




Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience

Interim Joint Doctrine Publication 02

INTERIM JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 02

OPERATIONS IN THE UK: THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO RESILIENCE

IJDP 02 dated December 2004
is promulgated
as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Tony Hagmut", with a horizontal line underneath.

Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

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¹ www.ukresilience.info.

PREFACE

SCOPE

1. This publication addresses Military Operations in the UK² in support of:
 - a. Civil authorities through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements.
 - b. Military operations abroad through Military Support to the Mounting of Operations (MSMO).
2. **Military Home Defence.** Military Home Defence (MHD) is the preparations for the defence of UK territory³ in the event of the re-emergence of an external military threat. It is outside the scope of this document, but is briefly described to place MACA and MSMO in context.
3. **Purpose.** The purpose of Interim Joint Doctrine Publication (IJD 02) *‘Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience’* is to:
 - a. Provide guidance on the nature, planning, Command and Control (C2) and conduct of those Military Operations that contribute to:
 - (1) The government’s Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) system for dealing with civil contingencies.
 - (2) The support of military operations abroad.
 - b. Give a brief description, as well as references to more detail, of the Government’s policy with respect to the management of emergencies as well as references to civil agencies’ (alongside which the Armed Forces are likely to be involved in MACA activities) responsibilities and doctrine for the management of disasters and emergencies.
 - c. Provide the military reader with an outline of the various civilian agencies’ command arrangements and capabilities.
 - d. Provide the civilian reader with a single source document detailing provision of military aid to the civil authorities, the legal and constitutional

² With the exception of Military Aid to the Civil Power operations in Northern Ireland.

³ HMG has defence responsibilities for the Isle of Man and Channel Islands, even though as British crown dependencies they are not technically part of the UK.

basis for such assistance, the procedures whereby it is provided, and some examples of assistance that has been provided in the past.

4. **Target Readership.** This document is aimed at a broad civil and military readership:

a. **Military.** The staffs of the CT and UK Ops Directorate and supporting directorates within MOD, Front Line and Home Commands, J5 Standing Joint Commander (UK)(SJC(UK), formation and unit commanders and regional liaison officers of all 3 Services (including Reserves).

b. **Civil.** The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS), other government departments (OGDs), the emergency services and other civilian agencies, and all those involved in enhancing the resilience of the UK.

5. **Context.** Measures arising out of the New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review in 2002 were implemented in December 2003, including establishment of the Directorate of Counter-Terrorist and UK Operations (D CT & UK Ops) (responsible for providing strategic guidance on operations in the UK and counter-terrorist operations worldwide) within the MOD, revision of the Standing Home Commitment tasks placed on the Armed Forces and improvements in the UK's overall resilience against the spectrum of threats now posed against the country and its population. Further work has refined C2 structures and updated policy, in particular for those activities associated with Military Task 2.3, Integrity of UK Waters. Military planning for graduated responses to meet a wide range of contingencies in the UK in peace, tension/crisis and war is conducted under the umbrella title of 'UK Operations', whilst the activities of non-military organisations is encompassed within IEM.

6. '*British Defence Doctrine*' (BDD) sets the strategic context for such contingent operations and discusses the need for an integrated approach between military forces and civil agencies in dealing with them. Other documents, such as the Cabinet Office '*Dealing with Disaster*' booklet and the J5 SJC(UK)-held Joint Contingency Plans (classified), provide broad civil policy and procedural guidance on the conduct of IEM and greater detail on the provision of MACA within the UK. IJD P 02 provides the link between these 2 layers of publications, drawing together the hitherto disparate aspects of contingency planning into an unclassified single-source document.

7. **Structure.** The publication is presented in 2 parts and 10 Chapters:

a. Part 1 covers defence MACA policy, military capabilities, C2 arrangements, and planning processes. Chapter 1 lays out the context for military operations in the UK. Chapter 2 provides the higher-level defence policy, describes the relevant Military Tasks and outlines the policy for

MACA, MSMO and MHD, the supporting military C2 hierarchy, the Armed Forces' preparations to respond to major incidents and relevant military capabilities. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 cover Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) respectively, while Chapter 6 links the preceding information by describing the planning process that identifies whether the Armed Forces are able to contribute to the performance of particular task, and how that contribution would be made.

b. Part 2 focuses on parallel civil organisations, capabilities and procedures, identifying where and how assigned military capabilities can be integrated during a major incident response. Chapter 7 describes the Government's resilience arrangements and IEM at Central, Regional and Local levels in some detail. Chapter 8 covers the organisation of the main Civil Agencies and voluntary organisations involved in IEM, whilst Chapter 9 provides details of the generic arrangements for Major Incident Response under IEM, with examples of where military forces might contribute. The final chapter deals with planning, training, exercising and plan validation.

The main body of the publication is supported by a comprehensive glossary of terms and definitions for both civil and military readers and an extensive reference annex providing details of key documents and the sources of further information.

LINKAGES

8. For military readers, IJDP 02 should be read primarily in conjunction with the J5 SJC(UK) Joint Contingency Plans. It consolidates high-level military doctrine in BDD, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 and appropriate civil guidance on UK Resilience and IEM. Although JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*' is primarily focused at campaign planning for deployed military operations, it also has linkages with UK Operations where the mechanisms for crisis management within the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) are discussed. IJDP 02 also has linkages with other Manuals produced by civil authorities and the emergency services, such as the Home Office Manual of Counter Terrorist Contingency Planning Guidance and London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedures Manual.

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and organisations concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). However, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Doctrine/Warfare Publications (JDP/JWPs).

Interim Joint Doctrine/Warfare Publications (IJDP/IJWPs) are published to meet urgent new short to medium-term needs for fully staffed and agreed joint doctrine, often when some associated aspects of doctrinal development/coordination remain outstanding or when there is a temporary void in policy or other directive. More short-term urgent requirements for doctrine are usually covered by Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position. They are raised in a foreshortened timescale by the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) to fill a doctrinal gap, often in association with a planned exercise or operation or possibly to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JDP/JWPs is explained in a current DCI.



PART 1

Military Organisation, Capabilities and Processes

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CHAPTER 1 – THE CONTEXT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE UK

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Background

101. One of the principal responsibilities of any government is the defence of the realm. In the UK there is a distinction between the defence of the UK against military threats, and the safety and security of the citizen. The safety and security of the population within the UK itself is always the responsibility of the Home Secretary, delivered through the Police and other emergency services and local authorities. MOD support must always be at the specific request of the civil authorities, and requires the specific authorisation of Defence Ministers. Any MOD support is subject to civil primacy.

102. This publication addresses Military Operations in the UK in support of the civil authorities, through the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements described later, and in support of the military's own operations abroad. It also briefly describes the military defence of the UK against external military threats.

103. In recent years the Government has placed great emphasis on improving the country's ability to respond to disruptive challenges, be they man-made or natural disaster. These efforts were brought into sharper focus by the events of 11 September 2001, and include creating a greater understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all agencies involved. The MOD has provided assistance to a number of other Departments and Agencies over the past few years¹ but there should be no doubt that military support is always provided as assistance only. The relevant civil agency retains responsibility and control on all occasions.

104. In the UK arrangements are in place to maintain and improve the quality of civil protection. The Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) provides the central focus for the cross departmental and cross-agency commitment, co-ordination and co-operation that will enable the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises. The overall objective, at all levels of government and beyond, is to enhance resilience to disruptive challenges at every level through anticipation, preparation, prevention and resolution. Resilience is defined as 'the ability at every relevant level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to handle and recover from such challenges'.² The processes which underpin resilience form the fundamental elements

¹ The fuel protest (2000), flooding (2000), the foot and mouth outbreak (2001) and the national fire fighters' strike (2002-2003, 2004).

² 'Dealing with Disaster' 3rd Edition, Cabinet Office.

of civil protection. The overall programme is wide-ranging, engaging hundreds of departments, authorities and agencies.

The defence contribution to resilience is important, but it is also essential that it is not seen as the sole, or even the major, contributor to the resilience of the UK as a whole.

Overview

105. The first response to most emergencies will be a civil one at the local level employing generic principles collectively termed Integrated Emergency Management (IEM).³ Where local services find that the scale or nature of events puts the situation beyond the capacity of their own resources, their recourse is usually to mutual aid arrangements. Whilst central government may need to be kept informed of events, it will not always be necessary for special arrangements to be put in place at that level. The concept of Lead Government Department (LGD) detailed in *‘Dealing with Disaster’* (3rd Edition Revised)^{4,5} sets out arrangements whereby central government will be organised to receive information from local agencies and respond as appropriate. The concept sets out, as far as possible, which government department would fulfil the function of LGD in any particular situation. The term ‘Lead Government Department’ does not imply that central government will assume responsibility for responding to the incident.

106. The fact that authorities other than central government can take responsibility for responding to an incident is itself an indication of the UK’s resilience. The central government should only be seen to take direct responsibility for an incident or emergency if it is directly involved (as it would be in the event of a terrorist attack) or if there is no alternative (for instance, if local responses are overwhelmed). It should be noted however that, by definition, **defence is the responsibility of central government, and the engagement of the Armed Forces therefore automatically brings with it the engagement of central government.**

107. If, because a co-ordinated response from a number of central government departments is called for, special arrangements do need to be put in place at central government level, this will be facilitated by the CCS and the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (OD Sec) within the Cabinet Office.⁶ The Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) or a similar committee will be convened and will meet in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR).^{7,8} In the first instance, the CCC may be chaired by the LGD;

³ Details are in Chapter 7.

⁴ In Scotland *‘Dealing with Disaster Together’*.

⁵ In Northern Ireland *‘Guide to Emergency Planning in Northern Ireland’*.

⁶ The purpose of the Cabinet Office as a Government Department is to co-ordinate the activities of Government Departments.

⁷ Despite COBR being a location, the committee operating from COBR is commonly (but erroneously) referred to as ‘COBR’.

the Home Secretary normally chairs if it is a counter terrorism incident, but in extreme situations (from any cause) the Prime Minister will assume chair of the committee. The membership of the committee will be determined by the nature of the emergency and the response required from central government.

108. The concept of command is recognised by the civil authorities, being defined in *‘Dealing with Disaster’* as ‘the authority for an agency to direct the actions of its own resources’. This does not necessarily imply a formal chain of command between central government and local agencies. A core principle of the police command chain, for instance, is that the police are operationally independent of government. (A position diametrically opposite to the position of the Armed Forces – for whom an operation *must* be approved by a Defence Minister. This is, in turn, an important way of identifying the difference between the two services). There are in practice, however, well-exercised procedures for the control of incidents at both local and regional level, described later in this publication and in more detail in *‘Dealing with Disaster’*. These procedures will vary between agencies; therefore a multi-agency response to an emergency will require the blending of different command structures with different characteristics. However, the Armed Forces with their particular command arrangements are not local responders, and their involvement automatically brings with it the involvement of a central government command structure.

109. In practice, most requests for MACA assistance are made centrally, other than MACC requests during a major incident. The latter should be referred to the local Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) to be passed via the Regional Bde/Div Structure to D CT & UK Ops before any commitment is made.⁹ The procedures for dealing with these requests are described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in most cases. Specific¹⁰ ministerial approval is required before any commitment can be made. In extreme situations it is possible that military resources may be made available by central government without the need for a formal request from local agencies.

SECTION II – UNITED KINGDOM OPERATIONS

Background

110. The MOD approach to all military operations in the UK is termed United Kingdom Operations (UK Ops).¹¹ It comprises the Armed Forces’ response to a wide range of contingencies and emergencies during peace, periods of tension and crisis, and war.

⁸ Separate, but similar, arrangements apply in Northern Ireland.

⁹ Immediate MACC assistance may be provided in an emergency, see Chapter 5.

¹⁰ Except for MACC Cat A requests where life is at stake – See Chapter 5.

¹¹ The planning processes were formerly known as Integrated Contingency Planning; this term still appears in certain staff titles and documents, but is now obsolescent.

The obvious characteristic of UK Ops (and MACA operations in particular) that differentiates them from other military operations is that they take place in the UK and often involve a wide range of civil authorities.

Responding to emergencies and disasters, in particular, will bring the Armed Forces into close contact with the public. Those members of the public directly affected will have had their lives seriously disrupted, and will be distressed or worse. Those not directly affected may have been indirectly affected and may fear the spread of the crisis; they will, at the very least, be closely interested in the response to a crisis. This has the following effects:

- a. A high level of motivation and significant pressure on all those engaged in the response at all levels, to resolve the problem rapidly and with the minimum of disruption.
- b. Very high public expectations of military capability, and therefore potentially serious consequences if things go wrong.
- c. A requirement to ensure that the legal basis of the response is as clear as possible.
- d. The need to be sensitive, balanced and fair in the treatment of the public.
- e. The need to address community issues. Guidance on the handling of these issues should always be sought from relevant local responders.
- f. A voracious appetite for information on the part of the public, the media, and political leaders at all levels, and a consequent need for reliable, consistent, and accurate information flows across the various elements of the inter-agency command structure and between the different layers of the command structure.
- g. Potentially complex financial arrangements with other government departments.

111. UK Ops comprises three areas, two of which are active and the third dormant. The active areas are MACA and Military Operations (MO). The third and dormant area is Military Home Defence (MHD). A brief description follows but they are covered in more depth in Chapter 2.

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

112. MACA supports the civil authorities in the fulfilment of civil objectives, principally in peace. It is conducted because the Armed Forces' national structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of benefit in time of emergency to fill civil authority capability gaps. MACA is subdivided into 3 categories:

- a. **Military Aid to other Government Departments.** Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD) is the assistance provided by the Armed Forces on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community.
- b. **Military Aid to the Civil Power.** The provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power (MACP) in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power. It includes capabilities such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
- c. **Military Aid to the Civil Community.** Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) is the provision of unarmed military assistance:
 - (1) To the civil authorities when they have an urgent need for help to prevent or deal with the aftermath of a natural disaster or a major incident.
 - (2) To civil sponsors, either by carrying out special projects of significant social value to the community or by attaching individual volunteers full-time for specific projects.

Military Operations

113. MO includes Military Support to the Mounting of Operations (MSMO) overseas. This is chiefly concerned with: Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP) and UK Entitled Personnel (RUKEP); the US/UK Lines of Communications (LOCs) arrangement and its associated Joint Contingency Plans (JCPs),¹² and the security of Defence Key Points. However, MO also covers operations within the UK such as the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO), Mine Counter-Measures and Hydrographic Survey.

¹² Extant Joint Logistic Plans are being rewritten as JCPs.

Military Home Defence

114. MHD addresses the defence of the UK against attack from external military threats.¹³ Planning for this involves support to the machinery of government, NATO and contingency plans for the establishment of additional military HQs and liaison officers. There is currently no major direct conventional threat to the UK and it is assessed that there would be considerable warning (years) of such a threat arising. Therefore, MHD plans are to be held dormant and will only be reinvigorated should this situation change. However, it must be stressed that it is vital to retain these plans so that any corporate knowledge is not lost over the years of dormancy.

¹³ Terrorist threats are dealt with under MACP procedures.

CHAPTER 2 – MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE UK

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

201. Chapter 1 introduced the concept of Military UK Operations and the MOD's contribution to Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). Military Operations known as UK Ops are subdivided into 3 areas, 2 of which are active and the third dormant. The 2 active areas are Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA), and Military Operations (MO) which includes support to the mounting of operations overseas. The third and dormant area is that of Military Home Defence (MHD), no longer assessed as required to counter any threat, but plans should be retained to ensure that corporate knowledge is not lost.

Higher Defence Policy

202. Military Tasks (MTs) provide a framework for the MOD on which to base its detailed defence planning for the size, shape and capabilities of the Armed Forces. The MTs reflect the broad types of tasks and operations in which the UK is likely to be involved and then provide a framework for developing force structure requirements. The Strategic Defence Review detailed a main Defence Mission, the eight subordinate Defence Missions and the 28 Military Tasks.¹ The 2003 Defence White Paper² reviewed this structure to improve its utility in planning military capability, so that it now comprises a single Defence Aim and 18 Military Tasks.

203. **Defence Aim.** The Defence Aim is: 'To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism, and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and security'. The purpose of the MOD is to deliver security to the people of the UK *by defending them*, i.e. without duplicating the efforts of other agencies. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other agencies contribute to the overall objective overseas, using other (i.e. non-defence) capabilities. Within the UK, the MOD contributes to security through the application of specific defence capabilities in support of the other authorities who share the overall objective. MOD works closely with other authorities, both at home and overseas, but does not, as a primary purpose, duplicate the activities and capabilities of those authorities in either place.

Military Tasks

204. The 18 Military Tasks are categorised into 4 generic categories: Standing Strategic Tasks, Standing Home Commitments, Standing Overseas Commitments and

¹ Supporting Essay Six, 'The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays' dated July 1998.

² Defence White Paper: 'Delivering Security in a Changing World Vol 2 Supporting Essay 2' CM 6041 dated December 2003.

Contingent Operations Overseas. The category most closely associated with military operations in the UK is the list of tasks falling under the heading Standing Home Commitments.

205. **Standing Home Commitments.** Standing Home Commitments encompass protection of UK sovereignty, security at home in support of other government departments (OGDs), and maintaining the Armed Forces' public profile. The engagement of the Armed Forces in state ceremonial, routine public duties and activities designed to promote the Armed Forces, the provision of secure air transport for the use of the Royal Family and senior members of government should not be confused with the remaining tasks in the group.

- a. **MT 2.1 Military Aid to the Civil Authorities.** MT 2.1 covers the provision of military support to the civil power, OGDs and the community at large. This can be either on an infrequent or emergency basis, or as a routine commitment (such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)). It also includes support to the maintenance of government in times of crisis and conflict.
- b. **MT 2.2 Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland.** Although clearly a military operation within the UK in support of a civil power, this task is specifically excluded from this publication.
- c. **MT 2.3 Integrity of UK Waters.** MT 2.3 covers the requirement to demonstrate British sovereignty within, and ensure the integrity of, the UK's territorial waters and, where necessary, to protect the UK's rights and interests in the surrounding seas, including port and route survey, renegade shipping, and maritime counter-terrorism.
- d. **MT 2.4 Integrity of UK Airspace.** A continuous recognised air picture and an air policing capability, providing for interception and possible destruction of renegade and hostile aircraft, is needed to maintain the integrity of the UK's airspace.
- e. **MT 2.5 Public Duties and VIP Transport.** MT 2.5 covers the provision of military capabilities for state ceremonial, routine public duties, the promotion of the Armed Forces in the public eye, and secure air transport for the use of the Royal Family and senior members of the Government.

206. MT 2.3 and MT 2.4 in particular would form the basis for defence-led operations in the UK should a significant increase in the risk of attack by conventional forces occur. The MOD maintains the capacity to plan significant defence-led operations within the UK, and thereby conduct Military Home Defence (MHD). However, in practice the re-emergence of a credible conventional military threat would represent a new task and the activities, and consequently the assets maintained to

undertake these 2 particular tasks, are minimal, although none are maintained specifically for land-based defence operations in the UK. Defence operations in the UK, including air and maritime operations, are always undertaken in conjunction with the responsible civil authorities, and almost always in support of those authorities rather than being defence-led.

207. The MOD's duty and responsibility to deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom by defending them, therefore, falls primarily into the remaining three categories. These focus on the maintenance of the strategic deterrent, the need to understand operating conditions globally, and the need to meet existing and potential defence commitments overseas. These tasks have an impact on defence activity within the UK, because of the need to mount military operations overseas from the UK. They therefore form the basis for the third category of defence operation in the UK – Military Support to the Mounting of Operations (MSMO). Ensuring that the MOD is able to mount military operations overseas is itself a contribution to the resilience of the UK.

208. **Standing Strategic Tasks.** Military Tasks covering the strategic elements of UK Defence Policy, including the nuclear deterrent and strategic intelligence gathering. The Standing Strategic Tasks are:

- a. **MT 1.2 Nuclear Deterrence.** MT 1.2 is the provision of an operationally independent strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capability, including its protection. UK military operations include the provision of assistance to the Nuclear Accident Response Group and enhancing the protection of certain key facilities.
- b. **MT 1.3 Hydrographic, Geographic and Meteorological Services.** These services support the strategic deterrent, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures operations, and are enablers to both military and civilian activities. This task overlaps with MT 2.3.

209. **Standing Overseas Commitments.** These tasks describe obligations to the 13 Overseas Territories and UK commitment to international alliances and partners as a means of safeguarding UK interests overseas and of promoting UK influence and support around the world. UK military operations associated with **MT 3.3 Defence Diplomacy, Alliances and Support to Wider British Interests** centre on the arrangements surrounding the provision of Host Nation Support (HNS) to foreign forces based in, or transiting through the UK.

210. **Contingent Operations Overseas.** These tasks define the range of contingent commitments that may demand a contribution from the UK's Armed Forces. UK military involvement is usually in the form of Military Support to the Mounting of

Operations and the reception of casualties through the Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP) process.

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Introduction

211. Military operations in the UK under MT 2.1 are placed under the umbrella title ‘MACA’. This section covers MACA in more detail. It examines the principles, procedures and essential features of providing military assistance.

212. MACA is further sub-divided into Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). These operations are distinct from one another in having differing legal bases and political and military implications.

213. The provision of MACA is guided by 3 principles:

- a. Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other law enforcement agencies, and the private sector must be insufficient or be unsuitable.
- b. The Civil Authority lack the required level of capability and it is unreasonable to expect it to develop one.
- c. The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and there is an immediate lack of Civil Power resources.

214. Definitions and examples of the three types of MACA are shown in Table 2. 1. More specific information on MAGD, MACP and MACC is provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively.

| Type | Definition | Example |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MAGD | Assistance provided by the Armed Forces to other Government Departments on urgent work of national importance in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community. | Fire Strike 1977/8, 1999, 2000, 2002/3 Foot and Mouth 2000 Fuel shortage 2000 |

| | | |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MACP | The provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power. For matters of public safety, support will routinely be to the police as the lead organisation; this includes specific security operations. | Counter Terrorism Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Fishery Protection Drug Interdiction Support to police and HM Customs and Excise (C&E) investigations. |
| MACC | The provision of unarmed military assistance to the country at large: Category A: Emergency Assistance. To the civil authorities in time of emergency such as natural disasters or major emergencies, i.e. to save life. Category B: Routine Assistance. Short-term routine assistance for special projects or events of significant social value to the civil community. Category C: Attachment of Volunteers. Individual assistance by volunteers through full-time attachment to social service or similar organisations | Specialist search for missing persons still believed to be alive Search and Rescue (SAR) ³ Floods (2000 in Vale of York) Construction or repair work of direct training value and unusual assistance to the public e.g. construction of local bridges in Scotland for a local community where civilian contractors would not do the work and there was beneficial training for Engineers. Volunteers to work with the Prince's Trust. |

Table 2.1 – Types of MACA Operation

Central Government

215. **Policy.** At the highest level the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (sub-committee on International Terrorism) (DOP(IT)) is the standing Cabinet forum for the policy direction of IEM. In a domestic context, DOP(IT) directs the work of 2 other standing ministerial sub-committees:

- a. **DOP(IT) Terrorism.** DOP(IT) Terrorism (DOP(IT)(T)) is a Ministerial Group which addresses the prevention and response to terrorism in the UK. It

³ SAR is a special case, see Annex E for details.

is supported by a committee of officials – Official Committee (Home) on International and Domestic Terrorism (TIDO(H)). TIDO(H) co-ordinates the policy and operational aspects of activities to counter the threat of terrorism and co-ordinates the policy and administration of the response by Government Departments and Agencies following a terrorist incident.

b. **DOP(IT) Resilience.** DOP(IT) Resilience (DOP (IT)(R)) is a Ministerial Group which addresses the UK plans for civil contingencies, resilience and consequence management. It is supported by a committee of officials – Official Committee (Resilience) on International and Domestic Terrorism (TIDO(R)). TIDO(R) directs the routine work of the CCS.




Figure 2.2 - Policy Committees for Crisis/Consequence Management

216. **Crisis Management.** The central government crisis management organisation will meet at 3 levels:

- a. **Level 1.** The Lead Government Department (LGD)⁴ Minister runs the response from their departmental emergency facilities.
- b. **Level 2.** The response is co-ordinated from the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) by the LGD.
 - (1) **Terrorism.**⁵ Always at level 2 with the Home Office⁶ as LGD.

⁴ Details in Chapter 7.

(2) **Other Incidents.** When the LGD determines a requirement for wider government resources.

c. **Level 3.** The response is co-ordinated by COBR/Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC). The Prime Minister or nominated Secretary of State leads in the event of a catastrophic incident requiring the involvement of Central Government to deliver an effective response, or where Emergency Powers are invoked.

217. **Civil Contingencies Committee.** The CCC is a crisis management committee with a combination of Ministers and their staff from the relevant Government Departments. The CCC is responsible for co-ordinating the national response to a crisis in the UK. The Defence & Overseas Secretariat (OD Sec) is responsible for the activation of COBR and the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)⁷ provides support on impact management and recovery issues. MOD is represented at the CCC by the Directorate Counter Terrorism and UK Operations (D CT & UK Ops), other attendees include:

- a. OD Sec.
- b. Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).
- c. Security Service (SS).
- d. Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).
- e. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
- f. Home Office (HO).
- g. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
- h. CCS.
- i. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).
- j. Department for Trade and Industry (DTI).
- k. Department for International Development (DFID).
- l. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).
- m. HM Customs and Excise (HMC&E).

⁵ MOD Counter Terrorism Policy is detailed in 'Global Counter Terrorism – a Strategy for the MOD' 27 Jun 04.

⁶ Except for incidents in Northern Ireland, run from the Northern Ireland Office Briefing Room.

⁷ For greater detail on the role of the CCS see Chapter 7.

- n. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).
- o. Attorney General's office.
- p. No. 10.
- q. HM Treasury.
- r. Environment Agency
- s. Food Standards Agency (FSA).
- t. Scottish Executive.
- u. Welsh Assembly.
- v. Northern Ireland Office.
- w. Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
- x. Ambulance Services Association (ASA).
- y. Chief Fire Officers Association.

Ministry of Defence

218. It is a fundamental principle of the UK's system of government that the Armed Forces remain under the control of central government and a fundamental principle of democratic government that civilian defence Ministers are publicly accountable for the actions of the Armed Forces. The command structure of the Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the Secretary of State for Defence (exercising the Royal Prerogative) to the individual unit and Service personnel. All defence operations, including those conducted in the UK, require authorisation by the Defence Council, and in particular, by Defence Ministers who lead the Defence Council. However, this single structure is divided into Strategic, Operational and Tactical competences, reflecting specific roles and responsibilities placed upon headquarters staffs.

The Armed Forces remain under military command at all times.

Strategic Command

219. **Policy.** The policy and commitments staff, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)) and the Policy Director, provides strategic guidance to the command structure as a whole, and advice to ministers and OGDs through COBR/CCC during a crisis or various inter-departmental groups at other times. In this way MOD acts as both a Military HQ and a Department of State. CT & UK Ops is responsible for all policy on UK Ops on behalf of DCDS(C).

220. **Crisis Management.** The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is directed by DCDS(C) as Director of Operations (D Ops), providing:

- a. Advice on MOD operational policy.
- b. Military advice.

221. MOD Ministers and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) are the MOD’s chief representatives within the government-wide crisis management mechanism, outlined at paragraph 216. In their absence, D Ops and his staff provide advice; specifically, CT & UK Ops (Pol) is responsible for providing policy advice, reflecting at all times the views and decisions of MOD Ministers, and CT & UK Ops (Mil) provides military advice and direction. CT & UK Ops are also responsible for identifying MOD Subject Matter Experts and for the provision of full-time (24 hour) MOD cover for the government’s crisis management mechanism, drawing on MOD’s augmentation arrangements as necessary. Subject Matter Experts can be drawn from any suitably qualified specialist area of the MOD and may include civilian as well as military experts.




Figure 2.3 - MACA Command Hierarchy

Joint Operational Command

222. For overseas crises and associated military operations, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is responsible at the operational level of command for the deployment, direction, sustainment and recovery of the deployed force. For domestic crises, and the support of deployed operations from within the UK, there is no PJHQ equivalent. Instead CDS has appointed CINCLAND as the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) with the primary responsibility for the MOD contribution to the planning and execution of joint and OGD-led civil contingency operations within the SJC(UK) Joint Operations Area (JOA).⁸ In exceptional circumstances a Joint Commander from another Service can be appointed for specific operations; however the ‘default setting’ is SJC(UK) who, unless directed otherwise, assumes command of all operations within the UK.

223. An appropriate subordinate commander and assigned forces for an incident will be detailed by a CDS Directive (drafted by D CT & UK Ops) to SJC(UK) (or another nominated Joint Commander). Single Service Chiefs will retain Full Command of their personnel. For the majority of UK operations the command structure will utilise the Army’s regional divisional and brigade hierarchy. However, bespoke arrangements may be necessary for certain contingencies.

224. Contingency planning for UK Ops on behalf of SJC(UK) is conducted by J5 SJC(UK), collocated with HQ LAND. When necessary, J5 SJC(UK) can form the nucleus of a planning staff to support an alternative nominated Joint Commander. J5 SJC(UK) develop contingency plans⁹ on capability¹⁰ or event-based¹¹ scenarios or following agreement by the MOD (using normal MACA procedures) to examine a request for Armed Forces support. The development of these plans identifies the capabilities required to perform a task. J5 SJC(UK) also provides a focal point for liaison with the Single Service staffs on the availability of appropriate military capabilities and facilities.¹²

Tactical Command

225. The tactical command level will normally report to an extant operational command level, usually based on the Army regional command structure, which has the advantage of being permanently established throughout the UK’s regions.¹³ Service

⁸ The SJC(UK) JOA is defined as the UK land area (less Northern Ireland) and territorial seas.

⁹ Details of the planning process are at Chapter 6.

¹⁰ For example, support to the DTI in the event of a fuel shortage, and to ODPM in the event of a fire fighters’ strike.

¹¹ For example, support to police security arrangements for large-scale public events.

¹² It is important to note that contingency planning occurs in order to identify the capabilities and resources required to perform a task. The resources and capabilities may not exist, or may not be available, and the very act of undertaking contingency planning may highlight factors that make the task inappropriate to the Armed Forces. Agreement to undertake contingency planning does not therefore represent an agreement to perform a task.

¹³ See Annex 2B.

personnel allocated to UK operations remain under a military command structure at all times. For formed units this will be their normal unit command structure. For ad hoc groupings of personnel allocated to an operation, a bespoke command organisation will be formed and specified in the CDS directive.

Legal Considerations

226. **General.** All operations must be conducted within both civil and military law. Failure to comply with this principle may result in criminal and/or civil law proceedings being brought against individuals or the MOD.

Unlike the police (and some other civil agencies), members of the Armed Forces have no powers over and above those of the ordinary citizen. They have the same personal duty as ordinary citizens to abide by the law at all times.

227. **Primary Legislation.** The use of the Armed Forces is governed by the following primary legislation:

a. **Civil Contingencies Act 2004.** The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) has repealed the Emergency Powers Acts 1920 (EPA 1920) and 1964 (EPA 1964) (except for Section 2). In the event of an emergency, in which the supply and distribution of the essentials of life to the community are extensively threatened, the CCA can be used to invoke emergency powers on a local, regional or national basis. The deployment of Service personnel may then be authorised, and they may be given the power to requisition equipment and other facilities.

b. **The Emergency Powers Act 1964.** The Defence Council may, under Section 2 of EPA 1964, authorise the temporary deployment of Service personnel on urgent work of national importance. This Act is the legislation ordinarily used to authorise MAGD deployments. It does not provide powers of requisition.

228. **Service Regulations.**¹⁴ The legal background to the employment of Service personnel in situations falling short of armed conflict is set out in the Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy, the Manual of Military Law and the Manual of Air Force Law.

Rules of Engagement

229. Most MACA operations will not require the use of armed Service personnel. Where personal weapons or public order control equipment are authorised,

¹⁴ A Tri-Service Discipline Act is intended to replace single-Service regulations in 2006.

commanders will normally be directed to employ appropriate Guidance Cards.¹⁵ The CDS Directive to the Joint Commander will explicitly state whether personal weapons or public order control equipment is authorised and, if so, whether Guidance Cards or a specific ROE Profile is to be applied.

Information Strategy

MACA tasks are never solely undertaken to enhance the standing of the Armed Forces and can never be justified on that basis.

230. Nonetheless, some aspects of MACA, such as assistance to civil authorities when dealing with natural disasters or other Consequence Management operations, provide significant opportunities to present positive media messages about the Armed Forces. Command Corporate Communications staffs, the Director of Defence Publicity (D Def Pub) or the Directorate of News (DNews), as appropriate, should be consulted in advance regarding the media profile that is to be followed. Timely information is primarily required in the Centre to ensure effective crisis management, including the implementation of effective and accurate media and communications strategies by the civil authorities.

Single Service Arrangements

231. Each Service has its own arrangements for UK Ops planning, co-ordinated with those of the other Services. Responsibility for ensuring this takes place rests with the D Ops staff at strategic level, SJC(UK) at the operational level, and the Army's regional brigade structure at tactical level,¹⁶ as well as with the single Services themselves. Joint Regional Liaison Officers have been appointed at tactical level to ensure that this co-ordination occurs within the regions. All operations are therefore deemed to be Joint (i.e. tri-Service). Single Service arrangements are, however, important as a means of identifying and generating suitable forces and capabilities for UK operations under the command of the nominated Joint Commander.

- a. **Royal Navy.** The 2nd Sea Lord/Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command (2SL/CNH) is responsible for RN UK Ops planning, and Flag Officer Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland (FOSNNI) is the RN UK Ops policy lead. 2SL/CNH has functional authority over all Royal Navy (RN) authorities and serving RN personnel in MOD establishments in the UK and takes the lead in defining the RN's manpower and support requirement for

¹⁵ Guidance Cards provide guidance to Armed Forces personnel on the extent and circumstances under which weaponry can be used to perform the task they are being asked to perform. A key principle in the use of force is always that it must be proportionate to the threat being posed either to the individual or to a third party. Rules of Engagement (ROE) and associated Guidance Cards contain a judgement as to the appropriate use of force in the circumstances. They do not authorise the use of force nor do they have any independent legal standing.

¹⁶ The civilian reader should note that the terms 'strategic', 'operational' and 'tactical', are used here in the military sense – usage differs in the civilian environment, see Chapter 9 and Glossary for details.

MACA tasks and in identifying the donor units. The RN's Contingency Planning effort is centred on the Directorate of Naval Security and Integrated Contingency Planning (DNSyICP), which has a small staff responsible for staffing contingency plans. They liaise with the Naval Regional Officers (NRO) and the Naval Base Commanders (NBC), who control the RN UK Operations effort in their land areas of responsibility.¹⁷

b. **Army.** HQ LAND is the lead command for UK Ops in the Army and provides the core joint staff for the SJC(UK). It maintains geographical command of all Army units throughout the UK,¹⁸ based on the Regional Forces' divisional and brigade structure.¹⁹ Each Regional Brigade has a Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO)²⁰ who is the primary point of contact for tri-Service liaison with local authorities, in co-ordination with single Service colleagues, emergency services and other agencies involved in emergency planning.

c. **Royal Air Force.** HQ Personnel and Training Command (HQPTC) has lead responsibility for UK Ops in the RAF, although a single-Service response will always involve consultation with HQ Strike Command which is the 'owner' of the majority of assets likely to be assigned to MACA tasks. HQPTC identifies the single Service personnel and support requirement before liaising with donor units and is supported by a network of RAF Regional Liaison Officers.²¹

The Armed Forces' Response

232. The capability of the Armed Forces to respond to a MACA request is based on three pillars:

a. **Pillar 1.** The Army Regional Chain of Command, support staff (for 24-hour operation) and Regional Liaison Officers. Each Service has its own arrangements, co-ordinated with the other Services, for local level liaison:

(1) **Royal Navy.** The RN has 4 NROs who represent the RN in the regions. However, the area Staff Officer ICP, a 2SL/CNH officer who is attached to each NBC's staff conducts local liaison, and the NBCs are the RN representative on the Joint Service Co-ordination Group (JSCG).²²

¹⁷ Annex 2A.

¹⁸ Except Northern Ireland.

¹⁹ Annex 2B.

²⁰ JRLOs are non regular permanent staff; experienced ex-regulars drawn from all 3 Services.

²¹ Annex 2C.

²² See paragraph 238.

(2) **Army.** Each Regional brigade has a JRLO,²³ a Deputy JRLO (part time) and a Brigade Reinforcement Team (BRT).²⁴ The JRLO provides the UK Ops focus for the brigade and is the primary point of contact for lead tri-Service liaison with the civil authorities, emergency services and other civilian agencies on all aspects of IEM. The BRT provides the Brigade HQ with 24-hour manning through a pool of watchkeepers and additional liaison officers.

(3) **Royal Air Force.** The RAF has 8 HQPTC staff officers parented by RAF stations throughout the UK as RAF Regional Liaison Officers. In addition to representing the RAF, they are the RAF members of the Regional HQ's JSCG.

b. **Pillar 2.** Communications for the Regional chain of command during UK Ops forms Pillar 2. The National²⁵ Communications fixed and deployable CIS infrastructure is provided by 2 (NC) Signals Brigade.²⁶ The Brigade also provides support to a number of separate national and HQ LAND tasks, which may mean its elements deploy separately from the other pillars.

c. **Pillar 3.** The necessary force elements provided by regular and reserve forces. The force elements will be determined by the planning process described in Chapter 6, which will determine the tasks to be conducted, the capability required and match this to forces that are available. For some eventualities contingency plans based around a particular capability or event already exist, whilst other situations would require a bespoke plan. The plan would also detail the command arrangements. Usually support under MACA procedures would initially be provided by the most appropriate and available regular unit, which can be drawn from any of the units in the Armed Forces currently located in the UK. The single Service HQs at paragraph 231 would generate these forces, under the strategic guidance of the MOD, to a mounting point where they would be taken under the specified command. There are 3 types of forces that can contribute to the military response:

(1) Specialist Elements that provide capabilities or advice beyond the capabilities of, or in addition to, the Civil Power. For example, EOD,²⁷ SAR.

²³ London District is established for 2.

²⁴ Provided by nominated reservists drawn from the TA, RNR and RAuxAF.

²⁵ GB only, not Northern Ireland.

²⁶ See Annex 2F.

²⁷ See Annex 2D.

- (2) Regular Forces at varying degrees of notice that do not train for this task and provide the required capability by virtue of training for warfighting.
- (3) The Reserves, including the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces.²⁸

Examples of Military Aid

233. The planning and command structure outlined above is responsible for identifying the most appropriate capabilities required to perform a particular task. The initial stage in the consideration of a request for military assistance is always therefore the identification of the task to be performed. By the same token, requests from the civil authorities couched in terms of the provision of support by a particular unit are (at best) incomplete and may actually be unhelpful. It is the identification of a task to be performed that gives a request substance which will then be considered depending on the situation, the availability of appropriate military expertise to perform the task, and agreement by MOD Ministers that the task is both suitable and important enough to justify the provision of Armed Forces support. Examples of the application of Armed Forces skills to particular tasks include:

- a. **Search Assistance.** Service personnel providing specialist support to the police in the search for missing persons and to the fire service in the search and rescue of casualties following a major incident.
- b. **Manpower.** The Armed Forces can allocate organised bodies of personnel to miscellaneous tasks such as helping prepare or repair flood defences.
- c. **Reconnaissance.** Air assets and small reconnaissance parties (especially in open ground such as moorland) can assist in the provision of information to an Incident Commander in order to allow the most effective combined response to a situation.
- d. **Temporary Mortuaries.** The Armed Forces can provide hard-standing for temporary mortuary facilities at the time of a major incident. Such support, however, needs to take into account limitations on access to Armed Forces facilities.
- e. **Engineering.** The Armed Forces can provide engineering expertise and equipment such as trackway for improving access, temporary bridging, ferry equipment or boats for crossing floods or rivers, plant equipment for moving earth/debris and construction and specialised equipment for emergency water supply, pumping or diving teams.

²⁸ See Annex 2F.

- f. **Airlift.** Both fixed and rotary wing aircraft may be available to move personnel and supplies to/from remote or cut-off areas.
- g. **Assistance to Defra during Severe Weather.** Farmers may request Service assistance, such as helicopter and motor transport, to provide urgent supplies of feed to livestock isolated by heavy snow or floods.²⁹

When considering military assistance, it is important to bear in mind both the qualitative and the quantitative characteristics of the Armed Forces.

234. The suitability of Armed Forces support is governed by the following characteristics:

- a. The Armed Forces are relatively small when compared to the numbers of personnel in the emergency services, health service and local authorities.
- b. The skills, the equipment, and the capabilities of the Armed Forces are designed for use on the battlefield. They are not primarily designed for conditions in the UK and its territorial seas. Both the applicability and the public impact of deploying battlefield capabilities, skills, and equipment should be taken into account when undertaking operations in the UK.
- c. The Armed Forces themselves draw on civil capabilities wherever possible. Armed Forces medical support, for example, is closely integrated into the National Health Service. Civil contractors undertake most logistic, transport, construction, and other support tasks not directly related to battlefield conditions.
- d. This allows Armed Forces personnel to concentrate on their core business – which is to prepare for and deploy on military operations. Using Armed Forces personnel to undertake civil tasks may damage their ability to prepare for tasks they are regularly asked to perform in the course of their normal duties.
- e. The Armed Forces do not have a monopoly on equipment suitable for use in emergencies, and even the specialist skills and equipment within the Armed Forces often have civil counterparts, more suited and specialist to the civil environment, and often on a much larger scale. All-terrain vehicles, for

²⁹ Special charging arrangements exist for requests sponsored by Defra, the Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD), the Welsh Assembly Government Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department (ARAD) or the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland (DARDNI). Individual farmers who request assistance directly from local units or Service Headquarters should be advised to contact their local Government Office Regional Resilience team, SEERAD, ARAD or DARDNI office, so that requests in each locality can be co-ordinated and assets allocated to the best effect.

example, are quite common in the civil sector. The leading road haulage companies in the UK all exceed the Armed Forces in size and capability (other than on the battlefield). Armed Forces engineering capabilities are especially tailored for battlefield use and, even taken as a whole, they generally do not exceed in size or capability the civilian engineering resources available in a medium sized town in the UK.

SECTION III – CIVIL/MILITARY LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS

Liaison with Other Government Departments

235. Within the MOD, D CT & UK Ops serve as the tri-Service focal point for all UK Operations and especially MACA. Likewise, D CT & UK Ops is responsible for liaison with OGDs, mainly the Home Office, OD Sec and the CCS. D CT & UK Ops also sit on various cross government meetings and is represented at the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee ACPO(TAM).

