concept allows for consolidation of teams, if required, to attain the necessary operational strength to accomplish its mission. The flexibility of SWAT is illustrated by its ability to isolate and contain a sniper by limited and selective force, or when necessary, to engage and neutralize a hostile force in an all-out firefight.

The primary concern of SWAT personnel is the protection of innocent citizens while undertaking measures to apprehend the perpetrators of crimes of violence. In dangerous tactical situations, the deployment of a specialized unit is essential to the safety and protection of the citizenry and other police officers.

## PERSONNEL

The law enforcement personnel involved in handling the threat created by the SLA represented the following agencies: The Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Firestone Station and Special Enforcement Bureau; the California Highway Patrol, South Los Angeles Office; and the Los Angeles Police Department.

The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department personnel responded to a radio report of an officer involved in a shooting on May 17, 1974, at 1758 hours. A lieutenant, four sergeants and fourteen deputies responded from Firestone Station and established a command post at 57th Street and Compton Avenue where they were joined by four sergeants and ten deputies from the Special Enforcement Bureau. This command post was subsequently moved to 60th Street and Compton Avenue to assist in crowd and traffic control on the south perimeter. Sheriff's Department personnel returned to routine operations on May 17, 1974, at 2000 hours.

The California Highway Patrol personnel responded initially to a citizen's report of a possible robbery and shooting at Slauson Avenue and Compton Avenue on May 17, 1974, at 1800 hours. Two sergeants and nine traffic officers responded to 56th Street and Compton Avenue where they became involved in crowd and traffic control until relieved by Los Angeles Police Department personnel at 1950 hours.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel responded to the Los Angeles Police Department command post at 57th and Alba Streets on May 17, 1974, at 1632 hours. A total of 127 FBI personnel were present. The Assistant Director of the FBI, Los Angeles Office; the Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Division; a Special Agent; 2 dog-handlers; and five FBI SWAT officers reported to the scene at 1466 East 54th Street. The remaining 117 agents were held in reserve or assigned to perimeter control.

Los Angeles Police Department personnel responded to the incident as a result of the initial planned deployment and in response to a Tactical Alert broadcast on May 17, 1974, at 1630 hours.

From the beginning of the operation, it became very difficult to establish perimeter control. Rush hour traffic and people responding to the scene due to the live radio and television



Crowds of curious onlookers



Crowd controlled by rope



An aerial photograph indicates heavy influx of vehicles and people into the area on the day after the incident.

broadcast of the incident added to the control problem. Eventually, thousands of people gathered in the area of 1466 East 54th Street. As crowd and traffic control problems increased along the perimeter, the Department deployment was escalated in order to handle the problems.

Two hundred and eighteen officers were assigned to perimeter control to ensure the safety of innocent bystanders by keeping vehicular and pedestrian traffic out of the involved area. Twenty-two personnel were assigned to operate the field command post located at 5535 Alba Street. Sixteen officers were assigned to evacuation teams to assist SWAT members in removing residents from the area prior to and during the incident. Only twenty-five SWAT members were initially deployed to handle the tactical situation.

Nineteen of the twenty-five SWAT personnel were deployed around 1466 East 54th Street. As the intensity of the battle increased, this force was supplemented by eighteen additional SWAT personnel. An investigation by Robbery-Homicide Division determined that twenty-nine Department personnel fired weapons at the incident.

During the incident and aftermath, a force of 410 Department personnel was assembled. Three hundred and five personnel received assignments and 105 were held in reserve at the command post. This force was gradually released as it became evident that control had been established in the involved area. By 2300 hours, on May 17th, all officers had been released except those involved in crime scene security, investigative follow-up, command post operations and logistical support.

On Saturday, May 18, 1974, a total of 196 personnel assignments were made for the twenty-four hour period. The greatest number within this force was used for crowd and traffic control and crime scene security. Throughout the early morning hours, into the day and night, a crowd, which at times numbered in the thousands, gathered in the area as the follow-up investigation continued. On Saturday, May 18, 1974, at 2000 hours, the mobile command post was deactivated.

On Sunday, May 19, 1974, 157 personnel assignments were made over the twenty-four hour period. Again, most of the manpower was utilized for crowd control and crime scene search.

Personnel assembled for the Task Force were assigned from various Areas within the Department. The total number of personnel

assignments, number of hours worked and the salary costs were as follows:

- \* There were 763 Department personnel assignments to the Task Force from May 17 through May 19, 1974.
- \* A total of 5,800.5 hours were worked by Department personnel.
- \* Of the 5,800.5 hours worked, 3,091.6 hours were at an overtime rate.
- \* The total cost for personnel deployed for the Task Force was \$59,581.81; of this, \$38,252.50 was at an overtime rate.

