

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2005

TO: BISMULLAH, HAJI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BISMULLAH, HAJI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee has been a Taliban member for six years.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a Deputy Commander for Rozei Khan, a Taliban Commander, during his time of command in combat.

2. The detainee worked for Abdul Wahed on the terrorist team.

3. The 40-man unit is part of the Taliban and supported by al Qaida. The supreme commander of the unit is Haji Raes Adul Wahed.

4. The detainee provided some tactical information for the 40-man unit and used a short-range radio and a long-range satellite telephone to communicate.

5. In response to United States' requests for information against Fidayan Islam, Fidayan Islam leaders directed the detainee to find and kill the local Afghans that are helping the Americans.

6. Fidayan Islam is the combined effort of Hezb-e-Islami and active Taliban.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BISMULLAH, HAJI

7. The detainee traveled the streets of Gereshk at night asking questions about the Americans and those who spoke to them. The detainee was hoping that a show of force would scare people into providing information that would lead to those helping United States Forces.

8. The detainee was an associate of Dost Mohammad. Dost Mohammad had planned a rocket attack against the United States military base in Deh Rawhud, Afghanistan in mid-August 2002.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. As Chief of Transportation, the detainee was issued a permit allowing him to carry a driver's license, use a mobile phone and weapon. The detainee was also given a vehicle and two weapons.

2. During August 2002, the detainee and two other former Taliban officials traveled to Pakistan with the objective of acquiring a sedan type vehicle for use in a car bomb attack against the United States military base in Deh Rawhud, Afghanistan.

3. Activity by United States Special Force teams in Gereshk, Afghanistan was monitored by Afghan military on duty at checkpoints throughout the city. United States Special Force activity, no matter how trivial, was immediately reported to the detainee. The detainee then called his insurgent counterparts via radio notifying them that the Americans were coming and warning them that they should hide.

4. The detainee passed reports of United States Special Forces activity to Sher Mohammad. Mohammad followed a similar reporting pattern to that of the detainee, alerting his insurgent counterparts by satellite phone.

5. The detainee was captured on 12 February 2003 at the Forward Operating Base in Gereshk, Afghanistan near the Afghanistan Department of Transportation Office.

6. On the morning of the detainee's capture guards woke him up and told him that someone came by to tell him that the Americans were holding some of the governor's brother's people outside for carrying weapons without permits.

7. The detainee approached the United States soldiers and told them that he knew these people as Dost Mohammed's soldiers and that they were authorized to carry weapons even though they didn't have their permits with them.

8. The United States soldiers asked the detainee to come back to base to answer more questions about the alleged Dost Mohammed soldiers.

9. The American forces took the detainee's satellite phone and moved him to the detention facility in Kandahar the next morning.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BISMULLAH, HAJI**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee did not participate in jihad against the Russians.
  - b. The detainee has no knowledge of Taliban in his region.
  - c. The detainee considers himself a friend of the United States and would not do anything to damage this relationship.
  
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 September 2005

TO: YAR, KUSHKY

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAR, KUSHKY

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that unknown personnel approached him, gave him a Rocket Propelled Grenade launcher and told him that he was part of an ambush against the Americans. He took the Rocket Propelled Grenade launcher. When the detainee learned the Americans were on the way, he threw the Rocket Propelled Grenade launcher in a well and hid in the hole.

2. The detainee and another individual, upon further questioning, admitted to being part of the ambush, but they were scared and threw their weapons down a well and hid in the hole.

3. The detainee was about to get on his tractor when the capturing unit detained him.

4. The detainee denied hearing about the planned attacks and warnings to clear the village due to the suspected arrival of the Americans.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee and another were both apprehended wearing Olive Drab (OD) Green jackets, consistent with the eyewitness accounts of the individuals responsible for the attacks.

2. The detainee claims no personal knowledge of Abdul Wahid or his relationship with the Taliban. The detainee claims that everything he knows about Wahid is common knowledge among the people of Bahgran district.

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**c. Other Relevant Data**

1. The detainee claimed that he was driving a tractor with another individual when they heard gunfire in the distance.
2. The detainee stated that he and the other individual saw United States military vehicles approaching. He further stated that the linguist working for the United States had previously told him that he should stay clear of the soldiers and to stay out of their way.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee claimed that he was on his way to the bazaar to buy rice, and a filter and oil for his tractor. He was in the company of another individual.
  - b. The detainee stated that while the other individual was wearing an OD green jacket, he was not. The detainee also denied knowing that these OD jackets were part of the uniform of Taliban fighters.
  - c. According to the other individual, everyone wears these types of jackets. He also claimed that he and the detainee never used a weapon.
  - d. The detainee denied any knowledge/involvement in the attacks on United States Forces and has maintained this story since his first interrogation. He also denied the report detailing his admission to United States Forces that he hid weapons in the well and stated he did not have a weapon with him at the time of his arrest.
  - e. The detainee denied ever admitting to any United States personnel that he was a Taliban fighter.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 August 2005

TO: MOHAMMED, ALIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, ALIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was inducted into the Militia about 22 years ago. He used an RPG, Kalashnikov, and machine gun, to fight as a mujahadin for over two months before he escaped.

2. After escaping from the Militia, the detainee met and worked with Mullah Nasim as a mujahadin for about two and a half months. The detainee and the other individuals in his group went from house to house collecting Kalashnikov's and ammunition.

3. Mullah Nasim was the former Director of Transportation for the Bamian Province, Afghanistan during the Taliban Regime.

4. Mullah Nasim was employed by the commander (Ramatullah) of the Afghan National Army 865th Brigade. He was also a member of the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-E Islami (HIG).

5. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar as a faction of the Hizb-I Islamic party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahadin groups in the war against the Soviets. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and sent mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. HIG has long established ties with Bin Laden. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Laden after he fled Sudan in 1996.

6. The detainee left Mullah Nasim's group and returned to Baghran to fight as a mujahadin for eight years. He had an RPG and four individuals under him.

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7. The detainee then spent two years working with Mullah Karim Akhound as a mujahadin.

### b. Training

1. The detainee was trained by the Militia for about two and one half months, during which time he was taught to use a Kalashnikov.

2. Detainee confirmed that he fought against the Russians in jihad for ten years.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was assessed to have been the Military/Security Commander or Chief for the Wahid Compound. The detainee indicated extensive knowledge of the compound and local Taliban leadership.

2. Abdul Wahid was identified as the district chief of Baghran during the Taliban reign.

3. Abdul Rais Wahid is a Mullah who dominates the Baghran Valley region. He is closely linked to the governor of Helmand Province, Shir Mohammed. Abdul Wahid supports, and is supported by the Taliban, HIG and foreign al Qaida.

4. Abdul Wahid planned to hold a meeting for Taliban leaders at his compound. The meeting was planned to be held under cover of darkness. Attendees were to arrive in inconspicuous vehicles and there were to be at least 100 security personnel operating around the meeting location.

5. Shir Mohammed is a member of the insurgent leadership infrastructure. The intent of the insurgents is to conduct assaults on U.S. and coalition forces.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. On the morning of 10 February 2003, U.S. elements approached the Wahid stronghold of Lejay Village and were ambushed from the high ground on both sides of the road. The U.S. Forces also received fire from positions in and around Lejay.

2. The detainee was captured on 10 February 2003 on the Wahid Compound in Lejay, AF.

3. The detainee was found hiding in a culvert on the Wahid Compound. The detainee had a freshly fired AK in his possession, three loaded magazines and a vest. He was wearing an OD green jacket like those worn by individuals captured on the north side of Lejay that morning.

4. The detainee had 3,000 rupees in his possession when he was captured.

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5. It is believed that the detainee received a telephone call alert and orchestrated the ambush on U.S. Forces.

6. The enemy insurgent's families had departed the villages around Lejay and moved to the south, prior to the U.S. arrival. Nearly all male fighters remained to delay/disrupt the U.S. Forces' advance toward Baghran.

7. Lejay is part of a region which has provided a continuous safe-haven to hostile Taliban Forces which provide Command and Control (C2) nodes, supplies, guerrillas, training and staging areas. It is also a financial source through its opium and heroin production.

8. Insurgents in and around Lejay are intent on the preemptive destruction of U.S. Forces in order to resist the reduction of the Taliban-based power structure.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. According to the detainee, he was captured after bathing in the river/spring near his house. He said he only had some hashish, matches, and a bar of soap with him at the time.

b. The detainee was not captured with a cell phone.

c. The detainee does not know how to use a phone and said that phones did not work in the area due to the terrain.

d. The detainee claims not to know any al Qaida or Taliban senior leaders and has no knowledge of terrorist activities in the area since the Russians left.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 August 2005

TO: BULLAR, MOHI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BULLAR, MOHI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was captured on 22 Feb 2003, when he fired on United States Security Forces, while they were conducting a search of a location containing land mines at Atburdah Village, Tirin Kowt District, Oruzgan Province.

2. The detainee was part of the firefight. He was prepositioned and hid out of sight. He fired with intent to kill or harm United States forces and friendly Afghans.

3. The detainee initially maintained he did not have a gun with him and did not hear gunfire or any noises. Then he stated that he thought someone was firing on his house, so he fired three gunshots into the air to scare them away. Later he admitted that he fired the bullets in the same direction that his neighbor Haji Gul Mohammed shot his bullets. He shot toward the people that were firing at Haji Gul Mohammed.

4. The United States Security Forces witnessed the detainee firing.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as working for Mullah Shokoor in Konduz. Mullah Shokoor was part of the main security escort for Usama Bin Ladin during the time when Kabul, Afghanistan fell into U.S. hands.

2. The detainee knows of Mullah Ghafur, the man whose compound was the target of the United States Security Forces search that evening. The detainee described Ghafur as being "with

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BULLAR, MOHI**

the Taliban" during the movement's rule, however, he doesn't know about his activities now. Ghafur was arrested in Kabul at some point.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee is an admitted opium farmer and dealer.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. He said he told lies in Kabul and in Bagram, and realized that lies were not going to get him home to take care of his wife and one-month-old son. He said he would no longer lie.

b. The detainee reiterated that he has no animosity toward the Americans.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 October 2005

TO: KARIM, BOSTAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. During the Russian/Afghan war, while he was a refugee in Miram Shah, Pakistan, the detainee served with the Mujahideen based in Pakistan.

2. The detainee is said to be an Afghan al Qaida member residing in Khowst and the planner for their attacks in the region.

3. Prior to his arrest, the detainee traveled in Afghanistan and Pakistan to recruit for the Tablighi. On this trip the detainee claimed that he was the Amir of the group of Tablighis.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claimed that he is a shopkeeper and a Tablighi.

2. The detainee is said to have stored mines at his residence and to have had direct communication with Arab al Qaida members operating out of Peshawar.

3. The detainee is believed to be a leader of an Afghan al Qaida cell in Khowst Province, Afghanistan.

4. A raid was conducted on the home of the detainee's associate. The raid netted several active anti-tank mines and empty mine shells with explosives removed.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN**

5. An associate believes the detainee may have belonged to one of the warlord groups in Khowst.

6. Another associate of the detainee described the detainee as a religious person, not a Taliban member but definitely a friend of the Taliban.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee is said to have told several people that he was preparing to conduct command-detonated mine attacks against U.S. Forces. Shortly after this threat, U.S. Forces discovered and destroyed in place two apparently command-detonated, probably plastic shelled, anti-tank mines that had been placed in holes on a highway in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee is said to have asked an associate to store some land mines at his home.

3. The detainee is said to have passed information to an associate on how to detonate mines.

4. The detainee promised to pay an associate if he planted mines.

5. The detainee was apprehended because he matched the description of an al Qaida bomb cell leader and had a Thuraya phone.