Regional/Local Liaison

236. **Joint Regional Liaison Officer.** The JRLO is the main focus for the integration of UK Ops with the civil authorities. Where geography prevents the JRLO from regular contact with the civil authorities, he is supported by Military Liaison Officers who are usually the appointed Commanding Officers of military establishments within the region. Single Service liaison staff (RN ICP and RAFRLO) are utilised in their liaison role and have direct line of communication to the JRLO. The Armed Forces are also represented by the Regional Brigade Commander or JRLO at Government Office of the Region (GOR) Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) and at Local Resilience Forums (LRF).

237. The JRLO's principal objectives are to ensure:

- a. Within each region the UK Ops activities of the 3 Services are co-ordinated to provide the optimum level of support when requested by the civil authorities.
- b. Representatives of the civil authorities are made fully aware of the capabilities and structures of the Armed Forces that could be employed under MACA procedures. This may include acting in a liaison capacity within national, regional or local civil emergency control centres when appropriate.
- c. The requirement for effective civil/military liaison is appreciated by all parties conducting emergency planning and that it is addressed in military and civil contingency plans and regularly tested.

The JRLO will also:

- d. In co-ordination with his single Service colleagues identify opportunities for military participation in civil emergency exercises or other training events in support of the objectives above.
- e. Exercise a co-ordinating role for liaison, planning and the execution of UK Ops within a Region in partnership with the single-Service regional liaison officers in order to achieve an effective network of local liaison across all 3 Services for routine UK Operations.
- f. Ensure that any tri-Service guidance on UK Ops is promulgated within his functional area of responsibility and that generic issues affecting regional military/civil liaison or tri-Service UK Ops are reported to SJC (UK).
- g. Act as the lead tri-Service representative as a point both of initial advice to the Civil Authority on military matters and liaison with the Regional Bde HQ.

238. **Joint Service Co-ordination Group.** The Joint Service Co-ordination Group (JSCG) is a military forum for the discussion of military issues, with attendance by key representatives of the civilian organizations that are likely to have involvement in, or make a contribution to, military activity. JSCGs are required to sit once a year but may be called more regularly to address specific MSMO or MACA operations and contingencies. Their main tasks are the preparation and co-ordination of tri-Service UK Ops within the region, liaison and co-ordination with regular and reserve units likely to become involved in UK Ops and ensuring that all military planning is consistent with the plans made by the relevant civil authorities.

239. JSCG attendees include (attendance varying depending on the scope of the meeting):

- a. Regional Brigade Commander (Chairman).
- b. JRLO (Secretary).
- c. GOR Resilience Director.
- d. ACPO (TAM) Representative.
- e. Brigade Staff Officers, including representatives from communications, medical and logistics branches.
- f. Commanders of Regional Military Units, including representatives of US Forces when present within the Region.

- g. Single Service representatives: RN by NROs or the ICP staff officers from the Naval Base Commands, RAF by the RAFRLOs.
- h. Representative from the Regional Divisional Headquarters.
- i. Representatives of Local Authorities, Emergency Services/Voluntary Aid Societies or other agencies in attendance as required, e.g. Department of Health/National Health Service (NHS) representatives should the RAMP Plan be activated.

Military-Police Liaison

240. **Counter Terrorism.** The Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) Committee (ACPO(TAM)), which CT & UK Ops Dir (Mil) normally attends, provides the direction to Police for the required liaison arrangements between the Services and the civil police. Such direction will be dependent on the situation at the time. This policy direction will be co-ordinated through the Home Office Terrorism Protection Unit (TPU), Regional Assistant Chief Constables Operations and Crime Committees (or equivalent) and through the single Services to the JSCGs. ACPO (TAM) (UK) Police Military Liaison Officer (PMLO) will assist by providing a conduit by which detailed liaison with individual Police Forces is to take place.

241. ACPO(TAM) deals with one of the Association of Chief Police Officers' main business areas. It works on policing policy issues in five portfolios: operational, technical, international liaison, legislation and training. In recent years³⁰ it has:

- a. Identified key police objectives to meet the long-term terrorist threat through enhanced preventative measures, pro-active operations and more co-ordinated post incident investigation.
- b. Provided advice to the Government on the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.
- c. Provided support to forces in providing a co-ordinated police response to investigate Irish Republican terrorist attacks.
- d. Developed a co-ordinated approach to countering violent animal rights activity.
- e. Supported a CT Liaison Officer working within the Home Office TPU to advise forces on certain CT arrangements, the Home Office Manual of Counter Terrorist contingency planning guidance, and CT exercises.

³⁰ ACPO Annual Report 2002.

242. **Association of Chief Police Officers' Emergency Procedures Sub Committee.** ACPO Emergency Procedures Sub Committee (ACPO(EP)) is a sub-committee of the ACPO General Policing Committee and is responsible for the provision of all guidance and policy on all resilience and consequence management issues for civil emergencies. This is embodied in the ACPO Emergency Procedures Manual, which provides the basis for all police emergency planning. In order to ensure the integration of police crisis and consequence Counter Terrorism policy, Chairman ACPO(EP) permanently represents the sub-committee on ACPO(TAM). SJC(UK) is represented at ACPO(EP) by the J5 staff. ACPO(EP) does not maintain representatives in the ACPO regions and all EP policy and guidance for military liaison and planning is communicated through Police Force Ops/Plans staffs and to ACPO(TAM) representatives.

243. **Police Military Liaison Officer.** ACPO (TAM) funds a Police Superintendent who is responsible for police liaison on UK Operations. PMLO co-ordinates military/police liaison and is available for liaison and advice to HQs and other appropriate military functions and activities. In England and Wales the PMLO is a police Superintendent (currently based in the Sussex Police force). Two Superintendents in Scotland (currently based in the Grampian and Strathclyde Forces) perform a similar role, as does a PSNI Superintendent in Northern Ireland.

244. **Police Military Liaison Officer Responsibilities.** The PMLO co-ordinates activities between the military and individual police forces. This enables:

- a. Police policy development at the strategic level.
- b. Routine liaison at the regional and local level.
- c. Integration during a multi-agency response.
- d. The development and maintenance of understanding, knowledge and trust between the military and the police.

245. PMLO main tasks include:

- a. Providing the single point of contact between the military and the police.
- b. Delivering and implementing Police policy on the use of Regional Forces in support of the police.
- c. Co-ordinating and developing Police policy for MACP, including CT.
- d. Co-ordinating police involvement in JSCGs, RAMP and US/UK LOC Working Groups and sub-Committees.

- e. Contributing to and co-ordinating Joint Command and Operational Training.
- f. Providing police expertise in the wider security planning process and keeping the Police Military Joint Planning Procedures (PMJPP) under review.
- g. Providing, or arranging for where appropriate, police Directing Staff, speakers and representation at relevant courses, seminars and exercises.
- h. Providing or arranging police representation at Vienna Document 1999, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990, Chemical Weapons Convention Inspections and fact finding missions under the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines.

SECTION IV – FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

General

246. For the reasons outlined above, MACA activity is, with a few specific exceptions, not funded within the MOD vote and is conducted on a repayment basis. Based on Treasury rules, it is normal practice within government for Departments to charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks. No matter how valid a request for assistance may appear, Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. If the cost is not applicable to the Defence vote, then it represents an improper use of resources and must be recovered.³¹

247. There are 3 main charging levels that can be used:

- a. **Full Costs.** These cover all costs, both direct and indirect, incurred in providing the assistance, and will include basic pay and allowances of the personnel involved. This is normal government practice.
- b. **Marginal Costs.** This involves the recovery of costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. Marginal costs are applied when a task undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities can be combined with a task or activity that the MOD would undertake on its own behalf (for example when a MACA task provides training for the Armed Forces in defence-related tasks).

³¹ Failure to account for these costs may lead to legal or other sanctions on the Department and/or the individuals involved in incurring the costs.

c. **Waive Costs.** No costs are charged to the civil authority in situations where life is at risk or in exceptional other circumstances. The decision to waive costs would normally be taken centrally, often by Ministers.³²

248. Charging policy may move from one category to another during and between operations. For instance:

a. Marginal costs may be charged in the early stages of an operation but, where the period of assistance becomes extended and starts to cause detriment to MOD's primary responsibilities, the charges may increase to full-costs.

b. If there are extended or repeated calls for the same MOD support, full costs may be applied. Support for regular annual events will, for instance, be charged at full costs. Regular use of the same MOD resources is likely to attract full costs, even if they are being used by different civil authorities.

c. If the civil authorities are capable of making suitable arrangements (for instance through mutual aid) but have not done so, full costs are likely to be applied.

d. If the civil authority itself charges for the service they are providing, or has an additional budget allocation for the overall task, then full costs are likely to be applied.

249. MOD Ministers can also decide to reduce or waive costs should they regard it as being in the national interest to do so. This decision would be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the factors outlined above.³³

Financial Provisions for Military Aid to the Civil Power

250. Some areas of MACP, for example routine EOD/IEDD, are funded by OGDs (in this case the Home Office and Scottish Executive), therefore costs would not fall to or be met by MOD. Due to the nature of MACP, the basis for costs would normally be decided before an operation was approved. Guidance can be obtained from D CT & UK Ops.

251. As this would suggest, the MOD accepts that it may occasionally be appropriate to establish dedicated MOD resources in support of the civil authorities,

³² However, under MACC Cat A rules unit commanders are empowered to respond immediately to save life and waive costs – See Chapter 5 for details.

³³ MOD will **not** waive costs on grounds of national security. Those aspects of national security for which the MOD has responsibility are funded within the defence vote. A MACA request might be related to national security, but would by definition fall within the responsibilities, and therefore the budget, of the requesting Department or agency. Whilst the MOD may decide that the provision of Armed Forces' support can be agreed on grounds of national security, that should not be taken as an indication that costs will be waived in whole or in part. The circumstances under which it is in the national **interest** to waive costs are liable to vary, and the decision rests entirely with MOD Ministers. It is the general rule that the national interest is best served by ensuring that the defence budget is spent on defence.

notably when the MOD has unique skills and capabilities unavailable to the civil authorities. Provision of dedicated MOD resources should, however, be seen as an exception rather than a rule. The MOD will, in any event, ensure that it is fully reimbursed for the provision of these dedicated resources. Civil authorities should always retain the option of developing these skills and capabilities themselves.

252. In a few areas (for instance coordinating the provision of civil air transport) MOD can offer a service that facilitates operational activity by the civil authorities without involving the Armed Forces. This support is generally provided on a cost plus basis (i.e. the cost of the support plus a handling charge).

Financial Provisions for Military Aid to the Civil Community

253. **General.** A local unit commander has the authority to waive charges if support is provided according to the terms of MACC Cat A outlined in Chapter 5³⁴ (i.e. that the support is urgently necessary for the purposes of the alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in times of disaster). All expenditure should, however, be reported through the budgetary chain to the relevant Civil Secretary/Budget Manager.

254. Guidance on responsibilities for ensuring that appropriate financial arrangements are made is given in paragraph 262, but all officers dealing with applications for assistance should be aware of the basis of charge for each task and, where applicable, the requirement for appropriate insurance cover and for an indemnity. In all cases it is important that those requesting assistance should be aware of:

- a. The financial implications of the request, even though in an emergency there may be no time to complete the paperwork in advance.
- b. The need for all expenditure/receipts (estimated or otherwise) to be reported through the budgetary chain to the relevant Civil Secretary/Budget Manager.

255. There are 4 financial principles governing military assistance:

- a. Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. Where work is done by the Armed Forces for other purposes, MOD is required by Treasury rules to secure reimbursement for the costs incurred.
- b. Defence Votes are to be safeguarded against risks. An applicant for MACC assistance will, therefore, be required to make any necessary insurance and indemnity arrangements.

³⁴ MOD can and has raised charges on civil authorities when the claim that the support was urgent proved false.

c. The basis of charge will vary according to the nature of the assistance to which it relates. Adherence to the principles set out in paragraph 247 generally requires MOD to recover the full costs of assistance provided to any outside body. Charging full costs avoids subsidising non-defence tasks, and will generally ensure that MOD does not undercut commercial companies which could provide the service. It also acts as a useful mechanism to limit the amount of assistance requested to the minimum necessary. However, where there is imminent danger to life, charges are waived. In situations where there is general danger to life, charges are reduced from the full to the marginal level.

d. Service personnel are not to be used as cheap labour or in competition with commercial firms.

256. Marginal costs can be raised when Armed Forces support provides clear and palpable advantage to the Armed Forces, to the extent that MOD funds can be diverted from their normal programme to the MACA task being undertaken. Nonetheless, and for the reasons outlined above, provision of MAGD and MACP support at no loss or zero cost still requires MOD Ministerial approval.

Preparation of Estimates³⁵

257. It is often impossible to predict with any accuracy the cost of most Armed Forces support, which should, in any case, only be called upon as a last resort, and when there is no alternative. A civil agency that bases its request for MAGD or MACP support on the idea that Armed Forces' support is the cheap option overlooks these points, and may well be surprised when the actual bill is delivered. As a rule, therefore, MOD does not promise to provide a cost estimate (as opposed to guidance on the charging regime) when it considers provision of the support, and never agrees to keep the costs of the support 'within budget'.

258. An estimate of the full cost of the support would form the basis for the provision of **dedicated** MOD resources in support of the civil authorities and for MACC Cat B and C support. In those (and some other) circumstances, an estimate of the charge for the task should be prepared with the greatest possible accuracy, taking account of data in the technical reconnaissance report and including the costs of all reconnaissance work, assessed on the same basis as the task itself (i.e. full or marginal costs). When an estimate of the costs is reported to the sponsor, it should be made clear that the estimate is liable to variation and that the charge will not be determined finally until completion of the task. If it should prove necessary to revise significantly an estimate which has already been given, the revised estimate must be submitted in

³⁵ Advice is to be sought from Finance staff before presentation of any estimates to a potential sponsor.

writing to the sponsor, who should be invited to confirm agreement that the task should proceed or continue.

Military Aid to the Civil Community Category B - Routine Assistance

259. The basis of charge will vary according to the status of the sponsor:

- a. For assistance to a local authority or non-commercial concern (i.e. a charitable or non-profit-making organisation), charges can be reduced to marginal cost if the conditions apply.
- b. Non-operational assistance to the police should not be considered under the provisions of MACC but under those for Training and Logistic Assistance to the civil Police (TLAP).³⁶
- c. One of the prerequisites for the granting of MACC³⁷ Category B is that the task must constitute good military training value. During the reconstruction phase following a major emergency, there may be tasks of a non-emergency nature which, by virtue of the training value which they afford, can be undertaken within the scope of a Category B deployment. If all the relevant conditions are met, it is possible to charge marginal costs to a public body or non-commercial concern.

Military Aid to the Civil Community Category C - Attachment of Volunteers

260. The social service organisation requesting the assistance should normally be charged the marginal costs incurred in connection with the attachment of Service personnel (e.g. travelling expenses and cost of accommodation). MOD will continue to issue pay and normal allowances without recovery.

261. **Training.** When determining the charging basis for military participation in a civil emergency exercise, consideration should be given to the extent of the military role envisaged in the emergency in question:

- a. Where the MOD agrees to participate in combined military/civilian exercises in order to test its own procedures (e.g. command-post exercises) costs would normally be waived.
- b. Where military participation is primarily of benefit to the civil authority requesting it, full costs charges would normally be raised.

³⁶ See Section VIII.

³⁷ See Chapter 5.

- c. Where no military role whatever is envisaged - giving military participation in the exercise something of the nature of a TLAP deployment - it may be appropriate to levy full costs.

262. **Recovery of Charges.** Responsibility for the preparation, presentation and recovery of charges for MACC Category B and C tasks rests with the following authorities:

- a. Royal Navy - the appropriate NBC.
- b. Royal Marines - the appropriate Royal Marines HQ.
- c. Army - the appropriate District/Divisional HQ.
- d. Royal Air Force - the appropriate Command Headquarters, except for helicopters for which details should be reported to MOD Finance Policy.

SECTION V – MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE MOUNTING OF OPERATIONS

263. MSMO involves the planning for and the deployment, supporting and recovery of military operations outside the UK. This is chiefly concerned with RAMP, UK Line(s) of Communications (LOCs), US/UK LOCs and their associated Joint Contingency Plans (JCP),³⁸ and Defence Key Points. A key feature of this planning is extensive liaison with civil authorities, particularly the police. This is usually conducted on a contingency planning basis via the regional JSCG or during operations via the JRLO who will have developed close relations with his police counterparts.

Reception Arrangements for Military Patients

264. It is Government Policy that British military casualties occurring overseas who require secondary surgery or specialised medical treatment will, whenever possible, be repatriated. There is also a potential requirement to treat Prisoners of War under the same arrangements. The NHS is responsible for the reception, triage and acute secondary care of military patients evacuated from overseas to the UK. The NHS determines which NHS hospital receives military casualties, based on bed availability and clinical need.

265. The RAMP plan is modular in concept and based on 4 levels of casualty management:

- a. **Level 1.** The day to day Aeromedical Evacuation system through the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine (RCDM).

³⁸ Extant Joint Logistic Plans are being rewritten as JCPs.

- b. **Level 2.** Arrangements to accommodate a surge in Aeromedical evacuation beyond the capabilities of the RCDM and University Hospital Birmingham, within the local area's capacity management systems.
- c. **Level 3.** Arrangements for the dispersal of patients to a wider area in the Midlands and East of England.
- d. **Level 4.** Full implementation of the RAMP plan to disperse patients throughout the entire UK NHS.

266. Depending on the situation the levels may not be activated sequentially; the level required will be driven by the prevailing capacity of the NHS at the time of notification of inbound casualties.

UK Lines of Communications

267. In order to deploy military capability from the UK to support overseas operations the UK peacetime LOC will need protection and reinforcement by the activation of measures such as movement control, or the Main Road Route System. The SJC (UK) is responsible for the maintenance of plans to provide support to the UK LOC.

- a. Movement control requires the activation of various movements teams, liaison staff and reinforcements. The personnel are used to enhance security and support outloading plans, easing the flow of men and materiel from and to the operational theatre. The personnel would be located at key supply depots, deployment ports (including civilian ports) and airfields/airports and railheads.
- b. The Main Road Route System is activated where significant road movement is required and includes:
 - (1) Enlisting the assistance of civil agencies such as the police and the AA in the Royal Military Police's traffic control arrangements.
 - (2) Establishing and manning Long Halt Areas by Division/Brigade HQs to provide parking, vehicle repair, Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL) stocks and rest areas.
 - (3) Marking civilian vehicles under military control.

US/UK Lines of Communications

268. The US maintains a number of bases in the UK in peace, and their size and number may increase in tension/crisis and in war. The UK has bilateral arrangements with the US to provide host nation support for the reception/outload of US forces

to/from the UK and the staging of capability through the UK prior to or during a deployment. The details of the agreed plans are contained within JCPs.³⁹

269. Support under JCPs can range from minor ad hoc requirements to the implementation of one or more JCPs to full activation of the US/UK LOC. In principle, any request for assistance would require MOD approval, although there is provision for certain minor requirements to be approved at lower levels when the JCPs or full US/UK LOC plan has not been activated.

Defence Key Points

270. Plans for the protection and support of Defence Key Points (DKP) are maintained by the owner of site or system and held by SJC (UK). The responsibility for the provision of this support rests with the owner of the DKP. Where this is not possible the SJC(UK) will be required to co-ordinate the provision of resources and support.

Other Related Operations

271. Operations related to MSMO include:

- a. **Nuclear Accident Response Organisation** Although not strictly part of MSMO, the MOD Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) is a related military operation and is mentioned to place it in context. The aim of the NARO is to ensure, in conjunction with the appropriate civil agencies, an effective response to a defence nuclear accident; the key objective is to protect public health and safety. Military assets are held at notice to respond to such an incident.
- b. **Return of UK Entitled Personnel.** In the event of escalating violence in countries overseas, a military operation may be mounted to remove UK Entitled Persons from danger. These operations are the responsibility of PJHQ. If, however, there should be a large-scale evacuation of forces personnel and dependants from UK foreign garrisons, then the reception at APOD/SPODs, accommodation, feeding and rehabilitation will be a UK military operation.
- c. **Military Resilience.** Military resilience is the means by which MOD units and establishments survive and recover from events which significantly impair their ability to carry out normal functions. It addresses the consequences of extraordinary events and responses beyond the scope of current business continuity planning and makes provision for uninterrupted, sustainable support to overseas operations and core defence functions.

³⁹ The Arrangement was activated to support Coalition operations in Iraq during 2003 and 2004.

SECTION VI – INTEGRITY OF UK WATERS

Introduction

272. Higher Defence Policy and the Military Tasks are described in Section I. This publication has so far addressed MT 2.1, MACA, MSMO and MHD. This section is an introduction, brief due to classification, of those operations in the UK related to MT 2.3 (Integrity of UK Waters)⁴⁰ that have been conducted as part of normal military business for many years, indeed, in some cases, centuries. Although at first sight these appear to be distinct from those discussed earlier, they are in fact a facet of the overall characteristics of UK Operations outlined earlier in the chapter. The Armed Forces continue to monitor UK waters, and maintain the capacity to adapt and prepare for a re-emerging military threat requiring MHD. In practice, however, operations in UK waters are undertaken using MACA procedures, in support of other agencies and Departments with responsibility for maritime security (see para 277).

Strategic Context

273. The maritime domain is a fundamental element of the UK economy and security. The UK waters are rich in fish, natural oil and gas, 95% of the UK's trade by weight is transported by sea, the maritime commercial sector employs more than 250,000 people directly (and a further 250,000 indirectly) with an annual turnover of £37 billion⁴¹ and the local waters are used by millions of vessels every year. Conversely, the long sea boundary around the UK provides particular challenges in ensuring security against terrorism, drugs trade or illegal immigrants and in enforcing UK legislation. The complex, interrelated array of organisations, military and civilian activity and the wide range of economic issues and security threats is commonly referred to as 'The Maritime Tapestry'.

274. **Strategic Environment.** Monitoring, policing and reacting to incidents and illegal activity in the waters around the coasts of the UK provide significant challenges for Government Departments and are the catalyst for military involvement:

- a. **Terrorism.** The potential range of incidents offshore includes:
 - (1) Attack on an Offshore Energy Installation (OEI).
 - (2) The hijack of a commercial ship with hostages.
 - (3) Covert use of sea freight to bring in weapons, personnel and/or munitions to further terrorist attacks ashore.

⁴⁰ **Integrity of UK Waters.** To demonstrate British sovereignty within and ensure the integrity of the UK's territorial waters and, where necessary, to protect the UK's rights and interests in the surrounding seas, including port and route survey.

⁴¹ Figures from Sea Vision UK, www.nmm.ac.uk.

- (4) Use of a renegade ship to deliver Weapon(s) of Mass Effect into a UK port.
- b. **Drugs.** As well as direct drug smuggling, UK waters are regularly used for cooping⁴² in support of the cross-Atlantic trade, as well as for direct access into the UK drugs market.
- c. **Pollution.** Illegal⁴³ or accidental discharge of effluents and/or cargo away from the coast.
- d. **Illegal Immigration.** While immigration controls exist, there will be people desperate enough to circumvent them illegally, and unscrupulous persons to exploit them.
- e. **Merchant Traffic.** The waters around the UK support a large volume of sea traffic. Whilst positive for the economy, the scale⁴⁴ makes monitoring this movement extremely difficult.
- f. **Fishery Conservation.** The British Fishery Limit (BFL) generates 70% of all fish landings from European waters. Fish conservation and enforcement of Fisheries Legislation within the 270,000 square mile BFL, in which 10,000 fishing vessels are permitted to fish, require substantial surveillance and policing effort.
- g. **Oil and Gas.** There are large natural oil and gas reserves within the UK sector of the North Sea and strong geological evidence of further deposits to the North and West of Scotland; such valuable strategic resources and their supporting activities need regulation and protection.
- h. **Port Security.** As official points of entry into and exit from the UK, ports are an obvious control node in regulating illegal activities. They also represent attractive targets for terrorists.

Legal

275. UK⁴⁵ law, and the jurisdiction of UK civil authorities stretches to the 12 mile limit of territorial seas. Conduct and jurisdiction in international waters are governed by international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

⁴² Transfer of drugs from a 'mother' ship to smaller 'daughter' vessels in which the drugs will be landed.

⁴³ Often under cover of darkness or bad weather.

⁴⁴ The Dover Straits is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, with over a quarter of a million shipping movements each year. Over 50 million people travel to, from and around the UK by ferry each year. Every day approximately 15 million containers are in transit at sea worldwide and on land and, of these, only 2% are screened.

⁴⁵ There are some differences between Scottish law and the law in the rest of the UK, notably in its application to offshore facilities.

Military involvement in the policing of UK territorial and international waters is under the following MACP arrangements:

- a. **HM Customs and Excise.** Commissioned Officers in the RN have statutory powers as Customs and Excise Officers⁴⁶ to exercise jurisdiction within the UK's territorial seas and over UK-flagged vessels on the high seas for customs and excise purposes (including the suppression of illicit drug trafficking). However, these powers are rarely used and RN warships will usually have HM Customs and Excise (HMC&E) officials embarked when employed in drug interdiction work.⁴⁷ An RN vessel's powers in territorial waters extend into international waters under the principle of 'hot pursuit'. Hot pursuit is deemed to exist if there is good reason to suspect that a vessel has contravened UK Law within territorial waters but has entered international waters.
- b. **Maritime Counter Terrorism.** Domestic criminal jurisdiction (exercised by the civil authorities) within the UK, under which Maritime Counter Terrorism (MCT) operations are conducted, extends to the limits of Territorial Seas and to the 500-metre safety zones established around OEI on the UK Continental Shelf. In 1998, an international convention⁴⁸ created a mechanism for extending jurisdiction to the high seas in the event of acts of violence, committed by non-state actors.
- c. **Fishery Protection.** Fishery protection is the longest running law enforcement/MACP operation involving military forces. All RN Officers are designated British Sea Fisheries Officers (BSFOs), under the terms of the Sea Fisheries Act 1968, which endows extensive powers of policing. However, in practice, only designated and qualified BSFOs, operating within the RN Fishery Protection Squadron, are authorised to police the BFL.

Central Government Responsibilities

276. The main government departments with interests associated with MT 2.3 are summarised at Figure 2.4.

⁴⁶ Granted under the terms of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.

⁴⁷ The Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 extends the powers to stop, board, search and escort to port a suspected vessel in international waters, provided that the state in which they are registered is a party to the 1988 UN Drugs Convention and has given its authority for the action.

⁴⁸ Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.

| Duty/Responsibility | Government Department/Agency |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Maritime Environmental Protection (MARPOL) | DfT (MCA) |
| Salvage | DfT(MCA) |
| Investigation of Maritime Accidents | DfT (MAIB) ⁴⁹ |
| Safety at sea | DfT (MCA) |
| Civil Search and Rescue | DfT (MCA) |
| Port and shipping security | DfT (TRANSEC), ⁵⁰ MOD ⁵¹ |
| MCT | Home Office, MOD, Northern Ireland Office (NIO), Police |
| UK law enforcement ⁵² | Police |
| Immigration control | Home Office ⁵³ |
| Enforcement of UK customs and fiscal regulations (Contraband interdiction) | HMC&E ^{54,55} |
| Fishery Protection (FP) | Defra, ⁵⁶ Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Northern Ireland) (DARD(NI)) |
| Military SAR | MOD in conjunction with DfT(MCA) |
| Defence of territorial integrity | MOD |
| Investigation of Air Accidents | DfT(AAIB) ⁵⁷ |
| Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid | Home Office/Local Authorities/Police |

Figure 2.4 - Government Department Responsibilities

277. **Port and Shipping Security.** Maritime security is an integral part of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) responsibilities. A revised, comprehensive security regime came into force on 1 Jul 04. The mandatory security measures, adopted in December 2003, include the International Ship and Port Facility Security

⁴⁹ Marine Accident Investigation Board.

⁵⁰ Responsible for the security of all major means of transport.

⁵¹ MOD - NBC for Naval Dockyards.

⁵² To 12nm territorial seas limit and safety zone around OEI.

⁵³ HMC&E in the absence of Immigration Officers.

⁵⁴ HMC&E's departmental responsibility is to the Chief Secretary of the Treasury, an arrangement borne of the primary responsibility of Customs to collect revenue on goods brought into the UK.

⁵⁵ A sub-department, Maritime A, runs the maritime element of HMC&E's responsibility, including operation of a fleet of 5 cutters (maintained at 30-minute standby throughout the year; 2 generally stationed in the SW, 2 in Scotland and 1 in the SE) and a Dornier and an Islander aircraft.

⁵⁶ Whereas Defra use the RN for surface presence and interdiction, SFPA and DAFNI use their own protection vessels. Airborne surveillance is provided to the SFPA and Defra through a contract with Direct Flight Aviation.

⁵⁷ Air Accidents Investigation Branch.

Code (ISPS Code). The code contains detailed security-related requirements for government, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B). Within the UK, implementation of the ISPS code is the responsibility of the DfT TRANSEC and the MCA.

Military Involvement under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

278. **Fishery Protection.** Since 1985, military involvement has been subject to a Contract with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), now Defra, to provide fishery protection around the coast of England and Wales. The MOD maintains a minimum of 2 Fishery Protection Vessels (FPV) at sea throughout the year, except during the 2-week period over Christmas and the New Year when a FPV will be kept on standby.

279. **Maritime Counter Terrorism.** Contingency plans exist for rapid force deployment to meet a terrorist incident onboard a civilian merchant ship, including the release of hostages, the protection of OEI and to deal with renegade shipping.

280. **Contraband Interdiction Operations.** The Armed Forces contribute to contraband interdiction both during routine operations around the coast of the UK and by offering military capability at request for a specific operation. Routine surveillance is conducted by RAF and RN assets during their routine operations but for specific operations, a range of military resources could be allocated under MACP procedures.

281. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** All 3 Services provide EOD expertise as MACP, under the tasking authority of the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC), Didcot.⁵⁸

282. **Search and Rescue.** The military, in conjunction with the DfT, maintain a UK military/civilian SAR capability to ensure the most effective and timely response is available to assist personnel in hazardous situations.⁵⁹

283. **Search.** The MOD conducts wide area search activity for sunken vessels/aircraft on request from the MAIB/AAIB. RN ships with high definition sonar, remote underwater vehicles or clearance divers may be employed for this role.

284. **Survey.** The RN's surveying squadron is tasked world-wide in support of the Defence Hydrographic Programme, which supports all naval activities including MCM Route Survey, plus the civil marine sector through the supply of hydrographic publications.

⁵⁸ See Annex 2D for details.

⁵⁹ See Annex 2E for details.

285. **Route Survey.** A series of shipping routes around the UK, establishing transit lanes and routes for entry/exit from ports are subject to route survey (RTSV). Each route is mine-hunted in accordance with MOD priorities in order to provide an accurate database of bottom contacts so that a subsequent minehunting operation can be conducted quickly and with greater confidence.

286. **Diving.** RN/Army diving teams may be used for underwater tasks under MACC arrangements, although MACC rules require that this will only be undertaken in the absence of suitable commercial contractors.

Command and Control

287. The strategic, operational and tactical command and control of operations in UK waters forms an element of the overall MOD command and control structure outlined above. Routine (non-operational) maritime activity remains under single Service command, as does routine (non-operational) activity on land. CINCFLEET is Joint Commander for fishery protection operations (in support of Defra).

288. Armed Forces Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft are co-ordinated by MOD's Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) located at RAF Kinloss (see Annex 2E). In common with tactical level command and control on land, tactical level command and control for maritime operations can if necessary be augmented at short notice by the establishment of a specialist maritime headquarters (known as CTF 320).

SECTION VII – INTEGRITY OF UK AIRSPACE

289. This section is a brief introduction to those operations associated with MT 2.4 (Integrity of UK Airspace).⁶⁰ Nearly 2 million flights carrying over 200 million passengers pass through UK airspace⁶¹ annually and the baseline predictions suggest that this will rise to over 240 million passengers in 2.3 million flights by 2007/8.⁶² The UK is responsible under ICAO⁶³ and NATO obligations for the safety and security of aircraft flying through UK airspace. Maintaining the integrity of UK airspace entails the maintenance of a continuous recognised air picture⁶⁴ and contingency plans for the interception and possible destruction of renegade and hostile aircraft.

⁶⁰ See para 205.

⁶¹ Civil Aviation Authority Corporate plan 2003, 2003/4 figures.

⁶² CAA Ibid.

⁶³ Chicago Convention 1944.

⁶⁴ Achieved by the integration of the civil ATC picture and military resources to form a Recognised Air Picture.

- a. **Hostile Aircraft.** Defence of the UK's airspace from external attack by another nation falls under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and thus NATO air defence procedures.⁶⁵
- b. **Renegade Aircraft.** A renegade aircraft is an aircraft that has been stolen or hijacked by terrorists either as a terrorist act in itself or for use as a weapon of mass effect. Contingency plans exist for dealing with such incidents; they are beyond the classification of this publication.

SECTION VIII – RELATED MILITARY ACTIVITIES

290. Some requests for support fall outside the MACA process, primarily because they are not operational activities. Assistance subject to such rules includes:

- a. Training and Logistic Assistance (TLAP) to the civil police.
- b. Aircraft Post Crash Management.

291. Other related activities of a non-emergency nature falling outside the scope of this doctrine are:

- a. Ordinary repayment services, for which full costs are normally charged. An example is the loan and hire of Service premises for recreational purposes.
- b. Use of private land for military training. This is at Service initiation (requests from a landowner would be a MACC Cat B request) and is subject to particular regulations.
- c. Voluntary part-time aid which individual Service personnel may give in their own free time and on their own initiative.

Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Police⁶⁶

292. TLAP does not form part of MACA, but guidance is included in this publication to ensure the widest distribution. Service involvement in the provision of TLAP carries a risk of misinterpretation, leading to the suggestion that the Services are becoming involved in areas properly the province of the civil police, and it is therefore sensitive. These difficulties can normally be overcome by distinguishing between involvement in police operational activity and involvement in other police activity. Any support provided which engages the Armed Forces in a police operation should be regarded as MACP.

⁶⁵ Allied Joint Publication 3.3 '*Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine*'.

⁶⁶ Occasionally requests for similar assistance are received from other organisations such as HM Prison Service or HM C&E, they should be treated in the same manner as requests from the Police.

293. **Training.** All requests from police forces for military training of any kind, whether for vacancies on Service courses or for ad-hoc arrangements such as the provision of instructors, are to be referred to D CT & UK Ops through the appropriate chain of command. Local commanders have authority to permit in certain circumstances the use of MOD facilities for police training; details are at Annex 2G.

294. **Logistics.** When the police deploy in relatively large numbers to deal with such occasions as large-scale demonstrations and public events, the Services may be requested to provide logistic support such as accommodation, stores, transport or catering. All such requests are to be referred to D CT & UK Ops through the chain of command giving details of the exact purpose of the police's request for facilities and the nature and location of the police operation it would support.

a. **Accommodation.** Accommodation may be provided at the discretion of NBCs, Regional Bde/Div Commanders or RAF Station Commanders where public order issues or events with a high public profile are not involved. In all cases:

(1) The general public is not to be admitted and accommodation is to be used only for administrative purposes (i.e. not for temporary police stations or arrest centres).

(2) The military establishments involved are not to be in the immediate area of the police operations and are therefore unlikely to become a target for public disturbances.

(3) Arrested persons are not to be brought onto or held on MOD Property for any purpose.

(4) Full costs are to be recovered.

b. **Supply of Public Order Control Equipment.** D CT & UK Ops must be notified immediately of all requests for purchase or loan of Service equipment and clothing. Such instances are likely to be extremely rare; police forces are now very well equipped. In an emergency it may be possible for MOD to authorise release of certain types of equipment; this will only result from a formal request by police forces through the Home Office to MOD.

295. **Procedure.** Requests for approval submitted to D CT & UK Ops through the chain of command should provide the following information:

a. Exact dates for use or the total number of days requested within a specific period.

b. Type of training and/or logistic support requested.

- c. Numbers involved.
- d. Facilities requested and location.
- e. Whether the same facilities have been used before, and date if known.
- f. Details of Service or civilian personnel and/or equipment involved.
- g. Assurance that:
 - (1) There will be no disruption to normal Service activities, including training.
 - (2) The activity will be discreet and out of public view.
 - (3) Logistic support to the police will be physically separate and unconnected with any potential disturbance and that no arrested persons will be brought onto Service property.
 - (4) Facilities cannot be provided from non-Service sources.
 - (5) Appropriate charges will be raised and accepted, and that appropriate indemnity arrangements will be made and in place prior to the assistance being given.
- h. Any other relevant details.
- i. Recommendation by each level of the chain of command on whether the request should be approved.

Aircraft Post Crash Management


296. Aircraft Post Crash Management (APCM)⁶⁷ is not covered by MACA procedures, but is included in this publication for information. The civil police have primacy at all crash sites in the UK and, off-base, the civilian emergency services will usually be first at the scene providing the immediate emergency response.

297. The ARCC will normally dispatch 2 Mountain Rescue Teams to provide the immediate guard force and to advise the emergency services. Nominated military units, with areas of responsibility aligned with Police Authority boundaries, are subsequently responsible for the cordoning and guarding of crashed military aircraft in the UK and of civilian aircraft which have crashed on a military airfield. Additionally, when Service resources are involved in the recovery process, either at the request of the Air Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) or under MACC provisions, APCM

⁶⁷ See JSP 551 'Military Flight Safety Regulations – Vol 2 Aircraft Post-Crash Management' for detail.

procedures will be applied. The nominated unit will provide an Incident Officer and guard force to assist and advise the police as necessary. Recovery of all military crashed aircraft is conducted by the Defence Logistics Organisation's Deployed Aircraft Recovery Teams (fixed wing) and Transport and Salvage Teams (rotary wing). The police or the AAIB may request assistance from the military for civil aircraft crashes and the recovery of crashed aircraft; such requests would be dealt with under MACA procedures.


ANNEX 2A – NAVAL HOME COMMAND REGIONAL BOUNDARIES¹



¹ The Channel Islands are the responsibility of NRO Wales & West.

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ANNEX 2B – REGIONAL FORCES’ BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE UK¹



¹ The Channel Islands are the responsibility of 43 (Wessex) Bde.

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ANNEX 2C – RAF REGIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS’ AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY¹



¹ The Channel Islands are the responsibility of RAFRLO South West.

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ANNEX 2D – MILITARY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL/IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DISPOSAL¹ CAPABILITIES

2D1. With the exception of the Metropolitan Police there is no non-military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) capability in the UK. EOD has 2 core categories: Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD)² and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD).³ Disposal activities in support of the police are funded by the Home Office.

2D2. Military involvement in bomb/IED disposal is co-ordinated through the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC) at Didcot. The JSEODOC will allocate military EOD teams to an incident by matching the capability requirement to the particular capabilities of the various teams.

2D3. **Royal Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** The RN EOD capability is incorporated in the diving units of the Fleet Diving Squadron (one unit tasked to EOD at Portsmouth and the Clyde) and in mine warfare vessels. RN assets are responsible for:

- a. The disposal of conventional and nuclear ordnance:
 - (1) Of naval origin found underwater.
 - (2) Found below the high water mark.
 - (3) Found on vessels and offshore installations.
 - (4) Found on or near RN property.
- b. CMD/IEDD under JSEODOC tasking.

2D4. **Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** Army responsibilities are divided between the Royal Engineers (33 Engr Regt (EOD)) and the Royal Logistics Corps (11 EOD Regt). The 2 units have complementary capabilities that are drawn from their allied skills: mines demolitions and earth moving for the RE and ammunition technical support and explosive safety for the RLC.

- a. 33 Engr Regt (EOD) has responsibility for:

¹ For a more comprehensive description of military EOD, refer to Joint Doctrine Pamphlet 2/02 '*Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal*'.

² Location, identification, rendering safe and final disposal of ammunition, pyrotechnics and explosive stores which have not functioned, or which may not have been fired.

³ Location, identification, rendering safe and final disposal of IEDs: devices placed or fabricated in an improvised manner designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass.

- (1) Enemy (mainly WW1/2) air delivered munitions, land mines and military booby traps.
 - (2) Service ammunition found during area clearance above the high water mark and in non-tidal waters unless specifically within the responsibility and expertise of the RN, RLC or RAF.
 - (3) Provision of a specialist/high risk search⁴ capability in support of IEDD.
- b. 11EOD Regt RLC is responsible for:
- (1) Clearance of land service munitions and explosive items of an unusual nature.
 - (2) Situations where the risk of a detonation is unacceptable (except where the item lies clearly within the expertise of the RN, RE or RAF).
 - (3) The military lead on IEDD, and all Army IEDD operations under MACP.

2D5. **RAF Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** RAF EOD personnel are stationed throughout the UK at RAF Stations. RAF EOD assets are responsible for:

- a. Disposal of UK and friendly aircraft ordnance.
- b. Disposal of all ordnance found on crashed aircraft, captured enemy aircraft and air-delivered munitions (except where found on RN or Army property or below the high water mark).
- c. Disposal of conventional ordnance found on RAF Property.
- d. CMD/IEDD under JSEODOC tasking.

2D6. Support is also provided to the police and Home Office in the examination and making safe of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. This support draws on the expertise outlined above and on MOD scientific expertise. Further details of this support are classified.

⁴ In an EOD context 'search' is the application of systematic procedures and appropriate detection equipment to locate belligerents' (including terrorists) resources and to confirm the presence or absence of explosive ordnance or other munitions. Low-risk search can be carried out by All-arms and police teams.

ANNEX 2E – MOD SEARCH AND RESCUE CAPABILITIES

2E1. The MOD provides declared Search and Rescue (SAR) facilities to cover military operations, exercises and training within the UK Search and Rescue Region (SRR). Although these resources are established for military purposes, it is MOD policy to render assistance whenever possible to other persons, aircraft or vessels in distress. Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR requirement, they will be made available for civil aeronautical, maritime and landbased SAR operations. Where MOD coverage does not meet the civil requirement, it is provided by the Department for Transport.

2E2. MOD declared SAR resources consist mainly of RAF and RN SAR helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, supplemented by other aircraft and surface vessels as necessary. On land, the MOD has specialist RAF Mountain Rescue Teams (MRTs). In the event of large-scale disasters, additional military resources can be made available through the Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) request procedure.¹

a. **Rotary Wing.** The RAF has SAR helicopter flights based at Boulmer, Chivenor, Leconfield, Lossiemouth, Valley and Wattisham and the RN at Culdrose and Prestwick. At each location, one helicopter is available at 15 minutes readiness between 0800 and 2200 with another available at 60 minutes readiness between 0800 and evening civil twilight (ECT).² Between 2200 and 0800, one helicopter is held at 45 minutes readiness.

b. **Fixed Wing.** The RAF maintains one Nimrod Maritime Patrol Aircraft at 60 minutes readiness, 24 hours a day, at RAF Kinloss for SAR duties. The Nimrod's combination of a powerful radar, long endurance and comprehensive communications make it the platform of choice for directing activities at the scene of an incident. The aircraft also carries air-droppable stores and multi-seat dinghies.

c. **Mountain Rescue Teams.** The RAF has 4 Mountain Rescue Teams (MRTs) based at RAF Kinloss, Leuchars, Leeming and Valley. Each MRT is available at one hours notice and is operationally controlled by the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss, although land SAR is co-ordinated by the police.

