

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 July 2005

TO: SALAM, MOHAMMED AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALAM, MOHAMMED AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Detainee met Mohammed Quahtani at a Ta'izz, Yemen Jam'at Al-Tabligh mosque and he suggested the detainee go to Pakistan. Quahtani gave the name of Abdul Rahman as a point of contact in Pakistan.

2. Quahtani paid approximately \$800 USD for the detainee's plane ticket. The detainee then traveled alone on Gulf Airlines to Karachi, Pakistan.

3. Detainee visited mosques in Karachi and then he traveled to Faisalabad, Pakistan to study the Koran at the Salafi Mosque. Eight months later the Pakistani Army captured him.

b. Training

1. In early summer 2001, the detainee was at the al Qaida Nibras guesthouse where new students attending al-Faruq training camp gather before deploying for basic training.

2. Detainee was seen at the al-Faruq camp and then in late summer 2001 at the Hasan guesthouse in Qandahar for trained Mujahidin.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The Jama'at Al-Tabligh is a legitimate Islamic missionary organization based in Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

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2. The Jama'at Al-Tabligh paid for all detainee's travels and Jama'at Al-Tabligh member, Abdul Rahman, paid for his lodging in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A film crew from the Al-Jazirah television company was at al-Faruq to film the co-joining of the Jama'at Al-Jihad and al Qaida.

2. Around October 2001, the detainee stayed in a two-story guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan with other senior al Qaida members.

3. The detainee has a history of inciting disturbances, assaulting guards, and possessing weapons and contraband. Detainee is aggressive with guards on a regular basis.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee went to Pakistan to get medical attention and has never been to Afghanistan. He has no knowledge of anyone involved with al Qaida.

b. The detainee says he did not have any knowledge of the September 11, 2001 attack nor did he have information of future attacks against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 November 2005

TO: QADER, AHMED ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADER, AHMED ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he met some Taliban members while in Kabul and they asked him to go with them to the back lines. He went to the back lines, but insisted that the Taliban did not recruit him. He left Kabul with them on his own. After his two-month stay, the detainee was told by the Taliban to go to the "Arab" house, also located on the back lines. The detainee stayed at the house for seven to nine months.

2. The detainee was identified as being in charge of the Golam Pache (Khana Gulam Bacha) guesthouse in Kabul. The detainee would get weapons for people staying at the guesthouse. He was also in charge of arranging transportation for everyone at the guesthouse.

3. The detainee was seen at the Khana Gulam Bacha (Golam Pache) guesthouse on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan during late 1999 - early 2000. The detainee was responsible for security at the guesthouse. Newcomers gave him their passports, money and all other personal belongings upon entering the house.

b. Training

At the back lines, the detainee was given a Kalashnikov and taught how to use it. He stayed with the Taliban for about two months.

c. Connections/Associations

1. According to a source, the detainee knew Usama bin Laden personally and was authorized by Usama Bin Laden to carry a special handgun. The source also stated that the detainee was a guard at the Golam Pasha guesthouse and often served as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.

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2. A senior al Qaida operative advised the detainee was seen with Abu 'Ummar Al-Badu, the Bedouin. The al Qaida operative reported Abu 'Ummar made possible threats against United States interests in Saudi Arabia.

3. A senior al Qaida official said he met the detainee just prior to 11 September 2001, when the two were both staying in a guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan which belonged to a man the official remembered as Al-Koett, variant Al-Qoett. The official said the detainee was the son of the sister of Al-Koett.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee states he traveled to Pakistan to study the Koran and computers. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and stayed for approximately two weeks before leaving for Quetta, Pakistan. He stayed there for two days before leaving for Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to start his own charitable organization.

2. The detainee said he went to Pakistan after leaving the Arab house. He said a Pakistani told him of a house with Arabs and took him there. The house belonged to the Salayfia University and housed approximately 15 people.

3. The detainee was in Wazir Akhbar Khan, Kabul, when he decided to leave the country. He traveled from Kabul to Khowst. He stayed in Khowst for two days before crossing the Pakistan border into the Town of Faisalabad, Pakistan. The Pakistani Military arrested him in Faisalabad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee said he heard about the 9/11 attacks and thought it was wrong to kill innocent people. This was not a good thing to do.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 August 2005

TO: SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee met twelve missionaries who encouraged him to become a missionary and go on Tableegh with them.
 2. The detainee went to the al Huda' Mosque, also known as al Da'wa, in the village of al Hudayda. There he met Sheik Saleh Muqbil, who also encouraged the detainee to go on Tableegh.
 3. Some al Qaida members had joined the al-Dawa al-Tabligh religious organization, which was well known for its support to Jihadist causes.
 4. In October 2001 the detainee traveled to Pakistan alone. He paid for his own ticket and flew from San'aa to Dubai to Karachi. Two unidentified Pakistani males met the detainee at the airport.
 5. Originally the detainee said that he had traveled with a group of Yemeni Tablighis and Tablighi representatives in Karachi met the group.
 6. The detainee traveled to Lahore and then went to the Raywand Mosque. For two months the detainee accompanied ten other missionaries, where they traveled from mosque to mosque.
 7. The detainee then joined a different group of 12 missionaries and went with them to Islamabad, where they traveled for two months from mosque to mosque.
 8. The day he returned, the detainee got his money and passport and traveled to Faisalabad, Pakistan and enrolled at the Salafeyah University.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

9. The detainee was a student attending religious studies at the Salafeyah University when Pakistani authorities raided Isa's house.

10. The Jamia Salafia School taught the Sunni school of thought. It taught only religious subjects and is run by the lunar calendar.

11. The detainee was identified by another individual who stayed at Issa's house as belonging to the Jamaat Tabligh.

12. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

13. The detainee was captured with 300 United States dollars in his possession.

14. The detainee is suspected of being a member of al Qaida due to his association with the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.

15. Another individual said he saw the detainee on the Taliban front lines around late 1999/early 2000.

16. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant said the detainee spent a lot of time at Hamza al Ghamdi's house in Kabul at the front lines.

17. The Ghamdi guesthouse was used to house all types of people to include newly arrived people, fighters from the front lines, wounded people and Usama Bin Laden associates.

18. An individual identified the detainee as being in charge of an unidentified guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan

19. Another individual said he saw the detainee at a guesthouse known as the Arab house which is located in the Hajji Habash district of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

20. Hajji Habbash guesthouse was for everyone coming to or leaving Afghanistan, especially for those leaving.

b. Training

1. A senior al Qaida operational planner thought the detainee had already completed his training in Kabul by the time he met him in 1999.

2. The senior al Qaida planner next saw the detainee at Mes Aynak training camp in fall 1999. The detainee was not a student at Mes Aynak; rather, he served as a carpenter, and was busy constructing structures on the base.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

3. The Aynak has been identified by an individual as being an al Qaida military training camp.

c. Connections/Associations

According to senior al Qaida operational planner Walid Muhammad Salih bin Attash, aka Khallad, aka Silver, he first met the detainee in early 1999 at the al Qaida village near the Kandahar airport.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated; "You killed my brother because he was defending the Koran, and I want to die too, and I want you to kill me."

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having been on Tablighi in the Lahore area, with any of the men he lived with at Aysa's house.

b. The detainee advised that if he were released from United States custody, he would either return to Tableegh or go home to Yemen.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 July 2005

TO: ALEH, ALI BIN ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALEH, ALI BIN ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee states that he decided to travel to Pakistan to see the country and pursue higher education, specifically to study Salafiah.

2. Salafiyya is an orthodox reform movement revitalizing the traditions held by the first Muslims. Adherents believe that new and modern interpretations of the Koran are a betrayal of true Islam.

3. While in Faisalabad, Pakistan, the detainee stayed with a man known as Isa, who housed several students from the Jamal Salafia Center.

4. The house where the detainee resided has been identified as the "Yemeni" house in Faisalabad.

5. Abu Zubaydah has been identified as the director of the "Yemeni" guesthouse in Faisalabad.

6. Abu Zubaydah is a known senior al Qaida operative who was captured in March 2002 in Faisalabad.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A known jihadist who received combat training in Afghanistan identified the detainee as part of his group fleeing Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul in December 2001.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALEH, ALI BIN ALI

2. During their travels in Afghanistan towards the Pakistani border, the group stayed for approximately two days at a madrassa run by the Jamiat Ulema-E-Islami (JUI). This facility in Barmal, Afghanistan, was used by many different groups of foreigners on their way to Pakistan.

3. The Jamiat Ulema E Islami (JUI), or "Assembly of the Scholars of Islam," is a radical Pakistani Islamist political party best known for its anti-U.S. threats, vocal support of Usama Bin Ladin, and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools (madrassahs). Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the cell leader of the 26 February 1993 New York World Trade Center bombing, is associated with the Jamiat Ulema-E-Islami (JUI).

4. Members of the Jamiat Ulema-E-Islami (JUI) also assisted this group in their final crossing of the Pakistani border.

5. A Yemeni recruited to train for one year in Afghanistan, who had left Kabul the night before it fell, recognized the detainee as someone he may have seen crossing from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

6. The detainee's alias was on a list of captured mujahidin found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, acquired in March 2003.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed that he did not receive any military training while living in Pakistan.

b. The detainee stated that he did not have any knowledge of the September 11, 2001, attack on the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon, nor did he have information of future attacks against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

26 May 2005

To: AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Faisalabad, Pakistan, via Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee resided at the Issa safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

3. Abu Zubayda was the director at the safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, as well as one located in Peshawar, Pakistan.

4. Residents of a safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, routinely received endorsement letters from a known al Qaida operative to attend terrorist training camp.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida lieutenant identified the detainee as one of the individuals captured in the Crescent Mill residence in Faisalabad, Pakistan, during a 28 March 2002 raid. The lieutenant further stated that he and a senior al Qaida official met the detainee in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. A senior al Qaida operational planner identified the detainee.

3. A senior al Qaida facilitator Abu Yasir Al Jaza'iri identified the detainee.

c. Other Relevant Data

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ALI ABDULLAH**

1. Among the items recovered during the 22 March 2002 raid of the safehouse, which the detainee was captured in, was a notebook containing information regarding nuclear bomb making, passports, and identification cards.

