

**SAM PAPERS No. 2/99 GREEK OCCUPATION OF IZMIR AND ADJOINING TERRITORIES**

**REPORT OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (MAY-SEPTEMBER 1919)**

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**PREFACE**

The Greek army started occupying Western Anatolia on 15 May 1919, in the aftermath of the First World War and under the sanction of the Council of the Paris Peace Conference. Although the initial instructions of the Council restricted the occupation zone to the borders of Izmir (Aydın) province, the Greek army started to advance into Anatolia from the first day of their landing in Izmir.

During the incursion of the Greek occupation forces, Greek soldiers and local Greeks committed atrocities against, not only the Turkish population, but also all of the non-Greek communities that had been living peacefully in the region for centuries. These atrocities included massacre, pillage, rape and the destruction of towns and villages.

The severity of the incidents and the reactions of the Turkish and Western witnesses forced the Paris Peace Conference to establish a commission to investigate the claims against the Greek forces. The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna [Izmir] and the Adjoining Territories conducted an investigation in the region between 12 August and 15 October 1919. The Commission visited the towns and villages where atrocities were committed, listened to witnesses from all communities, collected evidence and prepared a report.

The first objective of this study is to inform the reader about the formation of the Commission of Inquiry, the Commission's studies in Anatolia, the contents of its report and the ensuing discussion at the Council of the Paris Peace Conference.

Secondly, this study aims to give a brief description of the incidents that occurred during the first four months of the Greek occupation, a period corresponding to that investigated by the Commission.

Finally this is an attempt, with references to international law, to evaluate the incidents that the Commission detailed in its report.

All the events mentioned in this study are based on the official reports of European and American representatives in the region and the Turkish authorities. This study makes extensive use of official sources, such as documents on British foreign policy and papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. Furthermore, this study uses books and articles in English and Turkish that are the products of intensive archival research and of academic value.

We hope that this book will provide a contribution to academic research on Turkish-Greek affairs.

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## I. THE GREEK OCCUPATION OF IZMIR

### A. Greece's Interest in Turkish Territories

#### 1. First World War Secret Treaties for the Partition of Turkey

During the course of the First World War, the Allies concluded a number of secret treaties intended to shape the post-war world and, more significantly, to share out their possible territorial gains. Five of these treaties were related to the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Three of them concerned the rules and regulations governing the Turkish Straits and the division of various territories. Two of them, the Treaty of London and the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, were exclusively dedicated to the partition of the western districts of Asia Minor.

Britain and France paid a high tribute to Italy for her services to the Entente with the Treaty of London on 26 April 1915. According to the secret clauses of the Treaty, Italy would gain full possession of the Dodecanese, which she had held since the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912. Italy would also gain rights in Antalya province on the Asia Minor littoral. Italy's territory in Asia Minor, centred on Antalya and its hinterland, was to be proportional to that of the other Allied Powers. This zone was to be established in conformity with the vital interests of France and Britain. However, if France, Britain and Russia should occupy certain districts of Asiatic Turkey during the course of the war, then the territory adjoining Antalya was to be left to Italy, which reserved the right of occupation.<sup>1</sup>

Italy had planned to enlarge her proposed share in Asia Minor, but Britain had already prevented further Italian demands by making previous commitments to Greece.

Greece, after gaining her independence in 1829, expanded her territory three times against the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century and the first thirteen years of the twentieth century. She was enthusiastic about taking part in the final apportionment of 'the sick man of Europe'. As the traditional Megáli Idéa (Great Idea), a policy committed to creating a larger Greece by including practically all of the regions in which 'the influence of Hellenism has been paramount throughout the ages', became increasingly popular, the Greek Premier Eleutherios Venizelos, sought to fulfil the demands of his country by claiming the lands of 'ancient Greek heritage' on the opposite side of the Aegean.

On the one hand, Venizelos was following closely the Italian's expansionist aspirations for Asia Minor, and on the other hand, he was trying to contact the Allies so Greece could participate in the partition plans. Venizelos first received news from Rome of the partition plans around the middle of December 1914. The Greek minister plenipotentiary in Rome reported the latest news concerning the fate of Asia Minor in a dispatch dated 27 December 1914. He stated the following:

The Italian Government hopes that, in the event of Germany's defeat, the moment for the partition of Anatolia will arrive, and that then Italy will get her chance of securing a footing there. According to the Italian Government's forecast, Russia will be awarded the Armenian provinces, thus obtaining an outlet on the Mediterranean opposite Cyprus. France will get Syria, and Great Britain Arabia. There will be plenty of territory left over for Italy west of the Russian zone. The Italians realise, to their great chagrin, that it will not be possible entirely to ignore the claims of Greece, but as everybody wants Smyrna and the Maeander Valley, they feel confident that the region in question will not be given to us. In any case they will do

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everything in their power to reduce Greece's share of the Anatolian inheritance to a minimum.  
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Venizelos had an interview with Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister plenipotentiary in Athens, on 9 January 1915, on the subject of sending Greek troops to the assistance of Serbia. In this interview, after pointing out the difficulty of persuading the public, Venizelos mentioned his country's prospects of brilliant territorial gains.<sup>3</sup>

A fortnight later, on 23 January 1915, the British Government offered Greece large concessions on the coast of Asia Minor as an inducement to enter into the war on the side of the Allies. Venizelos welcomed this lucrative business with eagerness. However before he could give an official answer he had to persuade the Greek army and King Constantine.<sup>4</sup>

Contrary to Venizelos's expectations, King Constantine and Colonel Metaxas, the Chief of General Staff of the Greek army, had deep concerns about Greece's participation in the war. After two attempts ended in failure, Venizelos submitted a new memorandum to the King on 2 March 1915, recommending "the immediate participation of Greece in the Dardanelles campaign of the Allies. Greece would get Smyrna [Izmir] as previously promised as compensation for such a brave move. Even Constantinople [Istanbul] would be annexed to Greece."<sup>5</sup> Despite these brilliant pledges, the King persevered with his strict attitude against participation in the war and Venizelos was forced to resign on 6 March 1915.<sup>6</sup>

In a situation where Greece had declared and strengthened her neutral stand, Italy insisted on more gains from the post-war spoils. However, Britain and France were against such extra gains. During the war Lord Balfour, Foreign Secretary of Britain had long conversations with Imperiali, the Italian diplomatic representative to London, hoping to settle the pressing Italian claims. Italy demanded the addition of Mersin (Mersina) and Adana to her planned territory in Asia Minor, but France refused this concession. After this disappointment, Italy began to sound out the Allies on getting Izmir added to its assignment of Anatolian territory. Britain strongly rejected such a demand because Izmir could still be offered to Greece as an inducement for her entrance into the War.

The secret Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne signed on 19 April 1917 rewarded the Italian demands. By the terms of this Treaty, Italy recognised the claims of Britain and France to Mesopotamia, and obtained some further concessions for herself in Asia Minor, in the Antalya and Izmir regions. Since Britain and France did not abandon the idea of drawing Greece into the war, Italy's satisfaction would be only temporary.<sup>7</sup>

King Constantine was expelled from Greece in June 1917 as the result of an Allied operation, and Venizelos once again returned to power as premier. Venizelos immediately began to pursue an interventionist policy. Greece declared war on the Central Powers on 30 June 1917.<sup>8</sup>

Although Greek participation in the War did not provide a momentous contribution to the Allies' victory, as soon as the War ended, Venizelos claimed the territory promised by the British.

## 2. Greek Policy after the Mudros Armistice

The Ottoman and British officials signed an armistice at Mudros on 30 October 1918, putting an end to the state of war between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies.

The terms of the Mudros Armistice opened up the Straits, guaranteed access to the Black Sea and provided for Allied occupation of the fortresses along the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. The

Turkish forces were to be demobilised immediately, except where necessary to preserve order. The Allies were placed in control of all the railroads.

The most important provision of the Armistice was Article VII. This Article gave the Allies "the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies".<sup>9</sup>

In November 1918, immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice, Venizelos went to Paris to present Greece's territorial claims to the Peace Conference convened by the Allies to prepare draft peace treaties with the defeated powers. Venizelos reasserted Greece's claim to all of Western Anatolia, from opposite Rhodes to the Sea of Marmara, in a letter and memorandum addressed to the British Premier, Lloyd George.<sup>10</sup>

When the Paris Peace Conference was convened in January 1919, it appeared that all the Allied Powers agreed that the Ottoman Empire was to be divided into separate elements.<sup>11</sup> This was a great opportunity for legitimising Greece's demands. As a matter of fact, between 3 and 4 February 1919, Venizelos, in a lengthy exposition at the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, presented the case for the reconstitution of Hellas and the unification of all the Greek-speaking peoples under one flag. According to Venizelos, this claim was based on Point Twelve of the Wilson Principles and on the right of self-determination. He called for the cession to Greece of Northern Epirus, the islands in the Aegean, all of Thrace and most radically, Western Anatolia.<sup>12</sup>

To Lloyd George, who considered Venizelos to be "the greatest statesman Greece had thrown up since the days of Pericles", such demands seemed both fair and expedient. The Greeks could serve Britain's interests by replacing the Turks as the protectors of imperial communication lines with India.<sup>13</sup>

Despite Lloyd George's strong desire to recompense Greece urgently, the Supreme Council decided that the matter should be submitted to a Commission of Greek Claims, composed of the representatives of Britain, France, Italy and the United States. The Commission completed its work on 6 March 1919. It accepted the basic principles of the Greek case with modifications, but with the important reservations of certain members. There was a lot of difficulty concerning Western Anatolia because of the Allies' prior commitments in the secret treaties made during the War. Italy would make no accommodations whatsoever on the grounds that the question was too involved for the general solution of the Anatolian question and because the regions to which Greece aspired had been, to a large extent, the subject of well-known international agreements. The American representative was opposed to the cession of Western Anatolia to the Greeks on general principles. In addition, the American representative stated to the Commission that his country was free of the secret treaties' obligations and could not take them into consideration in the settlement of the question. Both the American and Italian members were opposed to the approval of the Commission report when it was submitted to the Central Committee on Territorial Questions on 7 March 1919.<sup>14</sup>

The question of the Greek demands simmered in the Central Committee for a number of weeks after the Commission of Greek Claims reported. It was not until the early part of May that it began to assume any significance in the Conference beyond one of principle or the respective interests of the Greeks and the Turks.<sup>15</sup>

## B. The Expedition to 'Mikra Asia' 16

### 1. The Landing of Greek Troops in Izmir

#### a) Why Occupation?

The subject of partition of Ottoman territory caused a deep confrontation between Italy and her allies at the Paris Peace Conference. Italy became particularly angry about the possibility of the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia. The Italian delegation left the Conference on 24 April in protest and did not return to Paris until 5 May. Although the Italians engaged in an unprecedented operation and sent a warship to Izmir on 30 April to prevent Greek occupation, the absence of the Italian delegation from the Conference facilitated the hard work of Lloyd George to persuade France and the United States in Greece's favour.<sup>17</sup>

As a result of British diplomacy, Greek forces were authorised on 6 May to land on Turkish territory.<sup>18</sup> There were three reasons for allowing Greece to occupy Izmir.

The first reason was to reward Greece for her participation in the War, as previously promised. However, to obtain the approval of the Allies other than Britain, they needed to be persuaded that the majority of the population of the aforementioned region was Greek. As early as February 1919, Venizelos presented to the Paris Conference some statistics about the Greeks inhabiting Western Anatolia, mostly inflated and manipulated by the Greek Patriarchate. Relying on these statistics he claimed that the total population of Greeks in Western Asia Minor, including the Vilayets<sup>19</sup> of Aydyn (Izmir) and Bursa (Hüdavendigar) were 1,080,000, while in the same territory the Turkish population was only 943,000.<sup>20</sup> However, these statistics were far from reality. Even the actual statistics of the Greek Patriarchate were different from those presented to the Conference. According to the statistics of the Greek Patriarchate which were published in London in 1918, the total number of Greeks in Western Anatolia, including Aydyn, Bursa and Biga was 934,061.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, according to the Turkish Official Statistics of 1910, which is the only reliable source still being cited by serious researchers, the Greek population of the region was clearly fewer than the Turkish population. The total Greek population in the provinces of Aydyn, Bursa and Biga was 511,544,<sup>22</sup> while the Muslim (Turkish) population of the same provinces was 3,170,705.<sup>23</sup>

The second reason was based on humanitarian concerns. Ostensibly, the Greek army would occupy the city and province of Izmir to stop Turkish atrocities against the Greek population in that city and the surroundings. Venizelos reported to the Conference, 12 April, one month before the decision for occupation, "Some serious troubles had been occurring in Izmir and Aydyn." He claimed, "Turks had committed some crimes against the Greeks in those regions" and emphasised his, "Concern for the furtherance of such atrocities."<sup>24</sup>

Lloyd George and the French Premier Georges Clemenceau strongly supported these accusations, despite the lack of convincing evidence in order to justify occupation. On 2 May, Lloyd George presented to the Council of Four, the executive organ of the Peace Conference, a document supporting the Greek cause and purporting to be from a Greek Committee in Athens. This document appeared to confirm the existence of atrocities committed by Turkish soldiers on the basis of official messages signed by the Turkish military officers ordering the Turks to exterminate the Greeks.<sup>25</sup> On 12 May, Clemenceau once more emphasised the importance of stopping the Turks' atrocities<sup>26</sup> and Lloyd George repeated his previous allegations.<sup>27</sup>

The third and main reason was to prevent the Italian operations in Western Anatolia. Britain and France were against comprehensive Italian expansion despite the fact that some parts of the region had been promised to Italy in secret treaties during the War. In Lloyd George's words, "Any day it might be found that Italy had captured Anatolia and it would be difficult to get them out of there once they had occupied it."<sup>28</sup>

When Lloyd George informed Clemenceau and Wilson on 6 May that the Italians had completed their preparations for a landing in Izmir, the French and American presidents demonstrated their strong opposition and gave their approval for a Greek operation.<sup>29</sup>

#### b) The Operation and the First Victims

Having obtained the authorisation of the Paris Peace Conference, the Greek troops left the Port of Eleftheron in Greece on 13 May 1919. Fulfilling the directives of Admiral Calthrope, the highest-ranking British naval officer in the region, the Greek military fleet anchored at the island of Lesbos (Midilli) on 14 May to review the final details of the landing.<sup>30</sup> On the same day at nine o'clock Admiral Calthrope informed Ali Nadir Pasha, the commander of the Turkish forces in Izmir, that the fortified positions of Izmir would be occupied by the Allied forces according to the clauses of Article VII of the Armistice. Admiral Calthrope did not mention the Greek troops in his first note to Ali Nadir Pasha.<sup>31</sup>

At 11:30, Admiral Calthrope sent another communication to Ali Nadir Pasha and stated the following points:

According to the seventh article of the Armistice and with consent of the Powers of the Entente, Smyrna [Izmir] will be occupied by Hellenic troops. The transports that are to convey them will begin landing tomorrow morning at 8 o'clock. From 7 o'clock, detachments of Greek sailors will occupy the landing stairs. To prevent any regrettable incidents and any misunderstandings, all the troops in the quarter of Passeports [a district of Izmir], as far as the point, except the posts of the police and gendarmerie, must concentrate at the barracks and conform to the decisions of the commandant of the occupation corps. The telegraph and post office will be immediately occupied by an English detachment to prevent all communication with the exterior.<sup>32</sup>

While the British admiral was informing the Turkish authorities about the occupation, the Greek naval commander, Mavroudes, was communicating the 'good news' to the Metropolitan of Izmir, Chyrysostomos, and his clergy, in the large hall of the diocese. Mavroudes read the following announcement from Premier Venizelos:

The time has come. Hellas was called by the Peace Conference to occupy Smyrna [Izmir] so as to safeguard public order. Our fellow Greeks understand that this decision was taken because the leaders of the Conference have decided on the union of Smyrna [Izmir] with Greece. I myself, having remained enslaved under the same yoke until the Balkan wars, understand well what feelings of joy overwhelm today the souls of Greeks in Asia Minor.