¹ MACC Cat A or B, see Chapter 5.

² The time at which the centre of the setting sun is 6 degrees below the horizon. This is the limit at which twilight is sufficient, under good weather conditions, for terrestrial objects to be clearly distinguished.

2E3. **Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre.** MOD SAR assets are co-ordinated by the ARCC at RAF Kinloss. The ARCC operates 24 hours a day and co-ordinates the use of military SAR assets within the UK SRR in incidents involving civil or military aircraft in distress, irrespective of nationality. It also controls the military contribution to SAR operations requested by UK SAR authorities or neighbouring Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCCs), including operations by military or civil aircraft, whether national or foreign.

2E4. The ARCC has extensive communications links with other SAR authorities and neighbouring RCCs. Other SAR authorities request military SAR helicopter, MRTs or Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) assistance for civil maritime or land SAR operations from the ARCC. Exceptionally, if military SAR helicopter assistance is necessary for immediate lifesaving, provision has been made for the MCA and the Police to make direct contact with the nearest helicopter unit and request assistance.³ In this instance, the requesting authority must inform the ARCC as soon as possible afterwards.

2E5. **United Kingdom COSPAS-SARSAT Mission Control Centre.** The COSPAS-SARSAT system is an international organisation that uses satellite technology to detect active radio distress beacons⁴ anywhere on Earth and to ensure that the distress alert data is passed quickly to the appropriate RCC. The ground segment of the system comprises 2 elements: the Local User Terminal (LUT) and the Mission Control Centre (MCC). The task of the MCC is to receive distress data from the LUT and foreign MCCs before passing this information to the appropriate RCC. The MCA is responsible for the maintenance and operation of the LUT while the MOD is responsible for the maintenance, manning and operation of the United Kingdom COSPAS-SARSAT Mission Control Centre (UKMCC) which is collocated with the ARCC at RAF Kinloss.

2E6. **Distress and Diversion Cells.** Throughout their flights, most aircraft remain in two-way radio contact with the Air Traffic Control Centre (ATCC) appropriate to the area in which they are operating. The UK centres are the Swanwick ATCC (near Fareham) and the Scottish and Oceanic ATCC (located at Prestwick) which provide alerting services in the London, Scottish and Shanwick Oceanic Flight/Upper Information Regions (F/UIRs). Usually, an aircraft with an emergency transmits its distress message in the first instance on the frequency (whether VHF, UHF or HF) in use at the time. It may also transmit on one or more of the dedicated VHF, UHF or HF distress frequencies. The transmission will be actioned by an ATCC which will, in turn, alert its Distress and Diversion (D&D) cell (located at West Drayton and Prestwick). D&D personnel will, again in turn, alert the ARCC, which will then direct the SAR activity.

³ MACC Cat A - See Chapter 5.

⁴ 121.5, 243.0 and 4060 kHz.

ANNEX 2F – SPECIFIC PILLAR 2 AND 3 CAPABILITIES

2 (National Communications) Brigade

2F1. 2 (National Communications (NC)) Brigade discharges its responsibilities through Territorial Army (TA) signal regiments aligned geographically with the regional brigade structure and a core regular signal regiment in London with squadrons at the Regional Divisions. The Unit Commanding Officers are directly involved in Regional Brigade planning, in particular in the communications estimate process.

2F2. **Incident Response Team.** The Brigade provides communications support to the Regional Brigade initially through 4 Incident Response Teams (IRTs)¹ which offer secure and insecure communications, AIRWAVE² and access to military IT systems and the internet.

2F3. **Command Support Team.** When the IRTs are activated consideration will be given to activating Command Support Teams (CSTs) based on the TA signal regiments.³ These units offer similar facilities to the IRTs, but on arrival will enable extended operations.

2F4. As the scale of the incident becomes clearer, the Brigade has other assets that may be deployed to provide more comprehensive communications at both Brigade and Divisional level. These include VHF communication area systems with rebroadcast facilities and interconnectivity with AIRWAVE, mobile command post facilities, and SATCOM.

Civil Contingency Reaction Force

2F5. The Strategic Defence Review (New Chapter)⁴ made provision for 14 Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRFs) nation-wide. CCRFs are designed to be a military force capable of being mobilised within 24 hours of the Secretary of State (or a Minister) making a call-out order authorising the call-out of members of the reserve forces. They form a source of general duties support to supplement the local civil emergency response. CCRFs would normally be deployed in conjunction with regular service personnel, but in some circumstances may form the only Armed Forces' contribution.

2F6. The CCRFs are drawn from the reserve forces. They therefore represent an important additional contribution to the support that can be provided in the event of a

¹ One at 12 hours notice, the remainder at 24 hours notice.

² For details see Chapter 9.

³ One CST per TA Signal Regt at 12 hrs notice, a second at 24 hrs notice.

⁴ 'Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter', Cm 5566 Vol 1, dated July 2002.

major emergency or disaster. Their mobilisation, however, means drawing on personnel who have active civilian lives and careers. MOD's agreement to mobilise CCRFs will take that point into account.

2F7. Members of the Volunteer Reserve should only be asked to carry out MACC Cat A tasks if they are already separately engaged in tasks associated with their commitment to the Reserves when the task arises, or if they present themselves for participation in the response. They can also volunteer as individuals for MACP/MAGD tasks. Defence Ministers can, however, formally mobilise members of the Reserve for MACP/ MAGD tasks under the 1996 Reserve Forces Act, Section 2 of the 1964 Emergency Powers Act and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. CCRFs are mobilised by the Secretary of State for Defence under the terms of the 1996 Reserve Forces Act. For that reason they should not be seen as being available for MACC Cat A tasks (see para 503). They can, however, be deployed in support of any civil authority, provided the tasks they are being asked to undertake are appropriate and of sufficient importance to justify the mobilisation of reserves.

2F8. The CCRF is designed to provide a composite general duties unit, based upon a Territorial Army (TA) infantry battalion with its administration and Command and Control structure. The CCRF is made up mainly from the TA Infantry battalion, but will also include volunteers from all arms of the TA All Arms, Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Although personnel are drawn from all reserve units, they are commanded, administered and organised by the regional brigades and the commitment attracts an additional training requirement. The CCRF normally consist of the unit's command and support infrastructure and a number of sub-units.

2F9. Likely CCRF tasks include reconnaissance, access control, assistance with mass casualties and displaced people, site search and clearance, transport and communications, provision of water and feeding points, and command and control.

2F10. The CCRF might be required to deploy in support of a CBRN incident and therefore will maintain a CBRN self-protection capability. Forces will not be earmarked but will be allocated on a case-by-case basis and, to facilitate an appropriate reaction time, stocks of IPE have been located around the UK. If required, Commands may request further CBRN equipment from the MOD stockpile. CCRF deployed to a CBRN incident will be used to reinforce and support civil capabilities undertaking consequence management. Service personnel so employed are to be trained and equipped to operate in a contaminated area using MOD CBRN protective equipment. However, they must only be employed in areas where it is assessed that the level of protection afforded by MOD CBRN protective equipment is adequate. When operating under civilian primacy, the exposure guidelines at CBRN incidents are to be consistent with ensuring that MOD personnel are not put at greater risk than other non-emergency service responders. Commanders are to ensure that the use of

emergency service capabilities, specifically detection, identification and monitoring, warning and reporting, contamination control, hazard management (including decontamination) and medical counter-measures are available to MOD personnel to ensure they operate safely.

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ANNEX 2G – TRAINING AND LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POLICE

Training Facilities

2G1. The handling of requests for the use of Service facilities for police training will vary according to the type of assistance required. Some requests will require prior Ministerial approval, some may be approved by local commanders.

2G2. **Use of Weapons Ranges.** Applications for the use of ranges for firearms training may be approved by a Naval Base Commander (NBC), Regional HQ LAND¹ or a RAF Station Commander providing:

- a. The request is for target shooting/weapon handling practice or instruction on gallery, electric target, 25-metre range, Individual Battle Shooting Range or Close Quarters Battle Range.
- b. No military personnel are involved except:
 - (1) Service personnel may be used as safety lookouts where the police are unable to supply them.
 - (2) Service personnel may act as instructors provided their activities are confined solely to instruction of the weapon being fired. They are not to run either firing points or butts.
- c. The police are responsible for the running of the range.
- d. Range allocation is subject to Service priorities (including Reserve and cadet forces).
- e. Conduct of the range is in accordance with current Range Conduct and Safety Rules and local Range Standing Orders, which are to be brought to the attention of the Police.

2G3. **Use of MOD Property.** Applications for the use of lecture halls and other buildings may be approved by a NBC, Regional Bde/Div HQ or a RAF Station Commander. The use of MOD property for non-military training of an uncontroversial nature² may also be approved providing:

- a. Service personnel are not involved in giving instruction or forming part of the crowd for public order/crowd control training.

¹ Army Training Estate.

² Such as public-order or crowd control training (when unconnected with specific public order operations or industrial disputes) or physical training.

- b. There is no detriment to Service commitments or training.
- c. The police meet the cost of the facilities provided.
- d. The arrangements are made discreetly and the training takes place out of public view.

If there is any doubt as to the sensitivity of a proposed use of MOD facilities, requests should be referred to D CT & UK Ops through the chain of command.

CHAPTER 3 – MILITARY AID TO OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

301. Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD) is assistance provided by the Armed Forces on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community.

302. The provision of MAGD is a very significant national step, requiring the use of emergency powers, and can only be undertaken with the specific authorisation of Ministers and the Defence Council and at the specific request of the appropriate Lead Government Department (LGD). The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) will often be activated. There are MOD contingency plans for providing assistance to other government departments (OGDs), including the provision of specific types of assistance. These plans are distributed to appropriate headquarters and form a basis for action, providing a guide as to the scale of potential deployments. It is envisaged, however, that MAGD contingency plans would always require amendment to suit specific circumstances prior to a deployment, and there is a limit to the amount of preparation that can be undertaken prior to Ministerial authorisation being obtained.

303. In some cases the provision of MAGD support requires special training in skills not normally available within the Armed Forces. If so, the request for support has to be made well in advance of the requirement to allow the training to take place. MOD does not routinely train Armed Forces personnel in skills irrelevant to their normal duties as members of the Armed Forces, nor does it duplicate capabilities available within the civil sector. Forming up the Armed Forces resources required to undertake a task could also add to the time required to deploy the capability.

304. The special training will be designed to enable the Armed Forces to provide a basic level of emergency cover, not the full cover provided by the dedicated service. This reduces the time required to put the emergency cover in place. In the case of support provided during industrial disputes, it also ensures that Armed Forces' support is designed to protect life, rather than contributing to a particular outcome of the dispute.

305. The existence of a contingency plan does not imply any guarantee that resources can be made available, or that training has taken place or will take place. Decisions to undertake training and to deploy Armed Forces support are taken case by case.

Legal Authority

306. Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964 (and related legislation) provides the statutory basis for the deployment of the Armed Forces on non-military tasks. It has, in particular, created a Defence Council Order mechanism¹ authorising such deployments on work of ‘urgent national importance’. This mechanism gave rise to the MACC Cat A authorisation process.² The key points of this mechanism are:

- a. A submission should in each case be made by D CT & UK Ops seeking approval for the deployment. That submission should contain the relevant facts and sufficient information to enable a decision to be made, including the likely impact on defence operations.
- b. The Defence Council will consider for approval as ‘urgent work of national importance’ any work proposed for such approval by D CT & UK Ops. Proposals will, however, normally relate to the maintenance of essential supplies and/or services and the alleviation of distress and safeguarding of lives and property in times of disaster.
- c. The Defence Council will decide whether to approve the particular employment as being ‘urgent work of national importance’ or not. In doing so they will have particular regard to any representation to that effect made by a civil department requesting the employment.
- d. A Defence Council Order, authorising Armed Forces personnel to undertake specific tasks, should be signed by at least 2 members of the Defence Council, including a Minister, on the same day.

307. The 1964 Act itself and the supporting regulations only refer to work of ‘urgent national importance’. The ‘civil department requesting the employment’ is, in practice, either the LGD associated with the particular emergency, or the Home Office as the overall lead department for civil emergencies and counter-terrorism. The Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Offices can also apply for support within the devolved regions on behalf of the relevant devolved executives (the devolved executives themselves cannot). The decision as to whether the support will be provided rests, however, solely with the Defence Council.

308. Ministerial authority is not required for discreet exploratory liaison between the military and local officials; however D CT & UK Ops approval is required for any discussions with other government departments. Furthermore, co-ordinated military/civil authority planning and formal meetings can only take place once Defence Council approval has been given.

¹ Issued on 10 February 1983.

² See Chapter 5.

Principles

309. MAGD will be authorised following these principles:
- a. The Services do not train for MAGD tasks except in relation to a specific task³ and after a request for assistance has been authorised by Ministers.
 - b. Service personnel are used only as a last resort; other options such as the use of managers and supervisors or private contractors should be pursued first.
 - c. The Armed Forces have to be capable of fulfilling the task required.
 - d. Penalties to military operations, capability and readiness will be considered prior to agreeing to provide MAGD.
 - e. MAGD is sensitive and therefore all planning is protectively marked and promulgated on a limited distribution.
 - f. MAGD is co-ordinated at the national level in response to a request from other government departments.
 - g. Service personnel deploy unarmed and act under the military chain of command at all times.

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS PROCEDURES

Command

310. D CT & UK Ops is responsible for the co-ordination of tri-Service assistance for MAGD. SJC(UK) will usually take the lead for MAGD operations exercising Operational Control (OPCON) over RN, Army and RAF assets as appropriate. If the assistance is of a specialist nature then MOD may direct that control be exercised through appropriate single-Service channels. The HQ LAND Regional Forces Divisional and Brigade HQ structure will normally co-ordinate and task tri-Service resources assigned by MOD for MAGD.

³ For example, during the fire dispute of 2002/3, Service personnel were given firefighting training in preparation for their duties.

Planning Timelines

311. The formal warning time for MAGD deployments will vary:

- a. For animal disease emergencies there is likely to be a period when the scale of the emergency is being identified before a request for assistance is made. This period may offer an opportunity for contingency planning or at least for reviewing lessons identified from previous emergencies.⁴
- b. Long range weather forecasts may allow some prediction of requests for severe weather assistance to farmers and others. Such assistance is more likely to be required after extended periods of poor weather.
- c. In the case of industrial disputes, warning may be as little as 7 days as a result of political and industrial sensitivities. However, the Lead Government Department is likely to be aware of the threat of strike action approximately 6 weeks in advance. Trades Unions are required to provide their employers with 7 days notice of their intention to ballot their members for strike action, thereafter the ballot process will generally last up to 3-4 weeks. Unions are then obliged to give a further 7 days notice prior to strike action commencing. Any subsequent periods of strike action, for example during a series of short strikes, are also required to be notified 7 days in advance. For industrial disputes the requesting Government Department would generally formally seek MOD assistance during the ballot process. MOD and SJC(UK) would commence preparations as soon as Defence Council authority has been given.

Industrial Disputes

312. The deployment of Service personnel for the maintenance of essential supplies and/or services can easily be perceived as ‘strike breaking’, especially in a long-running dispute. Passions can run high, and it is important that the deployment of Service personnel does not inflame a situation. The police are responsible for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance of law and order. Consequently:

- a. If threatened or attacked Service personnel should seek police assistance.

⁴ In the 2001 foot and mouth epidemic Defra (then MAFF) kept MOD informed from the outset (first case identified 12 Feb 2001) and Ministers formally notified the Ministry of Defence on 1 Mar 2001 that they were considering military assistance but did not call for large scale military assistance until the beginning of the week of 12 March 2001, when the scale of the disease had become apparent, and the Department identified a clear role for the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces went on to play a key supportive role, assisting centrally and locally in the organisational and logistical arrangements, particularly for slaughter, transport and disposal of diseased animals.

- b. Service personnel on MAGD duties are to be directed to avoid direct contact with pickets.
- c. If pickets confront Service personnel, they should act on the advice given by the police.
- d. In the event that no police are present, Service personnel are to withdraw from situations that would result in injury to themselves or others, or damage to equipment placed in their charge, pending the arrival of police assistance.
- e. Service personnel are not authorised to conduct any form of law enforcement activity, including that related to public order duties, as part of MAGD. Where MAGD is conducted in Northern Ireland, Service personnel may require to be protected by the police and by military units operating under the terms of MACP.⁵
- f. If Service personnel were unexpectedly attacked and police protection proved inadequate, they would be entitled to use minimum reasonable force in self-defence with a view to extricating themselves, as would any other citizen.

Personnel

313. **Minimum Experience Levels.** Service personnel under the age of 17½⁶ and recruits with less than 8 weeks basic training are not to be deployed on MAGD without the authority of D CT & UK Ops.

314. **Reserve Forces.** Formed reserve units may be called-out for permanent service under the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 for deployment on MAGD operations, other than industrial disputes. However, individual members of the Reserve Forces permanent staff, ordinary members in Full Time Reserve Service, and ordinary members who volunteer to do so may be deployed on supporting tasks during industrial disputes.

Presentation

MAGD deployments are generally politically sensitive and potentially controversial. It is for the LGD to take the lead in dealing with the media and, when assistance is provided at the national level, a media handling strategy will be developed centrally.

⁵ MT 2.2.

⁶ This may differ for specific operations; for example, the minimum age during the 2002/3 fire dispute was set at 18.

315. Comment on industrial disputes is to be avoided. Publicity should not normally be actively sought and media enquiries should be directed to the MOD Press Office.

Briefing Notes

316. Briefing notes for Service personnel deployed under MAGD are at Annex 3A.

ANNEX 3A – BRIEFING NOTES FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN MILITARY AID TO OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Introduction

3A1. These notes should be used when briefing Service personnel involved in providing Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD). They should not be issued to individuals as instructions. Additional instructions will be required for Service personnel conducting MAGD in Northern Ireland concerning the arrangements for protection by the police and troops operating under the terms of Military Aid to the Civil Power.

Background

3A2. Service personnel can be called upon to carry out urgent work of national importance, for example helping to maintain essential supplies and services during an emergency. An emergency of this kind has now arisen, in connection with which Her Majesty's Government has issued instructions that the Armed Forces are to help maintain essential supplies and services.

3A3. Members of the Armed Forces should be fully aware of their responsibilities and rights in such a situation. In helping to maintain essential supplies and services in an emergency, Service personnel are acting under military orders and in the interests of the whole community.

3A4. If being deployed during an industrial dispute, Service personnel are not taking the side of one party or another although inevitably their actions risk being described or misinterpreted as 'strike breaking'. They must maintain complete impartiality and act always within the law. They must, as far as possible, have no direct involvement with strikers, and will be unarmed.

Legal Authority

3A5. The Legal Authority for the deployment is as follows:

- a. The use of Service personnel to carry out civilian work under MAGD is authorised by the Defence Council under Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964 or the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Once the Defence Council has signed an Order or a State of Emergency has been proclaimed, orders issued to Service personnel to carry out such work are legal orders.
- b. A member of the Armed Forces has the same basic legal rights and obligations as any citizen.

- c. The police are responsible for the protection of persons and property and for the maintenance of law and order. Accordingly, if threatened or attacked during the performance of their duties Service personnel should seek police assistance.
- d. If police assistance is not available, Service personnel should attempt to withdraw from the situation but if this is impossible, the normal citizen's right of self-defence applies. This allows the use of only such force as is the minimum necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, for self-protection and the protection of comrades.
- e. As citizens, Service personnel are also bound to go to the assistance of the police should they specifically ask for help.
- f. If it is assessed that the police have asked for Service personnel assistance, not as citizens, but because they are members of the Armed Forces, they should withdraw from the situation and refer the police to their Commanding Officer.

Guidance in Relation to Picketing (if relevant)

3A6. Service personnel should, so far as possible, avoid both physical contact and argument with pickets. Although picketing in UK is generally conducted peacefully and within the law, there may be occasions when there will be confrontations between the pickets and those wishing to enter their workplace; in such circumstances, the police will usually be present and Service personnel should follow their instructions. However, should they encounter pickets and no police officer is present they should proceed as follows:

- a. If the pickets do not obstruct them and do no more than orally present their case, they should proceed with their duties and avoid entering into a debate on the situation.
- b. If the pickets obstruct their progress or threaten actual violence they should withdraw and call the police, whose advice should be followed as regards any further attempt to pass through the pickets.

3A7. Strikers may support their industrial action by 'sitting-in' at their place of work. Provided it is conducted peacefully, 'sitting-in' does not constitute a criminal offence and therefore the police cannot intervene. The police may intervene if a criminal offence has occurred or a breach of the peace seems imminent. Service personnel entry to places where there are 'sitters-in' might be regarded as provocative and lead to a breach of the peace. They should not seek to enter such premises.

Media Relations

3A8. If Service personnel receive an unauthorised approach from a member of the media, they should explain, politely, that they are not permitted to discuss the job that they are doing. Any questions are to be referred to their Commanding Officer, whose location or headquarters may be given.

3A9. Service personnel cannot prevent photographers or television cameramen from photographing their actions, but are to avoid being drawn into conversation with them. If such recording activity occurs, they are to inform their Commanding Officer.

3A10. Service personnel are not to give their name to any unauthorised person; they are only to give their name to a uniformed police or military officer.

Summary

3A11. The 4 main points to remember are that the Armed Forces:

- a. Are responsible to the Crown for helping to maintain essential supplies and services during an emergency.
- b. Are impartial in industrial disputes, and must as far as possible remain insulated from direct involvement with strikers.
- c. Have the same basic legal rights and obligations, no more and no less, than any other citizen, and should accordingly take all action in their power to avoid a breach of the peace.
- d. Always act within the law.

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CHAPTER 4 – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

401. This Chapter covers the policy guidelines for Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). It covers the conduct of MACP in Great Britain but does not include the provision for Counter Terrorism (CT)¹ support to the police in Northern Ireland, which is covered by separate Theatre instructions.

402. MACP is the provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power.

Civil Power

403. A Civil Power is a civil authority that has constitutional or statutory responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The Civil Power is considered to include:

- a. The Home Office, Scotland Office, Wales Office, Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- b. Home Department Police Forces.
- c. Non-Home Department Police Forces² (e.g. British Transport Police and UK Atomic Energy Police).³
- d. The Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).
- e. HM Customs and Excise (HM C&E).
- f. Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).

404. The Armed Forces have a range of capabilities, developed both for conventional and CT operations, that can be used to assist the Civil Power at home and abroad (including British overseas territories, British embassies and British-flagged merchant vessels) if requested. MACP is initiated by the Civil Power informing the MOD via the Home Office of a capability requirement; the MOD will then determine whether the request should be met and then how the gap should be filled. In general, assistance may take the form of advice or the conduct of specific activities but will always be subject to availability.

¹ MOD Counter Terrorism Policy is detailed in ‘*Global Counter Terrorism – a Strategy for the MOD*’ 27 Jun 04.

² See Chapter 8 for a more complete list.

³ But not MOD police.

405. The use of Service personnel in aid of the Civil Power is a particularly sensitive subject and Ministers will take a close interest in the control of all such operations.

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER PRINCIPLES

406. Generally MACP is requested to assist the Civil Power to deal with criminal activity. MACP can be described within 3 main categories as follows:

- a. **Counter Terrorism.** CT may include both direct deployment of specialist units to deal with isolated incidents and more general support based on a range of tri-Service CT capabilities, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assistance and security at political party conferences.
- b. **Counter Crime.** Counter crime support includes a wide range of general and specialist support to the Civil Power and police criminal investigations, including such activities as search.
- c. **Counter Drugs.** A specific aspect of counter crime support, MOD can provide both general and specialist support to HM C&E operations against illegal drug activity.

Legal Authority

407. The Common Law imposes a duty on every citizen, including Service personnel, to go to the aid of the police when requested to assist in the enforcement of law and order where it is reasonable to do so and where they have the resources and ability to do so. This forms the main (but not the only) basis for the MACP mechanism, since it provides a basis for issuing lawful orders to Armed Forces personnel to perform tasks not normally part of their duties. The common law duty is, however, difficult to formulate precisely and cannot be relied upon in all circumstances to provide a legal basis for a response, especially if commanders take it upon themselves to rely upon it without Defence Council authorisation. The duty of Service personnel to obey lawful orders remains paramount, once it is clear that the requirement for support is reasonable and justified. But the common law duty of Service personnel is no greater than that placed on any other citizen, and does not in itself justify the use of the Armed Forces in support of the police in preference to support from other citizens.

408. To ensure that the provision of the support is both reasonable and soundly based in law, all MACP support requires the approval of a Defence Minister. As a statutory basis for the provision of support, Section 2 of the 1964 Emergency Powers

Act and the Civil Contingencies Act provide a firmer authority for MACA activity than the common law.

409. Queen's Regulations⁴ provide an additional duty on military commanders to act on their own responsibility without a request by the Civil Power where, in very exceptional circumstances, a grave and sudden emergency has arisen which in the opinion of the commander demands his immediate intervention to protect life or property. This is in fact the same duty imposed on commanders by Defence Council Order for MACC Cat A.⁵

410. The legal position is dealt with at length in single-Service regulations.⁶ In outline, the Civil Power charged with responsibility for law and order (in most cases a Chief Officer of Police) may call for military assistance when a situation arises which the Civil Power are unable to deal with alone. The following points should be noted:

- a. **Accountability.** Service personnel are always answerable before the law for their actions and must be guided by the requirement to respond to any particular situation with the minimum force reasonable under the circumstances. A commander may even decide, after making his estimate, that military intervention is unwarranted.
- b. **Duty to Respond.** Military Commanders are bound to consider requests for assistance, whether they are made at a local level in response to a particular situation or at a national level.⁷ The manner, degree and extent of the aid to be provided must be assessed in the light of the prevailing circumstances.

Legal powers of Service Personnel conducting Military Aid to the Civil Power in the UK

411. **General Powers.** Service personnel are required to act within the rule of law and will normally have no special legal powers beyond those of the ordinary citizen. Hence Service personnel may use reasonable force to prevent crime, including in self-defence. As a last resort such force may include the use of firearms if authorised by the MOD and subject to the relevant Rules of Engagement (JSP 398).

412. **Arrests.** Although Service personnel should not normally attempt to arrest a civilian, in certain circumstances there may be no other option. Any citizen, including a member of the Armed Forces, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland may arrest

⁴ 'The Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy' (QRRN) J4801 to 4802 and J4805 to 4806, 'The Queen's Regulations for the Army' J11.001 to 11.010 and 'The Queens Regulations for the RAF' J852.

⁵ Defence Council Order dated 17 January 1983 - See Chapter 5.

⁶ QRRN Chapter 48, the 'Manual of Military Law', Part II, Chapter V, 'Manual of Air Force Law' Volume 1 Chapter 9.

⁷ The only authority they have to agree to a request is that provided under the 17 January 1983 Defence Council Order.

offenders for a breach of the peace.⁸ Furthermore, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland citizens may also arrest a person for any ‘arrestable offence’⁹ or ‘serious arrestable offence’¹⁰ that has been committed. These will include serious assaults, acts of hostage taking, theft and criminal damage. In Scotland a citizen may not make an arrest for a breach of the peace which has already taken place. He may, however, intervene to try to stop a breach of the peace and may act to assist a civilian police officer. Furthermore, in Scotland a citizen may make an arrest for serious offences only if he sees the crime being committed.

413. In agreeing the provision of MACP support, the MOD agrees that Armed Forces personnel can act under the supervision or direction of the police or other civil power to perform a particular task. Armed Forces personnel, however, remain under military command at all times. To ensure that both the command relationship and the legal basis of their involvement remain clear, the MOD does not agree to any request that places Armed Forces personnel under the direct command of police officers or other civil personnel, or which gives the Armed Forces generic civil powers. MOD would not, for example, agree to the enlistment of serving Armed Forces personnel as Special Constables, Firefighters or Paramedics, or their appointment as Health and Safety Inspectors, Trading Standards Officers or local government officials.

SECTION III – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER PROCEDURES

MOD Authorisation

414. There are only 3 cases where Service personnel may be deployed to assist the Civil Power when the deployment has not had prior approval by the Home Office and Defence Ministers:

- a. Where the immediate personal assistance of an individual, or group of individuals, is requested by a law enforcement officer in the circumstances described in paragraph 407.
- b. In a grave emergency when delay is liable to cause injury, loss of life or unacceptable economic damage.

⁸ In England and Wales a breach of the peace is an occasion where a person causes harm or appears likely to cause harm to persons or property, or acts in a manner the natural consequence of which is to provoke others to violence. In Scotland there is no strict definition; in fact it is normally taken to be somewhat wider than that of England and Wales – if the former definition is used when assessing whether action is appropriate it should meet the requirements of both legal systems.

⁹ An offence for which a suspect may be arrested without a warrant. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) (PACE) defines arrestable offences; essentially they are those that may carry a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment or more plus certain statutory offences – these are unlikely to be relevant to MACP tasks.

¹⁰ Certain offences defined under PACE which allow more robust police powers of detention.

- c. Routine deployments covered by standing Ministerial approval where the authority to deploy has been delegated to a military commander, such as EOD operations.

Routing of Requests

415. Units should not, except in the most exceptional circumstances (see paragraphs 410 and 414), give assistance to the Civil Power without prior ministerial authorisation, obtained through D CT & UK Ops. Units that receive requests for assistance should ask the Civil Power to route its request to the relevant Department for onward transmission to the MOD. The Home Office acts as Lead Government Department for all issues affecting Armed Forces' support to the police. Forces have therefore been instructed to apply for MACP support via the Home Office, rather than direct to the MOD. The Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Offices can also apply to the MOD for MACP support on behalf of the police or the devolved executives (which cannot apply direct) within the devolved regions. Other MACP authorities should apply for support direct to D CT & UK Ops.

Command

416. **MOD.** D CT & UK Ops has tri-Service responsibility for MACP policy and the conduct of MACP operations worldwide. J5 SJC(UK) has prepared contingency plans for the use of Service personnel in particular MACP situations. These are held by the relevant Joint Commander and are made available to the appropriate Service commanders as and when necessary.

417. **Operational.** The SJC(UK), or delegated Joint Commander in exceptional cases, will exercise Operational Command and utilise the component commander system to affect the best from each specialised environment.

418. **Command Relationships.** Overall responsibility for the resolution of criminal and terrorist incidents lies with the police, and the direction of operations at the scene will rest with the local Chief Constable. Service personnel deployed under MACP arrangements will be under the overall direction of the senior police officer dealing with the operation, irrespective of rank. However, command and tactical control of Service personnel will remain with the military commander.

Presentation

419. MACP tasks are undertaken in support of police (and other civil power) operations and investigations. Public presentation of these operations and investigations will themselves be subject to restrictions for legal and operational security reasons. As a result, most MACP support receives no publicity. Exceptions are made only with the agreement of the police or other civil power. The use of proactive publicity is rare and should not be undertaken without consulting D CT & UK

Ops. Under no circumstances should any comment be made about UK Special Forces involvement.

420. Armed Forces personnel are rarely required to give written or oral evidence in court because of their involvement in police operations. Provision of the support does, however, imply agreement to provide evidence should it be required. Under exceptional circumstances, when either the safety of an individual or the security of an operational capability might be compromised, MOD may request the police or other civil power not to submit such evidence to a court.

Sensitivities

421. Planning for MACP is likely to be highly sensitive and will be protectively marked. It may not take place without D CT & UK Ops approval.

422. **Reserves.** Reserves deployed in support of the police would be mobilised under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 in support of a Defence Council Order based on either the 1964 Emergency Powers Act or the Civil Contingencies Act.

Briefing Notes

423. Briefing notes to sub-unit commanders and for Service personnel deployed under MACP are at Annex 4A.

ANNEX 4A – BRIEFING NOTES FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

General

4A1. These notes are intended for use when briefing Service personnel involved in Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) operations. The overall principles are valid in all MACP circumstances; however, additional guidelines are issued for specific contingency plans, including the use of United Kingdom Special Forces. They do not cover Northern Ireland, where additional legal powers have been granted to Service personnel.

4A2. It is not practicable to give precise directions as to what course of action is appropriate in a particular case. Compliance with the general principles in this guidance should reduce the risk of a military commander acting outside the law. The military commander at the scene is responsible for the conduct of his personnel and any decisions that he makes. Whether such actions are appropriate will be judged on the basis of the law, the circumstances and the available resources.

Legal Authority

4A3. Commanders must be aware of the following principles:

a. **Authority for Intervention:**

(1) The Common Law imposes a duty on every citizen, including Service personnel, to go to the aid of the police when requested to assist in the enforcement of law and order where they have the resources and ability to do so. If assisting the police in such circumstances, Service personnel would be doing so as a citizen, not as a member of the Armed Forces.

(2) All MACP deployments require MOD authorisation. If life is threatened local commanders may decide to provide unarmed assistance under the Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) Cat A delegated authority.

b. **Use of Force.** Once Service personnel have become involved the following general principles must always be borne in mind:

(1) Both the military commander and the Service personnel under command are individually responsible for acting in accordance with the law.

- (2) Force is never lawful unless the immediate object to be achieved is the prevention of crime (including public order offences), the arrest of offenders, self-defence or the defence of others.
- (3) No more force may be used than is both necessary and reasonable in the circumstances and every reasonable precaution should be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to persons and damage to property.
- (4) The degree of force can never be reasonable if it is more than that required to achieve the immediate aim.
- (5) Force must never be used to punish or to act as a deterrent for the future. It must be justifiable solely by reference to the immediate aim.
- (6) Service personnel should be suitably equipped to deal with the situation at hand. If firearms are to be available as a last resort in civil disturbances, a force so armed should be kept in reserve and out of sight of those involved in the disturbance.

Action when the Police are Present

4A4. Military commanders should make a joint plan with the senior police officer, who would normally have overall direction at the scene of the incident.

4A5. It is the military commander's responsibility to determine the scope of the action his personnel will take in accordance with the guidance in paragraph 4A3.

4A6. Military commanders should consult the police about the support that they can afford to give their personnel but military commanders cannot give the police orders.

4A7. Representatives of the Civil Power, including police officers, cannot order military commanders or personnel to take a particular course of action. They may, however, advise them when any action taken has achieved its aim and this advice is generally to be accepted and the action terminated.

4A8. Military commanders should report both their commitment to MACP and details of their subsequent actions as soon as possible.

Action when the Police are not Present

4A9. As reflected in paragraph 4A3a, the absence of the police does not relieve a military commander, or any Service personnel under their command, of their obligation to take action when necessary in order to preserve law and order and to safeguard lives and property. This is so whether or not Service personnel have been placed in support of the civil power or a request for assistance has been made. The fact that Armed Forces personnel have no legal authority or standing over and above that

of the ordinary citizen should always be borne in mind when considering the use of force in the absence of a police presence.

4A10. If a time delay is acceptable, no action should be taken other than summoning the police by the fastest possible means and if appropriate making a contemporaneous note for future reference.

- a. If immediate action is required due to a threat to life, military commanders should act on their own responsibility and in accordance with their own judgement with full regard to the principles outlined in paragraphs 4A2 and 4A3.
- b. If, while action is in progress, it becomes possible to communicate with a police officer they should do so and be guided by him.
- c. Where military commanders have had to intervene on their own initiative, they should report the matter, including the details of action taken both to their military superior and to a senior police officer.

Further Guidance

4A11. The following general points should be noted:

- a. **Control.** Service personnel should not normally be deployed singly without support or in patrols or small parties where they may become isolated or surrounded. Military commanders should normally deploy Service personnel in formed bodies so that decisions can be taken by responsible commanders and proper orders issued. Service personnel will, where possible, also be accompanied by police officers.
- b. **Communications.** Communications should be maintained either by radio or telephone both between sub-units and the deployed military headquarters and between the HQ and the civil authorities.
- c. **Rules of Engagement.** The rules of engagement for the use of Service personnel involved in MACP operations will be approved by Ministers. Usually they will be directed to use specific guidance cards drawn from JSP 398.
- d. **Guards and Sentries.** Service personnel deployed to prevent the occupation of premises by unarmed demonstrators should be unarmed.

Relations with the Media or General Public

4A12. If Service personnel are approached by a member of the press or by any other member of the public they should explain, politely, that they are not permitted to

discuss the job that they are doing. They should refer any questions to their Commanding Officer, whose location or headquarters they may divulge. He will normally be authorised to make statements of fact about any incident, but should always seek guidance from his superiors before making any statement. Except in a situation where arrest under the Official Secrets Acts would be permissible, it is not possible to prevent photographers or television cameramen from recording what is happening, but Service personnel should not be drawn into conversation with them.

4A13. Service personnel should not give their name to any unauthorised person, only to a uniformed policeman or Service officer.

CHAPTER 5 – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

501. Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) is the provision of unarmed military assistance:

- a. To the civil authorities when they have an urgent need for help to deal with a natural disaster or a major incident.
- b. To civil sponsors, either by carrying out special projects of significant social value to the community or by attaching individual volunteers full-time for specific periods.

502. The responsibility, both operational and financial, for dealing with civil emergencies and with projects to benefit the civil community lies with the civil authorities. MACC, which is one of the forms of assistance that the authority may consider it appropriate to seek, should accordingly be carried out under their direction.

SECTION II – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY A

503. When there is a civil emergency as a result of a natural disaster or a major incident, responsibility for the immediate response lies with the emergency services who will request military assistance if they assess that civil resources alone are inadequate. The responsibility for recovery from a major emergency, such as providing temporary accommodation and food, clearing-up operations etc, will always lie with the local authorities, following the principles of '*Dealing with Disaster*'.¹

504. In the majority of cases emergency assistance will be requested and given at local level either through the nearest Service HQ or unit or the Air Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss without the need for prior reference to MOD or other government departments (OGDs), though details should be passed up the chain of command to D CT & UK Ops. It may be provided by the HQ or unit without reference to higher authority, under delegated authority based on Section 2 of the 1964 Emergency Powers Act, provided by the Defence Council Order dated 17 January 1983.² The Defence Council Order approved employment of Service personnel on tasks:

¹ In Scotland: '*Dealing with Disaster Together*', Northern Ireland: '*Guide to Emergency Planning in Northern Ireland*'.

² See '*The Queen's Regulations for the Royal Navy*', Articles J4803 and 4805, '*The Queen's Regulations for the Army*' paragraphs J11.004 to J11.008, and '*The Queen's Regulations for the Royal Air Force*', paragraph J853.

‘ ... as being urgent work of national importance, such work as is considered by a local commander,³ at the time when the work needs to be performed, to be urgently necessary for the purposes of the alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in time of disaster and do hereby authorise the temporary employment in such work of officers and men of Her Majesty’s Naval, Military or Air Forces, and specific tasks to be performed by officers and men of these forces assigned to that employment being such as may be specified by or under orders of the officers commanding the forces.’

This delegation is heavily caveated, notably to the provision of an urgent response at the time when the work needs to be performed by a local commander. It simply authorises a unit commander to deploy personnel under their command if they are available and can be immediately helpful in alleviating distress, protecting property, or saving lives. The circumstances must be urgent, and therefore exceptional. In practice, the frequency and the precise circumstances when MACC Cat A support would be appropriate are, of course, impossible to predict. But such emergencies – though serious – tend to be relatively straightforward incidents (for example serious flooding in the vicinity of Armed Forces establishments) which require a rapid, obvious and uncomplicated response.

Principles

505. The Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for MACC tasks. There are, by definition no permanent or standing MACC responses. Assistance is provided on an availability basis and the Armed Forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. Neither the production of contingency plans nor the participation in civil exercises guarantees the provision of MACC support.⁴ The fact that Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces have to be mobilised prior to deployment means that they are not in a position to provide MACC support.⁵ There should be no guaranteed standing arrangements to provide a Service response of a particular nature to meet a civil contingency.

Search and Rescue

506. The MOD has responsibility for providing SAR facilities for military operations, exercises and training within the UK and, by agreement, exercises responsibility for civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of the DfT. Where the coverage

³ For the purposes of this chapter the term ‘local commander’ should usually be interpreted as a Unit CO [for formed units], Naval Base Commander, Regional Brigade Commander or RAF Station Commander.

⁴ A limited number of standing commitments do exist, agreed individually under MACP procedures.

⁵ CCRFs are designed to provide support during civil emergencies, but because of the time required to mobilise them they cannot provide ‘urgent’ support. They will be mobilised and deployed as a rapidly as possible should their support be required.

provided by military SAR assets⁶ meets the civil SAR coverage requirements, they will be made available for civil maritime and land-based SAR operations. The MOD also establishes and maintains an ARCC for the operation and co-ordination of civil and military aeronautical SAR.

507. **Search and Rescue Land Co-ordination.** The Service response to an emergency may start with SAR but could develop into a wider MACC Category A operation involving assistance from other Services or units. In cases of inland emergencies, including on inland waterways, the ARCC would liaise with the Army Division/Brigade (Div/Bde) HQ in whose area assistance is being given and attempt to deploy a liaison officer to Silver/Bronze level of Command.⁷ Once the Service response to an emergency required a substantial Div/Bde contribution, the ARCC would hand over responsibility for the overall command and control of the military aspects of the operation to the Div/Bde HQ.⁸

Request Procedures

508. The sponsor (normally emergency services or the local authority) should make a request for assistance direct to the nearest Service unit or via a local police station giving as much as possible of the information required by the format for routine (Cat B/C) requests at Annex 5A. The request should provide details of the assistance required (capability) but not specific military units or equipment; it is for the MOD to determine the most appropriate Service response.

SECTION III – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY B

509. The Services may in some circumstances be able to provide routine assistance to civil authorities. However, Service requirements will always come first in determining relative priorities, and assistance will only be undertaken for public authorities or non-profit making organisations if exceptional circumstances exist.

Principles

510. The Armed Forces will assess requests for assistance on the following criteria:

- a. **Social Value.** The task must be of social value to the community. This is clearly a matter of judgement, but provision of local amenities for the benefit of an entire neighbourhood, or a project with an appeal to a section of the community at large, are more likely to qualify than projects in aid of private or

⁶ Details in Chapter 2.

⁷ See Chapter 9 for a description of command levels.

