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Missile Overview


Although Egypt, during the early 1950s, became the first "Third World" nation to develop a serious interest in ballistic missiles, less is known concerning its missile programs than any other country in the Middle East.

Beginning during the 1950s and extending through the mid-1960s, the Egyptian military sponsored a missile program staffed by German engineers and scientists to develop ballistic missiles and a satellite launch vehicle based upon experience gained with the World War II Wasserfall and A4 (a.k.a., V2) missiles. The available evidence suggests that the Egyptians intended to manufacture up to 900 missiles of three models by 1970.

Egypt's German engineers and scientists developed and partially tested three distinct surface-to-surface missiles: the single stage al-Zafir (Victor) with a projected range of 370 km; the single stage al-Kahir (Conqueror) - projected range of 600 km; and the two stage al-Ra'id (Pioneer) - projected range of 1,500 km. Each missile was designed to carry a unitary high explosive warhead of 500-800 kg. Although President Gamal Abdel Nasser would boast that the missiles were in series production, none reached operational service due to insurmountable guidance system troubles and gross mismanagement of the program. By the time of the June 1967 Six-Day War the entire missile program had come to a standstill.

Following the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union supplied Egypt with short-range FROG-7As artillery rockets. These were supplemented by small numbers of Scud B ballistic missiles during early 1973. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt launched approximately 200 FROG-7As, al-Kahir (al-Tin) and al-Zafir (al-Zeitun), along with three Scud Bs, at Israeli military targets. Although these missiles had only a minimal effect upon the course of the war, the Egyptians (as well as the Israelis and Syrians) came away from that conflict with the belief that ballistic missiles would play an increasingly significant role in any future conflict in the region, at both the tactical and strategic levels.

These experiences would provide the foundations for a number of more advanced ballistic missile programs within Egypt and, more ominously, set in motion cycles of ballistic missile proliferation throughout South and East Asia. The effects of these cycles of proliferation are being felt by the world today as ballistic missile developments are a major destabilizing factor in these regions.

Following the 1973 war, Egyptian interest in tactical ballistic missiles was revived, initially to maintain and upgrade its existing missile inventory, but subsequently in response both to the Iran-Iraq war and as a reaction to Israeli missile developments. As a result, during the early 1980s Egypt initiated a program (partially in cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) to develop an improved version of the Scud B. This program has continued, in one form or another, until today, although Egypt is not known to have either manufactured or deployed any improved Scud B missiles. The Scud B program was complemented by three programs during the early 1980s-Sakr-80, RS-120, and Condor II/Vector/Badr-2000.

By the late-1980s, all three of these smaller programs had succumbed to a lack of Egyptian funding and/or international pressure. Egypt currently has only one known active ballistic missile program—the improved Scud B (a.k.a., Scud C). The resources that had been allocated to the Condor II and other missile programs are believed to have been redistributed to the improved Scud B program. The current status of this program is obscure. It is, however, currently believed to be proceeding at an advanced research stage. Should, however, there be a dramatic change in its political climate and financial resources Egypt possesses the technological and personnel resources to produce a Scud B/C, or possibly Nodong, equivalent missile.

Two critical factors have strongly inhibited missile development in Egypt. First, Egypt simply doesn't possess the economic resources to pursue a missile production program of any significance with indigenous assets alone. Second, Egypt's military industries have repeatedly demonstrated an inability to efficiently conceive, implement and conclude major development programs. There have been notable exceptions to this, however, when Egyptian companies have been closely aligned with Western counterparts. These financial and organizational weaknesses have adversely impacted upon Egypt's efforts at missile development on numerous occasions.

Early Efforts, 1950-1967

The earliest documented missile development efforts in Egypt date to 1951. Following Egypt's humiliating defeat to Israel during the 1947-1949 war the government of King Farouk initiated a number of programs to modernize and strengthen the Egyptian armed forces, establish a modern arms industry, and revitalize the economy. Not possessing the domestic expertise to accomplish these ambitious programs Egypt was forced to seek foreign assistance. A royal commission appointed by King Farouk hired a number of former German World War II officers and experts.

With the approval of the West German Economics Ministry the first group of advisers (67 military and four naval experts) arrived in Cairo in January 1951.

To oversee the development of a modern arms industry the Egyptian Ministry of War concluded a contract with Dr. Wilhelm Voss an armaments expert. Voss traveled to Egypt with Fahrmbacher in January 1951.[1] Included within Voss's responsibilities was the development of a small, apparently solid fueled, tactical missile with a range of several kilometers. To staff this program Voss arranged for a small number of former German missile experts to be hired through a German firm owned by a Herr Fuellner.[2] By March 1952 progress had been made in the design of a tactical missile and discussions of a longer-range guided missile had begun. These discussions proved to be premature as development of the tactical missile was still encountering significant problems including the acquisition of sufficient quantities of quality steel, propellants and fuses.[3] These problems would persist throughout the life of the program and were ultimately be a major factor in the program's cancellation. Sometime during 1952, the first test flight of the new missile was conducted. The results were apparently unsatisfactory, and Egyptian government representatives proposed that the firm be placed under formal government control.

During July 1952 the "Free Officers," nominally headed by General Muhammad Naguib, ousted King Farouk and his government from power in a coup d'état. This new government looked with suspicion upon many of the officers and programs of its predecessors and the original project was dissolved.

For Egypt, 1958 was an important year as President Nasser initiated an ambitious program of domestic transformation and a drive for leadership of the Arab world. As part of these efforts Egypt entered into a union with Syria to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) and, as noted above, embarked upon an ambitious program of indigenous military industrialization.[4] The primary objectives of this military industrialization were the dramatic expansion of Egypt's infant aeronautical industry and the development of ballistic missiles. To facilitate this industrialization Egypt once again turned to former World War II German scientists and technicians.

To head the recruitment of foreign scientists and technicians, and to oversee their programs Nasser appointed General 'Azm al-Din Mahmud Khalil—former head of Egyptian Air Force Intelligence—as director of "special military projects." Among the first foreigners recruited was Ferdinand Brandner, an engine designer who had worked for Junkers and Messerschmitt during World War II. Also recruited were Dr. Eugen Sänger, then director of the Jet-Propulsion Institute in Stuttgart, Germany, and his wife/assistant Irene Bredt-Sänger.[5] Both of whom were involved in the wartime development of cryogenic rocket engines and an advanced concept orbital rocket bomber.

By 1960 the overall objectives for these "special military projects" had been established and they were organized into the Egyptian General Aero Organization. This organization was headed by General Khalil, who reported directly to President Nasser. Subordinate to the Egyptian General Aero Organization were approximately five factories tasked with the production of ballistic missiles, jet aircraft and engines.[6]

Concurrent with the establishment of the Egyptian General Aero Organization, work proceeded with the construction of drawing offices, machine shops, assembly halls and test facilities. In addition to the small missile test and launch site at the Sakr Factory (a.k.a., Factory 333)— the primary facility for the missile program, a significantly larger 200 km long test range, with static test stands and launch pads, was constructed approximately 100 km north of Cairo.

On 5 July 1961, Israel scored a major propaganda coup when it successfully launched its first solid-fuel sounding rocket, the Shavit II (Comet II), to the altitude of 77,000 m.[7] Although the Shavit II was ostensibly only a scientific rocket, the timing of the launch days before the annual Egyptian military parade marking the anniversary of the overthrow of King Farouk, was deliberate and the meaning was not lost to anyone. The Israeli launch of the Shavit II only reinforced Egypt's desire to rapidly proceed with their missile program.

By 1961 many of the details of events surrounding Factory 333 had become known to the Israelis who had initiated both political and covert programs to halt the German assistance. One of the first successes of the Israeli political efforts occurred during late-1961 when Eugen Sänger and his wife succumbed to pressure by the West German government and resigned their positions at Factory 333 and returned home. Although the Sängers' departure did have an effect upon the program, a significant amount of work had already been completed on at least two missiles.

Al-Kahir and al-Zafir

During early-1962, Egypt's first missiles entered the prototype test phase and on 21 July Egypt announced that it had successfully test fired four missiles, which had struck their targets several hundred miles away. Two of the missiles launched were identified as the al-Zafir (Victory), which had a range of approximately 370 km. The other two were identified as the al-Kahir (Conqueror), which had a length of 12 m and a range of approximately 600 km. At the time of the announcement President Nasser made a point of stating that the missiles had the range to reach "...just south of Beirut...," a clear threat to Israel. Several days later, during the military parade marking the 10th anniversary of the overthrow of King Farouk, Egypt displayed its new missiles.[8]

Both the al-Zafir and al-Kahir were liquid fueled, probably utilizing kerosene and nitric acid.[9] Published estimates indicate that the al-Zafir and al-Kahir rocket motors produced between 60-80,000 and 80-90,000 pounds of thrust, respectively. Estimated warheads for both missiles were 500 kg of high explosives for the al-Zafir, and 700 kg for the al-Kahir.[10] Both missiles bore an external resemblance to the World War II German Elektromechanische Werke Wasserfall (Waterfall).[11] In fact, the launch stand for the 21 July launches appears to have been a copy of the Wasserfall launcher. Guidance was apparently rudimentary with control vanes being positioned in the exhaust flow. Production rates for the al-Zafir and al-Kahir are unknown, but believed to have been extremely low in 1962. It is estimated that by July 1962 there was a total of 3,000 people involved in the Egyptian missile programs. Of which only a small number were Germans.

The impact of President Nasser's statement that the new missiles were capable of reaching "...just south of Beirut..." and the revelations of their test firings had a dramatic effect upon Israel. By their own admission they panicked and as a direct result initiated development of their Jericho series of ballistic missiles and pursue a nuclear weapons program.[12] Ezer Weizmann would later state that,

"We started working on [the Jericho SSM] in 1962... We started when Abdul Nasser fired his Zafir... in July 1962. And we convened a meeting at 12 midnight. I was Air Force Commander, Shimon was Deputy Minister, and everyone got into a panic... [T]his helped develop the [Jericho] missile..." [13]

From this point on Israeli efforts to disrupt the Egyptian missile program dramatically increased in size and scope to include bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Although a few would remain in Egypt for some time, by 1964 the Israeli efforts had resulted in the mass exodus of German scientists and engineers. It is possible that the Israeli efforts were responsible for Karl Knupfer assuming responsibility for the guidance system development from Görcke during 1964.[14]

Al-Ra'id[15]

During April 1963 Egypt reportedly test fired two of its new missiles (presumably the al-Zafir). These tests are believed to have used the transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) designed specifically for them.[16] The implications of these tests (e.g., mobile missiles could be moved closer to the Israeli border and were more difficult to locate and destroy), raised the threat to Israel.