The SLA incident on 54th Street has been referred to in the news media and by critics of the Department as an incident where the largest force of police had ever been assembled. This statement is untrue. In Los Angeles, the task force operation to cope with the threat of the SLA falls far behind the manpower used during the 1971 earthquake, the U.C.L.A. Student Demonstrations of 1970, the Newport Rock Festival at Devonshire Downs in 1969, the Century City Demonstration of 1967, and the Watts Riot of 1965. Police deployment on the night of May 17, 1974, totalled 410 officers. (The mission of the police on that evening is most analogous with the service of search warrants at the Black Panthers Headquarters at 41st Street and Central Avenue in 1969). The task force assembled to serve these search warrants numbered 584 personnel.

The SLA Task Force operation was a major undertaking, but in comparison with unusual occurrence control forces assembled in Los Angeles over the past nine years, the number of personnel assigned to the SLA incident remains relatively small.

The following is a time study of Department personnel deployed to the Task Force to handle the incident at 1466 East 54th Street. The study reflects the number of Department personnel deployed by rank and office, and their salary costs.

Note: Personnel Assignment on the following pages refers to one Department employee deployed for a single assignment period.

Personnel Deployment by Office - May 17, 1974

<u>Office</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>
Chief of Police	3
Press Relations Section	
Office of Administrative Services	
Technical Services Bureau	
Scientific Investigation Division	17
Personnel and Training Bureau	
Training Division	3
Office of Operations	
Operations-Headquarters Bureau	1
Uniformed Services Group	116
Investigative Services Group	25
Operations-Central Bureau	2
Newton Area	57
Rampart Area	14
Central Area	4
Hollenbeck Area	1
Central Traffic Division	43
Operations-South Bureau	1
Southwest Area	40
77th Street Area	19
South Traffic Division	20
Operations-West Bureau	
Wilshire Area	18
Venice Area	<u>25</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>410</b>

Personnel Deployment by Office - May 18, 1974

<u>Office</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>
Chief of Police	
Press Relations Section	2
Office of Administrative Services	
Technical Services Bureau	
Scientific Investigation Division	14
Office of Operations	1
Operations-Headquarters Bureau	1
Uniformed Services Group	123
Investigative Services Group	11
Operations-Central Bureau	
Newton Area	24
Central Traffic Division	19
Operations-West Bureau	
Venice Area	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	196



Personnel Deployment by Office - May 19, 1974

<u>Office</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>
Chief of Police	
Press Relations	1
Office of Administrative Services	
Technical Services Bureau	
Scientific Investigation Division	10
Office of Operations	1
Operations-Headquarters Bureau	
Uniformed Services Group	120
Investigative Services Group	15
Operations - Central Bureau	
Newton Area	9
Operations-South Bureau	
Southwest Area	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	157

Personnel Deployment by Office - May 17-19, 1974

Total Personnel Assignments for three-day period

Office

Chief of Police	6
Press Relations Section	
Office of Administrative Services	
Technical Services Bureau	
Scientific Investigation Division	41
Personnel and Training Bureau	
Training Division	3
Office of Operations	3
Operations-Headquarters Bureau	2
Uniformed Services Group	359
Investigative Services Group	51
Operations-Central Bureau	2
Newton Area	90
Rampart Area	14
Central Area	4
Hollenbeck Area	1
Central Traffic Division	62
Operations-South Bureau	1
Southwest Area	41
77th Street Area	19
South Traffic Division	20
Operations-West Bureau	
Wilshire Area	18
Venice Area	26
	<hr/>
TOTAL	763

Number of Personnel and Hours Worked by Rank - May 17, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deputy Chief II	1	-	9.0	9.0
Deputy Chief I	3	-	15.0	15.0
Commander	2	-	15.0	15.0
Captain III	1	-	13.0	13.0
Captain II	1	-	13.5	13.5
Captain I	2	-	20.5	20.5
Lieutenant II	4	8.0	64.5	72.5
Lieutenant I	3	7.5	14.0	21.5
Sergeant II	12	12.5	107.0	119.5
Sergeant I + 3	2	12.0	-	12.0
Sergeant I + 2	7	45.5	-	45.5
Sergeant I	18	48.0	22.5	70.5
Investigator III	7	24.0	66.5	90.5
Investigator II	10	34.5	91.5	126.0
Investigator I	4	26.5	19.0	45.5
Policeman III + 3	3	-	17.0	17.0
Policeman III + 1	24	85.5	162.8	248.3
Policeman III	103	183.5	640.5	824.0
Policeman II + 6	3	18.0	9.5	27.5
Policeman II + 2	58	225.2	.5	225.7
Policeman II	100	346.5	79.0	425.5
Policeman I	28	24.7	14.3	39.0
Reserve Officer	2	4.5	-	4.5
Civilian	<u>12</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>50.0</u>	<u>65.5</u>
TOTALS	410	1,121.9	1,444.6	2,566.5