⁸ SAR national assets (helicopters, Nimrod, MRTs) remain under OPCON ARCC at all times and are not available for local C2 direction.

commercial interests. A sponsor's charitable status is not of itself sufficient reason to allow military aid; there must be other justification within the terms of this sub-paragraph.

b. **Military Training Value.** The task must represent good training value, the equivalent of which is not available, within the same costs, from Service resources, or alternatively provides significant public service value for the Services. Service personnel will not be used as a source of cheap labour and will work as organised bodies under Service command.

c. **Sponsor.** The task must be conducted on behalf of a sponsor who agrees to appropriate financial, liability insurance and Health and Safety provisions for the task.

d. **Availability.** MACC Cat B should be available to all communities across the UK. Care should therefore be taken to ensure that it is not limited to those communities that are familiar with the procedures required to apply for MACC Cat B, or those that have particular links to the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces serve the population as a whole.

e. **Caveats.** Assistance will not be provided in the following circumstances:

- (1) If the task limits or hampers training required to maintain a unit's operational efficiency or if it clashes with any other military task.
- (2) If the task is to be performed on behalf of any political organisation.
- (3) If it is clear that the task could lead to undesirable publicity for, or criticism of, the Armed Forces.
- (4) If commercial organisations would have a reasonable complaint of loss of business.

511. **Reference to MOD.** Where the task does not meet all of the requirements above, it cannot be undertaken as a MACC Cat B task; but it may still be an appropriate task to be undertaken on a repayment basis, normally at full cost. A task disqualified under any of the exclusions in paragraph 510e, however, should not be undertaken on any basis without reference to MOD through the chain of command. Any cases of doubt, particularly concerning tasks involving a commercial organisation or venture or a private individual or body, should be referred through the command chain to MOD D CT & UK Ops.

Request Procedures

512. Requests may be made to Service units at any level, and should be passed through the single Service organisation for authority.⁹

a. **Timing.** Applications should be made as early as possible to allow time to assess the Services' ability to assist, plan the assistance and co-ordinate the assistance with other military activities.

b. **Initial Application.** A preliminary approach should be made to the military to identify whether it is worthwhile making a formal application. Thereafter, where possible, civil authorities should complete an initial application using the format at Annex 5A. This records details of the assistance required and confirms that the requirements set out in paragraph 510 have been met. If it is not possible to use this form, the maximum possible information about the task should be provided. At this stage a reconnaissance may be appropriate.

c. **Provision of Cost Estimate.** The aim of a reconnaissance should be to provide the sponsor with an estimate of the likely costs of the assistance that is as accurate as possible, but at the same time it must be made clear that the estimate is liable to variation and that the charge will not be determined finally until completion of the task. It should also be made clear to the sponsor that a charge may be levied for the reconnaissance itself, regardless of the outcome.

d. **Assessment of Feasibility.** The reconnaissance report and/or initial application should be assessed by the authorising HQ, who should take into account all other relevant factors including the availability of personnel, equipment and plant for the task. It is essential to avoid the risk of failing to complete a task by taking on more work than can be accomplished within the resources and time available.

e. **Formal Application.** If, after consideration of the initial application (and where necessary a reconnaissance) the authorising HQ decides to provide the assistance, the sponsor will be required to complete a formal application in the format at Annex 5B. The application must be signed by the person who accepts the financial liability and MOD's insurance and indemnity arrangements for the assistance requested or who has the legal powers to commit the sponsor to financial liability.

f. **Sponsor's Obligations.** The sponsor must accept that the provision of assistance may have to be interrupted, rescheduled or even cancelled for

⁹ Authority is normally held at the appropriate area Naval Base Commander, Army Regional Bde/Div HQ or RAF Command, unless reference needs to be made to MOD due the nature of the request.

Service reasons at any time. The sponsor must provide written confirmation that they have obtained the approval of appropriate organisations affected, as follows:

- (1) Trade unions.
- (2) Employers' associations.
- (3) The owner and/or occupier if private land is involved.
- (4) The local planning authority.
- (5) Conservation agencies.
- (6) Any other organisations affected.

Examples of Routine Assistance

513. The following list gives examples of the type of work which may be requested under this category:

- a. Construction, repair, rehabilitation and demolition, such as:
 - (1) Construction of short lengths of minor road, temporary bridges, air strips and piers.
 - (2) Demolition of obsolete structures.
 - (3) Simple land reclamation.
 - (4) Building of recreational accommodation or huts.
 - (5) Construction of sports grounds and recreational facilities.
 - (6) Improvement of drainage.
 - (7) Removal of underwater obstacles.
 - (8) Improvement of landscapes.
 - (9) Erection of shelters and rescue posts on hills and mountains and the marking of routes in isolated areas.
- b. Operation of specialist transport and equipment for particular projects and events such as:
 - (1) Heavy recovery vehicles.

- (2) Manned boats and other harbour craft.
 - (3) Helicopters and lorries to move heavy loads.
- c. Provision of individual skilled specialists, such as medical and veterinary experts, mountaineering and survival and rescue experts.

SECTION IV – MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY CATEGORY C

514. Applications for individual volunteers to serve with social service or similar organisations on schemes, which may be of significant social benefit to the civil community, should be forwarded to the appropriate authorising HQ, which will then follow the normal procedure for obtaining approval for temporary attachment. Acceptance will be subject to Service requirements and suitability of the volunteer in the view of both the Service and the organisation concerned.

515. The length of each attachment will be judged on its merits, but the attachment may not exceed a period of one year.

SECTION V – MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Indemnity and Insurance Requirement

516. MOD requires to be indemnified against potential claims rising out of the assistance requested. A copy of the indemnity form to be used is at Annex 5C. Any indemnity must be supported by proof of an adequate insurance policy. However there is no requirement for insurance or indemnity in the following circumstances:

- a. Where, as a result of an emergency situation, time precludes prior written indemnity. In this case the organisation seeking assistance will be required to give an immediate oral undertaking to sign an acceptance of liability as soon as possible. In seeking such an oral agreement the MOD will, whenever possible, ensure that the applicant is aware of the terms of the indemnity contained in Annex 5C before giving oral agreement.
- b. When assistance is provided to a government department.

Use of Volunteer Reserves for Military Aid to the Civil Community

517. Members of the Volunteer Reserve should only be asked to carry out MACC Cat A tasks if they are already separately engaged in tasks associated with their commitment to the Reserves when the task arises, or if they present themselves for participation in the response. Authorisation by commands may be given subject to the following:

- a. **Category A.** Naval Base Commanders (NBCs), Army Div/Bde and RAF Commands may authorise the employment of those members of these forces who are willing to volunteer, i.e. not a formal call-out.
- b. **Category B.** Where a task offers opportunities for special-to-arm training not otherwise available, NBCs, Army Div/Bde and RAF Commands may exceptionally authorise employment of Independent Reservists or members of the Royal Navy Reserve (RNR), Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), Territorial Army (TA) and Royal Auxiliary Airforce (RAuxAF). The task should normally be allocated as part of the formal training schedule using man training day allotments, and be consistent with the mandatory training obligations laid down by the regulations governing Reserve Forces. For tasks which do not meet these conditions, Naval Base Commanders, Army Div/Bde and RAF Commands may exceptionally authorise the use of Independent Reservists and members of the RNR, RMR, TA and RAuxAF who volunteer to participate; and careful consideration will need to be given to whether training day payments should be recovered from the sponsor in addition to the no-loss costs so that training allotments can be made up.

Use of Ships and Aircraft (Other than in Life-Saving Operations)

518. Where the use of HM Ships or other craft or aircraft (including helicopters) is proposed, D CT & UK Ops must be consulted.

Safety and the Environment

519. The MOD will comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Environment Act 1995. At the earliest opportunity following a request for MACC, safety and environmental advice should be sought from the relevant Service Chief Environment and Safety Officer (CESO). The General Agreement between MOD and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should mean that HSE inspectors will not inspect actual operations. They will, however, monitor standards of health and safety on MACC operations by giving advice (either centrally through joint MOD/HSE consultative arrangements or to the Commander carrying out the MACC task) and by investigating serious accidents and incidents. It is likely that a similar approach will be adopted by the Environment Agency (EA).

Public Relations

520. The possibility that a task may attract positive media coverage is not in itself a reason for undertaking MACC activity. Local publicity arrangements are the responsibility of the relevant civil authority, with MOD providing support if required on only those issues that directly affect the MOD. Enquiries should be handled by the Media Operations staff at the authorising HQ. Where an example of MACC

assistance might attract wider media interest, MOD (D News) should be informed and a brief report submitted to D CT & UK Ops/D Pol. (Where tasks concerning conservation are involved, the MOD Conservation Officer in the Defence Estates Organisation should also be informed.) The importance of co-ordinating media arrangements with the emergency services cannot be overemphasised.

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ANNEX 5A – INITIAL APPLICATION FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

To

From:

Name of Point of Contact

Organisation Name

Address

Tel No

Organisation Status (with aims if applicable)

Brief Statement of the Task:

Task to be completed by (date):

Have local employers' associations and Trade Unions agreed to the military undertaking this task?

Has the task been previously put out to tender?

Provide a short assessment of the social benefits to be derived from the task being undertaken.

Are there any other Governmental departments, organisations or individuals who may have an interest in the project? If so, provide details.

Have all other (non-military) options been considered and found to be unavailable?

Provide a short statement of implication if military assistance is not available.

Signed:

Date:

Appointment/Organisation:

ANNEX 5B – FORMAL APPLICATION FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY

To: The Secretary of State for Defence (through[insert HQ as appropriate]).

1. I/We of
(Hereinafter called ‘the Sponsor’) do hereby apply to you (hereinafter called ‘the Secretary of State’ for assistance (hereinafter called ‘the Service’) in or towards carrying out the works/service described in the schedule hereto.

2. **Indemnity.** In the event of the Secretary of State accepting and agreeing to act on this application the Sponsor undertakes to furnish a completed Indemnity Form as appropriate prior to the completion of the Service other than where a standing indemnity has already been furnished to the Secretary of State and the period covered in the form has not expired.

3. **Insurance.** In the event of the Secretary of State accepting and agreeing to act on this Application, the Sponsor undertakes:

a. To effect with an insurer or insurers a policy or policies of insurance to cover the requirements of the indemnities as follows:

(1) **Ground Risk Insurance.** Minimum of £2,000,000 (two million pounds) any one claim/incident.

(2) **Aviation Risk Insurance.** Minimum of £7,500,000 (seven and a half million pounds).

b. To duly pay the premium or premiums payable in respect of the said policy or policies and to produce the policy or policies and receipt or receipts whenever so required by or on behalf of the Secretary of State.

4. **Payment.** In the event of the Secretary of State accepting and agreeing to act on this Application, the Sponsor undertakes to:

a. Pay on demand the charge for the Service determined by the Secretary of State on termination of the Service notwithstanding any prior estimate of charge which may have been given.

b. Deposit with the Secretary of State the sum of £ and to make such further payments towards the charge as may be required before termination of the Service.

5. **General.**

- a. The Sponsor acknowledges the right of the Secretary of State to discontinue the Service without notice.

- b. The Sponsor certifies that it has obtained a statement in writing from every trade union, association of employers and other organisation whose members are likely to be affected by the provision of the Service that such trade union, association of employers or organisation does not object to such provision by the Secretary of State.

THE SCHEDULE OF WORKS

Description of the service:

Signature
being duly authorised to sign on behalf of the Sponsor

Name

Address.....

.....

.....

Position
(where applicable)

Dated

Witnesses*

(Second witness – *Scotland only*)

Address.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Dated

* Two witnesses required in Scotland

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ANNEX 5C – FORM OF INDEMNITY FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY TASKS

IN CONSIDERATION of the Secretary of State for Defence (hereinafter called ‘the Secretary of State’) agreeing to provide:*
(hereinafter called ‘the Organisation’) with

1. The Organisation **HEREBY UNDERTAKES AND AGREES:**

- a. That if any servant or agent of the Crown, shall suffer sickness or personal injury (including injury resulting in death) by reason of or arising out of any negligent act or omission connected with the performance of this agreement, the Organisation will fully and effectively indemnify the Crown in respect of:
- (1) All sums payable to that servant or agent or any dependant, relative or representative of his or hers by pay of pension, gratuity or other compensation (other than retired pay, pension or gratuity to which the servant or agent may be entitled by reason of length of time for which he or she has served as a servant or agent of the Crown) or by way of pay and allowances payable to him or her during any period of absence from duty as a result of sickness or injury.
 - (2) The costs and expenses of any hospital or medical treatment afforded to him or her on account of such sickness or injury, including any medical care or repatriation costs.
 - (3) Any funeral expenses incurred as a result of the death of the servant or agent.

PROVIDED that if the Secretary of State elects the indemnity under (1) above shall be deemed to be satisfied by the payment of the Organisation to the Secretary of State of a capital sum determined by the Government Actuary **and the Insurers**.

- b. That if any property of the Crown or of any servant of the Crown or any other property which, at the discretion of the Crown, falls to be replaced at public expense is lost or damaged, and such loss or damage occurs as a result of any negligent act or omission of the Organisation arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of the agreement, the Organisation will repay the Crown, as it may require, either the cost of replacement or repair, whichever is the less.

- c. That the Organisation will fully and effectively indemnify the Crown and any servant or agent of the Crown against all liabilities, claims, actions, proceedings, demands, costs, charges or expenses which may be incurred by or made against the Crown or any servant or agent of the Crown in respect of sickness or personal injury (including injury resulting in death) or loss of or damage to any property as a result of a negligent act or omissions arising out of or any way connected with the performance of this agreement.
- d. That the Organisation will indemnify the Crown against all payments made by the crown of sums paid to its servants or agents for the purpose of indemnifying them against any such liabilities, claims, actions, proceedings, demands, costs, charges and expenses as referred to in subparagraph c above.
- e. The Organisation will not make against the Crown or any servant or agent of the Crown any claim in respect of loss or damage to property from whatever cause, except negligence on the part of the Crown, sustained by the Organisation (or by any person employed by the Organisation or for whom the Organisation is responsible) by reason of or arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of this agreement.
- f. To effect with an Insurance Company or Companies a policy or policies of insurance covering all the matters which are the subject of the indemnities and undertakings herein and contained in the sum of £2,000,000 (min. £7,500,000 in the case of Aviation Risks) at least in respect of any one incident and unlimited in total and to ensure that the said policy or policies are endorsed as follows:

‘It is hereby declared and agreed that notwithstanding anything contained in this policy or in any memorandum, condition or schedule attached to or forming part of this policy, this policy covers all the sums within the total sum assured which the insured shall become liable to pay under an undertaking to the Crown a copy of which undertaking is set out at the foot hereof,’

PROVIDED ALWAYS that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting or affecting in any way the Organisation’s liability under any of the said indemnities or undertakings

- g. To assign the Crown all sums hereafter to become due under the said policy or policies and to ensure that the interest of the Crown therein is duly noted by the insurer or insurers.

h. To duly pay the premium or premiums payable in respect of the said policy or policies and to produce the policy or policies and receipt or receipts for the premiums for inspection whenever so required by or on behalf of the Secretary of State.

2. This indemnity will not apply to any of the liabilities referred to in 1a to 1f inclusive or to any other liabilities incurred by criminal acts.

Signed for and on behalf of

Position Dated

Witnessed Second witnessψ
(ψ *Scotland Only*)

Address

.....

.....

*Insert name and authority/organisation

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ANNEX 5D – APPLICATION FOR MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY - NOTES

5D1. An application for Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) assistance should be completed wherever possible before assistance is given. If time does not allow for this to be done, a written acceptance of the sponsor's liability for any charges raised by MOD should be obtained wherever practicable before the assistance is given, and in any event as soon as possible afterwards. Local commanders should ensure that those requesting assistance are aware of the costs which they will be expected to pay for the services provided, bearing in mind that MOD has discretion to waive costs only in the case of urgent attempts to save life.

5D2. For all Category B assistance an application has to be completed by the sponsor and returned to the authorising HQ *before* any assistance is given. In cases where an exchequer department is the sponsor, a written acceptance of liability for charges incurred, including any third-party claims, may be obtained instead.

5D3. Where the application is required, the sponsor should be made aware that agreement to undertake the task is subject to satisfactory completion of the form and confirmation of valid insurance cover. The authorising HQ should indicate clearly which of the asterisked items on the application may be deleted, and satisfy itself that whoever signs the form on behalf of the sponsor is authorised to accept the financial liability involved.

5D4. It is important that the authorising HQ should complete the schedule so as to make clear the extent of the assistance to be provided and the division of responsibility between the Services, the sponsor (including his servants or agents) and any other parties. Questions of legal liability following claims against insurance may sometimes hinge on whether a certain party was or was not responsible for a particular facet of the task.

5D5. If the circumstances make it necessary to impose an obligation not provided for in the application (e.g. when the nature of the task requires more comprehensive insurance to avoid risks to Defence Votes), a suitable alteration may be made to the application form on the advice of MOD.

5D6. The completed application should be regarded as part of the contract, which must be concluded in each case by written acceptance of the application. Any subsequent changes in the schedule must be agreed by the sponsor in writing and relevant correspondence should be attached. If the sponsor cancels the task after the application has been accepted, all nugatory (including reconnaissance) costs are to be recovered from the sponsor.

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CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING PROCESS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Planning resources

601. Generic planning for operations in the UK will normally be conducted by J5 SJC(UK) planning staff at Wilton. Additional planning resources may be required from the single Service UK Operations (UK Ops) planning staffs¹ and the Army's regional command structure, depending on the scale/complexity of the contingency. Co-ordination of planning will remain with J5 SJC(UK) who will maintain an overview of the various contingency and operational plans to ensure that they remain valid and to identify common resource requirements² that may require prioritisation.

Procedure

602. The generic planning procedure is usually distinguished by 5 phases, although it may be necessary to start the process at any of the first 3 and proceed from there:

- a. Identification of a General Requirement and Production of a Joint Planning Guide (JPG).
- b. Where the likelihood of an operation is judged to be of medium to high probability, production of a Joint Contingency Plan (JCP).
- c. Identification of a Specific Requirement and Generation of a Joint Operational Plan (JOP).
- d. Execution of the Plan.
- e. Post Operational Activity.

Identification of a General Requirement

603. In certain circumstances it is appropriate for the MOD to conduct contingency planning, even though there has been no specific request for assistance. This could be because of horizon scanning, historical events, the identification of a trend in requests, because of an operation³ or because of a perceived gap in preparedness. A JPG is intended to provide planners with appropriate planning data concerning a particular

¹ See Chapter 2.

² For example many plans may identify a common requirement for Support Helicopters, which is clearly a finite resource.

³ For example, the consequence management aspects of a Counter Terrorism operation will usually be aligned or form a subset of an overall plan.

contingency.⁴ Where there is a medium/high probability of an operation occurring, a JCP⁵ will be produced. Generic JCPs tend to be either capability or event-based.

Identification of a Specific Requirement

604. A specific requirement will usually be the result of a request for military assistance being received from outside the MOD. Planning for MACA can only be undertaken by the planning staffs described in Chapter 2 and by D CT & UK Ops, in consultation as necessary with other MOD experts. These staffs are also responsible for examining planning proposals received from outside the MOD. Only MOD-approved plans will be implemented by the MOD. The specific instance may be activation of an extant JCP,⁶ or a particular incident for which no JCP currently exists. In the case of the former, there will inevitably be a requirement to review the JCP in the light of the particular circumstances at the time. Whether based on a JCP or completely original, the JOP will form the basis of any Ministerial Submissions seeking authority to conduct the operation.

Execution of the Plan

605. Completion of a plan does not itself guarantee Armed Forces support. It is a necessary condition, but execution of the plan is still dependent upon approval to deploy the Armed Forces on the task by MOD Ministers, taking into account a wide range of factors. If approval is given, a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directive will be issued through D CT & UK Ops, tasking the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) to execute his plan. This will result in the refinement of the JOP into an Operation Order (OPORD).

606. The operation will then be conducted subject to a Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)⁷ process. The aim of CEA⁸ is to take a broad view of the campaign, in consultation with the Components/Supporting Commands, and determine if the required effects as envisaged in the campaign plan are being achieved. Measurement of success will be foremost in the Jt Comd's mind. He should be able to stand back from the detailed conduct of operations and take time to think, look ahead, identify emerging trends, see opportunities and detect looming threats. By this means execution of the JOP can be adjusted to increase the probability of success.

⁴ For example, a JPG addressing potential flooding would include geographical data, sources of meteorological information, references, key organisations and their responsibilities, transportation routes and other logistical data and possibly historical information from previous floods.

⁵ Referring to the former example, an area prone to flooding would have an extant JCP, based on the relevant JPG.

⁶ For example, a generic JCP to provide military assistance to the Prison Service could be activated for a particular prison.

⁷ Unlike the expeditionary model, the CEA process during military operations within the UK has to take into account the integrated civil-military response. In the UK, it will therefore usually be limited to an assessment of progress of the military part of the overall operation being conducted under Integrated Emergency Management procedures, although its output will be useful information at the Gold and Silver command levels.

⁸ See JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning', Chapter 2 for more detail.

Post Operational Activity

607. On completion of the operation there will be a lessons identified process, directed by the Jt Comd. The output from this process will be used to refine other JCPs/JOPs and may also prompt a Ministerial Submission or Note, informing MOD Ministers of those lessons.

SECTION II – PLANNING PROCESS

608. The planning process is characterised by the production of a cascade of documents:

- a. JPG.
- b. JCP.
- c. JOP.
- d. OPORD.
- e. Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO).

609. **Joint Planning Guide.**⁹ A JPG comprises generic planning data for a particular contingency. It is a statement of the nature and scale of the contingency coupled with resource constraints and capability requirements. It is the fundamental document on which JCPs and JOPs are based. The requirement for a JPG can be identified by MOD HQ, the SJC(UK) HQ, the Supporting Commands or other government departments (OGDs) and communicated to the SJC(UK) via D CT & UK Ops, who will, if appropriate, identify and task a Jt Comd with the preparation of a JPG through a Planning Directive. The Jt Comd will issue instructions to the J5 SJC(UK) to compile the JPG following the procedure below:

- a. The Jt Comd issues planning direction to Assistant Chief of Staff (Commitments) LAND outlining the planning parameters for the JPG; the likely objectives, timelines and any political or military constraints.
- b. A Contingency Planning Team (CPT) is formed under J5 SJC(UK) lead normally at Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff (DACOS)/SO1 level, with representation from all the relevant Divisions at the Joint HQ together with any specialists from other military headquarters or outside agencies. This may include staffs from the 3 Services.

⁹ This terminology has been introduced to be consistent with the expeditionary doctrine in JWP 5-00, Mar 2004, and replaces the former 'MACA Indices'.

- c. J5 SJC(UK) will commence detailed liaison within the constraints specified in the MOD Planning Directive HQ to identify and scope the planning issues. Although not specifically covert, JPG reconnaissance is normally carried out in as discreet a way as possible and with the smallest practicable team.
- d. On completion of the reconnaissance, the CPT produces a draft JPG that is then circulated to all interested parties within the constraints specified in the MOD Planning Directive.
- e. Once any comments have been incorporated, the JPG is allocated a number and added to the list of plans maintained at the Joint HQ. The schedule for the review of a JPG will be decided by Jt Comd.¹⁰

610. **Joint Contingency Plans.** In addition to the planning data contained in JPGs, JCPs contain specific information on the military capabilities required and their deployment options, including readiness states where appropriate, and are written in response to specific planning guidance. A proposal to compile a JCP may be generated by MOD HQ, the SJC(UK) or the Supporting Commands, but in order to target planning staffs effectively, compilation of a JCP will only commence on receipt of Planning Guidance from the MOD. The procedure for the production of a JCP is:

- a. MOD issues Planning Guidance to the nominated Jt Comd to compile the JCP. The Planning Guidance will contain, as a minimum, the military strategic objective(s), the timeline for planning and any political, military or resource constraints. The Planning Guidance also serves as a warning order to the Supporting Commands that planning is taking place and gives the scope of the planning.
- b. A CPT is formed under J5 SJC(UK) lead normally at DACOS/SO1 level, with representation from all the relevant Divisions at the Joint HQ together with any specialists from other military headquarters or outside agencies. This will include the staffs from the 3 Services who will initiate the identification of potential donor units and capabilities to support the JCP.
- c. The Joint HQ, in concert with the Supporting Commands and/or other outside agencies as appropriate, conducts such reconnaissance that may be required to support the estimate.
- d. A military strategic estimate is conducted by the CPT at the Joint HQ, with inputs from MOD HQ, Supporting Commands and other specialist staffs, including OGDs as appropriate. The output of the estimate will be a draft JCP, and possibly submissions for further guidance from MOD HQ.

¹⁰ The default is a biennial review.

- e. The draft JCP is circulated to all relevant authorities for comment.
- f. The final JCP will be submitted to MOD for approval and then issued to all relevant authorities and added to the list of JCPs maintained by the Joint HQ. The schedule for review of JCPs will be decided by the MOD.¹¹

Hierarchy of Operational Paperwork

611. **General.**¹² Contingency and operational planning for military operations in the UK is identical to that used for expeditionary operations.¹³ Where the Campaign appears relatively straightforward, or is envisaged to be of comparatively short duration, a Campaign Plan may be produced.¹⁴ Where a campaign is obviously complex or likely to be protracted, it will not be possible to articulate the detail of its later stages at the outset. In these circumstances a hierarchy of operational¹⁵ paperwork is employed.¹⁶

612. **Campaign Directive and Force Instruction Document.** The Campaign Plan is expressed in a Campaign Directive supported by a Force Instruction Document (FID)¹⁷ which presents the enduring supplementary instructions and supporting information ('annexes'). If required, J5 SJC(UK) will lead on the production of the Campaign Directive and co-ordinate the production of the FID.

613. **Joint Operational Plans.** Once the Campaign Plan is complete and the Campaign Directive issued it is then possible to break the whole campaign down into separate operations (which may be conducted within a single phase or overlap several phases). JOPs are plans for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as the basis for an OPORD, and are the most developed level of advance plan, consequently only those contingencies that are assessed as highly likely to develop into an operation will lead to the production of a JOP.¹⁸ JOPs will be written by J5 SJC(UK) to outline the envisaged concept of operations (CONOPS), including the Jt Comd's intent, and potentially draft Component (if required) mission statements.

614. **Operation Orders.** JOPs are both a Warning Order to the Components/Supporting Commands and a basis for an OPORD. OPORDs will include detailed co-ordinating instructions and are owned by J3/J5 SJC(UK) and usually co-ordinated by J3.

¹¹ The default is an annual review.

¹² Although at first viewing rather excessive, the hierarchy of paperwork described is generic in character, for straightforward low-key responses, JOPS, OPORDs etc would be brief and some parts of the generic structure, e.g. the FID, may not be required or be much reduced in scale.

¹³ JWP 5-00.

¹⁴ Guided by the format outlined in JWP 5-00, Chapter 2.

¹⁵ As opposed to planning.

¹⁶ Depicted JWP 5-00, Annex 3F.

¹⁷ JWP 5-00, Annex 3H.

¹⁸ JOPs are subject to 6 monthly review, or more frequently if the situation demands.

615. **Fragmentary Orders.** To keep pace with the changing operational environment, adjustments to issued OPORDs are made through FRAGOs, drafted and issued by J3/J5 SJC(UK) or J3 depending on the timeframe for their execution.



PART 2

Civil Organisations, Capabilities and Processes

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CHAPTER 7 – INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

701. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) contingency plans are co-ordinated with those of the civil authorities, including the command and control arrangements. For full compatibility in planning, and to guarantee successful implementation, liaison and mutual understanding are key requirements. For the military commander and his staff, this involves an understanding of the part played by central, regional and local government. This Chapter deals with the civil policy of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) and the co-ordination arrangements at central government, regional and local level.

Terminology

702. While there is no similar standardised, hierarchical system to that of the Armed Forces in the sphere of central and local government, defined arrangements do exist to co-ordinate the actions of disparate civil agencies, private companies and voluntary organisations. It is a feature of the UK's system of government that Whitehall is reluctant to interfere with matters of a local nature; the UK has elected local *government*, not a local *administration*, which means local autonomy is important.

703. Various terms are in common use to refer to different types of major emergency – *disaster*, *crisis* and *major incident* are among the most commonly used by professionals and volunteers involved in civil contingency planning. Each label brings particular associations. Within the emergency services the term 'major incident' is used as a preferred term, since there are specific events or circumstances which will initiate a response under the framework of each service's Major Incident Plan.

704. '*Dealing with Disaster*' uses the term 'major emergency' as a generic label that can be applied to a wide range of disruptive challenges, be they slow onset or sudden impact crisis or disaster. It defines a major emergency as: '*any event or circumstance (happening with or without warning) that causes or threatens death or injury, disruption to the community, or damage to property or to the environment on such a scale that the effects cannot be dealt with by the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations as part of their normal day-to-day activities*'.

Legal Framework

705. Historically, civil defence legislation dealt with civil protection measures, other than actual combat, for defence against a hostile attack from a foreign power. Emergency Powers legislation dealt with other civil emergencies such as industrial disputes affecting key national services or civil unrest. Following the fuel crisis and

severe flooding in the autumn and winter of 2000, emergency planning arrangements were reviewed and the government concluded that a major revision to the legal and organisational framework supporting emergency planning was required.

706. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is enabling legislation that, in Part 1 sets out local arrangements for civil protection. It imposes on certain local bodies (Category 1 responders) a legal obligation to prepare plans for addressing risk and dealing with a wide range of civil emergencies. The Act also provides a mechanism to impose duties on other local bodies (Category 2 responders) to co-operate with, and to provide information to, Category 1 responders in connection with their civil protection duties. Examples are:

| Category 1 | Category 2 |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| County Councils | Electricity suppliers |
| Metropolitan District Councils | Gas suppliers |
| London Borough Councils | Water suppliers |
| Unitary Councils | Telecommunication operators |
| Shire District Councils | Railway operators |
| Police Forces | Airport operators |
| Fire Authorities | Harbour Authorities |
| NHS Ambulance Trusts | Health and Safety Executive |
| Environment Agency | |
| Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) | |

Table 7.1- Category 1 and Category 2 Responders

707. Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act repeals existing civil defence legislation (the Emergency Powers Act 1920, Emergency Powers Act (Northern Ireland) 1926 and the Civil Defence Act 1948). Among other legislation repealed is Section 1 of the Emergency Powers Act 1964, although Section 2 (which directly affects MACA) remains extant. Under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act, emergency regulations can be made by Her Majesty through order in council (or a Secretary of State if the consequences of any potential delay warrants it) to control, prevent or mitigate the effects of an emergency. Unlike the existing legislation, emergency regulations made under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act may be made to have effect on specified Parts or regions of the United Kingdom only.

Fundamental Assumptions

708. Within IEM there are certain fundamental assumptions:

- a. There is no ideal response.
- b. Incidents will vary – although there may be similarities.

- c. A major incident for one organisation is not necessarily one for another.¹
- d. Response to a disaster will be local.
- e. Any response must be co-ordinated and combined.

Philosophy

709. IEM has an underlying philosophy:

- a. Deal with the consequences of the incident, not the cause.
- b. Integrate plans:
 - (1) Between departments or organisations.
 - (2) Between agencies.
 - (3) Across boundaries.
 - (4) For peace and war.
- c. People do their ordinary jobs in extraordinary circumstances.
- d. Do not change routine procedures in an emergency.
- e. IEM should be built in to an organisation as part of its normal functions.
- f. Ownership should be encouraged.

710. The underlying aim of the planning process is to develop flexible arrangements, which will enable an agency to deal with any crisis, whether foreseen or unforeseen, as any one emergency planning blueprint cannot be appropriate to all forms of possible incident.

Civil Contingency Principles

711. Civil contingency planning arrangements need to be integrated both within and between organisations. They should be an integral part of departmental and organisational planning and should work both individually and in collaboration with each other on certain key activities. For a truly integrated approach the following activities are therefore essential:

- a. **Planning.** Civil agencies conduct planning through 3 stages:

¹ For example, the Lockerbie disaster of 1998 was not a major incident for the NHS because of the extreme death toll, however for the police it most certainly was, as the crime scene was spread over a huge area of some 845 square miles.

(1) **Assessment.** Risk assessment in their own areas of responsibility, followed by the identification of preventative measures, the requirement for integrated plans and setting of priorities.

(2) **Prevention.** The implementation of measures in advance of an emergency to prevent it occurring and/or to reduce its severity. Certain types of activity carry known risks and are subject to legal requirements, regulations, and codes of practice or guidance documents specifying prevention measures.

(3) **Preparation.** Planning, training and exercising, including, for example, contingency planning and the preparation of resource registers and stockpiles. Planning is underpinned by training and exercises and is an integral part of the overall management strategy for the civil agencies.

b. **Response.** The basic objectives of the response, which will vary according to the circumstances of the event, will be to save life, to prevent escalation of emergency, to relieve suffering, the protection of property, to enable criminal and forensic investigations to be undertaken where necessary, to facilitate subsequent recovery and, finally, to recover. A key consideration when assessing and planning appropriate response frameworks for either sudden impact or slower onset emergencies is therefore to identify the trigger points that will prompt an organisation to activate its emergency management arrangements.

c. **Recovery.** Recovery management encompasses the physical, social, psychological, political and financial consequences of an emergency. Anticipation of those consequences and appropriate recovery planning must start right from the beginning of any response. Organisations and communities need to plan, manage and undertake those activities that will provide as rapid a return to normality as possible. Lessons from the past emphasise the need to involve the community fully in its own recovery, therefore the promotion and support of self-help activities are important considerations.

SECTION II – CENTRAL ARRANGEMENTS

712. The central arrangements for the development of Counter Terrorism and Resilience policy and crisis management were described in Chapter 2. While both Defence & Overseas Secretariat (OD Sec) and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) are intimately involved in this area, the CCS has a pivotal role in helping to maintain and improve the quality of civil protection. It aims to improve the UK's resilience to disruptive challenges at every level through anticipation, preparation, prevention and resolution by:

- a. Leading horizon-scanning activity to identify potential and imminent disruptive challenges to the UK and assist in the development of an integrated response.
- b. Leading the delivery of improved resilience across Government and the public sector, including supporting Ministers in developing policy – this includes the development and promulgation of doctrine.
- c. Ensuring that Government can continue to function and deliver public services during a crisis, working with Departments and the wider Cabinet Office to ensure that plans and systems to cover the full range of potential disruptions are in place and exercised.
- d. Improving the capability of all levels of Government, the wider public sector and the private and voluntary sectors to prepare for, respond to, and manage potential challenges through development of key skills and awareness.

The Lead Department Concept

713. **Principle.** The nomination of a lead department does not affect the underlying principle that wherever possible routine procedures and links should be used for dealing with major incidents. Local organisations aim to use normal links with government departments rather than channelling all dealings through the lead department although, exceptionally, special arrangements may need to be implemented. The concept of a Lead Government Department (LGD) aims to make it clear in advance to all levels of government, for as many potential challenges as possible, which department will be in the lead. They can thus plan ahead and should be ready to move into action immediately in times of crisis. The list of pre-nominated leads appears on the CCS website.² A summary, as at October 2004, is at Annex 7A.

714. **Change of Lead Government Department.** Circumstances may change as an incident develops or as the recovery phase is entered and it may become appropriate for the department originally nominated to lead to hand over the task to another department.³ The CCS would ensure that any such change was agreed interdepartmentally before being implemented and notified to everyone concerned.

715. **Lead Government Department Tasks.** A central government lead department is expected to be prepared to undertake some or all of the following tasks:

- a. Co-ordinate the activities of central government departments in the response to a disaster, providing a framework within which individual departments can discharge their specific responsibilities. An important part of

² www.ukresilience.info.

³ As occurred in the aftermath of the storms in October 1987 when the Home Office took the initial lead but handed over to the, then, Department of the Environment at a later stage.

this work will be to ensure that the necessary links are established with the local response.

b. Co-ordination of the collection of information on the incident and its effects for the purpose of:

- (1) Briefing ministers.
- (2) Informing Parliament.
- (3) Providing information to the public and the media at national level.

716. The way in which a government department performs its lead department role will depend on the circumstances of the event. In straightforward cases no special arrangements may be necessary; lead department officials will work from their normal offices or, out of normal working hours, from home.

717. Where circumstances demand, the LGD would activate special procedures, such as opening an emergency room, and may need to arrange regular meetings of the relevant departments, either directly or through the CCS.

718. However these activities are organised, it is incumbent on the LGD to ensure that there is no unjustified duplication in requests for information from those busily engaged at the scene. Pooling of information will ensure that departments can obtain the required data from the lead department or offer it for others to use.

Devolved Administrations

719. Each Devolved Administration (DA) has its own civil protection and lead organisation arrangements, which vary according to the terms of devolution settlements and local administrative arrangements. Where the response falls within devolved responsibilities, co-ordination would normally fall to a lead department within the DA itself.⁴ Ministers in the DAs are fully engaged in civil contingency planning and are members of the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), reflecting the wider principle that resilience is an issue that bears on all parts of the UK.

a. For incidents contained entirely within a devolved part of the UK, and where the response falls within their devolved responsibilities, the DA concerned would normally take full responsibility for planning and all response and consequence management activities within its authority. It would also liaise as appropriate with the other DAs, any UK-wide departments or agencies involved in the response and ensure that CCS was briefed as necessary.

⁴ See Annex 7A.

b. For incidents affecting more than one DA, each would implement its own response, lead department, and decision-making and co-ordination arrangements in relation to devolved matters. Additionally they would liaise with local lead organisations in other parts of the UK, departments and agencies with a wider geographical remit and the CCS.

c. Certain events may occur which relate to non-devolved matters where, regardless of location, the lead UK government department or organisation would have responsibility for immediate containment. In all such instances, the UK lead would liaise closely with its contacts in the DAs; for example, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency leads on marine safety across the UK and has a presence in all four home countries. In addition any military assistance is always centrally authorised and controlled – the DAs request military assistance through MACA procedures via the Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland Offices.

720. **Scotland.** The Scottish Executive has responsibility at a local level in Scotland. The Scottish Executive Justice Department has overall responsibility for policy on emergency planning in Scotland (apart from Health). Eight multi-agency strategic groups based on police force areas take responsibility for fostering co-operation and have representatives from emergency services, local authorities, health boards and trusts, utilities, industry and the voluntary sector.

721. Multi-agency co-ordination across Scotland is the responsibility of the Scottish Emergency Co-ordinating Committee (SECC). It brings together senior Scottish executive staff with representatives at chief officer level of all the agencies who would be involved in responding to a major incident or dislocation of services in Scotland. It also ensures that work is co-ordinated with the CCS. The membership of the SECC can be adjusted according to circumstances, but it includes Scottish Executive departments, emergency services, local authorities and the Armed Forces.

722. **Northern Ireland.** In Northern Ireland the Central Emergency Planning Unit of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy Minister performs the same functions as SECC in Scotland.

SECTION III – REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN ENGLAND

Introduction

723. The Government has established a new regional civil protection tier, drawing together activity already organised on a regional basis and providing a strong bridge between the centre and local arrangements. Regional Resilience Teams (RRT) have been formed in Government Offices, and Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) have been created to bring together the disparate key agencies and organisations in the regions. This activity is non-statutory and is not addressed by the Civil Contingencies Act. The Act does, however, provide for the role of Regional Nominated Co-ordinators and allow for special legislative measures to be used on a regional basis.

724. A wide range of organisations have an interest in civil protection at the regional level. These organisations have different roles and structures, though there is considerable commonality of purpose and approach when it comes to dealing with emergencies. Membership of the RRF will vary by regions but will usually include:

- a. Government Offices (and regional representatives of central government departments).
- b. Representatives of the emergency services.
- c. Environment Agency.
- d. Representatives of local authorities.
- e. Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
- f. Department of Health/National Health Service.
- g. Voluntary organisations.
- h. Government News Network.
- i. Armed Forces, usually the regional brigade commander.

Government Offices for the Regions

725. The Government, with the objective of strengthening the machinery for co-ordination in the regions, established the Central Government Offices for the Regions (GOR) in 1995. The imperative was to integrate a number of separate programmes to provide flexible support for regeneration and economic development in England in a way that meets local needs and priorities. The Government brought together the regional offices of some of the departments in England under a single Regional

Director. Close links are maintained with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the Home Office and LGDs. The departments involved are:

- a. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).
- b. The Department for Transport (DfT).
- c. Department for Education and Skills (DfES).
- d. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
- e. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).
- f. Department of Work and Pensions (DWP).
- g. The Home Office.
- h. Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).
- i. Department of Health (DoH).

726. The GOR activities are co-ordinated by the ODPM Regional Co-ordination Unit (RCU) and have offices in 9 English Regions:

- a. London.
- b. South East (Guildford).
- c. South West (Bristol).
- d. Eastern, (Cambridge).
- e. East Midlands (Nottingham).
- f. West Midlands (Birmingham).
- g. Yorkshire and the Humber (Leeds).
- h. North East (Newcastle).
- i. North West (Manchester).

727. Regional Directors are accountable to the relevant Secretary of State for the programmes their offices carry out. They are also responsible for administering a single budget for regeneration and economic development within their regional area.

Objectives for the Regional Tier

728. The regional role in emergency planning (which was added to GORs remit in 2003) has to be clearly defined and well understood by other responders, particularly at the local and national levels. The permanent core of the regional planning organisation is the Regional Resilience Team (RRT). Acting on behalf of the RRF in co-ordinating the Regional response, they primarily add value by avoiding duplication and nugatory effort. They achieve this by:

a. **Improving Co-ordination at a Regional Level:**

- (1) Map resilience at a regional level to identify gaps and interdependencies.
- (2) Assist with the brokering of mutual aid agreements and other contacts with and between regional partners.
- (3) Establish a strong cadre of staff familiar with emergency procedures.

b. **Improving Co-ordination between the Centre and the Region:**

- (1) Maintenance of agreements on support from central government.
- (2) Provision of coherent, collated regional information for central government and more consistent communication flows between central and local government.

c. **Improving Co-ordination between the Region and the Local Response Capability.** Co-ordination is achieved by ensuring that local responder organisations are represented on the RRF, and RRT represented on Local Resilience Forums.

d. **Improving Co-ordination between Regions.** The establishment of links between regions to support cross-boundary working, mutual aid agreements and information sharing.

e. **Supporting Planning for a Response Capability.** Some capabilities may be better established on a regional basis. Regional consultation with both the central and the local levels is intended to identify which capabilities should be established, and to promote the development of those capabilities through sub-committees of the RRF.

f. **Leading a Regional Response.** In the event of an emergency affecting the region, the new structures will provide regional level co-ordination or direction as necessary, through regional application of government advice and

direction, a regional voice to the media and support for central government's response at the regional level.

g. **Assisting with Recovery.** The regions have a significant interest in the recovery phase of a wide-area emergency. This links closely to their wider remit in the economic development field.

Regional Civil Contingency Committee

729. RRF do not have a direct role in response; they are confined to planning, prevention and preparation. A separate committee, called the Regional Civil Contingency Committee (RCCC)⁵ would be formed to co-ordinate the regional response. However, many of the same people will attend both RRF and RCCC, and other organisations would be invited to attend depending on the nature of the situation. The RCCC will be convened by the GOR.

