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US drug czar tied to atrocities in Gulf War
By Bill Vann
1 June 2000
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Barry McCaffrey, the director of the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy and point-man for the escalating
US military intervention in Colombia, was responsible for a military
operation at the close of the 1991 Persian Gulf War that claimed
the lives of thousands of fleeing Iraqi soldiers, prisoners of
war, civilians and even children, according to a recent article
in the New Yorker magazine. This slaughter was carried
out after a negotiated cease-fire already had been put in place.
Based on hundreds of hours of interviews with scores of current
and former military personnel who witnessed the carnage, the article
by veteran reporter Seymour M. Hersh provides a devastating exposure
of war crimes allegedly carried out under McCaffrey's direction,
and an indictment of the US war in the Persian Gulf as a whole.
Hersh gained his reputation as a reporter by exposing the 1968
My Lai massacre, in which US troops killed nearly 600 Vietnamese
women, children and old men in a ditch. His latest article, "Overwhelming
Force: What happened in the final days of the Gulf War,"
undermines the claims made by the government, the military and
the media nearly a decade ago that the US attack on Iraq had put
an end to the "Vietnam syndrome." The Gulf War, the
argument went, had demonstrated Washington's capacity to wage
a "clean" and relatively casualty-free war with international
support.
Hersh's investigation demonstrates that the atrocities committed
in the Persian Gulf differed from those carried out in Vietnam
principally in that US forces were able to carry them out from
a discreet distance. Killing was accomplished either through the
use of "smart bombs," like the one that killed hundreds
of women and children in the Al-Almariya air raid shelter, or,
as is reported in McCaffrey's case, the deployment of missile-firing
attack helicopters to incinerate Iraqi troops from a safe distance.
The principal lesson of the Vietnam War that the US military
carried into the Persian Gulf was the so-called "Powell Doctrine,"
named for then-Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin Powell.
It called for the use of overwhelming force to obliterate the
enemy and prevent American casualties, thereby minimizing opposition
at home. The result was the most savage aerial bombardment in
history, one that reduced the modern infrastructure of Iraq to
rubble, killing thousands of Iraqi civilians and creating conditions
of malnutrition and disease which, compounded by US-backed sanctions,
have claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands more over the
past decade, most of them children.
In Kuwait, millions of tons of explosives were dropped on trenches
and bunkers manned by Iraqi soldiers, killing untold thousands
while leaving survivors shell-shocked and virtually unable to
engage in combat.
The so-called "ground war" initiated by the US invasion
lasted all of four days. Most of the few dozen US casualties were
the result of "friendly fire," when American units were
caught in the massive fire power thrown against the Iraqis.
Some indication of the slaughter emerged with televised images
of the so-called "highway of death" from Kuwait to Basra
in southern Iraq. The US carpet-bombed Iraqis as they fled in
panic, leaving the six-lane highway littered for miles with the
blackened shells of trucks, cars and military vehicles and the
charred corpses of Iraqi soldiers and civilians.
On February 28, 1991, the Bush administration declared a cessation
of hostilities and called for a negotiated end to the war. Washington
had no interest in a permanent occupation of Iraq and feared that
the complete destruction of the military forces of Saddam Hussein
would create conditions for revolutionary upheavals and chronic
instability in the strategically important country.
At the time of the cease-fire, McCaffrey's 24th Infantry Division,
a mechanized unit of 18,000 troops with battle tanks and heavy
artillery, had driven into southern Iraq in a flanking maneuver
designed to cut off Iraqi columns fleeing from Kuwait toward Basra.
Hersh reports that while other US units ceased offensive operations
and stayed in place after the cease-fire, McCaffrey's division
pressed on until it came within striking distance of a road that
was one of the principal exit routes for Iraqi forces fleeing
from Kuwait. The Iraqis had been assured safe passage, but, according
to Hersh, the 24th Division's forward deployment was to make that
impossible.
In the pre-dawn hours of March 2, a scout unit in the forward
edge of the division reported that it had been fired upon by Iraqis.
Thus, according to the official version, began the "Battle
of Rumaila," named for the oilfield through which the road
passed. Troops in the unit commonly referred to the engagement
as a "turkey shoot."
Officers and soldiers interviewed by Hersh questioned whether
any Iraqi shots had been fired. Several interviewed for the article
had been with the units closest to the road and saw no hostile
actions by the retreating Iraqis. "Somebody panicked and
thought they saw something they didn't see," was one explanation
given for the reported Iraqi attack.
Nonetheless, the alleged incident was seized upon by US commanders
to launch a murderous assault that McCaffrey claimed was designed
to protect "the safety of my soldiers." By the time
the US attack began, however, the bulk of the Iraqi column had
proceeded north well past the 24th Division's lines, with Iraqi
tanks loaded onto flatbed trucks and their gun turrets locked
and pointed backwards, as had been agreed upon in cease-fire talks.
Hersh claims that McCaffrey chose to use massive force. Helicopter
gunships were ordered to destroy vehicles crossing a bridge over
the marshlands, effectively cutting off the road, while artillery
sealed off the other end to the south. The rag-tag column of trucks,
cars and armored vehicles was trapped in a killing zone, with
Iraqis abandoning their vehicles and fleeing in panic into the
ditches along the roadside. Apache helicopters pounded them with
missiles, while US tanks poured cannon fire on the defeated and
unresisting column.
