Sovereignty or Demography?

Reconsidering the Evidence on Partition in Ethnic Civil Wars

With ethnic violence within states now longer-lasting and more frequent than inter-state conflict, resources have been poured into understanding ethnic civil wars and how best to end the violence.[1] This increased research is not surprising given the levels of international intervention in ethnic civil wars as well as the egregious levels of civilian death and disability.[2] Further, the potential for conflict remains vast: in the 1990s more than 200 ethnic minorities and subordinate majorities throughout the world were contesting the terms of their incorporation into the world's state system.[3] This paper focuses on one ethnic conflict management tool that has regained international attention over the past decade: partition.[4]

Eschewed by policy-makers and academics for most of the post WWII era, the debate surrounding partition reemerged at the end of the Cold War, as international boundaries were once again open to large-scale change. Moreover, in the past decade Western states, heavily engaged in the conflicts of a collapsing Yugoslavia and elsewhere, have demonstrated an ambivalent attitude towards partition as a means to successfully regulate ethnic conflict.[5] More recently, partition has been suggested as one route to solve Iraq's inter-ethnic tensions.[6] This paper adds to the debates that have arisen over the past decade by examining all partitions that have followed ethnic civil

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[1] Fearon and Laitin detail the longer lasting nature of civil wars and their occurrence in Fearon, James, Laitin, David (2003) "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" *American Political Science Review* Vol.97 No.1 (February), pp.77-78; on civil war length in general, see Fearon, James (2002) "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" World Bank Group Research, available at http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict/topic/13191/library/doc?id=18171

[2] For the effects of civil wars, see Collier et.al. (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Poli*cy (Washington, DC: World Bank & Oxford University Press).

[3] Gurr, Ted Robert (1993) *Minorities At Risk* (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace), p.ix

[4] McGarry and O'Leary presented a taxonomy of macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation identifying partition as one of eight. See McGarry, John, O'Leary, Brendan (1993) "Introduction: The Macro-political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict" in McGarry, John, O'Leary, Brendan (eds.) *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London: Routledge). Partition's increased attention since 1990 is evident by the works of Chaim Kauffman, Nicholas Sambanis, Radha Kumar and others mentioned below in this paper.

[5] The Dayton Accords provided a de facto partition of Bosnia but with a commitment to reintegration drawing critics from both the pro and anti partition camp, see Kumar, Radha (1997) "The Troubled History of Partition" in *Foreign Affairs* Vol.76 No.1 (January/February) and Mearsheimer, John and Van Evera, Stephen (1995) "When Peace Means War," New Republic (December). The partition of Kosovo went further towards international recognition but this remains in an undetermined state, see International Crisis Group's "A Kosovo Roadmap: Addressing Final Status" in *Balkan Report* No.124

[6] See, for example, Leslie H. Gelb's (President Emeritus, Council of Foreign Relations) Op-Ed in the *New York Times*, "The Three-State Solution" 11/25/03, or the symposium sponsored by the *Ethics and Public Policy Center*, which examined, "the merits of various policy strategies for resolving ethno-religious conflict - particularly some form of partition," that focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, with Radha Kumar, Chaim Kaufmann, and Donald Horowitz in attendance. "Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Partition, and U.S. Foreign Policy" (01/15/03).

wars since 1945, finding partition to be a uniformly effective tool to eliminate violence and war recurrence, *but only if it includes the separation of ethnic groups*.

Debate about the relative merits of partition is not new. Until recently, however, all of these studies remained either at a theoretical level or relied exclusively on case studies.[7] Facts from the ground pointed to some successes and some failures, and the debate, unable to arrive at decisive empirical conclusions, often rallied around normative issues instead. In 2000, Nicholas Sambanis produced the first empirical study of partition using a large-*n*, cross-national database.[8] His results dismiss pro-partition claims, concluding that, "partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence [which] suggests, at the very least, that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the problem of violent ethnic antagonism."[9]

This paper re-examines the evidence on partition and challenges Sambanis's conclusions regarding the effectiveness of partition. The Sambanis analysis of partition missed the core, underlying assertions of pro-partitionists: those in favor of partition as a conflict-regulating tool (referred to henceforth as 'partition theorists') are interested in *unmixing populations*, which they believe will reduce security fears, and ultimately violence; they are not interested in *partition alone* – a division of territory – as an outcome. The previous statistical analysis relied on *sovereignty* as the critical independent variable representing partition and not the demographic separation of warring ethnic groups. In contrast, the current analysis recodes partitions to reveal the *degree of unmixing* and thus captures this core pro-partition assertion.

This paper is divided into five parts addressing partition's relationship to war recurrence and low-level violence. First, it will review the theoretical literature presenting the debates over partition. Second, it examines the previous large-*n* empirical test of partition theory and raises serious questions about the results: the analysis suffers from a methodological error, leaving its most important conclusions untenable. Third, to

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[7] See for example Tullberg, Jan and Tullberg, Brigitta (1997) "Separation or Unity? A Model for Solving Ethnic Conflicts" in *Politics and the Life Sciences* Vol.16 No.2 pp.237-248 and see responses in same issue by Lustick, McGarry and Moore, and Rothchild and Ryan. Also see Taylor, P. (1994) "The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System" in *Progress in Human Geography* Vol.18 No.2 pp.151-162 and for an earlier study, see Mansergh, P. (1978) *Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
[8] Sambanis, Nicolas (2000), "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the theoretical Literature" in *World Politics* 52 (July) 437-483
[9] Ibid p.479

address and correct this error, an alternative variable is proposed – the Post-Partition Ethnic Homogeneity Index – which captures the essence of partition theory and will enable us to better test whether the pro or anti partition camp is correct. Fourth, this paper will demonstrate that, where the Index shows warring ethnic groups were in fact separated, *war recurrence and low-level violence do not occur for at least five years*. Importantly, these results suggest that partition theorists are correct: the world's experience since 1945 demonstrates that partitions that separate warring ethnic groups have *uniformly* prevented both war recurrence and low-level violence. Fifth, policy implications of the results will be discussed: partition are likely to be efficacious where (i) groups are already in easily divided, homogeneous regions or (ii) the principal intervener is willing to undertake forced population transfers. Where neither of these two conditions is met, partition *should not* be considered as it provides no guarantees about preventing future war or violence.[10] These conclusions should close the debate on whether partition, as such, works, and move it squarely onto the issue of population transfers. While many of the humanitarian cost-benefit analyses have been addressed in previous works, this paper concludes by raising important practical considerations that call into question the feasibility of such transfers.

A Theory of Partition

Partition theory rests on two principles: (*i*) ethnic civil wars are qualitatively different from other civil wars and (*ii*) the ethnic security dilemma prevents de-escalation and demobilization once war has begun. Resolving this dilemma requires separating warring ethnic groups, inevitably involving population transfers. An additional argument has been made that sovereignty, in addition to the separation of ethnic groups, is essential for the long-term success of partition because reintegrating warring groups into a single state is unrealistic without a long-term commitment of international forces.

