„ Government
information
on the
Polish
foreign
policy
presented by
the
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs of
the RP,
Prof. Adam
Daniel
Rotfeld,
at the
session of
the Sejm on
21st January
2005
Mister
President,
Mister Prime
Minister,
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
I take the
floor with
certain
anxiety and
diffidence.
For it is
the first
time that I
stand on
this rostrum
as the newly
appointed
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs.
What is more,
I am to
present to
the House
the
priorities
and tenets
of Polish
foreign
policy
prepared
under your
leadership,
Mister
Speaker,
when you
were
executing
the office
of the
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs with
such success.
My address
opens the
fourth and
last annual
debate on
foreign
policy
during this
term of the
Sejm. We
have entered
an
election
year. That
is
significant,
since the
clear line
formerly
separating
domestic and
international
affairs has
become
blurred in
our times. I
mention this,
because I
would
like to
explain in
the
beginning
that it is
not my
intention to
become
involved in
any way in
the
pre-election
campaign.
The
national
interest of
the Polish
State
obligate us
to treat
external
policy and
its
instrument –
diplomacy –
in a way
transcending
party lines.
I wish to
ensure
optimum
effectiveness
of our
actions and
continuity
in all the
undertakings
initiated by
Minister
Krzysztof
Skubiszewski
in
the autumn
of 1989, and
advanced
over the
next 15
years by his
successors –
Andrzej
Olechowski,
Wladyslaw
Bartoszewski,
Dariusz
Rosati,
Bronislaw
Geremek and
Wlodzimierz
Cimoszewicz.
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
With those
assumptions
in mind, I
wish to
present a
list of
priorities
on the
agenda of
our foreign
policy.
First, we
shall
continue
consolidating
our place in
the
European
Union as a
responsible
state, for
which the
Common
Foreign and
Security
Policy and
the European
Security and
Defence
Policy is a
platform, on
the one hand,
for seeking
a
balance of
interests,
and on the
other – for
overcoming
the
still
existent
divisions
and
preventing
new ones. We
shall
strive for a
European
Union budget
for the
years
2007-2013
that
meets
Poland’s
interests.
It is our
goal to
ensure the
highest
possible
allocation
for the
policy of
cohesion and
agricultural
policy for
the new
member
states – so
that the new
budget
accelerates
the leveling
of
differences
in the
development
of
EU states.
We shall
seek to
attain
political
compromise
on the
New
Financial
Perspective
in June
2005. That
is a
difficult
task.
However, we
hope that
the
negotiations
will be
marked by
good will,
without
tactical
delays and
playing for
time.
Second, as a
member of
the North
Atlantic
Alliance and
the
European
Union we
shall seek a
new opening
in the
relations of
the whole
West with
Ukraine. The
democratic
breakthrough
that
occurred in
that country
has met with
the
understanding
and
support of
all
responsible
political
forces in
Poland. We
shall do
everything
to ensure
that this
breakthrough
gains the
appreciation
and
recognition
of the
community of
the
democratic
states of
the West.
After all,
it is an
event of
historic
proportions,
comparable
to the
European
‘‘Autumn of
the
Nations” in
1989. The
reforms in
Ukraine
require
support, and
its shift
towards the
Euro-Atlantic
structures –
reciprocation.
Acting
bilaterally,
we wish to
extend the
essential
assistance
to the new
president
and
government
of Ukraine,
and to share
our
experiences
in
developing
and
consolidating
democratic
and
pro-European
transformation.
In
particular,
we shall
seek to it
that the
European
Union raises
its
relations
with Ukraine
to
the level of
Strategic
Partnership
and opens
the prospect
of
integration,
while
advocating
NATO offer
of a
Membership
Action
Program.
Third, we
shall foster
the
privileged
character of
our
relations
with the
United
States. A
president
friendly to
the
Polish cause
will stay in
the White
House for
another four
years. The
government
realizes
that the
special
character of
the
Polish-American
political
relations
has not been
fully
translated
to all other
areas of
relations.
There has
been an
improvement
on economic
issues and
military
cooperation
- and
we intend to
maintain
this trend.
But things
are not as
good
when it
comes to the
waiver of
visas for
Poles
traveling to
the
United
States. It
would be
irresponsible
to promise a
rapid
breakthrough
on this
issue. We
shall do
everything
to
accelerate
the momentum
of changes
that would
meet the
expectations
of Polish
society. As
a new member
of the
European
Union and a
tested ally
of America,
we shall
strive over
the
coming weeks
and months
to revive
the spirit
of the
Transatlantic
community,
and to erase
the memory
of the
grievances
that
hindered
cooperation
on both
sides of the
Atlantic
over the
last two
years.
Fourth,
after the
elections in
Iraq, we
intend to
elaborate -
with the new
government
of that
state and
our allies
in the
stabilization
coalition –
a new
formula of
Polish
engagement
in
Iraq. The
elections in
Iraq are an
indispensable
element of
normalization,
even if the
conditions
for holding
them will
not
be perfect
everywhere.
Still, I am
confident
that they
will
bring
positive
changes.
They will
enhance the
legitimacy
and
authority of
the
government,
cooperation
with Iraq’s
neighbors
will improve,
and the
internal
security
structures
will be able
to assume
greater
responsibility
for the
situation in
that
state. The
present
Polish
Military
Contingent
will be
reduced.
The relevant
decisions
that have
been taken
will not
undermine
our capacity
to fulfill
our tasks.
We intend to
make further
reductions,
at the same
time
facilitating
the
assumption
of
responsibility
for the
security of
Iraq – by
the Iraqis.
But
neither we
nor anybody
else should
harbor any
illusions:
normalization
of the
situation in
Iraq will
take years
and will
require
active
support by
the
international
community.