Of course, I do not intend to suppress the expression of those feelings. I am sure, however, that such expression will not take the shape of any kind of hostility or arrogance against any of the elements of the population inhabiting the area.<sup>33</sup>

During the night of 14-15 May, Greek troops disembarked at Izmir under the protection of British, French and Greek warships.<sup>34</sup> On 15 May at 11 o'clock, the Greek troops began to march to the Turkish barracks. At the head of the troops, native Greeks carried a large Greek

flag and surrounded and preceded the troops in a compact body, shouting "Zito Venizelos" (Long live Venizelos) and applauding frantically.<sup>35</sup>

During this march, a shot went off and killed a Greek soldier. Although the Turkish officers announced that the shot was a personal act and could have been fired by a demonstrator, the Greek troops immediately took up their positions against the Turkish barracks and opened steady fire. A light machine gun also took part in the fusillade.<sup>36</sup>

As time passed, the landing turned into a general slaughter of the Turkish population. Besides Greek troops, the civilian Greeks roamed the streets and began looting and killing.<sup>37</sup> Greek soldiers occupying the Governor's Hall and the Turkish barracks plundered whatever they found, even snuffboxes and pocketbooks. The Greek officers did not try to prevent these abuses, but on the contrary, their attitudes and gestures excited them.<sup>38</sup> During this pillage, money was stolen to the value of 23,143,690 piasters, which was then equivalent to 5,250,000 French francs.<sup>39</sup>

Unfortunately, the first day of the Greek occupation was not only consisted of robbery, burglary and plunder. According to Allied sources, the Greek occupation forces and civilian Greeks killed 300 to 400 Turks on 15 May 1919. More than 2,500 Turks, some even as young as 14 years of age, were subjected to arbitrary detention. The Turkish population was subjected repeatedly to rape, beating, insults and torture.<sup>40</sup>

An Italian naval officer on the warship *Duilio*, which was anchored in Izmir bay on 15 May, communicated his observations during the Greek landing to the Italian Chief Commander of the Navy as follows:

Greek troops which were brought by seven ships started to land in Smyrna [Izmir] in the morning of 15 May at 9:30. As directed by the British Admiral [Calthrope] one night before, no one from the Turkish population tried to oppose or resist the occupation. The occupation started as local Greeks saluted the Greek forces with joyful demonstrations. After being sanctified by the Greek Metropolitan [Chrysostomos], troops began to march to the Turkish quarters of town, accompanied by victorious songs and applause. Then a firearm was shot. Recovering from the initial panic, the Greek soldiers started to attack Turks, beastly and wildly. A wounded Turkish colonel was transferred to the *Duilio*. After the first treatment he was sent to the Italian hospital in the town. During the incidents of the first day of the occupation more than 400 Turks were killed or wounded.<sup>41</sup>

The officers of the Allied Powers did not stop the Greek army's atrocities against the Turks in Izmir. Moreover, the Allied military authorities condoned the advance of Greek troops into the interior of the country.

## 2. Enlargement of the Occupation and More Atrocities

The Greeks made it clear from the first day that they had come, not for a temporary occupation, but for a permanent annexation of Western Anatolia into a greater Greece encompassing both shores of the Aegean, thus bringing nearer the Megáli Idéa and the restoration of the departed glories of the Greek Christian Empire of Byzantium.<sup>42</sup> A strong foundation was necessary for the establishment of lasting rule over the occupied land. Therefore, the Greeks commenced to penetrate into the interior of Anatolia.

The Greek troops started to enlarge their area of influence after establishing complete control of Izmir. They occupied Urla on 17 May and Çe?me on 20 May. Thus, the entire Izmir peninsula came under their control. The Greek troops advanced rapidly starting with a march to the



southern, southeastern and northeastern parts of Aydyn province on 20 May 1919. These operations were mostly accomplished through the river valleys where the Turkish towns were concentrated. After occupying Menemen, a small town in the Gediz valley on 21 May, the Greeks began to advance beyond the borders of Aydyn province. The occupations of Manisa on 26 May, Aydyn on 27 May and Turgutlu (Kasaba) on 29 May were completed without meeting any resistance. Bayındyr and Tire were occupied by 29 May.<sup>43</sup> The Greek incursion continued in June and Ödemiş, Bergama (Pergamon) and Kuşadası were occupied by the end of the month.<sup>44</sup>

During the advance of the Greek army, the Greek soldiers and the local Greeks, who were incited by the Greek officers and clergy, committed innumerable atrocities against the Turks. The atrocities took the form of mass destruction in some towns. In particular, incidents during the first two months of the Greek military occupation were dreadful in the towns of Menemen and Aydyn. These events were confirmed by the official reports of Turkish, British and Italian commissioners.

A Special Commission of Judicial Inquiry, established following the atrocity reports, reached Menemen on 17 June 1919. The Commission was composed of Turkish administrative and military officers, the British officers, Captain Charns and Lieutenant Lorimer, and medical delegates from the British and Italian consulates in Izmir. They presented a report to the commanders of the Allied Powers in Izmir. Some of the horrible details that were stated in this report are as follows:

... From the unanimous declaration of [persons] questioned separately by the Commission, it stands out clearly that the Mussulman population of Menemen gave a perfectly correct reception to the Hellenic occupying corps and that far from provoking them to the excesses, which would have been reprehensible in any case, it remained absolutely calm and tranquil. The Greek commandant's allegation regarding the shots fired on the Hellenic soldiers was denied upon oath by all the witnesses without exception. The non-existence of Greeks wounded, either civilian or military, as against a thousand Turkish victims, confirms the veracity of the evidence. The massacres, the destruction and the extortion committed at Menemen by the Hellenic soldiers and the native Greeks can only be imputed to a vile spirit of vengeance and cupidity ....

... All sorts of people, women, girls, children down to babies, more than a thousand persons, were basely assassinated. During the few hours of its stay at Menemen, the Commission was able to draw up a list, which though incomplete, contains the names of more than five hundred unfortunate victims. The Hellenic agent, having opposed a thorough investigation, and the exhumation of the hundreds upon hundreds of corpses buried clandestinely by the Hellenic military authorities, the identity of the victims could not be established on the spot the same day ....

... The Greeks, to hide the proof of their guilt, wanted to destroy the corpses. But the number of the latter being too great, for lack of time they piled them by tens into hastily dug trenches, insufficiently covered with earth .... The massacres were not confined to the town. They extended also to the surroundings, to the fields, the mills, the farms where another thousand victims may be counted. All the buildings outside the town, as well as several hundreds of houses in the town itself, were pillaged, sacked or destroyed.<sup>45</sup>

The situation in Aydyn was no different. Zükrü Bey, the commander of the Turkish forces in the region, communicated the sequence of the atrocities to the commander of the Italian contingents of Çine, to be forwarded to the representatives of Italy, the United States, Britain and France. Zükrü Bey, in his letter of 1 July, revealed the terrifying results of the Greek occupation and begged immediate relief:

The Greeks who have occupied Aydyn and the surrounding region have begun after a short period of calm, to practice with unheard savagery the policy of extermination of the Turkish element, with the object of being able to claim and annex these countries.... The massacres, the abominable offences, the burning of whole villages and of Turkish quarters, all these crimes perpetrated by the Greeks constitute a disgrace in our era of civilisation. To have been victims of such odious acts, what faults could possibly have been committed by these women, children and poor, innocent people who were only going about their own business. They have been fired upon with bombs, rifles and machine guns. They have been cast into burning houses and burnt alive.... Turkish travellers were taken out of the trains, the women and the young girls were violated before the eyes of their husbands and parents ....

... I beg you to be so good as to inform the Great Powers of the Entente that we pray them in the name of humanity to restore calm and order to this country by putting an end to the ignoble regime of Greek adventurers and by withdrawing the Hellenic forces of occupation.<sup>46</sup>

The victims of these massacres were not only the Turks or the Muslims in general. The Greeks targeted everything and everyone that was not Greek. In Nazilli, between 19 and 20 June, 16 Jews were slaughtered besides hundreds of Turks. The Jewish houses and synagogues were set on fire as well as the Turkish houses and mosques.<sup>47</sup> Such anti-Semitic acts were first practised in Izmir on 15 May. Some Greek soldiers plundered a number of Jewish shops during the incidents occurring that day. However, the British and French authorities warned them and the Greek officers sentenced them. Within the interior of Anatolia, far from the Allies' eyes, the Greek army and the local Greeks did not differentiate between Muslim and Jewish targets.

## II. THE ATTITUDE OF THE GREAT POWERS TOWARDS THE GREEK ATROCITIES

### A. Rethinking the Occupation

The diplomatic, consular and military representatives of the Allies in Turkey closely followed the Greek operations in Western Anatolia and communicated their observations to their headquarters abroad. Detailed reports of the atrocities and massacres in the Turkish towns and villages were often sent to the foreign capitals.

James Morgan, the British Consul General in Izmir, communicated to London on 11 July that the Greek artillery shelled two villages, killing 20 Turks, including women and children.<sup>48</sup> Morgan informed the British authorities of another barbarous act of the Greek army in his report of 17 July. He wrote in his report that the Greek soldiers had arrested 37 Turkish soldiers and civilians. The corpses of these people were found later. The throats of the victims had been cut, all the bodies had been pierced by bayonets and their ears and lips had been torn off.<sup>49</sup>

Major Hadkinson of the British army gave dreadful details of the Greek slaughter in Ayvalyk, Turgutlu and Nazilli in his report dated 4 July 1919. Hadkinson stated that the Greek soldiers had committed all sorts of crimes, particularly murder, rape, pillage and robbery. He continued by saying that innumerable dead bodies of the Turkish population from the occupied towns had been found outside of those towns.<sup>50</sup>

C.E.S. Palmer, a British diplomat, reported to the Foreign Office on 25 July that the Greek army had taken Turkish civilians as hostages, just as the German and Bolshevik armies had done during the War. He criticised the atrocities against the Turkish population.<sup>51</sup>

Palmer stated in his report of 1 August 1919, that the Greeks had killed 2,000 Turks in Aydyn and it was difficult to find any excuse for the Greek excesses.<sup>52</sup>

The Americans in Turkey were also sending reports on the Greek incursion and atrocities. W.L. Westermann, the American delegate to the Commission of Greek Claims at the Paris Peace Conference, recorded in a memorandum that, by the middle of June 1919, according to the reports from senior officials (such as the commanders of the American warships in Izmir, the Swedish Consul in Izmir and prominent American residents of the city) the Greek army and Greek officials in Izmir had been acting in a manner of semi-barbarity.<sup>53</sup>

The French and Italian delegates in Izmir sent notes to their high commissioners in Istanbul on 12 July 1919, also emphasising the gravity of the situation the Greek occupation caused. The Allied delegates stated that the Greeks were not following the orders of the Allied Commander in Izmir, who, as the Allied Commander in Chief of the Izmir operation, was technically in command of the Greek forces. In fact, the Greek field officers ignored the orders of their own commanders and acted completely independently. As a result there was almost no control exercised over the troops in the field and none at all over the irregular forces operating in the front and flanks of the army. They had organised massacres of the Turkish population, engaged in simple banditry and settled wherever possible. It was recommended that the entire Greek force be recalled to the Izmir district.<sup>54</sup>

All of these reports and hundreds of others, combined with the complaints of Turkish officials, including a letter of protest sent by the Turkish Sheik-ul-Islam, the highest official of the Islamic clergy, and the news reports in the widely circulated European newspapers, brought the matter to the attention of the Council of the Heads of Delegations of the Paris Peace

Conference. The members of the Council began to discuss seriously the Greek operations in Western Anatolia and to try to discover the dimensions of the atrocities.

## B. The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry

### 1. The Formation of the Commission by the Council of the Heads of Delegations of the Paris Peace Conference

#### a) The Italian Claims against the Greek Army

On 12 July 1919, Crespi, the Italian delegate, presented a memorandum including some complaints about the Greek operations in Turkey to the Council of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, which had convened at the Quai d'Orsay. He emphasised in this memorandum the discomfort of the Italian troops in Anatolia because of the unauthorised advancement of the Greek army. He recalled, "... The Council of Four had laid down that the Greeks should not be allowed to occupy any territory outside the Sandjack of Izmir and the Kaza of Ayvali[k] without being authorised to do so by the British Commander in the region ...". The Italian delegate strongly criticised the Greeks who had occupied Aydyn with wanton bloodshed. He also wanted, "The immediate withdrawal of the Greek army to the north of Aydyn."<sup>55</sup>

Although this memorandum mentioned some Greek atrocities in the region, in fact, it was presented to the Council to prevent possible clashes between the Greek and Italian occupation forces in Anatolia. Thus, the Council decided that A.J. Balfour, the British delegate, should instruct the British Commander in the region to send a report on the subject of incidents between the Greeks and Italians.<sup>56</sup>

The Italian complaints appeared once more at the Council during the meeting the following day. Aiming to put an end to such claims, Balfour suggested that Venizelos should be asked to attend the Council meeting to give a frank explanation of what was happening. The Council agreed and invited Venizelos to attend the Council the following day.<sup>57</sup>

Venizelos attended the Council on 16 July 1919, and tried to justify the Greek army's moves. He said that on June 18 he had sent a letter to the President of the Peace Conference calling attention to the concentration of Turkish troops in various places, notably the Izmir region. Further, he said that on June 23, the situation appeared to him to be so disquieting that he told the Greek General to take such action as was necessary so that he would not be driven into the sea. He added that he did not wish to expand the Greek occupation and that all he wanted was to be safe in Izmir and to preserve his hold on certain places that were entirely Greek. He also said that he was well aware that no conquest would influence the decisions of the Conference.<sup>58</sup>

While Premier Venizelos was trying to invent some reasonable pretexts, the Greek army was continuing its march inside Anatolia, contrary to the orders of the Conference. Moreover, this supposedly humanitarian strategy was lacking any reliable evidence. There was no Greek majority in any of the towns occupied. All the representatives knew this fact. Clemenceau, the head of the French delegation, asked Venizelos, "If he considered the Greeks in Smyrna [Izmir] formed a majority" and the latter answered in the affirmative.<sup>59</sup>

The Council decided at the end of Venizelos's presentation that the Italian and Greek parties should seek an agreement regarding the delimitation of the Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor. Subsequently, they should submit the results of their conversation to the Council as soon as possible.<sup>60</sup>

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## b) The Atrocities in Anatolia as a Subject of the Council Meetings

The subject of the Greek atrocities in Anatolia was first formally brought to the Council by the Grand Vizier ad interim and Sheik-ul Islam Mustafa Sabri Efendi. He stated in his telegram to the President of the Conference on 15 July 1919, "The Greeks had committed atrocities in Izmir and its surroundings." He formally accused the Greeks and requested the Conference to send a commission of inquiry to the region. He further stated, "The Council was not without responsibility, seeing that it had sent the Greeks to Izmir."<sup>61</sup>

When President Clemenceau read this telegram at the Council meeting on 18 July, Balfour, the British representative said, in acquiescence, that he had been "Much concerned about the reports from Asia Minor." Balfour added, "A question had been asked in the House of Commons and it had been learned on investigation that the Greeks had, in fact, committed atrocities." According to Balfour, "Even Venizelos himself had been forced to admit the truth of the allegations." However, Balfour claimed, "It was more important to prevent recurrences of atrocities in the future rather than to investigate those which had already occurred." He added, "The control could only be exercised by the Conference through the local Commander in Chief".<sup>62</sup>

On the other hand, President Clemenceau evaluated Balfour's remarks and said, "Balfour's plan to prevent further atrocities would only result in the issuance of a proclamation which would have no effect at all." He stated, "The Allies would have to deal with the Turks hereafter and that it had to be made clear to them that the Allies did not send the Greeks to Smyrna [Izmir] merely to commit atrocities."<sup>63</sup>

Tittoni, the Italian representative, supported Clemenceau's views. However, Balfour persisted in his stand that the Greek soldiers had committed the atrocities complained of. Thus, "they should be checked by the Commander in Chief in Anatolia, not by a special commission of inquiry."<sup>64</sup>

Balfour had his own reasons for his opposition to the formation of a commission of inquiry. Firstly, he did not want to inflame the past incidents that would produce a condemnation of the British officers who had not taken effective measures to stop such atrocities. Secondly, an independent commission consisting of all the Allied representatives would provoke a clash between the authorities of the commission and the Commander in Chief in Anatolia, who was British. Finally, the Italians would use the proven atrocities as an instrument to accuse the Greeks and this kind of confrontation among the Allies would weaken the Conference.