Three months later, during the military parade celebrating the 11th anniversary of the revolution, Egypt presented another surprise when it displayed four two-stage al-Ra'id (Pioneer) missiles. Egyptian officials described the al-Ra'id as a "space research rocket," however, most observers properly identified it as a surface-to-surface missile. Published sources estimate that the al-Ra'id could carry either a 1,800 kg high explosives warhead, or lift 900 kg into a relatively low earth orbit of approximately 482 km.[17] The range of the al-Ra'id in the surface-to-surface role was estimated to be approximately 1,000 km.[18] It was also reported at the time of the parade that the al-Ra'id has been successfully launched several times during May and June. Like the al-Zafir and al-Kahir, the al-Ra'id was liquid fueled, probably also utilizing kerosene and nitric acid. Egypt quickly announced that, by July 1964, it would launch a satellite designated the al-Najm (Star) into a low earth orbit utilizing the al-Ra'id, or a three-stage derivative, as a launch vehicle. The al-Najm was reported to be designed to explore the earth's electromagnetic field.[19]

Collapse of the Missile Program

Despite ambitious plans to produce 900 missiles (400 al-Zafir and 500 al-Kahir) by 1970 and outward appearances of great success and significant capabilities, Egypt's missile program was a distinct failure.[20] There were multiple reasons for this state of affairs. The primary technical reasons for this failure were the inability to both develop a reliable guidance system and manufacture reliable rocket engines.

These technical obstacles were directly related to the quality and skills of the foreign scientists and technicians, and the indigenous semi-skilled factory workers. The foreign scientists and technicians were primarily veterans of Germany's World War II missile program and had fallen far behind in the rapidly advancing field of rocket and missile design. In essence, the Egyptian missiles were World War II vintage designs, taking little, if any, advantage of post-war developments, simply because the scientists and technicians were not skilled in these areas. Additionally, the elitist attitudes of these scientists and technicians precluded the training of, or transfer of skills to, Egyptian personnel. This had a distinct effect upon the program as the foreign scientists and technicians rapidly left the program during 1963-65. This situation was exacerbated by the scarcity of qualified skilled and semi-skilled Egyptian factory workers. Thus, leading to production delays because of the inconsistent quality of production items, which significantly effected missile reliability. Compounded with this was the fact that a majority of the components required for missile production, especially within the areas of guidance and fuel systems, had to be imported covertly and at great expense.

The missile program's position was even more untenable given the severe monetary crisis then being experienced by Egypt. Thus the missile program was gradually and secretly phased out. For both propaganda and deception purposes, however, the missiles were still discussed publicly. Threats of the usage of these missiles would remain a cornerstone of anti-Israel Egyptian propaganda until the 1967 Six-Day War.[21]

By the time of the ballistic missile program was finally closed down during mid to late 1966, it is estimated that the Sakr Factory had produced approximately 100 al-Kahir and al-Zafir missiles. The vast majority of the Egyptian scientists, technicians and factory workers associated with the program were reassigned to different programs. Those missiles that had been constructed, along with all their associated manufacturing and testing equipment, were placed in storage with what would eventually become the Egyptian Armed Forces Technical Institute (AFTI). It currently appears that a very small group of Egyptian scientists continued the study of ballistic missiles until after the Six-Day War, however, this appears to have been primarily an academic effort.

The phasing out of the indigenous ballistic missile program did not mean, however, that Egypt was no longer interested in tactical ballistic missiles. Quite the contrary, during 1965, Egypt once again approached the Soviet Union requesting "...medium-range artillery rockets." Once again, it was the FROG-2 that was requested. Sometime during late-1965, Egyptian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Field Marshall Mohammed Abd el Hakim Amer traveled to Moscow. There, he was able secure Soviet approval for the acquisition of three brigades of FROG-2s sometime during mid-1967.[22] To prepare for their receipt a number of Egyptian artillery personnel were sent to the Soviet Union to undergo training.[23] Before the FROG-2s arrived in Egypt, however, the Six-Day War broke out and the delivery was delayed.

Renewed Interest, 1967-1973

During early-1967, President Nasser had become impatient with the status quo concerning Israel and had initiated a dramatic escalation in anti-Israel propaganda. In May, believing the inflated estimates of his Commander-in-Chief Field Marshall Amer, Nasser acquiesced to the massing of the Egyptian Army in Sinai, ordered United Nations (UN) observers out of the Sinai Peninsula, announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was now closed to all Israeli shipping and made repeated threats of war against Israel. This escalation crowned at the end of the month with a new Egyptian-Jordanian defense treaty, which placed the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces under Egyptian command. Realizing that war was inevitable, Israel launched a preemptive air strike against Egyptian airfields on the morning of 5 June 1967. Shortly thereafter, Israeli ground forces launched a offensive against Egyptian forces massed against it in the Sinai Peninsula. Later in the day the Israeli Air Force also conducted a series of crippling air strikes against Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi airfields. By the end of the day Israel had destroyed the combat effectiveness of all the major Arab air forces and had penetrated into the Sinai. Within four days Israeli troops reached the Suez Canal. This was accompanied by equally successful attacks against Jordan (e.g., the "West Bank") and Syria (e.g., the Golan Heights). The Six-Day War ended on June 10 when a UN negotiated cease-fire took effect.

Egypt's al-Zafir and al-Kahir missiles, which had become an integral part of Revolution Day military parades each year and the basis for many threats against Israel, played no part in the Six-Day War.[24] Within Egypt the failure to employ either the al-Zafir or al-Kahir was scandalous. Years later the Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly, would look back and describe this situation,

"The non-appearance of Egypt's much-heralded secret weapon, the Al Kahir missile, is a sordid tale, I regret to say. Al Kahir had been part of Egyptian folklore since word first leaked in the early 1960's that Egypt had its own short-range ballistic missile made in Egypt with the help of foreign technicians. Its range was said to be just over 100 miles. The authorities seemed pleased by the leak. Al Kahir missiles, trundling past on their long trucks, became an integral part of every military parade before 1967. When we lost in 1967, of course, the questions started: "Where was Al Kahir?" No answers came.

Even as general in the armed forces, I knew nothing about the weapon. But as Chief of Staff it became my responsibility to know. The responses to my initial inquires so appalled me that I decided to uncover the full story. I do not propose, here, to go into the shameful details—the wasted millions, the secret suspension of work, the deception thereafter by authorities afraid to admit the truth-though the Egyptian people must one day be told. I deal only with what confronted me. The missile had been written off, its technicians dispersed. The handful that had been constructed were in storage."[25]

The humiliating defeat of the war led not only to a complete reorganization of the military, but also to the reevaluation of all military programs. Although repeated failures and gross mismanagement of the indigenous ballistic missile program had resulted in its secret cancellation a small number of Egyptian scientists were apparently still involved in theoretical missile research. With the defeat in the Six Day War even these few personnel were apparently reassigned to other programs and all ballistic missile development—practical and theoretical—was halted.[26]

Immediately following its June 1967 defeat, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union not only for massive conventional military assistance, but for artillery rockets and tactical ballistic missiles also. During his April 1968 trip to the Soviet Union, President Nasser apparently succeeded in re-negotiating the 1965 agreement for the delivery of FROG-2s. The new agreement now called for the Soviet Union to provide Egypt with a brigade of 12 longer ranged R-65 Luna M TELs, known in the West as the FROG-7A. These systems were subsequently delivered during 1970 as part of a $650 million arms agreement with the Soviet Union.[27]

In the years following the Six Day War the cancelled al-Kahir and al-Zafir were still occasionally referred to by the Egyptian authorities for both internal and external propaganda and deception purposes. Apparently this deception was partially successful in reawakening Israeli concerns, for during the subsequent "War of Attrition" the Israeli Air Force, on several occasions, attacked the Egyptian missile manufacturing facilities at Heliopolis.[28]

The October 1973 War

Prelude to War

During the early 1970s, detailed plans were formulated for a new war against Israel and the recapture of the Sinai Peninsula. In order to provide his army with all possible firepower Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly, ordered that the al-Zafir and al-Kahir missiles be taken out of storage and test fired. The initial test launches occurred on 23 September 1971. The results were disappointing, with both missiles proving to be quite primitive. The al-Kahir's range and direction could be controlled only by the elevation and azimuth of its launching rail (it was now being fired as a large artillery rocket without the inertial guidance system originally developed for it). Its maximum usable range in this mode was approximately 8 km (as opposed to its publicly reported range of 600 km)! Its accuracy was equally appalling. Even with successive firings on the same elevation and azimuth, it exhibited a CEP of 1,600 meters at 8 km! Its only merit was the destructiveness of its warhead. The resulting impact craters were impressive. In normal soil, they were typically 27 meters wide and 10 meters deep. General Shazly would later state that "...apart from the destructive power of its warhead, al-Kahir was medieval." The al-Zafir had an even shorter range (as opposed to its publicly reported range of 370 km), and was only marginally more accurate than al-Kahir. Additionally, it had to be used with caution, since the AFTI had developed a TEL to fire four at once. Further tests of the al-Kahir and al-Zafir missiles were conducted in 1972 and 1973, with similar results.[29]

Even with these subsequent tests General Shazly was disappointed with the results, but felt that "...still anything was better than nothing," and ordered the deployment of both systems for the upcoming war, with some restrictions. These missiles could be employed against Israeli positions greater than 2.5 km from Egyptian lines and only during the initial artillery bombardment. Additionally, to maintain operational security Shazly ordered that both systems be renamed. The al-Zafir became the al-Zeitun (Olive), and the al-Kahir became the al-Tin (Fig).[30]

Concurrent with the efforts to resurrect the al-Kahir and al-Zafir, Egypt sought to expand its missile capabilities. This was done with the belief that an expanded missile force, especially if it had the capability to strike at Israeli populated areas, would act as a strategic deterrent, and would prevent another disaster like 1967. Additionally, it was believed that it would assist in redressing the imbalance of Israeli Air Force supremacy.[31] As noted above, efforts in this area had begun during 1968 when Egypt obtained the FROG-7A. Egypt subsequently requested the more modern and longer ranged R-17E, known in the West as the Scud B, but was refused. The Soviet Union refused because the Scud B would provide Egypt the capability of striking at Tel Aviv from west of the Suez Canal, and would be interpreted as a gross escalation of the Middle East arms race.