6. The detainee's palms were significantly scarred and the burn patterns were consistent with something bursting or exploding while being held.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. An associate of the detainee said that he had no knowledge of the detainee being associated with the Taliban or al Qaida and he had no knowledge of the detainee being involved with explosives.

b. A family member of the detainee claims the detainee has had scars on his hands since before the family member was born.

c. The detainee claims an associate gave him the cell phone while going through a police checkpoint.

d. One of the detainee's accusers has recanted his story about the detainee giving him mines. The accuser now claims the detainee did not give him mines, but that the person who previously resided in the house left the mines at his residence. He also says the detainee did not pass him information on how to detonate mines.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN**

e. An accuser of the detainee has since recanted his statement about the detainee's connections to anti-tank mines and now claims the detainee was not connected to setting anti-tank mines.

f. The detainee adamantly denied ever giving his associate anti-tank mines.

g. The detainee denied having any other associations to al Qaida or Taliban members or their whereabouts. The detainee stated that the al Qaida and Taliban are "lost."

h. An associate of the detainee said the detainee was not associated with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 September 2005

TO: WAZIR, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAZIR, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee was arrested with Bostan Karim for trying to pass a satellite telephone to Karim. The Pakistani police saw him and both were taken off the bus they were traveling on.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he has known Karim for four to five years. The detainee stated he met Karim while attending Jamat Tabligh religious training.
2. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
3. Karim visited a family who was sympathetic with al Qaida and the former Taliban regime. He was preparing to conduct command-detonated mine attacks against United States forces in revenge for the detention of family members.
4. Karim was observed trying to recruit for the Jamat Tabligh and asked an individual to store landmines at his home. Karim also drew some schematics on how to detonate the mines.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was carrying 2,700 United States Dollars, 3,600 Pakistani rupees and 70,000 Afghani rupees. He stated he was going to use the 2,700 United States Dollars to purchase stock for his business.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAZIR, ABDULLAH**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he and his brother used the satellite phone for the tire and battery business.

b. The detainee passed the satellite telephone to Karim because the detainee believed that the Pakistani police would ask for a bribe if they saw the satellite telephone, and he did not want to pay the bribe.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO: NASRAT YAR, HIZTULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRAT YAR, HIZTULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee admitted he had met Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in 1995 and saw him again in 1996 when Gulbuddin Hekmatyar came to the Sarobi region of Afghanistan to settle matters regarding land disputes.

2. The detainee admitted that he and his father were both Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin commanders from 1988 to 1996.

3. It was reported that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar stayed at the detainee's residence in Sarobi in November 2002.

4. The detainee attended a meeting in December 2002 with Taliban and Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin officials to discuss the operation of a training camp.

5. The detainee was one of the main contacts for two Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin leaders in their efforts to conduct underground activities to rally and arm villagers for attacks against Coalition Forces.

6. The detainee was identified as shipping weapons to Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin elements in the Parajan region of Afghanistan.

7. The detainee has fought with the Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The detainee has switched sides several times and claims his loyalty is for the Afghan people and not a particular regime.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRAT YAR, HIZTULLAH**

8. The detainee's arrest put most Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin attack plans on hold.
9. The detainee's brother held a secret meeting with five Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin commanders to plan ambushes on Coalition Forces to capture prisoners.
  - b. Other Relevant Data
    1. The detainee was captured at his compound on 1 March 2003. He was detained because of his suspected links to Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin and to rocket attacks against a foreign government agency.
    2. The detainee admitted he had four rocket launchers, 77 Kalashnikovs, three or four machine guns and several different weapons stored in his home.
  4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
    - a. The detainee stated that the Americans and United Nations support the Afghan Government and the Afghan people have to build their country the way others have been built. The detainee stated that the people under his command understand this and they are pro-American.
    - b. The detainee stated that he was hired to provide security against Taliban and al Qaida fighters and terrorists.
    - c. The detainee stated that he had instructed his personnel to give up their weapons only to the Karzai government or to American Forces.
    - d. The detainee stated he would oppose any Taliban, al Qaida or other terrorists entering his area.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 July 2005

TO: GHALIB, HAJI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHALIB, HAJI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Three potentially incriminating letters are associated with the detainee.
2. Letter one alleges detainee had prior knowledge of and failed to stop production of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's).
3. Letter one appears to have been written after the detainee's arrest because it refers to him as the "previous security commander." The detainee was the security commander until his arrest.
4. Letter two was written on Mullah Mohammed Omar's official letterhead regarding a meeting and agreement that the detainee and Malawi Ahmed Jan reached. The author is unknown.
5. Letter three was addressed to the Nangarhar intelligence department and "all Taliban members." It identifies the detainee and urges all recipients to offer as much help to him as possible.

b. Connections/Associations

Detainee identified Jan as the Taliban Minister of Mines and Industry. The detainee and others ambushed Jan and a group of Taliban, took Jan prisoner and beat him. Jan was released to the Pakistan government because it intervened.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHALIB, HAJI

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee fought in the Russian jihad as a commander for nearly fifteen years. After the jihad, the detainee served as the Deputy of Refugee Affairs in Jalalabad.

2. During the Taliban era, the detainee fought the Taliban. The Taliban captured the detainee and held him for nearly two months.

3. The detainee was confined for a short time in his hometown until several Taliban came in and beat him until he lost consciousness.

4. The Taliban released the detainee after village elders spoke on his behalf. He was exiled from Afghanistan when he was released.

5. The detainee returned to Afghanistan and fought alongside the Americans during the assault on Tora Bora.

6. After the fighting ended, the detainee was appointed as commander of security for Shinwar District. The detainee remained as the security commander until his capture.

7. Two months prior to his arrest, the detainee and the district commissioner discovered weapons stored in two locations, within and next door to a judge's office.

8. Detainee claims he notified the governor, the military head office and the intelligence office in Jalalabad but never received a response from anyone.

9. Mid February 2003, United States Security Forces (USSF) came to collect the weapons cache from the district governor. The detainee says he was in Kabul and did not inform the USSF of the existence of the IED's.

10. The detainee was captured on 26 February 2003 while at his security compound.

11. When informed that explosives were discovered behind the courthouse the detainee admitted he was aware of the ammunition but knew nothing of explosives. The detainee was arrested and taken to jail in Jalalabad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee characterizes two letters as forgeries. He said that the letter on Mullah Omar's letterhead was written by his enemies in an attempt to destroy his reputation.

b. The detainee claims that Haji Jabar, author of letter one is a liar and does not know why he would prepare a sworn statement against him.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHALIB, HAJI**

c. The detainee said that many HIG members in his province are causing trouble. He does not support the operations of the HIG as they preach resistance to disarmament.

d. The detainee denies having any explosive devices or planning any attacks against the Americans.

e. Even while confined, the detainee still considers himself a part of the government and is concerned with how stability could be achieved.

f. The detainee characterizes the Americans as his friends and the primary reason that he was able to return to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 October 2005

TO: KHAIL, HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIL, HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. In mid February 2002, al Qaida fighters in the Paktia province, Afghanistan, were providing payments of 3,000 United States Dollars to the detainee. The payments were intended to ensure that the detainee provided support to al Qaida and facilitate the departure of al Qaida family members from Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was identified as a military commander, leading a 12-man unit of former Taliban and al Qaida members who were planning to attack U.S. and Afghani Transitional Administration facilities using Guerilla warfare techniques in September 2002.

3. The detainee claimed that he was never in any military service and never received any military training but he did fight against the Russians. He also stated that he participated in several fights under the command of Niaz Ghul, a village elected commander. The detainee also stated that the district commander was a man named Momein.

4. The detainee released three-suspected al Qaida without investigation.

5. The detainee held a meeting at his residence in Menzi in Zormat with an extremist cell leader.

6. The detainee distributed arms for an ambush against his replacement. The detainee also gave out money to those who agreed to fight on his behalf. The detainee issued weapons to volunteers including RPG's, Kalashnikov's and at least one "ZK-1" anti-aircraft gun.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIL, HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ**

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother was identified as a senior lieutenant for a former Taliban Commander.
  2. The detainee's brother has a well-known car dealership in Zormat, where he also keeps an arsenal including AK-47s, RPGs and IEDs.
  3. The detainee was identified as being the Commander of Samoud Khan.
  4. Samoud Khan is a known Anti-Coalition Militia member.
  5. The detainee's telephone number and name was associated with a Taliban cell.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he does not know why the Americans detained him, and that he had helped them in the past by giving them information about al Qaida.
  - b. The detainee denied leading a 12-man unit of former al Qaida and Taliban in planning an attack on coalition forces.
  - c. The detainee stated "I don't like al Qaida, I don't like its name, and I don't like him, (Usama Bin Laden), and it's up to you to accept it or not."
  - d. The detainee denied having any military training.
  - e. The detainee denied knowing anything about Samoud Khan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2005

TO: MATIN, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MATIN, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee began working for the Taliban approximately one and a half to two months after the Taliban captured Mazar-e Sharif. He obtained his position from Sharifuddin who was the Chief of the Taliban Intelligence Department in Mazar-e Sharif at that time.

2. The detainee was the Deputy Chief of the Estakbarat (Taliban Intelligence Service) in Mazar-e-Sharif.

b. Other Relevant Data

As a prisoner at the Shebergan prison, the detainee was considered to be a threat based on what Jonbesh-e Milli Intelligence considered hard-line al Qaida and Taliban sentiments and a demonstrated ability to carry out threats. Jonbesh-e Milli Intelligence ran the Shebergan prison and was responsible for intelligence on its detainees.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he didn't hate Americans, he just wished to be released and to be given a specific time he will leave Cuba.

b. The detainee stated he came back to Afghanistan to look after some property and was not connected with anybody.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MATIN, ABDUL**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 Jun 2005

To: AHMED, SHABIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, SHABIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was the Commandant of Sheberghan village in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee admitted supporting the Taliban.
3. The detainee admitted to executing two men and one woman while acting as the Director of Security for the Taliban in Sheberghan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is considered to be a loyal member to the Taliban and has suspected ties to al Qaida and Mullah Omar
2. A Taliban Governor was a childhood friend of the detainee and helped the detainee obtain his job.
3. The detainee could not explain why he was offered the position, but stated that his friend the Governor may have talked with Mullah Omar in order to get him the job.
4. The detainee also stated he assumed the Director of Security position at the behest of another Taliban Governor.

c. Intent

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## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, SHABIR

1. The detainee stated he commanded 40 men armed with AK-47 rifles.
  2. After the war with the Americans began, the detainee turned himself into the locals, in order to avoid fighting with fellow Afghans.
  3. The detainee has also stated that he turned himself in to General Dostum.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. The detainee took the security chief position because he felt that his hometown region was going to be taken over by the Taliban and he wanted to be in their good graces.
  2. The detainee had possession of a Casio watch. This watch model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist groups with improvised explosive devices.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee related that if he were released, he would like to return to Afghanistan and get married. The detainee stated he would attempt to find work to support his family, possibly as a farmer.
  - b. The detainee stated he did not have any issues with Americans or the United States Government. The detainee was happy that Americans are helping to rebuild Afghanistan and he had no intentions of impeding the rebuilding process.
  - c. The detainee stated he had never heard of al Qaida until after the attacks on 11 September 2001. He did not find it acceptable for anyone to kill another person, whether they are Muslim, Christian or Jewish. The detainee does not wish to be involved in fighting.
  - d. The detainee stated he would not agree to join al Qaeda or any other extremist group upon his release. If the Imam of the mosque were to issue a fatwah against the United States, he would not follow it.
  - e. The detainee stated he never personally met Mullah Omar.
  - f. The detainee said he did not agree with many of the Taliban practices. The detainee said he was afraid of the Taliban, but happy they were able to institute rule of law.
  - g. The detainee claimed to have no information about a training camp, supposedly run by Usama Bin Laden, which was located outside Shebergan.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, SHABIR**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 November 2005

TO: SADIQI, ABDUL HALIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SADIQI, ABDUL HALIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to the Karachi consulate and obtained a visa.