Clemenceau was determined to establish a commission of inquiry in spite of Balfour's hesitation. Later, on the same day, when Venizelos was invited to the meeting to give a brief explanation of the decision he had reached with the Italian representative, President Clemenceau informed him, "It was probable that commissioners would be sent to inquire into the atrocities which were reported to have been committed by the Greek troops." He added, "Venizelos was without a doubt aware of what had occurred."<sup>65</sup>

Clemenceau's statements did not surprise Venizelos. He said that he fully understood the necessity of such a commission and that he would, however, remark that the Government at "Constantinople" [Istanbul] was not in full control of the situation. At this point Clemenceau once more mentioned the atrocities and said that he had observed that Venizelos himself did not always control the actions of his countrymen.

The Greek Premier was in a difficult position and could do nothing but accept the excesses. However, he tried to minimise the level of mass slaughter by reducing it to isolated, individual crimes. He affirmed that whenever there had been complaints of excesses he had had the

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culprits severely punished and that there had been two executions. Venizelos was not successful in spite of his efforts to persuade the Council that the Greek government had taken all the necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. At last he was forced to affirm that he did not wish to conceal anything and was ready to accept a commission of inquiry.<sup>66</sup>

The Council continued with its meeting after Venizelos left. Balfour withdrew his reservations and it was decided to send a commission to Asia Minor consisting of one commissioner each from Great Britain, France and Italy. The Council referred the subject of the participation of the United States in this commission to the American government.<sup>67</sup>

### c) Debate on the Structure of the Commission

According to the decision of the Council on 18 July 1919, the Commission of Inquiry would be composed of members from the four Great Powers of the Peace Conference. However, Venizelos, in a letter sent to the President of the Council on 19 July 1919, requested the appointment of a Greek commissioner to the Commission. President Clemenceau referred to Venizelos's letter during the meeting of the Council on 21 July and affirmed that this proposal did not appear to be very acceptable. Tittoni, the Italian representative, shared Clemenceau's opinion. He said, "The investigating commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission, then it might be argued on the same lines that Venizelos should have remained in the room at a previous meeting when the Council had deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation of Anatolia."<sup>68</sup>

At this point, Balfour, the British representative, asked the military experts present in the meeting room whether or not they thought the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a reliable finding. The military officers could not give reasonable justifications either for or against the proposal.

After further debate, the Council reached a compromise allowing a Greek officer to follow the studies of the Commission but not to take part in its work and not to vote.<sup>69</sup>

The members of the Council reached an agreement on the instructions for the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry at their meeting on 25 July. According to these instructions, the Commission would take as its subject matter the acts of the Greek troops during and after their occupation of Izmir, Aydyn, Ayvalyk and the adjacent regions. The Sheik-ul-Islam had reported these acts in the form of a complaint. The inquiry was to be expanded to include all the events relative to the above from the date of occupation up until the present. The Commission was to determine responsibilities and to submit its report as soon as possible to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, together with whatever conclusions it might consider relevant.<sup>70</sup>

Since the Commission was after all formed, the Greek Premier Venizelos tried to influence the Council's attitude towards the claims against the Greek army. The Council invited him to its meeting held on 5 August to present information about the situation in Bulgaria but he mentioned the subject of the Greek atrocities in Turkey more than he did Bulgarian affairs. Venizelos claimed, "The Turks had made a great outcry, which had perhaps been heeded too much in certain quarters." He frankly admitted, "Some excesses had occurred in Anatolia," but he also tried to find some excuses, saying, "The Greek troops had been attacked in the streets by people firing at them out of windows and on roofs." Contrary to previous reports of the British officers from the field, Venizelos reduced all atrocities, even the massacre of prisoners, to, "Rare and isolated instances."<sup>71</sup>

The members of the Council seemed unsatisfied by the Greek Premier's excuses. They had already informed the Turkish Government on 3 August 1919, of the creation of a Commission of Inquiry. The Turkish Government received this message with great satisfaction and stated in its communiqué of 4 August, "Without doubt the humanitarian decision of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude."<sup>72</sup>

One day before the newly established Commission would convene for its first meeting, 11 August 1919, DeFrance, the French High Commissioner in Istanbul, sent a telegram to the Council stating, "The presence of a Greek officer in the Commission's meetings would prevent the Turkish witnesses from making their depositions freely."<sup>73</sup> The Council decided at its meeting on 14 August that the Greek commissioner should not be present at the meetings of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry in Anatolia. The Council also decided that all necessary information should be communicated to him and that similar facilities should be given to a Turkish representative if subsequently appointed. By this decision a Turkish officer would be admitted to the Commission as well as a Greek one.<sup>74</sup>

The original members of the Commission were Admiral Bristol for the United States of America, General Bunoust for France, General Hare for Britain and General Dall'olio for Italy. Besides the commissioners, the following were appointed to the Commission as interpreters: Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant Stewart and Mr. Caessbrough for the United States; Lieutenant Rumerchéne, Lieutenant Vitalis and Lieutenant Dugoureq for France; Commander Thomson, Captain Harris and Lieutenant Higham for Britain; and Lieutenant Villari and Lieutenant de Bosis for Italy.<sup>75</sup> The Greek Government had designated Colonel Mazarakis to follow the investigation just a few days before the Commission's first meeting.<sup>76</sup> Colonel Kadri Effendi, the Turkish representative, could only be appointed on 21 August, nine days after the first meeting of the Commission.<sup>77</sup>

## 2. The Commission's Investigation in the Region

The Commission held its first meeting in Istanbul on 12 August 1919. The Commission convened 46 times up until the end of the investigation on 15 October. The first and last meetings were in Istanbul, but the Commission held all the others in the places where the incidents had occurred. The Commission visited Izmir, Menemen, Manisa, Aydyn, Nazilli, Ödemiş, Ayvalık, Çine and the surroundings during the course of the inquiry and listened to 175 witnesses. There were Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Americans, British, French and Italians among the witnesses.<sup>78</sup>

The Commission reached Izmir on 22 August 1919, and began to work at the Izmir High School the next day. In this first meeting, Colonel Mazarakis, the Greek representative, was informed of the decision of the Council of the Paris Peace Conference on his status vis-à-vis participation in the meetings. The same status would be applied to the Turkish representative.<sup>79</sup>

The Commission first of all listened to Yzzet Pasha, the Governor of Izmir. The governor gave detailed information on the incidents that had occurred during the landing of the Greek army in Izmir. Later in Izmir, the Commission listened to Chrysostomos, the Greek Metropolitan, some members of the Greek and Italian communities, and some British, French and American officials.<sup>80</sup>

After two weeks of inquiry in Izmir, on 6 August, the Commission proceeded to Aydyn. The situation there was terrible. From a population of 30,000 before the Greek occupation only 375 Turks were left. In Aydyn, the Turkish Colonel, Kadri Effendi, gave a letter to the Commission in which he stated the miserable condition of the remaining Turks in the town and their fear of the Greek soldiers. He requested the Commission to choose its witnesses not from Aydyn, but

from among the people who had fled from this town to Nazilli and Çine. The Commission accepted this request.<sup>81</sup>

The Commission reached Çine on 10 September 1919. There, the Commission listened to the witnesses of the atrocities in Aydyn and Çine. Major Zefik Bey, the Turkish commander in the region, was also among the witnesses. In Çine, for the first time since the start of the inquiry, the Turkish women who the Greeks had assaulted presented their testimonies to the Commission and answered questions. After Çine, on 11 September, the Commission went to Nazilli and continued to investigate the incidents and listen to witnesses from the Turkish and Greek population and then returned to Izmir via Aydyn.<sup>82</sup>

The Commission continued its inquiry in Ödemiş, Menemen, Manisa and Ayvalık between 19 and 24 September, and then completed its work in Izmir on 27 September 1919. The Commission once again convened in Istanbul on 30 September to classify the evidence and to prepare a report for the Council of the Paris Peace Conference and stayed in Istanbul until 15 October 1919.<sup>83</sup>

The Greek Premier Venizelos had sent two letters to the Council in Paris, dated September 22 and 28, while the Commission was working in Anatolia. In his letters he had protested against the allegedly insufficient extent to which Colonel Mazarakis, the Greek representative, had been associated with the work of the Commission of Inquiry. The Council decided in its meeting on 30 September that the minutes of the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Izmir should be communicated to the Greek representative Colonel Mazarakis, who should be asked and permitted to notify the Commission of any criticisms regarding the matters in question.<sup>84</sup>

The French commissioner, General Bunoust, presented the Report of the Commission to the Council on 7 October 1919. However, the Council did not make any deliberations on the report until 8 November 1919.

### C. The Report of the Commission and its Repercussions at the Peace Conference

#### 1. The Report and Conclusions of the Commission

The Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry was consisted mainly of three parts. The first part was a detailed narrative of the investigation and was officially called the 'Account of Events that took place following the Occupation, which were established during the Inquiry between 12 August and 6 October 1919'.<sup>85</sup> The second part was committed to finding the persons responsible for the incidents and was titled 'Establishment of Responsibilities'.<sup>86</sup> The third part, 'Conclusions put forward by the Commission', contained an evaluation of the inquiry and proposals for the Council of the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>87</sup> The Report also included correspondence with Colonel Mazarakis, the Greek representative to the Commission<sup>88</sup>, and a reservation from General Dall'olio, the Italian representative, on the subject of the Greek occupation of Izmir.<sup>89</sup>

##### a) An 'Account of Events'

The Commission presented the results of its investigations in forty-seven points as an 'Account of Events'. The first sixteen points were about the incidents before and during the Greek occupation of Izmir.

It was stated in the report that the governor (Vali), Nouredin Pasha, had unquestionably persecuted the Greek population in the Turkish province of Aydyn (Izmir) in 1914 and during the war. However, all the inhabitants, regardless of race, had been treated impartially since



the new governor, Yzzet Bey, had come to office. Peace had been restored despite the presence of several gangs of brigands in the region.

After giving a detailed summary of the landing of the occupation forces, the Commission stated that no opposition to the landing was organised by the Turkish authorities and the shots fired by Turks were isolated incidents. However, the Commission criticised the Turkish authorities for not taking effective measures to anticipate or prevent the escape of prisoners from the prisons near the barracks.

On the other hand, according to the Commission, the Greek High Command had taken no preventive measures to maintain order during the march of the Greek troops through the streets of Izmir. The Turkish troops had stayed in their barracks in accordance with the orders of the representatives of the Allies. The Greek military, civil and religious authorities had done nothing to calm the local Greek population. Moreover, the ceremony conducted by the Metropolitan to bless the Greek troops had only served to increase the tension.

The Commission explained in its report the skirmish during the landing of the Greek troops. While the Greek Premier Venizelos had insistently accused the Turkish army of being responsible for the killings during the occupation, the Commission stated that it was impossible to ascertain who had fired the first shots. Furthermore, the Commission affirmed that intense gunfire from the Greek troops followed and that many Turks had been killed. According to the Commission's report, 300 to 400 Turks had been killed or wounded on the first day of the occupation.

Points 17 to 32 of the Report were about the incursion of the Greek forces into the interior of Anatolia and the Greek soldiers' atrocities against the non-Greek population in the towns of Manisa, Nazilli, Turgutlu, Aydyn and Ödemi?. These points also contained an account of the fighting between the Greek troops and the Turkish gangs and the assaults of the Turkish gangs on the Greek population at the above mentioned towns.

The Commission attached great importance to the incidents at Aydyn where 3,000 Turkish and Greek people died. Points 33 to 40 of the Report were exclusively about the Aydyn incidents. In brief, the Commission accused the Greek army, which had occupied and re-occupied the town in violation of the instructions of the Allied Commander, of killing a large number of Turks for no reason. The Commission also found Turkish gangs<sup>90</sup> responsible for killing and robbing a number of local Greeks.

The concluding points of the report were on the incidents and atrocities that had occurred during and after the Greek occupation of Bergama, Manisa and Ayvalık.

#### b) Establishment of Responsibilities

The Commission made an evaluation of the events under the title 'Establishment of Responsibilities' and apportioned responsibilities for the incidents in eight points.

The Commission blamed the Greek Military High Command and certain officers who had failed in their duty for the incidents in Izmir. However, the Commission also accused the Turkish authorities in Izmir, who had not taken measures to prevent the escape of prisoners before the landing.

The Commission placed responsibility on the Greek government for the serious troubles that had stained the interior of the region with blood while the Greek troops were advancing. The Commission accused the Greek government representative in Izmir, first of all, for not

following the instructions of the Council of the Paris Peace Conference. Second, he had allowed the Greek troops to occupy the regions beyond the borders of Izmir province without seeking authorisation from the Allies' representative. Third, he had deliberately left the people in ignorance of the extent of the occupation, thus helping to increase the panic of the Muslim inhabitants and hence the disorder.

The Commission found the Greeks solely responsible for the Menemen massacre and affirmed that the Greek officers who had been present at Menemen had utterly failed in their duty.

### c) Conclusions of the Commission

The Commission's conclusions consisted of four main points.

First, the Commission stated that although the principle behind the occupation was only to preserve order in the region, actually the operations of the Greek authorities had all the appearances of an annexation. Moreover, the Commission affirmed that it found the occupation incompatible with the restoration of order and peace.

Second, the Commission asserted that if the purpose of the occupation was to preserve order and public safety, then the Allied troops should implement it, not the Greek troops. The Commission also declared that a Greek annexation of the region would be contrary to the principle of respect for nationalities because in the occupied region, with the exception of the city of Izmir and the town of Ayvalyk, the Turkish population undoubtedly predominated over that of the Greeks.

Third, the Commission proposed replacement of the Greek troops in Anatolia with the Allied occupation forces. If the Greek army were to take part in the Allied forces, then it should be placed far away from the Turkish nationalist forces.

Fourth and finally, the Commission stated that if the Greek forces were removed from the region, then there would be no reason for armed resistance against the Allied occupation because the opposition of the Turkish nationals was only against the Greeks.