During May 1972, as part of Egypt's efforts to mobilize Arab military power and to acquire advanced weapons for its upcoming war with Israel, General Shazly traveled to Iraq.[32] Here he requested Hawker Hunter attack aircraft and Scud missiles. Although no evidence has become available to support President Husayn's later claims that Iraqi Scuds were delivered to Egypt during 1973, one Hawker Hunter squadron did arrive during March 1973.[33]

During March 1973, the Soviet Union reversed its position and agreed to provide Egypt with the equipment and training required to deploy two Scud B brigades of 12 TELs each as well as an additional 150 FROG-7As. With the arrival of the Scud TELs also came a small number of Soviet advisors and technicians to assist in the formation of the 65th Artillery Brigade (Scud B). These were soon supplemented, during July and August, by an additional 63 Soviet advisors. By August, progress in the formation of the 65th Artillery Brigade had advanced to point where it was able to participate in an army wide operational exercise.[34] The arrival of the Scuds is believed to have been one of the final factors supporting President Sadat's decision to go to war in October.[35]

Wartime Operations

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian rocket and missile forces consisted of the 64th Artillery Brigade, 65th Artillery Brigade and two composite al-Tin/al-Zeitun batteries.

The 64th Artillery Brigade had 12 FROG-7A TELs and was organized into three battalions of 4 TELs each.[36] The 65th Artillery Brigade, which was in the process of forming, had only 9 Scud B TELs and was organized into two battalions.[37] Although the Soviets had agreed to provide Egypt with enough equipment and training to deploy two Scud B brigades, of 12 TELs each, only 9 TELs had arrived by October 1973.[38] To arm these 9 TELs the Soviets are believed to have provided approximately 18 Scud B missiles.
The FROG-7A and al-Zeitun batteries began their forward deployment, to firing positions along the Suez Canal, on the evening of 3-4 October and continued during the next two nights. The forward deployment of the al-Tin launchers, however, presented problems. Due to their large size, and the Egyptian claims that it could strike Tel Aviv, any forward deployment detected by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft would have resulted in a full-scale alert. To prevent such an occurrence, the al-Tin launchers were only moved up to their firing positions on the night of 5-6 October. Since the 65th Artillery Brigade was to be held back as a strategic deterrent, and because it was not yet fully operational, it remained deployed in concealed positions around Cairo. Thus by 0600 hrs. on 6 October all FROG-7A, al-Zeitun, and al-Tin launchers were emplaced in forward pre-surveyed and camouflaged firing positions.[39] The Director of Artillery, Major General Mahi then reported the complete readiness of all artillery and surface-to-surface rocket and missile forces to Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General Ahmed Ismail Ali.

At 1405 hrs. on 6 October 1973, General Ismail issued the code word to begin the artillery and rocket preparation and Major General Mahi gave the order to commence firing.[40] The exact numbers of al-Tin, al-Zeitun, and FROG-7As fired during the first days of the war is presently unknown. It is believed, however, that by midnight of 7 October the complete supply of approximately 100 al-Tin and al-Zeitun rockets was expended, and the two composite al-Tin/al-Zeitun batteries withdrawn. By midnight of 7 October, the 64th Artillery Brigade is believed to have fired approximately 60-70 FROG-7As. These were launched with an initial surge during the first few hours of the war at all assigned targets, and then selected targets were struck again at irregular intervals for harassment and an attempt to complete destruction of the target. Minutes after the start of the war, Israeli Major General Shmuel Gonen, officer in command of South Command, and key members of his staff flew in several helicopters to the Sinai. Upon reaching Gebel Umm Khisheid airfield he discovered it was under heavy attack by Egyptian aircraft and FROG-7As. Gonen then flew to the northernmost of the Bar Lev Line command posts, MARTEF, south of Baluza, and then to the larger installation near Romani. At Romani, he found that it too had been hit by FROG-7As. Shortly after dark he was able to fly back to Gebel Umm Khisheid, which had only sustained minor damaged due to the Egyptian bombardment. The significance of this adventure was not the damage caused by FROG-7As at either Gebel Umm Khisheid or Romani, but the fact that the commander of all Israeli forces in Sinai had to spend the first 6-8 hours of the war flying around in a helicopter because his main headquarters was being suppressed by air strikes and FROG-7A strikes. Although he maintained close radio contact with his subordinates and GHQ, he was unable to get a clear picture of the battle during these critical hours.[41]

Despite the large numbers of rockets fired during 6 October, the effectiveness and physical damage caused was not overly significant. The performance of al-Tin and al-Zeitun was predictably disappointing.[42] In fact, there is no record of a successful hit on an Israeli fortification by any of the approximately 100 of these rockets fired! The FROG-7As did achieve some limited success in suppressing, or damaging, Israeli targets. Two notable examples of this were the damage caused to the Israeli command post and ELINT/SIGINT site at Gebel Umm Khisheid, and the disruption of the Israeli chain-of-command.

Detailed information concerning Egyptian missile operations from October 7-13 is scarce. What can be pieced together indicates that the 64th Artillery Brigade continued to conduct FROG-7A harassment strikes against Israeli command posts and airfields. Egyptian sources indicate that they continued attacks in six areas: Romani and Baluza area; Tasa, Gebel Umm Margam, the airbases at Bir Gifgafa, the ELINT/SIGINT site at Gebel Umm Khisheid, and the Mitla Pass.[43] Israeli sources tend to support these Egyptian claims. For example, on 7 October, at least 3 FROG-7As were launched against the Israeli command post and ELINT/SIGINT site at Gebel Umm Khisheid, apparently at irregular intervals.[44] During 12-13 October, a number of FROG-7As were launched against the Israel facilities in the Tasa area including the headquarters of Major General Ariel Sharon's 143 Armored Division.[45] Years later Israeli sources still recalled with concern the Egyptian FROG-7A strikes upon the Bir Gifgafa airfields during this early period of the war.[46]

On 14 October the Egyptian Army launched a front wide offensive with the objectives of seizing the western approaches to the Mitla and Giddi Passes, expanding the depth of their bridgehead; and providing some strategic relief for their Syrian allies fighting on the Golan Heights. In support of this offensive the 64th Artillery Brigade appears to have fired at Israeli command and control facilities in five areas: Romani; Tasa, Gebel Umm Margam, ELINT/SIGINT site at Gebel Umm Khisheid, and the Mitla Pass.[47] These FROG-7A attacks are believed to have been ineffective as little, if any, mention is made of them in Israeli sources and the Egyptian offensive was decisively defeated.

During the night of 15-16 October the Israelis successfully conducted a counter-crossing of the Suez Canal, sending raiding columns into the Egyptian rear, while establishing a bridgehead. On 17 October, Major General Mahi ordered the Second and Third Army artillery commanders to assign the Israeli bridgehead their highest priority. Additionally, he ordered that the 64th Artillery Brigade also conduct FROG-7As attacks against the bridgehead and particularly the Israeli bridges.[48] The FROG-7A attacks began on the 18th and continued at a slow pace until the end of the war. At least two were launched against the bridges during the early morning hours of 23 October—both, however, missed.[49] Although the Egyptians claim to have hit the Israeli bridges with FROG-7As, there were no such direct hits.[50] There were, however, several near misses that did result in Israeli casualties. Reportedly, Israeli anti-aircraft artillery was able to shoot down, or detonate before impact, several of the FROG-7As heading towards the bridgehead.[51] As far as can presently be determined a majority of these FROG-7A attacks occurred during the hours of darkness. This was apparently done so as to afford the 64th's TELs some measure of protection from Israeli Air Force retaliation.

On 16 October, with Israeli forces rapidly expanding their bridgehead within Egyptian territory, President Anwar Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly. Therein he threatened to employ ballistic missiles against Israeli cities if they continued their penetration.

"Our Egyptian Sinai traversing Zafer [Victor] missiles are now on their pads ready to be launched by the single signal to the depth of Israel. We could, from the first minute of battle, have given the signal and issued the order... but we are aware of the responsibility of using specific types of weapons and we check ourselves by ourselves... though they should remember what I one day said and still say - eye for eye, tooth for tooth, depth for depth."[52]

Although Sadat stated that the missile to be employed for any such attack was the al-Zafir, it was, in fact, the Scud B.[53] President Sadat would never carry out his threat to attack Israeli cities. On 22 October, however, a few minutes before the UN cease-fire came into effect, he ordered the launch of three Scud B (R-17E) missiles at the Israeli bridges across the Suez Canal.[54]

"On October 22, just before the cease-fire came into effect, I went to the Ops. Room and ordered two ground-to-ground rockets fired at Deversoir. I wanted Israel to learn that such a weapon was indeed in our hands and that we could use it at a later stage of the war; even though Israel had in fact realized from the moment the war broke out that we meant and did what we said." [55]

On at least two separate occasions, General Shazly has expressed a distinctly different account of how and why the Scuds were fired,

"...on October 23 it was announced in Egypt that minutes before the cease-fire at 1900 hours the previous day, October 22, al-Kahir missiles had been launched at the enemy in the region of Deversoir. This was untrue. The three missiles we had fired were Soviet R-17Es, which the west knows as Scuds. It depressed me that, even then, our politicians not merely could not admit the truth, but were still trying to bolster lies with other lies." [56]

"...as for the Scuds we only fired three missiles - for political reasons, to satisfy Sadat's vanity - in the wrong time, on the wrong target." [57]

The 65th Artillery Brigade from its positions within the Cairo area conducted the Scud B launches. The Soviet instructors attached to the brigade carried out the actual aiming and launching of these Scuds. All three missiles failed to hit the Israeli bridges, and fell harmlessly in the desert.[58] In fact, the Israelis were only able to confirm the firings after they found a crater made by the Scuds.