2. The visa only took a day and a night.

3. The detainee was given a letter in a sealed envelope to give to the Kabul office of Jaishe-E-Mohammed. This letter would allow for his brother's release.

4. On 23 September 2001, the detainee legally crossed the border from Chaman to Spin Boldak on a Pakistani passport with an Afghanistan visa.

5. The detainee traveled to Kandahar. From Kandahar, the detainee went to an office in Kabul where he was told where his brother was in Konduz. The detainee took a flight from Kabul to Konduz on Iriyana Airlines.

6. Al Qaida and Taliban members used Iriyana Airlines to travel to different areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

7. The detainee traveled to Dashte Archi, where his brother was located.

8. The detainee's network of madrassas gave him easy access to organize and communicate with al Qaida members and sympathizers and develop new al Qaida recruits.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SADIQI, ABDUL HALIM

9. The detainee claimed that his organization had the ability to organize as many as 2,000 men to join in a Jihad against United States and Coalition Forces.

10. The detainee returned to Pakistan and assembled a force that consisted largely of Pakistanis but also included 300 Arab al Qaida operatives.

11. In the fall of 2001, during the fighting in Afghanistan, the detainee took this force on to Spin Boldak, Afghanistan. This was done by the order of an Arab al Qaida logistics officer.

12. In Spin Boldak, the detainee joined forces with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Commander Juma Namangani who had several hundred men of his own.

13. The detainee and Namangani traveled north to Takhar Province, Afghanistan, where they combined with other forces and began fighting against the Northern Alliance.

14. Not long after the fighting began in Takhar, the detainee and a significant portion of his force traveled to Konduz where the forces proved too strong, and the detainee and 400 of his men were eventually captured.

#### b. Training

The detainee's brother once taught him how to assemble and disassemble a Kalashnikov.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met and began cooperation with an Arab al Qaida logistics officer. This logistics officer was an assistant to Usama bin Laden.

2. In 2001, the logistics officer invited the detainee to attend the wedding of one of Usama bin Laden's children in Kandahar, Afghanistan. At the wedding, the logistics officer tasked the detainee with using his madrassas to recruit 2,000 fighters.

3. The detainee said he received permission to retrieve his brother from the local Taliban office in Pakistan. He claimed his brother received training at the Jaishe-E-Mohammed training camp for about one month prior to his departure.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied attending Usama bin Laden's son's wedding in Kandahar and denied knowing or associating with the Arab logistics officer.

b. The detainee denies knowing anything about al Qaida, the Taliban or madrassas in Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SADIQI, ABDUL HALIM**

c. The detainee denies knowing or associating with Mullah Omar or any Taliban or al Qaida personnel.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

14 November 2005

TO: SOHAIL, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SOHAIL, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee provided the names of security personnel assigned to the Karzai protection detail to a man who was associated with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

2. The detainee took photographs of an American camp in Kabul. He allowed the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin member to take them from the detainee's car.

3. The computer disk was given to the security subcontractor. The detainee believes he is associated with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

b. Connections/Associations

Three men identified the detainee as a source for a high level member of an anti-American terrorist organization, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claims that he provided information to an anti-American terrorist organization because he was told that if he did not cooperate, his family would be killed.

2. The detainee was aware of a possible plan to attack U.S. and Afghan forces.

3. The detainee applied for a visa to the United States under a false name.

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000504

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SOHAIL, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA**

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee claims that the confession regarding him providing classified information is false and coerced.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 August 2005

TO: KHAN, HAJI NASRAT

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, HAJI NASRAT

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee's son admitted that he and his father fought with the Taliban.

2. Detainee was captured by United States Forces with 700 weapons, including small arms and rockets.

3. Detainee was captured with letters addressed to him and from him although he claims to be uneducated and illiterate.

b. Training

Detainee claims he served in the Afghani army in the late 1950's or 1960's. Detainee claims he only served as an infantryman for approximately two years and only received small arms training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Detainee was a Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin commander.

2. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded HIG. Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama Bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, HAJI NASRAT**

3. Detainee was a village leader in an area controlled by the Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).
  4. Detainee claims he only met Gulbuddin Hekmatyar once.
  5. Reporting states Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin members were planning to kidnap United States Personnel on the Kabul to Jalalabad road between the Sorobi, Kabul province, Afghanistan and Jalalabad, Nangrahar province, Afghanistan to exchange for a captured Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin commander.
  6. Further reporting states Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin wanted to kidnap United States military personnel from Bagram Airfield.
  7. Detainee claims Engineer Wasil was his son's commander.
  8. Reporting states Wasil is a known member of the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin.
  9. Reporting further states Wasil is not supportive of the United States, and believes the United States should not be in Afghanistan.
  10. Detainee's son is a commander in the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin.
  11. Detainee's son admitted to having a weapons cache in his residence in the region of Surubee.
  12. Reporting states Detainee's son has links to al Qaida, Taliban and Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin which led to his son's arrest.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. Detainee claims he retired as the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin fifteen years ago when his health began to fail.
  - b. Detainee stated he did not know anything about the weapons found in the residence he was captured in.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: SHAH, NAHIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAH, NAHIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. Due to a financial dispute with an enemy of the family, the detainee claims the individual made false accusations to military authorities claiming that he was in possession of weapons at his home.

2. The detainee was identified as a Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin, member who possibly held the rank of Deputy Commander. There were a large number of weapons in the compound in which he was captured.

3. The detainee became angry when accused of having a connection with someone who was in the Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin or someone who was considered a terrorist.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's route of egress from Afghanistan is as follows: the detainee traveled from Tagab to Kabul to Kandahar and then to Quetta, Pakistan. From Quetta, he traveled to the Taftan area of the Iranian-Pakistani border region.

2. Joint military personnel entered the detainee's home and began a search for contraband items. He was told that weapons had been found in his house but he countered that they were actually found at his brother's house.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAH, NAHIR**

3. After the detainee was seized, he recanted his original story regarding the ownership of the weapons found at his house. He admitted that only two of the weapons were found at this house. One weapon was a Kalashnikov and the other was a British weapon.

4. During this later recant, the detainee stated that the two weapons were used for bird hunting and went on to say that any additional weapons may be the property of his brother and that if there were any weapons, they were acquired from a Mujahideen that was associated with his brother.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee insisted that he had been wrongly accused and implicated with the weapons.
- b. The detainee has denied ever being associated with the Hizb-l Islami Gulbuddin or knowing somebody who was.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20-364-0095

TO: MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that he wanted to travel as Tabligh to get to Europe, and then planned to request political asylum when he got to Europe.
    2. The Jama'at al-Tabligh is a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for actions by Islamic extremists.
    3. The detainee bribed a guard at the embassy to get a visa to Pakistan, telling them that he was Tabligh.
    4. The detainee traveled with 1,500 U.S. Dollars, 15,000 Pakistani Riyals, and 2,000 Yemeni Riyals.
    5. The detainee said that he paid a Pakistani to smuggle him to Europe.
    6. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan and then on to Lahore, Pakistan. From there he traveled to Mashhad, Iran and Tehran, Iran, where he was arrested.
    7. The detainee lived at the Tabligh's headquarters building in Lahore for two and a half months.
    8. A senior al Qaida lieutenant recognized the detainee from a photo.

UNCLASSIFIED

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM**

9. The detainee was identified as an old "junior" al Qaida member who had been around for some time.

10. The detainee was seen at al Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan.

**b. Other Relevant Data**

The detainee's name appeared on a list of 254 Arab nationals who were deported or repatriated from Iran as suspected al Qaida or Taliban members in roughly the December 2001-February 2002 timeframe.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. While staying at the Tabligh Center, the detainee states that he declined recruitment to do missionary work and instead spent his time and money seeking passage to Europe.

b. The detainee stated that he had opportunities to escape from custody in Afghanistan when he was escorted to five different jails, but he didn't try because he is innocent and trying to escape would have made things worse.

c. The detainee states that he is innocent, has told the truth, and has never been involved with anything criminal, and this could be verified with his government.

d. The detainee claims not to have had any military training and not to have met any individuals involved with al Qaida during the period of his detention in Iran or Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2005

TO: HUWARI, SOUFIAN ABAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUWARI, SOUFIAN ABAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Training
    1. The detainee was trained by the Algerian Army on how use hand grenades and the Kalashnikov and Seminov rifles.
    2. The detainee held a maritime crewmember's license and at one time he was working toward a master mariner license.
  - b. Connections/Associations
    1. In March 1998 the detainee was arrested by a Foreign Government service for his association with a known terrorist.
    2. The detainee lived in Georgia with Chechen fighters and their families.
    3. The detainee was acquainted with an al Qaida operative who lived in a Georgian guesthouse.
    4. The detainee knew the Chechen leader named Gelayev.
    5. The detainee was captured with an Algerian jihadist active in Chechnya and Georgia.
    6. The detainee was captured on a bridge approximately 50 miles from where he lived.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUWARI, SOUFIAN ABAR**

## c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee used a forged bank receipt to obtain a visa to travel to Italy. He purchased a round trip ticket to Italy but didn't use the return portion.
2. When he was in Europe the detainee used two false identifications from France and Italy with different names on them.
3. The detainee wore normal clothing to facilitate traveling between France and Italy without appropriate papers.
4. The detainee was arrested in Germany for crossing the border without appropriate papers. The detainee was deported to France and from France he was deported to Algeria.
5. The detainee traveled from Turkey to Georgia without appropriate papers. A Chechen man met the detainee at the airport in Georgia and provided him with travel documents.
6. The detainee admitted to fighting against the Russians in Chechnya. He is a member of the Chechen jihad and a suspected member of the Zarqawi network.
7. The detainee stated the Spanish bombings happened because the Spanish did not remove their troops from Iraq. The detainee feels the Spanish brought it on themselves.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said that the Jews are behind the ongoing war, and that they want the Christians to help them fight the Muslims. Once the Muslims are defeated, the detainee predicts that the Jews will turn against the Christians. The detainee also said that the Jews have taken over Germany and the United States, are working on Europe and the rest of the world and they are seeking power through their hidden agenda.
2. The detainee was jailed for 45 days in 1986 for stabbing a girlfriend and stealing jewelry from her.
3. The detainee said that when he lived in Europe he sold and used marijuana, hashish and cocaine and robbed tourists for money.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied participating in fighting in Chechnya and stated he had no role in activities within Afghanistan or America.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUWARI, SOUFIAN ABAR**

b. The detainee stated he has no interest in the ideas of Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida and he could not be persuaded to join their cause.

c. The detainee stated he has never been to Afghanistan or to a Zarqawi training camp.

d. The detainee claims that he did not see any fake passports in Duisi.

e. The detainee declined the Chechen leader Gelayev's offer to fight with them against the Russians.

f. Despite living with Chechen fighters the detainee stated he did not fight against the Russians.

g. The detainee claimed that he refused his friend's encouragement to fight the Jihad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 September 2005

TO: AL RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED  
ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. One year before the detainee was arrested, his uncle convinced him to dedicate himself to Islam. His uncle scared him by telling him about heaven and hell. He attended various mosques after that.

2. After the detainee's religious awakening, the detainee performed Dawa for three months in Sanaa, Yemen. He attended the Dawa mosques in Sanaa and Hededa as well as the al Hada and Bar mosques.

3. During Ramadan of 2001 a Chechen named Solieman took the detainee to the house of Hamza Ghulaiev in Omalo, Georgia. Solieman took the detainee there after learning he was interested in becoming involved in the plight of Chechens.

4. After watching a film that depicted Muslims in Chechnya being killed by Russian troops, the detainee decided he wanted to go to Chechnya and fight against the Russians.

b. Training

1. The detainee was at Ghulaiev's house in Omalo, Georgia on three occasions for weapons training. The first time the detainee was at the house Ghulaiev provided him with training on handguns, AK-47 and an unknown type of small crew-served weapon. This training was done for thirty minutes per day over a three-day period.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED ALI**

2. The detainee received weapons training at the al Khair Camp, a private training camp in Qargha.

3. The detainee trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was fighting in Chechnya prior to September 11, 2001.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was believed to have been a member of Abu Malik's Jamaat, while in Pankisi Gorge.