Ethnic Civil Wars

Ethnic civil wars, argue the partition theorists, are different than other civil wars because they trap individuals by their ascriptive characteristics. Once an ethnic civil war

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[10] Kumar, Rada in each of the cases highlighted in this influential article, population transfers were not an integral part of the decision, leading to a great deal of bloodshed and suffering.

has begun, due to real or perceived threats, virtually all individuals are forced into rigid, opposing sides in part because they can be identified easily by the enemy.[11] While not everyone is mobilized for war, it is rare to find members of one ethnic group fighting on the opposing side.[12] Unlike ideological wars where loyalties remain more fluid both during and after combat, ethnic wars do not offer this luxury, making post-war reconciliation in an intermingled state almost impossible. Further, since both sides are limited in their base of supporters – they cannot win the hearts and minds of the opposing ethnic group – victory can only be achieved by securing territory for one's kin, and ethnic cleansing is encouraged. Most importantly, during the war identities harden, further undermining the security dilemma and rendering peace within one state less and less likely. As Kaufmann states:

> War hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory can be assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute. Ethnic wars also generate intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation of each side's mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and even more because intermingled population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities…Once this occurs, the war cannot end until the security dilemma is reduced by physical separation of the rival groups.[13]

This formula does not take ethnic groups as given – as primordial – in any broad theoretical sense. However, there is an assumption that, during ethnic civil war, certain identities gain greater salience over others, which forces individuals into group identities, often as defined by their enemy. This point is reinforced by countless interviews of victims during inter-ethnic conflicts who, willingly or not, are forced to identify with an ethnic group:

> I am a Croat...I was Yugoslavian, and now I am a Croat. I always knew that I am a Croat, but I didn't feel it so much. Now, you have to be Croat, Serb, Muslim,

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[11] Ethnic group members have gone to great lengths to find out who is a member of an enemy group, including the use of electoral lists in Sri Lanka, identity cards in Rwanda, and census information in Bosnia. See Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.145
[12] Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.141
[13] Ibid. p.139

Jewish or whatever... For me personally, these identities didn't interest me at all: my being a Croat wasn't important. But now, you have to be."[14]

As another example, while research has indicated that Hutu and Tutsi identities were flexible in pre-colonial Rwanda and Burundi, this was certainly not the case during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.[15] In fact, ethnic group members have gone to great lengths to find out who is a member of an "enemy" group, including the use of census data in Nazi Germany, electoral lists in Sri Lanka, and identity cards in Rwanda.[16]

The Ethnic Security Dilemma and After

The security dilemma comes from Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz in the realist tradition of international relations.[17] This theory argues that in a state of anarchy, one state's defensive action makes everyone less secure. Barry Posen then applied this concept to ethnic conflict, initiating an extensive research program within the social sciences that continues to this day.[18] Posen argued that, as empires collapse and states fail, a situation of anarchy emerges among competing ethnic groups. Importantly, the demographic mixture of populations influences the intensity of the security dilemma: when islands of one group are located in the territorial confines of another, an offensive strategy may come to dominate in order to save their brethren "from a horrible fate."[19]

Saideman *et al.* underscored Posen's theoretical contribution by applying the formula to all states with ethnic minorities, arguing that the greatest potential threat to any group is its own state, given states' capacity to kill. As the authors state, "the search for security motivates groups in divided societies to seek to control the state or secede *if*

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[14] Fahy, Michael and Mogul, Jonathon (1995), "An Interview with Lidija Fekeza: An Archeologist in Sarajevo: Culture Under Siege" *The Journal of the International Institute* Vol.3 No.1
[15] For identity in Rwanda see Hintjens, Helen (1999) "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol.37 No.2 pp.241-286, for identity in Burundi see Lemarchand, Rene (1997) *Buruindi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (USA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press)
[16] See, for example, Seltzer, William (1998) "Population Statistics, the Holocaust, and the Nuremberg Trials" *Population and Development Review* Vol. 24 No.3, pp.511-552; Hintjens, Helen (1999) "Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol.37 No.2 pp.241-286; and Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.145
[17] Jervis, Robert (1978) "Cooperation under the security dilemma" World Politics, Vol.30 No.1,pp. 167-214 and Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of international politics* (New York: Random House)
[18] Posen, Barry (1993) "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" in *Survival* Vol.35 No.1 (Spring), pp.27-47
[19] Ibid. p.32

the state's neutrality cannot be assured."[20] Indeed, as the partition theorists argue, in an ethnic civil war the *biased nature* of the state has already been demonstrated, and all threatened groups must mobilize for self-defense. The crux of the partition theorists' argument remains: in order to build a lasting piece in a situation where groups are unwilling or unable to commit to peace, warring sides must be separated into homogeneous regions capable of self-defense. As Kaufmann argues:

> Solutions that aim to both restore multiethnic civil politics and to avoid population transfers, such as institution building, power-sharing, and identity reconstruction, cannot work during or after an ethnic civil war because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by mixed demography.[21]

As a result of this dynamic, ethnic civil wars, it is argued, will continue until one of three things happens: the groups are separated, one side emerges victorious, or a third party enters to enforce a peace.[22] Leaving the last two possibilities aside,[23] partition theorists focus on situations where long-term commitments of third-party troops and resources are not realistic but where the international community seeks a resolution to an ethnic civil war. As Donald Horowitz stated almost two decades ago: "separating the antagonists— partition—is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated."[24]

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[20] Saideman, Stephen, Lanoue, David, Campenni, Michael, Stanton, Samuel (2002) "Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: a Pooled Time Series Analysis, 1985-1998" *Comparative Political Studies* Vol.35 No.1 (February) 103-129, p.106-107, italics added
[21] Kaufmann (fn.10, 1998), p.122
[22] Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.139
[23] The dangers of leaving both sides to "fight it out" are immense: from a security standpoint, the danger remains its spread, through diffusion or contagion, beyond domestic borders to a wider regional war; from a moral standpoint, there remains the very real danger of mass killings of civilians and potentially genocide. For arguments about the spread of ethnic conflict see Lake, David and Rothchild, Donald (eds.) (1998) *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), especially articles by Kuran; Moore and Davis; Hill,Rothchild and Cameron. Third-party peacekeeping has proven viable where a third-party has vested interests to commit troops and resources. However, while many have argued the case for greater intervention, most recognize that the preponderance of obstacles, national and international, leave little hope for such a large and sustained commitment even in "ethically justified" interventions. For a normative argument in support of greater intervention, see Hoffman, Stanley (1995) "The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention" in *Survival* Vol.37 No.4 (Winter). For more on international intervention and its role in facilitating credible commitments, see also Walter, Barbara (2002) *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
[24] Horowitz, Donald (2000) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* 2nd Edition (California: University of California Press), p.589

No matter how territorially concentrated, however, virtually no ethnic group is concentrated enough *not* to leave behind some minorities as a result of partition. Partition theorists have identified these minorities as seriously at risk. Hurst Hannum states, "In the former Yugoslavia…the West's insistence on keeping "trapped" Serbs within Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (and trapped Croats within the latter) may have actually contributed to continuation of the violence, since peaceful means of redrawing borders seem to have been excluded."[25] Kauffman echoes these comments when he states that, "Partition without ethnic separation increases conflict because…stay-behind minorities are completely exposed."[26] If borders cannot be drawn to create completely homogeneous units, and this is almost always the case, partition theorists advocate the job be finished with population transfers.