Number of Personnel and Hours Worked by Rank - May 18, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total Hours</u>
Deputy Chief II	1	-	8.0	8.0
Deputy Chief I	1	-	8.0	8.0
Commander	1	-	9.0	9.0
Captain III	1	-	6.0	6.0
Captain II	1	-	7.5	7.5
Captain I	2	7.0	4.0	11.0
Lieutenant II	1	-	9.5	9.5
Lieutenant I	4	32.0	9.5	41.5
Sergeant II	10	64.0	29.0	93.0
Sergeant I + 3	-	-	-	-
Sergeant I + 2	2	7.5	-	7.5
Sergeant I	4	23.5	1.5	25.0
Investigator III	4	16.0	26.5	42.5
Investigator II	8	46.0	35.0	81.0
Investigator I	8	22.0	3.5	25.5
Policeman III + 3	2	16.0	6.0	22.0
Policeman III + 1	21	141.0	49.0	190.0
Policeman III	96	557.0	323.0	880.0
Policeman II + 6	2	5.0	-	5.0
Policeman II + 2	17	66.5	-	66.5
Policeman II	5	20.5	-	20.5
Policeman I	1	8.0	-	8.0
Civilian	<u>9</u>	<u>40.0</u>	<u>55.5</u>	<u>95.5</u>
TOTALS	196	1,072.0	590.5	1,662.5

Number of Personnel and Hours Worked by Rank - May 19, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total Hours</u>
Deputy Chief II	1	-	4.0	4.0
Deputy Chief I	-	-	-	-
Commander	1	-	7.5	7.5
Captain III	-	-	-	-
Captain II	1	-	8.0	8.0
Captain I	1	8.0	-	8.0
Lieutenant II	3	8.0	30.0	38.0
Lieutenant I	1	8.0	-	8.0
Sergeant II	10	72.0	27.5	99.5
Sergeant I + 3	-	-	-	-
Sergeant I + 2	-	-	-	-
Sergeant I	1	8.0	-	8.0
Investigator III	5	16.0	49.5	65.5
Investigator II	7	8.0	87.0	95.0
Investigator I	3	8.0	96.0	104.0
Policeman III + 3	3	-	36.5	36.5
Policeman III + 1	18	144.0	19.0	163.0
Policeman III	95	221.0	645.5	866.5
Policeman II + 2	-	-	-	-
Policeman II	1	8.0	1.0	9.0
Policeman I	-	-	-	-
Civilian	<u>6</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>45.0</u>	<u>51.0</u>
TOTALS	157	515.0	1,056.5	1,571.5

Number of Personnel and Hours Worked by Rank - May 17-19, 1974

Rank	Total Personnel Assignments for 3-day period	Regular Hours	Overtime Hours	Total
Deputy Chief II	3	-	21.0	21.0
Deputy Chief I	4	-	23.0	23.0
Commander	4	-	31.5	31.5
Captain III	2	-	19.0	19.0
Captain II	3	-	29.0	29.0
Captain I	5	15.0	24.5	39.5
Lieutenant II	8	16.0	104.0	120.0
Lieutenant I	8	47.5	23.5	71.0
Sergeant II	32	148.5	163.5	312.0
Sergeant I + 3	2	12.0	-	12.0
Sergeant I + 2	9	53.0	-	53.0
Sergeant I	23	79.5	24.0	103.5
Investigator III	16	56.0	142.5	198.5
Investigator II	25	88.5	213.5	302.0
Investigator I	10	56.5	118.5	175.0
Policeman III + 3	8	16.0	59.5	75.5
Policeman III + 1	63	370.5	230.8	601.3
Policeman III	294	961.5	1,618.0	2,579.5
Policeman II + 6	5	23.0	9.5	32.5
Policeman II + 2	75	291.7	.5	292.2
Policeman II	106	375.0	80.0	455.0
Policeman I	29	32.7	14.3	47.0
Reserve Officer	2	4.5	-	4.5
Civilian	<u>27</u>	<u>61.5</u>	<u>150.5</u>	<u>212.0</u>
TOTALS	763	2,708.9	3,091.6	5,800.5

Personnel Cost by Rank - May 17, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deputy Chief II	1	-	\$ 267.84	\$ 267.84
Deputy Chief I	3	-	379.35	379.35
Commander	2	-	340.50	340.50
Captain III	1	-	293.03	293.03
Captain II	1	-	246.51	246.51
Captain I	2	-	374.33	374.33
Lieutenant II	4	87.36	1,056.51	1,143.87
Lieutenant I	3	77.55	217.14	294.69
Sergeant II	12	115.88	1,488.37	1,604.25
Sergeant I + 3	2	124.08	-	124.08
Sergeant I + 2	7	445.45	-	445.45
Sergeant I	18	421.44	296.89	718.33
Investigator III	7	234.96	976.89	1,211.85
Investigator II	10	302.91	1,205.06	1,507.97
Investigator I	4	220.48	237.12	457.60
Policeman III + 3	3	-	236.47	236.47
Policeman III + 1	24	673.74	1,924.30	2,598.04
Policeman III	103	1,368.91	7,167.20	8,536.11
Policeman II + 6	3	186.12	147.35	333.47
Policeman II + 2	58	1,774.58	5.91	1,780.49
Policeman II	100	2,449.76	838.19	3,287.95
Policeman I	28	165.49	143.72	309.21
Police Reserve	2	-	-	-
Civilian	<u>12</u>	<u>81.38</u>	<u>393.50</u>	<u>474.88</u>
TOTALS	410	\$8,730.09	\$18,236.18	\$26,966.27