730. **Regional Civil Contingency Committee Levels of Response.** The RCCC will meet at 3 levels:

a. **Level 1.** Meetings convened, where possible, in the period prior to an emergency. GORs would convene a level one meeting (possibly at the request of a RCCC member) on the basis of a threat assessment or a local incident that could escalate. The meeting will review the situation, with a view to escalating to Level 2 if warranted. A senior official from the GOR will chair level one meetings.

b. **Level 2.** Meetings convened in the event of a wide area disruptive challenge in the region or if a national response or co-ordination of an event is required such as during a fuel distribution crisis. The meetings would be called by the GOR, in consultation with members of the RCCC and Central Government crisis management machinery. The meetings would seek to agree co-ordination of resources across the region, according to regional and national priorities, with regard to availability of resources.

c. **Level 3.** Level 3 meetings should only be called following the formal declaration of a state of emergency, which allows special powers under the CCA. Following the declaration the GOR, in consultation with members of the RCCC, could apply to move to Level 3 to the Central Government crisis management machinery. Central Government would need to agree that special powers were necessary in the region, and regulations would be made under CCA Legislation. This would act as a safeguard to stop regions moving to Level 3 without authority from Central Government. The Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC), acting on advice from RCCC, would have the power to

⁵ Gold Co-ordinating Group in London.

ensure that all resources, not just those belonging to central government, were used in a co-ordinated way to pursue national and regional priorities. RCCC, via individual members or the GOR support, would promulgate the RNC's directions and decisions to the local level.

731. Aspects of regional response are summarised in Table 7.2:

| Meeting Level | Phase | Indicative Trigger | Membership | Role | Chair | Example |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Regional Resilience Forum | Planning | On-going | Core | Planning against capabilities | As agreed | Day to day |
| RCCC Level One | Readiness | Threat or local major incident with potential to escalate | Core | Watching and evaluating as agreed | GOR rep of the central LGD | Warning of CBRN threat |
| RCCC Level Two | Wide area/ High impact Regional Emergency | One local responder completely overwhelmed/ majority of local responders in region affected | Core + Invitees | Co-ordination of central government resources | GOR Regional Director or other as agreed | Foot and mouth disease |
| RCCC Level Three | State of Emergency | Declaration of State of Emergency | Core + those directed to attend | Co-ordination of all resources | RNC/ Minister | Failure of critical national infrastructure |

Table 7.2 - Regional Response

732. **Principal Functions.** The responsibilities of the RCCC are to:

- a. Collate and maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation within the region with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management and recovery issues, continually assessing the adequacy of local contingency arrangements.
- b. Co-ordinate central Government activities within their regions and ensure that the national input is co-ordinated with local and regional efforts.
- c. Facilitate mutual aid arrangements within the region and, where necessary, between regions. Guide the deployment of scarce resources across the region by identifying regional priorities.
- d. Ensure an effective flow of communication between local, regional and national level, including the co-ordination of reports, as directed, to the national

level (Chair of COBR or the Civil Contingencies Committee) on the response and recovery effort.

e. Ensure that information is made available to the public in accordance with Government policy at the time. Where appropriate, provide a regional spokesperson.

f. Amongst matters that are likely to be considered are the application of priorities decided at central government to conditions existing in its own area and deciding on priorities for requests for Armed Forces manpower and resources.

Regional Nominated Co-ordinator

733. The role of Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC) (Emergency Co-ordinator when activated) is to ensure effective co-ordination and leadership at the regional level. The RNC would be pre-nominated by the organisations represented on the RRF in the same way that CCS co-ordinates nomination of LGDs in central government. It is likely that the RNC for any particular incident will vary according to the nature and location of the incident. For flooding, it might be an official from Defra, or in the case of a ‘flu pandemic’ the Regional Director of Public Health. The RNC would probably work within the region already but could be attached from Central Government, with appropriate regional expertise provided in support.

734. The RNC would not be formally appointed unless special legislative measures were to be taken. Such an action would require a Secretary of State to appoint a RNC in relation to each region of England to which those measures applied. Those measures would set out the functions to be given to the RNC for the purpose principally of co-ordinating activities to prevent, control or mitigate an aspect or effect of the emergency (whether wholly in the relevant region or partly here and elsewhere). MOD would not agree to the appointment of a serving military officer as a RNC.

SECTION IV – LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

Introduction

735. In every Shire county, London Borough, Metropolitan District and Unitary Authority in England and in every Unitary Authority in Scotland and Wales there is an Emergency Planning Officer (EPO). (S)he may or may not be supported by a team. Some Shire Districts in England employ their own EPO, others rely on the shire county to provide emergency planning expertise. At a local level, contact is maintained with the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) in conjunction with RN Area Staff Officers ICP and Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officers (RAFRLOs). It is vitally important to understand the way in which Emergency Planning is

organised and undertaken in any particular Local Authority area and it must not be assumed that the approach is uniform across the UK.

736. In England and Wales a ring-fenced Civil Defence Grant is paid by Central Government to Shire Counties, London Boroughs, Metropolitan Districts and Unitary Authorities as a contribution towards the work undertaken by Emergency Planning Officers. Shire Districts do not receive a grant direct although part of what is paid to the Shire Counties is based on the number of districts within the County. From 2005/6, it is intended that provision for local authority emergency planning will transfer to the revenue support grant. There will be no requirement on local authorities to spend any particular amount, but the duties in the Civil Contingency Act require local authorities to achieve certain outputs.

737. In Scotland, the Scottish Executive pays a Civil Defence Grant to each Unitary Authority, fire brigade and police force in Scotland. The grant supports the salary and ancillary costs for each local authority Emergency Planning Unit, each Fire Brigade's Emergency Planning Staff Officer, and each police force's Emergency Planning Officer. Training in the form of exercises, seminars and emergency planning courses is also carried out using grant funding.

738. In Northern Ireland the focus is on District Councils liaising with the emergency services in the production of their major incident plans, with PSNI normally the lead emergency service for land-based incidents.

739. The Civil Contingencies Act places a statutory duty on Local Authorities to make Emergency Plans. These plans may include references (even if it is on a 'when available' basis) to military support with the agreement of the regional military commanders.

740. A statutory duty is placed on local authorities to undertake civil defence activities, with the implicit promise of central government funds to undertake those activities. Legislation also requires local authorities to undertake specified emergency planning, some of which may be charged for.⁶ Local authorities can claim emergency financial assistance through the Bellwin scheme when emergencies or disasters occur that are outside local experience or are not covered by specific provision.

⁶ Notably within the Control of Major Accidents and Hazards Regulations (COMAH), together with several other examples, such as Rabies and Animal Health Regulations.

Organisation

741. **Shire Counties.**⁷ The Shire County organisations are likely to consist of a County Emergency Planning Officer, 3 to 4 Emergency Planning Officers and a number of Divisional Emergency Planning Officers. Most will have a strategic co-ordination group on which District/Borough/City Councils are represented. Some are now administratively sited with the Fire and Rescue Service but most still have direct access to the County Chief Executive. Operationally there may be 2 differently focused methods of response. In some counties, the Districts/Boroughs react directly and the County acts in support, co-ordinating the effort if the incident covers more than one district or spans a boundary. The second method involves a County response to any and all incidents with the Districts invited to supply resources. The method is usually determined by the size of County and number of Districts.

742. **Unitary Authorities.** In England, Scotland and Wales, the Unitary Authority will carry out the same statutory obligations as the large Shire Counties of England. Each has an Emergency Planning organisation, which is tasked to maintain emergency plans and arrangements. Management normally follows this generic structure, although it will vary between authorities:

- a. A senior co-ordinating group chaired by the Chief Executive or Chief Constable includes representatives from the emergency services and other relevant local agencies to determine policy on the IEM strategy for the authority.
- b. A working group, responsible directly to the senior co-ordinating group meets regularly to discuss detailed risk assessments, identify and promote best practice and foster agreements with neighbouring authorities.
- c. A working group which will identify whether appropriate plans exist, whether they require review and produce a training and exercise programme.

743. **Metropolitan District.** The emergency planners in the Metropolitan Areas are usually based individually at Borough Offices or in geographic groups.

744. **London.** Emergency planning in London is co-ordinated on a multi-agency basis by the London Resilience Forum. To co-ordinate the activities of the emergency services in a major incident the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) meets 3 monthly and produces a Major Incident Procedure Manual. Each of the 32 London Boroughs and the Corporation of London employ an Emergency Planning Officer responsible for planning for and co-ordinating the Borough's response to

⁷ While counties are typically large, well-resourced bodies, in some cases there may be capacity issues for smaller unitary authorities and shire districts – there may be a very small number of people working in any particular policy area, including resilience.

major incidents and liaising with the other members of London Resilience Forum. The Boroughs are grouped for mutual aid purposes into 5 areas, with a lead Borough being nominated as the initial contact point. Each Borough will have an emergency plan detailing duty officer, call-out details,⁸ and the procedures to be followed in using Borough resources, and the activation of certain contingency plans, such as evacuation.

Contingency Plans

745. In general, the perceived risks, and the plans for them, fall broadly into 3 categories:

- a. **Site Specific.** Hazardous site plans cover a particular threat in a specific location such as an industrial complex or a nuclear site, which in addition may have restricted and vulnerable access. Some of these are required by legislation⁹ and may be on-site (taking into account processes and materials within the site boundary) or off-site (where the planning is more concerned with what happens around the site – access arrangements, cordons, rendezvous points, evacuation considerations etc).
- b. **Foreseen.** These emergencies are assessed as being of reasonably high probability and could include, for example, maritime accidents, oil pollution and flooding/snowfall. Also included in this category are specific event plans, for example major air shows, sports events or regular concert venues, or in rural areas plans for certain animal disease outbreaks.
- c. **Unforeseen.** This category covers all those incidents hitherto regarded as of low probability or so unpredictable that specific planning is impractical. Examples of unforeseen emergencies are the Lockerbie bombing and the 1987 hurricane. To cater for these, most Emergency Planning Units have a generic Emergency Plan, which is sufficiently broad and flexible to cover most eventualities; this may include an evacuation plan for major urban areas.

⁸ London Local Authority Gold Protocols, agreed between all of the Boroughs, ensures that a Local Authority Chief Executive is on-call to co-ordinate the pan-London Local Authority response to a major incident.

⁹ COMAH - Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, REPPiR – Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations, 2001, Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) 1996.

ANNEX 7A – LEAD GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS¹

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| Default | Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) immediate lead and then nominate (PM to confirm). | Scottish Executive Justice Dept (SEJD) immediate lead and then nominate (Scottish Executive (SE) ministers to confirm). | Emergencies and Security Division (ESD) of the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) immediate lead. | Central Emergency Planning Unit of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister provide advice on lead allocation. |
| Terrorism Conventional/ Siege/Hostage. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). | Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit (TPU). | | | Northern Ireland Office. |
| | Home Office TPU (during Counter Terrorism phase). | | | Northern Ireland Office. |
| | Defra (consequence management). | Scottish Executive (consequence management for devolved functions). | WAG (consequence management for devolved functions). | Northern Ireland Executive (consequence management for devolved functions). |
| Civil Defence | Cabinet Office (CCS) working closely with the Overseas and Defence Secretariat. | | | |
| Flooding (coastal and riverine) | Defra | Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD). | Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside (DEPC) of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) (Rivers Agency). |

¹ As at 18 Oct 04; definitive list is at www.ukresilience.info.

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| Marine and coastal pollution (oil, chemical or gas): From vessels. From land. | Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Counter Pollution Branch. | MCA Counter Pollution Branch with SEERAD. | MCA Counter Pollution Branch. | |
| | Defra (with Environment Agency). | SEERAD | DEPC of the WAG (working with Defra and the Environment Agency). | Northern Ireland Executive Department of the Environment (DOE). |
| Marine Salvage | DfT MCA: Secretary of State’s Representative for Salvage and Intervention. | | | |
| Radiation Hazard Initiated or threatened by terrorism. Civil Nuclear installations. Defence nuclear installations and defence nuclear material in transit. Accidental release of radiation from civil nuclear material in transit. | Defra Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) supports all radiological emergencies. | | | |
| | Home Office TPU (during CT phase). | | | Northern Ireland Office. |
| | Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). | Scottish Executive Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department (SEETLLD). | DTI | Northern Ireland Executive DOE. |
| | MOD | MOD (SEJD to co-ordinate consequence management). | MOD (WAG ESD to co-ordinate consequence management). | MOD (Northern Ireland Executive DOE to lead consequence management). |
| | Department for Transport (DfT). | SEETLLD | ESD of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DOE. |

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| CBRN (non terrorist) | CCS to nominate LGD for emergency phase Defra LGD for consequence management. | Appropriate SE lead department for consequence management. | Appropriate WAG lead department for consequence management. | Appropriate NI lead department for consequence management. |
| Radiation Hazards (arising outside the UK) Result of terrorist action overseas. Result of accident overseas. | FCO lead on relations with overseas government(s). | | | |
| | Home Office TPU to lead in considering potential threat to UK. | | | |
| | Defra (with Environment Agency). | SEERAD and Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). | Defra (with Environment Agency). | Northern Ireland Executive DOE. |
| Satellite re-entry hazard | CCS responsible for ensuring LGD takes responsibility for consequence management once they become clear. Plan based on CCS assessment in conjunction with the DTI. (British National Space Centre). | | | |
| Emergencies on offshore installations | DfT Health and Safety Executive (HSE). | | | |
| Overseas Disasters (UK assistance sought) | Department for International Development. | | | |
| SAR Civil Maritime & Coastal Rescue. Military shipping and aircraft, civil aircraft at sea/on land where the location is unknown. | DfT MCA (HM Coastguard). | | | |
| | MOD (where location is known the emergency is treated as a transport accident-see below) | | | |

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| Severe storms and weather | CCS to ensure which LGD takes lead in good time to support the response. | | | |
| Primary impact on transport infrastructure. | DfT | Scottish Executive Development Department (SEDD). | Department for Economic Development and Transport (DEDT) of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive Department for Regional Development (DRD). |
| Primary impact on power system. | DTI | SEETLLD | DTI | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment. |
| Primary effect is flooding. | Defra | SEERAD | DEPC of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DARD or DRD depending on the source of flooding. |
| Transport Accidents | | | | |
| Shipping and air transport. | DfT Marine Accident Investigation Branch or Air Accident Investigation Branch. | DfT Marine Accident Investigation Branch or Air Accident Investigation Branch plus SEETLLD where issue devolved. | DfT Marine Accident Investigation Branch or Air Accident Investigation Branch. | |
| Land transport. | DfT and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). | | DEDT of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DRD. |
| Disasters in Sports Grounds | Department of Culture, Media and Sport. | SEJD | Local Government, Housing and Culture Department of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure. |
| Major explosions arising from landfill gas | Defra (with Environment Agency). | SEERAD | DEPC of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DOE. |
| Dam failures | Defra (with Environment Agency.) | SEERAD | DEPC of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DRD. |

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| Earthquake | Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). | SEJD lead. | ODPM | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI). |
| Major structural failure in building (other than those caused by external impact, gas explosion, fire or industrial process) | ODPM | Scottish Executive (department depending on outcome of the event). | WAG (department depending on outcome of the event). | Northern Ireland Executive (department depending on outcome of the event). |
| Serious Industrial Accident | CCS | SEJD | ESD of the WAG to nominate if devolved matter. | Northern Ireland Executive (department depending on nature and outcome of the event). |
| Rivers, inland waterways (outside Port Authority jurisdiction) or water services, or gas clouds of unknown origin. | Defra (with Environment Agency). | SEERAD | DEPC of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DRD. |
| Main focus the responsibilities of the HSE. | Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) (with HSE). | SEETLLD | DEPC of the WAG (with HSE). | Northern Ireland Executive DETI (with HSE). |
| Pollution arising. | Defra (see also radiation hazards). | SEERAD | Transport, Planning and Environment Department of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DOE. |

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| Unexploded Wartime Ordnance Disposal. Information on whereabouts. | Police (with MOD support). | | | |
| | ODPM | | | |
| Major software failures (analogous to Y2K) | CCS with Office of the 'E' Envoy. | SE Finance and Central Services Department (SEFSCD). | ESD of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Finance and Personnel. |
| Electronic Attack | UK: Home Office/National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC). | | | |
| | Home Office/NISCC. | SEFSCD and Central Services dept in support if Scottish dimension. | Personnel, Management and Business Services Group of the WAG in support if Welsh dimension. | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Finance and Personnel in support if NI dimension. |
| Disruption of Supply chains | CCS in consultation with DfT and devolved administrations confirm lead depending upon nature, territorial spread of disruption and supplies affected (e.g. DoH-Medical; Defra [with EA]-food, water waste; DTI –fuel, energy, electronic communication networks, postal services and manufacturing industry; DfT-transport; HM Treasury-finance). | | | |
| | | Appropriate SE Dept: SE Health Department (SEHD)-medical; SEERAD- food, water, waste; SEETLLD-manufacturing, oil, gas and electricity. | Appropriate WAG Dept: NHS (Wales)-health; DEPC-food, water and waste. | Northern Ireland Executive (department depending on outcome of the event. |

| Incident | Lead Government Department | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | England | Scotland | Wales | Northern Ireland |
| Animal disease and welfare | UK: EU and international aspects. | | | |
| Domestic policy and operational | Defra/State Veterinary Service (with DoH/Food Standards Agency if threat to human life). | SSRAD/Scottish Veterinary Service. | Joint Defra/ State Veterinary Service and Agriculture and Rural Affairs department of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive DARD. |
| Food Contamination | Food Standards Agency (FSA). | FSA in Scotland. | FSA in Wales. | FSA in NI. |
| Drinking Water Contamination | Defra | SEHD | DEPC of the WAG. | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety. |
| Infectious Diseases | DoH with HPA. | SEHD | Office of the Chief Medical Officer with Public Health Laboratories Service. | Northern Ireland Executive Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety. |

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CHAPTER 8 – CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

801. This chapter is primarily aimed at the military reader, outside the UK Operations organisations, whose knowledge of many of the organisations likely to be involved in major incidents is probably limited. As the focus is on the military readership, the level of detail on some organisations varies – there is a considerable amount of information on the police who will be a key partner in incident response, but it is relatively superficial on others, such as the Voluntary Organisations. It will be a useful briefing aid prior to participation in co-ordination groups at the Silver/Gold¹ level; in particular, it will explain the roles and responsibilities of some agencies in the key groups at Gold. Details are public domain, drawn largely from published material and the organisations' own web sites except where specifically quoted.

SECTION II – POLICE STRUCTURE

General

802. The Police Act 1964, the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, both recently amended by the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994, and the Police Acts (Northern Ireland) 2000 and 2003 are the statutory basis for police forces in the UK.

803. Police officers are not employees of the state or of local government. They hold their position as independent office holders under the Crown. At the same time, like any other citizen, they are answerable to both the ordinary criminal and civil law, as well as to the police disciplinary procedures.

804. The Home Office has central government responsibility for the Police Service in the UK.² However policing, with the exception of certain national agencies, is locally based and directed through the Tripartite System described later.

805. In 2003³ in England and Wales there were just over 133,000 full-time equivalent police officers, supported by 66,000 full-time equivalent staff, in the form of community support officers, traffic wardens and other police staff. A further 11,000 special constables were in post. They are structured into 43 police forces; their areas are at Annex 8A.

806. The 8 Police Forces in Scotland (details at Annex 8A) and common police services (such as the Scottish Criminal Record Office, Scottish Police College)

¹ Described in detail in Chapter 9.

² Except for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, funded by the Northern Ireland Office.

³ Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary Annual Report 2003.

comprise the Scottish Police Service, which has a strength of 15,000 uniformed police officers, 1,000 special constables and 6,000 support staff.

807. The Police Service of Northern Ireland replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 2001 in reforms to the service under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The service has an establishment of 7,500 regular officers complemented by 1,700 reserve officers.

England and Wales

808. The Metropolitan and City of London police forces are headed by a Commissioner, other forces outside London by a Chief Constable, each responsible for policing a geographical area that usually follows local government boundaries.

809. **London.** The City of London Police, one of the UK's smallest forces, with an authorised strength of 877 police officers, is responsible for the one square mile of the original walled city. The surrounding area of both inner and outer London, extending to some 15 miles from central London and covering 790 square miles, is the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police, the largest police force in the UK with an authorised strength of 32,000 police officers. The force is divided into territorial areas, each commanded by an Assistant Commissioner. Thereafter the organisation follows the general pattern of the structure of other UK police forces.

810. The Metropolitan Police provide certain national services for all forces, in particular the National Identification Service. It is also responsible for providing personal protection officers for members of the Royal Family, members of government and diplomats. The Metropolitan Police provide co-ordination in the investigation of terrorist offences.

811. **Provincial Police Forces.** There is considerable variation in the size of police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland but, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, there are features which are common to the organisation and structure of most forces:




Figure 8.1 – Typical Provincial Police Force Structure

812. Notes on Figure 8.1:

- a. **Chief Constable.** The Chief Constable has overall strategic responsibility for his force area.
- b. **Assistant Chief Constable.** The number varies from force to force but is related to its size. An Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) will have specific responsibility for functional areas such as the Basic Command Units (BCUs) and operations.
- c. **Director.** A civilian appointment (title varies) with overall responsibility for support services and administration.
- d. **HQ Department Functional Heads.** Usually with the rank of Superintendent with responsibility for specific areas such as Operations and Special Branch.
- e. **Basic Unit Commanders.** Combined with a single level of strategic command, forces create units with as much financial and operational autonomy as possible.

f. **Basic Command Unit.** The BCU is, as its name suggests, the fundamental territorial entity in a police force, forming the basic policing units with which the local population identifies. The name will vary between forces being variously called districts, areas, operational command units or divisions. Commanded by a Superintendent or Chief Superintendent, its size, and the area it covers, will vary, but it is usually between 100 and 1,000 police officers and supporting personnel and its area will be coincident with local authority boundaries. Sector teams of an Inspector, Sergeants and Constables police BCUs.

g. **Specialist Units.** In each police force there will be a range of specialist units such as Special Branch, mounted branch, river police, police dogs, underwater search, firearms or air support.

Scotland

813. Scottish police forces are similar in structure to English provincial forces. However they can differ due to the wide variations in the policing task across Scotland. In general, they are structured into Divisions or Area Commands (commanded by a Chief Superintendent or Superintendent) which are similar to the Basic Command Units in England and Wales. These are in turn divided into sub-divisions, sections or local command units.

Northern Ireland

814. The Police Service of Northern Ireland is structured into 29 District Command Units commanded by a Chief Superintendent or Superintendent.

Other (Non-Home Office) Police Forces

815. There are a number of Police Forces that do not report directly to the Home Office. Each has its own legal status, but their chief constables (or equivalent) are all represented in the Association of Chief Police Officers.

a. **Jersey.** The States of Jersey Police number about 250 officers and its Chief Officer reports to the Defence Committee of Jersey.

b. **Guernsey.** The Guernsey Police Force has an authorised establishment of 177 officers and 37 support staff and is responsible for policing the Channel Islands other than Jersey. The Chief Officer of Police reports to the Committee of Home Affairs of Guernsey.

c. **Isle of Man Constabulary.** The Chief Constable of the Isle of Man Constabulary (240 officers) reports to a police committee consisting of the

Minister of Home Affairs and other members of the Isle of Man Parliament with an equal number of lay members.

d. **Ministry of Defence Police.** The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) was formed in 1971 from the amalgamation of the existing single service constabularies and derives its authority from the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. The force of about 3,800 officers is headed by a Chief Constable and answers to the Secretary of State for Defence through the MOD Police Committee chaired by the 2nd Permanent Under Secretary (2nd PUS), which includes 3 independent members and professional police advisers. The force is responsible for policing all Ministry of Defence property, land and personnel and also polices USAF bases, Defence Research establishments, some Royal Ordnance factories and the Royal Mint. Its officers have full police powers in relation to those duties and, unusually for police officers, all are firearms-trained; at any one time 70% are armed.

e. **British Transport Police.** Headed by a Chief Constable, the British Transport Police (BTP) of 2,200 officers provides a national service policing the railway network throughout England, Wales and Scotland, the London Underground plus the Docklands Light Railway, Croydon Tramlink and Midland Metro Tram System. A statutory 9 member Police Committee oversees the force, 7 of whom are appointed by the Strategic Rail Authority and one each by Network Rail and the London Underground.

f. **United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary.** The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary (UKAEAC) was set up as part of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) by the Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 with a statutory remit to protect nuclear material both on UKAEA sites and in transit. This remit was later extended to include British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) and Urenco sites. A Chief Constable heads its 500 officers and it is accountable to Parliament through the Department of Trade and Industry. It is overseen by an 8 member Police Authority drawn from UKAEA, BNFL, Urenco, the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) and Office for Civil Nuclear Security plus an independent professional police adviser. The UKAEAC will become a stand-alone, independent police force in April 2005.

g. **Royal Parks Constabulary.** The Royal Parks Constabulary was created by the Parks Regulation (Amendment) Act 1974 and is accountable via The Royal Parks to the Department of Culture Media and Sport. The 150 officers are headed by a Chief Officer and are responsible for policing all the royal parks of London. A possible merger with the Metropolitan Police to form a separate operational command unit for the Royal Parks is being

considered; at present the force is overseen by a Royal Parks Police Committee.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Capabilities

816. Considerable investment has been made in recent years in equipping the 3 main emergency services with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Capabilities (CBRN) equipment and training them in their use.⁴ The emergency services are confident that, with their systems of ‘mutual assistance’, they are able to muster sufficient officers to cope throughout the likely duration of a CBRN incident. Police forces now have:

- (1) CBRN Personal Protection Equipment procured on a national basis with the other emergency services.
- (2) CBRN trained command teams.⁵
- (3) Protected responders (Police Support Units (PSUs))⁶ trained in the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and the handling of CBRN incidents.
- (4) Forensic Management Teams.⁷
- (5) Scenes of Crime Officers.⁸
- (6) A limited firearms capability – usually CBRN-trained firearms trainers.
- (7) A limited search capability.⁹
- (8) Detection/monitoring equipment.

Central Executive & Co-ordinating Bodies

817. **National Identification Service.** Run by the Metropolitan Police at New Scotland Yard for all police forces, the National Identification Service maintains criminal records, holding some 5 million records supported by 4 million sets of fingerprints.

⁴ Emergency service CBRN training and doctrine is co-ordinated at the Police National CBRN Centre.

⁵ On average 1 or 2 GOLD and 3 or 4 SILVER commanders per force, these are available to other police forces through mutual aid arrangements.

⁶ The average county force has 2 PSUs.

⁷ Metropolitan Police SO13 Forensic unit and its regional satellite units.

⁸ 2 CBRN trained per force on average.

⁹ London only at present (2004).

818. **National Criminal Intelligence Service.**¹⁰ The National Criminal Intelligence Service was set up in 1992 to provide the police and other law enforcement agencies with criminal intelligence and information about serious crime and major criminals of regional, national and international interest. The establishment of the Unit brought together the work of a number of established units such as the National Drugs Intelligence Unit and Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices.

819. **National Crime Squad.** From 1 April 1998, the National Crime Squad (NCS) has replaced the former 6 Regional Crime Squads. The activities of the NCS are directed at major criminals and organised crime. The headquarters are in London and there are three area commands in England and Wales. The Director General holds the rank of chief constable and all police officers serving with the NCS are seconded from their parent forces.

820. **Police National Computer.** The Police National Computer provides all forces with immediate access to criminal records, to details of persons wanted or missing and to vehicle registration information.

821. **Police Information Technology Organisation.** The Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) develops and manages the delivery of National IT and communication systems in support of the police and the criminal justice system, co-ordinates the development of local IT systems and provides a procurement service to police forces. In particular, it is responsible for the procurement and implementation of the AIRWAVE¹¹ communication system.

822. **Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre.** There is a statutory requirement for police forces to support each other, and this can be co-ordinated through the Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNICC). PNICC is opened to support police forces whenever, in an emergency, the issues and resources may be beyond the remit or capacity of any one police force or a group of forces. It has 3 related functions:

- a. To enable the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to put quickly into place an effective system for managing information about the emergency.
- b. To co-ordinate the provision of mutual aid between police forces.
- c. To provide a facility to ensure that central government is provided with current and relevant information, and to ensure that information from a national perspective is available to police forces.

¹⁰ The government has proposed the amalgamation of NCIS, NCS, parts of HM C&E and the Home Office into a Serious Organised Crime Agency (*One Step Ahead: A 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime*, CM6167, Home Office, Mar 2004). The proposal is now subject to public consultation.

¹¹ See Chapter 9 for details.

823. The PNICC has developed over the past 20 years. Over that period the facility has been activated for such emergencies as: co-ordinating police cell accommodation due to restrictions on prison cell space in the late-80s/early-90s; co-ordinating mutual aid between forces during the miners' dispute 1984/5; co-ordinating information and police resources during the fuel prices dispute in 2000 and fire strike 2002/3; and co-ordinating information on community issues and any tensions post 9/11 and during the second Gulf War in Iraq.

824. PNICC used to be housed at New Scotland Yard, but moved in 2003 to accommodation at the Cabinet Office. As well as affording better facilities, this move has assisted in communication with Government through the Cabinet Office's Civil Contingencies Secretariat. However, PNICC remains a police-directed and managed facility kept in a constant state of readiness by 2 full-time police staff. PNICC itself consists, when open for operational purposes, of a series of groups focusing on such issues as intelligence, planning, operations requirements and information management, in constant contact with police forces across the country to assess situations and provide information in both directions.

825. The President of ACPO takes the decision on whether to open PNICC, and liaises at ministerial level to ensure government is properly briefed from the policing perspective. Another officer of ACPO rank, usually an Assistant Chief Constable or Commander from one of the 43 police forces, directs PNICC itself and provides the link between the ACPO President and PNICC staff. That officer is assisted by a Chief of Staff, usually a Chief Superintendent, who manages and co-ordinates information for forces. Currently, day-to-day running costs of PNICC are met by Home Office grant, and respective forces pay the costs of any officers sent there in an emergency.

826. Although PNICC can provide a vital co-ordinating and support role, it is important to stress that individual Chief Officers remain responsible for operations and decisions within their own force areas.

Police Colleges

827. Training of UK police officers is conducted both locally and at police colleges, the proportions varying between forces.

828. **Centrex.** Centrex is the working name of the Central Police Training and Development Authority, a non-departmental public body tasked with provision of training to the police forces of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Training is provided to the extended police family – to police officers at all levels, special constables and security officers or street and community wardens. Foundation training is provided through a network of regional and satellite centres, with higher-level training centred on Bramshill, Hampshire. CENTREX also supports an Incident Management Team that attends major incidents and sieges of national significance to

identify good Command and Control practice and identify lessons for the management of future incidents. The Incident Management Team co-ordinates call-outs of the Major Disaster Advisory Team (MDAT), a group of police officers who have direct experience of major incidents and can thus assist the police incident commanders at a major incident.

829. **Scottish Police College.** Scottish police officers have been trained centrally since 1954. The Scottish police college at Tulliallan Castle near Kincardine in Fife performs 75% of police training, the remainder addressing local priorities being conducted locally by individual forces.

SECTION III – POLICE COMMAND AND CONTROL

Tripartite System

830. Each police force outside London is controlled by a Tripartite system, consisting of:

- a. The Home Secretary, or in Scotland the Scottish Executive and in Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland Office.
- b. A Police Authority (Northern Ireland Policing Board in Northern Ireland) or Joint Policing Board.¹²
- c. A Chief Constable.

Home Secretary

831. The Home Secretary (and Scottish/Northern Ireland equivalents outside England and Wales) has responsibility to promote and maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces and has a range of powers. In particular, he has powers to:

- a. Set objectives for the policing of an area, and to require performance targets to be set for measuring the achievement of these objectives.
- b. Issue codes of practice relating to the exercise of police authority functions.
- c. Require an inspector of constabulary to carry out an inspection of a police force.

¹² A term used in Scotland where force borders often cross local authority boundaries – a Joint Board represents their joint interests.

- d. Direct a police authority to take remedial action when an inspector of constabulary reports that a police force is not efficient or effective.
- e. Determine the financial grant for police purposes to each police authority, and place restrictions on the use of a proportion of that grant to some particular purpose.
- f. Approve all appointments to the ranks of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander or above.

The Police Authority

832. The exact responsibilities and working practices of the various forms of police authorities varies across the UK. However their essential role in providing local accountability for the Chief Constable is a common theme.

833. **England and Wales.** There are 43 police authorities in England and Wales, each of which oversees the work of its local police force. Police authorities are independent bodies made up of local people. They provide the buildings and equipment needed by the force, subject to the Home Secretary's approval, decide its establishment, and appoint the Chief Constable and Assistant Chief Constables. Responsibility for delivering policing services rests with the Chief Constable who has 'Operational Independence'. However, one of the police authority's key responsibilities is to monitor on behalf of the local community how well those services are being delivered and to hold the Chief Constable to account. In addition they:

- a. Consult the local community about the policing of their area and their priorities.
- b. Set the force budget and determine how much money to raise towards the cost of policing through the local council tax.
- c. Publish an annual local policing and best value performance plan (based on a draft by the Chief Constable) setting out the policing priorities for the year ahead, performance targets, and the allocation of resources to meet those priorities.
- d. Monitor the performance of the force in delivering the policing plan.
- e. Report to the community on performance during the previous year.
- f. Deal with certain disciplinary and complaint matters.

834. Since 1 April 2000, police authorities have had a statutory duty to ensure that the local community gets best value from their policing services. This involves police

authorities scrutinising everything that the police do over a 5 year period to see how the service could be improved.

835. Police authorities are normally made up of 17 members: 3 magistrates, 9 local councillors and 5 independent members (normally appointed by a local selection panel for 4 years) although this can vary. For example, the Metropolitan Police Authority has 23 members: 12 drawn from the Greater London Authority (GLA), 4 magistrates and 7 independent members.

836. Police authorities meet regularly (between 4 and 12 times each year) to take key decisions affecting local policing and question the chief officer and other senior police staff about all aspects of the force and its performance. These meetings are usually held in public. Police authorities also operate through committees, panels, project boards and other working groups set up to focus on particular aspects of authority business. All police authorities have a Clerk and Treasurer and a small number of staff who provide administrative, personnel, legal and policy support.

837. **Association of Police Authorities.** The Association of Police Authorities (APA) is the national body representing police authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Set up in 1997, the APA works to develop policies on all police related issues, co-ordinate responses from member authorities and raise public awareness of its concerns. It provides a national voice for police authorities and supports the operation of police authorities locally.

838. **National Service Authorities.** The 2 national service authorities perform a similar function to local police authorities in respect of the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. The Service Authorities, which were set up by the Police Act 1997 and came into being on 1 April 1998, are modelled on police authorities and undertake a similar role. The services are funded primarily through a levy on local police authorities. Each Service Authority is required to ensure the effective and efficient maintenance of the Service through:

- a. Appointing the Director General of the Service.
- b. Consulting local police authorities, chief constables and others about what they consider the National Services should be doing.
- c. Setting key objectives and targets for the Service.
- d. Publishing an annual service plan setting out what the Service is seeking to achieve in the year ahead.
- e. Monitoring performance of the Service throughout the year.

- f. Reporting back publicly at the end of the year on the extent to which the plan has been met.

839. **Scotland.** In Scotland 6 Joint Police Boards and 2 Police Authorities govern the 8 police forces. The Joint Boards were formed following local government reorganisation in 1996 that resulted in police forces serving areas administered by 2 or more local councils. Local councils select councillors to represent their interests on the Joint Boards and Police Authorities.

840. **Northern Ireland.** In Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland Policing Board acts as the local police authority. It has 19 members, comprising 10 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and 9 independent members appointed through open competition.

Chief Constable

841. The Chief Constable (Commissioner in London) is responsible for the direction and control of the police force. In discharging those functions, however, the Chief Constable must have regard to the local policing plan issued by the Police Authority but is independent concerning operational matters. The Chief Constable drafts the local policing plan before the Police Authority finally approves it. The Chief Constable is the disciplinary authority for all ranks up to, and including, the superintending ranks. Chief Constables have always had a high degree of autonomy on how to run their forces, but in doing so Chief Constables must be aware of local concerns over crime and public order issues. They are accountable for the performance of their respective force, particularly with regard to the Home Secretary's principal objectives and the local authority annual policing plan.

SECTION IV – FIRE SERVICE

General

842. The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (and equivalent legislation in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) provides the statutory framework for the administration of the fire service. Amongst other things this Act:

- a. Makes provision for a Fire and Rescue National Framework.
- b. Establishes the duties and powers of Fire and Rescue Authorities, including the power to respond to incidents other than fires and a duty to establish mutual aid arrangements. The Deputy Prime Minister can direct a Fire and Rescue Authority to act outside its own area.
- c. Places arrangements for fire safety, education and investigative work on a statutory footing.

- d. Establishes duties and powers to ensure an adequate supply of water for firefighting purposes.
- e. Establishes powers for Fire and Rescue Authorities to perform their duties at sea, including outside UK territorial waters.
- f. Allows the creation of larger Fire and Rescue Authorities on the grounds of public safety or economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

Responsibilities

843. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) has Central Government responsibility for the Fire Service, being essentially concerned with the total level of Fire Authority grant and directing the use of a proportion of the grant to specific purposes, seeing that the fire authorities comply with their statutory responsibilities and in taking steps to promote common standards. This is accomplished in 3 main ways:

- a. Advice to fire authorities on a wide range of technical, operational and other issues is usually formulated through the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (CFBAC) and the Scottish Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (SCFBAC). A number of advisory boards formulate and provide advice to the Councils and take forward work programmes approved by them and ministers.
- b. The Fire Service College at Moreton-in-Marsh near Gloucester, and its Scottish equivalent in Gullane, near Edinburgh, have fundamental roles in maintaining and improving professional standards throughout the Fire Service by providing management and specialist training courses.
- c. The work of the Fire Service Inspectorate, which provides professional advice by Inspectors on issues originating in the CFBAC/SCFBAC and training provided by the Fire Service College.

Fire Authorities

844. The 63 fire brigades in the UK are managed and funded by local government fire authorities (see details at Annex 8B). Although each fire authority sets its own policies, they have operational agreements with neighbouring authorities, in particular when dealing with major incidents. The structure of the fire authorities varies:

- a. County authorities, the traditional Shire Counties unaffected by local government reorganisation.
- b. Combined fire authorities, usually a combination of county councils and unitary authorities.

- c. Metropolitan fire and civil defence authorities,¹³ created by the Local Government Act 1985, in major conurbations.
- d. In London, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority – a functional body of the Greater London Authority.

845. In England and Wales the fire service consists of both whole- and part-time (retained) firefighters, in Scotland there are 3 categories of part-time firefighters: retained, volunteer and auxiliary, and in Northern Ireland whole-time, retained and volunteer. Whole-time firefighters predominate in urban areas while mainly part-time crews provide rural fire cover. There are approximately 52,000 firefighters in the UK, 35,000 whole-time (including about 4,500 in Scotland and 920 in Northern Ireland) and 17,000 part-time. Approximately 1,500 control room staff support them.

Chief Fire Officers Association

846. The Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA) is the professional body representing principal fire officers in the UK. CFOA was formed in 1974 following local government reorganisation to allow principal fire officers to meet and discuss fire-related or government-influenced matters, with the objectives of:

- a. Reaching a combined understanding of what each UK Fire Brigade needs to improve operations and training within their service.
- b. Discussing funding and government issues that affect fire authorities throughout the UK.

CFOA has a membership of almost all of the Chief, Deputy and Assistant Chief Fire Officers (Firemasters in Scotland) of fire brigades in the UK.

Command and Control

847. Fire Brigades have the ability to mobilise personnel and equipment quickly to almost any part of the UK mainland and generally receive calls for assistance through the public service communications network. Inter-service wide area communication is generally achieved using public networks; however, some capability will be available on a local incident basis to communicate between some services. It is by no means a universal provision due to frequency capacities, allocation etc and may be resolved in the near future by the adoption of a new communications system.¹⁴

848. Although the fire service has statutory responsibility for fires, in recent years the service's role has expanded to more generic rescue, such as road traffic accidents,

¹³ These authorities will be renamed Fire and Rescue Authorities under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act.

¹⁴ See Chapter 9.

water rescue, chemical spillage control and clearance, people trapped in machinery or rope rescue from high buildings.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and Conventional Terrorism

849. The Fire Service (ODPM-sponsored) New Dimension programme specifically deals with the response to conventional terrorism and CBRN incidents; fire authorities have been supplied with nationally procured equipment:

- a. CBRN Personal Protection Equipment procured on a national basis with the other emergency services.
- b. Mass¹⁵ decontamination equipment is based around modular fast-assembly kits that can be erected quickly and are strategically located no more than 45-60 minutes away from any point in the UK. The kits are transported on one of 80 Incident Response Vehicles, each of which carries 2 decontamination units, which would be supplied by 10 fire appliances. The units are self-contained, carrying water heaters and re-robing kits for decontaminated people.¹⁶ There are arrangements in place with the Environment Agency (and equivalents in Scotland) to dispose of contaminated water.

Urban Search and Rescue

850. Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) is the recovery of trapped people from collapsed buildings. The New Dimension programme is intended to provide a response capability beyond that of a normal brigade. The capability will be provided in two phases:

- a. Until the Fire and Rescue Services Bill places a statutory obligation on fire authorities to conduct rescue, and training has been completed, US&R will be conducted by members of the UK Fire Service Search and Rescue Team (UKFSSART). These teams are currently provided by 13 brigades spread throughout the UK and are intended for deployment abroad in natural disaster areas. New equipment in the form of Incident Response Units will be provided to those brigades that have a UKFSSART as an interim capability until US&R becomes a core fire service activity.¹⁷ The target response time is 2 hours from time of call (plus travel time) with a nominal crew of 5. UKFSSART provides a pool of approximately 300 persons trained to common international standards in US&R.

¹⁵ Mass: planning assumption is 20,000 people in 8-10 hours.

¹⁶ Up to 200 per hour.

¹⁷ Forecast as mid-2006.

b. The full capability will be provided by 80 US&R vehicles located throughout the country, each consisting of 2 vehicles with demountable pods containing technical (sensors, search tools, air lines etc) and heavy (lifting gears, shoring equipment) rescue equipment. Associated with the equipment is a training programme at the Fire Service College¹⁸ and provision of realistic training facilities.

SECTION V – NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AND AMBULANCE SERVICES

Organisational Structures

851. **England.** The National Health Service (NHS) organisational structure in England was changed in April 2002 to deliver the government's policy of devolving resources and power to a local level in Primary Care Trusts (PCT). The Regional Health Authorities were abolished and replaced by 28 Strategic Health Authorities (SHA) covering a larger area and focused on strategic planning, performance and quality measurement and ensuring national priorities are incorporated into local health service plans. The SHAs act as a link between PCTs and the Department of Health. The existing structure of NHS Hospital Trusts and 33 Ambulance Service trusts was unaffected.