The role of sovereignty within the debate has been ambivalent. Initially pro-partitionists, such as Kaufmann, claimed demographic separation with regional autonomy was sufficient to end ethnic wars, as long as the autonomy protected a group's key interests and held "regional defense capabilities."[27] Alexander Downes, however, stressed sovereignty as essential when moving beyond the end of war and towards a lasting peace. Downes, while accepting the security dilemma as an important factor in some ethnic conflicts, believes partition can be effective in a broader range of cases, relying on "standard realism" for his theoretical base. Even where populations have been separated, Downes suggests, autonomy is not enough to maintain peace. The very process of ethnic civil war, he states, "makes reconstructing a multiethnic state afterwards problematic because it destroys the parties' ability to trust each other not to violate any agreement negotiated."[28] His solution, therefore, supports a partition that emphasizes *both* sovereignty *and* demographic separation.[29] Kaufmann has implicitly supported this notion of sovereignty by examining only case studies of partition that included at least *de facto* sovereignty.[30]

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[25] Hannum, Hurst (2000) Territorial Autonomy: Permanent Solution or Step toward Secession?" Conference paper presented at Center for Development Research (ZEF Bonn): Facing Ethnic Conflicts (14-16 December 2000), p.6

[26] Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.162

[27] Kaufmann (1996), p.162

[28] Downes (2001), p.61

[29] Downes, Alexander, "The Holy Land Divided: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars" *Security Studies* Vol.10 No.4 pp.58-116. For theoretical argument see pp.67-77.

[30] Kaufmann (1998), especially pp.124-126

Alternative Explanations

While the security dilemma has received broad support as an explanation within the ethnic war literature, it does not explain all ethnic violence, and a host of alternative explanations exist.[31] Ancient hatreds is often cited as one plausible theory.[32] While there is evidence to suggest that in-group and out-group sentiment is socialized and can create group fear, it cannot account for the escalation, in some cases, of violence and the de-escalation of violence in others. More plausibly, other theories include those suggesting greed or visions of glory. While these undoubtedly provide explanatory leverage for some dimensions of violence (ethnic or otherwise), these theories tend to endow leaders with mythic powers that are unlikely to match reality. While Milosevic is often depicted as motivated by greed,[33] it does not account for why the Yugoslav war was so protracted in Bosnia, where ethnic demography was interspersed, with *both* sides involved in pre-emptive ethnic cleansing once the war escalated and atrocities, real or perceived, had been committed.

It must also be emphasized that partition theorists do not promote partition for *all* cases of inter-ethnic violence. Partition is recommended where ethnic violence reaches extraordinary levels – levels where the fear engendered by the ethnic security dilemma is likely to be activated. The ethnic security dilemma cannot and does not claim to explain all ethnic violence; nevertheless, the theory has proven powerful logically and evidence has supported its propositions, under appropriate conditions. Further, as suggested above, "standard realism" adds to and extends the theoretical support of partition by explaining the benefits of this conflict regulating tool in situations outside the security dilemma; after an ethnic civil war, a partition that separates ethnic groups and provides at least *de facto* sovereignty is unlikely to experience war recurrence because it does not

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[31] For a critique of the security dilemma, see Glaser, Charles (1997) "The Security Dilemma Revisited" World Politics Vol.50 No.1 pp.171-201. As noted above, however, the security dilemma is not the only theory being applied; Downes' extension applies partition to situations of standard realism in post-war situations. For other explanations, see Brubaker, Rogers and Laitin, David (1998) "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence" in *Annual Review of Sociology* Vol.24 pp. 423-452.

[32] For older accounts, see Geertz, Clifford (1963) "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Geertz, (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press); more recent accounts are found in, for example, Kaplan, Robert (1993) *Balkan Ghosts: a Journey Through History* (New York: St.Martin's Press).

[33] Monica Toft states that, "In his efforts to mobilize Serbs to attack Bosnia in 1992, Slobodan Milosevic…was probably more motivated by greed or personal ambition than by fear." (p.8); Toft, Monica (2003) *The Geography of Ethnic Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

confront the problem of credible commitment that persistently affects post-civil war peace processes.[34]

Recent Debate over Partition

Debates over partition have traditionally focused on the normative goal of self-determination.[35] This changed in the mid-1990s when academics such as Van Evera, Mearsheimer, and Kaufmann concentrated on partition only as a humanitarian tool, as a means of minimizing deaths and reducing human suffering once war had begun: "the international community should endorse separation as a remedy for at least some communal conflicts; otherwise the process of war will separate the populations anyway, at much higher human cost."[36] For partition theorists, partition is the lesser of two evils, a policy of "last resort"[37]: if ethnic civil war has begun, if the killings are underway, partition must be given serious consideration because it will save lives by preventing the large-scale slaughter or violent "cleansing" of ethnic groups. Thus, the benefits (i.e. saving lives, humane population transfers) outweigh the costs (i.e. the suffering that will inevitably occur through organized population transfers). Thus, if it can be shown that separating warring ethnic groups is in fact advantageous – if it ends the war and the violence – the international community should indeed consider this tool as an option in its conflict-regulating arsenal.

In response to these arguments, authors such as Radha Kumar have detailed the "troubled history" of partition, outlining the high costs associated with the process – the millions displaced, the hundreds of thousands killed – as well as other important consequences, suggesting that partition, "can trigger further fragmentation and

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[34] Walters, Barbara (2002) *Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

[35] This is exemplified by the rountable article where Tullberg, J. and Tullberg, B (1997) outline a "rational model" for solving ethnic conflicts that involves the democratic choice by an ethnic group to secede, and "migration over the border between the newly formed states should be part of such a solution." p.237 For a brief earlier overview of the history of the partition debate, see Kumar (1996) p.25; also see Schaeffer, Robert (1990) *Warpaths: the Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang), especially parts I and II.

[36] Kaufmann (1998), p.122-123

[37] Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1995) state, "U.S. policymakers must be willing at times to decide that states cannot be sustained and should instead be disassembled. Only if we accept this reality honestly and promptly will we have a reasonable chance of managing their disassembly and keeping it relatively peaceful. Partition should remain a last resort, but, regrettably, we still live in a world where it is sometimes necessary." (p.21)

conflict."[38]   Stories and images of the millions injured and dead that accompanied the population transfers in post-partition India, Palestine, and Cyprus are enough for many to condemn this method as barbaric and inhumane.[39]   Critics charge that this experience should be enough to dismiss the idea that even "organized" population transfers are possible.   Further, there is a deeper, philosophical opposition to even organized population transfers, arguing that they are contrary to human dignity; indeed, population transfers are a violation of many fundamental human rights.[40]

Partition theorists, in turn, point out that the cases selected as evidence to refute partition were not, in fact, the *type* of partition they are recommending – they either did not involve the necessary demographic separation or were not implemented as solutions to ethnic civil war. It bears repeating that the current argument is for partition as a last resort, only when all else has failed. The argument remains: faced with an alternative of certain death, surely the suffering associated with population transfers is better; and if facing other forms of ethnic cleansing short of death, surely even an imperfect population transfer, organized by the international community, would be preferable to those performed by an enemy under conditions of civil war. In addition, evidence from the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, while far from perfect, does suggest not all transfers must result in the catastrophic deaths seen after the partition of British India.[41]

Aside from population transfers, critics of partition theory also level two broader objections: first, partitions only transform internal wars into international ones; and second, they do not solve ethnic antagonisms. In response, partition theorists counter that while post-partition wars can and do occur, these tend to occur where populations were

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[38] Kumar (1996), p.30. Other ills include troop commitments and a damaged economy, among others. See also Kumar, Radha (1997) *Divide and Fall? : Bosnia in the annals of partition* (New York: Verso), especially chapters 1-3.