For many
reasons,
Poland
should not
shirk
participation
in that
joint
endeavor,
though our
contribution
may take
different
forms. Our
presence in
Iraq is
likely to be
of an
increasingly
civilian –
rather than
military –
nature.
Increasingly,
it will be
Polish
companies –
rather than
troops –
that will
facilitate
the
stabilization
of Iraq.
Fifth, our
priorities
include
seeking
jointly with
the
government
of the
Federal
Republic of
Germany a
future-oriented
formula of
relations
between our
states – a
formula,
that would
finally put
a closure to
the burdens
of the past
and open
qualitatively
new
prospects
for the
development
of relations
between
Poland and
Germany. In
recent
months we
have managed
to realise
some
significant
achievements.
Let me
recall that
the German
Chancellor
has
unambiguously
declared a
lack of
support of
the German
government
for
individual
property
claims that
could be
made by
citizens of
the Federal
Republic
of Germany.
The
newly-appointed
plenipotentiaries
of the
foreign
ministers of
Poland and
Germany for
bilateral
cooperation,
have
initiated
their
activity. We
must take a
sober view –
free of
illusion –
of the
problems in
relations
between our
states. Such
matters are
not resolved
by a single
act, or some
magic
formula. It
is a process.
The Polish
government
is under an
obligation
to care for
the
interests of
the Polish
state and
its citizens,
mindful not
only of the
coming
months or
years, but
of future
generations
– with an
awareness of
the historic
perspective
of that task.
We shall
strive to
secure
Polish
interests,
cooperating
constructively,
in the
spirit of
European
partnership,
with the
government
of
Germany.
Sixth, the
government
shall spare
no effort to
ensure that
Poland as
host and
organizer of
the III
Summit of
the Council
of Europe -
an
organization
that has
integrated
democratic
states of
our
continent
for over
fifty years
- performs
that
role well.
Let me
remind you
that the
Summit
meeting will
take
place in
Warsaw in
May of this
year. It is
our ambition
that
the Warsaw
summit
should
elaborate
the future
tasks of
that
important
European
institution,
becoming an
opportunity
for
deep
reflection
on the state
of the
architecture
of security
and
cooperation
in Europe,
and in
Euro-Atlantic
relations.
Also, we
would like
the Polish
presidency
of the
Visegrad
Group
to revive
the sense of
joint action,
primarily in
the
framework
of the
European
Union.
Finally, we
want to
leave a good
impression
of the
Polish
presidency
of the
Council of
Baltic
Sea States.
We shall
also
continue our
active
involvement
in
the work on
the reform
of the
United
Nations,
presenting
our
vision of a
New
Political
Act of that
organization
in the 21st
century.
Seventh, we
want the
coming
months to
change the
way we think
about
Poland’s
possibilities
of action in
areas
out-of-Europe.
The
government
issued a
political
signal for
such an
approach
with the
adoption
last
November of
a
comprehensive
strategy
addressed at
the
developing
countries.
We would
like to see
the
adoption and
implementation
of a Law on
cooperation
for
development,
and the
creation of
the
appropriate
organizational
structures.
Eighth,
Polish
foreign
policy has
the task of
attaining
objectives
serving the
Polish
economy and
Polish
companies.
The
economic
transformations,
privatisation
and
significant
liberalization
of trade
require
corresponding
changes in
the
structures
of Poland’s
foreign
representation.
That means
continued
integration
of the
resources
and
instruments
of
foreign
policy in
the Ministry
of Foreign
Affairs and
in the
diplomatic
missions.
That goal
should also
be served by
the
launching of
the planned
Polish
Agency for
Economic
Promotion.
The
economization
of Polish
policy –
despite
considerable
departmental
resistance –
is necessary
and requires
substantial
acceleration
in 2005, in
view of
Poland’s
participation
in the
common
commercial
policy of
the EU and
the need to
shape the EU
policies in
the interest
of the
Polish
economy.
Honorable
Members,
The
challenges
that Polish
foreign
policy has
had to face
in
recent
months, have
caused -
apparently
for the
first time -
divisions on
our
political
scene.
Oftentimes,
this Chamber
has
witnessed
heated
disputes
over such
issues as
the
Constitutional
Treaty for
Europe, or
the Polish
presence in
Iraq. This
indicates,
first and
foremost,
that the
development
of the
international
situation
poses
questions
that often
do
not have one
simple and
easy answer.
However, I
do not share
a
commonplace
view that
this is
supposed to
mean the end
of
national
consensus
over the
main themes
and tasks of
Polish
foreign
policy. That
claim has
been refuted
by the
conduct of
the Polish
people and
unity of
action of
Polish
politicians
over Ukraine.
That issue
confirmed
the truth
that when we
speak with
one voice –
we are
effective in
pursuing our
national
interests.
It would be
harmful for
our common
interests if
the
fundamental
issues of
Polish
foreign
policy
were to
become
entangled in
short-term
electoral
calculations.
It is my
ambition to
ensure the
continuity
of all the
processes
that serve
Poland well
and were
launched by
my
predecessors.
The new
political
alignment
and the new
government
are likely
put their
own imprint
on foreign
policy.
However, the
issues of
fundamental
importance
to Poland,
to its
security,
should be
continued.
For this to
happen, it
is
essential to
hold a
thorough
debate on
questions
that are of
fundamental
significance
to Poland
and its
foreign
policy.
Hence, it is
necessary to
recall some
elementary
concepts and
issues,
axioms of
sort, to
refresh the
way they are
understood.
I believe
this debate
will mark a
substantial
contribution
to
this process.
Members of
the House,
On 1st May
2004 Poland
became a
member of
the European
Union. It
is too early
to make a
full
evaluation
of that
historic
event.
Still, one
thing is
beyond
dispute: our
entry into
the Union
has
conclusively
discredited
many false
predictions,
fears and
concerns
that were
prevalent in
Poland and
abroad.
