The Perfecting
of Philosophy in Medieval
Times
This essay discusses the rounding of philosophy
into full and relatively complete form (perfecting
it) in the Scholastic System, the best synthesis
that man had been able to achieve up to that time.
This was the beginning of the "perennial
philosophy" in mature form, ready to serve man in
his studies and investigations, to guide his
thinking into rich and profitable fields, and to
assure the sane advance of true science. This essay
looks into the forces and influences that made for
the perfecting of philosophy and outlines the work
of the more notable philosophers of the Period of
Perfection.
Part I:
The Factors of Perfection in
Philosophy
Factors
By the "factors" of the perfecting of philosophy
we mean those facts and circumstances which proved
to be strong influences upon the thinking of
scholarly men, stirring them to philosophic effort.
Of all such factors, -- and there must have been a
rather large number of them, -- we choose for
mention and brief discussion only three; these we
deem the most important of all. They are, first,
the intellectual atmosphere in which men of genius
went to work; second, the questions that engaged
their special attention; third, the equipment with
which they undertook their task.
Of course, the men themselves, the thinkers, the
philosophers, were the greatest "factors" in the
progress they made. But it seems somewhat
inaccurate to call them by that name, as though
they were but an element in a kind of mechanical
process that worked inevitably and automatically.
We dare not degrade great gifts of mind, great
patience, and tireless labors, by naming them so
harshly. Therefore, we shall understand "factors"
in the sense explained in the preceding paragraph,
not as men or as the gifts of men's minds and
spirits, but as things that helped to stir men of
great mind and great diligence to the task of
bringing philosophy to a perfected state.
Atmosphere
By the "atmosphere" we mean what may be called
the spirit of the times, the interests and the
temperaments of people. Now, beginning in the late
8th century, and extending through a period of
about six hundred years, there was current in
Europe a spirit, -- always strong and often
widespread, although never, of course, universal,
-- for deep study, for living with "the things of
the mind"; in a word, for philosophy. Without such
an atmosphere, philosophy could not have matured.
As a plant requires suitable soil and climate, with
a proper amount of light, heat, and moisture, so
philosophy, -- considered objectively, -- requires
a suitable intellectual climate or atmosphere in
which to attain its growth.
In the 8th century a new spirit appeared in
Europe; a spirit for learning. This fact was first
made manifest in the multiplication and the
enlargement of schools, especially of the parish
schools and the cathedral schools. The spirit of
learning was fostered by Charlemagne who brought to
the continent from the British Isles the learned
Alcuin and a staff of teachers to take charge of
the palace school (the Palatine School) and to make
it a proper model for the others. Through the
centuries a zeal for learning grew among the
people. The 14th century found the European world
furnished with many great universities, -- Cracow,
Rome, Bologna, Paris, Cologne, Oxford, Cambridge,
and others. All of these were Catholic, for
European civilization was Catholic; all were
fostered and furthered by ecclesiastical power.
Themes
One of the most important themes of discussion
in the age of which we now speak was that of the
nature and value of knowledge. This metaphysical
question, basic in philosophy, was focussed upon
the elements of human knowledge, our ideas.
Now, ideas are, in themselves, universal
ideas, and the realities which they represent
in our minds are represented there in a
universal manner. When, for example, we have
the idea or concept of "tree," we have knowledge of
what tree means; we can write the definition of
tree as such; the definition is applicable to each
and every possible tree, regardless of size,
location, botanical class. For, we know an
essence, and we know it as abstracted from
the circumstances and limitations that mark the
individual things which have that essence in the
world of things outside the mind. This is what we
mean by saying that ideas are universal ideas, and
that we know things in universal.
Now, there is no question that the thing known
in an idea or concept is present to the mind in an
abstract and universal way. But there can be
question about the way in which that essence
actually exists in the things that have it. How,
for example, does the essence "tree," -- which is
the object or "thing known" in the idea "tree," --
exist in the actual trees which exist or can exist
in the world of reality outside our minds? Does
this essence exist "universally" in each individual
tree? Or does each tree merely reflect this
objectively existing essence as each of a thousand
mirrors reflect the same sun?