## 2. The Report and the Paris Peace Conference

### a) The Allies' Approach to the Report

The Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry was discussed at the meeting of the Council of Heads of Five Great Powers held on 8 November 1919. President Clemenceau pointed out that Greek Premier Venizelos had asked to be heard in the meeting. According to Clemenceau, "There were two questions to be asked of Venizelos. First, he should explain the massacres of which the Greek troops were accused. Second, Venizelos should give a reasonable clarification of the operations of the Greek army beyond the borders of Smyrna [Izmir] province without the approval of the Council." Clemenceau noted, "It was necessary to remind the Greeks that the Turkish question was not settled and to ask Venizelos to state definitely if they could maintain themselves in Smyrna [Izmir] with their own efforts." He also said, "The information received indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable and that the Turks would never accept the Greek occupation unless obliged to by force." Clemenceau frankly affirmed, "The Council would be more and more led to respecting the integrity of the Turkish territory. Under the above mentioned circumstances, it would be well to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as the conquerors of Asia Minor."<sup>91</sup>

The Italian representative to the Council, de Martino, made similar assertions to those of Clemenceau's. De Martino said, "The military occupations in Asia Minor were clearly only provisional and should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question." He stated, "The Italian opinion was clearly favourable to the principle of respecting the integrity of the territories." He also pointed out, "The relations between the Italian troops and the Turkish population were excellent and that no conflicts had occurred between them."<sup>92</sup>

Despite the analogous attitudes of the French and Italian representatives, Sir Eyre Crowe, the British delegate, stated "The Commission had been formed to investigate the claims of atrocities by the Greek army, not the general course of the Greek occupation in Anatolia." He asked the other members of the Council, "What would happen if they, as the Report of the Commission suggested, asked the Greeks to leave Smyrna [Izmir]? Would the Turks replace them or was an Inter-Allied occupation contemplated? If an Inter-Allied occupation was impossible, then could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to withdraw when there was no one to replace them? Could the Council possibly think of evacuating the country before a peace treaty had been concluded?"

Sir Eyre Crowe depicted in his further remarks some of the Greek excuses for the atrocities. He pointed out, "The Greeks claimed that many of the difficulties arose from the fact that they did not have complete authority in that region." He proposed, "To give the Greeks greater liberty of action and at the same time a greater share of responsibility." Clemenceau immediately rejected this proposal. The French representative told the British representative, "He observed the danger was that the Greeks would take too much latitude."<sup>93</sup>

At this point Greek Premier Venizelos was invited to the meeting to present his remarks on the Report.

#### b) The Greek Defence

Venizelos, at the beginning of his speech gave a brief historical summary of the investigation and asked the Council to consider the Report of the Commission null and void and to establish another commission of investigation.<sup>94</sup>

The Greek Premier told the Council, "He had been obliged to inform the Council on 22 August that his representative, Colonel Mazarakis, was not allowed to be present at the taking of testimony. He protested against that stand, which was contrary to the elementary rules of justice." Venizelos claimed, "The Commission had refused to call the witnesses which Colonel Mazarakis had proposed to be heard and in so doing, it had violated the most elementary principles of justice and it had put a positive premium upon false testimony."<sup>95</sup> Venizelos insisted on, "The fallacy of the testimonies which were taken by the Commission". But he did not give a reasonable explanation for how all of the 175 witnesses, in different places, at different times and with communication between them impossible, agreed on the same points about the incidents.

General Bunoust, the French member of the Commission of Inquiry, strongly opposed Venizelos's approach. He said, "The Commission had never decided to communicate the depositions taken; it had unanimously decided that the depositions would lack sincerity if the Greek representative had to be informed of them." He stated, "The Turks would not have opened their mouths in the presence of a Greek officer and that when the Council had sent a telegram to the Commission on 30 September ordering the notification of Colonel Mazarakis of the conclusions of the Report, the Commission had transmitted this in full to the Greek Colonel."<sup>96</sup>

In fact, Colonel Mazarakis had read the Report and sent a letter to the Commission on 11 October 1919 including his views on the course of the investigation and his own report on the results of the inquiry.<sup>97</sup> Briefly, in his long counter-report, Mazarakis stated, "The Report of the Commission had been written without a sense of justice." He made 17 points in his attempt to refute the conclusions of the Commission Report, claiming, "The responsibilities for the sad incidents in the towns and villages of Western Anatolia belonged to the Turks." He claimed, "The military occupation of Smyrna [Izmir] had been imposed to restore order, to rescue what remained of the Christian population and all the events, which had had regrettable consequences, had occurred after the Turks had attacked the Greek army." Mazarakis had further asserted that not only had the Greek authorities acted promptly throughout to restore order, but also he dared to suggest that they had taken and would continue to take an interest in the Muslim population. He claimed that even the shortcomings of the Greek Command in Izmir in anticipating the events could be explained to a certain extent: no one—neither Greece's representative nor the Allies' representatives in Smyrna [Izmir]—expected the Turks to attack and no effective action had been taken to distance the Turkish troops and prevent the people from gathering together. He finally stated, "Perfect order reigned in the zone occupied by the Greek army and complete anarchy outside the zone."

After the members of the Commission had read Mazarakis's report, they sent a letter to him on 24 October 1919 stating that the Commission's opinion on certain points did not accord with his own views, in spite of the statements of the witnesses that he had produced. The Commission, as a result of the Mazarakis's comments, made only one modification in its initial report and "Decided that there were no grounds for modifying its original account, which was adopted unanimously".<sup>98</sup>

After the General's detailed answer to Venizelos's claims, Clemenceau asked Venizelos if he intended to discuss the facts brought out in the report. The Greek Premier answered, "[He] did not want to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been brought to the knowledge of the Greek representative." This time Clemenceau astonishingly told Venizelos, "It was a serious matter to make such a reply and the Council expected from Venizelos some precise answers on questions of fact." Clemenceau emphasised, "As head of a government he had to know if the alleged facts had really happened," and he invited Venizelos to "Reveal the truth."

Surprised by such an approach from Clemenceau, Venizelos acknowledged, "There had been some excesses during the operations of the Greek army," but he claimed, "These excesses could readily be explained." He admitted equally, "The conditions under which the landing of the Greek troops to Smyrna [Izmir] took place created an administrative responsibility for the Greek Command and that the Greek government had imposed heavy penalties on them." He wanted the Council to remember that the day before the occupation, the Turkish population had assembled and that protests against the occupation had been posted up.<sup>99</sup>

General Bunoust immediately refuted Venizelos's claims on the Turkish protests in Izmir. He explained, "These posters were not appeals for resistance and the Turkish population was only asked to assemble in order to prove that the Turkish element was in the majority. Moreover, the crowd of Turks was unarmed."<sup>100</sup>

Additionally, on the incidents during the Izmir landing, Venizelos admitted, "The officer commanding the Greek troops had been guilty of imprudence", and he claimed, "In order to punish those responsible for the excesses, a court-martial had been held and three Greeks were condemned to death." However, Venizelos could not give a satisfactory explanation of the massacre of 20 prisoners. He only repeated, "The Greek lieutenant commanding the escort to the prisoners was severely condemned after the incident."

Venizelos said, "He did not share the Commission's views on the atrocities in Menemen." He stated, "The Greek troops had been attacked by Turkish fanatics while entering Menemen and this attack had provoked the excesses." He claimed, "Only 20 Turks, not 300 as stated in the report, were killed by the Greek soldiers in Menemen." He made similar claims for the atrocities in Nazilli.

Venizelos had some difficult minutes in the presence of those who had prepared the instructions while trying to explain the reason to order the Greek army to occupy and re-occupy Aydyn, contrary to the instructions of the Council. He stated, "The Greeks were in a state of war with the Turks. If the Turks could boast of having expelled the Greeks from Aydyn, then their situation in Smyrna [Izmir] would have become impossible." Therefore, "[He] had given the order to re-occupy the town." Moreover, he affirmed that after the Aydyn incident, he had instructed the Greek military authorities, "Not to hesitate and to go beyond the borders of the zone of occupation in the event of an attack by the Turkish bands."<sup>101</sup>

After Venizelos had completed his efforts to justify the Greek operations, Clemenceau once more reminded him, "Greece had had a mandate from the Conference and had not kept within the limits of that mandate." He asked Venizelos, "What would happen if the Turkish attacks should increase and if Greece could, without the support of her allies, make the necessary military and financial effort until such time when the country would be completely pacified." Venizelos replied, "Greece had an army of 12 divisions with 325,000 men, an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. Mustafa Kemal had only 70,000 men". He proudly asserted that with 12 divisions he had nothing to fear.<sup>102</sup>

Venizelos left the meeting when this highly interesting conversation ended and the Council postponed its discussion until 10 November 1919.

### c) Different Attitudes Towards the Course of the Greek Occupation

At the following meeting of the Council on 10 November, Sir Eyre Crowe, the British representative, pointed out, "The report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry at Izmir dealt with two questions: the complaints that had been made by the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Greek advance out of the borders that had been drawn by the Council." Sir Eyre Crowe said, "To evaluate the course of the Greek advance was not a goal of the Commission. Therefore, the Report of the Commission could only be accepted with some reservations."<sup>103</sup>

General Bunoust, a member of the Commission had a different approach. He stated, "The complaint of Sheik-ul-Islam to the Council had formed the basis of the investigation. This complaint had presumed that the Greek occupation was unjustified. Therefore, the Commission had necessarily examined that question. So the atrocities could not be evaluated without considering the Greek occupation of and advancement into Western Anatolia." General Bunoust added, "The Commission had not only utilised Turkish and Greek witnesses, but had also listened to citizens of the Allied Powers, such as the French employees of the railroad in Western Anatolia, before it reached a conclusion."<sup>104</sup>

At this point, the Council began discussions on whether or not to instruct the Greek forces to evacuate the towns outside of the borders of the occupation zone, such as Aydyn, which had been occupied by the Greek Army contrary to the Council's instructions and as a result of the instructions of Premier Venizelos. De Martino, the Italian representative, said that he wanted to point out some facts about the region of Aydyn. He stated, "There were three possible solutions to the question: to leave the Greeks where they were; to let the Turks occupy this territory; or to carry out an Inter-Allied occupation, which, out of necessity, would include the Greeks who were already there." According to de Martino, the Turkish occupation was not considered. He was afraid, "If it were decided to hold an Inter-Allied occupation, then the

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Council would have a tendency to exclude the Italian troops." He felt, "If the Allies, all of whom had interests in the Moslem countries, did not give evidence of solidarity towards the Moslem world, then they would expose themselves to the greatest danger in the future." He ended by asking the Council to include the Italians in an Inter-Allied occupation force.105

However, the British and French representatives were in favour of the continuation of the Greek occupation of Aydyn. Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that he had asked Venizelos if the Greeks were certainly able to hold the territory in question and had been told that they could. Clemenceau supported the British and proposed to allow the Greeks to remain in Aydyn. He also stated that the Greeks should be reminded that the occupation was provisional. The only opposition to this proposal came from General Bunoust. He pointed out that telling Venizelos the Greeks troops could remain in Aydyn and in essence that the Commission had not proceeded in the way it should have, would be an impeachment of the Council's own decisions.

In spite of General Bunoust's opposition, the Council decided to send a letter to Venizelos including the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.106

### 3. Decisions of the Council on the Report

At the Council's meeting on 12 November 1919, the British delegation presented a draft letter for Venizelos evaluating the Commission's Report and warning the Greek government about recurrence of such incidents. The important parts of this letter are as follows:

... While admitting the reasonableness of the reservations which you thought fit to express, the Supreme Council does not think that the results of the Inquiry can be regarded as wholly vitiated, in so far as the excesses and acts of violence committed by the Greek troops are concerned. The Council paid its tribute to the impartiality of the members of the Commission and to the scrupulous conscientiousness with which their work was performed.

The Council agrees that the incidents, which took place after the debarkation of the Greek troops at Smyrna [Izmir], appear to indicate an almost total absence of the precautionary measures on the part of the Greek civil and military authorities, which the circumstances required; this omission was the principal cause of the unfortunate incidents reported by the Commission.

It is our opinion that on the whole, the responsibility for the excesses committed and for measures the severity of which were not justified by the actual circumstances, rests upon the Greek military authorities. You yourself, moreover, with the loftiness and sincerity of your character, have recognised these faults and these abuses, and have ordered the punishment of the guilty.

The Supreme Council invites your most serious attention to these grave mistakes and trusts that the experience acquired by the Greek administration will enable it to avoid repeating them in the future.

Respecting the region of Aydyn, the Powers have decided that in view of the practical difficulties and of the political drawbacks which the organisation of an Inter-Allied occupation might entail, they prefer to maintain the situation as it actually exists and the Greek occupation...

... Supreme Council reminds you that the de facto occupation by the Greek troops of Smyrna [Izmir] and of the neighbouring district was only decided upon because of existing

circumstances, and creates no right for the future. This is merely a provisional measure which leaves entire liberty to the Peace Conference ....107

By sending this letter, the Council, on the one hand, condemned the atrocities that had been committed by or because of the misrule of the Greek military and political officers, but on the other hand, it legitimised the Greek occupation of Aedyn. The British policy aiming not to lose or lessen the Greek presence as a fortress against the Italian troops in Western Anatolia, provided the basis of the Council's attitude towards Greece.

Although the Council of the Paris Peace Conference generally accepted the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry and warned Greece, it did not take definite measures to prevent further atrocities by the Greek army. Even the Report of the Commission was not permitted to be published in the European press. Encouraged by this weak approach, the Greek troops in Anatolia persisted in increasing the atrocities in an enlarged area of occupation for more than three years.

### III. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF THE GREEK OCCUPATION

The Council of the Paris Peace Conference evaluated the Commission's Report politically and militarily, but no reference was made to its legal aspects. In fact, the Report reflected substantial violations of then existing international law. To better understand the dimensions of the violations, it is necessary to review the legal rules on the conduct of war and occupation and their violations during the early Greek occupation in Anatolia.

#### A. Basic International Documents on War and Occupation

What is called the modern law of war is derived from a number of sources. First, there are the customs or usages of war generally accepted by the nations of the world. Such customary rules originate from what Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth century founder of international law, called "natural law", which he defined as "A dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity, and that in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God." This primary source of international law exists, therefore, essentially in man's innate sense of justice.<sup>108</sup>

The second source is the treaties by which nations have agreed to be bound to each other. The development of the existing rules governing military occupation was preceded by centuries during which no real distinction was drawn between military occupation on the one hand, and conquest and subjugation on the other. Conquest of enemy territory was generally regarded as establishing annexation to the conqueror's realm and it was held that the successful sovereign was practically immune from any restrictions on his right to do as he pleased in the occupied area. A line of demarcation appeared during the second half of the eighteenth century between real acquisition and the mere occupation by the armed forces of a belligerent power.<sup>109</sup>

The best known and the most important of the attempts to define the rules of warfare were the results of the two conferences held in the Hague in 1899 and 1907.

The '1899 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land' set the basis for most of the principles currently guiding armies in the lawful occupation of enemy territory. The 'Fourth Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land' signed in 1907, particularly Articles 23/g, 23/h and 42-56, embodied the rules which have been adopted officially by most nations into their military manuals.<sup>110</sup>

Although most provisions of both Conventions were clear and left little room for debate in interpreting the meaning of the various clauses, doubts have frequently arisen concerning a few sections of the Conventions. One moot point arose during World War I, centring around Article II, the 'general participation clause' of the 1907 Convention, which reads, "The provisions contained in the regulations referred to in Article I, as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention". When Germany invaded and occupied Belgium in 1914, all nations that were then belligerents had already become parties to the Convention, so that for a time at least the provisions of Article II did not apply as far as the last portion of the article was concerned and all nations then belligerent were bound by the Hague Regulations.<sup>111</sup>



However, the 1899 Convention had been ratified by all the belligerents and was thus binding upon every one of them. Even for Greece, which was a neutral power until 1917, by entering into the war, both conventions became restrictive for her military operations during and after the war and in the course of armistice.

