Part I. The Hangang Bridge Massacre
An English abstract of the book - The American Captain Who Managed the Korean President ("Han-guk Dae-tong-ryon-ul um-ji-ghin miguk dae-wi") - coauthored by James Hausman and Jung Il Wha, published in Korean by Korean Mun-Won Publishing, Seoul, Korea in 1995.Revised - November 25, 1999
US Army Lt. Col. James Hausman (ret) liked to call himself the Father of the South Korean Army and his 'claim to fame' was enthusiastically endorsed by Rhee Syngman, Jung Il Kwon and other South Korean 'leaders'.
Although he played some minor roles in the selection and training of the officers who became top commanders of Rhee's army, his fame as the Father of ROKA came from his relentless campaign to purge the 'leftist' Korean officers. He and Rhee conducted organized and conducted ruthless campaigns to purge "Communists" in South Korea.
Hausman sought out those Koreans who had served the Japanese colonists ('once a whore, always a whore' - he would say) and put them in charge of his counter-leftist campaign. He figured correctly that these traitors would not hesitate to murder their own fellow countrymen in service of foreign powers.
Curiously Hausman's Japanese stooges vied for Hausman's favors by even going to the extreme of fingering their fellow Japanese army comrades. Thus, for example, Japanese army Lt. Park Jung Hee (later to become a noted dictator of South Korea) was turned in by a fellow Japanese officer Kim Chol Yol. Park was ordered shot by Hausman but Paik Sun Yop, another Japanese fellow officer and a trusted aid to Hausman, saved Park's neck.
The Korean people rose up against Hausman's reign of terror: Kim Ku's failed coup against the US Military Government on Korea, the Yosu army mutiny, the Cheju April 3rd Uprising, the Cheju 9th Regiment mutiny, the August Harvest Uprising and countless other armed and civil uprisings saw over 200,000 South Korean deaths by Hausman's Pro-Japanese thugs.
There is hardly any published information on James Hausman's deeds in Korea. Hausman did dictate his 'autobiography' to Chong Ilhwa, entitled "Han'guk t'aetongyong'ul umjigin Migun taewi Hausman." (The American Army Captain Who Managed the President of Korea). An English abstract of this book will be posted here soon.
Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl briefly mentions Hausman in his memoir The Truth about Cheju 4.3 (Chapter 24: The Assassins). Hausman presided over the execution of the Korean army men involved in the assassination of Park Jin Gyon - a former Japanese army officer and hand picked by Hausman to command the 9th Regiment on Cheju:
"The judge and other members of this court are nationalists and we are sure that you understand our motive for killing a traitor of our nation. Your nationalist conscience need not be troubled for sentencing fellow nationalists to death for an act of nationalism. By the very nature of this court, we expect death penalty and we hold no grudge against the court."
"Regimental Commander Park Jin Gyon has gone to the other world ahead of us and we will join him there in a few days. The judge, other members of this court and Col. Kim Ik Ruhl will some day join us, too. Then all of us shall meet again in front of God. This man's court is unfair but God's court is absolutely fair to all. Therefore, we ask that the judge try us again in God's court."
The court fell silent. All present was deeply touched. Col. Lee Wung Jun remained silent ashen-faced for a few moments and then adjourned the court. Thus ended the trial. As expected, all three were sentenced to death and they were executed by a firing squad several weeks later. I was not present at the execution, but witnesses said the three men died like soldiers. They prayed that their blood and spirit will help our independence and God will receive their soul. They shouted - 'Long Live Korea' - three times and sang military songs till their final moment.
Then an unbelievable thing happened. Capt. Hauseman strode over to the dead men and shot the corpse with his pistol repeatedly. Capt. Hauseman was in charge of intelligence and was close to Col. Park Jun Gyon. It was he who had recommended Park to Gen. Dean. The witnesses at the execution were deeply affected by this barbaric act. Some reporters and writers published thought-evoking articles on this event and became targets of the police investigation.
HAUSMAN. "The 26th. I entered our office, General Chae was there. We decided that we would displace our headquarters to Sihung. We formed a convoy, consisting of American automobiles. I rode with Major George Sedberry, advisor to ROM Army G-3.