2. The detainee has been cited for numerous incidents of failure to comply, guard harassment and assault during his detention.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. A senior al Qaida operational planner stated that the detainee did not go to Pakistan or Afghanistan for jihad. He also stated that the detainee was sent by his family to secure his cousin's release from Pakistani authorities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

26 October 2005

TO: ABU BAKR, OMAR KHALIFA MOHAMMED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU BAKR, OMAR KHALIFA
MOHAMMED**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee was recruited to work for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 2. In Libya the detainee preached anti-Qadhafi sentiment in local mosques, at weddings and on street corners. The detainee used sheep herding as a cover to conduct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group operations in the Jebbel-Acteher area of Libya.
 3. The detainee assisted people illegally entering Egypt and Sudan from Libya.
 4. The detainee used a fake passport to travel from Libya to Sudan.
 5. The detainee worked in Khartoum, Sudan overseeing Sudanese drivers for one of Usama bin Laden's transportation companies.
 6. The detainee traveled from Sudan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan via Karachi and Peshawar, Pakistan.
 7. In Jalalabad, Afghanistan the detainee lived in a house belonging to a group fighting against Qadhafi. The detainee joined this fighting group.
 8. The detainee left Sudan and traveled to Kabul and Khowst, Afghanistan with the intention of attending the Khaldan training camp in Khowst.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU BAKR, OMAR KHALIFA MOHAMMED

9. The detainee was in charge of a guard post behind the Jihad Wahl camp. The guard post had a 23mm cannon and an SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launcher. The detainee commanded five men during daylight hours and 20 to 30 men at night.
10. The detainee built props for ambush technique instruction at the Jihad Wahl camp. He also filmed Jihad Wahl training sessions.
11. The detainee conducted explosives training at the al Farouq camp.
12. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida member as an al Farouq instructor during 1998. The detainee provided instruction on topography and explosives.
13. The detainee went to the Taliban in 1998 to offer his services to fight the Northern Alliance.
14. The detainee joined a group clearing mines so the Taliban could advance against the Northern Alliance. The detainee stepped on a mine that detonated, resulting in the loss of his right leg.
15. The detainee had initially lied about his leg amputation injury.
16. An individual stated he immigrated to Afghanistan in 1999 to train under the detainee, whom he knew as Umar al Libi, at the Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
17. The detainee was identified by another fighter as being on the front lines near Taloqan, Afghanistan fighting the Northern Alliance in 2001. The detainee was a military leader in charge of many Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other Gulf States while on the front lines. The detainee would meet with the other Taliban leaders to plan military operations.
18. The detainee is said to have trained another fighter on the use of anti-aircraft weapons.
19. The detainee and an al Qaida member established a large training camp for Mujahidin in Afghanistan, where the detainee served as an instructor for many different groups.
20. In mid-August 2001 the detainee was seen at a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
21. Approximately two weeks after 11 September 2001, the detainee left the front lines and traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan with other fighters. The detainee stayed at a Libyan guesthouse in Kabul.
22. The detainee was identified as having stayed at the Ashara guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
23. In approximately October 2001 the detainee left Kabul for Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU BAKR, OMAR KHALIFA MOHAMMED

24. From Jalalabad the detainee traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan where he stayed in three different homes over the course of about three months. The detainee then moved to another house that belonged to the Al Solafiya University.

25. The detainee stayed at this school in Faisalabad, Pakistan until he was arrested in February 2002.

26. The detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W wristwatch in his possession.

27. The Casio model F-91W wristwatch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.

b. Training

1. While in Sudan, the detainee took weapons and explosives training.

2. The detainee received training on Kalashnikovs, PK's, Doshka anti-aircraft weapons and grenades at a camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee attended the Jihad Wahl training camp.

4. At the Jihad Wahl camp, the detainee learned about planning attacks, setting up missions, organizing a resistance cell, leadership, politics, and reasons for the success or failure of past jihad operations.

5. The detainee learned about explosive devices from an Egyptian explosives expert at the Jihad Wahl camp.

6. The detainee took a course on heavy artillery at the Jihad Wahl camp.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee met Abu Musab al Zarqawi on two occasions, first in 2000 and again in March 2001.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee said he went to Afghanistan to obtain military experience and weapons training and said he was not an instructor or a military leader.

e. Other Relevant Data

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU BAKR, OMAR KHALIFA MOHAMMED

1. The detainee was identified as an instructor at a camp in Afghanistan and a front line leader.

2. The detainee is said to have provided training on 32mm anti-aircraft weapons, mines, rocket propelled grenades and tactics to Libyan and Tanzanian fighters as well as other instructors.

3. The detainee is said to have had a lot of knowledge on how to operate, assemble and disassemble explosive devices (such as mines), missiles and remote controlled explosive devices.

4. The detainee is said to have had a document explaining how to destroy a target with a rocket propelled grenade using some type of distance calculation chart.

5. A former al Qaida member identified the detainee as a high-level member and military trainer at the camp in Afghanistan for members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

6. This former al Qaida member also identified the detainee as having a great deal of experience in arms dealing and was known to assist Usama bin Laden in purchasing weapons.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has no problem with the United States and does not plan to use what he learned at the training camp to attack the United States.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.

d. The detainee denied being at Taloqan or any place north of Kabul or Jalalabad.

e. The detainee claimed he never fought the Northern Alliance or the Americans and that he had never been at the al Farouq training camp.

f. The detainee denied being associated with, or a member of, the Taliban or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 August 2005

TO: MINGAZOV, RAVIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MINGAZOV, RAVIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee turned to Islam while he was still serving in the Russian Army.

2. In March 2000 the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan because believers there lived according to the laws of Shariat.

3. The detainee said he decided to leave his wife and son and travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to pursue living in a pure Muslim state. He intended to send for his family once he found a place to live.

4. The detainee said he is a religious person that would fight for Islam.

5. When confronted by investigators who believed he was involved with the fighting in Afghanistan the detainee stated that he may have been involved, but there are some things in life that are so important that you must protect them at all costs.

b. Training

1. The detainee served as conscript in the Russian military from 1986 to 1988 and then continued serving voluntarily until 1996.

2. The detainee spent two weeks at a training camp for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Mazari-Sharif.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MINGAZOV, RAVIL

3. The detainee heard about recruiting for the Arab training at al Farouq, so he went there out of curiosity to find out how the Arabs train.
4. The detainee received basic weapons training and physical fitness training while at al-Farouq.
5. The detainee attended the camp at al Farouq for one month with 60-70 students and was present at the camp on September 11, 2001.
6. The Al-Farouq camp provided a general training program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course lasting 40 days. This course consisted of a basic review of relevant military topics. The trainees were provided with fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, explosives, and so forth. At the end of the 40-day basic program, al Qaida selected the most promising trainees from the basic course for more advanced training and specialized coursework.
7. In November 2003, the detainee denied attending al Farouq, which contradicts information in his file.
8. The detainee found out that there would be lessons on making explosive mixtures in the Kara Karga region. Since it was boring in Bagram and there wasn't anything to do he went there out of curiosity. The lessons lasted for approximately two weeks until the Americans started bombing and everyone headed to Pakistan.
9. Training at Kara Karga included how to make a formula bomb. Students were taught how to make explosives out of common items such as fertilizer and ammonia.
10. Instruction at Kara Karga also included lessons on how to make poisons that could be inhaled, swallowed, or absorbed through the skin. Poisons were made and then tested on rabbits. While the rabbits got sick they did not die.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee spent half of a year in Tajikistan, until he was transferred to the Taldar Ravine. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was located there. The senior leader at the Taldar Ravine was called Vakhtior an Uzbek by nationality.
2. The IMU has been designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The IMU is a Coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states.
3. Detainee did not meet Usama Bin Laden personally but was forced to attend his speeches on politics and religion even though he did not understand the language.

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4. On March 12, 2002 the detainee traveled by van from Lahore, Pakistan to an al Qaida safe house where Abu Zubaydah lived in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan to investigate the possibility of establishing a car resale business.

2. The detainee left Russia in January 2002. He flew from Moscow to Karachi and then traveled by bus to Lahore, Pakistan. He stayed at the Tablighi Islamic Center.

3. When the United States bombing campaign started, the detainee traveled with a group of individuals for about a month moving through the mountains between Khost, Afghanistan and Banu, Pakistan.

4. The detainee was arrested in late March 2002 at the Crescent Mills, Faisalabad safe house with a number of suspected al Qaida members.

5. During the visit by the Russian delegation, the Attorney General told the detainee that he would be killed if he returned to Russia. The detainee didn't believe it was a credible death threat, however, he feels that it is an example of how difficult it would be for him to be back in Russia.

6. The detainee is not pleased with the United States because of their lack of action in Chechnya to protest the Russian's genocide of Muslims.

7. The detainee said that the United States is supporting the Northern Alliance fighters who are killing innocent people.

8. The detainee does not want to go back to Russia. He wants to live in a nice country among Muslims. Once he is settled there he would bring his family to be with him.

9. The detainee offered to exchange information about criminal activity for United States or European citizenship.

10. The detainee refuses to say anything about his fellow detainees because they are fellow Muslims that have given him their last piece of bread even though they were starving. He said that he would not say anything that would harm a hair on their heads.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims no knowledge of al Qaida or Taliban personalities or network.

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b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.

c. The detainee recognizes the United States policies of freedom of religion and does not oppose the United States Government.

d. The detainee did not go to Afghanistan to fight.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 September 2005

TO: LABED, AHMED BIN KADR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LABED, AHMED BIN KADR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. *Commitment*

1. The detainee admitted to going door-to-door with the Jama'at Tablighi (JT) for three days in Hamburg attempting to discuss Islam with people.

2. The Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic missionary organization founded to spread Islam and recruit followers. Islamic extremists have been known to exploit the organization to enhance their ability to fight the perceived enemies of Islam.

3. A member of JT traveled to Afghanistan while the detainee was there and asked the detainee to return to Germany with him in October 2001, but the detainee refused.

4. Around March 2001, an acquaintance at the al Nur Mosque gave the detainee two videotapes of the mujahudeen in Afghanistan and Chechnya. After watching the videotapes, the detainee contacted this facilitator and made arrangements for his travels to Afghanistan.

5. Originally, the detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to fight jihad to make amends for the wrongs he committed.

6. Later, the detainee stated that prior to viewing the videotapes, he had begun thinking of a scheme to travel to Afghanistan to purchase drugs and then smuggle them back to Germany to sell. He said he made plans to travel to Afghanistan under the guise of training for jihad.

7. In June 2001, the detainee purchased a fraudulent Belgian passport, while his facilitator purchased round trip plane tickets for the detainee to travel from Germany to Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LABED, AHMED BIN KADR

8. On 3 September 2001, the detainee and Bahaji traveled from Hamburg via Istanbul, Turkey, to Karachi, Pakistan. They remained for three days before flying to Quetta, Pakistan. In Quetta, the Taliban provided a driver to take them to a Taliban safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee volunteered to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance around Bagram under the command of Abdul Wakhil.

10. In December 2001, the detainee retreated with the Taliban to Zormut, Afghanistan. They remained in Zormut during the month of Ramadan and then traveled to Banuu, Pakistan.

11. The detainee met a senior al Qaida Lieutenant in December 2001 who was smuggling mujahidin into Pakistan

12. During Ramadan 2001, a senior al Qaida lieutenant convinced 20 of approximately 100 mujahidin to leave Afghanistan at the request of local Afghan leaders. About one week later, the group of 20 proceeded to Banu, Pakistan. The 20 men were told al Qaida would contact them to continue their jihad as soon as the situation in Afghanistan had improved.

13. Sometime in February 2002, al Qaida sent the group to Lahore, Pakistan, and then to Faisalabad, Pakistan. Traveling with this group was Jose Padilla (aka Abdallah al-Muhajir) and Fouad Zouaoui (aka Talha al-Kini).

14. Abdallah al-Muhajir and Talha al-Kini were planning to build a bomb using conventional explosives and radiological materials and then detonating it in the United States.

15. The detainee remained in Lahore for approximately three and a half months, moving between several homes. He was then taken to Abu Zubaydah's safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

16. According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the Lashkar e Tayyiba (LET) facilitated the movement of his group to safe houses in Lahore and Faisalabad.

17. The Secretary of State has designated Lashkar e Tayyiba as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

18. Pakistanis moved the detainee to Faisalabad, Pakistan, but they mistakenly placed him in Abu Zubaydah's house. Since the detainee did not have any connection or relationship to Abu Zubaydah, he should have been placed in the Yemeni house.

19. The detainee and others at Abu Zubaydah's house had a 15-minute period between the time they realized the Pakistani police had surrounded the house and the time entry was made to hide their fake passports and concoct stories to tell the police.

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b. Training

1. The detainee served in the Algerian Army as a conscript for four years starting in January 1979. He served primarily as a physical training teacher and weapons guard, receiving training on the AK-47, Seminov and Dictaroff (a single-shot rifle).

2. In September 2001, the detainee attended the al Farouq Training Camp and the surrounding mountain training area for approximately thirteen days. While in the mountains, he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Rocket Propelled Grenade and physical training.

3. The detainee also attended Camp Nine outside Kabul for approximately 25 days, receiving training in camouflage techniques, weapons and physical fitness.

c. Connections/Associations

1. During Ramadan 2000, the detainee met Sa'id Bahaji at the al Atrak mosque in Hamburg. Bahaji is a known al Qaida operative connected to the 11 September 2001 attacks.