Even if both Conventions were conceivably not binding on the belligerents because of Article II and the related clauses in the 1899 Convention, their provisions, which were merely declaratory of the existing laws and customs of war and conduct of occupation (what might be termed the 'codified customary law of nations'), would still have been binding on belligerents, independently of the convention of which such laws and customs formed an integral part. This concept is based on the reasoning that the declaratory parts of the two Conventions merely acknowledged in writing certain standards of conduct already accepted into international customary law, standards which therefore would be binding upon all states, irrespective of the fact that some belligerents had not ratified the Conventions in question. Thus, even if the two instruments were considered inapplicable under the circumstances outlined above, their contents, or a considerable portion thereof, were nevertheless binding on the members of the family of nations.<sup>112</sup>

Therefore, because the customs of war had been internationally adopted, there was no debate over whether or not the powers that had ratified the Conventions would implement the basic humanitarian principles in warfare. That was the presumption when the war started. Particularly for Greece, which occupied Western Anatolia through the instructions of the Council of the Paris Peace Conference that was composed of the Great Powers of the Allies; it was essential to obey the main rules of occupation created by these Powers. In fact, the Paris Peace Conference had accepted the two Conventions as the basic documents of the international law of war, as it had proclaimed in the Charter of the League of Nations on 28 April 1919, nearly a fortnight before the Greek occupation of Izmir started.

## B. The Greek Army's Violations of International Law

### 1. Violations of the Basic Rights of Civilians

The documents of international law in force in 1919 clearly adopted the principles to protect civilians from the evils of military operations. Family honour, the lives of individual, private property as well as religious convictions and practice had to be respected.<sup>113</sup> To kill or wound individuals belonging to the hostile nation was strictly prohibited.<sup>114</sup> The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, was prohibited. The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when state property, should be treated as private property.<sup>115</sup>

Principally, no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, should be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly or severally responsible.<sup>116</sup>

The Report of the Commission included many examples of violations of these international rules. The Greek soldiers and local Greeks committed dreadful atrocities against the Turkish population in Izmir on the 15 and 16 May 1919. About 2,500 civilian Turks were arbitrarily detained and were accused of being responsible for the first day incidents that were, in fact, started not as a mass resistance, but as individual acts. In violation of international regulations, they were inhumanely treated and were subjected to unhealthy conditions.<sup>117</sup> The Turks were the targets of killings, rape, pillage and other kinds of offences. The Greek military authorities did not take effective measures to prevent such crimes.<sup>118</sup>

The Greeks slaughtered 300 to 400 Turks in Izmir.<sup>119</sup> However, the body count from the Greek atrocities was not only consisted of slayings and pillage in Izmir. Similar atrocities occurred and thousands of Turks were killed, wounded, raped, beaten or robbed in Nazilli, Aydyn, Ödemi?, Menemen, Manisa, Ayvalyk and the villages between these towns.<sup>120</sup>

The Greek army's assaults also targeted religious buildings. All of the mosques and religious institutions of Manisa, numbering about 150, were violated by the Greek troops. Their doors were forced open, their floors torn up, their carpets stolen or soiled and their inside walls defaced. In addition, the school of theology and the Turkish cemetery were attacked, defiled and damaged.<sup>121</sup>

Furthermore, while the 1907 Convention prohibited the destruction or seizure of the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure was a necessity of war,<sup>122</sup> the Greek army wantonly set fire to some villages, agricultural fields and factories and killed livestock.<sup>123</sup>

## 2. Conditions of the Prisoners

Both the 1899 and 1907 Conventions stated that prisoners of war were under the control of the hostile government and not the individuals or corps that had captured them. So they had to be humanely treated. All of their personal belongings except arms, horses and military papers would remain their property.<sup>124</sup>

The Turkish army officers and civilians who were captured were treated inhumanely during the Greek occupation of Izmir, which was not even an operation during war but during armistice. According to Point 13 of the Commission's Report, the Turkish Governor, administrative and military staff, including the Turkish commander in the city, were insulted, beaten and even slain. In violation of the clear articles of the Convention, all of these Turkish prisoners were robbed of their personal money and belongings.

While it was forbidden to compel the inhabitants of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power,<sup>125</sup> all prisoners and most of the Turkish population were forced to shout "Zito Venizelos" (Long live Venizelos), and persons who refused to do so were immediately and severely punished. Most of the Greek officers approved of this behaviour and did not try to stop the atrocities.<sup>126</sup>

In Nazilli, 30 Turks were arbitrarily detained as suspects by the Greek soldiers and savagely killed outside of the town.<sup>127</sup>

## 3. Conduct of the Siege and Attacks on Civilian Locations

As a principle of international law, military actions against cities, towns and villages where civilians are living can only be carried out with the guidance of some restrictive rules. It is very important to determine whether or not the location is defended. The attack or bombardment by whatever means of undefended cities, towns, villages or dwellings is prohibited.<sup>128</sup>

The officer in command of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, has to do all in his power to warn the authorities. In sieges and bombardments, all the necessary steps have to be taken to spare, as far as possible, the buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or charitable purposes, historical monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are gathered, provided that these buildings are not being used at the time for military purposes.<sup>129</sup>

In conformity with their general attitude towards the 1899 and 1907 Conventions, the Greek troops in Western Anatolia did not conduct their military operations under the principles of international law. Although the Greek occupation was implemented at a time of armistice, the military attacks on residential areas were more severe than were those in time of war. For instance, the Greek artillery, without prior warning, shelled some villages around Aydyn. Many villages on the Balatcyk-Aydyn railway line were similarly destroyed.<sup>130</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Eighty years after the Greek landing in Izmir, it is still being debated in foreign academic and political circles whether or not the Greek government and army could be accused of the excesses in Anatolia. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry clearly stated that the responsibilities for the sad incidents that occurred in Western Anatolia during the incursion of the Greek forces undeniably rested on the wrong decisions and operations of the Greek authorities. It was accepted unanimously during the discussions at the meeting of the Council of the Paris Peace Conference that the Report of the Commission mostly reflected what happened and that it was far from exaggeration.

The Report of the Commission, the basic formal source for the incidents, was written only after the claims against the Greek occupation forces had been thoroughly investigated. The members of the Commission collected first-hand evidence; listened to witnesses of the events and inspected the area. When the Commission visited the towns and villages under Greek occupation, there was still smoke emanating from some of the destroyed buildings and the wounds of the victims were still bleeding.

Moreover, the Commission was composed of members from different powers. The members of the Commission signed the Report without hesitation despite the different and sometimes contradictory policies and interests of their respective governments.

Bearing in mind the realities of the structure and the course of study of the Commission, it was and still is impossible to refute the facts and conclusions it reached. As a matter of fact, even Greek Premier Venizelos could not easily contest the findings and the conclusions of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry during his long statements before the Council of the Paris Conference. He did not deny the excesses committed by the Greek army, but he tried to invent some excuses for them.

However, the approach of the Council towards the Report was interesting. Although all of the members of the Council agreed that responsibility for the incidents in Anatolia rested on the Greek authorities and that it was a mistake of the Greek government to instruct its forces in Anatolia to enlarge their occupation zone without authorisation from the Allied Command, the Council did not want the Greek Army to evacuate the region. Whereas some members of the Council wanted strong measures to be taken to prevent a recurrence of the atrocities, the British delegation opposed this.

The only affirmative step of the Council was to send a letter to Venizelos to inform him that the Greeks were responsible for the atrocities and to warn him not to repeat the same mistakes in the future.

Without a strong condemnation from the Great Powers, the Greek army continued its operations and atrocities in Anatolia for over three more years, until its banishment from the region in 1922. Had the Council exhibited a strong attitude against Greece and ordered the Greek army to withdraw within the borders of the initial occupation zone, as it had been proposed in the Report, then tens of thousands of innocent persons would not have been victimised.

## APPENDICES

Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories\*

### Document 1

Covering letter sent to the President of the Peace Conference.16

CONSTANTINOPLE, 14 October 1919.

Please find enclosed the dossier containing all the documents relating to the inquiry conducted in Asia Minor in execution of your decision of 22 July 1919.5

In addition to the minutes of meetings and their annexes, which include the witness statements in extenso, 17 the dossier contains, in accordance with the instructions set out in your telegram of 26 July: 18

1. An account of the events that took place following the occupation.19

This account sets out, in chronological order wherever possible, all the facts that we believe influenced events, and particularly those referred to in the complaint lodged with the Peace Conference by the Sheikh-ul-Islam.13

The report drawn up by the Colonel appointed by the Greek Government to monitor the work of the Commission is annexed to this account.20

The Colonel received a copy of the account of the established facts, but in accordance with your instructions of 22 and 26 July, we did not send him the chapter on responsibility or our findings.

As we stated in our reply to your decision of 30 September,6 which was sent to you on 3 October by the French High Commissioner in the east, we have been unable, whilst continuing to honour our commitments, to send the Greek representative the witness statements, which are confidential.

2. A chapter determining responsibility;21

3. The Commission's findings.22

These findings were adopted unanimously.

The Members of the Commission:

R.H.HARE, BUNOUST, A. DALL'OLIO, MARK BRISTOL.

### Document 2

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Background to the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and adjoining Territories

The Commission of Inquiry was created following a complaint lodged with the Peace Conference by the Sheikh-ul-Islam on 15 July.

It was comprised of the following Members:

For America: Commodore Bristol;

For France: Brigadier Bunoust;

For England: Brigadier Hars [Hare];

For Italy: Lieutenant-General Dall'Olio.

Lieutenant Luigi Villari was appointed Secretary-general. The following officers were also attached to the Commission:

For the United States of America: Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant Stewart (later replaced by Lieutenant Jones) and Mr. Caessbrough (Turkish interpreter);

For France: Lieutenant Rumerchène, Sub-Lieutenant Vitalis (Greek interpreter) and Sub-Lieutenant Dugoureq;

For the British Empire: Major Thomson (Turkish interpreter), Captain Harris and Lieutenant Higham (during the Commission's stay in Asia Minor).

For Italy: Lieutenant Villari and Lieutenant de Bosis.

The Commission met for the first time at the Italian Embassy in Constantinople on 12 August. On this occasion, it was unanimously decided that each member would take it in turns to act as President of the Commission, and that if the Commission met twice in one day, that the same Commissioner would act as President for both, and that each meeting in Constantinople would be held in the embassy of the State to which the President belonged.

Six meetings were held in Constantinople, the last on 19 August. The Commission then relocated to Smyrna, where it met for the first time on 23 August in the Sultanieh School, offered for its use by the Ottoman authorities. It held 12 meetings in Smyrna, the last (the 18th) meeting being on 5 September.

On 6 September, the Commission transferred to Aydin, where it remained until 12 September. Three meetings took place in Aydin itself; on 10 September it moved to Girova, in the Italian zone, to hear the statements of Turkish refugees from Aydin; it met on 11 September in Mazli [Nazili] in the zone occupied by the forces of the Turkish national movement, where it interrogated refugees, including Greek refugees, also from Aydin.

On 12 September, the Commission returned to Smyrna, where it met another nine times; four other meetings were held respectively in Odemisch, Menemen, Magnesios and Ayvalik. The last meeting in Smyrna (the 35th) was held on 26 September. The Commission, after hearing the witnesses, with the exception of those who were in Constantinople, returned to the town,

where it met for the 36th time on 1 October. Another 11 meetings were held there, the last one being on 15 October.

In all, it met 46 times.

175 witnesses from a range of nationalities and social backgrounds gave evidence.

The dossier was comprised as follows:

At each meeting, the witness statements, the deliberations of the Commission and, in the most important cases, its discussions, were recorded. An abridged version of the minutes, listing the matters discussed or decided and the names of the witnesses interrogated, was attached, in addition to letters, reports and other documents specifically relating to the meeting in question.

The other documents were put together in a special dossier.

The Commission's final report consists of three sections:

- a) The established facts, which form a chronological account of the events with which the Commission is concerned;
- b) An account of the responsibilities which, in the Commission's opinion, can be identified from the established facts, and
- c) The findings and recommendations that the Commission deemed useful to put forward in order to resolve any national difficulties.

The secretary-general,

LIEUTENANT LUIGI VILLARI.

Document 3

1. Account of Events that took place following the Occupation, which were established during the Inquiry between 12 August and 6 October 1919.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 7 October 1919.

No 1. - Since the armistice, Christians have not been in danger in the Turkish province of Aydin.

The Greek population was unquestionably persecuted in 1914 and during the war, and treated unkindly in the months immediately after the armistice by the Vali Nouredin pacha. However, since the rise to power of the current Vali Izzet Bey, all the inhabitants, regardless of race, have been treated impartially.

Despite the presence of several gangs of brigands in the region, we can confirm that peace has been restored.

Fears of Christian massacres were unjustified. Investigations have shown that attempts to rally Muslims to a Greek massacre, which came to the attention of the Greek authorities a few weeks before the landing and which were forwarded to Athens, were not written by officers in

the Turkish constabulary, whose signatures appeared on these documents. These documents are undoubtedly forgeries.

No 2. - Security in the vilayet of Aydin, and in Smyrna in particular, in no way justified the occupation of Smyrna's forts by application of Article 7 of the armistice.<sup>23</sup> (See the reservations expressed on this subject by the Italian General Representative in the minutes from the 37th meeting<sup>24</sup>).

Furthermore, the situation in the vilayet did not justify the landing of allied troops in Smyrna.

On the contrary, the situation worsened after the Greek landing due to the state of war existing between the Greek troops and Turkish irregulars.

No 3. - Smyrna's forts were occupied on 14 May 1919 by the British, French, Italian and Greek Allied Forces, acting on the orders of Admiral Calthorpe of Her Majesty's Royal Navy, one of the Allied High Commissioners based in Turkey for the purpose of executing the terms of the armistice. The order for the occupation stated that this was in execution of Article 7 of the armistice between Turkey and the allied Powers.<sup>23</sup>

No 4. - During the night of 14 May and early hours of 15 May, several thousand Turks were called to the Turkish quarter near the Jewish cemetery. This gathering was not aimed however at organising resistance to the Greek landing by force, but at demonstrating the might and predominance of the Turkish inhabitants.

No 5. - The Peace Conference ordered the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops.<sup>25</sup> These orders were issued by Admiral Calthorpe on behalf of the Conference.

The town of Smyrna was occupied on 15 May 1919 by Greek forces, assisted by the American, British, French, Greek and Italian navies.

The British, French, Italian and American navies landed small armed contingents to protect their respective consulates.

The Greek navy landed a group to protect the landing points of the Greek troops. This group had insufficient force to preserve order and carry out its mission.

The Greek forces were comprised of three regiments. The landing took place on the headland and on the quay in front of the Hotel Kramer. The troops began landing at 8 o'clock in the morning.

No 6. - No resistance to the landing was organised by the Turkish authorities. Gunshots fired by Turks were isolated incidents.

No 7. - Several hundred prisoners from different backgrounds escaped from prisons near the barracks a few hours before the occupation.

The Turkish authorities did not take effective steps to guard against or stop these escapes.

Some of the prisoners were able to procure weapons from the arsenal near the barracks.

No 8. - The Greek High Command took no preventive measures to maintain order whilst the Greek troops marched through the town. It had only placed detachments of Greek sailors in the



immediate vicinity of the two points chosen for the landing. In accordance with the orders of the representative of the Entente, the Turkish troops stayed in their barracks.

No mechanisms were in place to enable the Greek Command to communicate its orders to the Turkish authorities, or to obtain information on the state of mind of the population.

No 9. - The Greek, military, civil and religious authorities did nothing to appease the crowd.

The ceremony conducted by the Metropolite to bless the troops on their landing only served to add fuel to the fire.

The behaviour of the crowd, gathered along the route taken by the troops, incensed the Turkish inhabitants and led to acts of violence being committed by zealous individuals.

No 10. - The landing orders were not executed to the letter. They were modified without the approval of the Command, following the intervention of the captain of the *Averoff*, which had been warned that groups of Turks were amassing near Carantina.