"We went up the road blowing the shit out of everything,"
one soldier with a tank platoon told Hersh. "It was like
going down an American highwaypeople all mixed up in cars
and trucks. People got out of their cars and ran away. We shot
them. My orders were to shoot if they were armed or running. The
Iraqis were getting massacred."
According to McCaffrey, the attack destroyed more than 400
trucks and 187 tanks and armored vehicles. How many Iraqis were
slaughtered has never been estimated, either for the one-sided
battle in Rumaila or for the war as a whole.
At least one of the vehicles destroyed by a US Hellfire missile
was a bus carrying Iraqi children. The same tank soldier said
that a sergeant came and told him and other members of his unit
to prepare for a grim task. "He said, 'We've blown away a
busload of kids,' and warned us that we were going to get called
for a burial mission." However, the US soldiers were never
sent to bury the children's bodies. In all likelihood the corpses
were plowed under the sand together with the rest of the Iraqi
dead.
Other actions that fall into the category of war crimes were
also reported in connection with the 24th Division's operations.
One involved a scout platoon sent to block traffic on the same
road the day before the cease-fire went into effect. The Americans
were besieged by "scared and crying" Iraqis desperate
to surrender. Among them were wounded and bandaged soldiers aboard
a clearly marked hospital bus. The total number of prisoners reached
382.
According to the New Yorker article, the US scout unit
disarmed the Iraqis and herded them into a space sealed off on
three sides by the hospital bus and two trucks. They gave them
food and water and assured them they would be safe, radioing their
status and position to headquarters. When the unit received radioed
instructions to move on, US soldiers gave each of the Iraqis propaganda
leaflets printed in Arabic that promised that any soldier who
surrendered would be allowed to return home.
As they rode away, members of the scout unit reportedly saw
a column of Bradley armored vehicles approach and begin firing
machine-guns into the prisoners, some of whom attempted to run.
"I had fed these guys and gotten them to trust me,"
said Sgt. James Testerman, a member of the scout unit. He recalled
one Iraqi who refused to touch the food placed in front of him,
prompting the sergeant to take a bite of it to show him it wasn't
poisoned. "The tough guy broke down crying," he recalled.
"I can only imagine what he thought" when the armored
vehicles "started shootingthat we were sending him
to the slaughter. You think about it. All those people."
In another incident, a unit searching a village for weapons
reportedly opened fire with machine-guns on a group of villagers
walking behind a man waving a white flag. Soldiers who witnessed
the shooting estimated that 20 civilians were killed.
As the 24th Division prepared to go home, McCaffrey praised
his troops for their one-sided victory. The war in the Gulf, he
said, was "probably the single most unifying event that has
happened in America since World War II.... The upshot will be
that, just like Vietnam had the tragic effect on our country for
years, this one has brought back a new way of looking at ourselves."
More than a few of McCaffrey's soldiers saw the conflict differently,
however, feeling shame and revulsion. Major David Pierson, who
served as an intelligence captain with the 24th Division, indicated
that many felt guilty: "guilty that we had slaughtered them
so; guilty that we had performed so well and they so poorly; guilty
that we were running up the score.... They were like children
fleeing before us, unorganized, scared, wishing it would all end.
We continued to pour it on."
Within months of the division arriving back at Fort Stewart,
Georgia, an anonymous letter arrived at the Pentagon detailing
the massacre of the Iraqi prisoners and charging that McCaffrey
had initiated the March 2 battle without any Iraqi provocation.
The letter, which included detailed information that could have
only come from within the general's command staff, referred to
the actions as "war crimes."
Other soldiers assigned to the division also came forward and
told military investigators what they had seen. In each case,
the army conducted cursory and secretive investigations and suppressed
the charges, driving some of those who had made them out of the
service. Among McCaffrey's officers, few dared contradict the
official version, certain that their careers would be destroyed.
That the reports of these atrocities have only surfaced in
public nine years after the fact is a testament to the subservient
role played by the US media throughout the Gulf War. Officially
barred for the first time from any coverage of US military operations
on the front line, the media contented itself with acting as propaganda
cheerleader for the US effort and lionizing men like McCaffrey
and General Norman Schwarzkopf as heroes.
Accepting de facto military censorship, the television networks
and major news organizations repeated every pretext provided by
Washington for its military action, while remaining silent on
the devastating impact the US war machine had upon the people
of Iraq.
The silence continues. Hersh's well-founded charge of US war
crimes has received scant treatment in the broadcast and print
media.
While these atrocities were carried out under the Bush administration,
the Clinton White House has rushed to McCaffrey's defense, participating
in an extraordinary government campaign aimed first at suppressing
Hersh's article, and then vilifying its author. This included
pressure on former military officers to change their stories and
efforts to induce human rights groups to issue statements defending
McCaffrey and denouncing the piece before it was even published.
The White House and the Pentagon have serious and immediate
concerns about the retired general being implicated in war crimes.
As the Clinton administration's "drug czar," McCaffrey
has played the leading role in campaigning for the US Congress
to pass a $1.7-billion military aid package for Colombia that
would substantially increase US involvement in that country's
protracted civil war. He has also toured Latin America, attempting
to win support from the region's governments for Washington's
escalation.
See Also:
Desert Slaughter:
The Imperialist War against Iraq (preface)
After the Slaughter:
Political Lessons of the Balkan War
[14 June 1999]
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