Personnel Cost by Rank - May 18, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deputy Chief II	1	\$ -	\$ 238.08	\$ 238.08
Deputy Chief I	1	-	202.32	202.32
Commander	1	-	181.60	181.60
Captain III	1	-	137.91	137.91
Captain II	1	-	136.95	136.95
Captain I	2	85.19	73.04	158.23
Lieutenant II	1	-	155.61	155.61
Lieutenant I	4	330.88	147.35	478.23
Sergeant II	10	593.28	403.39	996.67
Sergeant I + 2	2	77.55	-	77.55
Sergeant I	4	206.33	19.76	226.09
Investigator III	4	150.64	389.29	539.93
Investigator II	8	403.88	460.95	864.83
Investigator I	3	183.04	43.68	226.72
Police Officer III + 3	2	148.32	83.46	231.78
Police Officer III + 1	21	1,111.08	579.18	1,690.26
Police Officer III	96	4,155.22	3,614.37	7,769.59
Police Officer II + 6	2	51.70	-	51.70
Police Officer II + 2	17	524.02	-	524.02
Police Officer II	5	144.94	-	144.94
Police Officer I	1	53.60	-	53.60
Civilian	<u>9</u>	<u>210.00</u>	<u>436.79</u>	<u>646.79</u>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>\$8,429.67</b>	<b>\$7,303.73</b>	<b>\$15,733.40</b>



Personnel Cost by Rank - May 19, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Personnel Assignments</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deputy Chief II	1	\$ -	\$ 114.04	\$ 114.04
Commander	1	-	170.25	170.25
Captain II	1	-	162.88	162.88
Captain I	1	97.36	-	97.36
Lieutenant II	3	87.36	491.40	578.76
Lieutenant I	1	82.72	-	82.72
Sergeant II	10	667.44	382.53	1,049.97
Sergeant I	1	70.24	-	70.24
Investigator III	5	156.64	727.16	883.80
Investigator II	7	70.24	1,145.79	1,216.03
Investigator I	3	66.56	1,198.08	1,264.64
Policeman III + 3	3	-	507.72	507.72
Policeman III + 1	18	1,134.72	224.38	1,359.10
Policeman III	95	1,648.66	7,223.15	8,871.81
Policeman II	1	56.56	10.61	67.17
Civilian	<u>6</u>	<u>31.50</u>	<u>354.15</u>	<u>385.65</u>
TOTALS	157	\$4,170.00	\$12,712.14	\$16,882.14

Total Personnel Cost by Rank - May 17-19, 1974

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Total Personnel Assignments for 3-day period</u>	<u>Regular Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deputy Chief II	3	\$ -	\$ 619.96	\$ 619.96
Deputy Chief I	4	-	581.67	581.67
Commander	4	-	692.35	692.35
Captain III	2	-	430.91	430.91
Captain II	3	-	546.34	546.34
Captain I	5	182.55	447.37	529.92
Lieutenant II	8	174.72	1,703.52	1,878.24
Lieutenant I	8	491.15	364.49	855.64
Sergeant II	32	1,376.60	2,274.29	3,650.89
Sergeant I + 3	2	124.08	-	124.08
Sergeant I + 2	9	523.00	-	523.00
Sergeant I	23	698.01	316.65	1,014.66
Investigator III	16	542.24	2,093.34	2,635.58
Investigator II	25	777.03	2,811.80	3,588.83
Investigator I	10	470.08	1,478.88	1,948.96
Policeman III + 3	8	148.32	827.65	975.97
Policeman III + 1	63	2,919.54	2,727.96	5,647.40
Policeman III	294	7,172.79	18,004.72	25,177.51
Policeman II + 6	5	237.82	147.35	385.17
Policeman II + 2	75	2,298.60	5.91	2,304.51
Policeman II	106	2,651.26	848.80	3,500.06
Policeman I	29	219.09	143.72	362.81
Reserve Officer	2	-	-	-
Civilian	<u>27</u>	<u>322.88</u>	<u>1,184.44</u>	<u>1,507.32</u>
TOTALS	763	\$21,329.76	\$38,252.05	\$59,581.81

## LOGISTICS

The cost incurred by the Los Angeles Police Department for logistics during the May 17, 1974, confrontation with members of the Symbionese Liberation Army at 1466 East 54th Street, and the subsequent aftermath investigation is separated into five categories:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Cost Incurred</u>
1. Cost of flares	\$ 472.50
2. Miscellaneous supply costs	5,495.73
3. Helicopter operating cost	415.53
4. Personnel feeding	175.00
5. Vehicle operating cost	<u>1,435.98</u>
TOTAL	\$7,994.74

### Explanation:

1. Cost of Flares - the use of flares to alert the public of road closures cost \$472.50. The flares were placed at various intersections throughout the affected area.
2. The emergency use of expendable equipment and equipment which enabled personnel of the Field Command Post to continue the protection of life and property cost \$5,495.73.

