Counterterrorism Blog
The first multi-expert blog dedicated solely to counterterrorism issues, serving as a gateway to the community for policymakers and serious researchers. Designed to provide realtime information about terrorism cases and policy developments.

  September 14, 2008

Two More Counterterror SEALs Die in Afghanistan

By James Gordon Meek

Two more Navy SEALs from an extraordinarily elite and supersecret counterterrorism unit have been killed in Afghanistan, following the death two weeks ago of a SEAL from the same clandestine unit.

Details were - not surprisingly - vague. There is no direct evidence they died fighting in the new CIA-led offensive against Al Qaeda and the Taliban along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. But their loss in Afghanistan is certainly significant and a real blow to their fellow operators in the Joint Special Operations Command, which includes the Army’s Delta Force.

The two SEALs were killed September 11 somewhere “in Afghanistan,” according to military press releases, and were part of the shadowy Naval Special Warfare Development Group, the elite counterterrorism force once known as SEAL Team 6. Typically, the military identifies which Afghan town, district, city or province where American troops perish. But for the third time since August 30, when Petty Officer 1st Class Joshua Thomas Harris, a Bronze Star recipient, was reported killed after being swept away during a combat river crossing, the precise location of the latest “DEVGRU” combat casualties is unknown..

Killed last week were Senior Chief Special Warfare Operator John Wayne Marcum, 34, and Chief (select) Special Warfare Operator Jason Richard Freiwald, 30, the Navy said. Each man had served in Iraq and Afghanistan and was a highly decorated SEAL. Before Harris, no DEVGRU SEAL had fallen in Afghanistan since March 2002, according to a review of Operation Enduring Freedom deaths at iCasualties.org.

Marcum earned four Bronze Star medals with the combat “V” distinguishing device, as well as the Joint Service Commendation medal, four Combat Action ribbons and a chestful of other decorations in his career. The younger Freiwald had also earned a Bronze Star and Combat Action ribbon, the Navy said.

Sadly, both SEALs leave behind a wife and daughter. The Naval Special Warfare Foundation, which accepts donations, will likely provide support for each family.

Diplomatic Explusions Highlight Need for US to Re-Engage with Latin America

By Jonathan Winer

The expulsions last week of the U.S. Ambassadors to Venezuela and Bolivia, and the U.S.'s reciprocal response should not have been unexpected. They illustrate the current condition of long deteriorating relations between the U.S. and those countries, as well as with Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, over the course of the Bush Administration. They are also an unsurprising result of systemic neglect of the U.S. relationship with Latin America more generally.

It’s difficult to imagine any Administration having a happy relationship with Hugo Chavez, who is the most difficult (and obnoxious) Latin American leader the U.S. has encountered since Fidel Castro. Chavez has combined cheesy domestic populism, socialistic and anti-Yankee rhetoric, Machiavellian uses of burgeoning oil revenues, corruption, and outright support for terrorists in neighboring countries to create a problem for the region that the U.S. cannot solve alone.

The need for a more inclusivist, collaborative U.S. strategy to combat Chavez’s excesses, and to minimize the harm he can do to such critical policies as combating narcotics and terrorism, has been evident for years. To date, that strategy has been largely Colombia focused, and largely law enforcement focused, and to that extent, it has been largely successful, as the capture of the FARC documents in the Raul Reyes computers last March demonstrated.

But the failure of the Bush Administration to put in place a wider diplomatic and development strategy, by which the U.S. would be able to make common cause with the many governments in Latin America who are infuriated and even threatened by Chavez, is striking. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru, have each recalled their own ambassadors from Chavez's Venezuela in previous years, and merely constitute the starting places for partners in such a strategy. The U.S. will need separately to redevelop its relationships over time with Chavez's erstwhile allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua, irrespective of its issues with Chavez. Figures such as Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega may find provocative behavior towards the U.S. helpful in the short-run, but are likely to find that longer-term political survival is facilitated by rapprochment with a post-Bush United States.

The newfound Russian and Iranian interest in the region highlights the weakness of the U.S. position in the region after two terms of President Bush. Neither country has natural strategic reasons to be involved in Latin America. Each is responding to the opportunity presented by Chavez’s hostility to the U.S., and the U.S. incapacity to date to respond effectively.

The opportunities for the two Presidential campaigns would seem obvious, at least in substantive terms, while U.S. politics remains focused on bridges to remote places in Alaska.

Read More »


  September 13, 2008

Serial Terror Blasts Strike Indian Capital, Indian Mujahedeen Claims Responsibility

By Animesh Roul

A series of explosions (at least six as per the latest inputs) have rocked Indian capital New Delhi within a span of half an hour on Saturday evening, (Sept. 13). The first explosion was reported in crowded Gaffar Market (near Karol Bagh). The second blast followed in Central Park of Connaught Place, another major hub for Delhites as well as foreigners. This was followed by two consecutive blasts in Greater Kailash-I’s M-Block market. The last couple of blasts took place on Barakhamba Road, near the Connaught Place in Central Delhi.