Probably the most confusing aspect concerning the use of Scud Bs during the 1973 War occurred during October 24-25 when the U.S. armed forces were placed on a worldwide DEFCON 3 alert. This itself was in response to a Soviet threat to intervene militarily to save the Egyptian Third Army, which was then being surrounded by Israeli forces. In the midst of these events there were inconclusive U.S. intelligence reports that the Soviet Union was shipping nuclear warheads and additional Scud Bs to Egypt. In retrospect, there is no confirmed evidence to support this, and even the unconfirmed evidence is minimal.[59]

Post-War Assessment

Of the approximately 300 surface-to-surface missiles available to the Egyptians at the start of the war they launched approximately 200-220. The 1973 War witnessed the first combat use of the Soviet Scud B and the FROG-7A. It was also the first and only operational use of the indigenous Egyptian al-Tin and al-Zeitun missiles. While the al-Tin and al-Zeitun were distinct military failures, the FROG-7A enjoyed moderate military success. The Scud B can't be said to have been either a military success, or failure, in the war. It was, however, a distinct political success as far as President Sadat was concerned. It provided him with a viable means of threatening Israel and drew the world's attention to the Arab-Israeli situation.

The Egyptian post-war military assessment of their use of surface-to-surface missiles was that while they succeeded in causing only minor physical damage, they were successful in causing a disruption of Israeli command and control during the first critical hours of the war.[60] They further believed that ballistic missiles would play an increasingly significant role in any future conflict, at both the tactical and strategic levels.[61] The Egyptians appear to have had no reservations concerning their operational deployment, which ran counter to Soviet doctrine. They understood the dangers and correctly believed that the benefits of an extremely forward deployment far outweighed the risks.

Rebirth of the Ballistic Missile Effort, 1974 - Present

During the months immediately following the war the Soviet Union provided significant quantities of replacement arms and ammunition to re-equip of the Egyptian armed forces. Included were additional FROG-7A and Scud B TELs, bringing the totals to approximately 18 and 24 respectively.[62]

During 1974, however, these arms deliveries quickly slowed as President Sadat displayed a willingness to pursue a pro-West attitude to the resolution to the Arab-Israeli problem, as opposed to a Soviet solution. This reduction in arms and spare parts deliveries led to open Egyptian criticism of the Soviet Union, which in turn resulted in a further decline in Egyptian-Soviet relations. Throughout 1975 the Soviet Union maintained its refusal to provide adequate supplies of critically needed spare parts (e.g., MiG-21 engines). During an interview that year, Egyptian Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant General Mohammed Ali Fahmy stressed the increasing tactical and strategic importance of ballistic missiles on the modern battlefield and confirmed that Egypt was committed to a multiple source policy on future weapons procurement. Egypt would never again be dependent upon a single source of supply. Additionally, the acquisition of Western technology was now to be actively pursued.

To achieve these objectives, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) was established that year with its headquarters in Cairo.[63] The AOI is a multinational activity formed by the Government of Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to obtain Western technology and establish an industrial base within the Arab world to produce modern weapons.[64] Egypt provided the industrial facilities and the majority of the personnel, while the GCC provided the financial backing. Among the facilities utilized to form AOI were those which had been involved with the 1960s German-assisted missile and aircraft programs, including: the Sakr Factory for Developed Industries, Aircraft Factory 36, Aircraft Engine Factory 135, and the Kader Factory for Developed Industries.[65] The AOI, although nominally a multinational corporation, was actually subordinated to the office of the Egyptian Minister of Defense and Defense Production, through the Ministry of State for Military Production.

Since it would take several years for the AOI to fulfill Egypt's requirements for critically needed spare parts and replacement weapons, it sought the immediate assistance of the PRC and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both countries responded favorably and within a year spare parts and replacement weapons began to arrive.[66] On 14 March 1976, Egypt unilaterally abrogated the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on the grounds that the Soviets had failed their obligations by not providing spare parts. The following month Egypt signed military agreements with both the PRC and DPRK, thus formalizing the supply of spare parts and replacement weapons.

In a historic move, on 28 March 1979, President Sadat and President Begin signed a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in Washington D.C., thus ending the state of war that had existed between the two countries since 1948. By the end of the following month all Arab countries except Sudan, Oman and Somalia had severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. Additionally, the GCC withdrew from the AOI. President Anwar al-Sadat's decision to sign the peace treaty was also unpopular among a number of radical factions within Egypt itself, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood, and on 6 October 1981, he was assassinated. President Sadat was succeeded by his Vice-President Hosni Mubarak.

During late-1980, Iraq invaded Iran, thus beginning an eight-year-long war. Because of their fear of radical Islamic fundamentalism as expressed in Iran, a majority of the Arab countries, including Egypt, sided with Iraq. Because of the AOI's military production capabilities, Egyptian cooperation with Iraq was close from the beginning of the Iran-Iraq conflict.[67] As a result of Egypt's vigorous support for Iraq, and President Mubarak's political efforts, the GCC decided to reactivate the AOI, during late-1982.[68] Three years later, in June 1985, a cooperation agreement was signed between Egypt and Iraq. Egyptian military-industrial cooperation with the GCC, as well as AOI cooperation with Western countries, increased significantly from late-1987 onwards.[69]

New Missile Programs

It was against the above background that Egypt, during the mid-to-late-1970s, initiated a modest program to maintain and upgrade its inventory of FROG-7A and Scud B missile systems. This program appears to have been limited to maintaining systems operability by replacing Soviet parts with indigenously produced, or foreign purchased, components. By the early 1980s this modest program had evolved into a program to develop a product-improved Scud and had been supplemented by at least three additional programs:

--Sakr-80
--RS-120
--Condor II/Vector.

Because these programs overlap in time frame, resources and personnel it is often difficult to distinguish exactly what was occurring in a specific program at a particular time, or if a particular effort was intended to benefit a specific program. More often then not, it appears that efforts were directed to benefit the overall goal of fostering an indigenous missile development within Egypt.

Sakr-80[70]

During the early 1980s, the Sakr-80 program was undertaken in response to a request by the Egyptian Army for a FROG-7A replacement. Additionally, it was hoped that the Sakr-80 (Eagle 80) would attract interest in a number of countries that also employed the FROG-7A, or who were interested in an inexpensive long-range area suppression weapon (e.g., a "poor-man's" MLRS).

Primary contractor and systems integrator for this program was the Sakr Factory for Developed Industries. The Abu Zaabal Company for Specialty Chemicals was responsible for the rocket motor and propellant. During 1983, Sakr was able to secure the services of the French company, Societe Nationale des Poudrers et Explosifs - Division Chimie Expansion (SNPE-CE) to assist it in a number of its programs. This collaboration is believed to have centered upon two programs. The development the Sakr-30 artillery rocket, a longer ranged version of the Sakr-18, and the Sakr-80, a replacement for the Soviet-supplied FROG-7A rocket. SNPE-CE's primary responsibility was to provide experience and technology in designing and developing the propulsion sub-assemblies (especially the propellant grains and ignition trains). Sakr was responsible for the airframe, warhead, guidance, fire-control, launchers and system integration. Provision was also made for the transfer of technology from SNPE-CE to the Egyptian company of Abu Zaabal Company for Specialty Chemicals. Sakr and SNPE-CE jointly shared the Sakr-80 research and development costs, which were reported in 1988 to have totaled approximately $100 million. Egypt, however, retained all rights to the Sakr-80.

Development proceeded well and during the 1987 Cairo Defense Exhibition it was announced that the Sakr-80 firing trials were well under way. These tests confirmed the validity of the Sakr-80 and its ability to serve as an enhanced FROG-7A replacement. Sakr has stated that it could begin mass production of the missile within a year of a procurement contract being signed. No procurement orders, however, are known to have been received and the program was suspended.

The Sakr-80 is a spin-stabilized ballistic missile, which is 310 mm in diameter, 6.5 m in length, and has a total weight of 660 kg of which 200 kg warhead. Its maximum velocity is 1,200 m/s and time of flight to the maximum range of 80 km is 160 seconds. The maximum altitude, which depends on the launch angle, is 29,000 m. Three warheads were developed, High-explosive, anti-personnel/anti-vehicle cluster (950 bomblets), and anti-tank cluster (65 anti-tank minelets). Publicly, Sakr has stated that no chemical munitions were planned. The Sakr-80 can be launched from the existing FROG-7A launcher, or from two new Egyptian platforms. These new TELs are a 8x8 ZIL-135 truck, carrying three missiles on their launch rails; and a T-54 tank chassis carrying four missiles in launch-containers. Neither of these TELs is known to have proceeded beyond the design stage.

RS-120[71]

Very little is presently known concerning the Egyptian RS-120 missile program. Sometime during 1986-1987, Egypt approached the CONSEN Group firm of IFAT seeking assistance in a program known as RS-120. The initial goal of this program was to develop a missile with a range of 120 km. There are, however, indications that the ultimate goal was the development of a much longer-ranged missile. This, however, remains to be confirmed.

IFAT contracted with the German firm of Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) to provide Egypt with technical assistance and equipment. So as to not violate West German export regulations, MBB agreed to undertake only part of the work. The balance was contracted out to the Italian firm of SNIA, a subsidiary of the Fiat Corporation.[72] By December 1987, growing international concerns over ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East (especially the Argentina-Egypt-Iraq Condor II program) resulted in West German security authorities advising MBB to discontinue their involvement in the RS-120 program. This was accompanied by concerns that the U.S. might "blacklist" the company if it continued its involvement. As a result, during early 1988, MBB withdrew from RS-120 program.

The ultimate fate of the RS-120 program is unknown. It probably continued for a short while after the withdrawal of MBB. Also unknown is the extent of SNIA's involvement, and any accomplishments that the program may have achieved.

Condor II (a.k.a., Vector or Delta)[73]

During the 1980s Egypt became involved in a program to produce a 800-1,000 km range ballistic missile in cooperation with Argentina, the CONSEN Group, and Iraq. This missile is known in Argentina as Condor II, in Egypt as Vector and in Iraq as Badr-2000.[74] To ease readability the more popular name Condor II will be used. Egypt's efforts to acquire a 1,000 km range ballistic missile are believed to have been prompted by several factors,

Egypt's long-term desire to acquire a ballistic missile for both political prestige and practical military use (e.g., the Scud B lacks sufficient range to reach many targets in Israel or Libya).

