The field of ethics,
also called moral philosophy, involves systematizing, defending, and
recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today
usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas:
metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Metaethics
investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they
mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than
expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these
questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God,
the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical
terms themselves. Normative ethics takes on a more practical
task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and
wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the
duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others. Finally, applied
ethics involves examining specific controversial issues, such as
abortion, infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns,
homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war. By using the
conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in
applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines of distinction between
metaethics, normative ethics, and
applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of abortion
is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type of
controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general normative
principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life,
which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that
procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "where
do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights?"
Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article)
1. Metaethics
The term "meta" means
after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion of
metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire
project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the
origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative
ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least
precisely defined area of moral philosophy. Two issues, though, are
prominent: (1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality
exists independently of humans, and (2) psychological issues
concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral judgments and conduct.
1a. Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism
"Metaphysics" is
the study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe. Some
things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such as rocks; and
perhaps other things are nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts,
spirits, and gods. The metaphysical component of metaethics involves
discovering specifically whether moral values are eternal truths that
exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions. There are two general directions that discussions of this topic take, one
other-worldly and one this-worldly. Proponents of the "other-worldly" view typically hold that moral values are
objective in the sense that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond subjective human conventions. They also hold that they are
absolute, or eternal, in that they never change, and also that they are universal insofar as they apply to all rational creatures
around the world and throughout time. The most dramatic example of this view is Plato, who was inspired by the field of mathematics.
When we look
at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be
timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the
universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them.
Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that
they are abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm.
He noted that moral values also are absolute truths and thus are also
abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral
values are spiritual objects. Medieval philosophers commonly
grouped all moral principles together under the heading of "eternal
law" which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects.
17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described
them as spirit-like relationships rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in a sprit-like realm. A
different other-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality is divine
commands issuing from God's will. Sometimes called voluntarism,
this view was inspired by the notion of an
all-powerful God who is in control of everything. God simply wills
things, and they become reality. He wills the physical world into
existence, he wills human life into existence and, similarly, he
wills all moral values into existence. Proponents of this view, such
as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe that God wills
moral principles, such as "murder is wrong," and these exist in God's
mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting
us with moral intuitions or revealing these commands in
scripture.
The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality follows in the skeptical philosophical tradition,
such as that articulated by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the objective status of moral values. Technically skeptics
did not reject moral values themselves, but only denied that values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind
of God. Moral values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that has since been called moral relativism.
There are two distinct forms of moral relativism. The first is individual relativism, which holds that individual people
create their own moral standards. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her morality distinct
from and in reaction to the slave-like value system of the masses. The second is cultural relativism which maintains that
morality is grounded in the approval of one's society - and not simply in the preferences of individual people. This view was
advocated by Sextus, and in more recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing skepticism
and relativism, "this-worldly" approaches to the metaphysical status of morality deny the absolute and universal nature of morality
and hold instead that moral values in fact change from society to society throughout time and throughout the world. They frequently
attempt to defend their position by citing examples of values that differ dramatically from one culture to another, such as attitudes
about polygamy, homosexuality and human sacrifice.
b. Psychological Issues in Metaethics
A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our moral judgments and conduct,
particularly understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might explore this subject by asking the simple question, "Why be
moral?" Even if I am aware of basic moral standards, such as don't kill and don’t steal, this does not necessarily mean that I will
be psychologically compelled to act on them. Some answers to the question "Why be moral?" are to avoid punishment, to gain praise, to
attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in
with society.
i. Egoism and Altruism
One important area of moral psychology concerns the inherent
selfishness of humans. 17th century British philosopher
Thomas Hobbes held that many, if not all, of our actions are prompted by
selfish desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such as donating
to charity, there are still selfish causes for this, such as
experiencing power over other people. This view is called
psychological
egoism and maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately
motivate all human actions. Closely related to
psychological egoism is a view called psychological hedonism
which is the view that pleasure is the specific driving force behind
all of our actions. 18th century British philosopher
Joseph
Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure prompt
much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an
inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This
view is called psychological altruism and maintains that at
least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive
benevolence.