The Companies of Evzones, which were to land at Carantina to occupy the hills above the town to the south, were taken to the customs pier, where they disembarked behind other regimental units. The guidelines that had been issued for the various itineraries to be followed were observed by their commanders, who were oblivious to the fact that the Turkish troops were confined to their barracks near the Konak.

No 11. - The first gunshots were fired near the corner of the Konak square, at the entrance to the street leading to Cocarialy.

It is impossible to ascertain who fired these first gunshots. The Greek troops did not open fire and only returned fire following these first gunshots.

No 12. - Intense gunfire followed these first gunshots. The Greek soldiers, who found themselves in the Konak square gardens, fired violently on the shutters of the barracks and the Konak.

It has been impossible to ascertain whether gunshots were fired from some of the windows of the barracks after the gunfire broke out.

No traces of bullets could be found in the walls of the buildings facing the barracks.

A few gunshots also seem to have been fired by Turks at certain points along the quays and in the town, in particular near the Greek consulate, where, according to Greek reports, the guard was forced to defend itself against a Turkish attack by firing gunshots.

No 13. - Along the route taken from the Konak square to the ship *Patris*, where they were imprisoned, the first convoys of prisoners comprised of officers and soldiers, as well as the Vali and civil servants, were tormented by the crowd which accompanied them and even by some of the Greek soldiers escorting them.

All the prisoners were robbed. They all had to shout 'Zito Venizelos', and walk with their hands raised. Some were massacred.

Apart from one or two exceptions, the Greek officers did not attempt to stop the acts of violence of their men.

No 14. - On 15 May, and for several days thereafter, the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested some 2500 people, including children under the age of 14. Staff and pupils in some of the schools were even imprisoned on the Patris. Many of the prisoners were mistreated, robbed and detained for several days in unacceptable conditions.

No 15. - On 15 and 16 May, countless acts of violence and looting targeted at the Turkish people and their homes took place in the town. Fezzes were stolen, preventing the Turks from leaving their homes. Many women were raped. Some people were murdered. The acts of violence and looting were committed for the most part by a mob of Greeks from the town, although it has been proven that soldiers also joined in and that the military authorities took no effective measures to stop the acts of violence and looting until it was too late.

No 16. - Conflicting reports have been given by the Turkish and Greek authorities as to the number of those killed and wounded on the day of the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops. Approximate numbers are as follows:

Greeks: soldiers: 2 killed, 6 wounded; civilians: 20 killed, 20 drowned, 60 wounded.

Turks: 300 to 400 victims (killed or wounded).

No 17. - After news of the landing of Greek forces in Smyrna spread to surrounding villages, the Greek inhabitants began to loot Turkish homes and steal Turkish livestock. Some Turks were also killed in the various villages.

No 18. - On 21 May, the Colonel in charge of the Greek occupying troops received a telegram sent from Paris the day before by Mr. Venizelos, who determined the conditions of occupation in the sanjak of Smyrna and in the kaza of Ayvalik, as well as in certain regions located outside the sanjak of Smyrna.

No 19. - It was not until 1 June that Commodore FitzMaurice, appointed representative of the Entente on 28 May, received instructions informing him of his attributions vis-à-vis the Greek authorities with regard to the extension of the occupied zone.

Following the departure of Admiral Calthorpe (21 May) and until 28 May, the representative of the Entente was the French Vice-Admiral Sagoy du Vauroux.

No 20. - The Greek High Commissioner, who arrived in Smyrna on 21 May, acted against the orders contained in the telegram of 20 May by authorising the Colonel in charge of the troops to issue orders for the following on 23 May:

- a) The occupation of Aydin;
- b) Intervention in the regions of Magnesios and Kassaba, without having first requested authorisation from the representative of the Entente.

The Greek High Commissioner has acknowledged his responsibility in this matter before the Commission.

No 21. - To justify the extension of the Greek zone, the Greek High Commissioner relied on:

- a) Uncorroborated information received by the military authority, according to which law and order was under threat in the aforementioned regions;
- b) An interpretation given by the military authority of conversations that took place with the English Colonel Smith, who was not qualified to replace the representative of the Entente.

Colonel Smith was unaware of the telegram sent to Colonel Zafiriou on 20 May by Mr. Venizelos. At no time did he authorise Colonel Zafiriou, even verbally, to go to the Aydin-Magnesios region and Kassaba. He merely pointed out to Colonel Zafiriou the advantage of sending troops along the railway to Trianda to protect the track, provided that Colonel Zafiriou had the authorisation to advance his troops.

Colonel Smith added that extending the occupied territory beyond Trianda could lead to chaos.

He reported this conversation to his commanding officer.

No 22. - The advance and installation of the Greek troops in the direction of Magnesios and Eudemich and Aydin and as far as Nazili initially took place under satisfactory conditions, despite the national feeling aroused by news of events in Smyrna. The Greek Command erred in tolerating the action of armed Greek civilians, who, under the pretext of assisting the Greek troops, began looting and committing all manner of excesses.

On 15 August, a court martial set up in Smyrna on 16 May by the Greek Command pronounced 74 convictions, including three death penalties for the events of 15 and 16 May alone. Those convicted included 48 Greeks, 13 Turks, 12 Armenians and one Jew.

No 23. - The tension created in the country by the events in Smyrna gradually increased for the following reasons:

- a) The subject of the size of the territory to be occupied by Greek forces was governed by uncertainty until 2 June, when Commodore FitzMaurice from the British navy was appointed to determine the limits of the occupation.
- b) The rapid advance of Greek troops into the country increased the agitation of the population. Turkish nobles began to evacuate the occupied region. Turkish regulars and the constabulary deserted. Greek civilians openly carried weapons. The activity of brigands increased, as did the number of acts of violence, theft and looting.
- c) Searches for weapons conducted by Greek troops in Turkish homes, in which they were assisted by armed civilians, aggravated the discontent of the population since the searches violated the Muslim custom of the sanctity of the home and was viewed as harassment.

Throughout the vilayet of Aïn [Aydyn], this tension led to apparent chaos, which tended to justify the extension of the zone occupied by Greek troops.

No 24. - The weapons carried by Greek civilians were probably obtained after the armistice from the contraband operating between the islands and coast.

It is pointless to dwell on the accusation made by the Turks against the Greek Red Cross that weapons contained in Red Cross boxes were landed in Smyrna.

All that has been proven is that in February a large number of boxes were unloaded from the Greek ship Adriaticos on several occasions and that these boxes eluded customs inspections. Turkish witnesses who gave evidence claimed that some of these boxes contained weapons and ammunition.

It was not until the beginning of March that the Greek authorities authorised the inspection of the boxes by Turkish customs officials.

No 25. - Ayassoulouk, Deunendjid and Baladjik were all occupied on 25 May. Aydin was occupied on 27 May, Eudemich was occupied on 1 June and Nazili was occupied on 3 June.

No 26. - A number of raids on Greek positions by Turkish gangs or rebels led to Greek reprisals, some of which could be justified on military grounds. All of these reprisals were brutal, murders were committed.

No 27. - Nazili was evacuated during the night of 19 June and early hours of 20 June at the instigation of the commander of the occupying battalion. This evacuation was not executed in accordance with the orders of the representative of the Entente, issued on 14 June, according to which the Turkish local authorities were to be forewarned of the departure of the Greek troops.

No 28. - The Greek military authorities explained that the battalion commander feared an attack, and that so that the enemy would not learn of its retreat, did not inform the Turkish authorities of its departure. The orders to evacuate Nazili were not given by the High Command until 19 June.

No 29. - Once the Greek troops had left, the Turkish authorities did not have time to create a police contingent which would replace the constabulary, disarmed during the Greek occupation and in a state of disorder. They were thus unable to prevent looting and the massacre of several Greek families by Turkish gangs, who entered Nazili a few hours after the Greek evacuation.

No 30. - The thirty or so inhabitants arrested in Nazili by the Greeks as suspects were taken away with the retreating troops.

One of them was killed en route under the pretext that he could not walk.

Some of the others managed to escape, but most were killed during fighting that broke out in the village of Kiosk, during which a Greek officer was also killed.

No 31. - After the Greek troops evacuated Nazili, Turkish attacks on Greek positions and individual soldiers increased.

Throughout the Aydin region the population was armed, Turks as well as Greeks.

No 32. - The Greek troops carried out armed reconnaissance patrols around Aydin. In the course of these reconnaissance patrols, some of the villages were burned down.

On 27 June, one of these reconnaissance patrols was repulsed by the gangs, which pursued it as far as the outskirts of Aydin. The fighting continued the following day. On 28 June, the attackers began to use 105-mm guns.

The Greeks retreated.

The Greek Commander and Greek witnesses assert that Turkish inhabitants fired on retreating Greek troops as they were crossing the Turkish quarter south of the railway track. Some of the fires that broke out in the Turkish quarter in the morning of 29 June started during this engagement.

Other fires also broke out in this quarter at various isolated points.

A large number of Turkish men, women and children who were trying to leave the burning quarter were killed for no reason by the Greek soldiers, who were guarding all the exits that led from this quarter to the northern part of the town.

There is no doubt that the Greek Command and troops ran amok.

The Greeks evacuated the town in the night of 29 June and early hours of 30 June after having committed numerous attacks and other crimes. A large number of Greek civilians hoping to escape by accompanying the troops as they retreated were prevented from doing so by the Command.

No 33. - The fire in the Greek quarter was started by Turkish gangs under their leader Yuruk Ali. The gangs entered the quarter in the morning of 30 June and burnt it down after having looted the houses, killing the occupants.

Irrespective of age or sex, a number of Greek inhabitants encountered by the gangs as they roamed through the town were ruthlessly killed.

Around 2000 or 3000 inhabitants were robbed but not killed. They had managed to take refuge in the French convent before the gangs arrived, after which they sought the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commander of the 57th Ottoman Division, in the Konak.

Similarly, several notables also managed to get to the Konak. Some escaped death, but others were executed.

It has not been possible to ascertain the total number of Greek or Turkish victims.

The representative of the Greek Government, who gave evidence before the Commission on 7 September, estimated the number of Greek victims to be in the region of 2000. Some 900 bodies had already been recovered by that time. An English witness put this number at about 400.

A French officer conducting an on-the-spot investigation several days after the events took place put the number of victims at:

1500 to 2000 Greeks;

1200 to 1500 Turks;

The French officer did however acknowledge that estimating the number of Turkish victims was a very difficult task.

No 34. - The Greek troops, with the help of reinforcements sent by General Nider, recaptured Aydin on 4 July. They set fire to the Turkish quarter situated in the western part of the town, where there were also some Greek factories.

No 35. - All the fires that were started between 29 June and 4 July most probably destroyed two thirds of the town of Aydin, which had a population of 20,000, including some 8000 Greeks.

Any houses that were not burned down were looted.

No 36. - Before the Greeks returned to Aydin, most of the Turkish population had already left the town and surrounding area in order to take refuge in the Italian zone or in the Nazili-Denizli region, where it remains today.

About a thousand or so Greeks were taken into the Turkish zone, where they were still living in hardship at the time of the Commission's visit to Nazili on 11 September.

No 37. - The reoccupation of Aydin was ordered by the Greek High Command in spite of the express orders of the representative of the Entente.

The Greek authorities acted on express orders received from Mr Venizelos in Paris on 2 July. The orders prevented the representative of the Entente from intervening in the matter.

No 38. - Most of the villages situated along the railway track between Baladjik and Aydin were destroyed by fires started in the course of the military operations that took place in the region.

No 39. - At present, peace has all but been restored, with the exception of the zone in the immediate vicinity of the front, where out-post engagements are still taking place leading to losses and requiring military measures which affect local inhabitants.

A similar situation exists in the Eudemich region, where the Greek occupation has taken place.

No 40. - The occupation of the vilayet of Aydin by the Greek forces has caused significant material losses to crops and property.

Some of the losses have been attributed to looting, theft and the destruction of livestock, although it is impossible to evaluate the exact extent of these losses. Some of the livestock was used for food by the Greek troops.

Other less significant losses were caused by military operations and skirmishes between the Greek forces and Turkish gangs.

Finally, considerable losses were suffered due to the burning of houses, villages and the town of Aydin. Losses resulting from the burning of Aydin are valued at approximately eight million pounds sterling.

When the Turkish inhabitants abandoned their houses and fled from the districts occupied by the Greeks, they also abandoned their crops, leaving them unharvested. The losses in terms of beans, liquorice roots and figs can be estimated at one million two hundred thousand pounds.

The olive crop will also suffer if conditions have not improved by November.

No 41. - Pergamos was occupied on 12 June. As this town is in the north of the sanjak of Smyrna, the Greeks were entitled to occupy it in accordance with the orders of the Entente given in the telegram of 20 May.

The Commission did not visit Pergamos.

From information gathered from reliable sources, it has emerged that Turkish irregulars who recaptured Pergamos killed the Turkish inhabitants who co-operated with the Greeks. They also massacred and often tortured all the Greek soldiers taken prisoner in the course of the Pergamos affair.

No 42. - On 17 June, following the evacuation of Pergamos, Greek troops which had gathered at Menemen launched an unwarranted and veritable massacre of defenceless Turks. The municipal authorities assert that more than 1000 Turkish inhabitants were killed, although this number would appear to be an exaggeration. An investigation carried out the following day by a French officer ascertained that 200 Turks had been killed and 200 wounded.

The massacre was not organised by the Greek Command. It resulted from panic on the part of tired young soldiers with little experience of war who were still suffering the effects of events in Pergamos. The officers, however, had done little to subdue their men.

No 43. - The Greek military command asserts that the Greek repression followed an attack by Turks who fired on Greek soldiers from a house near the railway station and from the Konak.

Numerous witnesses have given evidence on this subject. Evidence given by Greek witnesses is imprecise and sometimes contradictory.

It is the Commission's belief that the assertions of the Greek Command cannot be regarded as accurate.

No 44. - The occupation of Magnesios, outside the sanjak of Smyrna, took place on 25 May without the authorisation of the representative of the Entente and without this Supreme Authority being informed.

For military reasons, the occupation was extended and maintained as far as Ahmedli to the east and Papazli to the north-east. Greek troops even occupied Ak-hissar briefly, but did not stay here.

At first, the occupation of the Magnesios zone was not beset with problems. Relations between the population and the Greek troops became strained following the ill-treatment of some of the inhabitants, the damage and theft suffered by some of the properties and the searches made for weapons.

Apart from the Muftat, the Turkish civil authorities remained in Magnesios. The Muftat was summoned to Smyrna by the Greek authorities but fled to Constantinople.

At present, the situation is untroubled. The General in charge of the occupying division and the Turkish authorities enjoy a good relationship.

No 45. - After the armistice, gangs of Greeks from Mytilene made a number of incursions into the area around Ayvalik, robbing and killing several Muslims. Reprisals were carried out by some of the Turks in the region. Yet despite these acts of reciprocal banditry, the situation remained normal and satisfactory.

In the first few days of the occupation of Ayvalik, the military authority enlisted and armed demobilised soldiers and Greek civilians. The demobilised soldiers and Greek civilians acted deplorably and were accused of having set fire to two villages. They were disarmed and disbanded shortly afterwards.

Ayvalik currently has a relatively small Turkish population of around twenty Muslims.

The peace is unbroken in the country, but trade has come to a virtual standstill.

No 46. - Turkish refugees who left the territories occupied by the Greeks do not appear to have returned to their homes. This may be due to mistrust of the Greeks or because Turkish irregulars are preventing them from returning on political grounds.

The number of refugees is very considerable indeed, although the Commission has been unable to ascertain the exact figure.

In certain areas, such as the Meander valley, entire villages have had to be abandoned, even if they were not destroyed by fire.