2. The detainee was a member of a suicide paratrooper unit that was known as a "Kamikaze unit", under the leadership of Shamil Basayev and Ibn al Khattab.

3. After the detainee received training in Afghanistan, he went to Georgia by way of Istanbul, Turkey. While in Georgia he fought in Chechnya with Ibn al Khattab.

4. The detainee witnessed the ambush that killed Ibn al Khattab.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was fine before he began practicing Islam. His problems began afterwards. He did stop dealing drugs and chasing women after his religious awakening, but since then it has caused him problems and he no longer wants to follow Islam.

2. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Turkey and then on to Georgia to conduct Dawa using a legitimate passport in his true name. He traveled at the suggestion of his uncle, Abdul Rahman, using 10,000 United States dollars in cash, which his uncle gave to him.

3. The detainee spent a month at Wadi Valley receiving teaching on how to give support to Chechnya refugees and then traveled to Wadi Esefahan.

4. The detainee began Dawa there, but fell ill and was transported by helicopter back to Wadi Bankish where he was treated and recovered in a week. Once he recovered, he returned to Dawa.

5. The detainee was captured in a violent road ambush by Georgia Security Forces in Duisi, Georgia on 28 April 2002.

6. The detainee was captured with two explosive detonators in his possession.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED ALI**

a. The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or ever hearing of al Qaida until he was a prisoner here.

b. The detainee said he had nothing against Americans.

c. The detainee insists he never heard the word terrorism and never heard of al Qaida before his arrest.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2005

TO: COMMANDER CHAMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF COMMANDER CHAMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. While in the Badaber Refugee camp the detainee joined the Islamic religious party of Mulawe Mohammed Nabi.

2. The detainee fought as a member of the Mulawe Mohammed Nabi party all through the Russian occupation. For the first few years of the fighting, the detainee was a simple soldier, but after a few years he became a commander of about 15 fighters.

3. The detainee joined Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin for 6 months as a commander in mid 1990 when Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin was fighting Ahmmad Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance.

4. The detainee is a Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin field general.

b. Training

The detainee traveled with other men to the Trareemanqat area of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border and learned to shoot a bolt-action five shot rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a personal friend of Hekmatyr Gulbuddin and last met with Gulbuddin in Kabul, Afghanistan when Gulbuddin was Afghanistan's vice president.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF COMMANDER CHAMAN

2. The detainee is the assistant of Kashmir Khan who is subordinate only to Gulbuddin Hekmatyr in the HIG.

3. The detainee, Qalam, and Zardad are three Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin members that worked as intelligence collectors with direct communication with Hekmatyr.

4. The detainee, Almas, Qalam, and Salangi are all well known associates that are heavily involved in the drug trade and other illegal activities in Kabul. A source stated that Commander Almas is responsible for over 1,000 murders as a Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin leader.

5. The chief of police in Kabul, AF has strong ties with weapons and drug smuggling activities. The detainee and Qalam are major players in these operations.

6. In the beginning of 1991 the detainee was accepted into the Northern Alliance and instructed to remain in the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin and remain in Surubay in order to report Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin activities, movements and operations.

7. The detainee was given money in exchange for information on Hekmatyr.

8. The detainee attended a meeting between members of al Qaida, Taliban and the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin in Peshawar, Pakistan.

9. The detainee visited Major Mast Gul in Muzafferabad, PK on numerous occasions.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee, Qalam and Zardad were operating in Kabul and collecting information about the Afghan government and possibly United States forces.

2. The detainee, Qalam and Zardad set up checkpoints on the main road between Jalalabad and Kabul. At the checkpoints they would stop and search cars, steal items of merchandise they wanted and demand money from the drivers. If the drivers did not have money or refused to pay they were beaten. One of the checkpoints was called "Chaman Hotel" because it was near a hotel owned by the detainee.

3. The detainee and Qalam were given explosives along with instructions for placing them along a route on 16 February 2003 by an important Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin member. They planned to organize attacks on vehicles used by foreigners on the road from Kabul to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee worked as an intelligence informant for the Afghanistan information ministry. The detainee was offered a job collecting information due to his personal relationships with Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin and Taliban commanders.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF COMMANDER CHAMAN

5. While employed with the Information Ministry, the detainee was tasked with collecting information about Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin commanders in various Afghanistan districts.

6. A three-month campaign was fought against the Taliban/al Qaida forces in the Shaheekut, Gardiz area of Afghanistan during the spring of 2002. The detainee commanded a unit of approximately 40 soldiers and held the rank of brigade general.

7. The detainee claims to have earned a famous reputation from experience gained fighting in the Soviet/Afghanistan jihad. He boasted 20 total years of experience, 12 years against the Soviets, five years against the Taliban and one year against the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin.

8. The detainee was hired by an American contractor through a sub-contractor (Esko) to guard shipments of equipment on a route between Herat and Kabul.

9. In December 2002 an American contractor corporation employee provide the detainee with a list of named Afghan security element personnel. The list included weapon serial numbers.

10. The detainee intended to place a bomb at Camp Serenity at Pol-e-Charkhi during the upcoming grand opening ceremony for the radio network station at Camp Serenity. The main target for this attack was President Karzai, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan and other high-ranking Afghani officials.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee is thankful the United States went to Afghanistan because different tribes and Arabs had taken over the country. He hopes the United States stays long enough to stop the tribal wars.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 July 2005

TO: GHAFAR, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. A road pass filed with the Consulate General of Pakistan gave Haji Abdul Ghafar permission to travel to Pakistan for multiple visits with Haji Abdul Satar.
    2. The detainee is suspected of being Haji Satar's bodyguard and driver. It is believed that Haji Satar led a group of Taliban Forces and instructed them to kill westerners in Afghanistan.
    3. Mullah Satar was a leader on the ground of the group who killed the International Committee of the Red Cross worker. He was a top commander in Northern Afghanistan under the Taliban.
    4. The detainee claims he was sleeping when his wife and mother woke him to check on helicopters hovering overhead.
    5. The detainee ran from U.S. Forces and was found hiding in a creek bed away from his home.
    6. The detainee claims the attack happened approximately six hours away from his village.
    7. The detainee claims that he heard about a Red Cross employee being killed and he heard that Satar was the killer.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL**

### b. Connections/Associations

1. An American non-governmental worker obtained information stating that a group of sixty men attacked the International Committee of the Red Cross. The group's leaders included Abdul Hakim and Gut Mullah Satar.

2. Abdul Hakim issued fatwabs calling for jihad against the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

3. Abdul Hakim delivered speeches in Shah Wali Kot in an attempt to rouse the people to action against the United States and the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA). He also hoarded weapons and ammunition.

4. A Pashtu letter found in Afghanistan in May 2002 mentioned the detainee's name and a person named Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund as being connected with the International Committee of the Red Cross murder.

5. Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund is a Taliban facilitator and commander of approximately thirty people and is engaging in anti-United States and anti-Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan activities.

6. Abdul Hakim may be a Hezb-e Islami associate who traveled from Quetta, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan to recruit personnel to fight against U.S. forces.

7. The Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

8. Haji Satar had been killed by U.S. forces, but he was implicated in the March, 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker.

9. The group of International Committee of the Red Cross attackers consisted of Taliban and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin personnel.

10. The leaders of the International Committee of the Red Cross attackers stayed in caves in Takht Ghar, which are in the mountains in the Shah Wali Kot district.

11. The detainee resides in the Shah Wali Kot district.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee may have hidden a satellite phone belonging to Satar just before detainment. The phone was never found despite extensive searches.

2. The detainee had a Thuraaya satellite phone.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL**

3. The detainee has a history of harassing guards.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee claimed he didn't know any details about the murder.
  - b. The detainee claims his innocence and that he doesn't know Satar.
  - c. The detainee claims that he's not a Taliban or al Qaida supporter and doesn't know anyone actively involved.
  - d. The detainee claims that he was not aware of any other incidents regarding U.S. Forces being fired upon by anyone in the area.
  - e. The detainee swears to God that he has never fired a rifle.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO: JAN, SADA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, SADA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was a sub-commander during the Russian jihad.
    2. The detainee was a former Taliban Governor for the Village of Narang.
    3. The detainee was involved in the mob takeover of the Konar Province Governor's Office.
    4. The detainee attended a meeting to appoint senior government positions in Konar Province. The detainee stated all appointed personnel were affiliated with the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin terrorist organization.
    5. The detainee was a bodyguard for Haji Jan Dad Khan, the Governor of Konar Province.
    6. The detainee was Pashat District Manager. His office managed security for the District of Pashat. The transfer of weapons occurred within the detainee's office. The security forces within his office had weapons including machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47's and small radios.
    7. The detainee was referred to as commander in a letter addressed to him requesting a receipt for a transfer of weapons from his office to another.
    8. The detainee was involved in transporting missiles and had knowledge of attacks on the Asadabad Mission Support Site.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, SADA**

9. The detainee was responsible for rocket attacks on the Asadabad Mission Support Site.
10. The detainee reportedly took rockets into the house of a Taliban Commander.
11. At the time of the detainee's capture, numerous documents were found in his house that implicated him as being Taliban. Other items found in the detainee's house included document making items, items for making improvised explosives, Arabic instructional materials, Taliban cards and documents, Taliban hand stamps and affiliated documents and a report with information about military posts.
12. The detainee had a Jamiaat-e-Dawa al Qurani Wasounah/Islamic Emirate passport for security officers with his name on it. He also had multiple blank copies of passports.
13. At the time of the detainee's capture, two documents were found in the detainee's house listing the detainee as a camp commander.
14. At the time of the detainee's capture, signed promotion orders were found in the detainee's house that promoted him to the rank of colonel.
15. At the time of the detainee's capture, a letter was found in the detainee's house stating the detainee had 28 people with weapons that he wanted to send to Jan Dad Khan.
16. At the time of the detainee's capture, a list of 36 names was found in the detainee's house stating the detainee was their commander. The list had the detainee's personal seal at the bottom.
17. The detainee signed a document stating he had 120 former Khalis individuals plus weapons.
18. The detainee stated that he had a shoulder-fired rocket and several other weapons in his house along with loaded magazines for each weapon. The detainee stated that he hid the rocket in the foothills near his house.
19. The detainee was a member of Jamat-e-Daawa al Quran Walsuna and had several related pamphlets and books.
20. The detainee knows details of the chain of command for a branch of the Hizbi-I Islami Gulbuddin terrorist organization.
21. The detainee knows complicated details about opium and lumber smuggling operations from the Konar Province, Afghanistan to Pakistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, SADA**

b. Training

The detainee knows how to fire a AK-47 and a shoulder-fired rocket. The detainee fired these types of weapons during the Russian jihad.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was given his job of Pashat District Manager because of his close relationship with his former commander.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee served as a lieutenant in the Northern Alliance military when Rabanni was president.

b. The detainee stated that he hates the Taliban and was loyal to the current Karzai government.

c. If released, the detainee wants to return to his job with the government.

d. The detainee stated he used to work for the Afghani government and he approves of the American involvement in Afghanistan.

e. The detainee stated he knows the Americans are helping Afghanistan.

f. The detainee stated he is pleased with American involvement in Afghanistan.

g. The detainee considers the Taliban to be oppressors who have contributed to a poor situation in Afghanistan.

h. The detainee stated Usama Bin Laden is not from Afghanistan and he does not believe what he says.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2005

TO: MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is a professed member of Ittihad-E-Islami (a.k.a. Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan)

2. The detainee is a former Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel of the Mujahidin campaign against the Soviets and later against the Taliban.