Our ideas are applicable to things, or are
predicable of things, as constituting their essence
or as indicating what must be or may be associated
with their essence. Of the five modes called the
predicables, the most notable are genus
and species. If the idea "body" is
predicated of trees, grass, flowers, weeds, moss,
vines, and stones, it is predicated as their
genus, that is, as an essence which is in
each of the things named, and yet is not their
entire essence; for the plants are more than
bodies, they are alive. If, of the first six items
mentioned, we predicate the idea "plant," this is
their species, for it expresses their entire
essence; the points in which the various plants
differ are nonessential or accidental.
Now, the question arises: how does the universal
"body" (that is, the essence "body," known in
universal) exist in all these things, and in all
others called "body"? Do genera and species have
actual existence in things outside the mind, and if
so, what is the character of this existence? This
is the famous "Question of Universals" which was
hotly debated for more than four centuries, and
indeed is sometimes debated among philosophers
today.
The idea is a universal idea. The object
of a universal idea (that is, the objective essence
known in the idea) is called "the universal." What
are universals? What are genera and species? These
questions are identical in meaning, and they pose
the "questions of universals."
There are four doctrines possible in the matter
of universals. Three of these are fallacious; one
is correct and true. It required the genius of the
13th century to establish the true doctrine, which
we list here as the fourth, that is, Moderate
Realism.
1. Extreme Realism (called
Ultra-Realism and sometimes simply
Realism) holds that there are universal
essences in the world of reality outside our minds.
There is, for example, a universal essence of man,
and of this essence individual men either have only
a part or share, or each individual reflects the
entire essence as a little mirror reflects the
whole sun. This doctrine which comes flatly in
conflict with both reason and experience is to be
rejected.
2. Conceptualism says that the human mind
is built to form ideas, and these have no knowable
corresponding reality in the world outside the
mind. Individual human minds are like so many Ford
motors, all alike, all working the same way.
Therefore, universals are really nothing in
themselves, they are merely modes of the mind's
working. This doctrine which destroys the value of
all knowledge and plunges us into the insane
contradictions of skepticism is to be wholly
rejected.
3. Nominalism says that the mind, faced
by a vast and complicated world of individual
things, finds it convenient to make groups of these
things and to affix a name or label to each group.
The basis of the grouping is a "similarity" in
things. The names or labels are our ideas. Thus
ideas are not representations of essences; they are
merely group-names. There are no truly universal
ideas; hence there are no universals. Nominalism is
destructive of all knowledge, of all reasoning; it
renders science and philosophy impossible; it is
full of the contradictions of skepticism, as, for
instance, when it affirms a universal grasp of
"similarity" even in its detail of the universal
grasp of anything. Therefore, nominalism is to be
rejected.
4. Moderate Realism (called also
Qualified Realism) says that outside the
mind only individual things exist. There are no
universal essences in the world of creatures.
Creatures cannot exist universally, but only
individually. But the mind, in forming its
universal ideas, follows no mere inner drive of its
nature wholly divorced from the things known (as
Conceptualism maintains), nor does it merely apply
names to groups of "similar" things (as Nominalism
teaches). The mind is able to see wherein a
plurality of things are at one. The mind
sees, for example, that all trees are trees. It can
form the universal idea "tree," and the idea truly
represents the reality which makes any tree
a tree. In a word, the idea "tree" represents the
essence "tree." Only what is present to each tree
individually is represented in the mind
universally, that is, in a manner abstracted from,
or prescinding from, the individual limitations
(size, location, botanical kind, number of leaves,
etc) which make a tree this
individual tree.