No 47. - On the subject of the transporting of Greeks to the province of Smyrna, referred to in the complaint lodged by the Sheikh-ul-Islam Moustafa-Sabir with the Peace Conference,<sup>13</sup> the inquiry has shown that:

a) According to the telegram sent on 7/20 May by Mr Venizelos, the occupation was partly intended to enable refugees living in Greece to be repatriated to the sanjak of Smyrna and the kaza of Ayvalik;

b) Greek refugees have settled in some regions, particularly around Pergamos and Phocea. This phenomenon has been facilitated by the exodus of the Turkish population from these areas;

c) Faced with the disturbances that accompanied the occupation, the Greek authorities issued orders to halt mass repatriation. Only certain wealthy families whose means of support were known have been allowed to return.

Other refugees most probably succeeded in returning by landing away from the Greek-controlled ports, but their number can hardly be great.

The accusation made by Sheikh-ul-Islam is therefore not entirely justified.

The Members of the Commission of Inquiry

ADMIRAL BRISTOL GENERAL BUNOUST

US Delegate French Delegate

GENERAL HARE GENERAL DALL'OLIO

British Delegate Italian Delegate

Document 4

Appendix I. Letter from the Commission to Colonel Mazarakis,



Greek Government representative responsible for monitoring the Work of the Commission

CONSTANTINOPLE, 14 October 1919.

We are writing to acknowledge receipt of your report of 11 October 1919<sup>20</sup> which we had requested in our letter of 7 October. Our request was intended to allow the Peace Conference, after having studied the account of the facts established by the Commission, to examine any comments that reading this document may have prompted you to make.

Your report will be added to the dossier on the inquiry next to the account to which it relates.

The various documents which you sent to the Commission during the inquiry and to which you allude in your report will also be added to the dossier. 17

The Commission has taken into account the comments made by you in paragraph no 14 concerning the occupation of Ayvalik, and has modified the wording of paragraph no 45 of its account. We attach an amended copy to this letter.

You will not be surprised to learn, since you were informed of this during the meeting of 13 October, that the opinion of the Commission on certain points does not accord with your own, in spite of the witness statements that you have produced.

In fact, not only do individual assessments of a given fact differ, but, faced with an excessive number of contradictions in the testimonies of Greek and Turkish witnesses, the Commission has on occasion been obliged to attach special importance to testimonies or reports by persons not belonging to the nations directly affected by the settlement of the Smyrna question in order to establish the truth.

To sum up, after much deliberation, the Commission has deemed that, with the exception of the alteration to be made to the wording of paragraph no 45, there are no grounds for modifying its original account, which was adopted unanimously.

R. B. HARE, BUNOUST, A. DALL'OLIO, MARK BRISTOL

Document 5

Appendix II. Comments<sup>26</sup> made by Colonel Alexander Mazarakis on the account of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry.

1. It is asserted in paragraph no 1 that after the armistice, Christians in the vilayet of Aydin were not in danger. Yet the Commission admits that not only was the Greek population unquestionably persecuted after 1914 and during the war, but that Greeks were treated unkindly in the first few months following the armistice. The Commission also acknowledges the existence of gangs of brigands, but asserts that fears of massacres were unfounded.

With all due respect, I am convinced that a study of the history and recent fate of the Christian population in Turkey would undermine this assertion. All of the massacres and acts of persecution, which on many occasions elicited European intervention, were unforeseen and hence any intervention always arrived too late, after the acts had been committed. Let me remind the Commission that a list of the murders, acts of banditry and persecution of all kinds

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committed by the Turks after the armistice and prior to the occupation of Smyrna has already been submitted to it, and that much of the Greek population found itself exiled in Greece during this period, where it remains today, having abandoned all of its land occupied by the Turks, whilst another section of the population returned from central Asia Minor, where it had been transported, reduced to one half or one third of its former number, in extreme poverty and pitiful health, deprived of all means of settling and providing a livelihood for itself. I regret that under these circumstances I am unable to share the Commission's opinion that peace had been restored and that fears of a resurgence of Muslim extremism were unfounded, especially on the eve of the decisions of the Conference, which naturally could and were bound to arouse such extremism.

2. The Commission considers (paragraph no 2) that the occupation of the forts and the town of Smyrna was not justified by application of the armistice. It is not for me to enumerate the reasons why the Peace Conference ordered this occupation and why it specified that this occupation should be carried out by Greek troops. However, I venture to observe that the execution of the occupation was illusory, that weapons theoretically kept in the armouries were, as events have shown, in the hands of the Turks, that irregulars, tolerated if not encouraged by the Turkish authorities, were armed with heavy artillery, that without this occupation, the Greek refugees would have been unable to return, repossess their seized properties or resume work, and finally, that without wishing to examine the intentions of the Conference as regards the future of this region, which should nevertheless have had a say in the decision, the choice of the army of occupation was sufficiently justified by the fact that the region had been densely populated by Greeks for centuries. Indeed, before 1914, there were 495,174 Greeks and 219,583 Turks living in the sanjak of Smyrna and the kaza of Ayvalik alone. If this population declined during the war as a result of persecution, famine and murder, this was surely an added incentive for the victorious Entente to take adequate steps to protect it. I therefore believe that the occupation was not only justified, but also more essential than any other occupation carried out by the victorious Allies on the grounds of justice, political ethics and ethnography.

3. The Commission notes that since the Greek landing, the situation has been one of unrest due to the state of war. I would kindly ask the Commission to make the distinction, as it does in several of the paragraphs that follow, that in the zone occupied by the Greek army, law and order were restored in the first few days, whereas unrest and even anarchy reigned in the neighbouring unoccupied regions, and that the situation would be remedied if a decisive approach were adopted, if the Greek authorities were able to carry out their functions, if the Turks were not encouraged in their displays of national fervour by external attacks and by hopes of influencing Conference decisions and if the Turks were aware that the army of occupation sent by the Conference would respect their rights but not passively tolerate attacks on its security or dignity. The history of occupations both past and present, a history that is much longer and more turbulent, is proof that no army has ever been placed in such a situation and demonstrated more sangfroid, restraint and discipline. It would be unjust therefore to hold it responsible for a few isolated incidents, incidents that are encountered in peacetime and in the most civilised countries.

4. The Commission notes (paragraph no 4) that several thousand Turks gathered on the eve of the occupation, but does not believe that the purpose of this was to organise resistance by force to the Greek landing. It also notes (paragraph no 7) that several hundred prisoners from all backgrounds escaped from prison several hours before the occupation, that the Turkish authorities took no effective steps to guard against or stop these escapes, that some of these prisoners procured weapons from the arsenal, and finally, that gunshots fired by the Turks (paragraph no 6) were isolated incidents.

With all due respect, I cannot share the Commission's conviction that the Turks gathered for peaceful purposes in view of the inflammatory proclamations made in the mosques, in the press and in public squares, and in view of the release and arming of the prisoners. Nor do I agree that in actual fact it does not matter from the point of view of responsibility whether the shots fired on the Greek army were the product of an organised revolt or the initiative of a few individuals. The Greek army, marching by ranks of four in a column and with their weapons unloaded, was unable to make this distinction, once it found itself unexpectedly attacked. It was thus obliged to crush the rebellion brutally, arresting those whom it knew or suspected to be involved. Any other army would have acted similarly in such a position.

Regretfully, I must also point out that whilst the gathering of Turks is viewed with indulgence, any religious ceremony and expression of natural sentiment by the Greek population are deemed (paragraph no 9) to be of a kind likely to anger the Turkish inhabitants and lead to acts of violence. Nevertheless, the underlying cause for the rise in Turkish extremism is naturally found in the mere presence of the conquering enemy, the despised Christian. It is difficult however to avoid arousing such feeling without leaving the Christian population under the yoke of the conquered enemy, an enemy that over a period spanning five centuries caused them so much suffering. Their feelings are at least as worthy of consideration as those of their oppressor.

Wherever allied troops have, following a victory, occupied a country hitherto under the yoke of the enemy, their fellow creatures have welcomed them with genuine joy. In my report, I openly expressed the previously unheard view that the Greek Command should have had the foresight to act with more circumspection. Yet this does not represent grounds for attributing the Turkish attack to the expression of Greek sentiments, when so far it has been undisputed that the Turks fired the first shots before any hostile act towards them had been reported.

I must also point out (paragraph no 9) that there were no Greek civil authorities in existence, and that the military authorities, occupied for several hours with stamping out resistance, were unable to take immediate action to instil order in a large town with such a mixed population, and which the Turkish constabulary had left to its own devices.

I must also remind you that we are not dealing here with a few intermittent gunshots fired by the Turks, but with heavy gunfire, not only around the Konak and barracks, but along the entire length of the route to be taken by the troops in order to reach the Carantina ridge.

5. The Commission notes (paragraph no 14) that on 15 May and in the days that followed the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested around 2500 people. In a country where the army of occupation is attacked and where everyone is armed, I do not see how order could have been restored without criminals or suspected criminals being arrested by the military authorities. The procedure for carrying out arrests in peacetime is impolitic in a state of war. Once order had been restored, a Commission, of which the Muftat was a member, visited the prisoners and most of them were released.

Although there were reports that the prisoners had been robbed and mistreated, and that looting had taken place in the town on the first day, the military authority took immediate action to stop these acts. In fact, the clampdown was so severe that order had virtually been restored the following day.

With all due respect however, I believe that many of the crimes, particularly the reports of rape, were fallacious. During my stay in Smyrna, it was found following thorough investigation that several of these complaints had been made by women of dubious morality. Moreover, I do not understand why the Greek authorities were not notified sooner of these acts, so deplored by the Turks, particularly since the Greek authorities dealt severely with the few against whom

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a case could be proven. I regret that I cannot give credence to the claims of witnesses who knew that they would not be contradicted, since these accusations were made in secret.

6. As regards the number of Turkish victims in Smyrna (paragraph no 16), Aydin or elsewhere, there was scope for the most fantastic estimates, especially since a large number of the Turkish inhabitants who fled from the occupied zone could easily be cited as being among those who had 'disappeared' at the hands of the Greeks.

7. As for the tension created in the vilayet of Aydin (paragraph no 23), I venture to think that this will soon subside, provided that the Turkish population realises that a firm decision by the Conference will determine the future of the region once and for all. This is proven by the fact that for almost a month, the entire region (Magnesios, Eudemich, Aydin and Nazili) has been occupied under satisfactory conditions, as the Commission itself is aware. In addition, 150 zeibek, hitherto outlawed in the mountains, reported to the Greek military authorities and, after promising to live peaceably, were allowed to go free. In almost all the occupied towns, the Muslim population has co-operated with the Greek troops. I completely concur therefore with the Commission that the uncertainty reigning over the question of the size of the territory to be occupied by the Greek forces contributed to and aggravated the tension. I must add that this uncertainty has persisted for five months now. I am convinced that the Turkish unrest will miraculously disperse when the Conference reaches a final decision, when any attempt to influence this decision through unrest would be rendered fruitless and when the Greek army is free to defend the area entrusted to it. In my opinion, the false situation in which the Greek army found and continues to find itself is the principal, if not the sole cause of the Turkish agitation. Moreover, in spite of any complaints that may have been made, we have sufficient proof that the Turkish inhabitants who left the region would now be only too happy to return in the belief that they will be left in peace. They are only prevented from doing so by the gangs. Nevertheless, several Turks have managed to elude detection by the gangs and return home, particularly in the Pergamos and Magnesios regions.

The Commission partly attributes (paragraph no 23) the tension in the country to searches made for weapons. These searches are among the most legitimate and logical steps taken by an army of occupation in a country where the Turkish population is armed, and where almost all the armouries have been looted. Yet apart from isolated cases where the military authority found itself obliged to enter houses where gunshots had been fired, or where it believed weapons to be hidden, the Command and the High Commissioner were so insistent that these searches should not be carried out that the entire Turkish population, particularly in Aydin, is now armed. Furthermore, Colonel Skinas, standing accused before the court martial for not having taken steps to prevent the sad events that occurred in the town, cited in his defence the express orders given to him not to search Turkish homes. The Turks were aware of this, which is why all the proclamations made by the military authorities to the effect that the inhabitants were to surrender their weapons went unheeded. We are certain that the entire Turkish population remains armed to this day.

I would therefore ask the Commission, when it notes that Greek civilians, who lived in terror for five years, carried weapons, to recognise that the Turkish population was just as well armed, especially in the light of the fact that almost all the armouries were looted in spite of the terms of the armistice.

8. The Commission is prepared to acknowledge that the accusation made by the Turks that the Greek Red Cross used its boxes to conceal weapons should not be pursued. However, it notes that boxes were unloaded in February and that a number of Turkish witnesses assert that these contained weapons. It is all too easy to make unfounded accusations. The Greek Red Cross was under no obligation to submit its boxes of equipment for inspection by the Turkish authorities; if it did so spontaneously, it was to put a stop to the libellous reports in the Turkish press. I

have already explained to the Commission that these boxes contained clothing for refugees and that the Director showed them to Turkish officials in the hospital and even to the public prosecutor. In passing, I would point out that these officials together with the Turkish population flocked to the hospital for treatment and drugs, and that the Vali himself went there on Easter Day. The Turks repaid the great service which this institution rendered to the population, regardless of race or religion, and which is proven by the statistics submitted to you, not only in Smyrna but throughout the country, with this slander and with the murder of Dr Manolas, Director of the Red Cross in Makri. Under these conditions, I would ask the Commission to judge whether it is right to accept an unfounded accusation even in passing.

9. The Commission notes (paragraph no 29) that in Nazili, after the Greek battalion had withdrawn, the Turks massacred Greek families and looted the houses, and it attributes these acts to a lack of organisation and time on the part of the Turkish authorities. It is my belief, after the experience in Pergamos, where the Kaimakam and Turkish officers were in charge of massacres, and Aydin, where the Divisional Commander was in the town when the mass slaughter took place, that in reality there is no distinction between Turkish authorities and irregulars. It is also strange that Turkish reports contained in the press acknowledge that brigands were responsible for the situation in Nazili.

I would also ask the Commission to note that massacres took place in the surrounding villages as well as in the town of Nazili, that 47 Greeks were killed and the priest burned alive in Aktché, that 47 people were killed in Kiosk, including a doctor and the priest, who was first blinded and had his nose and ears cut off, that three were killed and seven wounded in Sultan Hissar, that more than 90 Greeks were killed in Omurlu, and that 70 bodies were found after the reoccupation.

10. In its report of events in Aydin, the Commission admits (page 6, paragraph no 32) that a large number of Turkish men, women and children who were trying to leave the burning quarter were killed for no reason by Greek soldiers, who evacuated the town in the night of 29 June and early hours of 30 June after having carried out numerous attacks and committed other crimes.

I can only express my surprise at such an assertion. I have studied the numerous inquiries into these events and in which Muslims, Armenians and other groups made statements. I have personally conducted a thorough investigation, questioning all the military personnel and civilians who were there whether such acts were in fact committed. The conclusion I have drawn from all of this is that the Turks, whether irregulars or inhabitants of the town, fired on the army, that the army returned fire and that naturally there were victims on both sides in this fighting, which lasted for almost two days. I therefore cannot legitimately give credence to witness statements which presented the events in this light. I also wonder how it could have been possible to calculate the number of Turkish victims, in view of the fact that virtually the entire Turkish population, aware of its complicity, followed the irregulars before the town was reoccupied.

Nor can I agree that the Greek survivors were at the Konak under the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commander of the 57th Ottoman Division. On the contrary, I believe that this officer, who entered Aydin with the gangs, is equally responsible for the acts of cruelty which were committed, not least because it transpired that several Greek notables were taken from the Konak and executed without the protection of that superior officer having any impact.