High alert has been sounded in other metros (e.g. Mumbai, Kolkata) after Saturday evening blasts. Police sources confirmed 15 deaths and nearly 100 people have been injured. Meanwhile, the so called Indian Mujahedeen (needless to say that IM is a front outfit of SIMI-LeT-Jaish and HuJi combine) claimed responsibility for the serial blasts which came close on the heels of similar synchronized attacks in major Indian cities Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmadabad this year.

  September 12, 2008

Sept. 23 Panel: "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda"

By Andrew Cochran

The Jihadists’ Revolt Against Al Qaeda: Why Some of Al Qaeda’s Old Allies Have Turned Against It

Tuesday, September 23, 10 am, 2255 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC

Co-sponsored by New America Foundation and The Counterterrorism Foundation

Participants:

Peter Bergen, Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation

Paul Cruickshank, Fellow, Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law

Evan Kohlmann, Senior Investigator, NEFA Foundation

Stephen Coughlin, Visiting Fellow, International Strategy & Assessment Center


Andrew Cochran, Moderator
Co-Chairman, Counterterrorism Foundation and Founder & Site Editor, Counterterrorism Blog

Guest Commentator: Maajid Nawaz, Director, Quilliam Foundation

Seats are limited. Please RSVP to Andrew Cochran

Exclusive Translation: Intercepted Letters from al-Qaeda Leaders Shed Light on State of Network in Iraq

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Yesterday, Center for Terrorism Research (CTR) adjunct fellow Bill Roggio posted an important report at the Long War Journal. He noted that a series of letters intercepted by Multinational Forces-Iraq—letters that chronicle the communications between al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri, and Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi—sheds light on how “Al Qaeda’s senior leadership has lost confidence in its commander in Iraq and views the situation in the country as dire.” These communications highlight divisions in the organization, the failures in its leadership, and problems with communications and propaganda efforts.

Today the Center for Terrorism Research provides an exclusive translation of these important documents, courtesy of CTR research fellow Tony Badran. We believe that this translation constitutes an important primary document for understanding the current state of the al-Qaeda network inside Iraq. To see the translation, click here.

Latin America Heats Up: Is There a Policy?

By Douglas Farah

The news that both Bolivia and Venezuela, whose presidents are staunch allies and friends, have chosen to expel the respective U.S. ambassadors is the most visible evidence of the frayed relations the United States now has with much of Latin America.

As my colleague Andrew Cochran wrote the United States then immediately took the step of designating the three most visible Venezuelan officials whose ties to the FARC were clearly established.

What is amazing is that, until this blow-up, U.S. officials in different departments of the government, have been minimizing the well-documented alliance, as well as other issues discussed below, that have made Latin America a far different place than it was five years ago.

Unfortunately, with the exception of Colombia policy, there has been virtually no policy toward Latin America, and the festering issues there have been left to fester.

As a friend said after recently sitting through a 50-minute briefing by a senior government official on security issues facing Latin America without once mentioning Venezuela, Iran or Russia, the presentation was a true "tour de force."

This was because the official managed to never mention any of the burning issues, instead painting a relatively upbeat picture of the regions as a free trade, democratic region in the full flower of health.

Much of the evidence against the three designated Venezuelans: Hugo Armando Carvajal (head of military intelligence); Henry de Jesus Rangel (director of intelligence); and Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin (former minister of defense and interior) comes from the computer of Raul Reyes, the FARC's deputy commander killed in Ecuador by Colombian forces on March 1.

The Reyes documents (which I have analyzed in this NEFA Foundation paper clearly outline the role of the three in protecting the FARC, meeting regularly with FARC leadership and discussing weapons shipments with the rebels.

The FARC moves its some 250 kilos of cocaine, largely Europe-bound, through Venezuela, and internal FARC documents show that the shipments are often escorted by Venezuelan military or intelligence officials to the ports from which they are embarked, in order to insure the drugs' safe transit. My full blog is here.

U.S. Treasury Department Designates Senior Venezuelan Officials For Assisting FARC

By Andrew Cochran

This morning, after Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez publicly ran the U.S. Ambassador out of the country, the U.S. Treasury department announced that two current and one former senior Venezuelan officials will be designated under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”). The designation indicates that the U.S. has proof that the Chavez officials are playing a siginifcant role in international drug trafficking on their own or providing material support to another person designated under the Act for drug trafficking - in this case, the FARC in Colombia. In short, the United States caught the Chavez government red-handed helping the worst narco-terrorists in the Western Hemisphere. From the press release:

“Today’s designation exposes two senior Venezuelan government officials and one former official who armed, abetted, and funded the FARC, even as it terrorized and kidnapped innocents,” said Adam J. Szubin, Director of OFAC... Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios is the Director of Venezuela’s Military Intelligence Directorate (DGIM). His assistance to the FARC includes protecting drug shipments from seizure by Venezuelan anti-narcotics authorities and providing weapons to the FARC, allowing them to maintain their stronghold of the coveted Arauca Department... Carvajal Barrios also provides the FARC with official Venezuelan government identification documents that allow FARC members to travel to and from Venezuela with ease... Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, the Director of Venezuela’s Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services or DISIP... has materially assisted the narcotics trafficking activities of the FARC. He has also pushed for greater cooperation between the Venezuelan government and the FARC... Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, who was Venezuela’s Minister of Interior and Justice until September 8, is the Venezuelan government’s main weapons contact for the FARC. The FARC uses its proceeds from narcotics sales to purchase weapons from the Venezuelan government... Rodriguez Chacin has held numerous meetings with senior FARC members, one of which occurred at the Venezuelan government’s Miraflores Palace in late 2007. Rodriguez Chacin has also assisted the FARC by trying to facilitate a $250 million dollar loan from the Venezuelan government to the FARC in late 2007. We cannot confirm whether the loan materialized."
Treasury also released an Adobe Acrobat file with the links between the three officials designated today and specific FARC leaders.

This is the most serious official measure by the Bush Administration against the Chavez government, and I wouldn't be surprised to see more designations of Venezuelan, and perhaps Bolivian, officials. Obviously this has been in the works for some time. I would surmise that the level of investigative work and the interagency discussions which led to to this announcement gave Chavez just enough intel upon which to make a pre-emptive strike and dismiss our ambassador.

This site has been among the leaders in the coverage of Chavez's assistance to the FARC in posts by Douglas Farah (see his archives); Jonathan Winer (see his archives); and Aaron Mannes (see his archives).

  September 11, 2008

CIA Hammers Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network Inside Pakistan

By James Gordon Meek

The CIA has begun waging an aggressive offensive inside Pakistan's tribal areas to kill Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, the New York Daily News reported today. The effort has picked up steam in recent weeks - which is obvious to anyone reading wire service reports of missile blasts from unmanned drones in the remote, mountainous badlands along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Osama Bin Laden's old Pashtun pal Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj, the Taliban's military masterminds and close allies of Al Qaeda, are among the top targets, U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism sources told me.

The CIA declined to comment on the operations. A plan for cross-border strikes by special operations forces was authorized by President Bush months ago, according to the Associated Press, but it has become increasingly public as targets became available - and were quickly attacked - in late summer.

However, CIA Director Michael Hayden may have hinted at the new effort - which is unhindered compared to the geopolitical red tape of just a year ago - in a message he sent to agency employees today to mark the September 11 anniversary.

"To see America under attack, as it was then, is something none of us can ever forget," Hayden wrote in the statement, according to a source. "There can be no finer way to honor the victims of 9/11 than to continue working with that full dedication to protect our country and uphold its values of freedom and decency in the world."

A Bad Deal on Libya

By David Schenker

Earlier this week, I published an op-ed in the Daily Standard about the August deal between Washington and Libya that paved the way for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Tripoli on September 5 and the normalization of bilateral ties.

The US-Libyan agreement establishes a mechanism to compensate the Lockerbie and La Belle disco victims of Libyan state-sponsored-terrorism. It also includes a provision to compensate the Libyan victims of the US counterstrike on Libya (codenamed El Dorado Canyon) in response to the La Belle disco attack.

It’s a remarkable agreement. As I noted in the Daily Standard piece:

On the face of it, the quid pro quo implicitly equates the intentional targeting of civilians (i.e., terrorism) with unintentional collateral damage incurred during a legal act of self defense. The administration's embrace of moral equivalency to seal the deal is stunning. In a surreal twist of events, Libyan leader Muamar Qaddhafi--who ordered the attack on the La Belle--could be eligible for compensation for the death of his adopted daughter, who was said to have been killed in the U.S. counterstrike.
The deal conflates the victims of terrorism and counterterrorism operations. Making matters worse, there’s been surprisingly little coverage of the egregious details of the agreement in the press. While the victims of Libyan terrorism are no doubt entitled to compensation, the Administration's deal comes at a high moral and political cost.

Google Surrenders to Sen.Lieberman, Changes YouTube to Bar Terrorist Incitement

By Andrew Cochran

On June 3, I posted about Google's hypocrisy in taking down a YouTube clip in Thailand because it "offended" the King, while continuing to enable terrorist organizations to post videos inciting violence. In May, Sen. Joseph Lieberman had urged Google to remove Internet videos produced by terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, from YouTube subsidiary. "Islamist terrorist organizations use YouTube to disseminate their propaganda, enlist followers, and provide weapons training. YouTube also, unwittingly, permits Islamist terrorist groups to maintain an active, pervasive, and amplified voice, despite military setbacks or successful operations by the law enforcement and intelligence communities." At that point, Google would not tighten its guidelines, citing free speech concerns. I commented that Google was risking litigation in the event of an attack by terrorists with a YouTube presence.