It has
turned out
that the
accession of
Poland and
nine other
states did
not
undermine
the
political
cohesion of
the European
Union.
Poland did
not become –
as had been
claimed – a
‘‘Trojan
horse”, and
we did not
need to be
taught on
how to be
good
Europeans.
The events
in Ukraine
demonstrated
something
quite
contrary:
that there
are
situations
in which it
is
worthwhile
to listen to
Poland very
closely and
that
Poland’s
actions
enhance the
prestige of
all Europe.
Members of
the House,
Our
membership
in the
European
Union has
become a
tangible
stimulus of
Poland’s
development.
We have
received the
first EU
funds and
more
importantly
– are making
good use of
them. No
one has lost
on our entry
into the EU.
Everyone has
benefited.
The best
example of
that is the
improved
situation of
our
farmers -
the social
group on
behalf of
which most
concerns
were
expressed in
connection
with
Poland’s EU
membership.
Our
national
identity has
not been
undermined.
We still
live in our
own country,
though now
it is
modernizing
faster.
There is a
natural and
quite
pronounced
need for a
frank public
debate on
the vision
of Europe
that we
desire and
our place in
it. This
is so,
because the
next few
months will
bring
intensive
discussions
in all the
member
states on
the vision
of Europe,
its future
development,
its
boundaries
and identity
in a
globalized
world. An
inspiration
or a
catalyst to
launch such
a
debate has
been the
process of
ratification
of the
Constitutional
Treaty,
discussion
on the New
Financial
Perspective,
the question
of Turkey’s
future
membership,
and -
what is also,
or even more
significant
from the
Polish point
of
view – an
elaboration
of concrete
conditions
and a date
for
opening of
the
accession
negotiations
with Ukraine.
Our agenda
today not
only
includes the
issue of
ratification
of
the
Constitutional
Treaty, but
also ways of
boosting
public
support for
our
membership
in the EU.
Ahead of us
is the
debate
preceding
the
constitutional
referendum.
The
sovereign
decision
we take will
not only
have crucial
impact on
the future
development
and shape of
the European
Union. It
will
constitute
a kind of
test of
Polish
aspirations.
Members of
the House,
The
Constitutional
Treaty
signed last
year is more
of a
conclusion,
systematization
and
rearrangement
of earlier
decisions,
than a road
map to the
future.
However,
rejection of
the Treaty
by Poland
would doom
our country
to
self-isolation,
and at best
– to revival
of the idea
of a Europe
of ‘‘two
speeds”, or
a Europe of
a ‘‘hard
core” and a
periphery.
The
greatest
weakness of
the Treaty
is its
language; a
search for a
compromise
formula is
often
expressed in
a
bureaucratic
jargon,
a lingo of
civil
servants
addressing
other civil
servants.
Treaties
written by
representatives
of 25 states
are rarely
simple,
clear and
legible.
However, it
is a Treaty
that despite
all its
flaws –
rooted in
its
compromise
nature –
duly takes
into account
Polish
interests.
At the same
time, it is
the point of
departure
for defining
our
vision of
Europe’s
future. We
speak of a
Europe that
is in
solidarity
as well as
cohesive,
efficient
and
effective.
For
that reason,
implementation
of the
Lisbon
Strategy
will be of
key
importance
to Poland –
today and
tomorrow. It
is a project
that
provides for
strengthening
Europe’s
competitiveness
in the
process of
globalization,
first and
foremost,
through
investment
in knowledge,
new
technologies
and
innovative
technical,
economic and
organizational
solutions.
It is in the
Polish
interest for
the European
Union to be
an
important
subject of
international
relations,
partner-like
in
political
relations
and
competitive
on the
global
economic
scene. The
rivalry on
the global
stage is on
the rise. It
poses
a strategic
challenge to
all the
European
states,
including
the
largest ones.
It is ever
more
difficult
for them to
compete on
their own
against such
powers as
the United
States, or
China or
India, both
growing in
strength.
Only as one
can Europe
face
the new
reality
effectively.
The casting
of Europe in
a
strategic
dimension is
in
accordance
with the
Polish
national
interests.
From that
perspective,
further
enlargement
of the EU
eastward is
to the
advantage of
Poland and
the European
Union
as a whole.
Our
membership
in the
European
Union has
shifted the
focus of
our
diplomatic
activity.
Increasingly,
the most
important
objective is
to promote
our
interests
and win the
support of
EU
partners for
our goals.
We have
demonstrated
that we can
be
tough
campaigners
in pursuit
of our goals,
without
losing sight
of the
interests of
the entire
EU. We have
not let any
one put
us in the
corner, nor
have we sunk
into
self-isolation.
We
neither want
to – not
should we –
move on the
margins, or
only
use the
brake, or
focus on
damage
control. The
brakeman can
only reduce
the speed of
the joint
journey, but
he certainly
has no
influence on
its
direction.
We want to
be, and are,
an
active
subject of
EU policy,
with growing
influence of
the
shape of
Union
decisions.
Members of
the House,
A key
question is
on the
agenda – and
it merits
serious
discussion:
with whom
and in what
way do we
want to
pursue our
interests
inside the
European
Union? Our
strategy
envisages
three basic
areas of
contacts.
First, we
cultivate
close
contacts and
collaboration
with our
strategic
partners,
mainly
Germany and
France, and
also Great
Britain –
with which
we
share the
same
appreciation
of the
significance
of the
Transatlantic
relations.
Second, we
nurture
close ties
with the
states of
our region,
particularly
members of
the Visegrad
Group. And
finally,
third – we
seek good
relations
and
cooperation
with all
Union
partners,
with whom we
share
interests on
specific
issues. In
other words,
we are not
inclined to
creating
durable
coalitions
within the
EU, but
define our
position on
a specific
matter and
look for
allies,
whose
approach is
similar or
close to our
position. We
firmly
and
unequivocally
reject the
concept of a
‘‘European
Directorate”
or a ‘‘hard
core” of
Europe. And
any way,
there
is no
tendency
today to
revive those
concepts.