ii. Emotion and Reason
A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the
role of reason in motivating moral actions. If, for example, I make the statement "abortion is morally wrong," am I making a rational
assessment or only expressing my feelings? On the one side of the dispute, 18th century
British philosopher David Hume argued that moral assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason. We can amass all the reasons
we want, but that alone will not constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a moral
pronouncement. Reason might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume's words, "reason is, and ought to be, the
slave of the passions." Inspired by Hume's anti-rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly
denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For example, although the statement "it is good to donate to charity" may on
the surface look as though it is a factual description about charity, it is not. Instead, a moral utterance like this involves two
things. First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of
approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying
"Hooray for charity!" This is called the emotive element insofar as I
am expressing my emotions about some specific behavior. . Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to donate to charity and am
essentially giving the command, "Donate to charity!" This is called the prescriptive element in the sense that I am
prescribing some
specific behavior.
From Hume's day forward, more rationally-minded philosophers have opposed these emotive theories of ethics and instead argued that
moral assessments are indeed acts of reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel
Kant is a case in point. Although emotional factors often do influence
our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral
action is motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions and
desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier, was proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and prescriptivist
theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making moral
choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or justification. If I
claim that it is wrong to steal someone's car, then I
should be able to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For
example, I could argue that stealing Smith's car is wrong
since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the
thief at risk of getting caught. According to Baier, then, proper
moral decision making involves giving the best
reasons in support of one course of action versus
another.
iii. Male and Female Morality
A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there is a distinctly female approach to ethics that is grounded in the
psychological differences between men and women. Discussions of this issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional morality is
male-centered, and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world which can be shaped into a value theory. According to many
feminist philosophers, traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices that have been traditionally
male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems of rules
required for trade and government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid systems of moral rules, such as lists
of rights and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children and overseeing domestic life.
These tasks require less rule following, and more spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman's experience as a model for moral
theory, then, the basis of morality would be spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in each unique circumstance. On
this model, the agent becomes part of the situation and acts caringly within that context. This stands in contrast with male-modeled
morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the
situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is offered by feminist ethicists as either a replacement for
or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems.
2. Normative Ethics
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong
conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of
proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative
principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to
us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong
for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I
was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this
same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible
action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also
be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill
others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that
establishes a single principle against which we judge all
actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of
foundational principles, or a set of good character traits.
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only
one ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a
single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies will be noted here: (1) virtue theories,
(2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.
a. Virtue Theories
Many philosophers believe that morality consists
of following precisely defined rules of conduct, such as "don't
kill," or "don't steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules, and
then make sure each of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue
theorists, however, place less emphasis on learning rules, and
instead stress the importance of developing good habits of
character, such as benevolence. Once I've acquired benevolence,
for example, I will then habitually act in a benevolent manner.
Historically, virtue theory is one of the oldest normative traditions in
Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization.
Plato emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called
cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice.
Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good
temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of
character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad
character traits, or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility,
injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since
virtuous character traits are developed in one's youth. Adults,
therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young.
Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits
that we acquire, which regulate our emotions. For example, in
response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue
of courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing
11 specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most virtues fall at a
mean between more extreme character traits. With courage, for
example, if I do not have enough courage, I develop the disposition
of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too much courage I develop
the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to
Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between
extreme character traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason
to do this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek
lists of virtues with three Christian ones, or theological
virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in virtue theory
continued through the middle ages and declined in the 19th
century with the rise of alternative moral theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue theory received special
attention from philosophers who believed that more recent approaches ethical theories were misguided for focusing too heavily on
rules and actions, rather than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre defended the central role of virtues in moral theory
and argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge from within social traditions.
b. Duty Theories
Many of us feel that
there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care
for our children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation.
These theories are sometimes called deontological, from the
Greek word deon, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of our
duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called
nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory,
irrespective of the consequences that might follow from our
actions. For example, it is wrong to not care for our children
even if it results in some great benefit, such as financial savings. There are four central
duty theories.