852. The Department of Health Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit (EPCU) oversees the provision of NHS emergency planning in England, ensures the application of lessons learned from incidents and exercises, liaises with other government departments (OGDs), and assists in the development of policies and guidance.

853. **Scotland.** In Scotland, health is a devolved responsibility. The Scottish Executive Health Department leads the central management of NHS Scotland, heading a Management Executive that oversees the work of 15 Area Health Boards. The Health boards plan health services within their area and commission services from those who provide them, such as NHS hospital trusts and Primary Care Trusts. They also conduct emergency planning for major incidents, including acts of terrorism. Scotland is served by one Ambulance service trust, the Scottish Ambulance Service.

854. **Wales.** In Wales, health is again a devolved responsibility with the Welsh Assembly's policy direction and fund allocation being managed through 22 Local Health Boards who commission services from service providers such as NHS Hospital trusts, General Practitioner (GP) and dental practices. Like Scotland, there is one Ambulance trust – the Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust.

¹⁸ Hitherto, training for UKFSSART members has been conducted in the USA.

855. **Northern Ireland.** The Northern Ireland Executive's Department of Health Social Services and Public Safety has devolved responsibility for the direction of health services through 4 Area Health Boards, who in turn contract for the provision of services from providers such as NHS acute and community hospital trusts and GP practices. Specific training in major incident response, including CBRN attacks, has been given to members of Emergency Medical Assistance and Rescue Teams, which are multidisciplinary groups drawn from medical, ambulance and fire services. Northern Ireland is served by a single ambulance trust, the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service.

Ambulance Services

856. Ambulance services have particular responsibilities for the development and validation of emergency plans and are required to take the leading role in the NHS, particularly in liaison with the other emergency services. The service is responsible for providing and co-ordinating the NHS response at the scene of an incident. The United Kingdom Ambulance Service is divided into 38 separate authorities in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and the Channel Islands as detailed at Annex 8C.

857. The core role of the Ambulance Service is that of patient/casualty treatment and transport. In other scenarios, support for other agencies would, in general, be limited to light rescue extrication. The Ambulance Service does not train in technical rescue onshore or offshore and is not equipped to do so. However, some Ambulance Services have developed procedures and skills for more technical involvement and, based upon risk assessment by the Service at the time of the incident, may operate with other agencies in hazardous or irrespirable atmospheres and chemical, public order and maritime incidents.

858. **Command and Control.** Activation of Ambulance Service assets is by radio or data from command and communications centres specific to the Service involved which determines the nearest available asset to be deployed. Inter-Ambulance Service communication on FM radio is nationally available by use of an Emergency Reserve Channel enabling vehicles from other Services to communicate with a local control facility. Like the Fire Service, there is a replacement programme in progress to procure new communications equipment.¹⁹

859. **Air Ambulance.** In addition to normal Ambulance Service assets, Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS), and in some areas fixed wing air ambulance provision, is being developed both rurally and in urban areas to complement ambulance-based operations. HEMS aircraft are required to land on-scene or in close proximity to any incident, as they do not have a winching capability.

¹⁹ See Chapter 9.

860. **Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.** The Ambulance Service is the specialist advisor on decontamination²⁰ during a CBRN incident – advice being channelled through the Joint Health Advisory Cell (JHAC)²¹ at GOLD command. They are equipped with PPE designed for use during both HAZMAT and CBRN agents and are trained to conduct their normal lifesaving duties where there is a CBRN hazard.

Primary Care Trusts

861. Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) manage local health services that are the normal first contact with the NHS, such as GPs, dentists and opticians. PCTs have major incident plans that mobilise primary care and community services in response to a major incident, for example taking pressure off receiving hospitals by discharging patients into the community. The plans will also deal with a potential influx of patients (such as those with minor injuries or affected by a chemical plume), and the administering of preventive measures such as vaccines or drugs to protect the health of their populations.

SECTION VI – MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY

Responsibilities

862. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is responsible for:

- a. Developing, promoting and enforcing high standards of marine safety.
- b. Minimising loss of life amongst seafarers and coastal users.
- c. Responding to maritime emergencies 24 hours a day.
- d. Minimising the risk of pollution of the marine environment from ships, and where pollution occurs, minimising the impact on UK interests.

863. The Department for Transport has Central Government responsibility for the MCA, which is a government executive agency formed in 1998. The MCA has about 1,165 staff based at more than 30 main locations around the UK coast, supported by over 3,250 volunteer Auxiliary Coastguards. MCA HQ is at Southampton, but most operational work on ships and at the coast is carried out locally.

²⁰ The main reference in this area is ‘*The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material, Strategic National Guidance*’, Home Office, 2nd Edition, May 2004.

²¹ See Chapter 9.

HM Coastguard

864. The MCA discharges its operational responsibilities through HM Coastguard, which is the authority responsible for the initiation and co-ordination of civil maritime search and rescue throughout the UK Search and Rescue Region. This includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea, or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the United Kingdom.²²

865. Professional Coastguards have increasingly been concentrated in a small number of Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCC) or Maritime Rescue Sub-Centres (MRSC) dealing with thousands of emergencies. The Auxiliaries of the Coastguard Rescue Teams are often first on-scene reporting a situation. In the 1990s their membership of 3,200 volunteers was reorganised. Initial Response Teams were designed for rapid call out to assess situations, while Back-up Response Teams formed mobile search and rescue units, trained and equipped to work on cliffs and in mud, with both rough terrain vehicles and boats for reaching inaccessible cliff and river sites.

866. HM Coastguard is also the MCA's initial point of contact for marine salvage and the management of marine pollution from shipping and offshore installations through its Counter Pollution and Response Branch. Collocated with the MCA is the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP). SOSREP is empowered under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and subsequent legislation to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport in salvage operations given certain conditions. This includes powers to require that a ship be moved to, or be removed from, or is not to be moved from a specified area or locality or from UK waters; there are also powers to establish a Temporary Exclusion Zone. SOSREP has similar powers, delegated by the Secretary of State of the Department of Trade and Industry, regarding pollution from offshore oil and gas installations. These powers may only be exercised if there is a threat of significant pollution of the UK environment.

867. To support salvage and counter pollution operations the MCA has access to various resources:

- a. Four Emergency Towing Vessels (ETV).
- b. Call-out agreements (Coastguard Agreement for Salvage and Towing) with various salvage and tug organisations.
- c. Stockpiles of salvage and counter pollution equipment around the country.

²² For details of the Defence contribution to Search and Rescue see Chapter 2.

Command and Control

868. The MCA is structured into 3 Search and Rescue Regions (SRR) with an organisational hierarchy of MRCCs and MRSCs. MRCCs and MRSCs are each centred on a District under the management of a District Controller. Each District controls 2 or more Sectors managed by Sector Managers who in turn direct the activities of the Coastguard Rescue Teams. At each MRCC and MRSC, a Watch Manager has delegated operational authority to act as Search And Rescue Missions Co-ordinator during his period of duty. Details are at Annex 8D.

- a. **Scotland and Northern Ireland Region.** The region covers Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Scottish Isles. It encompasses 6 Coastguard Rescue Co-ordination Centres and 5 Marine Offices, some of which are collocated. There are 207 smaller properties, which house Auxiliary Teams and their 21 Sector Managers. The region directs 2 Coastguard ETVs, one of which is stationed in the Minches and the other in the Fair Isle Channel. The Region's oil-related responsibilities include Search and Rescue (SAR) for in excess of 90 Mobile Rigs and over 100 Production Platforms; over 15,000 Personnel work offshore in its area. In total, the Region employs 264 permanent staff and 1,310 Auxiliary Coastguards.
- b. **Wales and Western Region.** The region runs from the Mull of Galloway in Dumfries and Galloway to Lyme Regis on the Devon/Dorset border. It encompasses 6 Coastguard Rescue Co-ordination Centres, 5 main Marine Offices (some of which are collocated), 2 fishing vessel Marine Offices and some 104 smaller properties which house auxiliary teams and their 22 Sector Managers. The region also directs a Coastguard ETV that protects the SW approaches. Falmouth Maritime Rescue Centre, which co-ordinates the operation of the ETV, is also the International Liaison Station for the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). The Registry of Shipping and Seamen is collocated with Cardiff Marine Office and the Regional Headquarters. In total, the region employs 273 permanent staff and 1300 Auxiliary Coastguards.
- c. **East of England Region.** The region runs from Lyme Regis to the Scotland/England Border on the east coast of the UK. There are 7 Rescue Co-ordination Centres, 8 main Marine Offices (some of which are collocated), complemented by 175 staff, 22 Sector Managers and almost 900 Auxiliary Coastguards. The region has particular responsibilities for the Channel Navigation Information System that conducts continuous radar surveillance of the Dover Straits and its approaches.

869. **HM Coastguard Search and Rescue helicopters.** HM Coastguard operates 4 SAR helicopters in Shetland, Stornaway, Portland and Lee-on-Solent, which

supplement military SAR assets²³ to achieve coverage of the UK Search and Rescue Region.

SECTION VII – OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Environment Agency

870. The Environment Agency (EA) is the leading organisation for protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales.²⁴ The agency is a non-departmental public body, funded largely by Defra and the Welsh Assembly Government. It has 11,000 staff and over 50% of its annual budget is allocated to capital spending on flood defences.

871. Unlike its partners, the EA's regions (8 English plus Wales) and areas (26 in total) are based on water catchment boundaries rather than county or district boundaries. Although not an emergency service, it has a 24-hour callout system that will respond to an incident that has caused, or has the potential to cause, harm to the natural environment (air, land and water), human health or the built environment. It also has inspection, regulatory and prosecution responsibilities on matters affecting the environment, for example management of hazardous waste, air quality, flood management navigation on certain inland waterways, estuaries and harbours and waste management.

872. Key responsibilities include:

- a. Maintaining flood defences²⁵ on certain rivers and coastlines.
- b. The issue of warnings to those likely to be affected by flooding or environmental damage.
- c. Provision of specialist environmental advice (usually through the Joint Health Advisory Cell (JHAC)²⁶ at Gold Command).
- d. Monitoring the effects of, and response to, an incident, to minimise the impact on the environment.
- e. Investigating the cause of an incident (if natural rather than criminal).

²³ Described in Chapter 2.

²⁴ In Northern Ireland the Environment and Heritage Service of the Northern Ireland Executive Department of the Environment.

²⁵ In Northern Ireland this is the statutory responsibility of the Northern Ireland Executive's Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Rivers Agency.

²⁶ See Chapter 9.

Scottish Environment Protection Agency

873. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) performs a similar²⁷ function in Scotland to the EA in England and Wales. It regulates:

- a. Activities that may pollute water air or land.
- b. Storage transport and disposal of waste.
- c. The keeping and disposal of radioactive materials.

874. It is also responsible for:

- a. Maintaining a flood warning system.²⁸
- b. Implementing a national waste strategy.
- c. Controlling, with the HSE, the risk of major incidents at industrial sites.
- d. Operating the Scottish portion of the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET).

Health Protection Agency

875. The Health Protection Agency (HPA) is a national organisation for England and Wales²⁹ dedicated to protecting people's health and reducing the impact and consequences of infectious diseases, chemicals, poisons and radiation hazards. It brings together the expertise of health and scientific professionals working in public health, communicable diseases, emergency planning, infection control, laboratories, poisons, chemicals and radiation hazards.

876. The HPA was set up as a special health authority in April 2003, working in partnership with the National Radiological Protection Board. It was formed by combining:

- a. The Public Health Laboratory Service (including the Communicable Disease Centre).
- b. The Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research.
- c. The National Focus for Chemical Incidents.
- d. The regional service providers that support the management of chemical incidents.

²⁷ But not identical, see website for details.

²⁸ Local authorities and landowners in Scotland have responsibility for flood defences.

²⁹ In Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland Executive's Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety.

- e. The National Poisons Information Service.
- f. NHS staff responsible for the control of infectious disease, emergency planning and other health protection support.

877. The Health Protection Agency Bill 2004, established the Agency as a UK-wide non-departmental public body, incorporating the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB).³⁰

878. The Agency has particular relevance to CBRN incidents. Its Emergency Response Division is intended to provide a central source of authoritative scientific/medical information and other specialist advice on both the planning and operational responses to major incidents and wider public health or other emergencies.

Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health

879. The Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health is responsible for the national surveillance of communicable diseases and environmental health hazards and the provision of expert operational support on infection and environmental health to health boards and local authorities in Scotland.

National Radiological Protection Board

880. The NRPB is a statutory body whose members are appointed by the Health Ministers. Its functions are to:

- a. By means of research and otherwise advance the acquisition of knowledge about the protection of mankind from radiation hazards.
- b. Provide information and advice to persons (including government departments) with responsibilities in the UK in relation to the protection from radiation hazards either of the community as a whole or of particular sections of the community.

881. Its advice would be sought by, and communicated to the Gold Commander through, the JHAC. The NRPB became part of the HPA on enactment of The Health Protection Agency Bill.

³⁰ As a statutory body, primary legislation is required to incorporate the NRPB into the HPA.

SECTION VIII – VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

882. Significant reliance is placed on Voluntary Organisations in responding to major incidents. It is part of the function of the Local Authority to co-ordinate the work of these organisations.

Royal National Lifeboat Institution

883. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) is a voluntary organisation supported by voluntary/charitable contributions from the public. The RNLI is not part of the MCA but works to it by responding to requests for assistance from HM Coastguard.

884. It provides, on call, a 24-hour service to cover search and rescue requirements to 50 miles out from the coast of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and a beach rescue service on 43 beaches in the south west of England. There are 231 lifeboat stations strategically placed around the UK and Republic of Ireland. In 2003,³¹ the RNLI launched 8109 missions that rescued 7987 people, saving 344 lives.

885. In addition to its traditional lifesaving services at sea and from beaches, the organisation is developing a hovercraft capability optimised for the inter-tidal areas of mud banks and sand not accessible by traditional lifeboats and it operates an inland station on the Norfolk Broads.

Mountain Rescue in the UK

886. Except for incidents on sea cliffs where HM Coastguard is responsible, the overall responsibility for search and rescue in the UK rests with the Chief Constable of the Police for the area in which the incident occurs. Assistance may be requested from voluntary rescue teams, National Park Rangers, RAF Mountain Rescue Teams (MRTs), RAF or Royal Navy SAR helicopters. All of these bodies work together both in the field and in the planning and organisation of rescue. The voluntary rescue teams in England and Wales are all autonomous bodies composed of unpaid volunteers who are called out by the police when their services are required. More recently, there has been a considerable increase in the number of requests by the police to the voluntary rescue teams for assistance in searching and rescuing in a non-mountain or open country environment.

887. The various local teams are grouped into autonomous regional organisations that vary slightly in their organisation and function. They are usually responsible for operations involving two or more teams together with co-operation with the police forces serving their area and the RAF or RN SAR helicopter stations and rescue teams

³¹ www.rnli.org.uk

serving their area. Nationally, the Mountain Rescue Council is a voluntary, charitable, autonomous co-ordinating body to which all the various regional bodies belong together with the British Cave Rescue Council and the Search and Rescue Dog Associations (SARDAs). The membership of the Council extends to cover the Association of Chief Police Officers, HM Coastguard, RAF SAR, The Home Office Radio Branch and Fire Service Inspectorate, the Sports Council and the Association of Chief Ambulance Officers.

- a. **Mountain Rescue Council for England and Wales.** The Mountain Rescue Council (MRC) acts as the liaison and co-operation between 47 independent MRTs, including 3 MOD MRTs, which are grouped into 8 regional associations (details at Annex 8E).
- b. **Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland.** 22 civilian, 3 Police and 2 MOD independent MRTs in Scotland are structured under the auspices of the Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland (MRC of S). Details are at Annex 8F.
- c. **Association of Lowland Search and Rescue.** The Association of Lowland Search and Rescue (ALSAR) develops, co-ordinates and promotes the activities of 5 lowland search and rescue teams covering areas not served by the MRC or MRC OF S. Details are at Annex 8E.
- d. **Northern Ireland Mountain, Cave and Cliff Rescue Co-ordinating Committee.** 3 voluntary teams (Mourne, North West MRTs and Police Service of Northern Ireland SAR Team) and the Irish Cave Rescue Organisation provide Search and Rescue cover in Northern Ireland, in close co-ordination with their equivalent in the Republic of Ireland, the Irish Mountain Rescue Association.

888. **Search and Rescue Dog Associations.** SARDAs are voluntary organisations dedicated to the use of dogs in searches for missing persons. The members are commonly drawn from MRTs and its regional associations are affiliated to the MRC and MRC of S.

Cave Rescue

889. **British Cave Rescue Council.** Cave rescues in the UK are carried out by 15 cave rescue organisations. The British Cave Rescue Council (BCRC) is the representative body for cave rescue teams and is affiliated to the MRC.

Voluntary Aid Societies

890. The National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee (NVASEC) is the co-ordinating body for the 3 Voluntary Aid Societies in the UK: The British Red Cross

Society, St John Ambulance and St Andrew's Ambulance. The Voluntary Aid Societies (VAS) are used in support of the general work of the emergency services (such as provision of first aid personnel or vehicles) or the general healthcare system by carrying out routine admissions, inter-hospital transfers, outpatient movements and the discharge of routine patients. The VAS will not always be present at major incidents. However they are factored into emergency planning - either to supplement full-time emergency services committed to an incident to ensure normal services continue, or direct involvement if the situation demands.

891. **British Red Cross.** The Red Cross and Red Crescent movement is the largest humanitarian network in the world. The British Red Cross has over 40,000 volunteers throughout the UK working within virtually all communities. It is an integral part of local authority emergency planning, its volunteers providing first aid, emotional and practical support such as providing information to people evacuated to rest and reception centres or person tracing.

892. **St John Ambulance.** St John Ambulance is a self-funding charitable company dedicated to the provision of First Aid and medical support services in support of community needs and education, training and personal development to young people - $\frac{2}{3}$ of its volunteers are under 25. In England, it has over 23,000 adult volunteers trained in First Aid and 1,300 vehicles, including the largest single ambulance fleet in the country. St John Ambulance Wales, a separate charitable institution, performs a similar role in Wales where 2,000 adult volunteers operate over 80 ambulances. Both organisations have emergency planning officers working in the respective council headquarters.

893. **St Andrew's Ambulance Association.** St Andrew's Ambulance Association performs a similar role in Scotland to that of St John Ambulance in England and Wales, training over 20,000 people every year.

Voluntary Organisations


894. Many other voluntary organisations may be able to contribute to an effective response to a disaster. Their work will usually be co-ordinated by the Local Authority. They include:

- a. **Women's Royal Voluntary Service.** A voluntary service of over 95,000 volunteers (including 13,000 men) dedicated to tackling social isolation or deprivation through England Scotland and Wales. Their chief role in emergencies is the provision of assistance to people affected by disasters such as evacuees and the supply of refreshments to emergency services. To achieve this task the Women's Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) has 24-hour rapid response teams and is written into local authority emergency plans.

- b. **Salvation Army.** The Salvation Army in the UK and Ireland is part of an international Christian church working in 109 countries worldwide. The Salvation Army keeps stocks of resources appropriate for a major incident and each region or division has a divisional emergency plan that relates to that particular area. This plan is lodged with local emergency services so that they can call on the Salvation Army as required. The Salvation Army has particular strengths in evacuation, mass feeding, and food distribution, shelter and clothing distribution, counselling, temporary mortuary and finding missing persons.
- c. **Radio Amateurs' Emergency Network.** Radio Amateurs' Emergency Network (RAYNET) is a national voluntary communications service provided by licensed radio amateurs. It has about 5000 members in 200 local groups. RAYNET can provide additional communications at major incidents by using volunteers' own equipment to transmit voice and data communications over both long and short distances.
- d. **Missions to Seafarers.** The Mission to Seafarers is a missionary society of the Anglican Church caring for the spiritual and practical welfare of seafarers. Based in port areas they can provide counselling and other welfare facilities.
- e. **Victim Support.** Victim Support is a national charity that helps people cope with crime. However its counsellors may also be utilised during major emergencies.
- f. **The Samaritans.** The Samaritans provide confidential emotional support counselling 24 hours a day, its counsellors may also be able to assist during an emergency.
- g. **First Aid Nursing Yeomanry.** The First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY) (Princess Royal's Volunteer Corps), a registered charity in the London area, has particular skills in first aid, communications and running a casualty bureau.
- h. **Disaster Action.** Disaster Action is a charity set up by the survivors and bereaved in response to a series of disasters that happened in the UK in the late 1980s. It can offer support and guidance to those directly affected by disaster and provides advice to emergency management organisations to ensure that the immediate needs of those affected by disasters are taken fully into account.

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
ANNEX 8A – POLICE FORCE AREAS



POLICE FORCES

| | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Scotland | | V | Fife Constabulary |
| I | Northern Constabulary | VI | Strathclyde Police |
| II | Grampian Police | VII | Lothian and Borders Police |
| III | Tayside Police | VIII | Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary |
| IV | Central Scotland Police | | |
| | | | |
| England & Wales | | | |
| 1 | Avon and Somerset Constabulary | 23 | Lincolnshire Police |
| 2 | Bedfordshire Police | 24 | Merseyside Police |
| 3 | Cambridgeshire Constabulary | 25 | Metropolitan Police |
| 4 | Cheshire Constabulary | 26 | Norfolk Constabulary |
| 5 | City of London Police | 27 | Northamptonshire Police |
| 6 | Cleveland Police | 28 | Northumbria Police |
| 7 | Cumbria Constabulary | 29 | North Wales Police |
| 8 | Derbyshire Constabulary | 30 | North Yorkshire Police |
| 9 | Devon and Cornwall Constabulary | 31 | Nottinghamshire Police |
| 10 | Dorset Police | 32 | South Wales Police |
| 11 | Durham Constabulary | 33 | South Yorkshire Police |
| 12 | Dyfed-Powys Police | 34 | Staffordshire Police |
| 13 | Essex Police | 35 | Suffolk Constabulary |
| 14 | Gloucestershire Constabulary | 36 | Surrey Police |
| 15 | Greater Manchester Police | 37 | Sussex Police |
| 16 | Gwent Police | 38 | Thames Valley Police |
| 17 | Hampshire Constabulary | 39 | Warwickshire Constabulary |
| 18 | Hertfordshire Constabulary | 40 | West Mercia Constabulary |
| 19 | Humberside Police | 41 | West Midlands Police |
| 20 | Kent Constabulary | 42 | West Yorkshire Police |
| 21 | Lancashire Constabulary | 43 | Wiltshire Constabulary |
| 22 | Leicestershire Constabulary | 44 | Police Service of Northern Ireland |
| | | | |
| Isle of Man | | Not Shown | |
| A | Isle of Man Constabulary | Guernsey Police Force | |
| | | States of Jersey Police | |


ANNEX 8B – FIRE SERVICE AREAS



FIRE SERVICES

| | | | |
|----|--------------------------------------------------|----|----------------------------------------|
| 1 | Central Scotland Fire Brigade | 32 | Isle of Man Fire & Rescue Service |
| 2 | Dumfries & Galloway Fire Brigade | 33 | Kent Fire Brigade |
| 3 | Fife Fire & Rescue Service | 34 | Lancashire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 4 | Grampian Fire Brigade | 35 | Leicestershire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 5 | Highland & Islands Fire Brigade | 36 | Lincolnshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 6 | Lothian & Borders Fire Brigade | 37 | London Fire Brigade |
| 7 | Strathclyde Fire Brigade | 38 | Merseyside Fire Brigade |
| 8 | Tayside Fire Brigade | 39 | Mid & West Wales Fire Brigade |
| 9 | Northern Ireland Fire Brigade | 40 | Norfolk Fire Service |
| 10 | Avon Fire Brigade | 41 | North Wales Fire Service |
| 11 | Bedfordshire & Luton Fire & Rescue Service | 42 | North Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 12 | Buckinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service | 43 | Northamptonshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 13 | Cambridge Fire & Rescue Service | 44 | Northumberland Fire & Rescue Service |
| 14 | Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service | 45 | Nottinghamshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 15 | Cleveland Fire & Rescue Service | 46 | Oxfordshire Fire Service |
| 16 | Cornwall County Fire Brigade | 47 | Royal Berkshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 17 | Cumbria County Fire Service | 48 | Shropshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 18 | Derbyshire Fire & Rescue Service | 49 | Somerset Fire Brigade |
| 19 | Devon Fire & Rescue Service | 50 | South Wales Fire Service |
| 20 | Dorset Fire & Rescue Service | 51 | South Yorkshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 21 | County Durham & Darlington Fire & Rescue Brigade | 52 | Staffordshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 22 | East Sussex Fire Brigade | 53 | Suffolk County Fire Service |
| 23 | Essex County Fire & Rescue Service | 54 | Surrey Fire & Rescue Service |
| 24 | Gloucestershire Fire & Rescue Service | 55 | Tyne & Wear Metropolitan Fire Brigade |
| 25 | Greater Manchester County Fire Service | 56 | Warwickshire Fire & Rescue Service |
| 26 | Hampshire Fire & Rescue Service | 57 | West Midlands Fire Service |
| 27 | Hereford & Worcester Fire Brigade | 58 | West Sussex Fire Brigade |
| 28 | Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service | 59 | West Yorkshire Fire Service |
| 29 | Humberside Fire Brigade | 60 | Wiltshire Fire Brigade |
| 30 | Isle of Wight Fire & Rescue Service | | |
| | Not shown | | |
| 31 | Isles of Scilly Fire & Rescue Service | 61 | States of Guernsey Fire Service |
| | | 62 | States of Jersey Fire & Rescue Service |
| | | 63 | States of Alderney Fire Service |


ANNEX 8C – AMBULANCE SERVICE AREAS



AMBULANCE SERVICES


| | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | North East | 18 | Bedfordshire & Hertfordshire |
| 2 | Cumbria | 19 | Essex |
| 3 | Tees, East and North Yorkshire | 20 | Gloucestershire |
| 4 | Lancashire | 21 | Oxfordshire |
| 5 | West Yorkshire | 22 | Royal Berkshire |
| 6 | South Yorkshire | 23 | London |
| 7 | Greater Manchester | 24 | Avon |
| 8 | Mersey | 25 | Wiltshire |
| 9 | East Midlands | 26 | Surrey |
| 10 | Lincolnshire | 27 | Kent |
| 11 | Shropshire | 28 | West Country |
| 12 | Staffordshire | 29 | Dorset |
| 13 | West Midlands | 30 | Hampshire |
| 14 | Hereford & Worcester | 31 | Isle of Wight |
| 15 | Warwickshire | 32 | Sussex |
| 16 | East Anglia | 33 | Isle of Man Ambulance, Paramedic & Patient Transport Service |
| 17 | Two Shires | | |
| | Northern Ireland | | Northern Ireland Ambulance Service |
| | Wales | | Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust |
| | Scotland | | Scottish Ambulance Service |
| | Not Shown | | |
| | Guernsey Ambulance and Rescue Service | | |
| | States of Jersey Ambulance Service | | |


ANNEX 8D – MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY ORGANISATION



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
ANNEX 8E – MOUNTAIN RESCUE COUNCIL



| | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------|
|  | ALSAR | Association of Lowland Search and Rescue |
|  | LDSAMRA | Lake District Search and Mountain Rescue Association |
|  | Mid-PSRO | Mid Pennine Search and Rescue Organisation |
|  | NESRA | North East Search and Rescue Association |
|  | NWMRA | North Wales Mountain Rescue Association |
|  | PDMRO | Peak District Mountain Rescue Organisation |
|  | SWERA | South West England Rescue Association |
|  | SWSARA | South Wales Search and Rescue Association |
|  | YDRP | Yorkshire Dales Rescue Panel |

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ANNEX 8F – MOUNTAIN RESCUE COMMITTEE OF SCOTLAND



- | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Aberdeen MRT | Arran MRT | Arrochar MRT |
| Assynt MRT | Borders SAR Unit | Brahma Mra |
| Cairngorm MRT | Dundonnell MRT | Galloway MRT |
| Glencoe MRT | Glenelg MRT | Glenmore Lodge MRT |
| Grampian Police MRT | Killin MRT | RAF Kinloss MRT |
| Kintail MRT | RAF Leuchars | Lochaber MRT |
| Lomond MRT | Moffat MRT | Ochils MRT |
| Skye MRT | Strathclyde Police MRT | Tayside MRT |
| Tayside Police SARU | Torrison MRT | Tweed Valley MRT |

SARDA Scotland

SARDA Southern Scotland

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CHAPTER 9 – MAJOR INCIDENT RESPONSE

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

901. The preceding Chapters have established the context, framework and nature of military support operations in the UK and the equivalent civilian capabilities, organisations and processes. This chapter describes the conduct. Initially the generic command framework and structure of the multi-agency response will be described before a description of the various types and scale of contingencies. This chapter also describes the care and treatment of people involved, both directly and indirectly, with a major incident and the systems employed for liaising with the media. This chapter draws heavily on '*Dealing with Disaster*', which remains the definitive reference for the civilian response.

Objectives

902. Irrespective of the particular responsibilities of organisations and agencies that may be involved with the emergency response they will all work to the following common objectives:

- a. Saving and protecting life.
- b. Relieving suffering.
- c. Protecting property.
- d. Providing the public with information.
- e. Containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread.
- f. Maintaining critical services.
- g. Maintaining normal services at an appropriate level.
- h. Protecting the health and safety of personnel.
- i. Safeguarding the environment.
- j. Facilitating investigations and inquiries.
- k. Promoting self-help and recovery.
- l. Restoring normality as soon as possible.
- m. Evaluating the response and identifying lessons to be identified.

903. An incident is usually described as going through 2 phases – the crisis and consequence management phases. The crisis phase is the early stage of the incident where the emphasis is on first responders' immediate response to the incident and action is focused on saving and protecting life and property and containing the incident, while consequence management is directed at recovery from the incident and a return to normality. However, it is important to note that crisis/consequence management is not a sequential process, they are 2 ends of a continuum. Consequence management will begin before the crisis is resolved, in particular efforts to mitigate the effects of a terrorist weapon (evacuation of the area, removal of combustible materials etc.) or a chemical incident.

SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANISATION

General

904. In order to achieve a combined and co-ordinated response to a major emergency the capabilities of the emergency services must be closely linked with those of the armed forces, local authorities and other agencies. To this end a generic command and control (C2) structure has been agreed nationally which can be employed for all incidents but remains sufficiently flexible to be adjusted for a specific scenario. The structure defines relationships between differing levels of management but allows each agency to tailor its own response plans to interface with the plans of others. Unlike conventional military C2 hierarchies, the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) structure forms when needed, grows as required with a coalescence of the appropriate agencies and, when no longer required, disperses.

905. The management of the response to major emergencies will normally be undertaken at one or more of 3 levels – Operational, Tactical and Strategic,¹ the levels activated being dependent on the nature and scale of the emergency. It is a characteristic of the command and control chain that the structure tends to be activated from the bottom upwards as an incident's scope is assessed and higher command levels are judged necessary.

906. The terms Bronze, Silver and Gold² (for operational, tactical and strategic respectively) are in common use in many organisations as substitutes – e.g. 'Bronze Commanders', 'Gold Control'. They are a useful shorthand and at the scene of an incident their use will usually result in equivalent command levels liaising with each other. The command levels are role orientated and must not be confused with rank structures. The most appropriate and experienced officer will be nominated to the

¹ For the military reader it is essential to note that the IEM community's usage of these familiar military terms is different: IEM 'operational' equates to military 'tactical', and vice versa. Use of the colour codes described later will help to avoid confusion.

² Not all police forces use Gold, Silver and Bronze terminology, they are not currently used in Scotland for example.

various command levels – for some incidents specialist training (e.g. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) training) will be required.

Operational (Bronze) Level ‘Forward Command’

907. At the start of any incident for which there has been no warning the operational (Bronze) level will be activated first. Usually located at the scene (proximity depending on the incident and assessed danger) at Forward Control Points, or in an associated area, the BRONZE commanders’ role is:

- a. Assessment of the extent of the incident.
- b. Consideration of the need for the next level of command.
- c. Management of specific areas of responsibility.³
- d. Obtaining further resources as required.
- e. To determine specific tasks to be undertaken.

908. The operational level reflects the normal day-to-day arrangements for responding to smaller scale emergencies. It is the level at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas. First responders will take appropriate immediate measures and assess the extent of problems, taking due regard of risk reduction measures and the health and safety of personnel. This assessment will be passed back to the appropriate control room (who will effectively become the initial Silver commander) which can determine whether the nature of the incident requires dedicated Silver Commanders.

909. Operational commanders will concentrate their resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility. They will act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisations until other levels of command are established. Individual agencies retain full command of the resources that they apply within a geographical area or use for a specific purpose, but liaise fully and continually with others to ensure an efficient and combined effort. The police will normally act as the co-ordinator of the response at an identifiable scene.

Tactical (Silver) Level ‘Incident Command’

910. Bronze arrangements will be adequate for the effective co-ordination and resolution of most minor emergencies. However, for more serious incidents that require significantly greater resources it may be necessary to implement an additional

³ For example, there could be inner and outer cordon commanders, a commander of RV points and marshalling areas, and a forward ambulance incident officer etc; these would all be at the Bronze level.

level of management. A key function of an operational commander or manager will be to consider whether circumstances warrant a tactical (Silver) level of management.

911. Usually located close to the scene, the Silver Commanders' role is:

- a. Overall management of the incident.
- b. To determine priorities in allocating resources.
- c. To obtain further resources as required.
- d. The planning and co-ordination of tasks to be undertaken.
- e. Liaison with other agencies.
- f. To consider the need for a strategic level of command.

912. A key feature of Silver is that it will commence early consideration of consequence management (this may hasten the requirement for a Gold Commander), while the Bronze Commanders' attention are directed towards rescue and mitigation/resolution of the incident's immediate affects.

913. Where there is an identifiable scene, tactical management is usually undertaken from an Incident Control Point^{4,5} established in the vicinity. Many tactical functions will then be discharged at or close to the scene. However Tactical managers must concentrate on overall general management; while they need to be aware of what is happening at operational level, they should leave the responsibility for dealing with that level to operational managers.⁶

914. Some agencies, (for example local authorities), may prefer to operate from their administrative offices but will often send liaison officers to enhance co-ordination.⁷ Inter-agency meetings at appropriate intervals between tactical managers and relevant liaison officers⁸ will aim to achieve effective co-ordination. Planning must also take into account that there may be a number of individual events, or in fact no actual central location to attend, for example for widespread disruption, health emergencies or if the incident is overseas.

⁴ Many agencies have mobile control rooms to perform this function – usually they will be collocated to enhance co-ordination.

⁵ In London groupings of Incident Control Points (ICPs) at Silver Control are known as the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre.

⁶ Consistent with the military principle of Mission Command.

⁷ For certain specific incidents, e.g. flooding, local authorities will have well-exercised call-out routines and nominated officers who will attend incidents with appropriate information and empowered to activate local authority resources such as emergency housing and dormant contracts with contractors. This will normally be detailed in the local authority's major incident plan.

⁸ These may be widely drawn, for example: Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Environment Agency, health organisations, gas, electricity, telephone or water companies, industrial or commercial concerns, or environmental specialists.

Strategic (Gold) Level Command

915. Some incidents, and the early stages of more serious incidents, may only require operational and tactical levels of command. If, however, it becomes apparent that the resources or expertise required are beyond the tactical commanders' level, or if there is a need to co-ordinate more than one incident/scene for which tactical command has been established, a Strategic Command will be necessary. Major emergencies can place considerable demands on the resources of the responding organisations, with consequent disruption to day-to-day activities. They may have long-term implications for people or the environment. Such matters require attention by senior management (and possibly also by elected members in local authorities).

916. The Gold Commander will typically:

- a. Be located away from the scene (most agencies will have facilities equipped and dedicated for the task)⁹ at a Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC).
- b. Establish a framework for the overall management of the incident.
- c. Establish policy within which tactical commanders will work (this will usually include media policy).
- d. Determine strategic objectives that should be recorded and subject to regular review.
- e. Provide resources, or determine limitations upon levels or resourcing.
- f. Give consideration to the prioritisation of demands from a number of tactical managers and allocation of resources.
- g. Ensure there are clear lines of communication with the tactical managers/commanders.
- h. Ensure there is long term resourcing and expertise for management/command resilience.¹⁰
- i. Undertake appropriate liaison with strategic managers in other agencies.
- j. Plan beyond the immediate response phase for recovering from the emergency and returning to a state of normality.

⁹ For example, many police forces earmark their training facilities, maintaining separation from their control rooms, which of course need to continue with routine business, and local authorities their council meeting rooms.

¹⁰ This is particularly important for extended incidents such as animal disease emergencies; strategic commanders clearly have continuing responsibilities in their parent agencies.

917. At the SCC, depending on the nature and severity of the incident, there may be a number of important sub-groups, intended to provide the Gold Commander with a single source of advice and/or information:¹¹

- a. Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG).
- b. Government Liaison Team.
- c. Joint Intelligence Group.
- d. Joint Health Advisory Cell.
- e. Recovery Working Group.

Strategic Co-ordinating Group

918. The requirement for strategic management may be confined to one particular agency (for example a major flooding problem will certainly require a strategic level of command at the Environment Agency (EA) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), but the impact on other agencies, such as the NHS might be significantly less). However, certain incidents require a multi-agency response at the strategic level when the issues that arise affect the responsibilities or activities of more than one organisation. Experience has shown that such issues can best be dealt with by establishing a SCG.

919. The SCG should be based at an appropriate pre-planned location, away from the noise and confusion of any disaster scene. Its members are representatives drawn from all relevant agencies, with authority to make executive decisions appropriate to the circumstances. Individual agencies may establish their own strategic command centres working in close liaison with the SCG. The SCG may be assisted by members of the Major Disaster Advisory Team,¹² a group of police officers with practical experience of dealing with major incidents.

920. On most occasions it will be a police responsibility to establish the SCG and chair it initially, although chairmanship may pass between agencies. It is usual to locate the SCG at Police Headquarters in the first instance. However, this may move to the local authority during the recovery phase, when the emergency services may have little or no involvement, or to another relevant agency.

921. In the event of a wide-area emergency the SCG will need to liaise with similar neighbouring SCGs and, during the recovery phase, with the appropriate Government Office of the Region or devolved administration. When appropriate, it provides the

¹¹ Some of these groups, for example the JIG and GLT, may not be established for a non-terrorist incident.

¹² Call-out is co-ordinated through the Incident Management Team at CENTREX.

focus for communication to and from the Lead Government Department (LGD).¹³ Government advisors or liaison officers may attend SCG meetings depending on the nature of the incident (for example, for nuclear or terrorist incidents).

922. The SCG should develop a strategy for providing information to the public and for dealing with the media. It will often need to designate a media briefing centre and appoint a suitable manager (normally a police media relations officer). More detail on media management is at Annex 9A.

923. Further issues which may need to be considered include:

- a. Welfare and support for those dealing with or affected by events, including the relatives and friends of those killed, injured or traumatised.
- b. Long-term implications for the community or the environment.¹⁴
- c. Visits by VIPs.
- d. Inquiries and investigations.
- e. The international dimension.

Government Liaison Team

924. The Government Liaison Team (GLT), headed by the Home Office Government Liaison Officer, comprises representatives of central government and is intended to take pressure off the Gold Commander by:

- a. Keeping Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) fully informed of the involvement of the incident.
- b. Accelerating liaison between the Gold Commander and COBR when Central Government involvement is required in decision-making.
- c. Ensuring that the police interest is taken fully into account at COBR, and conversely to ensure that the government's views are kept in mind at the scene.
- d. Ensuring smooth communication flow between COBR and the incident.

925. A key member of the GLT is the Home Office CCS Consequence Management Liaison officer who will:

¹³ See Chapter 7.

¹⁴ This task may be performed by the Recovery Working Group.

- a. Provide the link to the central CCS consequence management team focusing on recovery from the incident.
- b. Ensure that the appropriate local agencies are fully engaged in the response and that the recovery phase is being considered.

Joint Intelligence Group

926. The Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) is a multi-agency intelligence fusion centre routinely established during terrorist/CBRN incidents and on other occasions when deemed necessary by the Gold Commander. It is formed from representatives of the Security Service, Police, military intelligence and other relevant agencies who each draw information from their respective collection assets and pool them. It will also obtain information from the hot zone of a CBRN incident by debriefing personnel at the Inner Cordon Access Point.

927. The JIG chairman is normally a Detective Chief Inspector, supported by a Detective Inspector. Police personnel are drawn from a number of trained officers around the UK. Attendance at the JIG is co-ordinated by the Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre (PNICC).

928. The JIG has its own secure communications and IT equipment and will produce intelligence assessments on the terrorist organisations involved and the incident itself for the Gold Commander, and on a sanitised basis for Silver/Bronze Commanders. It is important to note that the JIG is entirely separate from the evidence gathering process.

Joint Health Advisory Cell

929. The Joint Health Advisory Cell (JHAC) is formed from representatives of the relevant strategic health authorities, Health Protection Agency, EA, Defra, Environmental Health, Public Health Laboratory Service, local water utility company, other appropriate specialists as required and the Met Office. It may be further supplemented for CBRN incidents by relevant specialists from AWE Aldermaston, DSTL Porton Down or National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB). Normally chaired by the local Director of Public Health, its role is to consider the health aspects of the incident and provide the Gold Commander with a single source of health advice.

930. The main tasks of the JHAC are to:

- a. Take advice on the health aspects of an incident from a range of experts. Much of this activity may be conducted by telephone or IT rather than by meetings.

- b. Provide advice to the Gold Commander on the health consequences of the incident, including those relating to evacuation or containment.
- c. Agree with the Gold Commander the advice to give to the public on the health aspects of the incident.
- d. Maintain a written record of decisions made and the reasons behind those decisions.
- e. Liaise with the Department of Health and other health authorities.
- f. Formulate advice to health professionals in hospitals, ambulance services and general practice.
- g. Formulate advice on the strategic management of the health service response.
- h. Establish the information base needed to evaluate the long-term health consequences of the incident.
- i. Instigate any health-related investigations found to be necessary.
- j. In the recovery phase, take responsibility for co-ordinating more detailed assessments of any immediate health impacts.

Recovery Working Group.

931. A sub-group may be formed for incidents where there is likely to be long-term environmental and/or health consequences. The group will typically be chaired by a Local Authority Chief Executive and features in the contingency plans of, for example, nuclear power stations.

Communications

932. Good communications are at the heart of an effective response. Planning for major incidents will build on existing communications equipment and procedures, with supplementary equipment used to cope with a larger crisis and accommodate the requirements of other agencies.

933. Emergency planning should aim to provide an integrated approach to emergency communication through identifying appropriate use of available media:

- a. Radio.
- b. Land line.
- c. CCTV.