  • Egypt's realization, in light of the 1973 War, that ballistic missiles would play an important part in any future Middle East war.
  • Israel's deployment of its nuclear capable Jericho II missile, with a reported range of 1,000-1,500 km.
  • Libya's continued efforts to both acquire ballistic missiles and develop an indigenous capability to produce them.
The Condor II is a direct descendant of an earlier Argentine program known as the Condor I. Which was begun by the Argentine Air Force during 1977-78 as a sounding rocket. Argentina realized that such an endeavor was beyond it's limited indigenous capabilities, so the assistance of MBB was secured. This assistance, which was funneled in part through a newly established industrial concern known as the CONSEN Group, successfully developed the Condor I sounding rocket.[75] The Italian firm of SNIA-BPD was also involved in the program, providing quantities of solid rocket fuel.[76] The Condor I was a single-stage, solid-fuel, sounding rocket capable of lifting a 400 kg payload to an altitude of 70,000m. Although the Condor I program was publicly described as being for non-military applications, its military utility was obvious. Argentine Air Force Chief-of-Staff Brigadier Jose Antonio Julia stated that,

"...the idea to manufacture the Condor came about in 1977-78 when the Air Force decided to develop the technology for a missile that would carry loads for a given distance. The idea to place satellites into orbit, but with a change in the trajectory and the load, the missile could carry anything."[77]

The Condor I program hadn't reached its test stage when, in late-1982, the decision was made to produce an even more capable system, known as the Condor II. Although it was publicly described as a space-launch vehicle, it was clearly a ballistic missile. The impetus for the program was the Argentine defeat in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Following that defeat a requirement was established for a ballistic missile capable of striking the islands. The Condor II was designed as a two-stage, solid-propellant missile having a range of 800-1,000 km, with a payload of approximately 500 kg, and would be carried by a wheeled TEL. The same engineers that were working on the Condor I began work on the Condor II. To expedite development, CONSEN also arranged for a number of well established European firms to provide key components for the Condor II program including,[78]

  • MAN of West Germany: the wheeled TEL.
  • MBB of West Germany: guidance systems and general missile technology.
  • Sagem of France: the inertial navigation systems.
  • SNIA-BPD of Italy: rocket motors and solid fuel technology.
  • Additional Condor contractors reportedly included the Swedish firm Bofors and the West German firm Wegmann.

As world concerns regarding the transfer of ballistic missile technology to Third World nations continued to grow, the role of the CONSEN Group became even more critical. Performing pivotal roles not only in Condor II, but in the Egypt and Iraqi participation in the program, and in Iraq's missile, chemical and nuclear programs.[79]

At this time Egypt's interests in developing a ballistic missile coincided with those of Argentina. During late-1982 or early-1983, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries calling for cooperation in the development of the Condor II. This relationship was formalized on 15 February 1984, when the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, through the offices of Ballistic Missile Egypt (BME) signed an agreement with IFAT for the joint development of the Condor II. By the end of 1984, Egypt, Argentina, Iraq and the CONSEN Group had entered into additional agreements that solidified Iraqi funding for the program.[80] Egypt's primary contribution would be technical expertise. On 9 April 1985, Argentina's National Executive Branch issued decree #604/85 approving the Condor I and Condor II programs as part of the Air Force's expansion program, and validating the contracts with Egypt, Iraq and the CONSEN Group (i.e., IFAT, Desintec, etc.).[81]

The initial plans are believed to have called for Argentina to complete the construction and testing of 10 missile. Five of these were to be delivered to the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and five delivered to Iraq. One source estimates that, eventually, each of the three countries would procure 200 missiles.[82] Both the Egyptians and Iraqis anticipated that they would then begin production of additional Condor II missiles in their respective countries by the end of the 1980s. Additionally, each would construct their own Condor II production and test facilities based upon those in Argentina. These facilities would be essentially identical, being produced from the same plans prepared by CONSEN Group. In Egypt the construction of Condor II facilities was known by the code name DOS, in Iraq they were known as DOT, and in Argentina they were called DAT.[83] The Egyptian DOS facilities are believed to have included a missile fuel and test facilities at Abu Zaabal, northeast of Cairo, and a missile production facility at Helwan (believed to be designated Factory 17).[84] The Abu Zaabal Company for Specialty Chemicals was probably responsible for the missile fuel facility, while the Sakr Factory for Developed Industries was responsible for systems integration, missile production and testing.

The two CONSEN Group companies most heavily involved with Egypt's participation in Condor II were the IFAT Corp., ltd., located in Zug, Switzerland (responsible for the financial aspects) and CONSEN S.A.M., located in Monaco (responsible for contracting). With other CONSEN Group companies (e.g., Transtecno, Delta Consult, etc.) playing smaller roles.[85]

Egypt's Condor II program was controlled through BME, which was under the direct control of Defense Minister Field Marshal Ghazala. BME was in turn headed by General Abdel El-Gohary, a member of Defense Minister Ghazala's staff. The chief engineer for the program was Colonel Fuad al-Gamal. To coordinate the development of the Condor II program with IFAT and CONSEN, Colonel Ahmed Hussam El-din Yossef Khairat was selected to established an office in Salzburg, Austria. This office was co-located with those of IFAT and CONSEN.[86]

It was Colonel Khairat, through the services of Abdel Kader Helmy, a naturalized U.S. citizen, who conducted an ambitious program to acquire a missile related technology and components in the U.S.; not only to support the Condor II program, but also Egypt's other missile programs (i.e., the Scud B program known to Helmy as "Scud B-100"). Between 1983 and 1988, Helmy and his co-conspiritors either exported, or intended to export, a large variety of U.S. missile related technology and components;

Due to a remarkable lack of operational security and inexperience, the majority of these efforts failed. In June 1988 Helmy and a number of his co-conspiritors were arrested.[87] The broad scope and quantity of the items desired is considerable, serves as an indicator of the slow progress being made with the Condor II program and Egyptian missile development in general. The loss of the U.S. conduit for missile related technology and components was a staggering blow to the Egyptian Condor II program, as is indicated by a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimate,

"...The progress [within the Condor II program] has been slow due in part to the lack of indigenous technology and the need to covertly acquire the technology/materials used in the production of ballistic missiles abroad. ...without the activities of Dr. Helmy, and his co-conspirators, in procuring restricted technology, completion of the Condor [II] missile program is doubtful." [88]

By mid-1988, as a direct result of the considerable U.S. political pressure, arising from the arrest of Helmy and his co-conspiritors, Egypt officially withdrew from the Condor II program.[89] This was marked by the contract between the Egyptian Ministry of Defense (i.e., BME) and IFAT being formally canceled on 11 July 1988.

This Egyptian withdrawal was accompanied by Iraq withdrawing its financial support for the program. There appears to have been a long standing Iraqi concern with Egypt's technical capabilities and management practices. Iraq apparently believed that, in numerous instances it was being charged twice for development work on Condor II. First, by contract European engineers and scientists, and second by Egypt. Additionally, workmanship at the DOS Condor II facilities in Egypt is believed to have been significantly inferior to that in Iraq, and there was concern that an explosion of missile fuel would occur at the Abu Zaabal facility.[90] These Iraqi concerns came to a head during 1988, with the arrest of Helmy.

A direct result of the collapse of the Condor II program was the reorganization of the Egyptian component of the program. This witnessed the sideways promotion of its principal backer, the former defense minister, Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala in April 1989 and the replacement of a number of key personnel.[91] In mid-1989, the program was believed to headed by a General Mustafa, assisted by a Dr. Toufik, while a Col. Essam Ayoub was responsible for the DOS construction program.[92] It is currently believed that sometime during 1989-90, Egypt re-examined the status of its various missile programs and made the decision to cancel all internal development of the Condor II program.[93] The resources that were allocated to the Condor II program were probably then redistributed to the Scud B program, which was being pursued with DPRK assistance.[94] It is conceivable that the Condor II production facilities at Helwan and the fuel fabrication facility at Abu Zaabal, which were never completed, have been reassigned to the Scud B program.

The final casualty of the Condor II program was the CONSEN Group itself. As a result of the negative publicity it received, the CONSEN Group suffered a financial disaster. By the end of 1990, the CONSEN Corp. and IFAT Corp., ltd. (both located in Zug, Switzerland), and Delta Consult and Delta System (both in Salzburg, Austria) had been liquidated. The remaining companies were either on the verge of liquidation or had been restructured and were attempting to acquire new businesses in the civilian engineering market.[95]

Scud B (a.k.a., Scud B-100 or PROJECT T)

During the past twenty-five years, Egypt has clearly demonstrated an unwavering commitment to the acquisition of both Scud B and Scud B related technologies. The catalyst for Egypt's Scud B program is believed to have been the political decision by the Soviet Union to refuse the delivery of spare parts to the Egyptian Armed Forces during the mid-1970s. The initial program is believed to have been limited to developing the capability to maintain the FROG-7A and Scud B systems in the Egyptian inventory. In order to accomplish this Egypt apparently began replacing, on a selective basis, Soviet parts with indigenously produced, or foreign purchased, components. This program is believed to have been managed primarily by the Sakr Factory for Developed Industries.

During the late 1970s Egypt is believed to have made the decision to expand beyond the simple maintenance stage and into the development of product-improved versions of both the FROG-7A and Scud B. To this end, Egypt approached the PRC and DPRK seeking cooperation and assistance. Since neither country operated the Scud B, or a missile in its class, they were unable to directly assist Egypt with this request. The DPRK, however, did provide a viable alternative.

Concurrent with these events in Egypt, the DPRK had approached the PRC seeking the acquisition of a 600 km missile eventually designated the DF-61. Due to political problems within the PRC the DF-61 was canceled during 1978.[96] With the cancellation of the DF-61 the DPRK came to the conclusion that best course of action was to produce its own ballistic missile. The most efficient and economical way to achieve this was to reverse engineer the Scud B as an interim step to the future production of an indigenously designed tactical ballistic missile with greater range and accuracy. It was at this point that the ballistic missile interests of both the DPRK and Egypt coincided, and the two countries are believed to have agreed to the exchange of missile information and technicians sometime during 1979-80. More significantly, during the early 1980s (tentatively fixed at 1981) Egypt, in violation of its agreement with the Soviet Union, transferred a small number of Scud B missiles to the DPRK. That year, on 21 August 1981 the Egyptian and DPRK Governments signed an agreement in P'yongyang covering cooperation in, and exchange of, scientific technology between the two countries for 1981-1983.[97] It is believed that portions of this agreement covered missile technology. To complement the Egyptian delivery the DPRK apparently requested, and received, PRC technical assistance in the areas of rocket engine design/production, metallurgy, and airframe technology.

With the transfer of Scud B missiles, and the decision to cooperate with Egypt, the DPRK reorganized its indigenous missile efforts into a multifaceted research and development program. The goal of which was to produce both reversed engineered and extended range variants of the Scud B; known as the Hwasong 5 (Scud B) and the Hwasong 6 (Scud C), respectively. It is believed that in return for the transfer of the Scud B missiles Egypt would be allowed wide access to both the DPRK the Hwasong 5 program and technology. Despite an ambitious start, the DPRK's Hwasong 5 program proceeded slowly due to both technical difficulties and the DPRK's severe budgetary crisis.