The first is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties under three
headings: duties to God,
duties to oneself, and duties to others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds: (1) a theoretical
duty to know the existence and nature of God, and (2) a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God. Concerning our
duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts: (1) duties of the soul, which involve developing one's skills and talents, and
(2) duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.
Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are universally binding on people, and
conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts: (1) avoid wronging others;
(2) treat people as equals, and (3) promote the good of others. Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal
one of which is the duty is to keep one's promises.
A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a "right" is a justified claim against another
person's behavior - such as my right to not be harmed by you. Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights of one
person implies the duties of another person. For example, if I have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay
me $10. This is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early account of rights theory is that of
17th century British philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's
life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the United States
Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson
recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness. Jefferson and others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other
more specific rights from these, including the rights of property,
movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features
traditionally associated with moral rights. First, rights are
natural insofar as they are not invented or created by
governments. Second, they are universal insofar as they do not
change from country to country. Third, they are equal in the
sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of
gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are inalienable which
means that I ca not hand over my rights to another person, such as by
selling myself into slavery.
A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that
we
have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's
talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued
that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses
our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of
reason that he calls the "categorical imperative." A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical
imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that we have, for example, "If you want to get a good job, then you ought to go to
college." By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal desires, such as "You ought
to do X." Kant gives at
least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is
especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an
end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never
use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end
whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of
that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct
since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By
contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat
that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for
example, to steal my neighbor's car since I would be
treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical
imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us
individually. Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be
treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant
believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by
appealing to this single principle of duty.
A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes prima facie duties.
Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts,
Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is much shorter,
which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:
Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm
them
Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
Justice: the duty to recognize merit
Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of
others
Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and
intelligence
Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others
Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow
my neighbor's gun and promise to
return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of rage, my neighbor
pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take vengeance
on someone. On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to
return the gun; on the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence
obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not return the gun.
According to Ross, I will intuitively know which of these duties is
my actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima facie
duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my actual
duty and I should not return the gun.
c. Consequentialist Theories
It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the
consequences of our actions. According to consequentialist normative theories, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a
cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences:
Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the
consequences of that action are more favorable than
unfavorable.
Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally
both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then
determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad
consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action
is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the
action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are sometimes called
teleological theories, from the Greek word telos, or
end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining
factor of its morality.
Consequentialist theories became popular in the
18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to
morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by
appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In
fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it
appeals to publicly observable consequences of actions. Most
versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the
general principle above. In particular, competing consequentialist
theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are
relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:
Ethical
Egoism:an action is morally right if the
consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable
only to the agent performing the action.
Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the
consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable
to everyone except the agent.
Utilitarianism:
an action is morally right if the consequences of that
action are more favorable than unfavorable to
everyone.
All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions
for different groups of people. But, like all normative theories, the
above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield
different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was
traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in
front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked
the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the
driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down the
road the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an
accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person
responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the
assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver
continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually
left unattended and often die from exposure to the country's
harsh desert conditions. On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman
in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of
her attempted assistance as she would be affected. Clearly,
the decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the
principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the
consequences of her action as others are affected,
particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those consequences
reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct
choice, irrespective of the negative consequences that result for
her. On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the
consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is
less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the
overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action.
i. Types of Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham presented one of the earliest fully developed
systems of utilitarianism. Two features of his theory are
noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences of
each action we perform and thereby determine on a case by case basis
whether an action is morally right or wrong. This aspect of
Bentham's theory is known as act-utilitiarianism. Second,
Bentham also proposed that we tally the pleasure and pain which
results from our actions. For Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only
consequences that matter in determining whether our conduct is moral.
This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as hedonistic
utilitarianism. Critics point out limitations in both of these
aspects.
First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong
to waste time on leisure activities such as watching television,
since our time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social
benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities
doesn't seem reasonable. More significantly, according to
act-utilitarianism, specific acts of torture or slavery would be
morally permissible if the social benefit of these actions outweighed
the disbenefit. A revised version of utilitarianism called rule-utilitarianism
addresses these problems. According to rule-utilitarianism, a
behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of
adopting that rule are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.
Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs the consequences of each
particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test only for
the morality of moral rules, such as "stealing is wrong."
Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable consequences
than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for
moral rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then,
offers a three-tiered method for judging conduct. A particular
action, such as stealing my neighbor's car, is judged
wrong since it violates a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule
against theft is morally binding because adopting this rule produces
favorable consequences for everyone. John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism is rule-oriented.
Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable
consequences are the only factors that matter, morally speaking.
This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally
significant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or
painful. For example, acts which foster loyalty and friendship are
valued, yet they are not always pleasing. In response to this
problem, G.E. Moore proposed ideal utilitarianism, which
involves tallying any consequence that we intuitively recognize as
good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M.
Hare proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves
tallying any consequence that fulfills our preferences.
ii. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory
We have seen that Thomas Hobbes was an advocate of the methaethical theory of psychological egoism - the view that all of our
actions are selfishly motivated. Upon that foundation, Hobbes developed a normative theory known as social contract theory, which is
a type of rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, for purely selfish reasons, the agent is
better off living in a world with moral rules than one without moral
rules. For without moral rules, we are subject to the whims of other
people's selfish interests. Our property, our families, and even our
lives are at continual risk. Selfishness alone will therefore
motivate each agent to adopt a basic set of rules which will allow
for a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would
include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However,
these rules will ensure safety for each agent only if the rules are
enforced. As selfish creatures, each of us would plunder our
neighbors' property once their guards were down. Each agent would
then be at risk from his neighbor. Therefore, for selfish reasons
alone, we devise a means of enforcing these rules: we create a
policing agency which punishes us if we violate these rules.
3. Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion,
animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical
ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be
considered an "applied ethical issue." First, the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are significant groups of
people both for and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since
everyone agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of gun control would be an applied ethical issue since
there are significant groups of people both for and against gun control.
The second requirement for in issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the
media presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment
of the mentally impaired, capitalistic vs. socialistic business practices, public vs. private health care systems, or energy
conservation. Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact on society, they are not all moral issues.
Some are only issues of social policy. The aim of social policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising
conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory
practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social policy and
morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of issues are often distinct.
For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies
regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain
neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a
resident having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than
one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.
In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy. With the issue of abortion, for example, we would simply
determine its morality by consulting our normative principle of choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion produces
greater benefit than disbenefit, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable to have the abortion.
Unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose, many of which yield opposite
conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between conflicting theories prevents us from using a single decisive procedure
for determining the morality of a specific issue. The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several representative
normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight of the evidence lies.
a. Normative Principles in Applied Ethics
Arriving at a short list of representative normative principles is itself a challenging task. The principles selected must not be
too narrowly focused, such as a version of act-egoism that might focus only on an action's short-term benefit. The principles must
also be seen as having merit by people on both sides of an applied ethical issue. For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to
God are not usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the debate. The following principles are the
ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical discussions:
Personal benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for the individual in question.
Social benefit: acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for society.
Principle of benevolence: help those in need.
Principle of paternalism: assist others in pursuing their best interests when they cannot do so themselves.
Principle of harm: do not harm others.
Principle of honesty: do not deceive others.
Principle of lawfulness: do not violate the law.
Principle of autonomy: acknowledge a person's freedom over his/her actions or physical body.
Principle of justice: acknowledge a person's right to due process, fair compensation for harm done, and fair distribution of
benefits.
Rights: acknowledge a person's rights to life, information, privacy, free expression, and safety.
The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional normative principles and are derived from both consequentialist and
duty-based approaches. The first two principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are consequentialist since they appeal to the
consequences of an action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining principles are duty-based. The principles of
benevolence, paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties we have toward others. The principles of autonomy,
justice, and the various rights are based on moral rights.