The spirit
of
European
cooperation
is good.
Members of
the House,
Our
membership
in the
European
Union has
induced us
to examine
our
bilateral
relations in
a new light.
This applies
in
particular
to our main
European
partners –
Germany,
France, and
also Great
Britain.
The
relations
with Germany
were in
recent
months and
years the
subject of
many,
occasionally
emotional
debates –
usually in
reaction to
the activity
of various
political
circles in
Germany. It
is
understandable
that
Polish-German
relations –
also today,
after the
enlargement
of the
European
Union – have
significance
that
transcends
bilateral
relations,
with a
dimension
that is not
only
historic and
determined
by the past.
To optimize
our policy,
we need to
answer the
following
question:
how do these
relations
impact the
implementation
of
our – that
is Polish
and German –
broader
aspirations,
both in
the context
of the whole
Europe, and
in the
Transatlantic
dimension.
From the
Polish point
of view,
those
relations
can
and should
be an
instrument
and a key
lever of our
role in
Europe. We
would like
to build a
new model of
Polish-German
relations
that would
be firmly
rooted in
the European
and
Transatlantic
context.
Close
cooperation
of Poland
and Germany
is
particularly
needed to
dynamise the
policies of
Western and
Euro-Atlantic
institutions
addressed to
our
neighbours
in the
East, that
is Eastern
Europe. A
joint
Polish-German
document,
which
ministers
Wlodzimierz
Cimoszewicz
and Joschka
Fischer
presented in
Luxemburg
last year,
could become
the
foundation
of new EU
policy
toward
Ukraine.
Other areas
of
Polish-German
cooperation
include the
future of
the
Transatlantic
relations,
and also the
political
and defense
identity of
Europe.
This
cooperation
must be
based on
respect for
the equality
of
the partners.
We recognize
the role of
Germany in
the European
construction;
we hope that
on the other
side of the
Oder River,
too, the
negative
stereotypes
of Poland –
also in
social
perception -
will be
replaced
with an
image of a
friendly and
helpful
neighbour.
Such a
future-oriented
model will
not become
the basis of
policy
unless past
problems –
which are
again
introducing
elements of
distrust,
uncertainty
and
destabilization
into
Polish-German
relations -
are closed
once
and for all.
Our
relations
require
explicit
declarations
and
clear
decisions by
all the main
political
forces and
parties in
Germany. The
future of
the
relations
between our
peoples must
not be
determined
by those who
are forever
stranded in
the
past. We
believe in
the power of
our
arguments.
They are
historically
justified
and have a
strong legal
basis. We
should
discard
complexes
and not be
guided by
emotions in
our policy
toward
Germany. Our
position
meets with
understanding
and a
will for
cooperation
on the part
of the
Federal
President,
Chancellor
and Minister
of Foreign
Affairs.
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
The year
2005 marks
the 60th
anniversary
of the end
of World War
II. For us,
it also
means the
60th
anniversary
of the
return of
the Western
Territories
to the
Homeland. We
have gained
sufficient
distance and
historic
perspective
to reflect
deeply
on the
responsibility
for the war,
its
consequences
and its
presence in
the
contemporary
awareness of
states and
societies.
It is the
Polish role
to safeguard
the historic
truth, to
resist its
distortion
and
falsification.
Allow me,
Mister
Speaker, to
make a short
digression
at this
point. I
believe the
time is
ripe, 60
years after
the end of
the war, for
the
elementary
truth about
what really
happened in
occupied
Poland to
come to the
awareness of
the
representatives
of the media
in the
community of
the
democratic
states – in
Europe, the
United
States and
Canada–
about who
was the
aggressor,
the
occupier,
who built
the death
camps and
murdered
people
there, and
who was
persecuted,
subjugated
and
subjected
to the
German, Nazi
policy of
extermination.
It was in
Polish
territories
that the
Germans
created the
largest
camps of
annihilation,
where –
alongside
the Jewish
people –
Poles and
members of
other
European
nations were
murdered on
a mass
scale. A few
days from
now, on 27th
January –
marking the
60th
anniversary
of the
liberation
of the Nazi
camp of
Auschwitz –
Birkenau -
the leaders
of almost 40
nations will
come to
attend
ceremonies
in
remembrance
of those
murdered at
the site of
that
death camp.
Today, a few
days before
the
ceremonies
that will
focus the
attention of
the whole
world, I
call on
representatives
of press
organizations,
the
Association
of
Polish
Journalists
and other
organizations
representing
the
Polish
media, to
address –
independently
of the
appeals,
corrections
and
diplomatic
representations
of the
Polish MFA -
a letter to
their
colleagues,
and partner
organizations
of
journalists
around the
world ,
telling them
that the
thoughtless
or
intentional
use of the
term
‘‘Polish
death
camps” is
insulting
and
shameful. It
not only
conceals the
truth about
the
perpetrators
of that
crime, but
slanders our
nation,
which was
the first
victim of
the criminal
practices of
Nazi
Germany.
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
Our
relations
with France.
I do not
have to
explain what
a
crucial role
in building
the European
identity has
been played
by that
country.
France is a
leading
foreign
investor in
Poland. That
creates a
favorable
basis for
further
development
of an
enhanced
partnership.
The climate
of our
mutual
relations
has improved
perceptibly.
The best
illustration
of this was
the
recent visit
to Poland by
the French
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs,
Michel
Barnier. Let
me put this
succinctly:
our mutual
intentions
concerning
the future
of Europe
are much
closer than
is being
presented in
the press,
commentaries
and
political
debate.
The question
occasionally
appears
whether the
Weimar
Triangle
has not
exhausted
its
political
potential.