We had a radio in the convoy, and while moving to our new location we received a message from General MacArthur. Sometime later, after President Truman had relieved General MacArthur, I was accompanying General Paik Sun Yup, then ROK Army Chief of Staff, on a U.S. tour. We paid a courtesy call on General MacArthur, in his seventeenth floor suite in the Waldorf Hotel. At that time I told General MacArthur about receiving his message while displacing to our new command post in Sihung.
Then I quoted the message, 'Repair to your former location, you have limited use of U.S. air and naval forces your area. Momentous decisions are in the offing, be of good cheer.--MacArthur.' The general was quite impressed. He stood up and gave me the famous MacArthur handshake, one hand shaking, the other on my elbow."
TOLAND: "Was MacArthur telling you to return to the front?"
HAUSMAN: "No, return to our headquarters. Now here is an important point, as it will have a bearing on things to come. We turned our convoy around and headed back toward our headquarters, . As we crossed the bridge, I had George Sedberry stop the car."
TOLAND: "This is in Seoul itself?"
HAUSMAN: "Yes. The engineers had prepared the bridge for demolition. Cases of dynamite were piled on the bridge approaches. I went over to one box of dynamite and carried it ten yards or so away from the bridge. I told the Korean Engineer officer to have all the dynamite removed. Needless to say, this was never done."
TOLAND: "Now would this be on the 26th or 27th, or something like that?"
HAUSMAN: "On the 27th. My idea of moving the dynamite was prompted by General MacArthur's message. I forgot all about the Dulles Western Defense Line statement. The U.S., God bless President Truman, is going to do something. I was certain of this. MacArthur had not visited Korea yet. I was not aware of any recommendations MacArthur may have made. None of that mattered. The message gave us the hope, the will, our morale went up several notches. 'Our' being collective, Americans and Koreans.
I think I have already told you that there is no difference between an American soldier and a Korean soldier. If a soldier doesn't have a leader, he will withdraw, refuse to fire his weapon at the enemy. A soldier needs a leader to tell him what to do. MacArthur was telling us, 'Get the hell back to your headquarters.'"
TOLAND: "And do something. Yeah."
HAUSMAN: "See what I mean? It was the right message. Now I would like to relate how this message was delivered to General Chae. To do this I must digress. Before we, the KMAG advisors, departed for Sihung, I and the ROK Army high command, held a meeting in our office (remember that General Chae and I shared the same office). In attendance were, the Minister of National Defense Shin Sung Mo (he was also concurrently the prime minister), General Chae Byung Duk, ROK Army Chief of Staff, all of the general staff, and several of the special staff.
We were all seated around the conference table. Minister Shin made a hearatrending speech, declaring, 'We will fight until the end, let's pledge that!' I called in my driver and sent him to my house for a bottle of whiskey. Within a matter of minutes, my driver returned with the whiskey."
TOLAND: "You pledged with a drink. How many were you, approximately--a dozen?"
HAUSMAN: "Chae, the Minister, four general staff members, three or four special staff members, and myself--about eleven or twelve. It must be remembered that at this time KMAG was really under orders to leave, our evacuation plan had been initiated. I was still there because I volunteered to stay along with Colonel Wright and about sixteen other officers. I believe there were about sixteen enlisted men too, a total of 33."
TOLAND: "So FIRESTONE had already been initiated."
HAUSMAN: "Actually CRULLER was the evacuation plan, FIRESIDE was the unclassified code word. Its purpose was to get appropriate instructions to the evacuees. My wife and three children were on their way to Japan. Anyway, we did make that pledge.
When I left General Chae, he was seated at the head of the conference table, his .45 pistol, and the empty whiskey bottle were close by. The room was dark because the windows were covered with blackout material. When we received General MacArthur's message, the first thing that entered my mind was to get back to our office and tell General Chae about the message. I hoped he did not use that pistol, or try to capitulate.
When I arrived at the office, General Chae was still seated at the conference table, the pistol and empty whiskey bottle were still there. I gave Chae the message and told him that this must mean that the U.S. is going to intervene. Just about that time, as if to underscore what I had just said, a U.S. bomber flew high over our headquarters, headed for the north. Chae was like a new man, he smiled and then he gave me a bear hug."
TOLAND: "How about those tanks that came down? Have those been stopped?"