With the Hwasong 5's attainment of production status during 1987, published reports began to surface that the DPRK was assisting Egypt with an improved Scud B program.[98] These accounts were followed by additional reports during 1988 and 1989 that the DPRK was directly involved in assisting with the establishment of an improved Scud production facility within Egypt.[99] The extent to which these reports are correct is presently unknown. It is currently believed that the DPRK provided Egypt with liberal access to its Hwasong 5 program, including the technical documentation and engineering drawings for the missiles. During May of 1991, U.S. intelligence officials reported that Egypt was negotiating with the DPRK to purchase the Hwasong 6.[100] This was followed in September 1991 by Israeli reports that "...Egypt soon will start local production of enhanced Scud-C [i.e., Hwasong 6] missiles..."[101]

Although the DPRK may have occupied a leading role in Egypt's improved Scud B program, it was by no means the only player. Egypt has pursued the acquisition of technology for its improved Scud B program through a number of other countries, including the U.K. and U.S. During the mid-1980s, Egypt conducted an ambitious covert program to acquire missile related technology and components in the U.S. to support the Condor II program (see below). These operations were coordinated through Abdel Kader Helmy, a naturalized U.S. citizen. Included among the items Helmy and his co-conspirators either exported or intended to export were a number specifically related to the Scud B program (identified by Helmy as the "...Scud B-100...")[102] The extent to which these acquisitions have assisted the Scud B program is presently unknown.

Additionally, during the first week of June 1990, the PRC and Egypt are reported to have concluded an agreement, which called for the PRC to update Egypt's Sakr Factory for Developed Industries to allow it to produce "...newer versions of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, the surface-to-surface Scud B and Silkworm..."[103] During late-1991 the U.K. Government brought pressure on British Aerospace (BAe) to halt the production of Scud components by Arab British Dynamics (ABD). ABD is an AOI company located in Heliopolis, Egypt, of which BAe owns 30%. During early 1991, it was discovered that ABD was planning to produce Scud components for the Egyptian Armed Forces. BAe was pressured into negotiating an end to ABD's production plans. As of early 1992, the Egyptian Government had resisted these actions.[104]

In August 2003, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan, chief of Egypt's air defense command, revealed the recent deployment of an unidentified surface-to-air missile capable of "instant detection and response to enemy air strikes."  The U.S. Department of Defense awarded contracts in 2003 and 2004 for missile procurement by Egypt of 25 Harpoons and 414 AIM-9M-2s.

The current status of ballistic missile development in Egypt is obscure. To date there is no confirmed evidence that Egypt has either commenced production an improved Scud B based upon DPRK technology, or purchased complete Hwasong 5/6s. It is believed that during the early 1990s Egypt gained access to the DPRK's 1,300 km Nodong program, however there is no confirmed evidence that it has acquired complete Nodong missiles. While the ballistic missile related cooperation between Egypt and the DPRK was, no doubt, significant, and was unquestionably beneficial to both countries, it apparently decreased dramatically during the late 1990s and early 2000s. This decline has apparently been precipitated by considerable political pressure by the U.S. and its allies and economic and the geopolitical pressures (especially Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the war on terrorism, etc.) in the region. Regardless, the Egyptian ballistic missile development program apparently continues, however, primarily as an Air Force sponsored research program rather than a production development program. Should, however, there be a dramatic change in its political climate and financial resources Egypt possesses the technological and personnel resources to produce a Scud B/C, or possibly Nodong, equivalent missile.

Developments in Egypt’s missile program over the 2005-07 period relate primarily to the upgrade and expansion of Egypt’s air-defense system. Throughout this period, Egypt cooperated closely with the United States in order to acquire new technologies for its air defense-system. In June 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense approved the sale of 25 Avenger air-defense missile launchers to Egypt. [Note: The Avenger is an anti-cruise missile Pedestal Mounted Stinger system produced by the Boeing Aerospace Company.][113] The $50 million contract was signed in June 2006 with delivery scheduled to be completed by September 2008.[114] Egypt has also been working closely with Russia to improve its space satellite capabilities. This cooperation led to the successful launch of Egypt’s MisrSat-1 satellite into orbit by Russia in April 2007. The MisrSat-1 is reportedly intended for remote sensing of Earth and scientific research.[115]

Developments in Egypt’s missile program over the 2005-07 period relate primarily to the upgrade and expansion of Egypt’s air-defense system. Throughout this period, Egypt cooperated closely with the United States in order to acquire new technologies for its air defense-system. In June 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense approved the sale of 25 Avenger air-defense missile launchers to Egypt. [Note: The Avenger is an anti-cruise missile Pedestal Mounted Stinger system produced by the Boeing Aerospace Company.] The $50 million contract was signed in June 2006 with delivery scheduled to be completed by September 2008. Egypt has also been working closely with Russia to improve its space satellite capabilities. This cooperation led to the successful launch of Egypt’s MisrSat-1 satellite into orbit by Russia in April 2007. The MisrSat-1 is reportedly intended for remote sensing of Earth and scientific research.

Developments in Egypt's missile program over the 2005-07 period relate primarily to the upgrade and expansion of Egypt's air-defense system. Throughout this period, Egypt cooperated closely with the United States in order to acquire new technologies for its air defense-system. In June 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense approved the sale of 25 Avenger air-defense missile launchers to Egypt. [Note: The Avenger is an anti-cruise missile Pedestal Mounted Stinger system produced by the Boeing Aerospace Company.][116] The $50 million contract was signed in June 2006 with delivery scheduled to be completed by September 2008.[117] Egypt has also been working closely with Russia to improve its space satellite capabilities. This cooperation led to the successful launch of Egypt's MisrSat-1 satellite into orbit by Russia in April 2007. The MisrSat-1 is reportedly intended for remote sensing of Earth and scientific research.[118]