2. Bahaji allegedly facilitated the false identification papers, cash, visa and transportation for the hijackers of the 11 September 2001 attacks. He also networked with other al Qaida cells around the world to fine tune the attacks on 11 September 2001.

3. An admitted al Qaida member identified the detainee as a friend of an explosives trainer.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Between 1973 and 1982, the detainee was arrested at least seven times in Algeria for stealing/robbery, receiving sentences varying from one week to two years. In 1985, he was found guilty of statutory rape after he married a 17-year old without her father's permission.

2. From 1990 to 1994, the detainee lived in Rome, Italy, where he dealt illegal drugs. He was arrested for stealing at least six times while in Italy.

3. From 1994 to 2001, the detainee lived in Hamburg, Germany, where he was involved in numerous illegal activities and spent over two years total in prison. His crimes included possession of a shotgun, pick pocketing, credit card fraud, prison escape and possession of fraudulent identification. He continued to deal in illegal drugs while in Germany.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied seeing American forces while serving with the Taliban fighting the Northern Alliance, and did not know they were even fighting until the bombing began.

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b. The detainee has no ill feelings towards the United States. He is aware he has made mistakes in the past and is willing to pay for these mistakes. He has spent most of his life in jail or prison and is hoping this will be his last detention, as he no longer wants to live a life of crime and wants to settle down with his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 July 2005

TO: ABDALLAH, MUHAMED HUSSEIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH, MUHAMED HUSSEIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was employed as an Arabic language instructor by a number of NGO's such as the Kuwaiti based Lajnat Al Da'wa, the Saudi based Hiyat Al Ighatha, and the Saudi Red Crescent Society (SRCS).

2. Senior officials of the SRCS were involved in money laundering operations aimed at assisting Pakistani-based extremist organizations.

3. The detainee taught Arabic Studies at the Institute of Hira in Peshawar. The Institute received its funding from the Kuwaiti based Lijnat Al Dawa Al Islamia NGO.

4. Lajnat Al Daawa Al Islamiya is an NGO operating in Afghanistan that may be affiliated with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida operations.

5. The detainee stated that he knew Abu Idriss, a known al Qaida member and suspected facilitator from the Kuwaiti school where he taught.

6. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant as being at an al Qaida guesthouse for visitors in Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee wanted to meet Usama bin Laden to ask for help in his home country.

7. On 27 May 2002, the detainee was detained during raids against suspected al Qaida residences and support facilities connected to the Afghan Support Committee (ASC).

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8. The detainee was arrested in the residence associated with Abdallah Abd Al Wali, a Somali working as the director of the ASC Education Department.

9. The ASC is listed on the United States Secretary of State's Terrorist Exclusion List as an organization which is engaged in terrorist activities.

b. Other Relevant Data

The detainee claimed he was unemployed from 1993 to 2000. The detainee could not explain how he supported his family during this time period. The one comment he made was that "God provides" and that his eldest two daughters who live in Canada and Saudi Arabia sent him money.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he was never told by Pakistani authorities the reason he was arrested.

b. The detainee claims to have no knowledge of Red Crescent money being used to fund terrorist activities.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th, 2001.

d. The detainee denied having any contact with al Qaida or Jihadi elements during his 15 years in Peshawar, Pakistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 September 2005

TO: HAMLILY, MUSTAFA AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAMLILY, MUSTAFA AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

The detainee received weapons training in Pakistan in late 1987 at the Bajawar camp, near Peshawar.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The Saudi Islamic Relief Society provided the detainee funds to travel to Pakistan and provided him a job in Peshawar where he worked for the IRS between 1987 and 1988.

2. The detainee moved to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in 1998, and was provided a house by the Taliban. In 2000, the Algerian Madafa was established next door to the detainee.

3. The Algerian Guesthouse, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was run by a senior al Qaida member.

4. The detainee hosted several senior al Qaida members in his home in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, for three months in late 2000.

5. The detainee was given a job in Kandahar, Afghanistan, with Wafa in 2001.

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c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled between Northern Africa, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia on several occasions using false Mauritanian and Iraqi passports. The Algerian government in 1987 revoked the detainee's Algerian passport.

2. The detainee worked for Wafa until the office closed shortly after September 11. Fearing retaliatory United States attacks against Afghanistan, he left and again returned to Peshawar.

3. The detainee was arrested in his residence in Peshawar by the Pakistani police in late May 2002. He was arrested with a member of the Lashkar-e-Tayba terrorist organization.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he had been asked to join the jihad against the Soviet Union, but claimed that he had been unwilling to do so because the killing of innocents that was taking place horrified him.

b. The detainee denied any and all terrorist affiliation, to include any relationship with al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 December 2005

TO: UTHMAN, MUHAMMED NOOR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UTHMAN, MUHAMMED NOOR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee stated that he returned to Khalden Camp in Afghanistan to train those individuals who wished to prepare to fight with the Taliban.

b. Training

1. The detainee arrived at Khalden Camp in 1994. He trained on multiple weapons and learned mountain warfare.
2. In 1997, the detainee served as a weapons trainer at Camp Khalden. He trained approximately 50 to 70 people on weapons and artillery.
3. In 1998, the detainee was one of three veteran trainers at Khalden Camp to receive two months of training on electronic firing devices, with the expectation that he would train other Mujahideen on electronics after the course.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met Usama bin Laden and Mohammad Atef, whom the detainee knew as Abu Haffs, on one occasion when the detainee went to Jihad Wahl Camp.
2. The detainee was the Head of the al Qaida Military Committee and Abu Haffs was his supervisor. Abu Haffs had a close relationship with and was trusted by Usama bin Laden.

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3. The detainee corresponded with a senior al Qaida operative in the mid to late 1990s while the two of them were working on managing the Khalden Camp. The two then became much closer in 2000 or 2001.

4. The detainee met Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul in 1999.

5. Ayman al Zawahiri is an al Qaida Military Advisor, a member of the al Qaida Shura Council and the leader of the Media Committee.

d. Intent

The detainee was going to participate in operations against Israel that a senior al Qaida operative was planning in 2001 to take place at an unspecified time in the future. However, the detainee was captured with the senior al Qaida operative in March 2002.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was the 70th Taliban Commander.

2. The detainee was the deputy Amir for Khalden Camp and was frequently left in charge of Khaldan, especially during the last few years before the camp closed. The detainee could handle all aspects of the camp, including managing money, people, course scheduling and instruction of all the courses.

4. The detainee was captured on 24 March 2002 in a safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

5. The detainee was captured at a house owned by a senior al Qaida operative with approximately ten other people.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee feels he is not a member of al Qaida and has no knowledge of al Qaida's operations.

b. The detainee claims he never swore allegiance to al Qaida, Taliban, Usama bin Laden, Sheik Abu Zubaida or any other individuals or groups.

c. The detainee is not a fighter and does not believe in fighting.

d. The detainee does not agree with the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden calling for violence against America.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 July 2005

TO: ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to join the mujahidin and to fight against the Russians.

b. Training

1. In 1991, the detainee received training in light weapons at a camp in Afghanistan called Kun Saiaf near the town of Kowt Towr Khan, Afghanistan.

2. In 1993, the detainee received security training under the supervision of Pakistani Intelligence in the Village of Sher/Khan, City of Dis Trist, Balusistan State in Pakistan

3. The detainee was identified as an expert in explosives.

4. In 2001, the detainee provided training in the use of electronics and remote detonation of explosives at a guesthouse in Kabul.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In 1993, the detainee joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and was part of a military committee.

2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They declared the government of Libyan leader

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BAKUSH, ISMAEL ALI FARAJ

Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al Qaida organization or are active in the international mujahidin network. The group was designated for asset freeze under Executive Order 13224 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 in September 2001.

3. In 1997, the detainee joined the Taliban.
4. In 1999, the detainee moved to Kabul and stayed in the town Wazeer Akbar Khan.
5. The Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood was the center of al Qaida activity in Kabul.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In Kabul, the detainee decided to fight with the Taliban and would fight sporadically whenever there was a fight between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

2. The detainee used the aliases Abu Ali and Haj Munier.

3. The name Al-Hajj Munir al-Libi was found on list of captured mujahidin on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shayk Muhammad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 May 2005

To: ABU AL QUSIN, ABDUL RAUF OMAR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
ABU AL QUSIN, ABDUL RAUF OMAR MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Because of his lack of future prospects, the detainee decided to go to Afghanistan in 1990 to use his military skills in what he described as a "Jihad against the Communists." He later clarified that he meant the pro-Soviet Afghan regime in Kabul.

2. The detainee traveled from Libya through Tanzania, Algeria, France and into Afghanistan. After arriving in Afghanistan, the detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Kabul, Lagman, and the Kunar Province.

3. After the Russians left Afghanistan, the detainee helped the Taliban fight other groups in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was recruited and became a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group at the Quetta, Pakistan University.

5. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a known terrorist organization.

6. The detainee advised he was willing to fight and die for Islam.

b. Training

1. The detainee served in the Libyan military from 1983 to 1990, where his training consisted of electronics (radios/TV's), AK-47's, Belgian pistols, PK machine gun and Uzi's.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
ABU AL QUSIN, ABDUL RAUF OMAR MOHAMMED**

2. During the time the detainee was in Afghanistan he trained in two Libyan training camps. While at the training camps, the detainee trained on: AK-47's, pistols, a Siminoff sniper rifle, 82 mm mortars, and anti-aircraft weapons such as the Doshka.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Prior to his arrest at a guesthouse in Lahore, Pakistan, the detainee resided with personalities from a senior al Qaida member's safehouse in Faisalabad.

2. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant as a member of al Qaida who subsequently joined the Libyan Group.

3. The detainee met with the leader of the Algerians in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in December 2001.

4. The network associated with the leader of the Algerians was activated and financed by Usama Bin Ladin.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stayed at a Libyan Islamic Fighting Group guesthouse where it was a requirement to be willing to fight in support of the group. The detainee remained at the guesthouse from 1999 until 2000.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested with an admitted supporter of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

2. The detainee traveled to Tora Bora in December 2001.

3. The detainee suffers from psychological problems, which have been tentatively diagnosed as not being an acute psychotic disorder, but rather as an schizotypal personality disorder that manifests itself in paranoia, social anxiety, and odd behavior. The detainee describes feeling sad and uneasy in large groups, and complained of occasional demonic possession that causes him to act in a bizarre manner on occasion.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee did not believe in violence. He joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group out of desperation. He was broke, had no place to go, was hungry, unemployed and had no way to support himself. His family did not receive monetary support from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, but he received food, shelter and an allowance for clothes.

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REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
ABU AL QUSIN, ABDUL RAUF OMAR MOHAMMED**

b. The detainee denies ever having had any association with al Qaida or any other terrorist or extremist group. He angrily defined its leadership and members as "savages" who twist the meaning of Islam, thereby hurting all Muslims. He expressed equally negative views of the Taliban, stating he steered clear of them and lived a quiet life after getting married in 1999. The detainee did not reveal anything to suggest that he is linked to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 September 2005

TO: BANI AMIR, SALIM MAHMOUD ADEM MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BANI AMIR, SALIM MAHMOUD
ADEM MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. In late September 1994, the detainee received a position as teacher with Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). The detainee worked at the Dar al Rabbiaa' wa al Hajiree lil Aytam school. This school is located in a small Pakistani village near Jeluzee called Babbi Ziyarat. The Babbi village is known as an al Qaida activity center.

2. RIHS is a Kuwait-based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). In Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is affiliated with the Afghan Support Committee (ASC), an organization that has funded Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and al Qaida.