The answer
is
simple:
institutions
of this kind
have proved
themselves
and
constitute a
useful
platform of
political
cooperation
and
discussion
on European
problems. We
shall
particularly
count on
an active
role of
France in
the
development
of the EU’s
relations
with our
Eastern
neighbours.
We put high
value on our
partnership
with Great
Britain. We
are
linked by a
community of
views on
many
European and
global
issues. In
the recent
period, the
British
government
has been
active and
imaginative
in
co-shaping
the
mechanisms
of European
cooperation,
particularly
including
questions of
defence
policy,
security and
common
foreign
policy. That
has made it
easier for
us, as well,
to formulate
our European
policy.
British
policy
illustrates
the theory
that states
have greater
impact on
shaping the
future of
Europe when
they take
positions
on issues of
key and
central
significance
– than when
they
distance
themselves
from
important
issues,
relegating
themselves
to the
periphery of
European
politics. We
hope for
tight
cooperation
with Great
Britain,
particularly
in creating
a modern
model of the
Transatlantic
relations –
relations
between
America and
Europe –
which is of
crucial
significance
to our
security.
Members of
the House,
The state of
the
Transatlantic
relations –
as all
relations
between
states – is
not a value
granted once
and for all.
Therefore,
those
relations
must be an
object of
our constant
care and
concern.
Today, the
main issue
is to
discard any
grievances
and
prejudices
left behind
by the
differences
over
the
intervention
in Iraq. I
note with
satisfaction
that there
is political
will on both
sides of the
Atlantic to
restore a
good climate
of
collaboration.
However, the
problem does
not
boil down to
the climate
and
atmosphere
of the
Transatlantic
relations.
Joint action
is the order
of the day.
From the
Polish point
of view, the
new
consensus in
the
Transatlantic
relations
should
concern two
strategically
important
areas.
First, we
are talking
about a
joint
response
of the West
to the
democratic
breakthrough
and
pro-Western
aspirations
of Ukraine,
and also
about a
common
political
line
toward the
other
partners in
the East of
Europe.
Second, we
need a
closer
Transatlantic
partnership
in the
so-called
Broader
Middle East.
That is
particularly
necessary
for
reviving the
Israeli-Palestinian
peace
process,
assuring
international
backing for
the
normalization
of the
situation in
Iraq, and
also to
attaining
lasting and
comprehensive
resolution
of the
problem of
Iran’s
nuclear
program.
Transatlantic
collaboration
on all these
issues would
guarantee
that
appropriate
ways and
means are
applied to
effectively
resolve
these
problems.
Let me add,
that chances
for new
openings are
appearing
with regard
to all these
issues.
When we
speak of the
Transatlantic
relations,
we should
recognize
that
differences
of view on
both sides
of the
Atlantic are
a normal
development.
However, the
new approach
signifies
that Europe
and the
United
States will
seek – in a
partner-like
way – a
common
denominator,
showing
respect for
each other’s
interests.
In the
context of
Iraq, it is
possible
to ascertain
– after two
years’
experience –
that neither
is
America
capable of
getting
everything
done by
itself, nor
is
the
temptation
of playing
the role of
a
‘‘counterbalance”
to
the United
States a
constructive
option for
some
Europeans
for
succumbing
to. At the
same time,
we must be
ready for a
serious
debate on
the
structural
model of the
Transatlantic
relations.
That
particularly
concerns the
role and
place of
NATO.
The
engagement
of the
Alliance in
Afghanistan,
and also in
the
training of
troops in
Iraq, is an
expression
of a
completely
new
strategic
role of the
Alliance. We
have given
backing to
this new
quality,
though it is
Poland’s
priority to
maintain
the classic
function of
the Alliance
as an
instrument
of
collective
defence. We
support the
selective
globalization
of
NATO’s
stabilization
activity,
because such
a role of
the
Alliance
finds
practical
use in the
modern
world. In
the view
of the
United
States, it
is the key
function of
NATO as a
global
force. That
is so,
because
Europe is no
longer
perceived
in America
as a
potential
target of
armed
aggression
on a mass
scale,
requiring
American
protection
and
guarantees,
but as a
partner of
the United
States in
confronting
global
threats.
NATO must be
an
instrument
of such
global
partnership.
Otherwise,
it will
wither away,
and the
interest of
the United
States in
the Alliance
will become
problematic.
That, in
turn,
would herald
the
beginning of
the end of
America’s
presence in
Europe.
I do not
have to add
that Poland
should be –
and is –
interested
in
maintaining
the presence
of the
United
States in
Europe and
its role as
a peculiar
European
power. For,
the
presence of
America in
Europe
introduces
an
unquestionable
value added.
That
manifests
itself,
first and
foremost, in
Eastern
Europe,
South
Caucasus and
Central
Asia.
We, in
Poland, are
aware that
our close –
even
privileged –
relations
with the
United
States are
not an
alternative
to our
engagement
in European
integration.
We ask
ourselves
this
question:
how can we
take
advantage
our
particularly
close
relations
with the
United
States to
improve the
Atlantic
relations
overall? Our
commitment
to improving
the
Transatlantic
relations
will not be
credible
unless it is
coupled with
an equally
strong
commitment
to the
development
of
European
cooperation.
The prestige
of Poland in
Washington
is today
higher than
at
any time in
the past.
This
prestige is
our new
asset and a
priceless
value, even
if it is a
value that
cannot be
measured.
Let us be
frank: other
countries
spend years
striving to
have
such
relations
though
without
success. The
kind of
position
that we have
in the
United
States is
not gained
through
lobbying.
That
prestige has
gained in
significance
since our
entry into
the European
Union. Our
relations
with the
United
States are
important
primarily
because only
America is
in
position to
extend
security
guarantees
to Poland –
in their
most
credible
version.