3. The detainee admitted to attending a meeting with known Hezbi-E-Islami Gulbuddin members in the past.

4. The detainee stated he worked with Hikmatyar during the time of the Soviets, when all of the Afghani warlords worked together to get rid of the Russians.

b. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee was conscripted into military service for one year.

2. The detainee fought in the Jihad against the Russians.

3. The detainee obtained a job with the Rabbani government as a border patrol [company commander] under the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior had various missions to include intelligence, policing, traffic control and border patrol.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR**

4. Under the Ministry of Interior, the detainee was again given a leadership position. The detainee held the rank of Colonel and was in control of a company of approximately 80-100 infantrymen.

5. The detainee worked for the Ministry of Interior for approximately 18 months. Shortly after he left, the Taliban took control of his company and arrested many of his men.

6. In or about 1997, the detainee left Pakistan to fight with the Alliance in Panjshir. The detainee fought for approximately three years in many battles in which the alliance was defeated.

7. The detainee and his cousin rented a place for six months in Gardez, until they ran out of money and moved into a tribal house.

8. The detainee states he had only been in that tribal house for approximately two days prior to his arrest. The detainee was taken into custody by United States Forces.

9. The detainee was one of three local nationals detained on 4 May 2003 and identified as Hezbi-E-Islami Gulbuddin operatives trained in the Logar district for attacks against United States Forces.

10. The detainee stated he was recruiting personnel for the Afghani Armed Forces at the time of his capture.

11. The detainee advised that in approximately a month he would have been reportedly promoted to Toran General. President Hamid Karzai reportedly approved of this promotion.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was not a Hezbi-E-Islami Gulbuddin Commander and he didn't have a Hezbi-E-Islami Gulbuddin identification card on his person when he was arrested.

b. The detainee denied knowing about documents on Taliban and Hezbi-E-Islami letterhead, which were retrieved from the housing compound in which he was captured.

c. The detainee told interviewers where he would get information for the United States, how he would convey it to the Americans and how the Americans could task him with assignments.

d. The detainee states he has not fought against or assisted anyone else who fought against any United States Forces.

e. The detainee states he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.

## UNCLASSIFIED

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### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR**

f. The detainee states he is glad the United States is helping the Afghans and believes that if the United States occupation ends then the Taliban and al Qaida will return.

g. When asked his feelings about 9/11, the detainee stated it is against Islamic belief to kill innocent people and to commit suicide.

h. If released, the detainee wants to work for his country in any job with the government, such as working as a police officer. He would like to return to Kabul, Afghanistan because security is good and there are good educational opportunities for his children.

i. The detainee denied working with a foreign government agency, stating it would shame him and his country.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 September 2005

TO: NAZARGUL CHAMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAZARGUL CHAMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was captured with an identified long-time Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) member.

2. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977. It was one of the major mujahedin groups fighting the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. He pioneered sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts.

b. Detainee Actions and Statements

In April 2003, the detainee moved from Pakistan to Gardez, Afghanistan, to work as a security guard at a fuel depot. The guards also manned vehicle checkpoints on the road from Khost, Afghanistan, to Gardez, Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured 5 May 2003 in a suspected HIG safehouse.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any association with Taliban, HIG, or any other terror groups. He also denied ever being contacted for recruitment to any type organization.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAZARGUL CHAMAN**

b. The detainee stated his only reason for coming to Afghanistan was to work for the Karzai government.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO: RAZAK, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAK, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed he fought against the Russian-backed Afghanistan Governments of Noor Mohammed Taraki, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal in the Kandahar area beginning in the late 1970's.

2. The detainee said that he had stopped fighting and began to work in commerce at the time Najibullah was president of Afghanistan. When the Taliban later gained control, Taliban Commander Hezatullah asked the detainee to join with the Taliban.

3. As the Taliban Minister of Commerce, the detainee oversaw a fleet of 1700 trucks and shipping vehicles.

4. The detainee tried to say that he was not the Minister of Commerce but was instead a secretary or assistant to the Minister of Commerce. This is contrary to information the detainee has reported numerous times before.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Mullah Omar called a meeting in Kandahar. During this meeting the detainee argued for a single tax option that would be fairer for businessmen. The detainee stated that Omar ended up using his suggestions.

2. In 1999, Omar asked the detainee to be the Taliban Minister of Commerce.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAK, ABDUL

3. The detainee was able to provide detailed information concerning the relationship between the Taliban Minister of Interior and the Taliban Regional Governors. Taliban Supreme Commander Mullah Omar appointed the Taliban Regional Governors.

4. In the spring of 2003, Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Usama bin Laden agreed to unite their forces.

5. The detainee reported that the Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin was the only group he was aware of that may have an active role in attacks on United States interests.

6. Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

7. Mullah Omar named Mullah Beradar as a military leader. Beradar was the former Taliban Kabul Corps Commander who served as advisor to the former Taliban Defense Minister.

8. The detainee, the former Taliban Minister of Commerce, and Mullah Dadullah were appointed as Beradar's deputies.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. At the time of the Coalition attacks on Kabul, the detainee communicated with other members of the Taliban government using a digital satellite phone.

2. The detainee was identified as one of three Taliban commanders responsible for the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross employee on 27 March 2003.

3. According to eyewitnesses, the men who captured an Ecuadorian Red Cross aid worker, Ricardo Munguia, called Mullah Dadullah on their satellite phone and under Dadullah's orders, shot Munguia dead.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to being the Minister of Commerce in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee said he wanted to go back to what he was doing before he was appointed to that position, which was private finance, such as trading of oil or fruit.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAK, ABDUL**

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 August 2005

TO: KAMIN, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMIN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a local Taliban cell leader.

2. The detainee traveled in February 2003 from Khowst, Afghanistan to Naurak, Pakistan via Mirah Shaw, PK. Once in Naurak, he waited approximately two weeks before returning to Khowst, AF.

3. The detainee is a Khowst al Qaida fighter.

4. The detainee was trained by al Qaida and worked for them for about four months prior to his capture.

5. The detainee was told not to tell anyone they worked for al Qaida but to say they worked for Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM).

6. The JEM is an Islamic extremist terrorist group based in Pakistan.

7. The detainee admitted he was a part of a missile attack against an AMF compound.

8. Al Qaida paid the detainee a total of 2,500 Rupees.

b. Training

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMIN, MOHAMMED

1. The detainee attended an al Qaida training camp and has demonstrated knowledge of various weapons and planned attacks against U.S. personnel and bases.
2. The detainee stated he had received military training on an AK-47, RPG, and a PK (little larger than an AK-47). He stated he trained on stationary targets and moving targets; this training was to be used in ambushes against American forces.
3. The detainee trained in Quralemsha, Pakistan on how to use, operate, and detonate remote control mines.
4. The detainee said that he knew and worked with a Bagram detainee training al Qaida how to build and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee replaced an al Qaida member named Work Sha who had been killed.
2. Abdul Rahman and Rasul Khan worked with Abu Layth al Libi. Rasul Khan told the detainee that Abu Layth al Libi worked for al Qaida.
3. Abu Layth al Libi controlled the "Southern Region" and was responsible for the Jemaah Islamiyah.
4. Abdul Rahman paid the detainee 1,000 Pakistani Rupees to hide mines and missiles.
5. The detainee was involved in purchasing and transporting weapons for Abdul Manan who was subordinate to Abu Layth al Libi.
6. The detainee stated Abdul Manan was a local cell leader of a group called Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). JEM is a cover name used for Al Qaida.
7. Abdul Manan is a Jaish-e-Mohammed facilitator operating in the Khowst District, Khowst Province, Afghanistan. Abdul Manan is responsible for attacks against American firebases in the Khowst Province and is actively recruiting in the area to carry out these attacks.
8. Abdul Manan paid the detainee 1,500 Pakistani Rupees to take pictures of the Khowst Airfield and the compound (next to the airfield) where the Americans are stationed.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said he was captured when trying to return to Khowst to deliver a GPS unit and a letter to al Libi.
2. The detainee stated that he had lied to prior interrogators and wanted to tell the truth.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMIN, MOHAMMED**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was asked whether or not he supports the jihad. Prior to his arrest he did, but now he claims he isn't sure where his allegiance lies.

b. If the detainee is released, he wants to go back to teach the Quran, perform labor jobs taking care of homes and land, and take care of his handicapped father.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 August 2005

TO: SHARBAT, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARBAT, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

#### Commitment

- a. On 27 May 03, in Khairo Village, Khost, at 11:00 local time, the detainee was arrested within 500m of site of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack on Coalition Forces, on the backside of hill where his brother Qader was found running from Afghani Military Forces.
- b. When questioned about whether he knew Qader the subject denied that he knew Qader or any knowledge of the blast. The detainee stated he didn't hear the explosion or see the dust plume. He only later admitted knowing Qader after his brother identified the detainee.
- c. During questioning in December of 2003, the detainee stated he never heard an explosion, but later changed his story stating the explosion was far away.
- d. The detainee has provided varying stories about his circumstances of capture. He stated he was watching his goats through binoculars when he was detained. Alternatively, his brother was looking through the binoculars when they were detained. Finally he stated he witnessed his brother being arrested and ran over to inquire about his brother and was arrested as well.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he had always told interrogators his brother was a good man. The detainee stated he never denied being related to his brother, or even knowing him when they were first detained.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARBAT, FNU**

b. He stated he always told interrogators he knew Qadar and that they were both detained because of lies.

c. The detainee said he did not have any dealings with the government and did not understand if the new Karzai government made any changes.

d. The detainee's name and photographs were shown to several detained al Qaida members, none of whom recognized the detainee.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 August 2005

TO: RAHMAN, MAHBUB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MAHBUB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was captured on 1 June 2003 along with four others, one of whom was a Saudi whose mission was to photograph Chapman and Salerno Bases for possible future attacks.

2. In late March 2003, Abu Layth al-Libi, an al Qaida facilitator, planned and coordinated a foiled reconnaissance mission to film the Salerno forward operating base and the villages surrounding the city of Khowst, Afghanistan.

3. Al-Libi is the al Qaida southern Afghanistan regional commander. He is responsible for operations in the areas of Khowst, Paktia and Ghanzni Provinces, to include Miram Shah, Pakistan. Al-Libi is a Libyan who specializes in explosive devices and guerilla warfare.

4. The detainee had been provided with a Kalashnikov rifle, ammunition, and a military cargo belt.

b. Connections/Associations

1. On the evening of 28 May 2003, al-Libi's group met with Abdul Rakhman and a student recruited from the Nizamia Madrassa at a house in the mountains near Naurak, Pakistan. The plan was for Rakhman to take the members of the team to Khowst, Afghanistan, so that they could film the airfield.

2. Abdul Rakhman is a known Arab al Qaida member who has been reported to operate in the Shahi Kowt area.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MAHBUB

3. The Nizamia Madrassa has been previously reported on for its affiliations with Afghanistan Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM). In March of 2003, this Madrassa was reported as being used by al Qaida, Taliban, and HIG personnel for training. It was cited as having been frequently visited by Jalaluddin Haqqani in 2002. Reports also indicate personnel from Nizamia Madrassa were, in the past, sent across the Afghan-Pakistan border to collect intelligence on United States and coalition forces in Khowst Province.

4. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded HIG as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahadin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan government, and establish a fundamentalist state.

5. Jalaluddin Haqqani is the former Taliban Minister of Tribal Affairs and personal friend of Usama Bin Laden.

6. On 31 May 2003, two men from the Shinkay Madrassa joined the detainee's group. The detainee had met one of these men the previous Ramadan at the same Madrassa.

7. Foreigners were conducting anti-coalition training in the Madrassa in Sinkay Village. Attacks against Afghan government posts were planned and based from the Madrassa. In May 2003, Afghan forces in Serabagh village captured three people who attended the Sinkay Madrassa.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. On the afternoon of 1 June 2003, three men (not including the detainee) were asking people in the village of Kondee, which is to the east of Salerno, where Salerno is located. One of the men they asked was an Afghan Militia Force (AMF) soldier. He did not answer them, but made his way to Salerno to inform his superiors.