### Miscellaneous Supply Cost Explanation

Equipment Damaged	\$3,386.00
Ordnance	1,010.13
Tear Gas	1,074.60
Mobile Fleet Expenses	<u>25.00</u>
TOTAL COST	\$5,495.73

3. Both turbine and piston-type helicopters were used by the Department to survey the affected area and surrounding perimeter, thereby ensuring officer and citizen safety.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Cost/Hour</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Turbine	4.60	\$ 62.49	\$ 287.45
Piston	<u>3.55</u>	36.08	<u>128.08</u>
TOTALS	8.15		\$ 415.53

4. The \$175.00 was the cost of feeding Los Angeles Police Department personnel during the aftermath investigation of the area surrounding 1466 East 54th Street, as well as the areas that were exposed to direct gunfire. This cost figure was obtained from the bill of the catering company which provided the food. A total of 70 box lunches were provided, costing \$3.50 each.
5. Vehicle costs incurred during the incident included the use of various types of Department vehicles.

### Vehicle Cost Explanation

#### Marked Vehicles

<u>Area</u>	<u>Vehicles Used</u>	<u>Miles</u>	<u>Cost/ Mile</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Central	1	24	\$.13	\$ 3.12
Rampart	4	32	.13	4.16
Southwest	7	84	.13	10.92
Hollenbeck	2	26	.13	3.38
Hollywood	10	260	.13	33.80
Two-wheel Motorcycles	5	100	.14	14.00
Wilshire	4	60	.13	7.80
77th	24	168	.13	21.84
Newton	24	802	.13	104.26
Venice	5	30	.13	3.90
Two-wheel Motorcycles	4	30	.14	4.20
Metropolitan	98	3,760	.09	338.40
Logistics van	1	10	.34	3.40
Central Traffic Two-wheel Motorcycles	62	620	.14	86.80
South Traffic Two-wheel Motorcycles	20	100	.14	14.00
Tactical Planning	2	130	.09	11.70
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>6,235</b>		<b>\$665.68</b>

Vehicle Cost Explanation

Unmarked Vehicles

<u>Area</u>	<u>Vehicles Used</u>	<u>Miles</u>	<u>Cost/ Mile</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
Newton	7	50	\$.09	\$ 4.50
Investigative Services	20	200	.09	18.00
S.I.D.	15	150	.09	13.50
Explosives Unit	1	100	.18	18.00
Chief of Police	<u>1</u>	<u>40</u>	.09	<u>3.60</u>
TOTALS	44	540		\$57.60

Vehicle and Equipment Cost Explanation  
May 17-19, 1974

Grand Totals - Vehicles and Equipment

1. Vehicles

(a) Marked \$ 665.68

(b) Unmarked \$ 57.60

2. Heavy duty vehicles

(a) One rig

27 hours  
\$ 12.00/hour

\$ 324.00

(b) One heavy duty truck

27 hours  
\$ 12.00/hour

\$ 324.00

3. Pickups, vans	90 miles
(a) One pickup	<u>\$.13/mile</u>
	\$11.70
(b) One van	100 miles
	<u>\$.18/mile</u>
	\$18.00
4. Generators	20 hours
(a) 25KV	<u>\$1.75/hour</u>
	\$ 35.00
	TOTAL COST \$1,435.98

### SWAT Logistics

The Special Weapons and Tactics Platoon from Metropolitan Division was responsible for tactical operations during the incident at 1466 East 54th Street. They were also responsible for the control of firepower. The ordnance and supplies utilized during the incident were obtained from many Department sources, but were used solely by Metropolitan Division personnel or at their direction.

### Ordnance

<u>Firearms</u>	
<u>Number</u>	<u>Type</u>
2	37mm gas gun
2	M16 .223 Caliber rifles
7	AR15 .223 caliber rifles
10	AR180 .223 caliber rifles
2	9mm MP-40 machine gun
12	12-gauge shotgun
2	.243 caliber long rifles
1	.38 caliber revolver
TOTAL	38

Ammunition

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number Fired</u>	<u>Cost</u>
.38 caliber 158 grain	3	\$ .33
.223 caliber soft nose	1190	240.25
.223 caliber ball	3320	655.80
.243 caliber	82	18.45
9mm	440	27.72
12-gauge .00 buck	317	63.40
12-gauge rifle slugs	<u>19</u>	<u>4.18</u>
TOTAL	5371	TOTAL \$1,010.13

Tear Gas

<u>Number of Rounds</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
75	Flite-rite projectiles	\$13.00	\$ 975.00
8	Canisters	12.45	<u>99.60</u>
			\$1,074.60

Additional Expenses

Mobile Fleet Expenses	\$25.00
<u>Total Operational Expenses</u>	
Personnel Costs	\$59,581.81
Logistical Costs	<u>\$ 7,994.74</u>
	\$67,576.55

## EVALUATION

It has been standard operating practice for many years within the Los Angeles Police Department to critically assess Department efficiency and effectiveness, as well as individual officers' conduct, in the handling of both major and minor incidents. These critical assessments are essential to the health and professional growth of the organization. Results of this evaluation process assist in improving operational plans for future unusual occurrences, enriching training and strengthening individual police officer discipline and response to major emergency situations. These critical evaluations, of course, occur well after the shooting has stopped, the smoke has cleared, the confusion and turmoil have ceased and the adrenalin flow has returned to normal. They are done in peaceful surroundings with time to think and discuss, and with the good judgment and wisdom that come from hindsight.