Today, Sen. Lieberman released a victorious press release, announcing Google's decision to strengthen the standards for videos on YouTube to bar those that incite violence. According to his release, the revised guidelines bar "predatory behavior, stalking, threats, harassment, intimidation, invading privacy, revealing other people's personal information, and inciting others to commit violent acts..."

Congratulations to Sen. Lieberman for his perseverance and to Google for changing its policies.

The Inside Story of the 2006 Airline Plot

By Paul Cruickshank

I have spent the last several months co-producing a documentary for "Dateline NBC," along with Richard Greenberg of NBC News, on the 2006 Airline terror plot, widely considered Al Qaeda's most ambitious plot since 9/11. The program will air this coming Monday the 15th on NBC at 10pm Eastern.

The plan, authorities alleged, was to explode up to seven airliners en route from Heathrow airport to North American cities. Based on interviews with key officials from the US, Britain, and Pakistan, the documentary will shed significant new light on the genesis of the plot and the unprecedented international investigation that thwarted it. Please tune in!

Here is the NBC Press Release:


CHRIS HANSEN REPORTS ON THE ALLEGED PLOT AND THE INVESTIGATION INTO WHAT AUTHORITIES SAY COULD HAVE BEEN THE WORST TERRORIST ATTACK SINCE SEPT. 11

"Inside the Cell" to Air on Monday, Sept. 15 at 10 PM on "Dateline"


(New York) - Sept. 11, 2008 - A jury in Britain delivered a verdict this week in the case authorities say could have been one of the biggest terrorist attacks since Sept. 11. Three men were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, but, the jury was deadlocked on the more specific charge - the alleged plot to blow up planes. The verdict surprised a lot of people and left many to question: What exactly were those men planning? And how close did they come to success?

Now, in an in-depth report, "Dateline's" Chris Hansen reports from the streets of London on the alleged plot, the men being accused of the crimes and the international investigation that stopped it. The hour-long broadcast, airing on Monday, Sept. 15 (10:00-11:00 PM/ET), includes interviews with senior government officials from the United States and Great Britain who reveal details about the investigation from the inside not previously reported, explores the potential threat to aviation and takes a unique look at one man who reveals how al Qaeda nearly recruited him, and who makes it his mission to stop others from being recruited by terrorist groups.

When asked if he thinks a British citizen or citizens will launch an attack on the United States from the UK, Andy Hayman, who was the top Scotland Yard official overseeing counterterrorism at the time, says to Hansen: "Well, this particular plot gives you an insight to that. If we've got one plot that's been hatched with that ingredient, and it's unsuccessful, I would assume that objective still remains in place."

Richard Greenberg is producer of "Inside the Cell"; Paul Cruickshank is co-producer.

David Corvo is the executive producer of "Dateline NBC."


Ignoring the Elephant in the Room in Afghanistan

By Douglas Farah

Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, has sounded the alarm on Afghanistan, correctly pointing out that the danger of losing there is real and the hour is late.

It is fitting, on this day, to remember that our collective inability to get Afghanistan right once before helped give our enemies the opportunity to plan and execute the 9/11 attacks that are being remembered today.

What is striking about the published reports of Mullen and Defense Secretary Gates is the absence of any discussion of one of the driving forces of the Taliban's mounting success: its access to tens of millions of dollars in opium and poppy money. The UN conservatively estimates the Taliban makes between $50 million and $70 million a year from the drug trade.

Talk about ignoring the elephant in the room! Here is the prototype of future terrorist and insurgent movements deriving its income from non-state sources, and combating that figures into the policy at best in a marginal way.

In the 1980s the mujahadeen relied on U.S., Saudi and Pakistani aid, and became, over time, a largely state-sponsored, though non-state, actor. Now there is far less state sponsorship (with the exception of Pakistan's ISI), and the revenue is derived from criminal activity, an MO we will see more and more frequently in coming years.

The other multiple issues listed by Mullen are correct. There is a severe shortage of manpower and airlift capability. There is a terribly disjointed chain of command among the NATO forces and between NATO and the U.S. forces. The intelligence sharing infrastructure hardly exists. All of these are crippling weaknesses, and weaknesses that simply adding more troops will not resolve. My full blog is here.

Firefighters' Developing Role in Counterterrorism

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Seven years ago, the 9/11 attacks sounded an alarm in fire departments across the country: suddenly, they would need to decide whether they had a role to play in preparing for, and preventing, terrorist attacks. A growing number of fire departments concluded that they did, and are now leveraging their existing capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of local counterterrorism operations.