An example will help illustrate the function of these principles in an applied ethical discussion. In 1982 a couple from Bloomington,
Indiana gave birth to a severely retarded baby. The infant, known as Baby Doe, also had its stomach disconnected from its throat and
was thus unable to receive nourishment. Although this stomach deformity was correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to
raise a severely retarded child and therefore chose to deny surgery, food, and water for the infant. Local courts supported the
parents' decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery have been performed for Baby Doe? Arguments in favor
of corrective surgery derive from the infant's right to life and the principle of paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue
the best interests of others when they are incapable of doing so themselves. Arguments against corrective surgery derive from the
personal and social disbenefit which would result from such surgery. If Baby Doe survived, its quality of life would have been poor
and in any case it probably would have died at an early age. Also, from the parent's perspective, Baby Doe's survival would have been
a significant emotional and financial burden. When examining both sides of the issue, the parents and the courts concluded that the
arguments against surgery were stronger than the arguments for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests
of the infant, given the poor quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe's right to life was not clear given the
severity of the infant's mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain
cognitive functions must also be present. The issue here involves what is often referred to as moral personhood, and is central to
many applied ethical discussions.
b. Issues in Applied Ethics
As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by ethicists today, some of which will be briefly mentioned here.
Biomedical ethics focuses on a range of issues which arise in clinical settings. Health care workers are in an unusual position of
continually dealing with life and death situations. It is not surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and
diverse than other areas of applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality of surrogate mothering, genetic manipulation of
fetuses, the status of unused frozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise about patient rights and physician's responsibilities,
such as the confidentiality of the patient's records and the physician's responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS
crisis has raised the specific issues of the mandatory screening of all patients for AIDS, and whether physicians can refuse to treat
AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation on humans, the morality of involuntary commitment, and the rights of
the mentally retarded. Finally, end of life issues arise about the morality of suicide, the justifiability of suicide intervention,
physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.
The field of business ethics examines moral controversies relating to the social responsibilities of capitalist business practices,
the moral status of corporate entities, deceptive advertising, insider trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination,
affirmative action, drug testing, and whistle blowing. Issues in environmental ethics often overlaps with business and medical
issues. These include the rights of animals, the morality of animal experimentation, preserving endangered species, pollution
control, management of environmental resources, whether eco-systems are entitled to direct moral consideration, and our obligation to
future generations. Controversial issues of sexual morality include monogamy vs. polygamy, sexual relations without love, homosexual
relations, and extramarital affairs. Finally, there are issues of social morality which examine capital punishment, nuclear war, gun
control, the recreational use of drugs, welfare rights, and racism.
4. References and Further Reading
Anscombe,Elizabeth "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958), Philosophy, 1958, Vol. 33,
reprinted in her Ethics, Religion and Politics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1981).
Aristotle, Nichomachean
Ethics, in Barnes, Jonathan, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Ayer, A. J., Language,
Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1946).
Bentham, Jeremy, Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), in The
Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by John Bowring
(London: 1838-1843).
Hare, R.M., Moral
Thinking, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan,
ed., E. Curley, (Chicago, IL: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).
Hume, David, A
Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), eds. David Fate Norton, Mary J.
Norton (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Kant, Immanuel, Grounding
for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr, James W. Ellington (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).
Locke, John, Two
Treatises, ed., Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963).
MacIntyre,
Alasdair, After Virtue, second edition, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1984).
Mackie, John L., Ethics:
Inventing Right and Wrong, (New York:
Penguin Books, 1977).
Mill, John
Stuart, Utilitarianism, in Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill, ed., J.M. Robson (London: Routledge and Toronto, Ont.: University
of Toronto Press, 1991).
Moore, G.E., Principia
Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
Noddings, Nel, "Ethics from the Stand Point Of
Women", in Deborah L. Rhode, ed., Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual
Difference (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
Ockham, William
of, Fourth Book of the Sentences, tr. Lucan Freppert, The Basis of
Morality According to William Ockham (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1988).
Plato, Republic,
6:510-511, in Cooper, John M., ed., Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
Samuel Pufendorf,
De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1762), tr. Of the Law of Nature and
Nations.
Samuel Pufendorf,
De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem (1673), tr., The
Whole Duty of Man according to the Law of Nature (London, 1691).
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trs.
J. Annas and J. Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
Stevenson, Charles L., The Ethics of Language,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
Sumner, William
Graham, Folkways (Boston: Guinn, 1906).
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