3. The Peshawar, Pakistan office director of RIHS is Abd al Muhsin al Libi. Al Libi also serves as the ASC manager in Peshawar. Al Libi is known to have a good relationship with UBL and has provided UBL and his associates with facilities in Peshawar.

4. The detainee was promoted to manager of the Dar al Rabbiaa' wa al Hajiree lil Aytam school in December, 2001 and remained in this position until captured in May of 2002.

5. The detainee was the director of an ASC school in Pushtungari.

6. Abu Bakr al Jaziri, the finance chief of ASC, was the chief of fundraising for UBL. Al Jaziri collected funds for al Qaida in Jalalabad through the ASC and local Arab NGO's by claiming the funds were for orphans and widows. In 2000, al Jaziri moved to Pakistan where he continued to raise money and transfer funds for al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BANI AMIR, SALIM MAHMOUD ADEM MOHAMMED

7. On January 9, 2002, RIHS and ASC were added to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224 blocking terrorist property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

8. As of October 2001, Pakistani RIHS employees were funneling money to al Qaida and other Jihadist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

9. When asked of any involvement the detainee might have with al Haramayne, he initially stated that he went to an al Haramayne institute before going to the Islamic Heritage Center.

10. On March 11, 2002, al Haramayne was added to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224 blocking terrorist property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. When the detainee was captured, he was making a decision to leave Pakistan. Even though his parents are dead, the detainee wanted his remaining relatives to meet his family. The detainee's wife was looking forward to moving to Sudan.

2. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad and Kunar, Afghanistan for approximately one week in 1998 in his capacity as principal (director) of the schools of RIHS.

3. On May 27, 2002 the detainee was arrested when a foreign government service conducted a series of raids against suspected al Qaida residences and support facilities connected with the ASC in Peshawar, Pakistan.

4. Pakistani police held the detainee for 12 days and then sent him to Bagram.

5. The detainee is a Sunni Muslim of the Hadith school.

6. The detainee went on Hajj in Mecca prior to entering school in 1981.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer.

a. The detainee has no knowledge of al Qaida plans or how funds are transferred to and from Islamic extremist groups or terrorist organizations.

b. The detainee does not support any type of terrorist organization.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BANI AMIR, SALIM MAHMOUD ADEM MOHAMMED

c. The detainee is just a simple person and is not interested in such issues as the Jihad. He stated that he felt his duty was to teach people.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: AL ZAHRANI, MUHAMMED MURDI ISSA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, MUHAMMED MURDI
ISSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go fight jihad after Sheik Hamud al Uqala issued a fatwa declaring that jihad should be waged against Americans.

2. An al Qaida facilitator arranged for the detainee to travel to Afghanistan.

3. The al Qaida facilitator did not actively recruit the detainee; rather, the detainee approached him about joining jihad. The facilitator did not need to convince the detainee to go to Afghanistan because at that point the detainee already had in his heart a desire for jihad.

4. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in early 2001. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, through Kuwait City to Karachi, Pakistan; then to Quetta and Islamabad, Pakistan; and finally through Peshawar, Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. In early summer of 2001 the detainee executed a man suspected of spying on jihadists in Afghanistan for a foreign government.

6. The detainee swore a bayat to Usama Bin Laden approximately one year after going through the al Qaida membership screening process in 2000 or 2001. He swore the bayat to Usama Bin Laden before he became part of the planning group for the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Masoud.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, MUHAMMED MURDI ISSA

7. In mid 2001, the detainee participated in numerous surveillance missions to collect information a special team needed to plan an assassination of a senior Commander of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan.

8. The detainee was engaged in an effort led by al Qaida to target another leader of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan for assassination.

b. Training

1. The detainee left Pakistan to train in Khaldan, Afghanistan. He stayed there for a week and trained to use a pistol.

2. After Khaldan, the detainee went to al Farouq for seven to ten days. He trained with weapons, including anti-aircraft weapons.

3. After training in Afghanistan the detainee traveled back to Lahore, Pakistan and then returned home to Saudi Arabia where he attended a technical school.

4. The detainee attended al Qaida special operations training over a period of two years between 1999 and June 2001. This training was conducted in small houses and in secret camps near Khowst and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee's training specialized in intelligence collection, bombings and explosives, hijackings and kidnappings, forced entry, mechanical repair, first aid, poisons, suicide missions, sniper missions, attacking convoys and urban warfare.

6. The detainee was trained on numerous light weapons including AK-47's, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, anti-personnel mines and light machine guns.

7. The detainee was also trained in assassinations, rappelling, hand-to-hand combat and the use of video simulation.

8. The detainee was trained in the use of codes and communications equipment for battle. The detainee was also trained to use a Motorola radio as a deceptive improvised explosive device.

9. The detainee was not a trainer but provided unofficial instruction to others on infiltration techniques and how to conduct clandestine reconnaissance missions.

10. In January or February 2001 the detainee finished training at the Algerian house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and was fighting at the front line in Bagram, Afghanistan.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met Usama Bin Laden's brother while working for G.T. Fashion, a private plane company.
2. The detainee said he knew a 9/11 hijacker with whom he studied the Koran, jihad, and law in Saudi Arabia.
3. The detainee and another 9/11 hijacker practiced disassembling and reassembling a gun while blindfolded as a training exercise for nighttime combat.
4. The detainee went to an Islamic studies school in Lahore, Pakistan run by the Jamaat al Tabligh to study the Koran. He also attended a school in Rayamand, Pakistan.
5. The detainee met a senior al Qaida member in Bagram, Afghanistan.
6. The senior al Qaida member the detainee met was second in command to Usama Bin Laden.
7. The detainee said he used to eat dinner with an al Qaida member whom he first met in Bagram, Afghanistan.
8. The detainee met several times with al Qaida leaders in Afghanistan, including Usama Bin Laden. The detainee discussed religion, his family life and politics with them. One of the leaders told him that someday they would enter Palestine.
9. The detainee met and spoke with Jordanian Abu Musab al Zarqawi several times in Afghanistan. The detainee talked with al Zarqawi about logistics and personnel for the fight against the Northern Alliance.

d. Intent

1. The detainee said he still remains loyal to al Qaida.
2. The detainee said he was committed to the idea of jihad and that his mission was to fight as a soldier of god against other soldiers.
3. The detainee said he is honored as a man to belong to al Qaida.
4. The detainee said America is ruled by the Jews; therefore, Israel and America are his enemies.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ZAHRANI, MUHAMMED MURDI ISSA

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured in Pakistan in 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 December 2005

TO: BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

To earn money for his move to Morocco, the detainee sold his personal belongings, including livestock, fabric and other things.

b. Training

A foreign government service noted that the detainee made no reference to military training he received in Bosnia.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The Pakistani Tablighis assisted the detainee with travel to Pakistan in early January 2000.

2. The Preachers of Islam, or Jamaat Tablighi, organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.

3. On the night of his arrest, the detainee was arrested with two other people, one of whom was a possible fighter who fought with, or on behalf of, Usama bin Laden.

4. A foreign government service has indicated a possible link between the detainee and a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI

5. A foreign government service identified the detainee as a known member of a Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat Cell.

6. A senior al Qaida operative identified the detainee as a good document forger.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued by a foreign government for his ties to Islamic extremists.

2. A foreign government service reported that the detainee is a fugitive from another country.

3. A foreign government service indicated the detainee's identification papers were found in a cave at Tora Bora on 18 or 19 December 2001.

4. A foreign government service reported the detainee is considered a dangerous terrorist and had ties to other terrorists.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies any affiliation with terrorism or extremism, to include membership in al Qaida. Despite admitting being of Libyan origin, the detainee similarly denied any association with, or in-depth knowledge of, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group or any other terrorist organization. The detainee claims to be opposed to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida's use of violence against civilians, which he says is un-Islamic.

b. A source stated the detainee was not a member of any militant group or organization.

c. The detainee denies having undertaken any military training or being a Mujahidin fighter. The detainee was in Jalalabad during the attacks of 11 September 2001 and claims to have had little knowledge of what happened until the start of the United States campaign.

d. The detainee denied receiving any military-type training in any camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The detainee said he hates armies and such training, and because of that, he was never in the military service.

e. The detainee related he was against acts of terrorism and would not associate himself with other terrorists or terrorist organizations. The detainee was questioned regarding the Tunisian Combat Group, and he stated he had never heard of this organization. He related he was not aware of any anti-government or terrorist organizations inside Tunisia. He stated he is not a member of al Qaida and would not join them after his misfortune of being detained. The detainee related he only wanted to be left alone.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDDI, ABDUL HADDI

f. The detainee further stated he has no problems with Americans, and if released, he would have no ill feelings about the United States Government.

g. The detainee claims to have no associations with the Taliban, calling them "bad Muslims," because "they are unjust to people," "too strict," and "practice bad Islam."

h. The detainee claims to have no affiliations with any Libyan fighting organizations.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 July 2005

TO: AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee performed a Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in 1992 or 1993.
 2. The detainee traveled to Malaysia and Thailand in August and September 2001 on a business trip to attempt to buy clothing for resale in Sudan.
 3. The detainee took approximately \$2,000 with him and ended up spending it all just for living expenses.
 4. During a visit to Malaysia, the detainee crossed the border to the capital of Thailand then returned to Sudan.
 5. After hearing of the situation in Afghanistan between the Taliban and another Muslim faction, the detainee made a decision to help the Taliban and travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee stated that Jihad is a part of the Islamic faith, and it was his duty as a Muslim to respond when the dispute is between Muslims.
 7. During a visit to the "al Kabeer mosque", or Great Mosque of Khartoum, Sudan, the detainee expressed his desire to perform jihad.
 8. The detainee considered the U.S. the enemy.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA

9. The detainee did go with another individual to fight a jihad for the Taliban.

10. The detainee departed Khartoum on 30 December and transited in Damascus, Syria, where he stayed four to five days before going on to Karachi, Pakistan.

11. The detainee traveled to the Jama'at al-Dawa Wa al-Irshat. The Jama'at al-Dawa Wa al-Irshat is a Pakistani center that assists Muslims who aspire to fight jihad.

12. The Dawa Wa al-Irshat is operated by Pakistani nationals and located in Peshawar, Pakistan and other additional facilities on the Afghanistan border.

13. The detainee was arrested in Parachinar, Pakistan before crossing the border. At the time of his arrest, the detainee was wearing a burka to disguise himself as a woman.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A foreign government service debriefing states that Muhammad Ahmad Muhammad al Hammudi is a friend of the detainee.

2. Hammudi was a senior operative of a network active between Syria and Sudan. The network's main focus was recruiting and training operatives to fight against the U.S. led coalition in Iraq.

c. Intent.

The detainee participated in a revolt with the other detainees when the Military Police (MP) searched their Korans.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he has nothing to do with al Qaida or Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). The detainee said he would never fight for anybody or an organization, and Muslims fight for god only.

b. The detainee has never been trained on the use of explosive devices and has not seen any. The detainee has not heard of any plans to blow up places.

c. The detainee stated that he did not believe in killing innocent people, and that he does not believe in martyr missions.

d. The detainee says he doesn't have any kind of animosity towards Americans or non-Americans.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF
AL HASSAN, MUSTAFA IBRAHIM MUSTAFA**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 June 2005

TO: YAKOUB MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKOUB MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. At the age of 19, the detainee took an interest in participating in jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan after listening to a presentation at a local mosque on the activities of the Afghanistan organization Jama'at al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah led by Shaykh Jamil al-Rahmani.
 2. Jamaat 'ud Dawa Il al Quran (JDQ) is a known militant religious group, oriented toward radical Islam, specifically the Salafi/Wahabi movements.
 3. When the detainee arrived in Pakistan, on his way to Afghanistan for jihad, he stayed in Peshawar, at the Bayt Dhiyafa Al-Mujahid (aka Mujahid Guest House) run by the JDQ organization.
 4. The detainee fought in the region where Konar province borders with Nangahar province, Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee also traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the battle of Jalabad.
 6. In late 1993, the detainee served on the front lines in Kashmir, traveling there in response to the fatwa issued by Sheikh al-Baz, which directed Muslims to travel to Kashmir to fight against India.
 7. In February 2002, the detainee voluntarily went to Afghanistan to fight jihad against the occupiers of Afghanistan to include the Americans.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKOUB MOHAMMED

8. The detainee stayed with other Arabs at several Markez Al-Daa'wa Wal Arshad (MDI) guesthouses in Pakistan awaiting transportation to Afghanistan.