This factor
must not be
underestimated
even in the
present
situation,
when the
horizon is
fortunately
clear of any
threats to
our
security.
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
The triumph
of democracy
in Ukraine,
attained by
peaceful
means, is a
great
achievement
of millions
of
Ukrainians.
It is
also our
Polish
success. The
mediation of
President
Aleksander
Kwasniewski
- who won
the support
of European
Union
representatives
for the
cause, the
engagement
of numerous
Polish
politicians,
the activity
of Polish
parliamentarians
above party
lines, the
involvement
of Polish
Euro-deputies
and
thousands of
young
election
observers –
these and
other
actions
contributed
to an
auspicious
resolution
of the
crisis, and
constitute
an important
investment
for the
future. The
mass
solidarity
of Poles
with
democratic
Ukraine is a
good point
of
departure
for a
breakthrough
in the
relations
between our
societies.
Relations at
presidential
levels are
important,
but
it is the
people who
will
determine
the future
of our
states.
In the
recent weeks
and months,
the
Ukrainians
and Poles
have
shown utmost
political
maturity and
proper
understanding
of the
raison
d’état. And
because of
that, we
shall spare
no effort to
create solid
and at the
same time
practical
foundations
for the
development
of mutual
relations at
the level of
societies,
so
that the
change is
tangible for
millions of
the citizens
of our
states on
both sides
of the
border.
I wish to
express the
conviction
that Ukraine
and all
Eastern
Europe have
permanently
returned to
the agenda
of important
issues that
occupy
European and
Transatlantic
institutions.
We
must
translate
this into a
positive
revaluation
of the
present
policies of
the West
toward our
neighbours,
and in
particular –
to elaborate
a realistic
and
substantial
‘‘opening
package” for
the
reformist
team in
Kiev. The
myth that
our Eastern
neighbours
were
incapable of
meeting
Western
standards of
democracy
and human
rights has
been
debunked.
Also, the
theory
has been
challenged
that the
nations in
that part of
Europe
belonged to
the sphere
of another
civilization
and culture,
to
another
‘‘zone of
influence”.
Finally, the
myth has
been
invalidated
that the
societies in
that part of
Europe were
mired in
apathy, and
were
incapable of
building a
civil
society
on their
own. The
earlier
events in
Georgia, and
the orange
revolution
in Ukraine,
have forced
politicians
to reassess
their views
and opinions
based on
prejudices
and
stereotypes.
Members of
the House,
The state of
affairs in
Belarus –
with which
we share a
common
border -
causes
understandable
concern in
Poland. We
support
the
democratic
and
pro-European
aspirations
of that
country’s
society.
Together
with our
European and
Transatlantic
partners, we
are trying
to co-shape
the policy
of the West
in
such a way
so as to
ensure full
solidarity
with the
democratic
and freedom
tendencies
in Belarus.
We are not
forgetting
about
Moldova,
either, and
the need for
a greater
engagement
of the
West in
solving the
conflict in
Transdniestria.
Members of
the House,
Relations
with the
Russian
Federation
are of key
importance
to
Polish
foreign
policy. Let
us make this
clear: our
involvement
in what
happened in
Ukraine was
not directed
against
Russia.
Our
engagement
was
motivated by
support for
fundamental
values
– and not by
a play of
interests.
It was
important
for us to
make sure
that the
sovereign
will of the
people was
expressed
in Ukraine.
No foreign
plot was
involved. In
fact, we
deeply
believe that
what
happened in
Ukraine is
in the
interest of
Russia.
Never in its
history, had
Russia as
many
supportive
and
friendly
states on
its Western
border as it
does today.
We
would like
Russia to
have the
closest and
strongest
possible
ties with
Europe, the
North
Atlantic
Alliance and
the European
Union. I
have in mind
not only -
and not
primarily -
ties in
the form of
networks of
oil and gas
pipelines,
though such
links are
very
important.
However, as
concerns
Poland and
Europe – it
is the
common
standards of
democracy,
freedom of
the press
and human
rights that
are the most
important
factors
of
consolidation
and
security, at
the same
time
constituting
a
common
denominator.
A stable,
prosperous
and
democratic
Russia
will be a
much more
important
center of
influence in
the whole
post-Soviet
space than
if it
followed a
policy based
on
anachronistic
concepts of
the
so-called
multipolar
‘‘zones of
influence”.
Furthermore,
Russia’s
relations
with the
democratic
Western
institutions
should not
be a
zero-sum
game
either. The
modernization
of Eastern
Europe and
the
prospective
integration
of Ukraine,
Moldova, and
also
Belarus,
with Euro-
Atlantic and
European
institutions
is in the
common
interest of
a democratic
Russia and
the West.
For Poland,
our
membership
in the
European
Union also
offers an
opportunity
to build a
new platform
of bilateral
relations
with
Russia. We
shall spare
no effort to
make
progress in
resolving
many
outstanding
problems. A
certain
experienced
Finnish
politician
advised that
one should
seek enemies
who are far
away, and
friends who
are near. It
would be
desirable if
our
two
countries
were guided
by that in
their mutual
relations.
Members of
the House,
A new
challenge
for Poland
is our
participation
in the joint
discussion
on a new
vision of
relations in
our
immediate
region
after the
enlargement
of the
European
Union.
Accordingly,
it
would also
be
worthwhile
in our
internal
debate to
consider the
place and
role of
regional
policy
within the
overall
tasks of
foreign
policy.
Cooperation
in the
framework of
the Visegrad
Group, the
Central
European
Initiative
and the
Council of
Baltic Sea
States has
enhanced the
identity of
Central
Europe and
ensured
stability
in the whole
region.
After our
accession to
the European
Union,
but even 2
or 3 years
before its
enlargement,
some of our
partners
expressed
doubts as to
the point of
preserving
the
sub-regional
structures.