My colleague Kyle Dabruzzi (formerly of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) and I have just published a new paper with the Manhattan Institute's Center for Policing Terrorism arguing that state and local political leaders should encourage this trend: rather than relinquishing counterterrorism to local law enforcement and the federal government, they should seek to integrate their fire departments into overall security planning. The paper explores how many of the core competencies that fire departments draw on in responding to, mitigating, and preventing natural or man-made disasters can be directed toward preventing terrorist incidents. At the same time, fire departments must be wary of encroaching on traditional law-enforcement functions, in order to avoid violating citizens' civil liberties and ensure that they retain the trust they now enjoy. Thus, we also examine parameters for doing so. An excerpt:

At first glance, fire departments are focused on the core competencies of prevention, protection, and response to natural and man-made disasters and other emergencies. For example, in a recent strategic document, the FDNY identified its core competencies as fire suppression, pre-hospital emergency medical care, structural evacuation, search and rescue, dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazardous materials (CBRN/hazmat), life safety, decontamination, and arson investigation—all of which it characterizes as response-oriented.

However, a closer inspection reveals that these core competencies also position fire departments to perform preventive functions. These include building community awareness, identifying signs of terrorist activities, information sharing, and providing relevant subject-matter expertise. Most career fire departments, for example, have teams of highly trained hazardous-materials and explosives experts. These firefighters can inform public-awareness campaigns focusing on signs of improvised explosive or incendiary devices, and they can develop programs to train fellow firefighters and public safety officers to notice warning signs. They can also improve pre-incident planning by articulating and listing potential threats in order of seriousness and likelihood, and aligning collective capabilities accordingly.

In exploring the application of a fire department's core competencies to prevention-oriented counterterrorism, fire departments must guard against drifting into law-enforcement activities—namely, investigating crimes and apprehending criminals. This division of responsibilities should not preclude fire departments from strengthening their role in counterterrorism. As a general rule, to the extent that counterterrorism involves investigating and apprehending dangerous people, it is the province of law enforcement; to the extent that it involves identifying, preventing, and protecting against dangerous situations, it is the firefighters'.

You can find the full report here.

Remembering 9/11 - “The Evil That Men Do Lives After Them”

By Victor Comras

It has become customary for commentators on terrorism to mark the anniversary of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack against the United States as an occasion to review and assess the progress we have made in combating terrorism. Our government and other governments around the world have expended enormous efforts to isolate Al Qaeda’s senior leaders, reduce their appeal, and to better secure our safety. Much of our confidence has been restored as we go about our normal daily business; although we have had to acclimate ourselves to new restrictions, airport inspections, a diminution of our civil liberties, and a massive invasion of our privacy. But, the fact is that terrorism has not abated. And while Al Qaeda may well be on the run, terrorism has morphed from being an “Al Qaeda thing,” into a tactic of choice for a growing number of disaffected groups and insurgency movements around the world. Funding for terrorism, and the number of those recruited to carry out suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, has increased.

Seven years after 9/11, Coalition forces are still fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan; and Al Qaeda, Sunni and Shiite terrorists in Iraq. Bin Laden and Zawahiri remain well hidden among friends somewhere in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. Hizbollah holds sway in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. Well-funded terrorist groups remain well entrenched in the Caucasus; Kashmir; North, East and West Africa, and throughout much of South East Asia. ETA is still active in Spain, and the FARC strong in and around Columbia. European and American security and police forces remain on alert. And, China contends with separatists using terrorist tactics in Xinjiang province. The latest State Department’s counter-terrorism report, confirms that state support for terrorism remains strong and that private source funding for terrorism remains substantial.

Just yesterday a special UN forum hosted by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on the plight of victims of terrorism suffered untoward acrimony with members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference protesting the selection of Israeli victims of terrorism invited to speak at the meeting. In their view, Israeli’s killed or injured by suicide bombers do not fit their definition of terrorism. That brings us to the continuing failure of the United Nations to define terrorism. This failure manifests the continuing lack of political will in large parts of the world to hold accountable those who employ terrorist tactics in furtherance of political aims with which they might agree.

The UN’s failure to reach consensus on a definition of terrorism has also seriously hampered the international community’s ability to stem terrorism financing. In the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism every country remains free to interpret its own obligations and to define for itself which groups they will consider terrorists and which they will support as “freedom fighters.” For too many countries terrorism is defined not by the use of terrorist tactics, but, rather by whether or not they agree with the group’s political objectives or aspirations.

We simply cannot be satisfied with these results. So, as we remember those who died from, and suffered from, 9/11, we here on this counterterrorism blog will remain committed to reminding all who read what we write that there is still so much that needs to be done.