- d. Mobile phone.
- e. Databases.
- f. Text messaging.
- g. Video conferencing.
- h. Pager.
- i. Television networks.
- j. Fax.
- k. Public radio networks.
- l. E-mail.
- m. Internet.
- n. 'Low-tech' information transfer – briefings, liaison meetings, messengers, use of display boards, paper forms and so on.

934. Telecommunications networks in particular have various methods for managing network loading and emergency capabilities which are detailed at Annex 9B.

Debriefing, Inquiries and Lessons Emerging

935. For all incidents it is essential to keep records. Single agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh and a comprehensive record kept of all events, decisions, the reasoning behind key decisions and actions taken. Each organisation should maintain its own records and nominate individuals responsible for overseeing the keeping and storage of the records and files created during the response, and also for assuring the retention of those that existed before the emergency occurred. Records are required to:

- a. Facilitate operational debriefing.
- b. Provide evidence for inquiries, whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or of some other format.
- c. Allow lessons to be identified and made more widely available for the benefit of those who might be involved in future emergencies and for post-event action such as revision of plans, procedures and training, strengthening of liaison with other agencies or devising small exercises to test alternative approaches.

SECTION III – RESPONSE TO LOCALISED INCIDENTS

936. Within the United Kingdom there is substantial experience of major emergencies occurring within the bounds of relatively small areas. To create stability, it is essential that the emergency services establish control over the immediate area and arrangements for co-ordinating the response between the services.

Procedure

937. Current practice is that the first members of the emergency services to arrive on the scene make a rapid assessment and report back to their control room – not immediately becoming involved with rescue. The key information will be:

- a. Where the incident is.
- b. What is involved.
- c. Which services and resources are present or required.

938. As soon as possible after the initial report, additional information will be passed on hazards (actual and potential), access to the scene, estimates of the number and main types of injuries, possible control and rendezvous points and any other relevant information.

939. The control room which receives the initial message will alert the other emergency services and local authorities. In accordance with their own procedures, those agencies will in turn alert personnel or activate appropriate response plans to the level they judge necessary. These response plans may involve alerting other relevant commercial, industrial, voluntary or other organisations.

940. The underlying principle for a major emergency with an identifiable scene is that the police normally assume the management of overall co-ordination at all command levels. This approach ensures that resources are used to best effect and avoids situations where, for example, resources may be called upon simultaneously by different agencies. This is particularly the case for major emergencies that occur near or across boundaries.

941. The Bronze Commanders will:

- a. Assess control measures with regard to reducing risk.
- b. Decide which specific functions should be controlled by which agency after taking due account of:
 - (1) The circumstances.

- (2) The professional expertise of the emergency services and other agencies. The utility companies, gas, water and electricity may be required very early on to render working areas safe.
 - (3) Any statutory obligations.
 - (4) The overall priorities at the scene.
- c. Set up an Inner Cordon (see Figure 9.1) to secure the immediate scene, exclude non-essential personnel and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area.
- (1) The boundary of the Inner Cordon will be determined jointly by the police and fire service based on the geography of the area (there may be a natural cordon such as a major road, river etc), and the risk from the incident (for example from a bomb explosion, or the downwind plume from a chemical spillage or CBRN incident).
 - (2) All those entering or leaving the Inner Cordon will report to a designated cordon access point, which will be controlled by a designated Bronze commander who will register entry or exit. This will ensure that at all times people within can be accounted for in the event of an escalation of the incident.
 - (3) Within the Inner Cordon the Fire Service assumes responsibility for safety management. All civilian emergency services personnel entering the cordon will have to adopt safety practices consistent with those employed by the Fire Service.
 - (4) Personnel entering the cordon are also checked to ensure that they have the appropriate level of personal protection equipment and it provides an opportunity for briefing about the evacuation signal, hazards and control measures and other issues about which they need to be aware.
- d. Set up Forward Control Points (FCPs) for each agency involved, with regular inter-agency co-ordination meetings. Where possible the FCPs will be collocated.




Figure 9.1 - Operational Level Arrangements

- e. If practical, establish an Outer Cordon (see Figure 9.2) around the vicinity of the incident to control access to a much wider area around the site. This will allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and in privacy. Access through the Outer Cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel will be through a Scene Access Control Point. The Outer Cordon may then be further supplemented by an external Traffic Cordon, which will be used by the police to redirect traffic, control traffic flows and clear key routes into the incident.
- f. Establish internal traffic routes for emergency and other vehicles.




Figure 9.2 - Tactical Level Arrangements

- g. Decide on the location of key functions or facilities. For example:
- (1) Casualty clearing station(s) to which the injured can be taken.
 - (2) An ambulance loading point for those who need to be taken to hospital.
 - (3) A collection/assembly point for survivors before they are taken to a survivor reception centre.
 - (4) Possible helicopter landing site(s).
 - (5) A rendezvous point or points for all responding personnel, which maybe some distance from the scene in the event of a bomb incident or incidents involving hazardous materials.
 - (6) A marshalling area for assembling vehicles and equipment.
 - (7) A body holding area, which is undercover and protected from public view.

(8) A media liaison point.

(9) Consider the possible need for evacuation of the public from the immediate vicinity – this may have to be considered at a very early stage.

942. Some functions will by their nature be discharged outside cordons and away from the scene but need to be considered as essential components of an integrated response:

- a. Local authority crisis/emergency centre.
- b. Casualty bureau.
- c. Rest centres.
- d. Temporary mortuary.
- e. Friends and relatives reception centres.
- f. Receiving hospitals.
- g. Survivor reception centres.
- h. Media liaison points.

943. Liaison officers at the scene should be clearly identifiable. They will be equipped with their own communications so that they can remain in contact with their organisation to obtain any further support rapidly. Where local authority services might be required at short notice, resources will be assembled nearby so that they are ready for immediate action if called upon by the emergency services.

944. If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, a Site Incident Officer from the affected organisation will usually liaise with responding organisations. Such a representative can ease access to facilities within the establishment and act as a link between the establishment's senior management and the emergency management structure. Many of the sites will have a major incident plan¹⁵ which will have pre-planned arrangements for both on-site and off-site reactions to incidents.

¹⁵ For some sites, such as nuclear and chemical facilities, this is a statutory requirement.

SECTION IV – RESPONSE TO NON-LOCALISED INCIDENTS

Maritime Emergencies

945. The objectives of the combined response and a tiered management framework also apply to maritime emergencies. However, the nature of a maritime emergency raises specific management and co-ordination issues that do not arise with land-based emergencies.

946. **Roles and Responsibilities.** The offshore response to a maritime emergency will normally be co-ordinated by the appropriate Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) or Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre (MRSC). However, it is essential that land and maritime authorities liaise at the earliest opportunity to address the particular problems caused by such emergencies, and the fact that maritime incidents may have an on-shore dimension. The land-based authorities are responsible for dealing with the shore-based consequences and the reception and care of survivors once they are on shore. Further liaison will be required for dealing with wreckage and pollution and to decide on appropriate destinations and berthing arrangements for vessels in distress.

947. **Fire and Rescue Offshore.** Arrangements for dealing with fires, chemical hazards and rescue from vessels at sea have been formalised between the MCA and certain brigades.¹⁶

948. **Co-ordinating Maritime Incidents.** Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, whether offshore, inshore or on the coast, are controlled, directed and managed from a single co-ordination centre (either MRCC or MRSC). MOD assets are co-ordinated through the ARCC at RAF Kinloss.¹⁷

949. **Initial Reactions.** Initial information about an incident is usually reported to an MRCC/MRSC, which will initiate SAR operations if lives are at risk. If there is any pollution or threat of pollution the duty MCA Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer (CPSO) will be alerted. The CPSO will decide on the relevant course of action, initiate the appropriate level of response and alert the appropriate people in the MCA Counter Pollution and Response Branch. In the event of a major incident the MCA may activate the Marine Emergency Information Room in Southampton prior to the deployment of people and equipment to the scene.

950. **Subsequent Co-ordination.** Pollution and salvage incidents will be co-ordinated from either a Marine Response Centre (MCA-led dealing with pollution offshore), a Shoreline Response Centre (Local Authority-led dealing with pollution

¹⁶ This was one of the consequences of the Fire and Rescue Services Act.

¹⁷ See Chapter 2.

onshore), or a Salvage Control Unit (SOSREP-led salvage).¹⁸ They may be located at the nearest MRCC/MRSC or at a Port or Harbour complex, depending on the circumstances of the incident.

Terrorist Incidents

951. The response to a terrorist incident will be similar to that of any major incident but the police will take overall command of the incident. The important difference from 'natural' incidents is that the crisis phase requires special handling, particularly if there is a hostage situation. The latter may entail the direct intervention of military forces, following central government approval, under Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) procedures, at which point command of the incident will be formally transferred from the police to the military commander and then handed back once direct military intervention has concluded.

952. The methodology of some terrorist incidents includes the use of bomb threats, which may in themselves be treated as serious incidents. Certain key activities arise with the management of a bomb threat; not all of these activities will necessarily be carried out in every circumstance, nor will they necessarily occur in the same order:

- a. Police evaluation of the threat with a designated co-ordinator at the threatened location.
- b. Confirmation that a device exists at the threatened location.
- c. Consideration of cordons (dependent on the threat and possibly over 500 metres away).
- d. Establishing a cordon.
- e. Potential evacuation to a safe distance.
- f. Rendering any suspect device safe.
- g. Gathering of forensic evidence.
- h. Recovery and re-occupation of the scene.

953. Military involvement in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)/Improvised Explosive Device (IED) disposal is co-ordinated through the Joint Service EOD Operations Centre (JSEODOC) at Didcot. The JSEODOC will allocate military EOD teams to an incident by matching the capability requirement to the particular capabilities of the various teams.

¹⁸ See Chapter 8 for details of the powers of the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP) in relation to salvage and pollution matters.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Incidents

954. From a civil perspective, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents are:

- a. Terrorism: criminal and deliberate.
- b. Not routine hazardous materials incidents - but there are overlaps.

955. CBRN adds extra dimensions to a conventional incident:

- a. It presents additional hazards to both responders and potential victims.
- b. Detection, monitoring and identification¹⁹ of the materials used is necessary.
- c. Normal jobs must be conducted in personal protection equipment.
- d. Public reaction will probably be different and this must be allowed for in the public information plan.
- e. Decontamination will be required, potentially of responders and their equipment, plus large numbers of public including the young, disabled and infirm - some of whom will also require medical treatment for 'conventional' injuries as well as the effect of the CBRN incident. The incident site itself will need to be decontaminated eventually.
- f. Media interest will be still further heightened.
- g. The response will be multi-agency, as always, but potentially with different agencies and specialists.
- h. International, government and political interest will increase.
- i. The emergency services themselves could be the target.

956. **Procedure.**^{20, 21} Essentially the same command structure is used as for a conventional incident, with adaptation of procedures at and near the incident to the new threat (see diagram at Annex 9C):

¹⁹ In a HAZMAT incident the chemical agent is normally known - if not in advance at least soon after arrival.

²⁰ For detail see *'The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material, Strategic National Guidance'*, Home Office 2nd Edition May 2004.

²¹ For more detail, see *'The release of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) substances or material – Guidance for Local Authorities'* Home Office August 2003.

- a. The Fire Service and the police, to establish whether it is a CBRN or HAZMAT incident conduct an on-scene assessment. To assist in this assessment the Fire Service has access to detection equipment.
- b. Once the initial assessment is completed an Inner Cordon is established and initial access arrangements determined. The size and shape of the cordon will be determined by a hazard assessment conducted by the Fire Service in consultation with the police, taking into account the CBRN material identified, geography, wind direction and other relevant factors.
- c. The area within the Inner Cordon is identified as the 'Hot zone' – only personnel in full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) may work within this area.²²
- d. The Ambulance Service determines whether decontamination is required and if mass decontamination is necessary. A MoU between the Ambulance and Fire Services describes the procedures by which responsibility passes from the former to the latter when mass decontamination is required. The ambulance service retains responsibility for the decontamination of medical casualties.
- e. Egress from the Hot Zone for the general public is through a nominated access point, which is the start point for decontamination procedures which are contained within an area known as the 'Warm Zone', the contamination present coming with the people leaving the Hot Zone. Emergency service personnel within the Warm Zone wear PPE whose scope is determined by dynamic risk assessment – it may therefore be a lower standard than that in the Hot Zone.
- f. The first stage of decontamination is a primary triage point where Ambulance Service personnel classify people in one of 3 categories:
 - (1) The most critically injured.
 - (2) Those requiring clinical decontamination due to wounds or because they are unable to decontaminate themselves, such as children or the elderly.
 - (3) Lightly contaminated people who can decontaminate themselves.
- g. Ambulance Service personnel decontaminate the first 2 categories, the third proceed through the mass decontamination procedure controlled by the Fire Service.

²² This applies only to civilian emergency services personnel entering the 'hot zone'. Specific military personnel, if authorised, will conduct their own risk assessments and determine levels of PPE accordingly.

- h. Mass decontamination follows a set sequence:
- (1) **Disrobing.** All clothing is removed, thus removing a large proportion of any contaminants. Police at the disrobing point collect and bag all possessions, labelling the bag with the details of its owner for potential evidentiary purposes – continuity of recording is therefore essential.
 - (2) **Showering.** Each person proceeds through a shower area, for thorough cleansing under the supervision of the Fire Service.
 - (3) **Dressing.** Once clean each person dresses in dry clothing provided as part of the mass decontamination equipment. At this point the police will take each individual's details for use at the Casualty Bureau.
- i. All persons within the Inner Cordon, including fatalities, pass through the decontamination process. Once through, they are in an area within the Outer Cordon, designated as the Cold Zone (uncontaminated). After this point is reached:
- (1) Uninjured persons are passed on to a survivor rest centre loading point for transportation to a designated rest centre. On arrival their details are passed to the Casualty Bureau.
 - (2) Injured persons pass through a secondary triage point where they receive medical treatment before being passed on to the ambulance loading point for transport to designated hospitals. On arrival their details are passed to the Casualty Bureau.
 - (3) Decontaminated victims are placed in a decontaminated body holding area before transportation to a mortuary. Details of casualties are passed to the Casualty Bureau.
- j. Emergency service decontamination is conducted in separate smaller decontamination units as the PPE they use is designed for wet decontamination – there is no need for the disrobing/showering/dressing procedure.
- k. The mass and emergency services decontamination units are self-contained and collect the contaminated water created during the decontamination process. The EA²³ has procedures in place to dispose of the contaminated water.

²³ SEPA in Scotland.

1. Decontamination of the incident site itself is part of the recovery phase and is the responsibility of the local authority, assisted by relevant experts.

Widespread Natural Disasters

957. Historically the United Kingdom has been relatively fortunate, suffering less from the frequency and scale of such widespread natural disasters as storms, flooding or earthquakes. However, since the UK is a generally densely populated country, any widespread disasters are likely to affect large numbers of people. The disaster could overwhelm local resources, disrupt communications and cut off access or egress routes, which may be compounded by people attempting to leave an affected area.

958. The initial formal response to a widespread disaster would be similar to any other incident. Where inter-agency strategic management is required, Strategic Co-ordinating Groups, normally meeting in police headquarters, will be established to ascertain the extent of the emergency and to set out policy priorities for the response. In the likely event that the consequences span police areas a number of SCGs may be established and liaison maintained between each group, with one SCG taking the lead in agreement with the others. Each SCG would also provide the focus for liaison with central government.

959. Resources will be stretched by a widespread disaster. The SCG, whilst avoiding tactical decisions, may have to call on the resources which industry, the Armed Forces and voluntary agencies can provide. Such responses can be mobilised more quickly if plans have been made in advance which address their availability and means of obtaining them. Although there is no single model for dealing with the complex problems which widespread disasters present, the basic principles outlined in this chapter do not change.

SECTION V – CARE AND TREATMENT OF PEOPLE

960. The care of those involved in a major emergency and the way they are treated lie at the heart of the response. In particular, sudden impact major emergencies may cause physical injury, affect people's mental state or affect their material welfare through stress. Experience and study of major emergencies has identified various key groups of people:

- a. Those who have been injured.
- b. Those directly caught up in the emergency occurrence, but who are not physically hurt.
- c. Families and friends of the injured, missing or deceased.
- d. Rescuers and response workers.

- e. Wider sections of the community whose lives are affected or disrupted.
- f. Witnesses and spectators.

961. In addition to medical assistance or material welfare, some of those who are suffering from the effects of an emergency may need immediate access to social and psychological support. Local authorities are responsible for co-ordinating the provision of welfare services both in the immediate aftermath and these facilities undoubtedly would be needed in the medium and longer-term. Many local authorities maintain crisis support teams who are specially trained to respond to the particular personal problems associated with emergencies.

Care of Injured Survivors

962. For an event where there is no contamination, injured survivors will normally be taken to a casualty clearing station. Medical and paramedical personnel will carry out triage and any appropriate stabilisation measures before ensuring that casualties are evacuated in accordance with clinical priorities for hospital treatment. The casualty clearing station is usually sited in a building, tent or temporary shelter close to the ambulance loading point.

963. The Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO) will be responsible for:

- a. The establishment of medical communications on site.
- b. The transport of medical teams.
- c. Whether a Medical Incident Officer (MIO) should be appointed.
- d. In liaison with the MIO (if activated), conveyance of casualties to appropriate receiving hospital(s).
- e. Transport of casualties to distant specialist hospitals by helicopter where appropriate.
- f. The provision of all ambulance resources necessary for the ongoing treatment of casualties.
- g. The distribution and replenishment of medical and first aid supplies.
- h. Identification of the receiving hospitals.

Care of Uninjured Survivors

964. Those who have survived a major emergency with no physical injuries (or with only minor injuries) may nevertheless be traumatised and suffering from shock,

intense anxiety and grief. They will, therefore, need to be treated with great sensitivity. The local authority, particularly social services departments, will need to co-ordinate both the professional and voluntary sector welfare response. They will need to work closely with health professionals and with police Family Liaison Officers where appropriate.

965. Survivors are usually anxious for information about their own relatives, friends and colleagues, information about the incident, number and location of other survivors, and what will happen to them next and when. Their initial needs are likely to include:

- a. Shelter and warmth.
- b. Information and assistance with communication.
- c. Support in their distress.
- d. Food and drink.
- e. First aid to treat minor injuries.
- f. Changing, washing and toilet facilities, and perhaps spare clothing.

966. The facilities above will usually be delivered at a survivor reception centre, a secure area to which all survivors who are uninjured or have only minor injuries will be taken. The responsibility for organising, staffing and providing logistical support at survivor reception centres and rest centres usually rests with the local authority supported by other organisations such as social services, medical and police family liaison personnel. The reception centres will also be used by police documentation teams to gather information from survivors who will often be able to provide crucial information about what happened and may be important witnesses at any subsequent trial or inquiry. Survivors will generally move on from the reception centre to some form of temporary housing or a rest centre which can provide overnight accommodation if it is not possible for them to return to their own homes.

Friends and Relatives

967. Experience has shown that many people will travel to the scene or to meeting points such as travel terminals if they believe their friends or relatives may have been involved in an emergency. If necessary the police, in consultation with the local authority, will establish friends and relatives reception centres at suitable locations, staffed by police, local authority and suitably trained voluntary organisations, including representatives of faith organisations when appropriate. At these centres the fullest possible information to enquirers seeking news of people who might be affected will be given taking care to be accurate while preserving the privacy of the individual.

Police Casualty Bureau²⁴

968. In many emergencies, establishing the identity and whereabouts of people will be a critical issue. The purpose of a Police Casualty Bureau (PCB) is to provide a central contact and information point for gathering and distributing information about individuals who have been, or are believed to have been, involved in an incident. For the purposes of the bureau, a 'casualty' may be defined as 'any person who is directly involved in, or affected by the incident'; this will therefore include survivors, evacuees and the deceased.

969. A PCB has 3 fundamental tasks:

- a. To obtain relevant information regarding persons involved or potentially involved.
- b. To assess and process that information.
- c. To provide accurate information to relatives and friends, the investigating and identification officers and HM Coroner.²⁵

970. When a casualty bureau is required, its early establishment²⁶ is essential. It will typically be a consideration following declaration of a major incident, although the level of authority needed will differ between police forces. Without such a facility, calls from concerned friends and relatives may swamp control centres, with the potential to inhibit severely the management of the response to the incident. Once the PCB is activated and able to receive calls, the media will be used to publicise a dedicated telephone number. The PCB telephone numbers will also be passed as soon as possible to telephone network controllers, control rooms for the other emergency services and local authority (or authorities), receiving hospital switchboards and embassies (if appropriate). These measures will reduce delays and confusion caused by embassies and relatives ringing round for information.

971. As part of this process, the police will send documentation teams to each receiving hospital, the mortuary, survivor reception centre(s) and possibly rest centre(s) as well as to relatives. Good co-ordination of this activity is essential to avoid unnecessary duplicated visits.

972. In order to fulfil its role the casualty bureau will:

- a. Receive enquiries from the general public and file missing person reports.

²⁴ Casualty bureau is the common term used for what is properly titled a Casualty and Information Bureau.

²⁵ Procurator Fiscal in Scotland.

²⁶ The casualty bureau is usually staffed by police civilian employees such as control room personnel or call centre staff.

- b. Record details (including their whereabouts) of survivors, evacuees, the injured and deceased through reports from police documentation teams, receiving hospitals, survivor reception centres, rest centres, friends and relatives reception centres etc.
- c. Formulate a comprehensive list of missing persons.
- d. Collate data to support identification of persons involved.
- e. Liaise with the ante mortem team.²⁷
- f. Inform enquirers (by the most appropriate means) of the condition and location of these persons.

973. An important principle of the way the casualty bureau operates is that the people who receive information and record enquiries from the general public (the incident enquiry unit) are not involved in the collation and matching processes. They are therefore unable to give information out to enquirers. A separate unit will pass messages on behalf of casualties and operate a 'callback' service to enquirers when matches have been made, but not in the case of fatalities.

974. In the case of fatalities, details are passed to the Identification Commission. The bereaved will then be informed (see Dealing with Fatalities below).

Air Accidents and the Emergency Procedures Information Centre

975. In the event of an air crash, the Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC) at Heathrow, managed by British Airways, may open. If so, its telephone number will be broadcast. Once open, EPIC acts as a central airline information co-ordinating point. It collates information about reservations, next of kin and other relevant data, thereby supporting the work of the PCB and the coroner.

976. If foreign nationals are thought to have been involved, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will refer any enquiries from foreign consulates, embassies or high commissions to the casualty bureau. The police will inform the consular authorities of the death of any of their nationals.

Diverse Needs

977. Any major emergency occurring in the United Kingdom is likely to involve members of faith, religious²⁸ and ethnic minorities and may have to deal with the

²⁷ The team responsible for compiling files in respect of each person missing, or believed to be involved and not identified, for comparison with post mortem data and for information of HM Coroner/Procurator Fiscal.

²⁸ Various sections of the faith communities have well-established emergency arrangements.

specific needs of children. Their needs will therefore be borne in mind when planning or executing Major Incident Plans. Such needs will include:

- a. Language facilities (or at least the identification of language resources that may be available).
- b. Religious requirements such as medical treatment, hygiene, diet and place for prayer. Depending on the faith of the deceased or bereaved there may also be concern about how the dead are handled, and the timing of funeral arrangements.
- c. The specialist staff to deal with children.

Rescuers and Responders

978. Major emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response, a response that may need to be sustained over long periods. There is therefore a requirement to address the physical and psychological needs of the staff in response organisations. This will include proper risk assessment and the use of appropriate protective equipment, the provision of refreshments and more substantial meals, washing and changing facilities, appropriate work rosters and a comprehensive briefing process. There may be a need for other services, including counselling, after the incident has been resolved.

Maintenance of Order

979. A major incident may have a serious impact on law and order. The police have a duty to keep the peace and protect the public. Any military involvement in this task would only be at the request of the police and authorised through MACP procedures.

SECTION VI – DEALING WITH FATALITIES

980. It is essential that the handling of issues surrounding fatalities is both efficient and sensitive. Dealing with fatalities during major emergencies must recognise the conflict between trying to satisfy:

- a. The full and proper legal requirements for enquiring into what happened.
- b. The emotional and information needs of the family or friends of the deceased.

981. Hard won experience in recent years has produced details of good practice which provides an appropriate and sensitive service to relatives while meeting the

requirements for formal identification, and the welfare needs of those who must deal with potentially large numbers of the deceased and human remains.

Procedure

982. The authority of HM Coroner²⁹ is generally required before those who have been pronounced dead can be moved from the scene of the incident. Arrangements are then the responsibility of the police, who will act on behalf of the coroner to implement a victim recovery plan.

983. The police overall incident commander will appoint a Senior Identification Manager (SIM) to manage and co-ordinate all aspects concerning the identification of victims.³⁰ The SIM will normally appoint a senior officer to be responsible for the recovery of the deceased from the disaster site. This officer will formulate a recovery plan together with other relevant persons and agencies. This will include the Coroner, the police Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and where relevant other investigative agencies.

984. Personnel tasked with the recovery of the deceased and human remains should be specifically selected and trained for this purpose. In a large-scale incident, the military may be requested to support the police in this process, through the appropriate channels. Such support may include wide-scale search over open terrain and the provision of logistical support, particularly if victims are to be recovered from a difficult area. Untrained personnel would conduct their activities under the supervision of trained officers.

985. In summary the recovery process is as follows:

- a. Victims (or human remains) will not normally be moved until a medical practitioner or paramedic has pronounced life extinct and endorsed the body label accordingly.
- b. Each victim will be issued with a unique reference number, which will remain constant throughout the identification process.
- c. The removal will take place in a systematic, structured and documented fashion (including video or photographic evidence if possible), although there are alternative arrangements if quick removal is necessary (e.g. to prevent loss or further damage to the deceased victim or to rescue or provide medical treatment for trapped survivors).

²⁹ Procurator Fiscal in Scotland.

³⁰ Disaster Victim Identification (DVI).

d. During the process a key requirement is the need to preserve evidence, this particularly affects the procedures for dealing with valuables and other property.

e. Once extracted from the incident site, human remains may be taken first to a location designated as a body holding area. This should be under cover and protected from the public view for reasons of security, protection and sensitivity. A body-holding area should only be regarded as a temporary holding point between the site of retrieval and the designated mortuary.

986. For a major incident, existing mortuary capacity will probably be inadequate and its location unsuitable. The usual practice is for victims to be taken to a temporary mortuary for post-mortems to be carried out. It is the responsibility of the coroner's office to arrange for the transfer of victims to the mortuary. This is co-ordinated by the police acting on behalf of the coroner's office using vehicles belonging to undertakers or police. It is essential to establish documented continuity in respect of each aspect of the recovery and transportation process.

987. Temporary mortuary³¹ provision is an inter-agency activity with the local authority taking the lead, taking into account the requirements of the Coroner, pathologists and Health and Safety Regulations. Potential sites³² are identified when formulating and reviewing the authority's major incident plan, with the assumption that they would be fully operational within 24 hours from the start of the emergency and any shortfalls in meeting the selection criteria can be corrected within this period.

Identification³³

988. HM Coroner³⁴ has to determine who died and how, and when and where the death occurred for those victims lying within his district who have met a violent or unnatural death or a sudden death of unknown cause. The powers and duties of coroners do not vary with the numbers of people killed or the circumstances in which the deaths occur.

989. The task of identifying the dead is undertaken by an Identification Commission, normally chaired by the coroner, made up of the supervising pathologist, police Senior Identification Manager, Police Family Liaison Co-ordinator and specialists such as those in odontology, radiology and fingerprints. The functions of the Identification Commission include reviewing presented identification evidence,

³¹ Military commanders cannot enter into formal or informal arrangements with local authorities on the provision of military sites for temporary mortuaries without approval from D CT & UK Ops.

³² Sites may not be buildings – temporary structures such as Portakabins, road trailers, tents or inflatable structures may be used.

³³ For further information, including arrangements for dealing with mass fatalities, see the joint Home Office and Cabinet Office publication, '*Guidance on dealing with fatalities in emergencies*' 2004.

³⁴ Procurator Fiscal in Scotland.

making recommendations to the Coroner on identifications and advising the SIM on issues relating to the recovery and identification of victims.

990. The process is characterised by careful, discreet communications to ensure that there are appropriate links between coroner and staff, the police (including family liaison officers) and the bereaved and that the possibility of multiple contacts and misidentification of fatalities and casualties is avoided. When a positive identification has been made, it is generally the police who will inform the next of kin once the approval of the coroner has been given to do so. On occasions, the next of kin may be part of the identification process. However, there are specific rules covering this eventuality.

SECTION VII – EVACUATION

Introduction

991. In some circumstances it may be necessary to advise the public on whether they should evacuate a given area or stay put and shelter indoors. Such circumstances include risks to life or health from:

- a. Release or threatened release of radioactive materials or other hazardous substances.
- b. Spread of fire.
- c. Threat of explosion.
- d. Damage caused by severe storms.
- e. Threat from serious flooding.
- f. Threat of environmental contamination.

992. Risk assessment will be conducted using information from a number of agencies, for example:

- a. Information on the nature of the risk may be obtained from the fire service, from chemical data systems and other accredited sources.
- b. There are arrangements for the Meteorological Office to forecast the direction and spread of any chemical plume, using information provided from the scene together with remote telemetry.
- c. The Meteorological Office and/or Regional Weather Centres issue severe weather warnings.

d. The Meteorological Office issues warnings of abnormally high tides that could possibly lead to flooding to the police and to the Environment Agency. The Environment Agency is responsible for issuing flood warnings to the public and other organisations on specific rivers and coastline.

Decision to Evacuate

993. It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and who define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from other agencies:

- a. The Fire Service concerning the risks associated with fire, contamination and other hazards.
- b. Ambulance and social services on problems associated with moving people who are frail, disabled or at risk for any other reason.
- c. Local authorities on the location of pre-designated rest centres and on other possible places of shelter within the area.

994. The police can only recommend evacuation and have no power (except within the inner cordon in response to a terrorist incident) to require responsible adults to leave their homes. In deciding whether to evacuate or not, it is necessary to assess whether bringing people outdoors may put people at greater risk than leaving them where they are to shelter indoors. This is particularly important in the case of the release of hazardous substances, or where terrorist devices may be present.

Procedure

995. The physical and organisational difficulties of large-scale evacuation should not be underestimated. There are particular problems in evacuating hospitals, prisons and nursing homes; evacuation is usually a last resort because of the length of time it takes. It is a particularly manpower-intensive operation and is therefore a contingency that may require military assistance. The outline procedure is as follows:

- a. Evacuation assembly points will be set up near the affected area; if time permits these will be signposted.
- b. People in the affected area will be advised to go to their nearest evacuation assembly point. Various methods can be used for warning and informing the public: loud-hailers, tannoys, mobile public address systems, radio or TV announcements, works sirens, display screens, scoreboards and monitors, or various combinations of these methods.

- c. People taking prescribed and other medications, or reliant on particular items of equipment (wheelchairs, crutches, nebulizers etc) will be reminded to carry these with them, and particular attention needs to be paid to those with sensory impairment.
- d. The police will, as far as is practicable, take steps to ensure the security of property left empty after evacuation. In the event of an extended evacuation, the local authority may have planned for, or have to consider, other security arrangements. These may involve a contractor.
- e. Dispersal of evacuees to survivor reception centres or rest centres will be co-ordinated at the evacuation assembly point.

996. Reception and rest centres should maintain a comprehensive index of evacuees and their whereabouts, including if they elect to go to another destination (relatives etc). The police will need this information initially for casualty bureau purposes. They may also need it later if they have to interview witnesses.

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ANNEX 9A – THE MEDIA

Introduction

9A1. The purpose of this annex is to highlight some of the issues relating to the media and describe some potential arrangements. For the military reader it is important to note that the Armed Forces' involvement in a major incident is at the request of the civilian authorities who retain primacy on all issues, including dealing with the media. Any exclusively MOD media issues will be dealt with by specialist MOD personnel in co-ordination with the other civil agencies. In this context this Annex is informative only as there will usually be little direct involvement between Service personnel on Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) duties and the media unless part of the overall media strategy.

SECTION I – LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

9A2. In the first instance, the task of coping with media pressures usually falls to the police in their role as co-ordinators of the management of the response at and around an emergency scene and with their responsibility for criminal investigation. But there are other aspects – temporary accommodation for victims and perhaps their relatives and friends, safety of damaged buildings, road access and so on – which call for a quick reaction by local authorities. They too must therefore be involved in the media response from the outset. Depending on the nature of events, attention may also focus on industrial operators and commercial or other organisations. The News Co-ordination Centre (NCC), which coordinates the central government media response and public communications, will also be established.

9A3. The media response is characterised by:

- a. **Rapid Arrival.** Media personnel will arrive very quickly and can quickly reserve all available accommodation in the area. They will often have learnt of a major emergency at the same time as, or even before, the emergency services.
- b. **Immediate Demands.** When they arrive, the media will expect to have access to the facilities they require and will expect an instant response to their requests for information and briefing.
- c. **Rapid Escalation.** Demands from local and regional media will quickly be augmented by demands from national and possibly international media. If these demands are not anticipated, media representatives are likely to add to the confusion.

Initial Actions

9A4. Experience has shown the value of dealing immediately with a number of key issues:

- a. **Control of Access to the Emergency Scene.** Restricting access aims to allow rescue services to carry out their work unhindered and to preserve evidence at what may be the scene of a crime.
- b. **Establishing a Media Liaison Point.** A designated point close to an emergency scene, preferably (but not always) outside the Outer Cordon, for the reception of media personnel, checks on their bona fides and briefing on arrangements for reporting, filming and photography. It may be little more than a rendezvous point with further facilities provided at a media centre.
- c. **Nominating a Media Liaison Officer.** The swift attendance at the scene of a media contact (likely to be from the police) should ease the pressure from the media on responders. Failure to arrange this will prompt media representatives to approach anybody available, which could lend credibility to inaccurate sources. Brief interviews with senior police, fire, and ambulance officers at the site, as well as with specialists from appropriate agencies such as rail or airport officials, will add authority to the information being given.
- d. **News Co-ordination Centre.** Depending on the nature and location of the incident, the NCC may assist in the management, and setting up of, the media operation. This may include establishment of a media centre, in conjunction with the emergency services and local authorities. If the nature of the incident has national and regional implications, the NCC will work with the Government News Network to coordinate the public and media.
- e. **Assistance from the Government News Network.** Reinforcement may be requested from one of the eight network offices of the Government News Network (GNN). They will arrive with their own communications facilities and technical support equipment. Assistance can range from helping to staff a media centre to acting as liaison officers with the lead government department) and handling VIP visits.
- f. **Co-ordination.** The media will use all means of communication and any available member of the response teams to gather information. It is vital that information is properly co-ordinated and shared so as to avoid the emergence of different or even contradictory information. The nominated media liaison officer should co-ordinate the media response from the earliest possible stage. Others should deal only with issues that fall within their own area of responsibility unless prior agreement has been reached.

9A5. During the initial stages of the incident, when definitive information is sparse, the following is useful advice:

- a. On arrival at the scene the media will keep open channels on mobile telephones to ensure instant access to their editors. It is possible to anticipate this and protect the cellular telephone system from saturation by invoking the Access Overload Control for Cellular Radio Telephones (ACCOLC)¹ (see Annex 9B).
- b. The media may need to be reminded that in the initial response period no-one can know precisely what has happened. Initial statements should focus on what is happening, what the limitations of knowledge are at the time and what is being done to arrive at a fuller appreciation of the situation. If such statements are backed by a commitment to provide accurate information as soon as it is available, media personnel are more likely to attend briefings and thus, accept a measure of co-ordination, particularly if the briefings are scheduled at regular intervals.
- c. The media will welcome any factual statements, particularly from eyewitnesses within the emergency services. However, such statements should not include speculation on causal factors, nor premature or uncorroborated estimates of the numbers of casualties.
- d. Care should be taken that information about casualties is not released until details have been confirmed and next of kin informed. It may be necessary to explain that it can take a long time to identify victims. Only the coroner or police may authorise the release of information about individuals.
- e. Limitations on the release of information, often because of the need to avoid prejudicing what may become a criminal prosecution, should be clearly and frankly explained.
- f. It is important to develop the best possible relationship with media personnel from the start. Pressure of competition between media teams and individuals will make them sensitive to any restrictions which appear to them to be unfair or if media organisations are being treated differently. It should also allow positive advantage to be taken of the help which the media can provide, for example by broadcasting appeals for blood donors, publicising details of any evacuation arrangements or broadcasting casualty bureau telephone numbers.

¹ Not all media will have access to an ACCOLC-protected telephone. Those who are using telephones when ACCOLC is invoked are not cut off.

g. The management of large numbers of media representatives can be assisted through 'pooling' arrangements. A pool might, for example, comprise one television crew, one news agency such as the Press Association, a photographer and a radio reporter. Although a limit can be set on the number of media personnel to be allowed access to the site, such restrictions are seldom welcome and it is best to allow the media to decide who their representatives should be. Pooling may be particularly helpful if safety or security considerations restrict access to an emergency scene. The use of pooling should, however, be regularly reviewed.

9A6. There will be great pressure to obtain interviews with survivors and relatives but many will feel too shocked and distressed to give interviews. The first consideration should always be the well-being of the individual. It does, however, relieve pressure on all concerned if a willing and able survivor, relative or friend agrees to speak at a press conference to characterise the events for all. Press officers of involved organisations should support relatives and survivors, advising them prior to any media exposure and helping them to prepare a statement.

Subsequent Actions

9A7. In the event of a major emergency, the initial actions just described may be no more than holding arrangements. As the situation develops, the need for a comprehensive media response organisation headed by someone who equates to a public relations manager may become apparent. The public relations manager for the emergency may be drawn from the police or appropriate local authority, depending on circumstances and locally agreed plans.

9A8. The public relations manager must be fully involved in the senior management arrangements for the emergency, for example by attending Strategic Co-ordination Group meetings, so that he or she is fully briefed and can plan and oversee all aspects of the media response:

9A9. A major emergency may also justify the establishment of a media centre to provide working accommodation for media personnel, a news conference and briefing area, facilities for monitoring television, radio and newspapers and a press office with communications equipment. The media centre may be set up by the police or by the local authority or, in collaboration with the police, by the principal organisation or company involved in the emergency. The location of, and responsibility for, establishing the centre should be agreed in advance as part of the planning process.

9A10. Normally, the police will take the initial lead in dealing with the media as part of their role in managing the co-ordination of the response. As the emphasis switches to the recovery phase, the co-ordination management role may pass to another agency, such as the local authority or the Health Service, who would then take the lead in

dealing with continued media interest and providing any necessary public advice and information. Close and continuing co-operation between the police and the relieving agency's media teams from the outset will achieve a smooth handover.

Ministerial Media Briefings

9A11. A major emergency inevitably results in requests for ministerial briefing and statements. It is the responsibility of the Lead Government Department (LGD) to co-ordinate a consistent and properly considered response by central government. On media matters, therefore, Chief Constables and local authority Chief Executives should look to the emergency centre of the LGD as their main central government contact, which in turn will direct press officers accordingly.

'Connecting in a Crisis'

9A12. 'Connecting in a Crisis' is a BBC initiative that seeks to help meet the public demand for information in the event of an emergency. It is about warning and informing in the interests of public safety, concentrating on delivering essential information quickly and is not about the wider issues of news reporting. It aims ahead of any disaster to forge close links between the emergency planning community and BBC local broadcasters on both radio and television, so that in the event of an emergency this framework will provide essential information, warnings, advice and reassurance in the first few hours.

9A13. The emergency planners' access into the BBC's range of services is via the managing editor of the local BBC radio station. The prime BBC conduit is local radio, supplemented by local and regional Ceefax, websites, regional TV and RDS. The arrangements are robust and often well practised, for example in the Yorkshire floods of 2000 and the Foot and Mouth outbreak in 2001. The arrangements are increasingly being incorporated into major incident plans.

Media Emergency Forum

9A14. The national Media Emergency Forum (MEF) is an ad hoc group of senior media editors, government representatives, local authority emergency planners, blue light services and private industry set up to consider media issues arising from civil contingencies and, since 11 September 2001, from terrorist attacks. Part of their work is to review the lessons learned in major incidents and exercises with a view to improving the way that information is passed to the public.

9A15. This work is also mirrored locally. In every government office region there is a Regional Media Emergency Forum (RMEF) to give a regional perspective to the national group's work but more importantly, to forge links between government, both local and central, emergency services and the regional and local media.

9A16. Issues addressed include automatic recognition of press cards, creation of media centres, pooling procedures, frameworks for briefings and protocols for restricting access to the incident site.

VIP Visits

9A17. Visits by VIPs, which will be co-ordinated by the police, can lift the morale of those affected as well as those who are involved with the response. A government minister may make an early visit to the scene or areas affected, not only to mark public concern but also to be able to report to Parliament on the response. A government minister visiting the scene may be accompanied by local Members of Parliament. This would be arranged by the Minister's Private Office. It is possible that the scale of a disaster may, in addition, prompt visits by a member of the Royal Family and/or the Prime Minister. Local VIP visitors may include the Lord Lieutenant, the High Sheriff, religious leaders, local MPs, mayors, chairmen and other elected representatives. If foreign nationals have been involved, their country's Ambassador, High Commissioner or other dignitaries may also want to visit key locations. VIP visits of the Armed Forces that may involve members of parliament must be approved by the Under Secretary of State in the MOD.

9A18. Visits to the scene of an emergency need to take account of the local situation, and the immediate effects on the local community. It may be inappropriate for VIP visitors to go to a disaster site itself whilst rescue operations are still going on, particularly if casualties are still trapped. VIP visits should not interrupt rescue and lifesaving work and the police must be consulted about the timing of visits.

9A19. The emergency services are experienced at handling VIP visits in normal circumstances and many of the usual considerations will apply to visits to a disaster site. However, it may be necessary to restrict media coverage of such visits, in which case pooling arrangements may be made. Visiting Ministers and other VIPs will require comprehensive briefing before visiting the site and will require briefing before any meetings with the media.

9A20. VIPs are likely to want to meet those survivors who are well enough to see them. It will be for the hospitals to decide, on the basis of medical advice and respect for the wishes of individual patients and their relatives, whether it is appropriate for VIPs and/or the media to visit casualties. If the media cannot have access to wards, VIPs can still be interviewed afterwards at the hospital entrance about how patients and medical staff are coping. Such VIP visits are best managed by an independent team in close consultation with the police.

Sustainability

9A21. Major emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response. Media interest, particularly if it is international, can create pressure throughout a 24-hour period and careful planning of staggered handovers is essential. Chief Constables and local authority Chief Executives will wish to take the sustainability of the level of response to the media into account, and seek mutual aid accordingly. The pooling of resources in a joint media centre should be helpful in this respect. It needs to be remembered that sustainability applies not only to operational personnel but also to those involved in providing clerical support.