HAUSMAN: "No. We still had to displace. But, the tanks had outrun the North Korean infantry. They were unprotected and couldn't do much damage. A point about the bridge. I sat down with General Chae and explained that one person, and only one person, should have the authority to order the bridge blown. I reasoned that he and I would be away from headquarters visiting units. Consequently, he should appoint someone, some one who would remain in headquarters around the clock. These requirements fit General Kim Paik Il, the vice chief of staff, perfectly. General Chae appointed him."
TOLAND: "You took him out to the bridge itself, when you said this?"
HAUSMAN: "No. We were in our office. I think both General chae and Kim understood about the bridge. I recall telling Kim that I was sorry he could not go home and help his family evacuate to the south. I later learned that he, as well as other General-grade officers in headquarters, used their aides to help family members evacuate. President Rhee had already been evacuated to Taegu. I never discussed the bridge blowing with Kim Paik Il--I knew nothing about the order, or for that matter, who gave the order. I do know that I was almost killed when it blew--about 700-800 troops and civilians were killed."
TOLAND: "How was that?"
HAUSMAN: "I was on my way to Suwon, along with a Lieutenant Colonel Bob Hazlett, a Lieutenant Lee Soo Yong, and my driver Shin Yong Sun. Our mission was to contact and brief the Ambassador and General Church. General Church and his group departed Japan on a peace time mission, and was later designated General Headquarters Advance Command and Liaison Group (GHQ/ADCOM).
As our Jeep crossed the Han River Bridge and advanced a short distance, the bridge blew. It was a tremendous explosion. Our Jeep actually left the road, vertically. With such a short wheelbase, it's a wonder it didn't overturn. We apprised the Ambassador and General Church of the situation--about the tanks in Seoul--evacuation plans, etc."
"From June 1950 to May 1951, I was a Special Investigation Officer, and by this time had attained the rank of Chief Warrant Officer. From 11 May 1951 to the end of the conflict, I served as Squadron Commander of the 6006th AISS (Air Intelligence Service Squadron, renamed the 6006th Air Intelligence and Reconnaissance Squadon after the war. Nichols stayed on in Korea until 1960).
At 0500 (a.m.) in the morning of 25 June 1950, Korean time, thousands of North Korean puppet military, directed by USSR and China, came streaming across the 38th parallel north of Uijonbu and other crossings....
My first responsibility was the immediate and systematic destruction of my own Headquarters then located in a civilian house at Pupyong (ASCOM). We destroyed its contents and then the destruction of arms and materials left behind on the trail as South Koreans and their defenders ran south for refuge with their BVD's down. The limited roadways were so jammed with foot-sore, frightened, and fleeing peasants, the military had difficulty in advancing to the rear.
I was a loner at the rape and destruction of Kimpo Airfield. In a disorderly advance to the rear, the loner follows the withdrawal leaving a path of destruction of millions of dollars of aircraft and other supplies, at Suwon, Taejon and on to Taegu. Among other things, I appointed myself the job of destroying what others left behind: buildings which contained classified material, aircraft, vehicles, communication equipment, ammo dumps, fuel dumps -- anything the advancing enemy might find useful. I used gasoline, hand grenades and small arms to do most of the destruction.
The first hot days of the battle, I saw few remaining defenders; all other US intelligence units immediately sought safety in Japan.
The bridges across the Han Gang went up in blood, guts and powder as our allies (ROKA) destroyed bridges behind them in a vain effort to gain time. Some made it off the bridges and into the last evacuation boats below: thousands didn't.
I was on the enemy side of the river when the bridges were blown. I helped men, women and children get across the river ahead of the advancing enemy troops. I was the only American there at the time, all others had evacuated. I stayed there as long as I could -- until the enemy was within small arms firing range. I obtained a small boat, permitted others to get in, jumped in the water, held on to the back of the boat and kicked like hell in an effort to get to the other side in as short order as possible.
South Korean National Police, Seoul City Police, military and government officials ran like turpentined rats, leaving their posts, their responsibilities and their families. Defenseless civilians were abandoned by their defenders to suffer the cruelest consequences at the merciless hands of the conquering enemy.
After having said this, Nichols cooly describes the Suwon Massacre wherein 1,800 Korean civilians were killed in cold blood by Nichols' own men. James Hausman's involvement in the massacres at Suwon, Taejon and Pusan will be described in the articles to come.