Following this standard practice, the SLA incident has undergone a careful and critical evaluation. It has been determined that the incident was handled with a high degree of professional skill by all levels within the Department. Command decisions were made without hesitation and, for the most part, proved to be both prudent and correct for each situation. The execution of those decisions by operational people was accomplished efficiently and effectively. The exercise of restraint and discipline by officers was remarkable. SWAT officer intrepidity and bravery was in abundance.

There were, however, some aspects of the total operation which perhaps could have been improved.

Officers were prevented from fully implementing a well-drawn evacuation plan. Critical information received at the last minute caused a revision in the plan that made complete implementation impossible. Full implementation would have placed officers in direct line of fire. The evacuation that did take place was remarkable, considering the situation, and officers conducting the evacuation were often placed in positions of extreme danger. Contingency plans are now being drawn that will reduce the possibility of this situation developing in the future.



During the early stages of the incident, it was noted that insufficient personnel were deployed to establish an effective perimeter control. This necessitated a call-up of additional personnel to strengthen the perimeter. This situation was corrected by command officers during the incident.

For twenty-eight minutes, the Field Command Post suffered a complete break in radio communication with the operational officers. While this was partially an equipment failure, it was extremely disruptive to command control. Steps were immediately taken to restore communication, but the delay could have had disastrous results.

The manner in which Christine Johnson was taken into custody was the subject of careful scrutiny. When she emerged from the house she was confused and disoriented. A SWAT team member exposed himself to gunfire and led her out of the line of fire. At this time, SWAT officers had to assume that anyone emerging from the house was potentially dangerous. In taking her into custody, they used procedures designed to be used only in dealing with armed felons. In judging their actions, in light of what is now known, it is conceded that the officers perhaps were too rough. However, she was unharmed by officers' actions and was immediately provided medical treatment for injuries received while inside the house.

It was also determined that there could have been quicker evaluation of intelligence data received and wider dissemination of that data between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This is a problem that often develops when two agencies are working on the same criminal investigation. This problem was recognized and corrected by establishing a more closely-coordinated working relationship between the Los Angeles Police Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation command personnel at the scene.

A well-planned and exhaustive search for physical evidence on the day following the incident failed to consider the possibility of evidence being scattered and covered by the force of the fire

hoses. A visual search only was conducted around the perimeter of the house. The same dig-and-sift type of search used within the foundation area should have been extended outside the foundation. The success of this exhaustive and intensive method of search was somewhat diminished by the fact that sightseers recovered a few additional pieces of evidence.

Lastly the Department should have made a greater effort in assisting the activities of the media. Press, radio and television coverage, as is so often done, served as the best evidence of the Department's professional handling of the incident. The Department is well aware of this fact and, therefore, more care should have been given to ensuring that the media had a full opportunity for the widest and broadest coverage.

The above critical judgments are not intended to detract from the heroic efforts of the officers who were involved in this violent encounter. Rather they are designed to strengthen and improve the Department's ability to meet its obligation to the community "To Protect and To Serve".

## CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS

On May 22, 1974, Los Angeles County District Attorney Joseph Busch announced that his office had filed a total of 19 criminal counts against William Taylor Harris, his wife, Emily Montague Harris, and Patricia Campbell Hearst. The charges stem from five separate incidents within Los Angeles County which began on May 16, 1974, at Mel's Sporting Goods Store in Inglewood in which the Harris couple and Patricia Hearst were involved in the "shoplift." Their subsequent escape resulted in a shooting, the commandeering of automobiles in Lennox and Hawthorne, and the abduction of Tom Matthews in Lynwood. On May 17, 1974, the trio abducted and robbed Frank Sutter in the Hollywood Hills. The final incident occurred on May 19, 1974, when Patricia Hearst and two unidentified male Negroes attempted to rent an apartment from Anita Alcalá. When Anita Alcalá refused, one of the unidentified males slashed at her with a knife, cutting her dress.

On May 22, 1974, various local jurisdictions presented their cases to Deputy District Attorney Bruce Campbell who issued the 19 count complaint. Judge Rochman, Division 30, Los Angeles Municipal Court, issued a felony warrant (A 307833) charging the Harris couple and Patricia Hearst with numerous counts of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to commit murder, driving without owner's consent and kidnapping. Bail was set at \$50,000 on each defendant.