[39] See Kumar (1996) and also Schaeffer, Robert (1990) *Warpaths: the Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang), especially chapter 9

[40] Population transfers are considered a violation of human rights such as freedom of movement (UDHR 13), right to property (UDHR17), and right to a family life (UDHR 12), among others. Interview with Corinne Lennox at Minority Rights Group International (02/26/05).

[41] See chapter by Koufa and Svolopoulos in Smith, P. (ed.) (1991) *Ethnic Groups in International Relations* (Dartmouth: European Science Foundation); Koufa, Kalliopi K. and Svolopoulos, Constantinos (1991), "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey: the Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations". For less sanguine perspective over a long-term perspective on the integration of the refugees, see Hirschon, R. (1988), *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus* (New York: Oxford University Press)

not separated (e.g. post-partition Ireland, British India, Palestine).[42]   Furthermore, conflicts between two states often receive greater diplomatic pressure, thus increasing the possibility of the war ending earlier than would be the case if it remained an internal conflict; in addition, the partitioned states are then subject to international laws regulating war, potentially rendering the conflict more humane. As for solving ethnic antagonisms, say partition theorists, it is not clear this is within anyone's power: at least separation reduces real security threats, which may give a chance for moderates within the polity to be heard.[43]   In sum, there are many and varied objections to partition; the question becomes whether the benefits outweigh the costs. This returns us to the most central question dogging partition theorists: does partition work?   Does partition end wars sufficiently to prevent their recurrence and does it stop the violence?

The partition debate principally remained here, with each camp relying on detailed case studies they deemed most relevant to their argument.[44]   This changed, however, when Nicholas Sambanis entered the debate with the first large-*n* empirical test of partition theory as a solution to ethnic civil war.

Partitions According to Sambanis

Sambanis was motivated by a healthy skepticism towards the partition theorists, stating:

> However intuitive that reasoning may be, it is nothing more than a series of unsubstantiated assertions. Beyond a handful of self-selected cases, partition theorists have not presented proof that partition is the only viable and credible solution to ethnic civil war. They have not even proven that partition outperforms other war outcomes in terms of peace-building potential.[45]

Sambanis compiled a dataset of all civil wars since 1945, which he used to compare partition theorists' claims against those of rival hypotheses. A rival hypothesis was

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[42] See, for example, Downes, Alexander (2001), "Implementing partition without separating the groups in conflict to reduce or eliminate the number of minorities left behind is sure to see them cleansed, or for conflict over the intermingled region to continue. Examples of this problem include Kashmir in India…and Northern Ireland…" p.74

[43] Kaufmann (1996), pp.173-174

[44] In Kaufmann (1998) and Kumar (1997), case studies are provided of cases from Bosnia, Ireland, India, Palestine, and Cyprus. For a detailed case study of Israel-Palestine, see Downes (2001).

[45] Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.439

included in the statistical analysis, "if at least one other scholar has identified it as significant for war termination and peace building."[46] The chosen variables, which include a dummy variable for partition, were put to the test on three criteria: their ability to promote post-war democratization; their ability to prevent war recurrence; and their ability to reduce low-level residual violence. After conducting an analysis, he concludes that, "Although it may seem like a clean and easy solution, partition fares no better than other outcomes of ethnic civil war."[47]

In terms of low-level violence, he reports, "I can point to only very weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that partitions help end low-level ethnic violence…More importantly, the positive impact of partitions seems fragile and extremely dependent."[48] In terms of war recurrence, his conclusion is more unequivocal: "the evidence does not support the assertion that partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence."[49]

Definitions

For civil wars, the Sambanis dataset, which is modified and re-used for this paper's analysis, uses a broad definition that enables it to draw on a variety of different civil war related databases.[50] The definition itself is relatively uncontroversial except for its "1,000 deaths", which did not require an annual death threshold, but rather, "1,000 [battle] deaths for the duration of the war".[51] Low-level violence is defined as violence short of war, which relied largely on the Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) dataset coding all armed conflicts causing 25 or more deaths but falling short of war.[52]

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[46] These variables include GDP per capita, cost of the measure as measured by deaths and injury, the war's outcome (government victory, rebel victory, etc.), and others; ibid. p.469

[47] Ibid. p.439

[48] Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.478; Sambanis states that the positive impact of partition is dependent on: on whether or not the war ended in a treaty, on the war's intensity, on the number of people displaced by the war, and on the number and size of ethnic groups.

[49] Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.473

[50] His definition is based on six criteria: caused more than one thousand deaths; challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; involved the state as one of the principal combatants; included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war. See Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.444

[51] Sambanis (2000b), Appendix B: Data-Set Notes, p.2; see footnote 39 for the website where the appendix can be obtained.

[52] ibid.

When identifying partitions, this paper joins Sambanis in examining only those occurring within the context of a civil war, deliberately excluding peaceful partitions.[53] The current debate finds partition theorists supporting partition *only as a last resort –* priority should be about saving lives, and this benefit negates partition's costs. Where a third party is not prepared to invest the extraordinary resources required to maintain peace with an inter-mixed population, partition should be considered.

In coding 'partition' within the current debates, it is necessary to move beyond traditional conceptualizations. In the past, partitions were understood as a 'fresh division' of some territory, usually executed by a sovereign (often Great) power occurring at the time of decolonization. As Schaeffer writes, "The simultaneous devolution and division of power is what distinguishes partition in [Korea, China, Vietnam, India, Palestine, and Germany] from the division of other countries in previous times."[54] The era of decolonization, however, as it is traditionally conceived, is over, and the term decolonization today remains too politically loaded to gain much analytical leverage.[55] Many in the Chechen leadership, for example, claim their homeland to be under Russia's imperial power, while the Russian leadership is adamant that Chechnya is integral to the Russian Federation. More importantly for the current theoretical argument, who imposes partition is relatively unimportant: the critical factor is whether dividing warring groups into separate entities can prevent war recurrence.[56] Moving away from decolonization, it is not even clear how a strict division between secession and partition could be coded accurately; in Kaufmann's table of ethnic secessions and partitions,[57] for example, Cyprus (1974) is a 'partition' while Abkhazia (1992-1993) is a 'secession,' despite the fact that both Turkish Cypriots and Abkhaz had separatist movements and both movements were successful primarily due to an external power

[53] Peaceful partitions would include cases such as the breakup of Czechoslovakia.

[54] Schaeffer, Rober (1990) *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang), p.5

[55] Traditionally, decolonization has been differentiated from secession based on how integrated a territory was to the metropolitan center.

[56] Debates regarding differences between secession and decolonization (e.g. Chechen insurgents claim to be waging a war of liberation against the colonizing center of Moscow, whereas Moscow is adamant that this is a secession (although in the latest campaign 1999-present) they now claim the insurgents are led by "bandits", criminals, or radical Islamic groups. Further, many academics bring partition, secession, and decolonization into a similar category for analysis; McGarry and O'Leary (1993) lump "partition and/or secession (self determination)" together in their taxonomy, and include decolonization within it. Pp.11-16

[57]

(Turkey and Russia, respectively).[58] Besides, given that the implications of partition theory affect partitions and secessions equally in the minds of academics and policy-makers, it is logical to code both.[59] Finally, it is relatively unimportant whether a post-partitioned entity receives international recognition as a sovereign territory (*de jure* sovereignty, e.g. Bangladesh from Pakistan) or *de facto* sovereignty (e.g. South Ossetia from Georgia), so both of these are coded as well.