2. When he arrived at a burial ground near Salerno, Rakhman took the camera to begin filming. Shortly thereafter, shots rang out.

3. When the AMF moved towards Kondee to investigate the three men asking questions about Salerno, the three men began firing on the AMF with AK-47s. All three were apprehended after a short firefight.

4. The three men were brought to Salerno for questioning. They had one AK-47, one pistol, one ICOM radio tuned to the Salerno security frequency, one set of binoculars, eight hand grenades, one small video camera. The men stated that there was another man near the Lakan Madrassa.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MAHBUB**

5. The AMF arrested two more men at the Madrassa with two AK-47s, bayonets, one set of binoculars, and a spare videocassette for the video camera. The detainee was one of the two men captured in the compound. The detainee was identified as someone who shot an AMF soldier in March.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he supports the new Afghani government and fully believes America's presence within Afghanistan is important to achieving peace within his country.

b. The detainee claims he is not presently, nor has he ever been affiliated with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 August 2005

TO: MOHAMMED, SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's family actively aided and abetted Taliban and al Qaida in the Serkhankhel Village area.

2. The detainee admitted that his family had collected firewood for al Qaida but this took place during the time of the Taliban. In late 2001, Arabs came to his village and took houses.

3. The detainee's father admitted that they guarded al Qaida weapons in their home.

4. The detainee has assisted his brother Allah Mohammed in his footwear business and participated in Allah's anti-coalition activities.

5. The detainee stated that he was an enemy of infidels and non-Muslims.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee knew about two people that were former Taliban and were assisting al Qaida operatives in the area of Zurmat, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's brother Allah Mohammed is an al Qaida sympathizer and leader of anti-coalition activities in the Districts of Shahi Kot and Zurmat, Paktia Province, Afghanistan. He has ties to past and present Taliban leaders.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, SAID

3. Allah Mohammed supported Moalim Shah Wali and the Taliban in the past and maintains strong ties to other Taliban and al Qaida sympathizers/operatives in his area.

4. Mualim Shah Wali is the displaced leader of Shahi Kot District, Paktia Province, Afghanistan and a long time al Qaida facilitator and Taliban supporter.

5. Mualim Shah Wali maintains relationships with al Qaida members living in Saudi Arabia.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was apprehended by United States Forces on 02 May 2003 in Serhkhankhel, Zurmat District, Paktia Province, Afghanistan, under suspicion of assisting anti-coalition forces.

2. The detainee's brother, Allah Mohammed, remained an active leader of Moalim Shah Wali's political structure based in Shahi Kot. He is known to have strategized acts against United States forces and the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan.

3. The detainee's father, Said Khan, knew of his son Allah's involvement in anti-coalition activities and supported his efforts as an advisor.

4. The detainee seemed very uncomfortable and was shaking when he was asked questions about his support of al Qaida and Taliban elements within his village.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied helping the Arabs.

b. The detainee admits that his brother, Allah Mohammed, has had dealings with al Qaida in the past and only by force.

c. The detainee recanted the statements he made in Bagram about giving al Qaida firewood and denied ever saying that his brother dealt with al Qaida.

d. The detainee has fired a Kalashnikov and an "American Rifle" but only during ceremonial events as wedding celebrations.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

21 June 2005

TO: AMAN, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMAN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee admitted that he joined the Taliban in 1999.

2. The detainee worked for the Taliban for two years, until the Taliban was defeated.

3. The detainee was the Deputy Officer of Personnel at 3 Corps in Gardez(sp). He was offered the position and promoted to Colonel by General Zia Uddin, the 12th Division Commander.

4. Zia Uddin has been cited as being responsible for attacks in Gardez(sp) out of spite for being removed from his position in May 2003, and may be working with Taliban and al Qaida leaders against the Afghan government.

b. Training

1. The detainee was a Captain in the Afghani Army for 17 years. He had 6 months of military training at the Technical Military School in Kabul, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was captured at his residence by United States Forces, suspected of being a Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) member.

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMAN, MOHAMMED

2. A Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) identification card was found in the detainee's residence at the time of his capture.
  3. The Hisb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. HIG has staged attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) and establish a fundamentalist state.
  4. It was reported that the detainee met with HIG leader Asadullah on 10 May 2003.
  5. Asadullah is an associate of former Taliban commander Saifullah Rahman Mansour and acts as a liaison between Mansour and the Hisb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).
  6. Detainee said the last time he met with Assadullah was in the early part of May 2003.
  7. Detainee admitted to knowing the police chief of Gardiz, Abdullah Mujahid.
  8. Abdullah Mujahid was identified as being responsible for the attack on a Special Forces Detachment in the vicinity of Gardez(sp) City, Afghanistan.
  9. The detainee was present at a 30 April 2003 Taliban leadership council meeting.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. The detainee left Gardez(sp) and joined the Mujahideen in Zormat, Pakistan. He worked under CDR Mohammed Ghani for approximately three years and nine months.
  2. When the Taliban came to Gardiz, the detainee lived in a military division housing area in Kabul (Wazir Akbar Khan area) for free.
  3. The detainee was given permission to stay at the government military division housing complex (Wazir Akbar Khan area) by Said Ishraq Husseini, the Under Secretary of Defense for Ahmad Shah Masoud and Under Secretary for the Ministry of Interior.
  4. The detainee referenced his supervisor as the Taliban Modir for Gardiz, Afghanistan, Mullah Mohammed Rahim.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said he was obligated to work for the Taliban, because they were the controlling government, and it was the only way he could support his family.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMAN, MOHAMMED**

b. Detainee stated he registered with Hisb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) despite not being an actual member. He explained that when the Soviets first invaded Afghanistan, the only way a person could enter Pakistan as a refugee, was to register with a political group.

c. Witnesses testified that the detainee was a lower level clerk or functionary within the Taliban and/or Afghan military.

d. Detainee stated he feels 9/11 was a crime against humanity, a crime against the world.

e. Detainee stated he would support the new government if released because a stable government is the only means to achieve peace within the country.

f. Detainee stated he would go back home and attempt recruitment back into the Afghani Army if released from custody.

g. Detainee also stated that if released he would like to return to his village in Gardez(sp) to rejoin his wife and children and work at his pharmacy in order to provide for them.

h. Detainee stated he would be willing to undergo a polygraph examination to prove his innocence as well as his loyalty to President Karzei and the Americans.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 Jun 2005

To: KAKAI, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAKAI, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee is responsible for a rocket attack on Gardeyz Firebase.
2. Detainee is an anti-coalition militia member.

b. Training

1. Detainee revealed he was taught to use bombs during the Jihad, (probably when he was between 12 and 15), and that he knows about the construction of the bombs that destroyed shops.

2. Detainee claims a vendor in Kabul from whom he purchased the two rifles trained him how to fire the Russian made weapon.

3. According to the detainee, the only instruction he ever received on explosives was how to pull the pin and throw a hand grenade. The merchant from whom he bought the grenade provided this instruction.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Detainee has been linked to Mullah Ghani a former Taliban commander.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAKAI, FNU

2. Mullah Ghani has been identified as an Anti-Coalition militia member who operates in the Zormant area of Sahak, Afghanistan.

3. Ghani has also been identified as having smuggled Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenades.

4. Mullah Ghani works directly for Saifullah Rhaman Mansour, a former commander for the Taliban 8th Division in Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. Detainee has been linked to Bow Auddin, a person known to sell explosives to Anti-Coalition militants.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee purchased a Kalashnikov rifle, six magazines, two hand grenades and one American Bolt-Action Clip-Fed rifle from a shop in Kabul.

2. Detainee was captured by Afghani National Army and American forces based on his involvement in the bombing of two video stores in Gardez.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee denies that he was ever involved in the bombing of two video stores in Gardez.

b. The detainee has never sworn Bia-at to any person or organization except for the old king Zaher Sha.

c. Detainee denied ever receiving any military training.

d. Detainee said his arrest was due to one of four possible acquaintances whom Detainee believes falsely accused him of Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) assistance and activity.

e. Detainee claims no involvement with armed hostilities towards American or Coalition forces.

f. Detainee claims the weapons found in his home were purchased for home defense.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 November 2005

TO: PARACHA, SAIFULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In approximately 1999, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan to meet with Usama Bin Laden to offer al Qaida the services of his media company.

2. In the summer of 2000, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a group of men. This group included a terrorist facilitator and men bringing funds to Mullah Omar to support the Taliban.

3. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee agreed to a plan to use the detainee's textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. The plan was to place the explosives in the containers that the detainee used to ship women and children's clothes.

4. The detainee assisted a senior al Qaida operative in choosing homes in Karachi, Pakistan to use as safehouses and residences for al Qaida families.

5. The detainee provided shipping regulations regarding the United States to a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee was sympathetic to the extremist cause.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was a Pakistani businessman who had a relationship with al Qaida.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH**

2. The detainee met with a senior al Qaida operative on several occasions.

c. Intent

1. During discussions with a senior al Qaida operative about the pending war in Iraq the detainee displayed strong anti-United States sentiment. The detainee commented that nuclear weapons should be used against United States troops because thousands could be killed at once. The detainee suggested the weapons could be acquired from other countries, such as China.

2. The detainee stated to a senior al Qaida operative that nuclear reactors in the United States would be excellent targets for attack.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured in Bangkok, Thailand after he was identified as a high-ranking member of Anti-Coalition Forces. The detainee was captured with documents that had significant intelligence information.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to contribute to the establishment of a school for girls in Kandahar and other cities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 Jun 2005

To: MUJAHID, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUJAHID, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee went to fight in the jihad against the Russians between 1987 and 1991.

2. The detainee was an Assistant Investigation Commander for the police in Gardez between 1992 and 1995. Between 1995 and 1998, he was the military commander of an air defense base in Kabul. From 2001 until 2003, the detainee was a Criminal Investigation Officer for the Gardez police.

3. The detainee was responsible for an attack near Gardeyz, Afghanistan, which caused the death of one American and the injury of two others.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a former Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) commander.

2. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad (MOI), a Sunni anti-U.S. missionary organization formed in 1989.

3. The Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) had been transporting and hiding al Qaida members who escaped from Afghanistan. The detainee was identified as working in Quetta, Pakistan, assisting al Qaida members to move out of Afghanistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUJAHID, ABDULLAH

4. The detainee was identified as a member of the Military Council for the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT).

5. The detainee was chosen to replace Muhammad Azam Cheema as the Chief of Operations in India during an LT meeting in Muridke, Pakistan, in late February to early March 2003.

6. The detainee was reported to have ties to Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and al Qaida.

7. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) is a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin.

8. The detainee is affiliated with Mullah Abdul Fatah, a member of al Qaida, who conducted a meeting in Kabul, Afghanistan, on 16 Aug 2003, to recruit former explosive experts to conduct attacks.

9. The detainee was in contact with Saif ur Rahman, a Taliban commander in Gardez, and Jalaluddin Haqqani, an al Qaida commander in Pakistan. The detainee worked against the U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces and the Afghan government. The detainee had ties to local anti-coalition militias.

10. Rahman has known links with both Taliban and al Qaida.

11. Haqqani is the former commander in chief of the Taliban Southern Forces and is heavily involved in the drug trade.

#### c. Intent

1. During a meeting with an Afghan Military Force commander, General Zia Udeen and the detainee discussed operations to create disorder in the outlying areas around Gardez to disrupt civil security.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was in the Afghan military during the Rabbani government and fought against the Taliban. He was appointed as Head of Security for Gardez and Paktia, and continued in this position during the Karzai government.