  September 10, 2008

The Case of Belal Khazaal and "Essential Provisions in the Rules of Jihad"

By Evan Kohlmann

Yesterday, at the Supreme Court of New South Wales (NSW) in Sydney, Australia, former Qantas Airlines baggage handler Belal Khazaal was convicted by a jury of "knowingly making a document connected with assistance in a terrorist act" in violation of S101.5 of the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code. The charges were filed in relation to a book published by Khazaal under the alias "Abu Mohammed al-Tawhidi" titled "Essential Provisions in the Rules of Jihad." The book, dated September 2003, was written in Arabic and included large sections directly appropriated from the raw writings of known terrorist leaders -- such as Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri's book "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner." According to an introduction to the book signed by "Abu Mohammed al-Tawhidi" (a.k.a. Khazaal):

"This is but a short document I hastily prepared in response to a request from brothers working to support this religion. I was requested to prepare it, in this fashion, to serve as a reference to all brothers or small cells desiring to support this religion. With Allah’s help I set on its compilation and I completed it in few days. I am however convinced that had I sufficient time and had I been settled in my residence I would have produced a better job than this work which has been conceived in haste. However, better 'haste' than never... I seek the Almighty’s reward and I seek martyrdom for his sake. I do so running towards it not away from it. I beseech my brothers who read this message to pray that I may attain martyrdom."
Khazaal's 102-page "master guide" to the "essential provisions in the rules of jihad" included both theoretical and ideological material--as well as detailed, explicit instructions on how best to exterminate "Americans and Jews." The book includes an entire step-by-step manual on conducting assassinations (originally written by Saudi Al-Qaida commander Abu Jandal al-Azdi), as well as directions on "remote control detonation devices", "letters and letter bombs", "booby trapping a car", "detonating a car from a distance", "sniping", "smothering", "hitting with a hammer", and "martyrdom operations." Among other things, the book emphasizes to readers that "small groups can cause havoc among Americans": "Pursuing Americans and Jews is not an impossible task. Killing them with a single shot, a stab or a pack of a popular mix or with an iron rod is not a difficult deed. Neither is burning their properties with a Molotov bottle. Small groups with small available means can cause horror to American and Jew alike."

One of the final sections of Khazaal's book is titled, "Recommendations to the Mujahideen: Examples of Jihad During Weaker Times to Emulate." According to this section:

"The impressive success of the conquest of New York is but a reminder that today’s mujahideen are no less than their forefathers. They are young, very professional men who can fly and maneuver planes. They are so disciplined to follow instructions to the letter and are ready to sacrifice themselves to regain the dignity and glory of the Muslim nation. Friend and foe alike acknowledge that today Mujahideen are technologically-savvy and employ sophisticated communication technology such as satellite telephones and use the Internet through a coded manner including steganography and other forms of technology... Of the unique examples that attracted my attention in the last two decades are legends that need no introduction. But it is the quality of men that needs emphasis. The famous 'Engineer' Yahya Ayyash and another unknown and unrecognized man yet he is no less heroic, Ramzi Yousef... His original plan was to destroy the entire [World Trade Center] inflicting maximum damage and casualties in the vicinity of a quarter of a million as punishment for America‘s frequent bloody interventions in Islamic affairs... I can only imagine his glee in his captivity (may Allah break his chains) as he was listening to the news of the Conquest of New York and the success his comrades were able to carry out what he started."
Khazaal's conviction in what has been a landmark legal case in Australia represents a major victory for the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP). It should also be taken as a stern warning to those--not just in Australia, but around the world--who believe that they can continue to use the Internet to incite the murder of innocent civilians in terrorist acts without facing serious consequences for their own actions.

  September 9, 2008

Qatanani Deportation Case - Something Dis’d and Missed

By Bill West

Last week, the Immigration Court removal (deportation) case in New Jersey against Mohammad Qatanani, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of Passaic County, ended when the Immigration Judge ruled against the Government and in favor of Qatanani, granting him permanent resident alien status in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had sought Qatanani’s removal from the U.S. for allegedly having made false statements in his application for residency concerning his detention in Israel for having been affiliated with the terrorist organization Hamas. The Immigration Judge, according to media reports, ruled the ICE prosecutors had failed to present sufficient evidence supporting their case.

Qatanani, in his defense, had several senior law enforcement officials testify on his behalf, including a representative of the U.S. Attorney's Office in New Jersey. This seeming divergence of law enforcement posture in a terrorism-related deportation case, even within the Federal Government, is almost bizarre. ICE legal personnel have yet to state if they intend to appeal the Immigration Judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, as they may. What really happened in this case? A fine article appears today at IPT News that covers what likely did occur in this case. This may be one for solid Congressional inquiry.

Where We've Come since 9/11

By Michael Jacobson

My colleague Matt Levitt and I wrote two op-eds this week taking stock of the US counterterrorism efforts as we approach the seventh anniversary of 9/11. We also assess what the terrorist threat is likely to look like and what counterterrorism environment the next administration will inherit in January 2009. As we noted in one of the pieces, despite the steps that has been made, this area is still very much a work in progress.

Here is an excerpt from our op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle:

As the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approaches, and with the Bush administration entering its final months, it's worth pausing to reflect on how much progress we've made these past seven years against the terrorist threat to the United States. Yet the next administration will face an evolving terrorist threat and inherit a counterterrorism regime that is still a work in progress.

While the United States has overhauled its counterterrorism structure to face this new, ever-evolving enemy, keeping up with the adapting threat is a serious challenge for the often plodding government bureaucracy.