9. Due to the fact that false documentation could not be procured, the detainee dressed in women's clothing with full head covering in an attempt to illegally cross the Afghan-Pakistan border.

b. Training

The detainee trained at a JDQ training camp outside of Assad-Abad, Afghanistan, on the use of AK-47s, M-16s, RPGs, 82-mm mortar and an old piece of Soviet artillery.

c. Connections/Associations

1. En route to Afghanistan for jihad, the detainee visited a mosque in India where he misrepresented himself as someone interested in volunteer service with the Tabligh in Pakistan. With this cover, he was able to secure a visa from the Pakistani Embassy.

2. The Jama'at Tablighi (JT) is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

3. The detainee lived at the JDQ training camp outside of Assad-Abad for approximately one year after fighting jihad against the Russians, working with Abu Ekhlash Al-Masri.

4. Abu Ekhlash is known to be a terrorist tied to al Qaida who specializes in the construction of remote control explosive devices and the poisoning of foods.

5. In 1993, the detainee began to study the "Salafayeen" teachings and joined the Pakistani MDI in their jihad to retake Kashmir from Indian control.

6. The Pakistani NGO Jama't Al-Dawa Wa Al-Irshat (JDI), formerly known as Markez Al-Dawa Wa Al-Irshat (MDI), is dedicated to converting people to Islam and to supporting the Islamic jihad in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

7. JDI is currently known to help foreign Arabs both exfiltrate and infiltrate Afghanistan in support of the jihad against the United States. JDI also supplies money, weapons and clothes to Mujahideen in Kashmir, Pakistan.

8. The detainee states that MDI is the same organization as Lushker Al-Tayeba.

9. The Secretary of State has designated the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKOUB MOHAMMED

organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad (MDI), a Sunni anti-United States missionary organization.

d. Other Relevant Data

On 19 March 2002, Pakistani authorities detained four foreigners (including the detainee) and two Pakistanis on the border of the Kurram Tribal Agency, apparently en route to Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee's behavior has generally been cooperative and non aggressive. He has several failures to comply and one instance of making a weapon out of altered prayer beads.

b. The detainee never made it to Afghanistan to fight against the Americans, as he was captured in Pakistan with other Arab jihadists prior to arrival in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims he only went to jihad in Afghanistan because of media reports stating Americans were taking away land from Muslims.

d. The detainee has denied any connection with al Qaida or any other terrorist group.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 August 2005

TO: OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. According to Foreign Government service reports, the detainee is known for having involvement with terrorist activities in the 1980's.

2. The detainee was provided with false travel documentation and he traveled to Afghanistan either through Pakistan or Iran.

3. Detainee traveled to Pakistan under Usama Bin Ladin's protection.

4. Detainee was in charge of the Tunisian guesthouse and was responsible for greeting new arrivals to Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The Khaldan training camp provided a six-month training program that consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and a tactical course.

2. The Khaldan camp had tunnels used by the Taliban and al-Qaida as shelters.

3. The Derunta training camp provided a two-week poisons course.

4. The Derunta training camp was known to house senior al-Qaida members.

5. The Derunta camp also had random areas for test firing of explosives and weapons.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN

6. Reports state the detainee attended al-Qaida training camps and specialized in anti-aircraft missiles, and eventually became a camp trainer.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name appeared on a spreadsheet account of stipend assistance provided to al Qaida operative families covering a six-month period of May to October 2002. The spreadsheet was found on a 20-gigabyte laptop computer hard drive associated with al Qaida financial operative Mustafa Ahmad Al-Hawsawi.

2. Al-Hawsawi, an al-Qaida financial manager, was known to provide funds for the September 11 hijackers.

3. The detainee lived in Lahore, Pakistan at the home of Nur Zaman.

4. Pakistani Police arrested the detainee in the home that he was renting from Nur Al Zaman.

5. Nur Zaman is a known member of Lashkar-I-Tayyiba.

6. Lashkar-I-Tayyiba (LT) an armed wing of the Pakistan based religious organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad (MOI) a Sunni anti United States missionary organization formed in 1989. LT operatives have facilitated the movement of al Qaida members in Pakistan.

7. A man known to facilitate movement of al-Qaida members identified Nur Zaman and stated Zaman assisted him in moving al-Qaida members in Pakistan.

8. It was stated by an al-Qaida facilitator that Nur Zaman was trusted by al-Qaida and facilitated the movement of Arabs into Afghanistan, and likely met Usama Bin Ladin from Zaman's days in the training camps in Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stayed in a Zahidan, Iran guesthouse run by Abd Al-Ghaffar Al-Libi. During this time, he met another guest, Nasir Al-Maghribi.

10. Nasir Al-Maghribi is a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

11. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in 1995 and is aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization and is active in the international mujahidin network.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. Detainee denied being a member of any militant groups when he lived in Tunisia.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMAR, ABDULLAH BIN

- b. Detainee stated he does not know anything about the Taliban.
 - c. Detainee denied receiving any type of military or weapons training, even when he lived in Tunisia.
 - d. Detainee stated after he moved to Pakistan, he never left Pakistan and never went to Afghanistan.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

24 May 2005

To: DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1999, the detainee left England for Afghanistan in order to live in an Islamic society under Sharia law.

2. The detainee is a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

3. LIFG is identified as a terrorist organization in the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.

4. The detainee is suspected of appearing in a confiscated Islamic extremist military training video showing atrocities in Chechnya.

5. The detainee went to Bosnia to join the mujahideen. The detainee enjoyed his experience in Bosnia and believed it was a good Muslim cause.

6. Detainee's travel from Pakistan to Afghanistan was facilitated by a senior al Qaida Lieutenant.

b. Training

1. The detainee received small arms training during secondary school in Libya.

2. The detainee received training at the Khaldan Camp after arriving in Afghanistan and then joined the fighters in 1999.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a false passport.
2. The detainee stayed at the guesthouse of a senior al Qaida leader.
3. The detainee had a good relationship with Usama Bin Ladin.
4. The detainee was the financial supervisor for operations at the Sanibel organization in Kabul, Afghanistan.
5. Sanibel is identified in Executive Order 13224 as an organization that supports terrorism.
6. The detainee was connected with senior LIFG operatives.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee said his views of Islam are similar to that of the Taliban.
2. The detainee received two months of solitary confinement as punishment for assaulting a soldier at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
3. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Lahore, Pakistan on charges that he was al Qaida before being turned over to United States authorities.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he could not be in the extremist training video because he was never in Chechnya, Russia.
 - b. The detainee claimed to have no knowledge of Usama Bin Ladin or al Qaida.
 - c. The detainee said he never worked for the Taliban while living in Kabul.
 - d. The detainee claimed to have no knowledge of the September 11th attacks or any planned attacks against the United States.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 May 2005

To: NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan a number of times before his final trip to Afghanistan with his wife in July 2001.

2. The detainee was among the Jihadist personnel in Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee attended a mandatory 30-day military training camp where he learned to dismantle and re-assemble a 7.63mm AK-47.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is a believed associate of a high-level al Qaida member.

2. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan.

3. A Wafa official identified the detainee as a Wafa member and a Karachi University microbiology graduate student that purchased materials for Wafa from "New Chemicals."

4. Wafa Humanitarian Organization has been identified under Executive Order 13224 as an organization that supports terrorism.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID

5. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida Lieutenant.

6. The detainee rented a house in Qandahar next to the residence of Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Umar.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested in Faisalabad, Pakistan by Pakistani Military and/or Police while living in the Yemeni House.

2. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant was identified as the director of the "Yemeni" guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the U.S. prior to their execution on September 11th.

b. The detainee said he traveled from Yemen to Pakistan to have knee surgery for a soccer injury that caused him pain for 15 years. At other times the detainee said it was a horseback riding injury. Once in Pakistan, the detainee elected not to have the surgery because the doctor said it would take three months to recover.

c. The detainee claims he traveled to Afghanistan because he heard it was poor and in need of educators.

d. The detainee said he did not know if the house in which he was arrested was affiliated with Taliban or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 October 2005

TO: MADNI, HAFEZ QARI MOHAMED SAAD IQBAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MADNI, HAFEZ QARI MOHAMED
SAAD IQBAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee asked an unidentified confidant where and with whom a United States government official would be on New Year's Eve.

2. The detainee wanted to know if there were protective officers with the government official and if they were American.

b. Connections/Associations

1. An acquaintance of the detainee failed an attack on an American commercial airline in 2001.

2. In mid-December 2001, the detainee speculated that something big was going to happen during a meeting with other al Qaida operatives.

3. The detainee had visited with members of al Qaida in Jakarta, Indonesia.

4. A member of the detainee's family was a leader of the female section of the Al Ikhwan Al Muslimoon Group in Indonesia. This group has been identified as an Islamic extremist group in Asia.

c. Intent

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The detainee stated that it was better to kill one U.S. Government Official than 100 Americans.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee claimed to be an al Qaida operative.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee admitted traveling to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan and many times to Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

N/A

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 November 2005

TO: AZIZ, AHMED OULD ABDEL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AHMED OULD ABDEL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 because he heard about the Taliban from friends and thought it was a good regime.

2. The detainee valued and had a desire to learn the Taliban's religious beliefs. He was in support of the Taliban's resistance against the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee traveled from Mauritania to Damascus, Syria, from Syria to Istanbul, Turkey, from Istanbul to Karachi-Lahore-Peshawar, Pakistan and to the border of Afghanistan where the detainee took a taxi to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. After Jalalabad, the detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee believed that going to Kabul was important because it is the Capital and the center of power for the Taliban.

5. The detainee went to the frontlines in Kabul to observe war.

6. The detainee stayed in a guesthouse frequented by known al Qaida members.

7. The detainee was identified as a mujahidin fighter and had a good reputation as a fighter among the brothers in the Kandahar safehouse.

8. The detainee used a forged passport under another person's name to travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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9. The detainee was a member of al Qaida and pledged bayat to Usama Bin Laden.

b. Training

1. The detainee visited a camp in Kabul.

2. The detainee received military training in Afghanistan and fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.

3. While at the front line, the detainee received "theoretical" training in the use of the Kalashnikov.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee acknowledged that his employer and direct supervisor was associated with high-ranking members of the Taliban and al Qaida.

2. The detainee believed that his direct supervisor was more affiliated with the Taliban than with al Qaida.

3. The detainee stated that the only close friend he knew in al Qaida was his direct supervisor.

4. The detainee spoke with Usama Bin Laden.

5. The detainee attended the wedding of Usama Bin Laden's son.

6. The detainee attended the celebration of al-Zawahiri joining al Qaida at Usama Bin Laden's compound.

7. The detainee's wedding was coordinated by a senior al Qaida operational planner.

8. The detainee used Taliban guides to escape Afghanistan in Dec 2001.

9. The detainee traveled with members of al Qaida out of Afghanistan in Dec 2001.

10. The detainee identified and visited one of Usama's compounds near the Institute before and after the compound was bombed in Kandahar.

11. The detainee is familiar with many al Qaida members who were in Afghanistan.

12. The detainee is familiar with a Senior al Qaida member.

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13. The detainee attended a speech by Usama Bin Laden at Tarnak Farms near Kandahar, Afghanistan sometime near November 1999.