An occurrence of partition was defined in the Sambanis dataset as, "a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes."[60] This definition is in line with the reasoning provided above, except for two aspects. First, partition receives a very generous application as a "war outcome". To mention three, the war fought between Pakistan and India in 1965 over already partitioned Kashmir was coded as a partition despite no effective change to the line of control; Tajikistan was labeled a partition outcome in 1994, but no available sources on the war could confirm a partition; further, Sambanis's own notes state Bosnia is coded as partition due to its partition from Yugoslavia in 1992, which is hardly a war outcome given the war raged from 1992 to 1995.[61] Despite these questionable cases, a replication was made using the Sambanis dataset and I was able to reproduce his estimates.[62]

The second, and much more alarming aspect of the coding, is a conceptual difficulty that clouds the Sambanis conclusions. The following section outlines this problem and follows up with an alternative approach to testing partition theorists' claims.

It's the demography, stupid

While Sambanis does look at partitions, he does not test the claims set forth by partition theorists. As we saw above, partition theorists, in fact, do not advocate the blanket application of new borders to solve ethnic civil wars, and to claim as much is disingenuous. Partition theorists argue for the need to separate warring populations –

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[58] Kaufmann (1998), p.126. The role of Turkey in enabling the de facto independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been well-documented; for the critical role of Russia in enabling Abkhazia's de facto independence, see Toft, Monica (2003) *The Geography of Ethnic Violence* (USA: Princeton University Press), chapter 6.

[59] Sambanis (2000)

[60] Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.445

[61] In his Appendix B: Data-set notes, he states, " Bosnian partition from Yugoslavia in 1992", Sambanis (fn.33, 2000b) Appendix B: Data-set Notes p.43; see footnote 39 for how to access Appendix B

[62] The Sambanis dataset and accompanying material is available through the WorldBank site http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/data.htm.

with population transfers where necessary – in order to recreate relatively homogenous units where ethnic groups' security fears are tempered and prospects of demobilization and reconstruction can begin without the need for long-term commitments of international troops. To quote from Kauffman, "The critical variable is demography, not sovereignty. Political partition without ethnic separation leaves incentives for ethnic cleansing unchanged; *it actually increases them if it creates new minorities.*"[63] If the critical variable is demography, not sovereignty, then we should not be using *de facto* sovereignty as the critical independent variable. Sambanis acknowledged the dangers of partition without transfers[64] and yet continued with the analysis, misrepresenting the literature by stating:

> According to partition theorists, the success of partition depends on the demographic reorganization of the new territories and on the absence of militarily significant minorities in the new states. However, successor states in most actual cases of partition are not ethnically pure. Hence, this core premise of partition theory may be unrealistic.[65]

The premise, however, is not and has never been a naïve belief that partition alone will separate warring parties: as discussed above, *population transfers* remain a central position for partition advocates.

The only variable in Sambanis's analysis coming close to addressing the issue of demography is Vanhanen's ethnic heterogeneity index. Vanhanen's index, however, was developed to explore the more general relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic division.[66] As an aggregate index in countries with more than two ethnic groups, it cannot capture the specifics of which parties are at war, whether these groups separated after the war, and to what extent this was achieved.

In order to directly test the ideas set forth by partition theorists, it is necessary to construct a new variable. If the critical variable is demography, and if the assertion stands that poorly partitioned countries with new minorities *increase* the security threat, this is what we should capture. Logically, this new variable should represent the degree

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[63] Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.161-162, italics added.
[64] Sambanis states, "successor states will rarely be ethnically homogeneous and may incorporate new ethnic antagonisms." Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.440
[65] Ibid. p441
[66] Vanhanen (1999) "Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis" in *Journal of Peace Research* Vol.36 No.1 pp.55-73

to which the warring ethnic parties were separated. With this goal in mind, the Post-Partition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PPEHI) was created.

Post-Partition Ethnic Homogeneity Index

The construction of the PPEHI is relatively straightforward. We begin with a state that contains a titular majority ethnic group and a minority ethnic group. A civil war begins between these two groups and, at some point, the territory is partitioned in the hopes of ending the violent conflict. This creates two countries, each with its own titular majority as well as a potentially "stay-behind" minority from one of the two warring groups that did not fit within the newly-drawn borders. The key to the PPEHI is in understanding the degree to which the ethnic groups were separated, or, in other words, measuring to what degree the security dilemma was decreased after partition has occurred. Therefore, three numbers are needed: (i) the percentage of the minority group in the original country (recorded as O); (ii) the percentage of the original minority left in the rump state after partition (N_1); and (iii) the percentage of the original titular group now found as a minority inside the new state (N_2). The following illustration will aid this description:

PRE-PARTITION

Original Country Border

Original Minority Concentration "O"

POST-PARTITION

Rump State Border

New State Border

Stay-Behind Minority Enclaves "N₁"

Stay-Behind Minority Enclaves "N₂"

We now have two new states and two new minorities: the left-behind minority in the rump state (N_1), and the new minority of the new state (N_2). Since our theoretical interest focused on demography, with an understanding that leaving sizeable minorities on either side of a new border could increase conflict, this index uses the largest minority group found among the two to calculate the degree to which a partition and population transfers succeeded in separating the warring groups.[67]

To calculate the PPEHI, one subtracts the largest new minority percentage ($N_{larger\ of\ 1or2}$) from the original minority percentage (O) and divides this by the original minority percentage (O) and then multiplies the result by 100; this simple calculation will explain the percentage change of ethnic minorities produced by partitioning the country:

$$PPEHI = \frac{(O - N_{larger\ of\ 1or2})}{O} \times 100$$

The maximum score a partition could receive would be +100, indicating a complete separation of the warring ethnic groups. This number continues to fall as the size of the stay-behind minority continues to grow relative to the original minority percentage. Our interest, however, lies only in the upper range, which informs us as to whether the partition achieved the separation of the warring groups.

Coding PPEHI

The coding of the PPEHI was not simple as timely data on minority populations – often difficult to ascertain in the best of times – proved difficult to find after the end of a civil war. In terms of resources for coding, a staple set of books and encyclopedias was used.[68] The guiding principle in gathering the data was to have at least two credible

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[67] There are other possibilities to calculate this number, such as adding N_1 and N_2 to find the aggregate size of left-behind minorities. The results were virtually identical despite a range of different approaches; this one was chosen because it better tests the conceptual idea of the ethnic security dilemma.

[68] The staple consisted of: Encyclopedia Columbia, 2001 edition; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2003 edition; Brogan, Patrick (1990) *The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflict* (USA:Vintage Books Edition); Arnold, Guy (1995) Wars in the Third World Since 1945 (London: Cassell);

sources provide the same numbers and, when these numbers were close but not exact, an average was taken. Where two sources could not be found among the staple, case-specific academic works were consulted as an alternative. Where data was not available for the year directly after partition, data was used for the first date found after the end of the conflict. Fortunately, I was able to collected data for all but one of the 18 cases Sambanis coded as ethnic civil war occurrences of partition. Tajikistan had to be excluded from the analysis, as mentioned earlier; it is impossible to code for a country that did not undergo a recognizable partition after or during its civil war, especially a war that was deemed by most experts to be regional and ideological, not ethnic.[69] Further, as the Sambanis dataset ends in 1999, the relevant variables for all cases of ethnic civil war have been updated through mid-2004. This update includes the additional case of Kosovo, which was partitioned in 1999.