### Patricia Campbell Hearst

Five counts 217 P.C. (assault with intent to commit murder)  
Five counts 245 P.C. (assault with a deadly weapon)  
Four counts 211 P.C. (robbery)  
Three counts 10851 V.C. (driving without owner's consent)  
One count 207 P.C. (kidnapping)  
One count 209 P.C. (kidnapping for purpose of robbery)

### William Taylor Harris

Five counts 217 P.C. (assault with intent to commit murder)  
Four counts 245 P.C. (assault with a deadly weapon)  
Four counts 211 P.C. (robbery)  
Three counts 10851 V.C. (driving without owner's consent)  
One count 209 P.C. (kidnapping for purpose of robbery)

Emily Montague Harris

Five counts 217 P.C. (assault with intent to commit murder)  
Four counts 245 P.C. (assault with a deadly weapon)  
Four counts 211 P.C. (robbery)  
Three counts 10851 V.C. (driving without owner's consent)  
One count 207 P.C. (kidnapping)  
One count 209 P.C. (kidnapping for purpose of robbery)

Count 19 of the complaint, ADW, charged Patricia Hearst with threatening Anita Alcalá with a gun. The Harris couple was not charged. Conviction of kidnapping for the purpose of robbery carries a life sentence.

In addition to the local charges, Federal warrants were issued on May 20, 1974, in Los Angeles, charging Patricia Hearst and the Harris couple with violation of the National Firearms Act as a result of their alleged possession of automatic weapons in the Inglewood shooting. Patricia Hearst was also charged in a Federal complaint in San Francisco, as a material witness to the bank robbery which occurred April 15, 1974, at the Hibernia Bank.

On June 6, 1974, a Federal Grand Jury in San Francisco indicted Patricia Hearst for armed robbery in connection with her involvement in the Hibernia Bank robbery.

United States District Judge Oliver J. Carter issued a warrant for Patricia Hearst's arrest and set bail at \$500,000. Conviction of the Federal charges could result in a maximum fine of \$10,000 and 35 years imprisonment.

On May 18, 1974, Christine Johnson was arrested for 32 P.C. (accessory to a felony) by officers of Criminal Conspiracy Section, Investigative Support Division, for her part in harboring members of the Symbionese Liberation Army at 1466 East 54th Street. The Director, Office of Operations, ordered her release under authority of 849 b(1) P.C. (insufficient grounds for criminal complaint).

Due to the nature of the information contained in the following two paragraphs, the name of the arrestee has been changed. On May 24, 1974, John Smith #1 was arrested for 32 P.C. (accessory to a felony) by officers of Criminal Conspiracy Section, Investigative Support Division, for his part in harboring and aiding members of the Symbionese Liberation Army at 1466 East 54th Street.

On June 3, 1974, Sam Mayerson, Assistant Director, Central Operations, District Attorney's Office, rejected a felony complaint on John Smith #1 due to insufficient evidence.

Further charges may be filed by local and Federal authorities as a result of their continuing investigation into the actions and conduct of the Symbionese Liberation Army.

#### False Statements

Shortly after the May 17th confrontation, a male, who identified himself as James Johnson and the son of Christine Johnson, made several statements to a representative of the press. These statements described property damage which had occurred at his mother's house as a result of the shootout. The press published these statements and claimed that James Johnson was the son of Christine Johnson, the resident of 1466 East 54th Street.

Investigators from the Criminal Conspiracy Section, Los Angeles Police Department, interviewed James Johnson after uniformed officers had arrested him June 9, 1974, on two outstanding warrants charging violation of Section 11550 P.C. (Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance). James Johnson admitted that his true name was Walter Seals and that he was no relation to Christine Johnson. He stated that he had made false statements to the representative of the press and had even been misquoted. He stated that he made these statements in hope of financial reward.

## PUBLIC AGENCIES

On the day of May 17, 1974, several other public agencies were involved at the scene of this major event. Although the Los Angeles Police Department had the overall responsibility for neutralizing these terrorists, they could not have accomplished their mission without the complete support and cooperation of other public agencies. These other agencies and their degree of involvement are as follows:

### Fire Department

On May 17, 1974, at 1645 hours, the Fire Department Field Commander was informed that a major effort to apprehend members of the SLA was to occur in the area of 54th Street and Compton Avenue. At approximately 1650 hours, the Fire Department Field Commander established his field command post at 55th Street and Compton Avenue. He maintained liaison with the Police Department's field command post during the entire operation. At approximately 1652 hours, a paramedic unit and one engine company were dispatched to the field command post.

In cooperation with the Police Department, four rescue ambulances and four fire-fighting units were deployed on the perimeter of the incident. As the fire broke out at 1466 East 54th Street, fire companies were placed on all avenues of approach. Because of the automatic weapon fire that was coming from the house, the Battalion Chief, being responsible for the safety of his men, decided not to dispatch his men to the location. There was a present danger to the firemen because of the continuing hostile shooting. At approximately 1901 hours, when the hostile shooting had ceased, Department SWAT personnel provided security for the firemen. When Fire Department personnel arrived at the fire, the Police Department Field Commander requested that no one approach the fire because of reported exploding ammunition and the possibility of bomb booby-traps. Four pumper trucks were used to extinguish the fire. Later, hand lines were put into operation on the structures exposed to the west and east of the main body of fire.