[1] Ibid. During World War II Dr. Wilhem Voss was general director of both the Skoda arms factory in Czechoslovakia and the Hermann Goring Steel Mills.
[2] "500 From Europe Aid Cairo on Arms," p. 1; and El-Ad, Avri. Decline of Honor, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1976, p. 95 & 110. There is some suggestion that upon his arrival Voss found a small group of Germans who had previously traveled to Egypt and established a missile program. This, however, remains to be confirmed.
[3] Decline of Honor, p. 102.
[4] The UAR was a "marriage of convenience" which only lasted until September 1961 when it was dissolved. Egypt, however, retained the name United Arab Republic until 1971.
[5] Sänger is sometimes spelled Saenger.
[6] Bhargava, Gp. Capt. Kapil. "HA-300: Egypt's Cosmopolitan Status Symbol," Air Enthusiast, No. 11, 1979, p. 2.
[7] Fellows, Lawrence. "Israel Launches Research Rocket," New York Times, July 6, 1961, p. 1; "Israel's Rocketry Debut," Missiles and Rockets, July 10, 1961, p. 10; "Israel's Big Lift From Shavit II," Life, July 14, 1961, p. 51; "Winds of Change," Time, July 14, 1961, p. 26; "Made in Israel," Newsweek, July 17, 1961, pp. 52-53; and "A Missile Race in the Middle East," Missiles and Rockets, July 17, 1961, p. 58. The name Shavit II was a bit of Israeli psychological warfare, as there was no Shavit I—the "II" was utilized to keep the Arabs guessing.
[8] "Egypt Plans Satellite Launch Within Year," Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 9, 1963, pp. 32-33; "Egypt Fires Missiles; Claim Range of 360 mi.," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 30, 1962, p. 20; "Shots of the Week," Missiles and Rockets, July 30, 1962, p. 15; and Bit'on Heyl Ha'avir [Air Force Journal] as cited in The Middle East Record, Volume Three, 1967, The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1971, p. 206.
[9] "Egypt Plans Satellite Launch Within Year," p. 32.
[10] Bit'on Heyl Ha'avir, p. 206; and Frank, Lewis A. "Nasser's Missile Program," Orbis, Vol. XI, No. 3, Fall 1967, pp. 746-757.
[11] For a description of the Wasserfall, and other World War II German missiles, see: Smith, J.R. and Kay, Anthony. German Aircraft of the Second World War, Putnam, London, 1972, pp. 645-712.
[12] Cohen, Avner. Israel and the Bomb, Colombia University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 116-17 & 143-44; "U.A.R. Launchings Displease Israel," New York Times, July 23, 1962, p. 4; and "The Free Booters," New Republic, April 6, 1963, pp. 6-7.
[13] This quote is taken from a document entitled, Meeting: Minister of Defense E. Weizmann, and Gen. Tufanian, of Iran - TOP SECRET, dated July 18, 1977. This document was among thousands of such items seized at the time of the fundamentalist revolution in Iran and subsequently published by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
[14] "Middle East Missile Sales, Syrian Threat Cited," Ma'ariv, August 20, 1993, p. 18, as cited in JPRS; Katz, Samuel M. Soldier Spies, Presidio Press, Novato, 1992, pp. 156-59; "Israel-Shamir," Associated Press, July 3, 1992; Black, Ian and Morris, Benny. Israel's Secret Wars, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1991, pp. 192-98; Lotz, Wolfgang. The Champagne Spy, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1972, pp. 85-87; de Gramont, pp. 60-64; Terry, Anthony. "400 Germans Making Nasser Missiles," Washington Post, March 24, 1963, p. A17; and http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/biography/Lotz.html (accessed December 8, 2002).
[15] "Egypt Plans Satellite Launch Within Year," p. 32; "Egyptians Show New Two-Stage Rocket in Parade," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 29, 1963, p. 26; "Nasser Shows New Rockets," Missiles and Rockets, July 29, 1963, p. 30; and "Egypt Shows SA-2, Other Missiles in Parade," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 5, 1963, pp. 30-31. Bit'on Heyl Ha'avir, p. 206, suggests a warhead of approximately 800 kg.
[16] "Nasser's Missile Program," p. 755.
[17] "Egypt Plans Satellite Launch Within Year," p. 32; and "Egyptians Show New Two-Stage Rocket in Parade," p. 26.
[18] Bit'on Heyl Ha'avir, p. 206, suggests a range of 1,500 km.
[19] "Egypt Plans Satellite Launch Within Year," p. 32; and "Egyptians Show New Two-Stage Rocket in Parade," p. 26.
[20] The Hunt for German Scientists, p. 216
[21] Ibid.
[22] Approximately 18 TELs by contemporaneous Soviet export standards.
[23] Wetmore, Warren C. "Egypt Seeks New Soviet Missiles," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 10, 1967, p. 26.
[24] Wetmore, Warren C. "Israelis' Air Punch Major Factor in War," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 3, 1967, p. 22; and "Soviets Shifting Mideast Balance," p. 21.
[25] Crossing of the Suez, pp. 78-79.
[26] Crossing of the Suez, pp. 78-80; "Soviets Shifting Mideast Balance," p. 21; and "Massive Resupply Narrows Israeli Margin," p. 18.
[27] "Communist Military Assistance To Less Developed Countries Increases," Defense Intelligence Digest, [Declassified], October 1971, p. 29, states that during 1970 "(e)quipment valued at about $660 million was supplied to the UAR... including FROG launchers for the first time." O'Ballance, Edgar. The Electronic War in the Middle East, Archon Books, Hamden, 1974, p. 39. O'Ballance mistakenly identifies these as Luna 2s (FROG-3). The Soviet designator for the rocket itself is 3R-11. For a description of the Luna M system see: Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles: 1946 to Present, pp. 130-139 & 153.
[28] Crossing of the Suez, pp. 78-80; and "Soviets Shifting Mideast Balance," p. 21.
[29] Crossing of the Suez, p. 78-80, and 309.
[30] Ibid.; and Shazly, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Saad el-. Letters to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., dated 10 July 1988 and 19 June 1989.
[31] There is some debate as to whether this Egyptian strategy was effective. Some believe that the Egyptian possession of Scud Bs during the war had no impact on the Israeli decision not to bomb Egypt strategically. Others believe the Scuds played a significant role in the decision not to bomb Egypt strategically." Glassman, Jon. Arms for the Arabs, John Hopkins University Press, Washington, D.C., 1975, footnote no. 40, p. 226
[32] Crossing of the Suez, pp. 145-147.
[33] For a detailed description of the R-17 and its development see, Zaloga, Steven J. The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2002.
[34] Bartov, Hanoch. Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days, Ma'ariv Book Guild, 1981, p. 232; Arms for the Arabs, pp. 101-102; and Wallach, Col. Dr. Yehudia; Lissak, Dr. Moshe; and Itzchaki, Arieh. Carter's Atlas to the History of the State of Israel: The Third Decade 1971-1981, Carter, Jerusalem, 1983, p. 44.
[35] Herzog, Major General Chaim, The War of Atonement: October 1973, Little, Brown & Company, 1975, p. 24-25; and Arms for the Arabs, pp. 101-102.
[36] There is some confusion as to number of FROG-7A TELs in the 65th Artillery Brigade. I have used the number 12 which is provided in Williams, Louis. Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, University Publishing Projects, Tel Aviv, 1975, p. 188. This source is based upon Israeli intelligence information and documents captured during the 1973 War.
[37] There is some question as to whether the 65th Artillery Brigade was actually designated as such at the time of the war. Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, p. 188.
[38] By the end of 1973 Egypt had established two Scud brigades. One brigade (the 65th) had been semi-operational since before the war. The equipment for the second brigade had arrived in Egypt by December 1973. Personnel for this second brigade are believed to have completed their training in the Soviet Union during the latter part of December 1973. The actual formation of this second brigade apparently took several weeks, so that it wasn't until the first quarter of 1974, that this brigade became operational.
[39] Ramadan War, 1973, p. 54.
[40] "New Soviet Weapons Unveiled in Mideast," p. 50; and Ramadan War, 1973, p. 72.
[41] Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974, p. 420.
[42] Crossing of the Suez, pp. 78-80.
[43] Hassan, Osman and Badry, Maj. Gen. Hassan el-. The October War: An Authentic Illustrated Record, General Egyptian Book Organization, Cairo, 1977, maps 1-4.
[44] Carter's Atlas to the History of the State of Israel: The Third Decade 1971-1981, p. 90.
[45] Dan, Uri. Sharon's Bridgehead, E.L. Special Edition, Tel Aviv, 1975, pp. 94 and 104.
[46] Middleton, Drew. "Influx of Arms Caused by War Worries Israel", New York Times, November 2, 1980, p. 21.
[47] October War: An Authentic Illustrated Record, map 3.
[48] It is interesting to note that, soon after the Israeli crossing had been identified as such, Egypt filled aircraft bombs with chemical agents and prepared them for usage in case the Israelis approached to close to Cairo. Fortunately, these were not employed.
[49] Insight Team of the London Sunday Times. The Yom Kippur War, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1974, pp. 394-5.
[50] Ramadan War, 1973, p. 106.
[51] War of Atonement, p. 229.
[52] Rayyes, Riad N. The October War, An-Nahar Press Services, Beirut, 1973. p. 275.
[53] Hotz, Robert. "Israeli Aircraft, Arab SAMs in Key Battle," Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 22, 1973, p. 14.
[54] Crossing of the Suez, p. 268; and War of Atonement, p. 245.
[55] Sadat, Anwar el-. In Search of Identity, Harper & Row, New York, 1978, p. 265.
[56] Crossing of the Suez, pp. 78-80.
[57] Shazly, letter dated 19 June 1989.
[58] Brownlow, Cecil. "Soviets Poise Three-Front Global Drive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 5, 1973, pp. 12-13.
[59] For two examples of the confused contemporaneous reports concerning these events see: Brownlow, pp. 12-13; and Ropelewski, Robert R. "Egypt Assesses Lessons of October War," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 17, 1973, p. 15. Two in-depth studies of exactly what happened during these tense and confused days are: Blechman, Barry M., and Hart, Douglas M. "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis," International Security, Summer 1982, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 132-156; and Bandmann, Yona and Cordova, Yishai. "The Soviet Nuclear Threat Towards the Close of the Yom Kippur War," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1980, pp. 94-110. One of the best descriptions of the events surrounding the confused U.S. intelligence suggesting that Soviet ships were bringing nuclear warheads to Egypt see, Richelson, Jeffrey. "Task Force 157: The US Navy's Secret Intelligence Service, 1966-77," Intelligence and National Security, Volume 11, Number 1, January 1996, pp. 106-145.
[60] Ramadan War, 1973, p. 94.
[61] Ibid.; and Hotz, Robert. "Battlefield Equation Changes Seen," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 14, 1975, p. 15.
[62] Williams, p. 188; and "Egypt," Military Powers, Volume 2, February 1987, p. 38.
[63] Ropelewski, November 6, 1978, pp. 16-18; and Ropelewski, November 13, 1978, pp. 38-47.
[64] The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
[65] AOI assumed responsibility for a total of nine key production facilities: Aircraft Factory 36 at Helwan; Aircraft Engine Factory 135 at Helwan; Kader Factory for Developed Industries at Heliopolis; Electronics Factory within the Kader Factory; Sakr Factory for Developed Industries; Arab British Helicopters Company; Arab British Engines Company; Arab British Dynamics; and the Arab American Vehicles Company. Military Powers: The League of Arab States, pp. 99-100.
[66] "International News: Mubarak," United Press International, April 2, 1983; "Egypt, An Air Power in Transition," AIR International, Volume 22, Number 4, April 1982, pp. 168 & 197; "China," AIR International, Volume 14, Number 1, January 1978, pp. 3-4; "Egypt," AIR International, Volume 10, Number 5, May 1976, p. 210; and Middleton, Drew. "Soviet Arms to Cairo Reported Continuing," New York Times, February 2, 1977, p. 7.
[67] "Egypt's Role in Gulf War, Arms Manufacture Assessed," Al-Hawadith, 15 January 1988, pp. 26-27, as cited in JPRS-NEA-88-014, 7 March 1988, pp. 2-3.
[68] For a detailed overview of the Egyptian aerospace industry and the capabilities of the AOI at the time see the special report that appeared in the August 15, 1983 issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology, "Middle East Aerospace," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 15, 1983, pp. 129-65