Our view on
this matter
is
different.
What is
more, we
have managed
to use
concrete
initiatives
-
including
those
connected
with our
current
presidency
of the
Visegrad
Group – to
define the
needed
direction of
the
evolution of
cooperation
in the
region, so
that its
desirability
and
usefulness
is
convincingly
manifested.
This
also concern
to the
Regional
Partnership
launched in
2001 –
which
affiliates
the states
of the
Visegrad
Group, as
well as
Austria and
Slovenia.
Our partners
have had an
opportunity
to
become
convinced
that Poland
does not
treat the
region as a
base for its
political
ambitions at
the EU
forum. Nor
do we
make
pretensions
to playing
the role of
a regional
leader. We
have other
goals: we
want to use
our prestige
and position
in
the European
and
Transatlantic
family to
promote the
interests
of the
region.
The
enlargement
of the
European
Union and
NATO, the
total
change of
the
geopolitical
picture of
Europe, and
also the
emergence of
new
challenges,
has altered
the context
of action
of the whole
institutional
construction
in Europe –
and not
only of the
sub-regional
links. These
institutions
must
determine a
new sense
for their
existence.
That, too,
is a
task for our
policy.
Members of
the House,
We would
like the May
summit
meeting of
the states
of the
Council of
Europe in
Warsaw to
generate a
specific
vision of
the future
and place of
that
organization
in the
context of
other
European
structures.
The point is
to ensure
that the
visions
being
elaborated
by the
respective
institutions,
such
as the
Council of
Europe or
the OSCE,
are coherent
visions.
For, those
institutions
require
total
reconstruction.
It is
especially
important to
eliminate
the overlap
and
duplication
of actions,
as well as
institutional
rivalry. We
should
counteract
the tendency
of the
respective
organizations
to
focus on
their own
internal
problems.
And let us
not delude
ourselves
that one-off
solutions or
miracle
cures are
possible.
At the turn
of January,
Warsaw will
host another
session of
the
Warsaw
Reflection
Group, which
affiliates
distinguished
analysts and
researchers
from Europe
and North
America. It
will
have the
task of
preparing a
report on
the
complementarity
of
the European
structures.
It is most
important
not to lose
any
of the
normative,
political
and
operational
achievements
of the
institutions
functioning
in Europe.
The matter
is urgent.
It is
the case,
because the
last OSCE
Ministerial
Council in
Sofia
demonstrated
how the
natural
identity
crisis of
that
organization
may be
exploited
for the
pursuit of
particularistic
political
goals. This
is how we
perceive the
attempts to
restrict the
activity of
that
organization
in the
human
dimension.
Such an
approach is
short-sighted
and may lead
to effects
that are
opposite to
what was
intended.
For our
part, we are
considering
a
constructive,
joint search
for new
solutions.
The
appearance
of new
challenges
and
asymmetrical
threats,
such as
international
terrorism,
proliferation
of
weapons of
mass
destruction
and new
phenomena,
such as
failing
or failed
states,
highlights
the need for
a
redefinition
of the
global
international
order. In
shaping
Polish
foreign
policy,
we act on
the
assumption
that
effective
multilateralism
is the
key to
ensuring
world peace
and
stability.
We shall
make every
effort to
preserve and
strengthen
the
multilateral
institutions
of global
management,
particularly
the United
Nations.
In this
context,
reform of
the UN is
the most
urgent
matter.
In autumn of
2002 the
Polish
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs,
Wlodzimierz
Cimoszewicz,
pointed out
the need to
restructure
the UN. At
that time,
he put
forward the
initiative
of
elaborating
a New
Political
Act for the
United
Nations for
the
21st
century.
Changes were
necessitated
by the fact
that while
the system
of world
security is
dynamic, the
structures
remain
static. In
effect, that
leads –
first of all
– to a
conceptual
inadequacy
of the
organization.
The UN often
lacks the
means
to
counteract
new types of
threats and
resolve new
problems.
The issue is
that for
many years
now the
major
conflicts
have
been
emerging
inside
states,
rather than
in the
relations
between
them. On the
one hand,
the
international
community
usually
expects the
UN to
intervene
quickly and
effectively,
and on the
other – the
Organization
does not
possess
suitable
norms,
procedures
and
instruments.
Secondly, it
is a case of
political
inadequacy,
which means
that the
alignment of
forces
inside of
the
organization
does
not reflect
the actual
balance of
power in the
world.
Thirdly,
there is
institutional
inadequacy,
which causes
United
Nations
bodies and
officials to
work in an
ineffective
and outdated
way.
The Polish
initiative,
therefore,
was a
comprehensive
vision of
UN reform.
We proposed
that a draft
of the
changes be
prepared
by a Group
of
Independent
Personalities.
As known,
the
Secretary
General
established
such a group
over a year
ago and
it presented
its report
last
December.
The year
2005 will
test
the capacity
of the
United
Nations, and
especially
its member
states, to
take action
for reform.
The
scheduled
high-level
meeting on
the
anniversary
of the
Millennium
Declaration
should
bring
political
consensus on
the package
of changes.
The
question is:
Will it
deliver? The
question
remains
open.
There is no
simple
answer.
In its
commitment
to changing
the UN,
Poland does
not pursue
any hidden
goals. We
are not
demanding a
permanent
seat on the
Security
Council, we
are not
advocating
institutional
change.
We are
acting on
the
assumption
that first,
you have to
identify the
problems,
define a new
mandate of
the
Organization
– and only
then
deliberate
on the
institutional
changes. Our
approach is
guided by
the
interests of
the
international
community;
we are
moving
beyond
regional
parochialism.
Our
initiatives
primarily
comprise an
intellectual
contribution;
it
is an
attempt at
innovative,
creative
thinking.