2. The detainee was fired and replaced as Director of Security for the Gardez area due to suspicions of collusion with anti-government forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUJAHID, ABDULLAH

- a. The detainee stated he was never associated or affiliated with any Taliban or al Qaida members, nor was he ever part of any military council associated with anti-U.S. and anti-coalition activities.
  - b. The detainee stated he approves of the American involvement in Afghanistan because they are improving the country for everyone. When asked his feelings on jihad, the detainee stated he simply fought against the Russians when he was handed a weapon.
  - c. The detainee claimed that neither he nor Zia Udeen did anything to create internal strife between competing villages and groups in Gardez and Paktia.
  - d. The detainee stated he never heard of Mullah Abdul Fatah.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 August 2005

TO: RAHIM, MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee claims he has four years of military service and was a Mujahadeen foot soldier operating out of his home village.
    2. The detainee was Chief of Logistics for a Cooperative Logistics Company located in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Taliban government owned the company and it was closely affiliated with Taliban intelligence. The company provided logistical support directly to the Taliban government.
    3. The detainee was responsible for purchasing items as directed by Mohammad Ibrahim.
    4. Mohammed Ibrahim worked for Taliban Central Intelligence.
    5. After the detainee purchased the items he would then resell them to company employees at a higher rate. The profits would then be deposited into Taliban controlled accounts.
    6. The detainee was captured at his home with an AK-47 and Taliban related documents. These documents have been reported as financial records indicating large money transactions with a group called the "Afghan Islamic Movement".
    7. The detainee was controlling a large cache, located in a nearby school, which contained 68 x 122 mm rockets; 1218 x 76 mm AT and HE rounds; 54 x 122 mm artillery rounds; 82 x 76

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED

mm MNTN gun rounds; 44 x 100 mm tank rounds; 9 x SPG-9 rounds; 17 x 60 mm mortar rounds; and 35 x 140mm rockets.

8. The detainee kept the records for documentation of where money and supplies went in case of inquiry by the new government. He said he worked there for about 30 months until the day the Taliban fell from power.

#### b. Connections/Associations

1. Mullah Abraham was appointed by an al Qaida Intelligence member, Mullah Wasiq, as the Deputy Minister of Intelligence.

2. Mullah Wasiq reported to Mullah Qari Ahmedullah, who ultimately reported to Mullah Omar.

3. Ammadullah was the Chief of Intelligence and he reported to the Deputy Chief of Security Services Mullah Omar in Kabul, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee is identifiable as a former companion of Bin Ladin during the jihad against the Russians. He was among a group protecting Bin Ladin at his last meeting at Tora Bora.

5. The detainee was entrusted by Bin Ladin to exfiltrate his guard forces from Afghanistan back to their countries of origin. Bin Ladin and his companions spent the night in a house belonging to an Afghan acquaintance of the detainee.

6. The detainee attended a meeting of Taliban members in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. Reports indicate that additional Taliban groups were formed and given commanders.

7. The detainee commanded one of the newly formed Taliban groups, which was comprised of approximately 13 Taliban soldiers. His group is assessed to have possessed numerous weapons.

8. The detainee attempted to align himself with other Taliban to continue the anti-United States/Coalition Campaign.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee attempted to export gems from Afghanistan to Germany in order to raise revenue to finance al Qaida.

2. The detainee stated that the Taliban leaders from Pakistan gave him several satellite phones with long-range capability.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED**

3. Reporting indicates that Taliban leaders planned to hold another meeting in March 2003 to form more groups and assign commanders to those groups. The additional groups were to be assigned tasks and given their agenda.

4. Taliban members were armed with mines when they traveled to the meetings.

5. According to a Foreign Government Service, members of the Afghan Islamic Movement were trained at Usama Bin Laden's Khaldan Training Camp during the period 1996-2001.

6. The Khaldan camp was used to train Mujahideen and consisted of tunnels to house soldiers and supplies. The students at the camp were Arabs undergoing small arms training.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not even know the weapons were there. He then related the weapons belonged to the district and the district commissioner. He continued to deny that he owned even one bullet from the weapons cache.

b. The detainee denied any knowledge of the weapons in the schoolhouse in his town and blamed unknown enemies for saying they were his.

c. The detainee again denied that he was continuing to serve as a logistics officer for the Taliban and assisting them in obtain weapons and supplies.

d. The detainee denied the allegation that he was continuing to run the cooperative for the Taliban by brokering deals for supplies and money into Afghanistan.

e. The detainee denied being part of the Taliban and said he did not like them and was forced to work for them. He denied any association with the "Afghan Islamic Movement" and that he was unaware of any such organization.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 August 2005

TO: HAJI HAMIDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJI HAMIDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a member of the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) during the jihad. He served with the HIG before the Taliban regime took over.

2. The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977. It was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Laden.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a member of the Mahaz-e Melli Tanzim.

2. The Mahaz-e Melli Tanzim attempted to recruit and organize supporters in Kabul, Afghanistan, following the fall of the Taliban. King Zahir Shah intended to establish a post-Taliban government for the purpose of rebuilding the war torn nation.

3. In 2003, the detainee was a HIG commander who worked directly for Abu Bakr, the alleged highest ranking HIG commander in Kabul. The detainee controlled a large weapons cache in Kabul.

4. The detainee was reported to be one of the heads of the Psychological Operations Wing of the HIG.

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000878

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJI HAMIDULLAH**

5. The detainee was captured in August 2003, in Kabul, in one of the homes owned by Raouf.

### c. Detainee Actions and Statements

In May 2003, the detainee was the commander of 30 men, with ties to the Taliban, who were planning an attack on an Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) unit in the vicinity of Kabul City, Afghanistan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. As a known HIG member, the detainee was arrested by the Taliban and placed in jail. He spent 23 months in jail before escaping to Pakistan.

2. In November 2001, while attempting to recruit and organize supporters for Shah and the Mahaz-e Melli in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance arrested the detainee, however the detainee escaped.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee claimed he is friendly to the United States and turned to the Islamic faith as being a reason not to kill.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 December 2005

To: SHAYED, MOHAMMED ALI SHAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAYED, MOHAMMED ALI SHAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee stated that in approximately 1986, he joined jihad. He fought against the Russians for five years during which he was shot in the neck and leg. He was fighting for jihad as a doctor for two years. Then he became the sub-commander for four years.

b. Training

The detainee was trained by the Harakat Manqalab Aslami Party to use the AK-47 during the jihad against the Russians. The detainee did use the AK-47 during the jihad.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee fought, as a group leader, with Nasrullah Mansour during the Russian Jihad. Nasrullah had a son, Saif Rahman Mansour, who became powerful in the Taliban.

2. The detainee was introduced to a Mujahedin group, Hezb-E Islami. He then went back to Afghanistan for over a month, where he was introduced to jihad. Approximately two years later, the detainee was wounded in the leg by government forces, after which he returned to Pakistan.

3. A source indicated that as of late June 2002, the detainee claimed that he was an agent of influence for Iran.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAYED, MOHAMMED ALI SHAH**

4. A foreign government source reports that the detainee worked for the former Taliban Eight Division Commander, Saifullah Rahman Mansour. The source indicated that the detainee acted as Mansour's representative in Iran.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source said that the detainee said the Iranians had given him \$50,000 United States Dollars to distribute among Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) delegates to buy their votes for the upcoming July 2002 parliamentary elections.

2. A source said that the detainee distributed this money to five Loya Jirga members from Paktia Province. The detainee stated that he expected to be elected to the parliament as one of the two representatives from Paktia Province.

3. A foreign government reports that as of late April 2003, Mansour reportedly was receiving financial and logistical support from Iran.

4. On 10 August 2003, the detainee returned to Afghanistan from Iran in order to distribute money to anti-coalition militants on behalf of Saifullah Rahman Mansour. The detainee returned to the Gardez, Afghanistan area with approximately \$150,000 United States Dollars to be distributed to tribal leaders and representatives of 14 anti-coalition militant groups in the Gardez area of Paktia Province, Afghanistan. The detainee planned to hold a meeting with the 14 representatives on the night of 12 August 2003 or 13 August 2003, at which time the detainee planned to distribute the money.

5. The detainee left Afghanistan in approximately February 2003, when he learned that United States/Coalition forces were seeking to detain him. The detainee is reported to have transported the brother of Saifullah Rahman Mansour, Latif Mansour, along with several unidentified members of Saifullah Rahman Mansour's family to an unknown location in Iran at that time.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he never provided support to the anti-coalition militia, the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee said that he fully supported the Coalition Forces and that there were recorded conversations with the Coalition Forces about the promise of democracy in Afghanistan. The detainee strongly believes that with the help of the Coalition Forces, democracy in Afghanistan is possible today. The detainee stated that even during the jihad, he did not work with those who were against the United States.

b. The detainee advised that he only traveled with \$550 United States Dollars prior to his arrest.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAYED, MOHAMMED ALI SHAH**

c. The detainee denied allegations against him including distributing Kalashnikov rifles, talking about selling or transporting Kalashnikovs on the radio or being with Mansour against the government.

d. The detainee stated he never fought against nor assisted anyone else who fought against any United States Forces.

e. The detainee denied being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida and stated that he is against the Taliban.

f. The detainee stated that the 11 September 2001 attack was a big crime against humans and that everyone who is responsible are criminals.

g. The detainee indicated that the United States arrival in Afghanistan was the saving of the Shia people.

h. When released, the detainee intends to go to Gardez, Afghanistan and be a medical doctor.

i. The detainee claimed he was wrongfully detained. He believes that someone told American Forces he brought back \$150,000 United States Dollars from Iran to Afghanistan to fund anti coalition militant forces. The detainee denied these allegations. The detainee further related he has never had more than \$1000 United States Dollars with him.

j. The detainee listed numerous groups that could benefit from his detention. The possible opponents included opponents in a land rights court case, defeated candidates for Loya Jirga, the intelligence service and former Communists.

k. The detainee stated that he once received a warning from the Taliban when he was attempting to run for tribal leader by the deputy minister of Zormat. The detainee was told that he had become Americanized and that he should be careful.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 September 2005

TO: YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee had plans to blow up the main Gardez bridge using explosives and a remote controlled improvised explosive device (IED).

2. The detainee was suspected of targeting United States forces.

3. The detainee told American forces that he possessed a Kalashnikov rifle and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) rounds at his home.

4. The detainee was responsible for the IED attack on United States Security Forces in Gardez, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee took the jeep of a local merchant named Bahauddeen and never returned it. The Jeep contained 5 AK assault rifles, 2 rockets and one machine gun.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he was trained at his post on how to fire the AK-47 and RPG by other personnel at the check post.

2. Detainee admitted to firing an RPG only one time, during training.

c. Connections/Associations

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000883

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA**

1. The detainee has ties to Anti-Coalition Militants, has conducted recruiting, and planned on blowing up the bridge in Gardez, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's brother was apprehended for suspected involvement in mortar attacks on United States Forces and the detainee's brother was found to be in possession of a Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) identification card

3. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) is a Terrorist Organization

4. The detainee and Bow Audin are cousins, and Audin is known to have sold explosives and rockets.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

The detainee states that al Qaida are bad people and blames them for ruining his country.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 August 2005

TO: BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'RI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-  
JAZA'RI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. Sometime in 1985, the detainee, his father, his two brothers, his cousin Mustafa Hamlili, and a friend of the family named Abu Yasser left Algeria and went to Peshawar, Pakistan, to perform jihad.
    2. Abu Yasir was the head of External Information and the head of Finance for al Qaida prior to September 2001.
    3. Mustapha Hamlili specialized in forging documents as a follower of Omar Chaabani (aka Abu Jaffar). Chaabani's group members transited through Peshawar, Pakistan, at a center activated and funded by Usama Bin Laden.
    4. Enroute to Afghanistan, the detainee's group traveled to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, where they stayed for about three months at a guesthouse operated by the Egyptian Jihad Group and run by Ayman Al-Zarqawi, the second in command within al Qaida. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden (UBL) while at this guesthouse, and the detainee's father began a relationship with UBL.
    5. The Secretary of State has designated Al-Jihad (aka Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, and Islamic Jihad) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This group is an Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s that merged with al Qaida in June 2001. The group's primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

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6. During the post-Soviet years when the Mujahidin leaders were vying for control of Afghanistan, the detainee was aligned with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

7. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. The Secretary of State has identified the HIG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan government, and establish a fundamentalist state.