While Fire Department personnel extinguished the remaining fires, Police Department personnel searched for a reported tunnel connecting the structures at 1466 East 54th Street and 1462 East 54th Street. A tunnel was not located. The fires were extinguished by 1930 hours and Fire Department personnel remained on the fire scene performing clean-up tasks until midnight.

The Los Angeles Fire Department later reported that:

1. The fire probably started in the north or northeast portion of the house.
2. The cause of the fire was undetermined.
3. The heavy black smoke that was present and the rapid spread of the fire is indicative of a flammable liquid.

Note: A two-gallon metal gasoline can, with perforation in its side, was found in the northeast portion of the house (see page 67). This gasoline can was similar to the gasoline can found in the abandoned van at 1451 East 53rd Street earlier in the day.

Both Jane Smith #1 and Jane Smith #3 (see "SLA - Within The House", page 61) stated to Los Angeles Police Department investigators that they saw a white female SLA member walking around the house holding bottles filled with gasoline. Due to the nature of the information contained in this paragraph, the names of the witnesses have been changed.

#### Federal Bureau of Investigation

This branch of the federal government was a prime contributor in all phases of the events of May 17th. Intelligence information supplied by this agency assisted in the successful completion of the neutralizing action. The particular participation of the FBI is delineated throughout the body of this report.

#### Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Sheriff's Department personnel from Firestone Station and the Special Enforcement Bureau responded at 1758 hours, when a radio broadcast was made, "Officer involved in a shooting". A total of 29 Sheriff's Department personnel assembled at 57th Street and Compton Avenue. Their duties were exclusively those of perimeter control at 57th Street and Compton Avenue. At approximately 1900 hours, personnel from the California Highway Patrol and the Los Angeles Police Department relieved the Sheriff's units at 57th Street and Compton Avenue. The Sheriff's units then reformed at 60th Street and Compton Avenue and established a command post. At approximately 2000 hours, the crime scene was secured and the command post

was deactivated. Special Enforcement Bureau units proceeded to Lennox Station for routine duties. Firestone units resumed normal patrol.

#### California Highway Patrol

Two sergeants and nine traffic officers participated in activities surrounding the incident from 1801 hours to 1935 hours on May 17, 1974. Their duties were primarily traffic control. Two personnel were assigned to the Los Angeles Police Department command post for liaison purposes. At approximately 1930 hours, the California Highway Patrol personnel were relieved by Los Angeles Police Department personnel.

#### Red Cross

A representative of the Red Cross was at the scene to offer Red Cross assistance. No assistance was requested or given, however, the representative referred several citizens to the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services.

#### Department of Water and Power

A Department of Water and Power crew was requested by the Fire Department. The crew reported to the Fire Department command post and was requested to cut service wires on a pole located in the rear of 1462 East 54th Street. After cutting the service, the crew left the involved area.



## PUBLIC RESPONSE

030/630

Public response to the Department's actions during the late afternoon and evening of May 17, 1974, was quite favorable. However, after certain individuals and groups voiced criticism regarding the handling of the incident, the public's favorable response grew even stronger and more vocal.

The Department received 1,437 letters, cards and telegrams regarding the incident. Of these, 1,182 commended the officers for their courage, discipline and professional conduct, while 255 were critical of the Department's actions either wholly or in part. Almost all the critical letters were signed by individuals, while a great number of the commendatory letters came from clubs, groups and families, thus nearly quadrupling the favorable response. Most of these commendatory letters voiced either shock, dismay or anger that criticism should be leveled at the Department.

The Los Angeles Times received approximately 400 letters regarding the incident. No accurate totals were kept regarding praise or criticism, but the Times has stated the response was preponderantly favorable. Twenty letters were received by the Herald Examiner, sixteen favoring and four condemning the police role.

Overall examination of the letters showed that the public perceived the critical situation that confronted the police on May 17th, and overwhelmingly supported the Department's actions.

The following are typical excerpts from these letters:

"Criticism aimed at the Los Angeles Police Department by the American Civil Liberties Union and others reveals a totally inept line of reasoning in view of the circumstances surrounding the 54th Street incident."

"The loss of human life is a tragedy, but to criticize the Los Angeles Police Department for its handling of the SLA affair reveals a naive mentality that tends to ignore the facts."

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"The critics seem to be preoccupied with the terrorists' rights, rather than the human rights of all law-abiding people, including the police who risked their lives

during the confrontation. This seems to be of little interest to the critics. After all, isn't that what the police get paid for?"

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"Let me add my voice to the growing number of citizens who are proud of the response by the police. Their quick and determined action saved a difficult situation from getting worse. No civilians were injured, which is a better record than the SLA."

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"I praise the Los Angeles police. I was pleased to see them perform in a professional manner against declared social outlaws."

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"The Los Angeles Police Department's behavior last Friday was one of the most disturbing acts of official barbarism that California has ever experienced."

"The Department had the ability to control the situation, isolate the area, evacuate residents, and wait out the SLA. The officers determined the violence of the response. Time was on their side. To enter the line of fire was their choice."

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"I was sickened and outraged by the wanton incineration of six frightened young people holed up at 54th and Compton."

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