Members of
the House,
A serious
domestic
debate
should be
devoted to
the future
profile of
Poland’s
political,
military and
economic
engagement
in a global
set of
relations. I
am referring
to Poland as
a
state that –
through its
accession to
the European
Union – has
entered a
new system
of
international
relationships,
of which
the Union is
a collective
subject.
Stanislaw
Wyspianski
wrote
with a sense
of irony in
‘‘The
Wedding”:
‘‘The whole
damn world
can take up
arms,
provided
Poland’s
countryside
remains at
peace with
no alarms”.
That is not
and must not
be the motto
of
Polish
foreign
policy in
our times.
Security has
become truly
indivisible,
and threats
to our
national
security may
originate
in exotic
and highly
remote
regions.
Therefore,
it is the
imperative
of Polish
foreign
policy to
seek
national
security
in the
framework of
international
security, in
cooperation
with
other
states. Our
role in Iraq
should be
examined
from
precisely
that point
of view.
The problem
is that the
demand for
such
difficult
and costly
roles to be
played by
NATO and
European
Union is not
likely to
diminish.
NATO is
militarily
engaged in
Afghanistan
and expects
that Poland,
among
others, will
also make
active
contribution.
The European
Union is
establishing
battle
groups. The
humanitarian
disaster in
South-East
Asia points
to the need
for
remodeling
the concept
of such
groups, so
that they
will be
able to
deliver
effective
international
relief in
such crisis
situations.
The
situation in
Sudan also
indicates
the need for
such
actions.
Therefore,
we face the
need of
drafting a
sensible
doctrine of
international
engagement
of our
military
forces in
similar
operations.
We are
talking
mainly about
humanitarian
interventions.
That kind of
Polish
involvement
will require
broad public
understanding.
Until now,
the obvious
though
relatively
recent
postulate
that
we should
transform
ourselves
from a
country that
was helped
by
others into
a country
helping
those in
greater
need, could
have
sounded as
an empty,
abstract
declaration.
The tragedy
in Asia
has
demonstrated
how
important it
is for
Poland to
join relief
efforts and
show
solidarity.
Helping
those who
are weaker,
poorer,
afflicted by
disease,
hunger and
disasters
should
henceforth
change our
sensitivity
and
awareness,
but it also
should have
its
organizational
and
financial
dimension.
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
Poland’s
entry into
the EU
structures
and policies
necessitates
a
reassessment
of our
relations
with
non-European
states and a
redefinition
of our place
in the
global
system.
Europe is
increasingly
perceived as
an entity.
We should be
influencing
the shape of
the EU
policy
toward the
non-European
regions. We
have certain
advantages:
we have
never been a
colonial
state,
we have a
developed
network of
missions,
numerous
communities
of Polish
expatriates,
as well as a
large pool
of experts
and
researchers.
Our greatest
weakness and
restriction
are the
modest
resources at
our
disposal.
You cannot
pursue an
active
policy
without
adequate
funds.
The
government’s
recently-adopted
strategy
toward the
non-
European
developing
states is a
signal of
political
will, and
of the need
for action.
It is an
important
signal,
since it is
of a
concrete and
systematized
character.
This
strategy
goes
beyond
general
declarations.
It is a task
for years to
come.
The rank,
significance
and
attractiveness
of such
partners as
China,
India,
Pakistan,
Malaysia,
Thailand,
Indonesia,
some
Arab states,
the RSA,
Nigeria,
Angola,
Brazil,
Argentina,
Chile,
Mexico and
many others,
will
continue to
rise. In
order
to take
advantage of
the
opportunities
provided by
Poland’s
participation
in global
processes,
we must
consistently
modernize
our system
of
management
of foreign
policy
instruments.
Members of
the House,
The fact
that many
Poles,
people with
Polish roots
live abroad
is part of
our national
identity.
Over the
past years,
we have
built a
comprehensive
government
strategy of
cooperation
with
expatriate
Polish
communities.
There is a
proven
mechanism
for
the
realization
of that
policy. Some
issues here
deserve
special
attention.
That
particularly
applies to
the
assistance
for Poles in
the East,
who often
find
themselves
in a
difficult
material
situation.
That applies
to the
implementation
of the
Polish
minority
postulates
in
Lithuania.
That also
applies to
the
possibility
of
self-fulfillment
of the
cultural
identity by
Poles in
Germany. I
wish to take
this
opportunity
to express
my
appreciation
and thanks
to both
houses of
parliament
for
their help,
assistance
and active
work with
the Polish
expatriate
communities.
Mister
President,
Mister
Premier,
Mister
Speaker,
Members of
the House,
The balance
sheet of
foreign
policy in
recent years
has been
impressive.
The
accession to
the European
Union
crowned many
years of
efforts and
opened a new
chapter in
the history
of our
state. We
have built a
strong
position in
the
Transatlantic
relationship,
and high
prestige in
Europe. The
changes in
Ukraine have
opened new
opportunities
for our
policy in
the
East. We
have started
actively
moving into
areas
outside of
Europe.
The
international
environment
in which we
operate is
exceptionally
unpredictable
and
unstable.
The
situation is
prone to
dynamic
changes.
That
sharpens the
dilemmas we
face
and
complicates
the search
for the
right
responses.
I have
attempted
today to
focus the
attention of
the Members
of
the House on
these
fundamental
dilemmas,
tasks and
priorities.
Many states
face similar
challenges.
And in
today’s
world, the
only
effective
response to
most
international
problems is
a
collective
response.
In
conclusion,
allow me to
repeat my
conviction
that the
effectiveness
of our
foreign
policy is
largely
determined
by
the
following
elements:
continuity
and
consistency,
and also
recognition
of the
national
interest
above party
lines –
which
is reflected
by the joint
or
convergent
positions of
the main
political
forces on
the goals
and tasks of
foreign
policy of
fundamental
significance
to the state
and nation.
Thank you
for your
attention.”
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