At the time of the Sept. 11 attacks, al Qaeda was a centralized, hierarchical organization that directed international terrorist operations from its base in Afghanistan. By 2004, al Qaeda appeared to be in disarray, with its capabilities dramatically diminished. That picture has changed substantially over the past few years, as al Qaeda's center has grown stronger once again, with its new safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where it can train and recruit operatives, and direct its global propaganda efforts.

To read the entire piece, click here:

Our other piece appeared in the Camden Courier-Post this past Sunday. Here is an excerpt from that piece:

Despite setbacks, al-Qaida remains a potent threat. In mid-August, the U.S. intelligence community's senior ranking terrorism analyst concluded that while increased counterterrorism efforts worldwide have constrained the ability of al-Qaida to attack the United States and its allies, the group "remains the most serious terrorist threat to the United States."
As recently thwarted terrorist plots in Britain, Germany and elsewhere make clear, seven years after 9/11 we remain in a heightened threat environment. But the nature of the transnational threats facing the world today is far different than the ones the United States and its allies faced on 9/11.

While al-Qaida itself remains a formidable opponent -- particularly with its recent resurgence and secure safe haven in northwest Pakistan -- its affiliates and homegrown cells pose a growing threat as well. As of 9/11, al-Qaida was the main threat facing the United States. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida was a centralized, hierarchical organization directing terrorist operations around the world from its base in Afghanistan.

The Unites States now faces a different -- and in some ways more complicated -- threat than it did on 9/11. This is a threat -- and an enemy -- that continues to evolve rapidly, often in response to U.S. and international pressure. Today, the United States and its allies face a three-fold threat. The first is from the core al-Qaida. While al-Qaida was on its "back foot" from 2004 to 2007, it has now "regained its equilibrium," according to a senior Homeland Security official.

To read that entire piece, click here:

The Airline Bomb Plot & the Visa Waiver Program

By Michael Cutler

ABC Nightline aired a news story last night about the conviction of the British citizens who were involved in a conspiracy to carry out terrorist attacks to bring liquid explosives on board a number of airliners that were destined to arrive in the United States. This plot is the reason that we are restricted to bring no more than 3 ounce bottles of shampoo and other fluids on airliners. It is the reason that so many seemingly bizarre measures have been taken by TSA officials, such as when nursing women were reportedly required to drink their own breast milk brought to feed their infant children.

The timing of this news story is coincidental but it is certainly worth remembering that this week our nation will mark the seventh anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. What is, in my judgement, utterly unacceptable is that fact that even with all of these concerns about potential future devastating terrorist attacks, our nation still permits aliens from some 27 countries to seek to enter the United States without first applying for and receiving a visa.

Those British terrorists, not unlike Richard Reid, the so-called "Shoe Bomber," would not require visas in order to board an airliner destined for the United States. The point is that while far from perfect, the visa requirement could well have kept Richard Reid off the airliner he had planned to destroy by detonating explosives secreted in his shoes. The point is that these British terrorists could have sought to board an airliner they were intent on destroying without first securing visas. The visa requirement also provides other significant benefits to law enforcement and hence, represent a vital, additional layer of security that is being ignored by our government, even as the administration pushes forward with plans to expand the Visa Waiver Program to include additional countries.

Last year I was interviewed by Mike Ahlers of CNN for a news report he was writing about the Visa Waiver Program and the fact that the executives of the travel and hospitality industries advocating that our government expand the Visa Waiver Program. As you read these articles and my commentaries you should be asking yourself, "Are we safer today than we were on September 10, 2001?" Our government is supposed to represent the best interests of We the People and the best interests of our nation. That our government would ratchet up security at airport and other vulnerable venues makes good sense, if those measures are truly effective and enhance our safety and the security of our nation. These measures must make a "real world" difference and not simply create an illusion of addressing vital national security issues.

Distinguished Experts to Discuss Saudi Penetration Into U.S. Institutions

By Andrew Cochran

Tomorrow at 10 am ET, I will join other distinguished experts on a special panel to discuss the effects of Saudi penetration into our nation’s financial, legal and educational infrastructure. The Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET) will host the panel in room 2255 of the Rayburn House Office Building, and the other experts participating are as follows:

Dr. Ali Al Ahmed, Director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs, who will address the Saudis' culture of corruption and intimidation and how it made its way into the United States;

E.J. Kimball of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, who will talk about U.S. Muslim organizations connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi royal family;

Reed Rubinstein, Attorney at Greenberg Traurig, who successfully prevented CAIR from suing Andrew Whitehead;

Ilan Weinglass, Editor of the Terror Finance Blog, on Saudi use of foreign courts to sue American writers and journalists in order to suppress their freedom of speech;

Frank Gaffney Jr., President of the Center for Security Policy, who will highlight Saudi infiltration into our nation’s financial infrastructure;

Winfield Myers, Director of Campus Watch, who will address the issue of Saudi funding of American college campuses and its inhibitive effect on objective scholarship;

Dr. Sandra Alfonsi, Chair, Curriculum Watch, on Islamist revisionism in American textbooks; and

Anne Korin, Co-Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, who will tackle our dependence on foreign oil and the state of alternative energy research and development.