Results

The following table (Table 1) represents the findings of the 18 cases. The titles represent the codes used in the formula above, with 'prewarmin (O)' representing the minority before the war (for example, in Azerbaijan the minority is the Armenians, who formed 5.8 percent of Azerbaijan before the civil war); 'rumpmin (N_1)' represents the percentage of the original minority remaining in the original country after partition (for example, in Azerbaijan there were approximately 20,000 Armenians still in Azerbaijan-proper after the civil war, creating an N_1 percentage of 0.25); and 'newstmin (N_2)' represents the percentage of the dominant group from the original country now found in the new state (for example, in Azerbaijan these are the number of Azeris found in Nagorno Karabakh after the conflict officially ended, a negligible number in this case).

The *Economist* and the *Economist Intelligence Unit* available at www.economist.com; CIA World Factbook;

69 Tajikistan was excluded in the following analysis despite its inclusion in the Sambanis piece. It was not clear from the Sambanis article, appendix, or coding notes in Appendix B as to why Tajikistan was coded as a partition or an ethnic civil war. The only plausible partition was Tajikistan's separation from the Soviet Union in 1991 almost a full year *before* the civil war began; nowhere else is partition mentioned in the literature. Most academic literature focuses on the regional nature of the conflict and, to some extent, ideological nature of the conflict involving Islamists, Soviet Communists, and democratic reformists. For recent scholarship of the conflict see Foroughi, Payam (2002), "Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions" in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* Vol.22 No.1 pp.39-61 and Lynch, Dov (2001) "The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process" in *Civil Wars* Vol.4 No.4 (Winter), pp.49-72

<center>TABLE 1</center>

Country	prewarmin(O)	rumpmin(N_1)	newstmin(N_2)	PPEHI
Azerbaijan	5.8	0.25	<.01	95.69
Yugoslavia-Bosnia	8.9	<.01	37.1	-316.85
Yugoslav-Croatia ('91)	19.7	1.0	12.5	36.55
Yugoslav-Croatia ('95)	12.5	4.5	<.01	64
Cyprus ('63)	18.2	11.9	<.01	34.6
Cyprus ('74)	12.3	1.3	0.4	98.7
Ethiopia-Eritrea	6.4	0.12	<.01	98.1
Georgia-Abkhazia	1.8	<.01	<.01	100
Georgia-Ossetia	3	<.01	0.05	98.3
India (1947-1948)	24.4	10.4	1.6	57.38
India-Kash.(1965)	10.4	10.4	3	0
India-Kash. (1989-1994)	10.4	10.4	3	0
Israel-Palest.	33.3	<.01	13.8	58.56
Kosovo	14	0.7	6	57.14
Moldova	31	24	40.5	-30.6
Pakistan-Bngl.	46	0.3	0.2	99.35
Russia-Chechnya	0.6	0.3	2.5	-316.67
Somalia	27.4	<.01	28	-2.19
Algeria[*]	21.5	0.9	<0.01	95.8

NOTE: Scores of "<.01" assume value 0 for calculation of the PPEHI.

[*] The case of Algeria is controversial for a number of reasons and therefore has been included in the table for the interest of readers but will not be analyzed. First, it is not clear whether this was a case of decolonization or secession and second, it is not clear how the *harkis* should be dealt with. The above numbers represent the *harkis* being included in the "ethnic Algerian" group while the *pieds-noir* are deemed "European."

The PPEHI is so valuable precisely because it allows us to see what was achieved with partition. Rather than a simple binary code indicating if de facto sovereignty was achieved, these numbers capture the extent to which minorities were divided. For example, the 1991 Yugoslavian partition resulting in an independent Croatia succeeded in removing Croats from Yugoslavia, but failed to separate the ethnic groups: over 12 percent of Croatia's population remained Serbian. As the PPEHI demonstrates, this partition homogenized the territories by a paltry 36.5 percent, reducing the security dilemma only marginally; partition theory would expect a high likelihood of war recurrence under these conditions, which is precisely what happened. In contrast, Pakistan's partition in 1971 succeeded in separating Pakistanis and Bengalis with a PPEHI of close to 100 percent; as would be predicted by partition theory, there has not been a recurrence of war.

<center>21</center>

Examining the PPEHI

As a starting point of examination, the PPEHI was added to the Sambanis dataset to check for significance on the most crucial test: war recurrence. Using binary probit, the variable warend2 (no war recurrence for at least two years after the end of the civil war) was regressed on the continuous variable PPEHI for only ethnic wars that experienced partition. The results demonstrated a positive coefficient significant at the 0.1 level for a one-tailed test. However, due to a small-*n*, these results can be seen as nothing more than preliminary – we run into the problem that, as yet, there have been too few partitions. I have added these statistical results in a brief appendix for those interested.

With these encouraging preliminary results, we can now look in greater detail at the cases themselves to examine the specifics of partition and its impact on war recurrence and low-level violence. This process necessitates that we disregard partitions as *sovereignty* and instead focus on what effect each occurrence of partition had upon *demography*.

By looking at the PPEHI, we can determine whether any one partition selected from the database would be considered a "good partition" or a "bad partition" by partition theorists. A good partition is one in which the warring minorities are separated completely, leaving negligible "stay-behind" minorities; a bad partition would be one in which the minorities were not separated, leaving sizeable "stay-behind" minorities in either of the two emerging states. For this study, any partition that succeeded in separating the warring parties by a PPEHI percentage of 95 or more (where the maximum is 100) is considered a "good partition". The threshold of 95 percent was chosen as it indicates the two groups have been effectively separated in their entirety, a critical demand by partition theorists. The actual number chosen – 95 – is not a fixed threshold, but is rather a guide to those territories where populations were separated: this is a number very close to 100 but one that still accepts the inevitability of a small, residual

minority which does not impact the value of the results.[70] It should be emphasized that the PPEHI does not refer to the percentage of an ethnic group in a territory, but rather the *degree* of separation; the argument here is that groups need to be separated and any number very close to 100 achieves that goal.

Table 2 below compares "good" and "bad" partitions against the two primary criteria established by Sambanis in his article: whether the country experienced no war recurrence for 2 and 5 years, and whether the country experienced no low-level violence for 2 and 5 years after the end of the civil war. Although Sambanis also analyzes post-war democratization as a third criterion – and finds post-partition states associated with higher levels of democracy – these results will not be dealt with here as they do not form the core of the partition theory argument.[71]

TABLE 2

Country	PPEHI	Comp.Partition?	warend2	warend5	noviol2	noviol5
Azerbaijan	95.69	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia-Bosnia	-316.85	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yugoslav-Croatia '91	36.55	No	No	No	No	No
Yugoslav-Croatia '95	64	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cyprus '63	34.6	No	No	Yes	No	No
Cyprus '74	98.7	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia-Eritrean	98.1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Georgia-Abkhazia	100	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Georgia-Ossetia	98.3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
India (1947-1948)	57.38	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
India-Kash.(1965)	0	No	Yes	No	No	No
India-Kash. (1989-1994)	0	No	Yes	No	No	No
Israel-Palest.	58.56	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kosovo	57.14	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Moldova	-30.6	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Pakistan-Bngl.	99.35	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russia-Chechnya	-316.67	No	No	No	No	No
Somalia	-2.19	No	No	No	No	No

NOTE: warend2: did the war end for two years?; warend5: did the war end for five years?; noviol2: were there two years without low-level violence?; and noviol5: were there five years without low-level violence?