The mind knows things really, according
to the reality which is their essence, but
the mind knows in a mode or manner which is its
own. Now, the mind's mode of knowing is the mode
called "universality." Hence, the universality of
our ideas is in the mind and from the mind, but it
is based upon reality inasmuch as the essence which
the mind knows universally is actually verified
individually in each and every thing which has that
essence. Here we see the reason for calling this
true doctrine on universals "realism," and at the
same time "qualified" or "moderate" realism. For
our ideas represent essences really, yet we do not
assert that the object of an idea (that is, the
essence represented; the "universal") exists as a
universal essence outside the mind.
The Question of Universals was not the only
theme discussed by the philosophers of the age of
the perfecting of philosophy. Far from it. But this
is a question of outstanding importance, and it
brings with it the study of nearly every important
question of metaphysics. For the critical question
(which has to do with the nature, value, and extent
of human knowledge) is the fundamental question of
all philosophy; and the question of universals is
the very focus and point of the critical question.
Penetrating study of the critical question, and, in
special, of the question of universals, could not
fail, and did not fail, to bring with it deep
interest and active discussion of all other
important philosophical questions.
The themes discussed in the Period of Perfection
were, therefore, fundamental and all-important
themes. They constituted a notable "factor" in
making the age what it was, a time of bringing
philosophy to rounded completeness.
Equipment
The great philosophers of the age of the
perfecting of philosophy brought to their task no
certified list of credits from some collegiate
agency. Nor had they at ready disposal endless
libraries of printed books, in most of which, to
steal a phrase from C.E.M. Joad, each author thinks
it interesting to present the reasons which have
led him to formulate his particular brand of
error.
The limitations of the times were, in some
sense, a benefit. The philosophers had great
writings; they had such a library as their times
could boast; it was a library that could be known
and mastered, and was worth the effort that
mastering required. It was not a babble of voices
confusing issues and overwhelming the mind with
unlimited digression and unrestrained
ineptitude.
From the late 8th century there were available
for the studious mind the works of Plato and of
Aristotle at least in part (although until the 13th
century Aristotle was known in Europe in very
defective and even falsified translations). There
were also the works of Porphyry, Boethius,
Victorinus, Macrobius, Apuleius, Cassiodorus,
Trimegistus, Hippocrates, Lucretius, Seneca,
Cicero, Galen, Martian Capella, St. Augustine,
Origin, St, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius, St.
Ambrose, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Nemesius,
Pseudo-Dionysius, St. John Damascene.
Movements
Matthew Arnold says that great creative epochs
in literature result from the happy concurrence of
two notable powers, -- the power of the man and the
power of the moment. It may be truly said that the
age of the perfecting of philosophy came from a
similar union of powers.
Although we refuse to list the men of the period
as mere "factors" of philosophical achievement, we
must notice the fact that the age was one of great
and gifted teachers. Among these we mention Alcuin,
Roscelin, Anselm, William of Champeaux, Abelard,
Bernard of Clairvaux, the doctors of the schools of
Chartres and St. Victor, William of Auvergne,
Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Roger Bacon,
Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent,
John Duns Scotus, Raymond Lully, William of Ockham.
In addition to these Christian teachers the
Arabians Averroes and Avicenna, and the Jewish
philosopher Moses Maimonides, lent their learning
and energy to the philosophical effort of the
times.
As for the power of the moment, four items may
be mentioned.
- First, philosophy, ripened by five centuries
of intense study, was ready for expression in an
orderly and complete synthesis at the opening of
the 13th century.
- Second, the works of oriental philosophy
were spread, in Latin translation, through
western Europe; these aroused both sympathy and
strong controversy, and so proved to be a force
in the intellectual movement of the age.
- Third, great universities were multiplied
and their influence was a strong and steady
force for philosophical achievement.
- Fourth, the religious orders of St. Francis
and St. Dominic carried to the common people not
only the better knowledge of the Christian
Religion but also a great deal of philosophical
knowledge; for members of these religious
families went everywhere and were often forced
to meet on philosophical grounds the thinkers of
non-Christian persuasions.
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