8. The detainee was a member of HIG from 1991 to 1993.

9. The detainee fought on the front lines with the HIG in 1996.

10. The detainee served as a foot soldier in HIG fighting against Generals Dostum and Massoud after the Soviets left Afghanistan.

11. After leaving Afghanistan, the detainee returned to Peshawar where he joined the Algerian jihad group Jamiat Islami. This group was formed to go back to Algeria and begin a new jihad. The detainee's main job was distributing the Al Ansar newspaper, which they received via fax from London, England.

12. The Secretary of State has designated the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The GIA is an Islamic extremist group attempting to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. Since 1992, the GIA has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats.

13. The detainee was a member of GIA from 1993 to 1994.

14. The detainee joined a group called Hillafah to which he was elected as the group's leader because he spoke Pashtu and was able to pass himself off as Afghani.

15. According to the detainee, Al Khalifa is a very disciplined sect that enforces Islamic or Shari law. Losing your life is an acceptable risk for non-compliance.

16. The Al-Khalafa group was dedicated to overthrowing the Pakistani government.

17. While a member of the Khalifah group, the detainee tracked down, assaulted, and robbed a group of men of about 700,000 Pakistani rupees. The group of men included an individual the detainee suspected of spying on the Khalifah group.

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18. According to the detainee, the Khilafa group itself had relationships with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

19. The detainee stated that Jamaat Muslimeen and Al Khalifa were the same organization, just different names used in different locations and that all were part of Takfir Wa Hijra.

20. Jama'at al-Muslimin is an extreme Islamic fundamentalist group whose leader is 'Abdallah al-Rifa'i. As of early 2002, al-Rifa'i, who moved his headquarters from Pakistan to the United Kingdom to Bangladesh, estimated there were 10,000 members worldwide.

21. The detainee was described as a very violent person with little contact except for his close friends and those affiliated with Takfer Wael Hagra. The detainee believes that only he and a few others within Takfer Wael Hagra are important and that even other Muslims are subservient infidels who cannot peacefully live or practice among them. This group has no problem killing others.

22. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated the detainee was a Taqfiri, a group of religious fanatics who were known to purge and kill their own members. The detainee was a good contact if one needed to stay or pass through the tribal region on the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.

23. The detainee assisted two reported al Qaida supporters and facilitators in moving a group of Kurdish fighters and their families from the Afghanistan border to a guesthouse in Pakistan.

24. The detainee admitted to having killed Asadullah al-Sindi. Al-Sindi was Usama Bin Laden's commercial representative in Pakistan and a member of al Qaida. This action alienated the detainee from many members of al Qaida.

25. Sometime in 1997, the detainee was arrested by the Pakistani police for stealing a car with three Pakistani friends, all of whom had been associated with al-Khilafa. For this crime, he served approximately one and a half years in prison, until his release and his expulsion from Pakistan in 1999.

26. After spending approximately one year in jail, the detainee was deported to Afghanistan. The detainee went to Jalalabad where he had a friend named Abdullah from Morocco, whom the detainee had fought with in the HIG. Abdullah subsequently introduced the detainee to various people within the Taliban.

27. The Taliban gave the detainee room and board in Kabul for approximately four months. During this time, the detainee received a job as a translator at the Taliban Foreign Ministry based on the personal recommendation of the Taliban Foreign Minister. The detainee

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did not mind working for the Taliban as they listened to him and treated him with kindness and respect.

28. From at least January 2002 through February 2003, the detainee received financial assistance from al Qaida for living expenses such as food, rent, clothes, and so forth. The detainee stated that Abu Sulayman al-Jaza'iri was responsible for providing money to the individuals and families in the Peshawar area in Pakistan, although he often relied on intermediaries, such as Abu Nasim and Muhammad Shah, to provide the money directly to families.

29. The detainee stated Abu Nasim al Tunisi is a Tunisian who provided the detainee with a monthly stipend of 7,000 Pakistani rupee after the detainee had fled Afghanistan, and was living in Pakistan. Abu Nasim was a member of the Tunisian Fighting Group, and was acting as a money courier.

30. The Secretary of State has designated the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The TCG reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. The loosely organized TCG has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots.

31. The detainee said that Abu Nasim al-Tunisi was in charge of a cell comprised of twelve families, including the detainee's family. Abu Nasim had visited the detainee's home many times and had the detainee's phone number.

### b. Training

1. The detainee attended the Sadda Camp several times between 1986 and 1991. The camp was started when the Russians invaded Afghanistan and it provided general and specialized training in weapons, tactics, and special operations. Training at this camp was considered mandatory for fighters entering Afghanistan to fight the Russians.

2. Training at Sadda Camp consisted of anti-aircraft guns and small arms, such as the Kalashnikov, AK-47, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and the PK machine gun. The detainee claimed that during the training he fired each of these weapons and then used them on the front line. While fighting on the front line in Afghanistan, the detainee received training on the Stinger missile, but he never fired it.

3. Sometime in 1999, the detainee and 15 to 20 other Algerian members of GIA received training at the al Qaida-sponsored Jaluzi Camp near Peshawar in preparation for returning to Algeria for jihad.

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4. The detainee attended the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan for one month in preparation for returning to Algeria for jihad.

5. The Khalden Camp was an al Qaida training camp located near Kabul that was operated by Ibn Shaykh Al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah. Instruction at this camp included urban guerrilla tactics, physical conditioning, and endurance.

6. Abu Zubaydah is a senior member of al Qaida.

7. In November 2002, the detainee participated in a three-day improvised explosive devices training class, including the use of poisons in explosives, in Peshawar, Pakistan. The explosives expert teaching the course had been a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

8. In November 2002, during the three-day improvised explosive devices (IED) training course, the detainee and other participants discussed several methods on how to attack United States forces at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Methods discussed included poisoning the food while it was at the Karachi port and attaching IEDs to fuel trucks entering Bagram. In addition, they discussed using bombs to attack troops in Konar and Nangarhar Provinces.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. In 1995, Muhammad Shah offered to sell uranium to the detainee. Several months later, Shah offered the uranium to al Qaida, and then to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan. The detainee believes the uranium was stolen from the Pakistan government. Shah showed photographs of the uranium to the detainee.

2. Mohammad Shah, an Afghan al Qaida supporter who was positioned well within the Taliban, was living in Peshawar, Pakistan, as of 14 August 2002. Shah had been helping Abu Sulayman, an Algerian al Qaida member, to plan attacks on United States forces by attacking low flying aircraft inside Afghanistan around Khowst and Jalalabad.

3. In 2000, the detainee was pressured by a long-time friend to provide lodging for Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Kabul. The detainee's wife objected to Zarqawi staying with them, so the detainee rented a house for him instead. The detainee said he never personally met Zarqawi.

4. Abu Musa'ab al-Zarqawi is a Jordanian citizen with ties to al Qaida and other terrorist organizations and currently operates out of Iraq. He has provided the financial and material support for the assassination of a United States diplomat, participated in acts of terrorism, trained terrorists, led terrorist cells, and facilitated transport of terrorists. Zarqawi has arranged training for terrorists at al Qaida camps and eventually established his own terrorist cell and camps, which specialize in poisons.

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5. The detainee stated he met Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM) two months before the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. He recalled only seeing this individual twice in 1987 and then again for a one time event in 1990. He was not a close associate of this person and had limited contact.

6. An Egyptian suspected of connections to al Qaida stated the detainee was a member of Hizbul Mujahideen.

7. The Secretary of State has designated the Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The HM was founded in 1989 and is the largest Kashmiri militant group, officially supporting the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan or independence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan's largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Isiami. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan through the mid-1990s and trained alongside the Afghan HIG until the Taliban takeover.

8. The detainee hosted Khalil Haqqani at his home during the winter of 2002-2003. Khalil is the brother of Jalaluddin Haqqani.

9. Jalaluddin Haqqani is the former Taliban Minister of Tribal Affairs and personal friend of Usama Bin Laden.

10. On 18 November 2002, the Irish National Police arrested and questioned Libyan extremist and document forger Ibrahim Mohammed Mustafa (aka Abu Hafs). During a search of his home, officers seized 56 pages of handwritten notes including names and numbers in his personal telephone directory. Several names on this list may match the detainee's name, his family members, and his friend Abu Yasir.

11. During an Irish National Police raid of the Dublin residence of Libyan extremist Jamal Mohamed Octabesh in late October 2003, officers seized 55 pages of documents, including lists of names and telephone numbers. Several names on this list may match the detainee, his father, and his cousin.

### d. Intent

The detainee believes he has been imprisoned unjustly and he hopes bad things will happen to America.

### e. Other Relevant Data

Pakistani police came to the detainee's father-in-law's home on numerous occasions because the detainee and his two Pakistani companions were causing disturbances and threatening villagers. On one occasion, the father-in-law refused to allow the detainee's disruptive friends back into his home. He confronted the detainee who went for a gun. The father-in-law was also

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armed and shot the detainee in the chest. The detainee was treated at a Pakistani hospital after this incident, and then arrested while still at the hospital for previously stealing a car.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having a police record in Pakistan, and claims local villagers were lying because they did not like Arabs.

b. The detainee said that he never swore bayat to Usama Bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 October 2005

To: AL-KAZIMI, SANAD ALI YISLAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-KAZIMI, SANAD ALI YISLAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In May 2000 the detainee took a flight from Sana, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

2. On 18 May 2000 the detainee went to Afghanistan via the Karachi-Quetta-Kandahar route using the passport that al Qaida operatives obtained for him.

b. Training

1. During 1989 and 1990 the detainee attended the Sawadya training camp in the Alidal Province, Yemen, and he had two months of special forces training at al Houdqeda training camp in Yemen.

2. The detainee said when he arrived at al Farouq around the end of May 2000 he went through basic training, which lasted 45 days. The training focused on weapons, such as the AK-47 and the Beka, and other areas, such as topography, camouflage, formations and mountain tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In mid July 2002 a senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money to purchase a truck to transport explosives.

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2. The detainee commented on several meetings he had with senior al Qaida officials to discuss operational planning.

3. The detainee was asked by Usama Bin Laden to be a bodyguard, and the detainee accepted.

4. The detainee said he did not go to Afghanistan intending to become a bodyguard and was very surprised and honored when he got the job.

5. The detainee served as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden between August 2000 and approximately February 2001.

#### d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee, along with other operatives, left Kandahar, Afghanistan to escort their wives out of the city. Then the detainee and other operatives returned to Kandahar to rejoin the fight.

2. The detainee received 100,000 riyals from a senior al Qaida operative to purchase a truck to transport explosives.

#### e. Other Relevant Data

In 1994 the detainee was arrested for destroying tombstones. A sheik issued a fatwa stating that it was illegal to have tombstones above ground. The detainee destroyed several tombstones because they were being worshipped as if they were gods.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied he had ever been asked to purchase the explosives and further added that he did not know who was going to provide the explosives.

b. The detainee said he had never been spoken to about the purchase of explosives or what the intended target was. The detainee added that he never intended to use the truck to transport explosives; he was only trying to get money.

c. The detainee said an operative never spoke to him about an operation either being carried out at Port Rashid or using a plane to fly into a target.

d. The detainee said he did not want to pursue the explosives transporting operation. He further commented that the operative planning the operation was crazy.

e. The detainee denied he had ever heard of an operative planning an attack against Port Rashid.

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5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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