The secret crossing of the bridge and then demolishing it, abandoning the soldiers and citizens of Seoul became the biggest shame of Syngman Rhee, who had been a strong independence leader. Sixty two members of the National Assembly were also left behind with eight being killed and twenty-seven either kidnapped or missing.
After becoming president, Park Chung-hee established the doctrine of defending Seoul to the death and built a safe capital, learning from Rhee's mistakes. He said many times that if there was a war, he would stay in Seoul and fight to the death. On April 29, 1975, one day before the collapse of South Vietnam, Park pledged to defend Seoul to the death and wrote in his diary,
'We have witnessed the stark reality and truth that a nation that is not determined to protect itself cannot survive. As admiral Lee Soon-shin said if you seek to die you live and if you seek to live you die. This land is a precious place that we will be buried in and will leave to our descendants to last forever. We have to keep this land until the end of the world. It should never be trodden on by the ignorant communists. If we fail to defend this land we will die.'
In his brain, there was a map of hell caused by the national leaders abandoning the people during the Korean War. He had tried to prevent it happening by predicting what would happen and felt lost because he had not been listened to.'The Official History Of The Korean War' volume I states,
'Because of the demolition of the bridges over the Han 44,000 soldiers fight in Seoul were missing. In the 7th division 500 out of 10,000 managed to cross the river carrying just four machine guns. From the 1st division, 5,000 crossed, but had to leave their artillery behind. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th divisions managed to cross the river in a disorderly manner. Government officials and citizens abandoned in the city were either massacred or went into hiding.'
The leaders of the country escaped from Seoul secretly in accordance with their position of power. Syngman Rhee left at 2:00am on June 27, defence minister Shin at 2:00pm the same day and army chief of staff Chae Byong-deok at 2:00am, June 28. Chae even failed to order a withdrawal of front-line units before he left, though there may have not been a communication system set up.
Those who suffered the most among the abandoned were the wounded. On June 24, there were 1,300 patients in the army hospital in Seoul. After three days of fighting 3,200 wounded soldiers were placed in civilian hospitals including Seoul National University Hospital, which was protected by one platoon. When the North Korean soldiers entered Seoul, eighty or so wounded who could walk went up a mountain and continued to fight until they were all killed. The remaining wounded were then massacred in their beds.('The History Of The Korean War' volume I)
On September 15, 1950 the martial law high court sentenced chief engineer, Choi Chang-shik to death for gross misconduct in the face of the enemy. The main culprit, Chae Byong-deok had already been killed two month before in the battle at Hadong. Colonel Choi was executed on September 21, 1950.
After the May 16 coup, Choi's wife Ok Jeong-ae appealed for a reversal of the conviction which she won. The appeal decision said that the action to demolish the bridge was,
'in accordance with operational orders from a superior officer. Choi tried to stop people and cars approaching the bridge by firing over people's heads and delaying the explosion for forty minutes. His behavior was according to military behavior.'
Many witnesses say that Choi could not evade moral responsibility, knowing that many people were on the bridge. If communications could have been maintained then the blast could have been prevented. After Chae Byong-deok escaped to Shiheung and ordered the bridges blown, staff at headquarters suddenly realized that they should delay demolition until a withdrawal of forces was achieved.
They sent operational chief Chang Chang-kook and section chief Chung Lae-hyok to the bridge to prevent the blast, but the two failed to contact Choi due to a paralysed communications network. When the two arrived at a police box near the bridge, they were prevented going any further by military police who would not listen to them. All Chae Byong-deok thought about when giving the order was to prevent North Korean tanks crossing the river.
In the early morning of June 28, first-lieutenant Kim Ki-dam, an ordinance officer of the capital defence command was able to cross the Han on foot. He contributed to the book 'Witnessed By Old Soldiers' compiled by Kim Jon-pil's classmates,
'After the Hangang bridge was blown I went to the railroad bridges. As I neared them it was obvious the two outer ones had been blown up, but I was not sure about the central one. I walked on the wooden sleepers and about halfway across I found boxes of dynamite with a fuse leading to the other side. I couldn't run because I had to stay on the sleepers. The bridge save my life, but allowed the tanks across.'
This one railroad bridge was intact, and if people had known, many lives would have been saved. Several days later, North Korean tanks rolled across this bridge, making the blasting of the other bridges no consequence.