14. The detainee knew of an Egyptian who was well known for his explosive training and would usually encourage people to join the Taliban.

15. The Egyptian who was well known for his explosive training had a camp in Kabul where he trained people in making and using explosives. The detainee met him when in Kabul. The Egyptian was considered an expert in explosives.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee knows Dr. Al Zawahiri who visited the Institution where the detainee worked on several occasions.

2. The detainee has broad knowledge of Taliban and al Qaida guesthouses in Kabul.

3. After a senior al Qaida member's convoy was bombed, the Taliban took the senior al Qaida member to the detainee's house.

4. The detainee had knowledge of the al Qaida assassination of the Northern Alliance commander.

5. The detainee left Afghanistan in December 2001 and traveled with his direct supervisor and crossed the border into Pakistan. They stayed in Quetta for approximately one week before separating.

6. Before parting with his direct supervisor, the detainee received \$5000 United States dollars all in \$100 denominations. The detainee stated that his supervisor invited him to his room in the guesthouse and gave him the money.

7. The detainee and his wife were arrested at their apartment on either June 24 or June 25, 2002 by Pakistani authorities.

8. At the time of his arrest, the detainee had a false passport with him that the Pakistani authorities seized.

9. The detainee believes he was arrested after a Pakistani led the police to his apartment. The police accused the detainee of being an al Qaida member.

10. The detainee's facilitator stated that the detainee was a problem because the detainee would not adhere to his specific guidance to stay low in a safehouse and avoid using the cell phone.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AHMED OULD ABDEL

11. The detainee's facilitator was concerned that talking on the cell phone and such visibility would likely result in the detainee being captured by the Pakistan Police.

12. Another al Qaida facilitator knew the detainee as Abu Jaffar Al Mauritani and recalled seeing the detainee in the circles of mujahidin fighters who fled Afghanistan and were laying low in Karachi, Pakistan.

13. The al Qaida facilitator stated that he may have assisted the detainee's facilitator with logistical support for the detainee and may have passed money for living expenses to the detainee.

14. A senior al Qaida operative knew the detainee as Abu Jaffar Al Mauritani. The senior al Qaida operative met the detainee at the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

15. The senior al Qaida operative provided the detainee with money for living expenses.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies being a member of al Qaida but said that several people attempted to recruit him during his time in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated that the attacks on September 11 were wrong and not with the teachings of Islam. The detainee also stated that he hoped he was not being judged on the actions of Usama Bin Laden.

c. The detainee denies being related to his close al Qaida friend Abu Hafz the Mauritanian by marriage or by blood relations.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution neither on September 11th 2001 nor of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 November 2005

TO: AL NAELY, ABBAS HABID RUMI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NAELY, ABBAS HABID RUMI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. An associate of the detainee recommended that the he should go to Afghanistan and join the Taliban in their struggle to establish an Islamic state. The detainee was led to believe that if he established himself early with the Taliban he would be successful, rising quickly in the Taliban ranks. The detainee left Iraq for Afghanistan in 1994.

2. The detainee claims to have fought in eastern Afghanistan.

3. Originally, the detainee explained that his decision to go to Afghanistan was made out of religious fervor and to fulfill his religious obligation to fight a jihad. Later, the detainee admitted that he is not a religious man. The detainee also cited his desire to become financially successful as a reason for traveling to Afghanistan, claiming he was told there would be good jobs there for an Arab.

4. The detainee arrived at a guesthouse near Logar, Afghanistan and went to the front lines.

5. The detainee served as a fighter for the Taliban.

b. Training

1. While in the Iraqi military the detainee was trained on the rocket-propelled grenade and the mortar.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NAELY, ABBAS HABID RUMI

2. The detainee claims that he was at a guesthouse used by the mujahideen in Kashmir, Pakistan for more than a month. The detainee's training consisted of physical training, marching and exercising.

3. A high-ranking member of al Qaida claims that the detainee trained at the al Farouq Camp in Kabul, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Once in Afghanistan the detainee met with Usama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban. The detainee pledged a bayat to Mullah Omar.

2. While traveling in Afghanistan, the detainee said that he came into contact with Mullah Omar. The detainee claims that he asked Omar for money to help assist him in getting back to his family in Iraq. The detainee said Omar gave him 200,000 Afghani rupees and wrote a letter to the governor of Herat requesting that the governor also help with his situation.

3. The detainee claims that on three separate occasions Usama Bin Laden met with and tasked the detainee to conduct missions in support of al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee served as an infantry corporal in the Iraqi military from 1 May 1987 through November 1988.

2. The detainee was transferred and served as a border guard in November 1988.

3. The detainee claims to have been put back in the Iraqi Army for the first Gulf War. American Forces captured the detainee during the first Gulf War.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he met with Usama Bin Laden and Mullah Mohamed Omar in May 2001. The purpose of this meeting was for the detainee to tell Omar that his soldiers were committing war crimes and because of these atrocities, he could no longer support the Taliban. Omar told the detainee to leave Afghanistan or risk being thrown in prison.

b. A person known to the detainee claims that the detainee was recruited to join groups of fighters and refused.

c. The detainee advised that he was basically a beggar while in Afghanistan. The detainee went from charity to charity and frequently visited Taliban officials asking for money.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NAELY, ABBAS HABID RUMI

d. The detainee claims that he never committed any acts of aggression against the Coalition Forces. The detainee stated that he was never armed with any type of weapon while in Afghanistan and his only military training was the time he served in the Iraqi army.

e. The detainee acknowledged that his first story about being a close associate of Usama Bin Laden was not true. The detainee said the truth is that he never personally met Usama Bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 November 2005

TO: SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. In 1992, the detainee traveled to Gardiz, Afghanistan to fight and was assigned to a mortar battery.
 2. The detainee actively recruited for jihad from 1992-1997. The detainee felt it was an important function and would often speak of jihad while he preached at mosques in Germany.
 3. Based on the detainee's advice, an individual in Duisburg, Germany traveled to Afghanistan for weapons training and to join the armed Taliban forces. The detainee arranged for this individual to meet with Usama bin Laden and the individual swore allegiance to al Qaida. The individual became an important and influential al Qaida member.
 4. While in Germany, the detainee worked with a friend who recruited people to go fight jihad in Afghanistan.
 5. In December 1999, the detainee became the Imam at a mosque in Montreal, Canada. The detainee thought that the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and the Salafis might have a presence at that mosque.
 6. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an al Qaida facilitator who played a part in recruiting jihadists to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya and to become suicide hijackers

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHL, MOHAMEDOU OULD

in the west. The detainee convinced the al Qaida operative and three future World Trade Center suicide hijackers to undergo al Qaida basic military training in Afghanistan.

7. An al Qaida operative stated that the detainee facilitated the operative's initial travel to Afghanistan and his initial introduction to Usama bin Laden.

8. An Islamic extremist stated that he attended meetings in the detainee's house on numerous occasions with a future suicide bomber and an al Qaida operative.

9. The detainee swore loyalty to Usama bin Laden in 1990.

b. Training

1. The detainee was trained in the use of weapons and terrorist tactics in Usama bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan.

2. In January 1991, the detainee trained for six weeks at Camp Farouq, located near Khowst. Training consisted of physical exercises and weapons training on the AK-47, Seminov, Uzi, M-16, Makarov pistol and rocket propelled grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

1. From 1993 through 1999, the detainee was tasked by an individual to set up a radio broadcasting station in Sudan, to assist in counterfeiting money, especially United States currency, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and to help establish greater Internet connectivity between Sudan and Kandahar. The detainee denied taking part in any of these taskings.

2. The individual who tasked the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's key operatives.

3. The detainee was involved in money laundering activities. The detainee wired United States currency three times for one of Usama bin Laden's operatives.

4. The detainee stated that he attended a mosque in Duisburg, Germany where the director was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the area.

d. Intent

1. The detainee said that his goal while in Afghanistan was to become a martyr by dying for Islam. However, the detainee would fight in a battle and there would not be another one for months, thereby reducing his chances to be martyred.

2. The detainee is a suspected facilitator of the failed millennium bombing conspiracy.

e. Other Relevant Data

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

1. In January 2000, the detainee departed Canada to travel to Mauritania. On the way to Mauritania, the detainee was detained in Dakar, Senegal where he was questioned and released after four days.

2. In April 2000, the detainee traveled from Mauritania to Germany where he was detained for three weeks and questioned by German authorities.

3. In April of 2000, the detainee left Germany and traveled to Mauritania where Mauritanian government officials seized his passport.

4. In September 2001, the Mauritanian Security Service detained the detainee after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or U.S. interests.

b. The detainee stated that he did not know of Usama bin Laden's operative's involvement in terrorism when he transmitted money for him.

c. The detainee strongly denied that he had helped anyone travel to Chechnya or Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 November 2005

TO: ZEIDAN, IBRAHIM MAHDY ACHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZEIDAN, IBRAHIM MAHDY ACHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is a suspected associate of a senior al Qaida operative. He traveled to Afghanistan to live under the Taliban.

2. The detainee was at al Farouq when the USS Cole was attacked in October 2000. He appeared in a movie about the attack on the USS Cole that al Qaida made at al-Farouq.

3. The detainee was arrested for anti-government activities in Jordan before joining his brother in Afghanistan.

4. In late 2001, a senior al Qaida associate saw the detainee with a group from Khaldan defending the City of Khowst.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended a three-week mandatory military training course in Jordan. The training consisted of marching and some weapons training.

2. The detainee received training at al Farouq.

3. In late 2000 or early 2001, the detainee took two weeks of training at a series of Egyptian guesthouses. The training included courses on surveillance, counterintelligence, report writing and observation/inspection.

4. The detainee received three months of weapons training at the al-Ghuraba Camp in Kabul.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZEIDAN, IBRAHIM MAHDY ACHMED

c. Connections/Associations

1. One of the detainee's brothers was a member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He was killed in 1998 by Jordanian police while trying to illegally cross the Jordanian-Syrian border.

2. A few weeks before the 11 September 2001 attacks, a senior al Qaida associate gave the detainee three passports and approximately \$300 U.S. Dollars for a class on making fake passports.

3. The detainee was once kidnapped by members of an Afghan tribe in Kabul. One of the detainee's brothers arranged money for the detainee's ransom of at least \$240,000 U.S. Dollars with the assistance of a senior al Qaida operative.

4. The detainee attended the wedding of the sister of a senior al Qaida operative.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee felt that the attacks on America were God's wrath against America for their treatment of Muslims around the world.

e. Other Relevant Data

A few months before the September 11 attacks, the detainee was told that the United States was on alert for something that was going to happen.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of ricin or any other toxins.

b. The detainee stated that if he is released and is ever approached by a group to commit jihad, he would not affiliate with them.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.

e. The detainee is not a member of al Qaida or any other militant Islamic organization.

f. A senior al Qaida operative commented that he did not think the detainee had sworn bayat/allegiance to al Qaida.

g. The detainee denies receiving counter-intelligence training and false passport making.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZEIDAN, IBRAHIM MAHDY ACHMED**

h. The detainee denies ulterior motives for his travel.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 August 2005

TO: OBAIDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAIDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee attended a Madrassa in Dusarakuh, Afghanistan where he practiced militant Islam and was recruited by al Qaida.

2. During the time of Taliban rule, the detainee helped coordinate the movement and activities of various foreign al Qaida operating in the Khowst area.

3. After the beginning of the Allied Forces Campaign against al Qaida and the Taliban, the detainee used his compound to hide and relocate about 18 Arab al Qaida members to Pakistan. Subsequent to the Shahi Kot Campaign, the detainee hid six additional al Qaida Arab members in his house.

4. One month after the conclusion of the Shahi Kot fighting, the detainee received orders to prepare command-detonated mines to use against United States forces in the Khowst area.