The underlying cause of the unfortunate events in Aydin can be found in the narrow-mindedness with which the Command executed its orders not to go any further south than the town, an order that it interpreted as denying it of the most basic safety measures that were necessary for the protection of the troops, and not to disarm the population, which enabled

the Turkish inhabitants to join with the irregulars in attacking the troops. Although they were poorly executed, these orders, which demonstrate the loyalty of the Greek Command and the advantage the enemy derived from it, are worthy of the Commission's attention.

11. The Commission notes (paragraph no 40) that the occupation of the vilayet of Aydin by the Greek forces led to considerable material losses. I venture to consider that these losses, most of which were suffered by the Greeks, particularly in Aydin, were not due to the Greek occupation, which in the space of a month caused virtually no material losses, but to the actions of Turkish irregulars, who were the aggressors at Pergamos, Nazili and Aydin.

12. The Commission considers (paragraphs no 42 and 43) the assertions of Greek witnesses whereby gunshots were fired by Turks in Menemen on Greek soldiers, leading to disturbances in the town, to be inaccurate. Yet the inquiry into events held the next day by the military judge Mr. Papageorges and by the former Muslim Prefect of Drama Mr. Naïb Zadé Bey, the inquiry held by Captain Apostolakis and the statements of more than 20 witnesses whom I personally questioned are unanimous and concur on this subject, particularly with regard to the murder of a Greek corporal, the gunshots fired from the Hassan Azap house and the Konak and the number of victims, which was put at 40.

I am not in a position to know the reasons why the Commission reached this conclusion, reasons that have a bearing on the importance and veracity of the witnesses who gave evidence, and can therefore only note this difference, which might not have existed if the procedure had been that proposed by the Greek Government from the outset.

13. The Commission notes (paragraph no 44) that the occupation of the Magnesios zone was not beset by problems and that relations between the Turkish population and the Greek troops subsequently became strained following mistreatment, searches etc.

Regretfully I must protest against the repeated accusations levelled exclusively at the army of occupation following complaints made by Turks. At the very beginning, I gave the Commission a long list which mentioned 115 Greeks who had suffered at the hands of Turkish gangs in the Magnesios region. The same report also described the mass slaughter of Greeks at Yorktchekioy, Papazli, Yakakioy, etc.

Since it has thought it advisable to recount the complaints made by Turks, I would also ask the Commission to record in its report the massacres of Greeks in that region, whose lives are every bit as important as the damage mentioned. Without this information, the account gives the reader a false impression.

I do not know if the Commission during its visit to Magnesios was aware that several Turkish inhabitants had managed to elude detection by the gangs and return home. This proves more than any statement or complaint made for political ends the confidence of the Muslim population in the justice and order reigning in the occupied zone, in contrast with the anarchy and pressure from gangs in the unoccupied zone.

14. The Commission makes an assessment of the sentiments of half of the Greek population of Ayvali (page 4, paragraph no 45) which surprised me greatly. I do not understand how the Commission can claim to be aware of the sentiments of the Greek population of Ayvali, since in the few hours it spent there it did not have time to hear a single one of the many inhabitants who were waiting to be called, military and religious authorities excepted, and a list of whom I have submitted to the Commission. Even if this assessment was supplied by someone, I do not believe that it should be presented as a categorical observation of the Commission itself if it has not been substantiated by a more in-depth and general consultation of the people.

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If the Commission had paused to consider the secular sufferings of the Greek race in Asia Minor and the war of extermination that it has endured over the last five years, which have reinforced rather than weakened its national sentiment, it would surely have refrained from making this assessment, which could deeply wound the national sentiment of the Greek people and against which I protest in the strongest and most categorical terms.

The Turkish refugees who left the territories occupied by the Greeks (paragraph no 46) were prevented from returning home by irregulars, or rather by the Turkish organisation that is known to be part of the Turkish Government. The political aim is clear: to influence the Conference with regard to the political future of this part of the Ottoman Empire in a period of indecision and expectation.

The fact that several Turks have returned home, particularly in the Pergamos and Magnesios regions, is proof of the confidence which the Greek administration has managed to inspire, despite the numerous obstacles it has had to face, such as the presence of the Turkish authorities, which take their orders from the Ottoman Government, the inability to act freely in the various branches of administration as a result of the hybrid situation in the country and the continuous preoccupation with the security of the zone, which is threatened by external gangs, etc. It is my firm belief, based on a careful examination of recent history in the Near East and on an in-depth study of the character of the Turkish people, that we should know better than anyone, having lived alongside them for centuries, that if the people could see that the Conference had reached a decision, then apart from a few professional agitators or exploiters, they would stay or return home, happy to be able to live in peace at last and escape from such an ill-fated, oppressive and backward government indifferent to both Turks and Christians.

16 [sic]. On the subject of the transporting of Greeks into the province of Smyrna, raised by the complaint made by the Sheikh-ul-Islam (paragraph no 47), I profess that I have not had sight of this document and therefore am not entirely familiar with the facts on which this complaint is based. I should point out however that it is not a question of 'transporting Greeks', but of repatriating Greeks who are native to Asia Minor and who were expelled by the Turks in 1914.

This repatriation, which is as logical as it is legitimate, should naturally preoccupy the Greek Government, which has expended considerable sums in support of them for years.

I have supplied the Commission with correspondence exchanged on this subject between the Greek Commissariat in Smyrna, from when this was first set up, and the authorities of the Kingdom, from where it has emerged that strict orders were issued and executed in order to prevent this repatriation.

Personally, I find that this measure, intended to prevent difficulties arising, in view of the fact that the properties of evicted Greeks had been seized and occupied by Turks, and to prevent friction between the Greeks and Turks, was too harsh. From the point of view of absolute justice, I wonder who has more rights, the owner who has been evicted and who wishes to return home, or the person who occupies it arbitrarily? How would a court rule in such a case? This has not been evaluated from a political point of view, since not only do Turks base their complaints on this, but they take advantage of it to claim and try to persuade the entire world that Turks are predominant in the region. They may even be believed by those visiting the country who see Greek villages, the former inhabitants of which are still in exile or who have perished in central Asia Minor, now inhabited by Turks.

17. Alongside the established facts contained in its account, I would ask the Commission to be so good as to recount the numerous murders of Greeks by Turks, not only in those places where the Commission conducted its inquiry, but also in regions where the Greek army never set foot

and where, as a result, responsibility for events is clear-cut. 47 murders were reported in Philadelphios and neighbouring areas, 110-115 to the south of the Meander, 14 in Makri etc. These are referred to, together with names and dates, in the documents that I submitted to the Commission on the first day.

To summarise if I may:

1. The military occupation was imposed to restore order, to rescue what remained of the Christian population, which was persecuted, exiled and massacred for five years, and to prevent a resurgence of Turkish extremism;
2. All the events which had regrettable consequences took place after Turks had attacked the Greek army;
3. Not only did the Greek authorities act promptly throughout to restore order, but I even venture to suggest that they treated and continue to treat the Muslim population favourably;
4. Even the lack of foresight on the part of the Greek Command in Smyrna can be explained to a certain extent in view of the fact that neither Greece's representative nor the representatives of the Entente in Smyrna expected the Turks to attack, and thus took no effective measure to move the Turkish troops and prevent the people from gathering and going about their business;
5. Perfect order reigns in the zone occupied by the Greek army, whilst there is complete anarchy outside this zone.

COLONEL ALEXANDER MAZARAKIS,

Delegate of the Greek Government

CONSTANTINOPLE, 11 October 1919.

Document 6

## II. Establishment of Responsibilities

CONSTANTINOPLE, 11 October 1919.

No 1. - The inquiry has proven that the general situation of Christians in the vilayet of Aydin has been satisfactory since the armistice and that they have not been in danger.

Although the Peace Conference gave the order to occupy Smyrna on the basis of inaccurate information, initial responsibility for events lies with the individuals or governments who established or passed on the uncorroborated information, such as that referred to in paragraph no 1 of the established items. (On this subject the Italian General Representative expresses once more the reservations contained in the minutes of the 37th meeting).

No 2. - The primary cause of events stems from religious hatred, demonstrations of which the Greeks did nothing to prevent. Far from seeming to be the execution of a civilising mission, their occupation immediately assumed the appearance of a conquest and crusade.



No 3. - Responsibility for events which took place in Smyrna on 15 and 16 May and in the immediate vicinity of the town in the first few days following the landing lies with the Greek High Command and with certain officers who failed in their duty.

The Greek Government has acknowledged this responsibility by the sanctions it has taken.

Some of the responsibility does however lie with the Turkish authorities in Smyrna, who took no steps to prevent common law prisoners from escaping and taking up arms before the Greeks arrived.

No 4. - In the person of the civil Supreme Authority representing it in Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the serious disturbances which bathed the country in blood while the Greek troops advanced because:

a) The said authority did not comply with the instructions of the Supreme Council contained in Mr Venizelos' telegram of 7/20 May. Without requesting any authorisation from the representative of the Entente, it allowed the military Command to give the order on 10/23 May to send troops to Aydin-Magnesios and Kassaba outside the limits of the sanjak of Smyrna;

b) The same authority deliberately left the population in ignorance of the extent of the occupation, thus helping to increase the tension of the Muslim inhabitants and contributing to the ensuing chaos.

No 5. - The supreme Greek authorities are held responsible because they allowed armed civilians to move about the country.

They even tolerated the involvement of some of these armed civilians alongside regular troops in some of their military and policing operations.

No 6. - The primary cause of the disturbances that occurred in the Meander valley was the occupation itself, for which there was no justification.

The regrettable events that accompanied the advance and installation of the Greek troops were due to the state of war in which the country found itself on the arrival of the troops.

The centuries-old hatred between Turks and Greeks undoubtedly increased the frequency and savagery of these acts.

In all justice, the Greeks should not be held solely responsible for these acts.

The same considerations apply to the events that took place in the Pergamos region and around Magnesios and Eudemich.

No 7. - On the contrary, the Greeks are solely responsible for the Menemen massacre. This massacre was not premeditated, but the Greek Command knew that the troops were tense following the Pergamos affair and could and should have taken steps to control the troops, whom, out of nervousness, fatigue and fear carried out a veritable massacre of defenceless Turkish civilians without provocation.

The Greek officers who were present at Menemen utterly failed in their duty.

No 8. - Although the situation has now improved, calm has not yet been restored in the vilayet of Aydin.

Virtually all trade with central Anatolia has ceased.

This situation is undoubtedly the result of the occupation and the state of war which still exists between the Turkish irregulars and Greek troops, even though the latter are no longer extending the zone of occupation.

The leaders of the Turkish national movement, who are acting in concert with former leaders of the gangs of brigands, still do not have sufficient authority over their forces to prevent them from carrying out the occasional incursion. Consequently, they can be held partly responsible for the current situation in the country.

Yet underlying the responsibility attributed to the leaders of the Turkish national movement is that of the Turkish Government, which until now has had no authority over the leaders of the national movement.

The Members of the Commission:

MARK BRISTOL, BUNOUST, A. DALL'OLIO, R. H. HARE.

Document 7

Thirty-seventh meeting

2 October 1919.

General Dall'Olio reports as follows:

The Commission of Inquiry should examine the events that accompanied and followed the occupation by Greek troops of the regions of Smyrna, Aydin and Ayvali, which are set out in particular in Sheikh-ul-Islam's protest addressed to the Paris Conference. Consequently, and since these instructions are supported by the specification that the period under examination is between the Greek occupation and 26 or 29 July, I am of the opinion that the reasons for the landing and the occupation of the forts should not be discussed. This question is not within the Commission of Inquiry's remit but within that of the Conference, and for this reason I believe it to be my duty to maintain my point of view, and I would urge my colleagues to be good enough to accept the reasons I am offering on this subject.

In any event, I would ask that this declaration, which is generally one of reservation, to be included in the minutes.

Document 8

III. Conclusions put forward by the Commission

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13 October 1919.

I. - The situation which has arisen in Smyrna and in the vilayet of Aydin following the Greek occupation is false because:

a) The occupation, the purpose of which in principle was only to maintain order, actually has all the appearances of an annexation.

The only effective authority is in the hands of the Greek High Commissioner.

The Turkish authorities which have remained in office no longer have any real power. They no longer receive orders from Constantinople, and in view of the near complete disappearance of the Turkish police and constabulary no longer have the means necessary to execute their decisions;

b) The occupation is imposing considerable military sacrifice on Greece, a sacrifice which is out of proportion with the mission to be carried out if this mission is a temporary one and intended only to maintain order;

c) In its present form, it is incompatible with the restoration of order and peace, of which the population, threatened by famine, are in dire need.

II. - It is the Commission's view:

a) That if the sole purpose of the military occupation of the country is to maintain law and order, the occupation should be entrusted not to Greek but to Allied troops, under the authority of the Allied Supreme Command in Asia Minor;

b) That occupation by the Greeks alone should only continue if the Peace Conference is resolved to pronounce the complete and definitive annexation of the country to Greece.

In this case, the Greek Command should be allowed freedom of action with respect to the Turkish forces;

c) that annexation pure and simple as envisaged above would be contrary to the principle which proclaims respect for nationalities, since in the occupied region, outside the town of Smyrna itself and Ayvali, the Turkish population undoubtedly predominates over the Greek population.

It is the Commission's duty to point out that Turkish national sentiment, which has already demonstrated its resistance, will not accept this annexation. It will give in only to force, that is, in the face of a military expedition which Greece alone could not conduct with any likelihood of success.

III. - Under these conditions, the Commission proposes the following measures:

a) To have all or some [sic] of the Greek troops relieved by much smaller contingents of allied troops as soon as possible.

b) If, to protect Greek self-esteem, it is decided that some of the Greek troops should take part in the occupation, to distribute these troops within the occupied region to prevent them from having any direct contact with Turkish national forces.

c) Once the Allied occupying forces are in place, to request that the Turkish Government reorganise the constabulary under the control and command of inter-allied officers.

The constabulary should be rendered capable of maintaining order throughout the region and thus of replacing allied detachments as soon as possible.

d) The Turkish Government should restore the civil administration at the same time as it re-organises the constabulary.

IV. - Since the leaders of the national movement have asserted on more than one occasion that their opposition is to the Greeks alone, the measures proposed should deprive them of any reason for armed resistance and restore to central government in Constantinople the authority it currently lacks.

There should be no further obstacle to the disbanding of the irregular troops.

Failing this, the Entente will witness first-hand the extent of the pledges of loyalty made by both the leaders of the Turkish national movement and by members of the Turkish Government.

The Members of the Commission:

ADMIRAL BRISTOL GENERAL BUNOUST

US Delegate French Delegate

GENERAL HARE GENERAL DALL'OLIO

British Delegate Italian Delegate

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128. 127See Appendices, Document 3, Point No. 30.
129. 128Fletcher School..., op. cit., Article 25.
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131. 130See Appendices, Document 3, Points No. 32 and 39.

- Translated from its original in French.

16 In the original, this document was preceded by a table of contents enumerating the documents contained in this appendix.

17 Not included in file copy of this appendix.

18 See Vol. I, No. 17, minute 12.

19 Document 3 below.

20 Document 5 below.

21 Document 6 below.

22. Document 8 below.

23 Article 7 of the Armistice of Port Mudros provided that: "The Allies have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies" (Cf. British and Foreign State Papers (1917-1918), vol. cxi, p. 612).

23. Document 7 below.

24. 25Cf. Vol. I, No 10, note 8.

26 Note in the original: "This report was accompanied by the following covering letter:

Constantinople, 29th [September]/12th October 1919.

Dear Chairman,

I have pleasure in submitting to the Commission some comments suggested by the account of the results of the inquiry that you kindly sent me.

Yours etc.,

Colonel Alexander Mazarakis