9A22. In the much longer term, experience has shown that media interest is revived on anniversaries of events, and chief officers may wish to give consideration as to how these occasions should be handled.

Media Debriefing

9A23. Where there has been a considerable amount of media attention there will be inevitable strains between media and emergency service interests. There is much to be gained by inviting senior media representatives to meet with senior members of the emergency services some weeks after a disaster to discuss how both sides saw the way information was managed and to identify any lessons to be learned. This may be accomplished through the Regional Media Emergency Forum, and at a national level through the National Media Emergency Forum.

SECTION II – CENTRAL ARRANGEMENTS

Public and Media Communications

9A24. Ministers have agreed that, during a crisis or emergency the News Coordination Centre (NCC) will support the LGD and/or CCC/COBR in providing advice to Ministers on the overall handling of the public information and media communications aspects of the emergency/crisis.

9A25. The level of support for LGDs is flexible depending on the seriousness of the situation. In the event of an incident, it is expected that the NCC will be operational within 2 hours. For example, the NCC could simply coordinate briefing lines, at the other extreme it could organise a full 24-hour operation providing a combination of the activities set out below:

- a. Staffing a 24-hour operation-with the support of both the LGD and other Government departments.
- b. Producing co-ordinated/consolidated briefing for use by Ministers, press officers and stakeholders to ensure consistency in the messages delivered.

- c. Co-ordinating requests for interview with Ministers and leading ‘talking heads’/ third parties.
- d. Establish a central press office to work with the Lead and other government departments.
- e. Work in conjunction with the Media Monitoring Unit and the GNN to operate an analysis and monitoring team, ensuring that coverage is monitored and assessed and, where necessary, errors corrected.
- f. Forward planning capability.
- g. Work with the media to facilitate coverage, where necessary.
- h. Establishing an emergency media centre.
- i. Organise media briefings.
- j. Working closely with GNN in the regions.
- k. Regular updating of UK resilience website and links to related sites as well as monitoring of other external sites.
- l. Devising communication strategies, including an exit strategy.
- m. Working with LGD to ensure that all relevant audiences, public and stakeholder, are targeted quickly and effectively.
- n. Liaising closely with Media Emergency Forum/regional MEFs.
- o. Co-ordinating the production of emergency advertising.

ANNEX 9B – TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS

9B1. Major Incident Planning includes provision for the various forms of communication between the civilian and military agencies involved in incident response. This Annex describes some of the systems involved and the procedures in place to safeguard some of the networks at periods of high loading that typically occur during major incidents.

Airwave¹

9B2. Airwave is a secure, resilient digital radio network dedicated for the exclusive use of the UK's emergency and public safety services² throughout England, Wales and Scotland. The service is designed to carry both voice and data communications and, through contract terms placed on the provider,³ offers guaranteed levels of coverage - even within remote areas or confined spaces such as buildings or tunnels.

9B3. The system employs multi-functional handsets that act as digital radio, mobile phone and data terminal, enabling police to access local and national databases, such as the Police National Computer and for the emergency services to transfer data to their control rooms. The system is designed for interoperability and allows secure partitions so that different organisations can share a single network. This ability to set up 'Virtual Private Networks' allows maintenance of privacy for individual organisations whilst offering the potential to link communications at times of need. The service is currently being introduced force-by-force, starting in Lancashire in 2001, with migration over 4 years so that England and Wales forces will be fully operational by the end of 2004 and Scottish forces by the end of 2005. At the end of this period the existing disparate force-specific analogue radio systems will be withdrawn, and the radio bands that they currently occupy will be released for other uses.

9B4. The Fire and Ambulance Services have similar requirements for new communications equipment – interoperability with other forces and the other emergency services being a high priority.

- a. The Ambulance Service's national re-procurement project is managed by the NHS Information Authority, with Airwave a candidate solution. Rollout of the new service is planned between 2004-2006.
- b. Firelink, on behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, is managing the Fire Service's communications requirements for a wholly new digital system for all fire and rescue services in England, Wales and Scotland.

¹ Formerly known as the 'Public Safety Radio Communications Service'.

² Including key MOD UK Ops staffs.

³ The contract to provide the Airwave Service was awarded to BT (subsequently mmO₂) in Feb 2000 by PITO.

Airwave is a candidate solution, with a successful supplier due to be selected by the end of 2004 with a phased introduction from end 2004 to 2007. The contract would be for the supply of the complete system until 2014, with a possible 3-year extension. The system being procured will be for wide area communications between fire appliances, their control rooms and other responders although it must be interoperable with 'at-incident communications' used within burning buildings etc.

Private Telecommunication Providers

9B5. The 2 major operators in the UK – British Telecommunications plc (BT) and Cable & Wireless plc (C&W) have a responsibility under their operating licences to make provision for the availability or restoration of communications services in an emergency or during a network failure. These services are able to respond quickly to meet the needs of the emergency services and local authorities where requirements have been discussed with BT and C&W beforehand.

9B6. BT has its own range of movable exchange units located around the country which can be deployed into the area of an incident and linked into the remainder of the network. These are supplemented by a number of mobile command vehicles and emergency message control centres. A wide range of facilities is available that includes simple Public Service Telephone Network (PSTN) telephone circuits, fax, Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), audio and video conferencing, private circuits (kilostream and megastream) and small switches.

9B7. BT has trained managers who can liaise at Gold, Silver and Bronze levels in the provision of emergency communications, backed by emergency planners. To co-ordinate BT's response there are a number of pre-planned responses for specific emergency roles or incidents. The generic plans are held in Network Management centres. They include:

- a. **Roles.** Casualty Bureau, Temporary Mortuary.
- b. **Incidents.** Nuclear Incident, Control of Major Accident Hazards sites, rabies, foot and mouth, flooding, airports.

9B8. Emergency services and local authorities have 24 hour access to the respective service provider by using the BT National Emergency Linkline and the C&W Direct Access Response.⁴ In the event of an emergency these controls will mobilise the resources requested, including an Incident Manager if needed. BT and C&W have a memorandum of understanding for mutual assistance when they are supporting

⁴ These are not for normal business enquiries - misuse may cause confusion and undue delay to emergency communication.

authorities involved with a major emergency. Other licensed operators may also be able to provide support, although this would need to be pre-planned.

Telecommunications Traffic Overload Management

9B9. A major emergency can produce traffic overload of the PSTN. This may occur as members of the public seek assurance about the safety of others and/or from damage by an incident to the telephone systems. In the first instance the telephone operators will apply normal, business-as-usual, traffic management measures. Such action will protect the network but essential services responding to the incident will be subject to the same restriction.

9B10. If a casualty bureau is established, PSTN controllers need notification of the bureau numbers as soon as possible so that they have time to establish the appropriate telephone network controls in order to reduce the likelihood of overloaded telephone exchanges.

9B11. When the public telephone networks do become overloaded, restrictions may need to be invoked. Schemes are available for both the mobile and fixed telephone services to give call preference to registered essential users.

Access Overload Control

9B12. Mobile telephone numbers of essential users can be registered via a sponsoring process, for the **ACCess OverLoad Control (ACCOLC)** scheme, supported by the main mobile telephone operators in the UK. Organisations are responsible for ensuring that appropriate users are registered.

9B13. The Police Incident Commander is normally the authority able to invoke ACCOLC. Exceptionally, the Cabinet Office may take this responsibility after consultation with the Lead Government Department. It is important to recognise that this is a two-edged sword: non-registered users, who may nonetheless be important to the emergency in question, may not be so easily contactable once ACCOLC is invoked.

9B14. ACCOLC only affects mobile phones within the incident area designated by the Police. Unregistered phones will receive a 'service unobtainable' or 'service busy' tone. Calls from registered mobile phones within the incident area to locations outside are treated normally once outside the incident area.

Government Telephone Preference Scheme

9B15. Fixed service telephone numbers of essential users can be registered for Government Telephone Preference Scheme (GTPS). The GTPS is available from BT and C&W (and Kingston Communications in the Hull area). Under GTPS all


telephones will still be able to receive calls but a proportion of lines may be designated as retaining an outbound service when others are barred. The designated lines are those assessed as necessary to maintain the life of the community during a civil emergency. Rules for invoking GTPS are similar in principle to those for ACCOLC, and would only come into operation if an intolerable burden were placed on the network.



Emergency Communications Network

9B16. A private switched telephone network, known as the Emergency Communications Network (ECN), provides a robust emergency communication system via dedicated PABX (private automatic branch exchange) switches. It provides links to local authorities, with connections to police and fire headquarters and a number of central government departments.

9B17. The Cabinet Office, where a supervisor maintains the ECN directory, manages the network. The ECN is continuously available and can have a role in support of the PSTN through all stages of traffic overload management. The ECN enables direct access to the PSTN and break-in from the PSTN.

ANNEX 9C – CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR INCIDENTS – DECONTAMINATION PROCESS





Generic Layout of a CBRN Decontamination Area and the Decontamination Process

CHAPTER 10 – TRAINING AND EXERCISE POLICY

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Support to Integrated Emergency Management

1001. Engagement in planning training and exercises in support of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) should reflect the wider principles outlined in this publication. It should:

- a. Be approached as a tri-Service issue.
- b. Take into account the primacy of the civil authorities.
- c. Be realistic - military involvement should include only those tasks or the provision of capabilities that would occur in an actual incident.
- d. Not encourage the belief that the Armed Forces' support will play a greater role in a response than would actually be the case.
- e. Reflect the fact that engagement of the Armed Forces draws in a central government department, due to its command and control structure.
- f. Make it clear that military assistance engages the MOD command and control structure in the wider government crisis management organisation, while Armed Forces' personnel, skills and capabilities are employed in conjunction with, but not part of, that wider structure, remaining under military command throughout.
- g. Reflect the fact that Armed Forces' support will usually be either specialist military (e.g. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Counter Terrorism (CT)) or general duties military support. The support will always reflect military skills and capabilities, not civil expertise,¹ matched to the capability requirement.

1002. Particular care should therefore be taken when addressing exercise programmes that these points are reflected in the civil exercises in which the MOD participates. The fact that the full central-government (i.e. Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)) command structure is not being exercised should at least be understood when participation is agreed, and opportunities to engage the Armed Forces in exercises which involve the COBR structure should be preferred over those that do not. Similarly, exercises that engage a wide range of civil agencies and

¹ For example, most Armed Forces' firefighters are neither qualified nor experienced to the same levels as civilian firefighters.

structures, especially those that reflect the need to prioritise multiple calls on Armed Forces support, should be preferred over those that assume a particular role for the Armed Forces.

1003. In sum, all operations in support of IEM will need to address the balance between the requirements of military operations and IEM support. Training and exercise programmes that do not take these factors into account will only be partially effective.

Central Government Co-ordination

1004. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) has established a cross-governmental department Exercise Working Party (EWP). The EWP meets to liaise and ensure that cross-government IEM exercises are co-ordinated and receive support from all government departments. In addition to MOD UK Operations exercises, the EWP co-ordinates the following IEM exercises:

- a. National Contingency planning exercises, for which Armed Forces' participation will be co-ordinated by the Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) training staff in conjunction with D CT & UK Ops. There are 2 or 3 live-play exercises and 9 regional tabletop exercises each year sponsored by the Home Office.
- b. **Counter Terrorism.** The Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit (TPU) run a series of exercises for which MACP specialist CT capability is often used.
- c. **Lead Government Department.** The Home Secretary has devolved the requirement to conduct contingency planning and exercises to each Lead Government Department (LGD), and it is their responsibility to fund, plan and conduct IEM exercises for the area that they are designated as LGD.²
- d. **Emergency Services.** The emergency services run a series of local exercises to validate major incident plans, the more comprehensive of which may merit military involvement.

SECTION II – MOD UK OPERATIONS TRAINING

1005. In order to ensure that MOD UK Ops training is linked into the EWP and that MOD exercises are co-ordinated, there is an UK Ops Exercise & Training Working Group. This group is responsible to the One Star UK Ops Steering Group for the co-ordination of MOD exercises and in ensuring that the training undertaken covers all aspects of UK Ops.

² See Annex 7A.

1006. The SJC(UK) training staff is responsible for compilation of the tri-Service UK Ops Exercises Grid. D CT & UK Ops will insert the National Exercises discussed at the EWP into this Grid and will liaise with the SJC(UK) staff on the level of Armed Forces' participation in National Exercises.

SECTION III – PARTICIPATION IN INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TRAINING

1007. In all cases the civil authorities will have the lead in co-ordinating and executing IEM training and the MOD will only participate in a supporting role.

1008. MOD personnel should only participate in IEM training if there is a positive training benefit for the individual or the unit, e.g. the provision of temporary shelter and food.

1009. There is no requirement to clear planning staff/Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) participation in IEM table-top exercises.

Exercising on Military Property or Land

1010. IEM training with the emergency services may take place on MOD property and land in order to practice C2 and liaison for major incidents, particularly those that are CT-related.

Exercising on Public Highways and Land

1011. Outside MOD establishments, military support to IEM training in public view should only be in support of National, Government Offices for the Regions (GOR), local authorities or emergency services' sponsored exercises. The chain of command should be kept informed of any approach from civil authorities hoping to include military involvement. All requests must be made in good time through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) procedures to D CT & UK Ops.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear and other Exercises and Training

1012. ACPO(TAM) has agreed that all police forces taking part in CT exercises will notify the Home Office TPU with details of the proposed exercise. This will ensure that such exercises do not duplicate others, and meet basic requirements of organisations, such as formal debrief/learning mechanisms with a link to policy development forums. The TPU keeps records of each exercise, and will issue a unique reference number to police forces which informs all other government departments that the exercise has been notified to TPU for post-exercise learning.

1013. It may be the case that participation in training and exercises for a particular scenario or type of emergency or disaster has particular resonance or has particular

implications. Examples are training and exercising for certain industrial disputes, the response to a specific category of terrorist threat, or a distinct type of natural disaster at a time when the likelihood of such a dispute, threat or disaster is particularly high.

1014. It is essentially a matter for the civil authorities to ensure that the request for the Armed Forces' participation is appropriate in these circumstances and that participation has been properly authorised by the civil command chain. It is also essential that media and other communications strategies are in place to ensure that both the event itself and Armed Forces' participation are properly managed and do not cause undue alarm. This issue should also be addressed as part of any preparations for engagement in civil training and exercises. In the event of uncertainty, guidance should be sought from D CT & UK Ops. It is, in particular, imperative that any MOD involvement in IEM Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) training is approved through the chain of command by D CT & UK Ops.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The reference for the terms and definitions used in this Glossary is indicated in parentheses.

Access Overload Control

The Access Overload Control Scheme gives call preference to registered essential users on the main mobile networks in the UK if the scheme is invoked during a major emergency. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Ambulance Incident Officer

The officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of that service at the scene of a major incident. Works in close liaison with the Medical Incident Officer (MIO) to ensure effective use of the medical and ambulance resources at the scene. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Ambulance Loading Point

An area, preferably hard standing, in close proximity to the Casualty Clearing Station, where ambulances can be manoeuvred and patients placed in ambulances for transfer to hospital. Helicopter landing provision may also be needed. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Ambulance Safety Officer

The officer responsible for monitoring operations and ensuring safety of personnel working under her/his control within the inner cordon at a major incident site. Liaises with safety officers from other emergency services. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Ante Mortem Data

Information obtained from family, friends, etc. about a person who is believed to be among the deceased. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Ante Mortem Team

Officers responsible for liaising with the next of kin on all matters relating to the identification of the deceased. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Bellwin Scheme

Discretionary scheme for providing central government financial assistance in exceptional circumstances to affected local authorities in the event of a major emergency. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Body Holding Area/Body Collection Point

An area close to the scene where the dead can be temporarily held until transfer to the temporary mortuary or mortuary. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Bronze

Operational commander. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*). The command level below the Tactical (Silver) Commander.

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Cascade System

System whereby one person or organisation calls out others who in turn initiate further call-outs as necessary. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Casualty

A person killed or physically or mentally injured in war, accident or civil emergency. For Casualty Bureau purposes, the term encompasses any person involved in an incident, including evacuees. In maritime emergencies, it is also used to refer to a vessel in distress. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Casualty Bureau

Police central contact and information point for all records and data relating to casualties, evacuees and others affected by the incident. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Casualty Clearing Officer

The ambulance officer who, in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer, ensures an efficient patient throughput at the Casualty Clearing Station. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Casualty Clearing Station

An area set up at a major incident by the ambulance service in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing With Disaster'*)

Chemet

A scheme administered by the Meteorological Office, providing information on weather conditions as they affect an incident involving hazardous chemicals. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Civil Contingencies Committee

Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC) of Ministers (chaired normally by the Home Secretary) convened to provide central government oversight of a major emergency. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Civil Contingency Reaction Force

A military force capable of being mobilised at short notice to assist in dealing with a major civil emergency if local civil emergency services and regular forces are unable to cope on their own. (IJD P 02)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat

The Cabinet Office secretariat which provides the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency commitment, co-ordination and co-operation that will enable the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Control of Major Accident Hazards Sites

Industrial sites which are subject to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Command

The authority for an agency to direct the actions of its own resources (both personnel and equipment). (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Co-ordination

The harmonious integration of the expertise of all the agencies involved with the object of effectively and efficiently bringing the incident to a successful conclusion. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Control

The authority to direct strategic and tactical operations in order to complete an assigned function and includes the ability to direct the activities of other agencies engaged in the completion of that function. The control of the assigned function also carries with it a responsibility for the health and safety of those involved. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Controlled Area

The area contained by an Outer Cordon; the area may be divided into geographical sectors. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Control Room

Centre for the control of the movements and activities of each emergency service's personnel and equipment. Liaises with the other services control rooms. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Co-ordinating group

A group comprising the senior representative at the scene of a major incident from each service or agency present. The group is normally chaired by the police and decides on actions to be taken. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Cordon – Inner

Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Cordon – Outer

Seals off a controlled area around an incident to which unauthorised persons are not allowed access. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Crisis Management Team

Personnel brought together under the Chief Executive to manage and co-ordinate the local authority response to an emergency. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Defence Council

The formal legal basis for the conduct of defence in the UK rests on a range of powers vested by statute and Letters Patent in the Defence Council, chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence. The Defence Council is responsible for approving the employment of Armed Forces on MACA tasks. This authority is delegated in certain circumstances (generally during emergencies which threaten life) to local unit commanders in order to speed response. The current composition of the Defence Council is:

The Secretary of State for Defence

Minister of State for the Armed Forces

Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Defence Procurement

Under Secretary of State for Defence and Minister for Veterans

Chief of the Defence Staff

Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff

Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord

Chief of the General Staff

Chief of the Air Staff

Permanent Under Secretary of State

Chief of Defence Procurement

Chief Scientific Adviser

Second Permanent Under Secretary of State

Devolved Administrations

Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly Government and Northern Ireland Executive. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Disaster Victim Identification

The process of collating information about the victim of a disaster to assist in identification. (ACPO Emergency Procedures Manual)

Emergency Centre / Emergency Control Centre

Local authority operations centre from which the management and co-ordination of local authority incident support is carried out. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Emergency Communications Network

A private switched telephone network providing links to local authorities, with connections to police and fire headquarters and a number of central government departments. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Emergency Procedures Information Centre

A central airline information co-ordinating point at Heathrow, managed by British Airways. It collates information about reservations, next of kin and other relevant data, thereby supporting the work of the police casualty bureau and the coroner. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Evacuation Assembly Point

Building or area to which evacuees are directed for transfer/transportation to a reception centre or rest centre. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosives ordnance which has become dangerous by damage or deterioration. (NATO: AAP-6)

Forward Control Point

Each service's command and control facility nearest the scene of the incident – responsible for immediate direction, deployment and security. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Friends and Relatives Reception Centre

Secure area set aside for use and interview of friends and relatives arriving at the scene (or location associated with an incident, such as at an airport or port). Established by the police in consultation with the local authority. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Gold

Strategic commander. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*). The command level above the Tactical (Silver) commander.

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Hospital Documentation Team

Team of police officers responsible for completing police casualty record cards in hospitals. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Hospital Friends and Relatives Reception Centre

An assembly point at a receiving hospital where friends and relatives can be received and arrangements made for their special needs. The receiving hospital is responsible for establishing the centre. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Identification Commission

Group representing all aspects of the identification process which is set up to consider and determine the identity of the deceased to the satisfaction of HM Coroner. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Incident Control Point/Post

The point from which each of the emergency services tactical managers can control their services' response to a land-based incident. Together, the incident control points form the focal point for co-ordinating all activities on site; also referred to as 'Silver control'. In London, incident control points are grouped together to form the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC). (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Incident Officer

An officer at the scene who commands the tactical response of his/her respective service. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Inner Cordon

Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Integrated Emergency Management

An approach to preventing and managing emergencies that entails five key activities – assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Investigating agencies

Those organisations that are legally empowered to investigate the cause of an accident (Air Accident Investigation Branch, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, HSE, etc.). (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Joint Emergency Services Control Centre

A grouping of **incident control points** (see above) – used in London. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Joint Regional Liaison Officer

An officer appointed to each Army Regional Brigade who is responsible for leading tri-Service liaison with local authorities, emergency services and other agencies involved in emergency planning. (IJDP 02)

Joint Service Co-ordination Group

The formal military focus for civil/military and tri-Service liaison within an Army Regional Brigade’s area. (IJDP 02)

Lead Government Department

Department which, in the event of a major emergency, co-ordinates central government activity. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Local Emergency Centre

Purpose-designed and equipped control centre for the co-ordination of the response to a nuclear emergency emanating from a civil nuclear power station. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Major Disaster Advisory Team

A police service team available at short notice to give advice on certain aspects of major incident management. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Major Incident

In Integrated Emergency Management any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services, the NHS or the local authority for:

- a. The initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties.
- b. The involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people.
- c. The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media, usually to the police.

- d. The need for the large-scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services.
- e. The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations, e.g. local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people.

(‘*Association of Chief Police Officers Emergency Procedures Manual*’ and the ‘*Fire Service Major Incident Emergency Procedures Manual*’)

In addition, for specific NHS purposes, a major incident may be defined as ‘Any occurrence which presents a serious threat to the health of the community, disruption to the service, or causes (or is likely to cause) such numbers or types of casualties as to require special arrangements to be implemented by hospitals, ambulance services or health authorities.’ (Cabinet Office: ‘*Dealing with Disaster*’)

Major Incident Control Room

Established in protracted emergencies to co-ordinate the overall response, deal with ongoing resource and logistical requirements and provide facilities for senior command functions; often referred to as ‘Gold Control’. (Cabinet Office: ‘*Dealing with Disaster*’)

Major Incident Procedures

Pre-planned and exercised procedures which are activated once a major incident has been declared. (Cabinet Office: ‘*Dealing with Disaster*’)

Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre

HM Coastguard regional centre responsible for promoting the efficient organisation of search and rescue services and for co-ordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations within a search and rescue region. (Cabinet Office: ‘*Dealing with Disaster*’)

Maritime Rescue Sub Centre

HM Coastguard unit subordinate to a rescue co-ordination centre and established to complement the latter. (Cabinet Office: ‘*Dealing with Disaster*’)

Marshalling Area

Area to which resources and personnel not immediately required at the scene or being held for further use can be directed to standby. (Cabinet Office: ‘*Dealing with Disaster*’)

Media Centre/Media Briefing Centre

Central location for media enquiries, providing communication, conference and monitoring facilities, interview and briefing, access to responding organisation personnel and staffed by spokespersons from all the principal services/organisations responding. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Media Liaison Officer

Representative who has responsibility for liaising with the media on behalf of his/her organisation. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Media Liaison Point

An area adjacent to the scene which is designated for the reception and accreditation of media personnel for briefing on arrangements for reporting, filming and photographing, staffed by media liaison officers from appropriate services. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Medical Incident Officer

Medical officer with overall responsibility (in close liaison with the ambulance incident officer) for the management of medical resources at the scene of a major incident. He/she should not be a member of a mobile medical team. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Military Aid to other Government Departments

Assistance provided by the Armed services on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community. (IJDP 02)

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

The collective term given to the three types of operations which may take place in a civilian environment, i.e. MACC, MACP and MAGD *see associated entries*. (JWP 0-01.1)

Military Aid to the Civil Community

The provision of unarmed military assistance to the country at large: in time of emergency such as natural disasters and major emergencies; to provide more routine assistance for special projects or events of significant social value to the civil community in the creation and development of local community projects; and of individual assistance by full-time attachment to social service or similar organisations. (IJDP 02)

Military Aid to the Civil Power

The provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power. (IJDP 02)

Military Home Defence

The military activities required to preserve the functions of government and to protect essential national infrastructure in times of crisis and war. (JWP 0-01.1)

Military Support to the Mounting of Operations The planning for and the deployment, supporting and recovery of military operations outside the UK. (IJDP 02)

Mutual Aid Arrangements

Cross-boundary arrangements under which emergency services, local authorities and other organisations request extra staff and/or equipment for use in a disaster. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre

An interdepartmental organisation created to co-ordinate and develop existing work within government departments and agencies and organisations in the private sector to defend the critical national infrastructure (core IT services that need to be protected) against electronic attack. (NISCC website)

Operational level (Bronze)

The operational level of management reflects the normal day-to-day arrangements for responding to smaller scale emergencies. It is the level at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Outer Cordon

Seals off a controlled area around an incident into which unauthorised persons are not allowed access. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Overall Incident Commander (Gold)

The designated senior officer in charge of the police response who normally co-ordinates the strategic roles of all the emergency services and other organisations involved. (Cabinet Office: *‘Dealing with Disaster’*)

Post Mortem Data

Information obtained from the post mortem examination process. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)

National radiation monitoring and nuclear emergency response system set up as part of the National Response Plan after the Chernobyl accident. (Defra website)

RAYNET

Radio Amateurs Emergency Network. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Reception Arrangements for Military Patients

The NHS plans for the allocation of military patients to NHS hospitals following their repatriation. (IJDP 02)

Rescue Co-ordination Centre

An organisation responsible for co-ordinating and controlling the conduct of Search and Rescue Operations within a Search and Rescue Region. (JWP 3-66)

Receiving Hospital(s)

Any hospital selected by the ambulance service from those designated by health authorities to receive casualties in the event of a major incident. (Cabinet Office: *Dealing With Disaster*)

Regional Civil Contingency Committee

A regional committee formed to co-ordinate the regional response to an event which completely overwhelmed local responders or which had an impact over a wide area. (ODPM website)

Regional Co-ordination Unit

The RCU is the ODPM co-ordinating body for all the Government Offices for the Regions. (ODPM website)

Regional Nominated Co-ordinator

A nominated official responsible for the co-ordination of activities under emergency regulations following application of the Civil Contingencies Act. (*Civil Contingencies Act 2004*)

Regional Resilience Forums

Regular regional meetings intended to bring together the key players, including central government agencies and the Armed Forces, and representatives of local responders including the emergency services and local authorities. (*ODPM web site*)

Regional Resilience Teams

Teams established at the Government Offices for the Regions to co-ordinate resilience activities across their areas and act as a bridge between local responders and central government. (*ODPM website*)

Rendezvous Point

Point to which all resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue and deployment. In protracted large-scale incidents, there may be a need for more than one rendezvous point. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Resilience

The ability at every relevant level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to handle and recover from disruptive challenges. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Rest Centre

Building designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees, with overnight facilities if necessary. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Search and Rescue

Operations for locating and retrieving persons in distress, providing for their immediate needs and delivering them to a place of safety. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Search and Rescue Region

A specific geographical area within which Search and Rescue operations are conducted and controlled by a Rescue Co-ordination Centre. (MCA: *Search and Rescue Framework Document*)

Senior Identification Manager

A police officer appointed by the senior police officer to manage and co-ordinate all aspects concerning the identification of victims in support of the Coroner/procurator Fiscal. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Senior Investigating Officer

The senior detective officer appointed by the senior police officer to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Silver

Tactical commander. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*). The command level above the Operational (Bronze) Commander and below the Strategic (Gold) Commander.

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Statutory Services

Those services whose responsibilities are laid down in law: police, fire, ambulance and coastguard services, local authorities, etc. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Strategic-Co-ordinating Group

A group comprising senior officers of appropriate organisations which aims to achieve effective interagency co-ordination at strategic level. This group should normally be located away from the immediate scene. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Strategic Level (Gold)

A strategic level of management that establishes a policy and overall management framework within which tactical managers will work. It establishes strategic objectives and aims to ensure long-term resourcing/expertise. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*).

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Survivor Reception Centre

Secure area set up by local authority to which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Tactical Level (Silver)

A tactical level of management provides overall management of the response to an emergency. Tactical managers determine priorities in allocating resources, obtain further resources as required, and plan and co-ordinate when tasks will be undertaken. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Note: Contrary to traditional military definitions, the Operational (Bronze) level lies below the Tactical (Silver) level, and the Strategic (Gold) level is not at central government; usually it is at County/Unitary Authority level.

Temporary Mortuary

Facility accessible from a disaster area designated for temporary use as a mortuary and adapted for post mortem examinations to take place. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Territorial Departments

The Scotland Office, Northern Ireland Office and Wales Office. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Triage

Process of assessment and allocation of priorities by the medical or ambulance staff at the site or casualty clearing station prior to evacuation. Triage may be repeated at intervals and on arrival at a receiving hospital. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Urban Search and Rescue

Search and rescue activities carried out on and within collapsed structures (as opposed to those in the open air). (Cabinet Office: Resilience website)

Utilities

Companies providing essential services e.g. gas, water, electricity, telephones. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Voluntary Aid Societies

St John Ambulance, St Andrew's Ambulance and British Red Cross Society. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

Welfare Co-ordination Team

A team normally co-ordinated by the appropriate local authority social services director or deputy to look after the longer term welfare needs of those affected by disaster. The team may include representatives from other local authority departments, police, faith organisations and appropriate voluntary organisations. (Cabinet Office: *'Dealing with Disaster'*)

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AAIB | Air Accident Investigation Board |
| ACCOLC | Access Overload Control Scheme |
| ACPO | Association of Chief Police Officers |
| ACPO(TAM) | Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters) |
| ACPO(S) | Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland |
| AIO | Ambulance Incident Officer |
| APA | Association of Police Authorities |
| APCM | Aircraft Post Crash Management |
| ARAD | Agriculture and Rural Affairs Department (Welsh Assembly) |
| ARCC | Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre |
| ASA | Ambulance Services Association |
| ATCC | Air Traffic Control Centre |
| | |
| BCRC | British Cave Rescue Council |
| BCU | Basic Command Unit |
| BFL | British Fishery Limits |
| BNFL | British Nuclear Fuels Ltd |
| BRT | Brigade Reinforcement Team |
| BSFO | British Sea Fishery Officer |
| BTP | British Transport Police |
| | |
| CFOA | Chief Fire Officers' Association |
| CBRN | Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear |
| CCRF | Civil Contingency Reaction Force |
| CEA | Campaign Effectiveness Analysis |
| CINCFLEET | Commander in Chief Fleet |
| CMD | Conventional Munitions Disposal |
| CMO | Chief Medical Officer |
| CCC | Civil Contingencies Committee |
| CCRF | Civil Contingencies Reaction Force |
| CCS | Civil Contingencies Secretariat |
| CFBAC | Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council |
| CFOA | Chief Fire Officers Association |
| COBR | Cabinet Office Briefing Room |
| COMAH | Control of Major Accident Hazards |
| CPT | Contingency Planning Team |
| CRF | Commander Regional Forces |
| CT | Counter Terrorism |

| | |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| D & D | Distress and Diversion |
| DA | Devolved Administration |
| DAFNI | Department of Agriculture and Fisheries Northern Ireland |
| DARDNI | Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland |
| DCDS(C) | Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) |
| DCMO | Defence Crisis Management Organisation |
| DCMS | Department of Culture, Media and Sport |
| D CT& UK Ops | Directorate Counter Terrorism and UK Operations |
| Defra | Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs |
| DfES | Department for Education and Science |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DfT | Department for Transport |
| DoH | Department of Health |
| DOP(IT) | Defence and Overseas Policy (Sub-committee on International Terrorism) |
| DTI | Department for Trade and Industry |
| DWP | Department for Work and Pensions |
| EA | Environment Agency |
| ECN | Emergency Communications Network |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| EPIC | Emergency Procedures Information Centre |
| ETV | Emergency Towing Vessel |
| FCO | Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
| FCP | Forward Control Point |
| FSA | Food Standards Agency |
| GCHQ | Government Communications Headquarters |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| GLT | Government Liaison Team |
| GMDSS | Global Maritime Distress and Safety System |
| GNN | Government News Network |
| GOR | Government Offices for the Regions |
| GTPS | Government Telephone Preference System |
| HAZMAT | Hazardous Material |
| HMC&E | HM Customs and Excise |
| HEMS | Helicopter Emergency Medical Service |
| HMIC | Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary |
| HMICS | HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland |

| | |
|---------|----------------------------------------------|
| HPA | Health Protection Agency |
| HQ LAND | Head Quarters Land Command |
| HQ STC | Head Quarters Strike Command |
| HSE | Health and Safety Executive |
| ICP | Incident Control Point |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IEDD | Improvised Explosive Device Disposal |
| IEM | Integrated Emergency Management |
| JESCC | Joint Emergency Services Control Centre |
| JCP | Joint Contingency Plan |
| JHAC | Joint Health Advisory Cell |
| JHC | Joint Helicopter Command |
| JIG | Joint Intelligence Group |
| JLP | Joint Logistic Plan |
| JOP | Joint Operational Plan |
| JPG | Joint Planning Guide |
| JRLO | Joint Regional Liaison Officer |
| JSCG | Joint Service Co-ordination Group |
| JSEODOC | Joint Service EOD Operations Centre |
| JTAC | Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre |
| Jt Comd | Joint Commander |
| LEC | Local Emergency Centre |
| LESLP | London Emergency Services Liaison Panel |
| LGD | Lead Government Department |
| LOC | Line(s) of Communications |
| LRF | Local Resilience Forum |
| MACA | Military Aid to the Civil Authorities |
| MACC | Military Aid to the Civil Community |
| MACP | Military Aid to the Civil Power |
| MAGD | Military Aid to other Government Departments |
| MAIB | Marine Accident Investigation Board |
| MCA | Maritime and Coastguard Agency |
| MCT | Maritime Counter Terrorism |
| MDAT | Major Disaster Advisory Team |
| MDP | Ministry of Defence Police |
| MEDEVAC | Medical Evacuation |
| MEF | Media Emergency Forum |
| MIO | Medical Incident Officer |
| MRC | Mountain Rescue Council of England and Wales |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| MRCC | Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre |
| MRC of S | Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland |
| MRSC | Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre |
| MRT | Mountain Rescue Team |
| MT | Military Task |
| | |
| NARO | Nuclear Accident Response Organisation |
| NBC | Naval Base Commander |
| NCIS | National Criminal Intelligence Service |
| NCS | National Crime Squad |
| NIO | Northern Ireland Office |
| NISCC | National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre |
| NRO | Naval Regional Officer |
| NRPB | National Radiological Protection Board |
| NVASEC | National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee |
| | |
| ODPM | Office of the Deputy Prime Minister |
| ODSec | Defence & Overseas Secretariat |
| OEI | Offshore Energy Installation |
| OGD | Other Government Department(s) |
| | |
| PCB | Police Casualty Bureau |
| PCT | Primary Care Trust |
| PITO | Police Information Technology Organisation |
| PJHQ | Permanent Joint Headquarters |
| PMLO | Police Military Liaison Officer |
| PNICC | Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre |
| POL | Petrol, Oil and Lubricants |
| PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |
| | |
| RAFRLO | RAF Regional Liaison Officer |
| RAYNET | Radio Amateurs Emergency Network |
| RCC | Rescue Co-ordination Centre |
| RCCC | Regional Civil Contingency Committee |
| RCDM | Royal Centre for Defence Medicine |
| RCU | Regional Co-ordination Unit |
| RIMNET | Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network |
| RNC | Regional Nominated Co-ordinator |
| RNLI | Royal National Lifeboat Institution |
| RRF | Regional Resilience Forum |
| RRT | Regional Resilience Teams |

| | |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SARDA | Search and Rescue Dog Association |
| SCFBAC | Scottish Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council |
| SCC | Strategic Co-ordination Centre (formerly Police Main Base Station) |
| SCG | Strategic-Co-ordinating Group |
| SE | Scottish Executive |
| SECC | Scottish Emergency Co-ordinating Committee |
| SEDD | Scottish Executive Development Department |
| SEETLLD | Scottish Executive, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department |
| SEERAD | Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department |
| SEFCSD | Scottish Executive Finance and Central Services Department |
| SEJD | Scottish Executive Justice Department |
| SEPA | Scottish Environment Protection Agency |
| SFPA | Scottish Fishery Protection Agency |
| SHA | Strategic Health Authority |
| SIM | Senior Identification Manager |
| SIO | Senior Investigating Officer |
| SJC(UK) | Standing Joint Commander (UK) |
| SOSREP | Secretary of State's Representative |
| SRR | Search and Rescue Region |
| TIDO(H) | Terrorism International and Domestic Officials Committee (Home) |
| TIDO(R) | Terrorism International and Domestic Officials Committee (Resilience) |
| TLAP | Training and Logistics Assistance to the Civil Police |
| TPU | Terrorism Protection Unit (Home Office) |
| UKAEA | United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority |
| UKAEAC | United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary |
| UKFSSART | United Kingdom Fire Service Search and Rescue Team |
| US&R | Urban Search and Rescue |
| VAS | Voluntary Aid Societies |
| WAG | Welsh Assembly Government |

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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¹ As at 19 Oct 04.

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Police

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Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/hmic.htm
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/Police/15403/2058
Ministry of Defence police www.mod.uk/mdp
National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre www.niscc.gov.uk
Police (links to regional services) www.police.uk
Police Federation of England and Wales www.polfed.org
Police Federation for Northern Ireland www.policefed-ni.org.uk

Police Information Technology Organisation www.pito.org.uk
 Scottish Police College www.tulliallan.police.uk
 UK Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary www.ukaea.org.uk/ukaeac

Ambulance Service

Ambulance Services Association www.asa.uk.net

Health Service

British Association for Immediate Care (BASICS) www.basics.org.uk
 NHS Emergency preparedness division www.doh.gov.uk/PolicyAndGuidance/EmergencyPlanning/fs/en
 NHS Scotland Emergency Planning www.show.scot.nhs.uk/emergencyplanning/

Fire Service

CFOA www.fire-uk.org
 Firelink www.firelink.org.uk/cms.cgi/site/
 Fire Service College www.fireservicecollege.ac.uk
 UKFSSART www.ukfssart.org.uk

Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Air Accident Investigation Branch www.aaib.dft.gov.uk
 Marine Accident Investigation Branch www.maib.dft.gov.uk
 MCA website www.mcga.gov.uk

Environment/Public Health Protection

Chartered Institute Of Environmental Health www.cieh.org.uk
 Environment Agency www.environment-agency.gov.uk
 Floodline (Environment Agency) www.environment-agency.gov.uk/subjects/flood/
 Health Protection Agency www.hpa.org.uk
 Health and Safety Executive www.hse.gov.uk
 HSE Hazardous Installations Directorate www.hse.gov.uk/hid
 HSE Nuclear Safety Inspectorate www.hse.gov.uk/nsd
 HSE Railway Inspectorate www.hse.gov.uk/railways
 Meteorological Office www.metoffice.gov.uk
 National Radiological Protection Board www.nrpb.org
 NIE Dept of Agriculture and Rural Development www.dardni.gov.uk
 NIE Dept of the Environment, Environment and Heritage Service www.ehsni.gov.uk
 Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/radioact/radrimnet.htm
 Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health www.show.scot.nhs.uk/scieh
 Scottish Environment Protection Agency www.sepa.org.uk

Voluntary Organisations

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| British Red Cross | www.redcross.org.uk |
| Disaster Action | www.disasteraction.org.uk |
| First Aid Nursing Yeomanry | www.fany.org.uk |
| Missions to Seafarers | www.missionstoseamen.org |
| Mountain Rescue | www.mountain.rescue.org.uk |
| Mountain Rescue Committee of Scotland | www.mrc-scotland.org.uk |
| Radio Amateurs Emergency Network | www.raynet-uk.net |
| RNLI | www.rnli.org.uk |
| St Andrew's Ambulance Association | www.firstaid.org.uk |
| St John Ambulance | www.sja.org.uk |
| St John Ambulance Wales | www.stjohnwales.co.uk |
| The Samaritans | www.samaritans.org |
| Victim Support | www.victimsupport.com |
| Women's Royal Voluntary Service | www.wrvs.org.uk |

Media

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| Media Emergency Forum and Regional Media Forum | www.ukresilience.info/mef/mef1.pdf |
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Academia

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|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Crisis Research Centre, Leiden University | www.cot.nl |
| Disaster Research Centre , Delaware University | www.udel.edu/DRC |
| Disaster and Emergency Management on the Internet | www.keele.ac.uk/depts/por/disaster.htm |
| European Crisis Management Academy | www.ecm-academy.nl |
| Gender and Disaster Network | www.anglia.ac.uk/geography/gdn |
| Institute of Civil Defence and Disaster Studies | www.icdds.org |
| International Disaster Information Centre | www.disaster.net |
| International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters | www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/ijmed |
| Internet Journal of Rescue and Disaster Medicine | www.ispub.com/journals/ijrdm.htm |
| Natural Hazards Centre | www.colorado.edu/hazards |
| Task Force on Potentially Hazardous Near Earth Objects | www.nearearthobjects.co.uk |
| Tornado and Storm Research Organisation | www.torro.org.uk |
| World Institute for Disaster Risk Management | www.drmonline.net |

Related websites

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| American Society of Professional Emergency Planners | www.aspep.org |
| Bureau Enquete-Accidents | www.bea-fr.org/anglaise/ |
| Disaster Central | www.disaster-central.com |
| Disaster Help (FEMA) | www.disasterhelp.gov |
| Disaster Information | www.disasters.au.com |

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| EMGold (Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response Association – USA) | www.disasters.org/emgold |
| Emergency Management Australia | www.ema.gov.au |
| Emergency Preparedness Canada | www.epc-pcc.gc.ca |
| European Commission, Civil Protection | www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/civil/index.htm |
| Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA) | www.fema.gov |
| Federal Emergency Management Agency library | www.lrc.fema.gov |
| Federation Nationale de Protection Civile (Fr) | www.protection-civile.org (in French) |
| Medecins Sans Frontieres | www.msf.org |
| National Homeland Security Knowledgebase | www.twotigersonline.com/resources.html |
| National Transportation Safety Board (USA) | www.nts.gov |
| New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence | www.mocd.govt.nz |
| Ready Gov (US) | www.ready.gov |
| Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief REDR (Charity) (International Disasters) | www.redr.org |
| Survive: The Business Continuity Group | www.survive.com |
| Technical Rescue (magazine) | www.t-rescue.com |
| UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs | www.reliefweb.int |

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