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[70] The average size of the largest residual minorities found after "good partitions" amounted to a mere 0.33 percent. Kaufmann (1996) argues that, "While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require total ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irredentist rescue operations."

[71] Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.459-464.

As the results indicate, *for all partitions achieving a PPEHI separation score above 95 percent, there were no war recurrences for at least five years, nor were there recurrences of low-level violence for five years.* In fact, for all partitions achieving a PPEHI separation score of at least 60 percent, there was no war recurrence or return of low-level violence. For partitions with lower scores, the results are very mixed with most experiencing either war recurrence or a return of low-level violence. These results suggest that a partition that successfully separates the warring ethnic groups produces substantially different results from partitions that do not separate the warring groups, and this is exactly what partition theorists predict. This further underscores the importance of looking at demography and not sovereignty, the importance of disaggregating partition into those that separate the warring groups and those that do not; only by isolating good partitions from the rest can we properly test partition theorists' claims. While the number of cases is small – there have been only six cases of "good partition" – the results are consistent and unambiguous.

One case that stands out is the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. While this partition succeeds in the criteria established by Sambanis, the conflict did return to war in 1998, after a seven year peace. Nevertheless, partition theorists do not claim separating warring groups will always prevent war recurrence forever into the future, they only claim it is often the *best option* to give peace a chance. As mentioned earlier, partition theorists further state that any future war between partitioned states will be an improvement upon a return to civil war because the two sovereign states are then subjected to greater international attention and diplomatic pressure, increasing the likelihood of war ending quickly. Ethiopia and Eritrea exemplify this logic: the civil war the two sides fought lasted over 15 years, whereas the international conflict of 1998 faced heavy international pressure and ended within two years. Moreover, had population transfers occurred at the time of partition, the tens of thousands of Eritreans remaining in Ethiopia would not have faced the horrific expulsions that occurred during the new war, conducted by the enemy.[72]

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[72] Minority Rights Group reported that by early 2000 over 54,000 Ethiopians of 'Eritrean' origin had been deported. Tronvoll, Kjetil (2000), *Ethiopia: A New Start?* (UK: Minority Rights Group International). Amnesty International reported in 1999 that, "the expulsion of people of Eritrean origin was often carried out in an inhumane manner that amounts to cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment." See Ethipiopia section under Amnesty International (1999), *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Human Rights Issues in a Year of Armed Conflict*, p.27

Comparing Good Partitions with the Alternative

We can see the benefits of separating warring groups more starkly by comparing the results of those countries that experienced good partitions with all other civil war outcomes since 1945, including those that experienced bad partition and those that experienced no partition at all. We begin with a cross-tabulation of whether low-level violence ended for at least two years (Table 3). By looking at the row marginals, we can see that in the majority of cases (60 percent), low-level violence did *not* end for two years. Strikingly, for those civil wars that ended with a good partition, none (0 percent) experienced further low-level violence for at least two years. While these resulted in a Chi-Square value of 9.933 for a very significant p-value of 0.007, the statistic must be treated with caution as three cells had an expected count below 5.

TABLE 3

CrossTab: Has the low-level violence ended for two years?

Did Low-level Violence End for 2 Years?	Good Partition	Bad Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 (100%)	4 (33%)	22 (35%)	32 (40%)
No	0 (0%)	8 (67%)	41 (65%)	49 (60%)
Total	6	12	63	81

CHI-SQUARE = 9.933 (*df*=2), PR = 0.007

The same holds for the five-year interval (Table 4), with the majority (60 percent) unable to end their low-level violence, while all cases of good partition successfully prevented their low-level violence. This produces a Chi-Square value of 9.933 and another low and significant probability of 0.007; again, three cells have expected counts below 5.

TABLE 4

CrossTab: Did Low-Level Violence End for five years?

Did Low-level Violence End for 5 Years?	Good Partition	Bad Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 100%	4 40%	22 37.67%	32 40%
No	0 0%	8 60%	41 63.38%	40 60%
Total	6	12	63	81

CHI-SQUARE = 9.933 (*df*=2)   PR = 0.007

Turning now to war recurrence, we again find that the pattern holds. Looking at the cross-tabulations as to whether the war ended for at least two years (Table 5), we notice that most wars (71.25 percent) in fact do not recur. Nevertheless, for the cases of good partition, *all* manage to avoid war recurrence (100 percent). The Chi-square test produced a statistic of 2.79 for a probability of 0.247 with three cells having expected counts below five.

TABLE 5

CrossTab: Did the War End for two years?

Did the War End for Two Years?	Good Partition	Bad Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 100%	8 67%	44 70%	58 72%
No	0 0%	4 33%	19 30%	23 28%
Total	6	12	63	81

CHI-SQUARE = 2.620 (*df*=2), PR = 0.270

Similarly, looking at the five-year interval (Table 6), we see that the majority of cases (69.33 percent) do not experience war recurrence, while *all* cases of good partition (100 percent) succeed in avoiding a recurrence of civil war. The Chi-square statistic is 2.65 for a probability of 0.266 with three cases having expected counts below five.

TABLE 6

CrossTab: Did the War End for five years?

Did the War End for 5 Years?	Good Partition	Bad Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 100%	7 58%	42 67%	55 68%
No	0 0%	5 42%	21 33%	26 32%
Total	6	12	63	81

CHI-SQUARE = 3.384 (*df*=2), PR = 0.184

These numbers suggest strong and persuasive evidence in favor of the partition theorists. In terms of low-level violence, far from partition producing "weak" evidence with a "fragile and extremely dependent" impact, as the Sambanis study concluded, the results here are unequivocal: *partitions that have separated warring ethnic groups have terminated low-level violence for at least five years; with the evidence to date, it proves a sufficient condition.* This is all the more impressive given that a large majority of civil war terminations continue to experience low-level violence, a plague that haunts civilian populations for years after combat operations officially conclude. In fact, the numbers suggest that a good partition is the *best choice*, if the goal is to prevent low-level violence.

In terms of war recurrence, a good partition that separates warring ethnic groups has *always* prevented a return to war lasting at least five years; with the evidence to date, good partition proves to be a sufficient condition. These results are a strong challenge to anti-partitionists.[73] While there may be alternatives that *sometimes* prevent war recurrence, a good partition is the *only guarantee* of preventing a return to war that will last at least five years. In sum, *partitions that have separated warring ethnic groups have proven to successfully prevent civil war recurrence and end low-level violence in society* − and this is exactly what partition theorists have been claiming all along.

Implications: Should the International Community Promote "Good Partitions"?

The policy implications of these results are clear: if the international community wants to end an ethnic civil war, prevent its recurrence, and prevent the continuation of

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[73] Sambanis (fn.8, 2000), p.479-480

low-level violence, partition should be considered. However, partition should only be considered (*i*) where populations are already largely separated at the time of intervention or (*ii*) where interveners are prepared to implement population transfers. If neither of these conditions holds, partition will provide no guarantee against war recurrence or other forms of violence.