[69] "AOI Courted by Western Aircraft Manufacturers for Joint Projects," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 November 1987, pp. 1172-1173; Deen, Thalif. "Egypt Set to Head Arab Arms Bid," Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 April 1988, pp. 681-685; and Bailey, Robert. "Building an Arab Armaments Industry," Middle East Economic Digest, 5 March 1988, pp. 6-7.
[70] Foss, Christopher F. "Egypt's Winning Formula," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 14, 1991, p. 1181; Turbe, Gerard. "Egyptian rockets and the French connection Sakr and SNPE," International Defense Review, February 1, 1988, p. 202; "Weapon Systems and Equipment - Egypt Moving to More Co-operation," International Defense Review, June 1, 1989, p. 858; Wanstall, Brian. "Egyptian Arms Industry and Forces Update: The legacy of Camp David," Interavia Aerospace Review, May 1, 1988, p. 469; Turbe, Gerard. "Egypt Arms Manufacturing Base for the Arab World?," International Defense Review, January 1, 1988, p. 73; "More Details of the Egyptian Sakr 80 Rocket System," Jane's Defense Weekly, March 12, 1988, p. 462; and "Sakr Rocket Under Development," Jane's Defense Weekly, November 28, 1987, p. 1254.
[71] George, Alan. "Saddam's Secret Weapons," Middle East, June 1989, p. 21; George, Alan and Lansinger, Herben. "Rocket Merry-Go-Round," Profil, 20 March 1989, pp. 36-38, as cited in JPRS-TND-89-009, 5 May 1989, pp. 31-34; and George, Alan and Lansinger, Herben. "Death Through DOT," Profil, 24 April 1989, pp. 38-42, as cited in JPRS-TND-89-009, 5 May 1989, pp. 34-36.
[72] For an excellent study of Fiat's efforts in assisting ballistic missile development in the Third World see: Freidman, Allen. All In the Family, September 1988, pp. 220-234.
[73] The subject of the Condor II project and the various connections between Argentina, CONSEN, Egypt and Iraq is an extremely complicated one and deserving of its own in-depth study. It is not discussed at length here, since the intent of this paper is an overview of ballistic missile development in Egypt. Among the more significant documents available concerning Egypt's involvement in the Condor II project are, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. United States of America, Plaintiff v. Abdel Kader Helmy, et. al., Defendants, Cr. No. S-88-201-RAR [corrected to read S-89-201-RAR], November 17, 1989; and Affidavit of David E. Burns, Customs Investigator, dated June 24, 1988. These documents were used throughout the preparation of this section. To ease readability, however, they will be cited only this once. Other supporting sources will be cited as required.
[74] "Secret Egypt-Iraq Accord Collapses," Financial Times, June 12, 1989. The code name Badr-2000 is sometimes erroneously applied to the Egyptian version of the Condor II. The Egyptian version is variously reported as either "Vector" or "Delta." It is conceivable that "Vector" and "Delta" are actually two different projects, however, insufficient information is currently available to determine this.
[75] For an overview of the CONSEN Group see: Friedman, Alan. "The Flight of the Condor," Financial Times, November 21, 1989, p. 10.
[76] Timmerman, Kenneth R. The Death Lobby, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1991, pp. 53-54, and 152.
[77] "Condor Project to Continue," DYN, 5 October 1989, as cited in JPRS-TND-89-020, 26 October 1989, p. 21.
[78] "The Flight of the Condor," p. 10; Gillette, Robert. "3rd World Missiles Linked to German, Italian Firms," Los Angeles Times, February 8, 1989, p. 1; and Gillette, Robert. "CIA Chief Cites Firms' Weapons Aid to 3rd World," Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1989, p. 13.
[79] "Saddam's Secret Weapons," p. 21; "Rocket Merry-Go-Round," pp. 36-38; and "Death Through DOT," pp. 38-42.
[80] Barth, Karl Gunther and Lambrecht. "How German Scientists Developed a New Medium-Range Missile for Egypt and Argentina Which Can Carry Nuclear Warheads," Stern, August 25, 1988; "In Search of the Forbidden Missile," Corriere Della Sera, September 1, 1988; and U.S. News & World Report, July 25, 1988, p. 38. There are some indications that the Saudi Government may have also provided some initial funding for the Egyptians in the project.
[81] Baizan, Mario. "Iraq's Involvement in Condor II Project Viewed," SOMOS, 28 January 1991, pp. 1-4, as cited in JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, pp. 13-15.
[82] "In Search of the Forbidden Missile," Corriere Della Sera, September 1, 1988.
[83] "MidEast Markets: Iraq Goes it Alone on Condor II," Financial Times, May 15, 1989. The three primary Condor-related facilities in Iraq were situated southwest of Baghdad. Construction is believed to have begun sometime during 1985 and was completed during early-1989. The total construction cost of the facilities themselves is estimated to be $400 million. The overall project was given the CONSEN Group code name of DOT, while the three facilities were identified as:
DO1: Chemical facility for the manufacture of missile propellants. Iraqi designation: Project 096.
DO2: Missile production facility. Iraqi designation: Project 073.
DO3: Test facility for static testing of the rocket engines and initial trials of the missile. Iraqi designation: Project 1157.
Interestingly, it appears that there were Condor II facilities in Romania where they were identified as DET. The extent of the Romanian connection is presently unknown.
[84] Ibid., and "The Flight of the Condor," p. 10.
[85] "Saddam's Secret Weapons," p. 21; "Rocket Merry-Go-Round," pp. 36-38; and "Death Through DOT," pp. 38-42.
[86] Ibid. Within Argentina, overall control of the Condor II program apparently extended from Raul Thomas, Secretary for Defense Production, to Air Force Brigadiers Hugo Venture and Crespo. Brigadier Crespo is believed to have been the primary contact with the Egyptians. "In Search of the Forbidden Missile," Corriere Della Sera, September 1, 1988.
[87] Howard, John. "Five Charged With Plotting to Export Rocket Parts," Associated Press, June 24, 1988; Shenon, Philip. "U.S. Accuses 2 Egyptian Colonels In Plot to Smuggle Missile Material," New York Times, June 25, 1988, p. 1; and Marcus, Ruth and Ottaway, David B. "Egyptian Officer Tied to Smuggling Effort," Washington Post, June 25, 1988, p. A1.
[88] United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. United States of America, Plaintiff v. Abdel Kader Helmy, et. al., Defendants, Cr. No. S-88-201-RAR [corrected to read S-89-201-RAR], November 17, 1989, Attachment #2.
[89] Tatro, December 29, 1989; and Ottaway, David B. "Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project; State Department Official Offers No Details on Iraqi Program." Washington Post, September 20, 1989, p. A32. President Mubarak subsequently stated that U.S. did not intervene in any Egyptian decisions concerning Condor II, see: "Mubarak Addresses Missiles in Interview With Qatari Papers," MENA, 27 December 1989, as cited in JPRS-TND-90-002, 17 January 1990, pp. 13-14.
[90] "Secret Egypt-Iraq Accord Collapses," Financial Times, June 12, 1989. Interestingly, on 17 August a explosion ripped through an Iraqi production facility at al-Hillah. "Britain-Iraq," Associated Press, September 5, 1989; and Mallet, Victor and Walker, Tony. "Egyptians Confirm Explosion in Iraq," Financial Times, September 7, 1989, p. 4.
[91] Cowell, Alan. "Cairo Aide's Ouster Tied to Effort to Get Missile Parts in U.S.," New York Times, April 18, 1989, p. A8.
[92] "MidEast Markets: Iraq Goes it Alone on Condor II," Financial Times, May 15, 1989; and "Secret Egypt-Iraq Accord Collapses," Financial Times, June 12, 1989.
[93] For an example of the reports of Egypt's withdrawal from the Condor II program see: "Egypt 'Has Pulled Out of Condor Program'," Jane's Defense Weekly, 30 September 1989, p. 630.
[94] Tatro, December 29, 1989.
[95] "Take-Off Delayed," Middle East, January 1991, p. 16.
[96] For a detailed account of missile development within the DPRK see the following articles by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.: "Syria's Acquisition of North Korean SCUDs," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1991, pp. 249-251; "New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, July 1990, pp. 343-345; "North Korea's HY-2 'Silkworm' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, May 1989, pp. 203-207; and "The North Korean 'SCUD B' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 177-181.
[97] "Events in September, 1981," Vantage Point, Vol. IV, No. 9, p. 28.
[98] Walker, Tony; Gowers, Andrew and Buchan, David. "Egypt And Argentina In Long-Range Missile Plan," Financial Times, December 21, 1987, p. 28.
[99] "Korea Helps Egypt Build SCUD B," Flight International, 16 July 1988, p. 19; and Tatro, Nicolas B. "Israel-Missiles," Associated Press, December 29, 1989.
[100] Gertz, Bill. "U.S.: Iran Fired Ballistic Missile," Washington Times, May 24, 1991, p. A5.
[101] "Egypt to Build Scuds," Defense News, September 2, 1991, p. 2.
[102] United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. United States of America, Plaintiff v. Abdel Kader Helmy, et. al., Defendants, Cr. No. S-88-201-RAR [corrected to read S-89-201-RAR], November 17, 1989.
[103] Darwish, Adel. "China to Update Egypt's Missiles," Independent, June 14, 1990.
[104] George, Alan. "BAe Told to Stop Scud Work," Flight International, 29 January 1992, p. 7; and "British Company Helps Chile, Egypt Build Rockets," Reuter, June 24, 1991.
[105] "500 From Europe Aid Cairo on Arms;" Decline of Honor, p. 83; and Ordway III, Frederick I. and Wakeford, Ronald C. International Missile and Spacecraft Guide, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1960, p. 21.
[106] Decline of Honor, p. 102.
[107] It is unclear as to whether this factory was identified as the Sakr Factory when it was established. The term Sakr Factory will, however, be utilized to facilitate readability. Ropelewski, Robert R. "Improvisation Key to Egyptian Growth," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 13, 1978, pp. 38-47; and "500 From Europe Aid Cairo on Arms," p. 1.
[108] It is unclear as to whether this factory was identified as the Sakr Factory when it was established. The term Sakr Factory will, however, be utilized to facilitate readability. Ropelewski, Robert R. "Improvisation Key to Egyptian Growth," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 13, 1978, pp. 38-47; and "500 From Europe Aid Cairo on Arms," p. 1.
[109] What function, if any, Irene Bredt-Sänger served in Factory 333 is unknown. It is probable that she remained, as she had during the war, her husband's assistant. She is known to have been engaged in research and teaching in Egypt.
[110] Helwan is approximately 23 km south of Cairo on the Nile River. Detailed descriptions of the HA-200 and HA-300 programs can be found in the following sources: "The 'Status Symbol' Fighter," Flying Review International, April 1967, Vol. 22, No. 8, pp. 491-492; "Germano-Spanish-Egyptian," Air International, July 1974, p. 48; and "HA-300: Egypt's Cosmopolitan Status Symbol," pp. 1-11.
[111] "Improvisation Key to Egyptian Growth," pp. 38-47.
[112] Ibid.
[113]"US Agrees to Sell Anti-Aircraft Launchers to Egypt," Associated Press, 29 June 2005; "Pentagon Authorizes Sale of 25 Air Defense Units to Egypt," Agence France Presse, 29 June 2005; "Avenger - Pedestal Mounted Stinger," 5 May 2000, .
[114]"Boeing Awarded Contract to Build Avengers for Egypt," Boeing, 27 June 2006; Robin Hughes, "Egypt to Get More Avengers," Jane’s Defense Weekly, 12 July 2006.
[115]"Russia’s RS-20B Missile to Remain on Combat Duty," BBC 17 April 2007; "Dnepr Rocket Launches 14 Satellites," Agence France Presse, 17 April 2007; "Russian Rocket Launches Cluster of Foreign Satellites, Including 7 Built by U.S. Students," Associated Press, 17 April 2007.
[116] "US Agrees to Sell Anti-Aircraft Launchers to Egypt," Associated Press, 29 June 2005; "Pentagon Authorizes Sale of 25 Air Defense Units to Egypt," Agence France Presse, 29 June 2005; "Avenger – Pedestal Mounted Stinger," 5 May 2000, <http:/www.fas.org>.
[117] Boeing Awarded Contract to Build Avengers for Egypt," Boeing, 27 June 2006; Robin Hughes, "Egypt to Get More Avengers," Jane's Defense Weekly, 12 July 2006.
[118] "Russia's RS-20B Missile to Remain on Combat Duty," BBC 17 April 2007; "Dnepr Rocket Launches 14 Satellites," Agence France Presse, 17 April 2007; "Russian Rocket Launches Cluster of Foreign Satellites, Including 7 Built by U.S. Students," Associated Press, 17 April 2007.



 

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