5. The detainee placed two Soviet anti-tank mines on the road between Khowst and Miram Shah, Pakistan. He eventually removed the mines, because no United States forces passed by the road and a rain shower washed away the dirt that was covering the mines.

6. The detainee continued to experiment in order to devise a means to detonate the mines. In mid-July 2002, the detainee had at least 18 anti-tank mines hidden in his compound.

7. The detainee was either given a vehicle or received funds to buy a vehicle that he used to scout a position from which he could attempt another mine attack.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAIDULLAH

8. The detainee received cash and additional explosives at his home and traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan to receive instructions or carry messages between Arab al Qaida and their Afghan subordinates still in Khowst Province.

9. The detainee was captured with over 20 anti-tank mines in his home and was personally carrying a notebook containing electronic and explosives schematics.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended a mechanical high school in Khowst City, Afghanistan. Subjects relating to tanks, mines and weapons were taught by Taliban at the school. He attended the mine course, which covered the basics regarding Russian mines, approximately one month prior to 11 Sep 2001.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee joined Jama'at al-Tabligh in approximately 2000.

2. The Jama'at Tablighi is a legitimate Islamic Missionary organization based in Pakistan and is believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

3. The detainee said Karim was a member of the Jama'at al-Tabligh and a shopkeeper who he partnered with in business. The detainee became indebted to Karim after losing 50,000 Rupees. In return for the debt, Karim asked him to store some land mines at his home.

4. Bostan Qadeem, aka Kareem, is a suspected al Qaida cell leader and bomb maker. He and another man were detained. The two did not have identity papers. In their possession they had a Thuraya satellite telephone, \$2,700 USD, 3,600 Pakistani Rupees and 70,000 Afghan Rupees.

5. Three days before the detainee's arrest, Karim drew some schematics on how to detonate the mines in a notebook that the detainee kept under his mattress.

6. The detainee said that Karim told him that the purpose of the land mines was to kill people that Karim disliked.

7. Karim asked the detainee to take a truck full of wood, lumber and a bomb to Kabul, Afghanistan for the purpose of driving it close to where the Americans are.

8. The detainee says that Karim is thought to be a Taliban commander who was getting funding from the Taliban or Arabs.

d. Other Relevant Data

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1. The detainee was arrested during a raid on Miland Village, Ismail Khel District, Khowst Province, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was captured on 20 July 2002.
3. The detainee says that he never would have placed or detonated the mines Karim had given him. He only promised to help Karim because he had been promised money, and he needed the money to help support his family.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee never saw Jama'at al-Tabligh members who were associated with Al Qaida or who were recruited on behalf of Al Qaida.
 - b. The detainee stated that he never attended training camps related to the Jama'at al-Tabligh, jihadists or the military.
 - c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and he also denies knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
 - d. The detainee claims not to have any knowledge of or affiliation with al Qaida or Taliban forces. He says he made a mistake and regrets his actions.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 August 2005

TO: GUL, AWAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, AWAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

In 1981, the detainee joined the Mujahaddin for jihad.

b. Training

1. The detainee worked for the Taliban as a commander of 75 Taliban soldiers, south of Jalalabad. Prior to the Taliban, the detainee was the commander of the Fourth Unit, which had 250 soldiers at the same location.

2. The detainee provided reserve support to deployed units when needed. He had three sub-commanders responsible for tanks, artillery, and infantry.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Shamshateau refugee camp in Pakistan where he worked closely with his commander.

2. The Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) headquarters and operations center was located in Shamshato, near Peshawar, Pakistan.

3. The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party, was founded in 1977 and was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, AWAL

4. The detainee saw or met Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) on three separate occasions.

5. Following the battle of Tora Bora, Usama Bin Laden and Sheik Zawahiri reportedly visited the detainee's house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee tried to resign twice from his position with the Taliban.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. During the time of the Taliban, the detainee told his soldiers "We should be helping Americans."

b. When asked his feelings towards the United States, the detainee stated "All people are different and have different religions which makes them different. We should not step on each others rights."

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 September 2005

TO: WAKIL, HAJI SAHIB ROHULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAKIL, HAJI SAHIB ROHULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is a member of the Jamaat al Dawa al Quran.
 2. The detainee was actively involved in two Jamaat al Dawa al Quran training camps.
 3. The detainee attended a meeting with a Foreign Government Agency to develop a plan to conduct double agent operations against the United States.
 4. A Foreign Government Agency provided the detainee money to hire a group of men to fire a rocket from the Marawara region of Konar into a U.S. compound near Asadabad.
 5. In December 2001 small groups of Arabs escaped from the Tora Bora and were initially resettled to the Konar province village of Marah Warrah. The detainee moved the Arabs for their safety.
 6. The detainee paid to have a radio antenna installed to facilitate the Arab's communication.
 7. The detainee was responsible for members of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin having access to a cache of light and heavy weapons in the Kamdesh district area.
 - b. Training

The detainee knows how to use an AK-47, pistols and grenades.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAKIL, HAJI SAHIB ROHULLAH

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee provided another man with money and instructions to smuggle the Arabs into Pakistan.
2. The detainee is a member of an alliance between the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Wahhabi to coordinate efforts to drive U.S. forces from Afghanistan.
3. The detainee received weapons and supplies from al Qaida through the Nawa Pass.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that the Jamaat al Dawaa al Quran is a small organization interested in helping the Afghani people rebuild their lives. The original purpose of the Jamaat al Dawaa al Quran was to repel the Russians from Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that he no longer fights and the Jamaat al Dawaa al Quran does not represent his beliefs in any manner.

3. The detainee traveled to the United Arab Emirates ten times from 1996 to 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee fought jihad against the Russians and fought against the Taliban and al Qaida at Tora Bora.

b. The detainee supported the Northern Alliance in their efforts to defeat the Taliban, al Qaida and Usama Bin Laden.

c. In 1997 or 1998, the detainee traveled to Mazar-e-Sharif to visit with Massoud.

d. The detainee traveled twice to Tajikistan in 1998 in connection with Massoud and the Northern Alliance.

e. The detainee traveled to Cyprus three times in 1999 to attend international conferences organized by influential expatriate Afghans to increase resistance to the Taliban.

f. The detainee states that he never worked with the Arabs or against the Americans.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 August 2005

TO: MELMA, SABAR LAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MELMA, SABAR LAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is a Brigadier General in the Afghan military. He is suspected of assisting al Qaida members to escape from Tora Bora into Pakistan. He was a commander of 600 border security troops in Konar, Afghanistan.
 2. The detainee is a member of Jamiat-e-Dawa el al Qurani Wasouna (JDQ).
 3. The detainee has met with Haji Rohullah, leader of Jamiat-e-Dawa-el-al-Qurani Wasouna and Loya Jirga representative for the Konar region, on numerous occasions.
 4. Jamiat-ul-Dawa-ul-Qurani (JDQ), an Islamic extremist group with ties to the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID), consisted of Afghan refugees from camps in the Peshawar area. This organization supported the continued war in Kashmir.
 - b. Training
 1. The detainee's military service includes being appointed the title of Brigadier General due to his experience fighting against the Soviet Union and the Taliban.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 1. During the fight against the Taliban, the detainee was Nasruldeen's commander. Nasruldeen was allegedly responsible for attacks on government and coalition entities.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MELMA, SABAR LAL

2. The detainee knew Faqirullah. He knew Faqirullah was possibly involved with the Jam' at Islami, was a high level commander for the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and a dedicated Mujahideen.

3. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, it ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and pioneered sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. It offered shelter to Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

4. The detainee met Ali (NFI) twice in the Konar region, and twice in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee confirmed Ali was a member of the Hezb-e-Islami Khalis under Yunis Khalis.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. Around 15-16 November 2001, nine Arabs, two of whom were wounded, fled Tora Bora for Konar Province, Afghanistan. The detainee assigned one of his leaders to personally handle the security for the Arabs.

2. The detainee arranged for the nine men to be transferred to his fort, where they awaited the arrival of Haji Rohullah. When he arrived, Rohullah provided the detainee with an unspecified amount of money and instructions to smuggle the Arabs into Pakistan. The Arabs' weapons and the truck were given to the detainee as a reward.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2005

TO: SALAAM, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALAAM, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee's family owned hawallas (Money Exchange/Forwarding Business) in Bermal, Afghanistan; Miram Shah, Pakistan; and Al-Amin, United Arab Emirates. The detainee worked in the Afghanistan and Pakistan locations.

2. The detainee traveled between Afghanistan and Pakistan along routes where he was never asked for any identification or a passport by either the Pakistanis or Afghans.

3. The detainee traveled to Miram Shah, Pakistan to purchase a Kalashnikov weapon.

b. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was arrested in his shop by Afghan and United States soldiers.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he is an honest businessman and has never received money on behalf of the Taliban or al Qaida or any other groups. He stated that the money received was from families from outside the country trying to get money to support their families in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee has no knowledge of money transfers outside the three hawallas owned by his family in the United Arab Emirates, Miram Shah, Pakistan, and Bermal, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALAAM, ABDUL

c. The detainee claims all he and his brothers were trying to accomplish was to make an honest living and provide for their families.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 November 2005

TO: KADIR, KHANDAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KADIR, KHANDAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he supported Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, as did the United States during the Soviet invasion. However, Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is now considered the enemy.

2. During the Russian Jihad, the detainee was a nurse for Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin but has had no involvement with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin since 1992.

b. Intent

1. The detainee related that he owned a Kalashnikov and a pistol. The detainee stated that he never used these weapons against the United States. The detainee only has the weapons for protection. The detainee said that it is common in his town to carry a Kalashnikov. His job requires that he carry a Kalashnikov.

2. The detainee is suspected of running a safe house in Khowst. This safe house is believed to be his home or in close proximity.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured in Khowst in his house 19 September 2002. He had been on duty all week and came home on Friday. The detainee claims his enemy had him arrested.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KADIR, KHANDAN

2. Various documents, allegedly from government officials, were found. They authorize unimpeded movement through checkpoints and security and offer vehicle clearance.

3. The detainee was authorized to carry a weapon.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he has never attended any military schools or received any military training.

b. The detainee was very forthcoming during the interview. The detainee is of above average intelligence and cooperated throughout. The detainee strongly believes that he has been wrongly imprisoned, because an individual threatened to have the detainee arrested by the Americans.

c. The detainee related that he has never been a member of any terrorist organization. The only terrorist organization that he has knowledge of is the Taliban.

d. The detainee stated that he is against the Taliban because they do not build or help his community by building roads, schools, lighting, etc. The Taliban terrorizes the people and have destroyed schools.

e. The detainee was asked about the Usama Bin Laden tape found in his house. The detainee claimed it was not a tape but only a cover from a tape. The detainee claimed that his enemy, Pacha Khan, left the tape cover at his house.

f. The detainee related he worked with Americans before his detainment. The detainee identified a journalist/reporter whom later stated he worked for American intelligence.

g. The detainee stated, when American forces entered the country, he was approached and worked with Americans who said they worked for American intelligence. The Americans stayed at his house for 15 days before moving to the airport.

h. When asked his thoughts on Afghanistan's future, the detainee replied his goal was to assist in the development of Afghanistan. The detainee wants better resources, schools, roads and broad-based, established democratic government. Additionally, the detainee would also like to see Afghanistan develop relationships with foreign countries.

i. The detainee seems to not like the Taliban, al Qaida, or the Jama'at Tablighi. The detainee volunteered to work with Americans against these groups if he could be returned to Afghanistan.

j. The detainee is not upset at the United States but is frustrated with the methods used to capture people. The detainee claims other Afghans who have a grudge against someone else are just accusing people because of personal rivalries and are making up stories about people who

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KADIR, KHANDAN

are actually innocent. The detainee claims that a person by the name of Jan Baz turned him in to United States forces for a reward.

k. The detainee claimed to be a Jama'at Islami member. The detainee explained that the group opposes the Taliban forces. The Jama'at Islami used to pass out anti-al Qaida posters offering monetary rewards in exchange for information to the schools in the area.

l. In the spring of 2002, the detainee stated he was offered a job with the new Afghanistan government of Karzai. The detainee also stated that he was made the director of the 7th division of the Afghanistan National Security office in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee claims a letter of appointment to this post is among his belongings held by United States forces. His responsibilities included monitoring media, hospitals, schools and tracking narcotics trafficking.

m. The detainee fought against the Taliban. The detainee was jailed three times by the Taliban, twice for political reasons and once for being late to mosque.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 August 2005

TO: OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee took a job with the Taliban so as to avoid being considered part of the opposition.