Homogeneous regions within a single country are extremely rare. Some authors have pointed to Czechoslovakia as an example where homogenous units can facilitate partition's success. This example, however, can only be applied very selectively: "That the Czech Republic and Slovakia were relatively homogeneous and that dissolution of the federation did not require an alteration of internal borders or a substantial displacement of people make the comparison with Bosnia untenable."[74]

Given that internal regions are rarely homogeneous, we need to re-examine population transfers that the international community would need to implement. Without transfers, bad partitions may only remain peaceful with the help of a heavy military presence. Indeed, the spring 2004 deadly clashes in Kosovo, an example of a bad partition, suggest that a return to war is a very real possibility if the international community were to leave.[75] Yet none of the prominent academics and policy makers who support population transfers has examined their practical nature in any depth.[76] While the full normative dimensions of this question are outside the scope of this paper, the final section will briefly sketch one practical problem, suggesting that "humane" population transfers pose more than the traditional moral questions raised above.

The nature of humane, organized population transfers makes one enormous and potentially fallacious assumption. This is the assumption that, given a safe passage or corridor in a post-partitioned state, all members of one ethnic group will voluntarily leave one region for another. Reports from the ground suggest this may indeed not be the case, as many victims refuse to believe the imminent danger surrounding them. As Helen Mintjens writes about the Rwandan genocide, "Many victims of the genocide appeared to

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[74] Kumar (1997), p.25

[75] The events of March, 2004 led to widespread violence, death and the, "ethnic cleansing of entire minority villages and neighbourhoods." See International Crisis Group's report, *Collapse in Kosovo* (04/22/04).

[76] Kaufmann (1998) does go furthest in within his analysis of the Dayton Accords, but otherwise does not suggest how he would identify members of, for example, the Tutsis or Hutus he recommends for separation.

be taken by surprise…many Tutsi refused to believe that their Hutu neighbours and the armed forces would one day come to kill them simply because they were Tutsi."[77]

This problem would be compounded when whole villages or towns of one ethnic group are located on the "wrong side" of new borders; under these conditions whole villages or towns may refuse to leave. If this occurs, what would the intervening force do? For partition to be successful, for it to end the war and the violence, the vast majority one ethnic group must be transferred; it cannot permit small communities to remain as pockets within a larger partitioned territory, for this would exacerbate tensions for a variety of reasons and lead to continued or renewed hostilities. As such, the intervening force should be prepared to *forcibly* expel these groups. This raises the next question as to how these groups would be identified. Following the logic of saving those individuals that the war would have killed or separated anyway, "at much higher human cost,"[78] the interveners would be in the ironic position of relying on the same electoral registries, census data, or identity cards as those used by the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing.

Put in a concrete situation, in order to save the Tutsis from their "horrible fate," the international community would need to identify all Tutsis, *as perceived by the enemy*, and forcibly relocate them. This process alone would largely, if not completely, discredit any humanitarian objectives of a mission. In Darfur, as another example, an intervention force would need to somehow identify who was "Arab" and who was "non-Arab" (based, remember, on cultural affinity, for this is how the perpetrators, the *Janjaweed*, proceed), and then *force* these groups out of their homes and communities based on a collective identity. These are serious questions for partition involving population transfers; they pose severe, practical challenges to any intervener considering partition as a strategy even when it is based on genuine, humanitarian goals.

Conclusion

This paper has examined partition as a method of regulating ethnic civil wars. Beginning with theoretical issues raised for and against partition, it then re-examined the first large-scale, cross-national empirical study of partition. Sambanis looked at partition as sovereignty and argued that it fared no better than many other civil war outcomes and,

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[77] Hintjens, Helen (1999) p.270. Hintjens uses the groups names Bahutu and Batutsi ('ba' referring to a group), but I have changed this to the more conventional Hutu and Tutsi to avoid confusion.
[78] Kaufmann (1998), p.122-123

given its high costs, was therefore unhelpful as a conflict regulating tool. In contrast, this paper focused on the key, underlying variable of partition theorists – demographic separation – and coded the degree of separation that followed all ethnic civil wars that experienced partition since World War II. Using the Post-Partition Ethnic Homogeneity Index, these partitions were re-analyzed, revealing a consistent and unequivocal conclusion: in all cases where the PPEHI showed a complete separation of warring minorities – the type of partition that partition theorists are arguing for – there were no war recurrences and no occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years. This outcome trumps alternatives and provides strong evidence for partition theorists.

Finally, the paper examined policy implications of these results and concluded that partition should only be considered where populations are already separated demographically or where the intervener is prepared to implement population transfers. Given the rarity of homogeneous populations, this implies that the debate should shift from the efficacy of the partition, which appears to be robust, to the normative and practical issues of population transfers. This paper closed by sketching a practical challenge of population transfers, suggesting a core assumption underlying the idea of humane population transfers – that people will take advantage of safe corridors – may be incorrect and certainly needs more research. Unless the intervening actor is prepared to identify individuals based on group characteristics and then force entire communities to leave their towns and villages, partitions will not be "good partitions" and there will be no guarantee against war recurrence.

Good partitions create highly prized outcomes, but the methods needed to achieve them raise practical and normative challenges that must be addressed. Indeed, these challenges may overwhelm any humanitarian benefits driving the current research project of partition.

Appendix: Statistical examination of the PPEHI

As mentioned above, the PPEHI was added to the Sambanis dataset to check for significance on war recurrence. Using binary probit, the variable warend2 (no war recurrence for at least two years after the end of the civil war) was regressed on the continuous variable PPEHI for only ethnic wars that experienced partition. When examining the PPEHI as a continuous variable, however, its value is affected by the pre-war minority percentages; as a control, therefore, the pre-war minority variable has also been included in the model. As one can see from Table 7, the results show a positive regression coefficient for PPEHI with a p-value significant at the 0.17 level.

TABLE 7

Probit Coefficients for No War Recurrence after Two Years

Variable	*B*	*z-value*	*p>|z|*
Constant	1.255	1.89	.0295
Prewar Minority	−.038	−1.26	.104
PPEHI	.004	1.39	.082

NOTE: N = 18[79]. β is an unstandardized coefficient; z is a z-test of β, and p is the p-value for a one-tailed z-test.

The results suggest that, indeed, the greater the separation of warring minorities produced by a partition (i.e. the higher the PPEHI), the greater the expected likelihood of not experiencing a return to war for at least two years.   The 0.08 p-value is all the more surprising given the small-*n* we are working with (N=18); it is, in fact, amazing is that we have any significance at all.

It should be noted, however, that if any other control variables are entered into the probit analysis, all results become further insignificant; this is almost certainly due to the small-*n*. Statistically, we run into the problem that, as yet, there have been too few cases of partition to produce more significant results. In the future, however, coding could be made not only on partitioned countries, but also for all countries that have experienced

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[79] Tajikistan was excluded from the probit analysis and Kosovo was added to the original Sambanis dataset; see footnote 46 above for explanation of Tajikistan.

ethnic civil war, looking at the pre-war and post-war minority populations by region to steer the argument away from partition, per se, and towards the separation of ethnic groups even within united countries. Further coding could also include more subtle measures of the geographic positions for minorities; academics such as Kaufmann, for example, argue that those close to borders are more likely to provoke future wars.[80]

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[80] Kaufmann (fn.10, 1996), p.262