The Approach
Attack - First Wave
Attack - Second Wave
The Third Wave Decision
Aftermath

The Third Wave Decision 

The question of whether the Japanese should have launched a third wave against Pearl Harbor was highly controversial at the time and has remained so ever since. 

Aircraft from the first two waves arrived back at their carriers between 10.10am and 12.15pm. Many of the pilots expected, and hoped, to return to Hawaii after re-fuelling. Fuchida, the operational leader, and Commander Minoru Genda, who had shaped the air attack plan, were in favour of another assault, though Genda recommended it be delayed until the American carriers had been located. However, at 1.30pm, the task force was ordered to retire. Vice Admiral Nagumo, its commander, and his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, had no doubts that this was the correct decision. Indeed, Kusaka later told Genda that they had decided at the start of the operation not to carry out any follow-up strikes. 

The morning's spectacular results convinced Nagumo and Kusaka that all objectives had been met. Fuchida had concluded, in response to questioning by Nagumo, that the US Pacific Fleet had been put out of action for six months. Therefore, the original aim set by Admiral Yamamoto, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet, to protect the flank of the south-east Asia invasion had been fulfilled. The Americans were now thoroughly alert and had responded quickly and, in places, even forcefully to the surprise attack. Any further strikes could not be launched until aircraft had been re-fuelled and re-armed and aircrews briefed which would have resulted in dangerous night flights and landings in worsening weather. A prolonged deployment in the target area had fuel supply implications for the task force. Casualties from any third wave would be much heavier. Nagumo feared a counter-attack by the US land-based aircraft still operational and those units of the Pacific Fleet, including up to five aircraft carriers, not present at Pearl Harbor, the positions of which were unknown. Also, he could not discount the possibility that US submarines would be seeking out the task force. Nagumo felt that his most important remaining duty was to return his own six aircraft carriers, the only ones the Japanese possessed, safely home. Once there, it was a certainty that they would be needed for other operations. 

At Combined Fleet headquarters in Japan the news of the success at Pearl Harbor was greeted with delight and astonishment. Yamamoto and most of his staff were in favour of a third strike, but the C-in-C, who did not yet know the extent of Japanese losses, decided to leave the decision to Nagumo, whose cautious nature was well known. On his return at midday, Fuchida had told Nagumo that there were still many significant targets worthy of attack. There was a complete infrastructure of dockyard installations, fuel storage tanks, power station and ship repair and maintenance facilities which supported the US Pacific Fleet and without which its rebuilding would have been impossible. There were also plenty of vessels not touched in the first assaults. Most tantalising of all, news of the original raid might have brought the American aircraft carriers back within range of attack. Genda wanted to finish the task. Most of the American battleships had been put out of action, the airfields on Oahu were badly damaged and many, if not all, defending aircraft had been destroyed. Japanese losses had been light. Genda realised that his airmen had given Japan a superb opportunity to strike a decisive blow which would not occur again.

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