2. The detainee worked as Chief of the Taliban Border Security Department in Kabul. His duties included controlling smuggling. He also held positions as Chief of Communications and Chief of Security.

3. The detainee was identified as a fundamentalist connected to the Taliban who opposed Coalition Forces and was active in organizing Anti-Coalition efforts.

4. The detainee attended weekly al Qaida planning meetings in Khowst, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee assisted in the southern exfiltration routes of al Qaida members from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee worked for Abdul Razaq who worked for Mullah Mohammad Omar.

2. Abdul Razaq was the Supreme Commander in the Helmand Province. His unit received money and weapons from al Qaida.

3. Mullah Mohammad Omar is a former Taliban Supreme Leader with ties to al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI

4. The detainee met with senior Taliban officials Saif Ur Rahman Mansur and Sultan Majruhi in the Paktia Province. Saif Ur Rahman Mansur was a facilitator for al Qaida and Sultan Majruhi was from the Department of Intelligence.

5. Sultan Majrukhi is an Anti-Coalition Militant known to provide support to the detainee.

6. The detainee is a suspected associate of Siraj Haqqani.

7. Siraj Haqqani is an Anti-Coalition Militant who has at least three commanders and a number of supporters in the Khowst area of Afghanistan. He was responsible for attacks on American and Afghan Forces.

8. The detainee and Siraj Haqqani received support from Kasim Jan.

9. Kasim Jan was a suspected Anti Coalition bomb maker who was captured by U.S. Forces.

10. A senior Taliban commander asked the detainee to take a message to Jalaluddin Haqqani.

11. Jalaluddin Haqqani was the former Taliban Minister of Frontiers and Tribal Affairs.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested at the Khowst Airport on 14 September 2002.

2. The detainee fought in the Jihad against the Russians. He was an assistant to Commander Sharahy in Khowst.

3. The detainee considers Americans his enemy and expresses hatred toward Americans.

4. The detainee's wife is the sister of Osman. Osman is suspected of being the detainee's bodyguard. Before the detainee was taken into custody, Osman was always with the detainee carrying a Kalashnikov Rifle.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee states that he does not know why the American Forces arrested him.

b. The detainee claims to be an ordinary farmer forced to work for the Taliban.

c. The detainee claims to have had no prior knowledge of the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 or any future attacks.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI

d. The detainee states that he has no knowledge of anyone smuggling anything into the U.S. He does not believe that al Qaida is involved in narcotics.

e. The detainee denied all connections with personalities and groups who are suspected of having or do have affiliations with al Qaida.

f. The detainee denied any involvement with Haqqani or his organization and denied any knowledge of Haqqani's safe house and weapon cache.

g. The detainee claims to have no knowledge about bomb making of any kind.

h. The detainee stated that he did not fight the Russians and found the allegation that he had fought them silly. He related that he was a child and was just reaching puberty at the time the Russians pulled out.

i. The detainee denied he ever assisted al Qaida or Taliban members move across the border. The detainee stated that he did not have the authority anyway because that kind of power resided with powerful men such as Mullah Omar.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: SALEH, AYOUB MURSHID ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH, AYOUB MURSHID ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee became interested in the prospect of receiving military training in Afghanistan because he heard a religious man speak in a local mosque about the religious duties of Muslims. A fatwa taught the detainee that he must apply himself to avoid sin and he must undergo training.

2. In June 2000, the detainee met a well-known, wealthy jihad recruiter in his hometown. According to the detainee, it is well-known that the recruiter travels around Yemen recruiting young men for jihad wars and encouraging people to go to Afghanistan for military training.

3. The detainee stated the recruiter asked him if he would like to go to Afghanistan for a year of training and then return to Yemen to go to college. The recruiter told the detainee it was his obligation as a Muslim to learn to fight and defend Muslim children.

4. The detainee agreed to join the jihad and train in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and then to Karachi, Pakistan. From there the detainee went to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed at a house that had Taliban people in it.

6. From Quetta the detainee traveled to Kandahar, where he stayed at a guesthouse for in-processing and getting ready to go to the training camp. The detainee also surrendered his passports, money and all personal belongings.

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7. Before Kabul fell, the detainee fled to Loghar and then to Khowst. The detainee stayed in Khowst, and then traveled to Zurmat before crossing the border into Pakistan traveling to Banu, Lahore, and ultimately Karachi.

b. Training

1. At al Farouq the detainee completed most of basic training. He was trained on the Kalashnikov, BEKA, Rocket Propelled Grenades, RPK, Molotov cocktails, defensive and offensive grenades, topography, crawling, signals, and how to ignite 50 grams of TNT.

2. The detainee related he took a one-month artillery course at Karghar in Kabul.

3. Also while in Kabul, the detainee took a one-month training course in first aid.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In the late evening of 10 September 2002, the detainee was captured with al Qaida members during a raid of apartments in Karachi by Pakistani police. After a firefight between the Arabs and Pakistani police two Arabs were dead and five captured.

2. The detainee was told that a senior al Qaida operational planner could help smuggle the detainee from Pakistan to Yemen via Iran and Oman.

d. Intent

The detainee stated he currently has no animosity toward the United States, but added that after a long incarceration, it was difficult to say if that would remain the case.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. During the September 10, 2002 raids, 20 packets of individually wrapped documents belonging to various members of Usama Bin Laden's family, 22 remote radio type detonating devices, two handguns and three Russian style grenades were found. Police officials also seized a Kalashnikov rifle and submachine gun used by the Arabs.

2. The detainee stated he could not finish the training at al Farouq because he became sick with malaria and had to miss the last few weeks of training. The detainee went back to the guesthouse in Kandahar to a clinic that was part of the guesthouse.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he never fought at the front line.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEH, AYOUB MURSHID ALI

b. The detainee claims that he is not a member of al Qaida, had never planned any attacks and has no knowledge of any past or future attacks.

c. The detainee stated he did not know who used the computers found during the raid on an apartment and he did not know the origins of the weapons and grenades also found in the apartment.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 October 2005

TO: AL MARWALAH, BASHIR NASIR ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALAH, BASHIR NASIR ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee left nursing school in 2000 to go to Afghanistan. He was not recruited. He wanted to go there on his own.

2. The detainee wrote a will to his family explaining his desire to become a martyr.

3. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan, with three other Yemenis. The group flew from Sana'a to abu Dhabi, to Karachi, Pakistan and then to Quetta where they stayed at a safe house. From there they were guided to Kandahar and to al Farouq.

4. The detainee returned to Yemen in December 2000 to finish nursing school. He decided to return to Afghanistan, a second time, to receive training to fight in Chechnya.

5. On 12 September 2001, the detainee evacuated al Farouq for Kandahar and was taken to a safe house in Kabul.

6. The detainee traveled back and forth from Kabul to Bagram.

7. The detainee retreated to Kabul and went to Lougger. He stopped in a valley on the way to Khost with a group of about 400 Arabs.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALAH, BASHIR NASIR ALI

b. Training

1. The detainee received basic weapons training at al Farouq, including familiarization training on the Kalashnikov, RPK machine gun and Seminov rifle.
2. After the USS Cole incident, the detainee was taken to a location outside Kabul, to complete his basic training. He received training on the Makarov pistol, Dragunov sniper rifle, PK machine gun, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), hand grenades, and map reading.
3. The detainee returned to al Farouq for advanced infantry training, so he could fight in Chechnya.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Another individual reported that a senior al-Qaida operative had given a letter to the detainee along with other important documents and correspondence for destruction.
2. The detainee was associated with a senior al-Qaida facilitator. This senior al-Qaida facilitator acknowledged that the detainee wanted to be a martyr. This senior al-Qaida facilitator described the detainee as a good soldier.
3. The detainee was one of ten individuals captured with a senior al-Qaida operative during the September 2002 raid in Karachi.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A foreign government agency captured the detainee during a September 2002 raid on three suspected al Qaida safe house apartments in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was one of the Arabs within the apartments and a two and one half hour long firefight between the Arabs and the government agency ensued. When the action was complete, two Arabs were dead and five were captured including the detainee. Some weapons were recovered from the scene.
2. A known al Qaida member claimed that all six of the Arabs who were in the safe house during the September 2002 raid, were al Qaida.
3. According to another detainee, the detainee fought on the front lines against the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, at Khorbagh, Afghanistan, located north of Kabul.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he found the 11 September 2001 attacks "beyond imagination" and was saddened by the deaths of so many people.

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b. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to fight Jihad; nothing else. He fights for religious reasons, and he has no allegiance to Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida.

c. The detainee stated he never went to the front lines. Instead, he stayed in the rear near Bagram.

d. The detainee stated he had never heard of al Qaida until he saw it in the news. He also stated that at no time was he ever approached to join al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 November 2005

TO: BALZUHAIR, SHAWKI AWAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BALZUHAIR, SHAWKI AWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan because of a video he saw about Chechnya. He was also concerned about the Palestinian struggle for independence.

2. The detainee went to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001 for jihad.

3. The detainee was given money for a passport and had visas and a plane ticket to Karachi given to him.

4. The detainee departed for Kandahar with three other Yemenis. He stayed at a guesthouse for roughly a week before training at al Farouq.

5. The detainee is one of six al Qaida members who fled Afghanistan and were waiting to travel out of Pakistan when they were detained by Pakistani authorities following a fire at an apartment in Karachi, Pakistan on 11 September 2002.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at al Farouq for about two months in the Summer of 2001. He received training on the Kalashnikov, pistol, Uzi, PK machine gun, Rocket-Propelled Grenade, RPK rifle, dynamite and hand grenades.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BALZUHAIR, SHAWKI AWAD

2. After completing his training, the detainee went back to Kandahar and stayed for about two weeks before returning to al Farouq for one month. During this month he received training on the 82mm mortar, 75 mm mortar, SBG 9, Narem Jack mortar and the BM mortar.

3. After mortar training, the detainee went to the front line for one month. He left the front line and returned to al Farouq for about three months to receive training on infantry tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. During the detainee's stay in al Farouq, Usama Bin Laden came to the camp on two separate occasions and gave speeches. Usama Bin Laden noted that a big event soon would take place against "non-believers", but he did not elaborate.

2. In December 2001 the detainee met a senior al Qaida operative and was ordered to travel to Iran in preparation for their onward travel to Yemen.

3. The detainee provided details on three terrorist facilitators, one of whom was identified as the planner of the al Qaida attack on the USS Cole.

d. Other Relevant Data

A laptop computer acquired during the detainee's arrest on 11 September 2002 contained flight navigation maps, a flight simulator and images of the interior and exterior of various United States ships. The laptop also contained documents relating to kidnapping and the smuggling of money, weapons, ammunition and personnel.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

b. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

c. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility, with negative results.

d. The detainee said he was not involved in armed resistance with the Pakistani Police who attempted to arrest the group of Arabs living in the Karachi apartment.

e. The detainee did not fight while he was on the front line.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BALZUHAIR, SHAWKI AWAD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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