I will discuss the Islamic Saudi Academy of northern Virginia, about which I've written numerous posts as an example of the Kingdom's continued export of radical Islamist propaganda and as a case study in homegrown radicalization.

To find out more about this seminar and EMET, please e-mail Sarah Stern, EMET President.

Voices of the Awakening: Transfer of Anbar Security and Other News

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Today FDD's Center for Terrorism Research brings you the second installment of our Voices of the Awakening project, authored by Sterling Jensen, which is designed to provide Westerners a better understanding of ongoing developments in Iraq's Awakening movement. This regular feature includes critical translations of Awakening news and documents, Jensen's observations and analysis, and occasional interviews with the movement's leaders.

The Iraqi Awakening has reported an eventful first week of September, including the transfer of Anbar provincial security responsibility to the Iraqi security forces (ISF), an official letter from the Awakening to the prime minister conveying Ramadan blessings, and a visit from the head of the Sunni Endowment of Iraq. An excerpt from this week's news:

[A]s a message to the government of Iraq (GoI), Sheikh Ahmad [Bezia] said that Anbaris accomplished this heroic fight against international terrorists by joining the ISF. The Awakening thought that by joining the ISF and helping the national government to eliminate extremism, terrorism, and sectarian violence, the justification for Iraq's de-Baathification laws would end. However, the Iraqi Awakening was surprised when the GoI announced they had prepared a list of former Iraqi officers, soldiers, and members of the Baath Party [there is no indication in the speech as to the purpose of the list, but the context is a GoI list of "irreconcilable" former regime elements]. Sheikh Ahmad asked the GoI to take into consideration the sacrifices and efforts of those who were once covered under the de-Baathification laws, but who supported the GoI and fought al-Qaeda from 2006-2008--and to re-evaluate them so long as they have not shed innocent Iraqi blood....

INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE: The Iraqi Awakening is approaching the GoI diplomatically on the issues of transfer of security responsibility, and former regime element reconciliation and integration. It was the GoI that wanted the transfer of the security responsibility to happen sooner rather than later, even though the Iraqi Awakening and provincial government would have preferred to postpone it because of autonomy issues. However, the Iraqi Awakening thought it was in their best interest to support the GoI initiative. Sheikh Ahmad Bezia wants to show the GoI that this tribal-movement-turned-political party is law abiding, patriotic and subservient to Baghdad.
For the entire Voices of the Awakening update, click here.

Algeria minimizing Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's threat

By Olivier Guitta

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was just in Algeria to talk mostly about terrorism. Indeed Algeria has been witnessing regular and numerous terror attacks perpetrated by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
For one of the most exhaustive coverage on AQIM, please visit The Croissant.

I wrote a piece for the MIddle East Times last week on how the Algerian government is minimizing AQIM's threat. You can read it here.

Here is an excerpt:

Several spectacular and bloody suicide attacks have been perpetrated by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria in recent weeks. The high number of deaths has attracted much publicity, but these are far from being isolated events. Indeed, AQIM has been targeting, murdering, kidnapping or maiming law enforcement personnel, regular citizens and foreigners on an almost daily basis. The situation is dire, yet the Algerian government goes on pretending that everything is under control. Clearly it is not.

AQIM aims to pull-off spectacular attacks that make the international headlines. For example, at the end of July a car bomb targeted President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika' s convoy in Bouira. Fortunately, security services thwarted this attack - AQIM's second on the president. In September 2007 a suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of the crowd that was awaiting the president's arrival, after being spotted by a police officer who lost his life during the attack.

While it is true that Algerian security forces have been relatively successful in fighting off AQIM terrorists, the organization remains very active, carrying out attacks sometimes on a daily basis. On average AQIM is successful in two out of three times. Its members are mostly quite professional, and the trend has been toward an "Iraqization" of its tactics. Car bombs and suicide attacks are the new modus operandi of AQIM. But this switch in tactics has resulted in a huge decline of AQIM's popularity among Algeria's population, especially since they are also very much targeting civilians.

But AQIM is not the only organization that has lost credibility; the Algerian government has too. And for a few reasons.

First, the authorities continue to downplay AQIM's capacity to hit Algeria. The declaration from Interior Minister Zerhouni after each attack repeating that AQIM is dying off and that the latest attack was proof of its weakness and despair is ringing very hollow. Zerhouni also sounds like a broken record when he keeps on repeating that AQIM has only 400 militants.

  September 8, 2008

The Success of the Fusion Strategy in Counterterror Operations

By Douglas Farah

After a few years in the wilderness, the U.S. military and its allies in other parts of the world have honed the cutting edge of a significant series of steps that are yielding highly successful results in combatting non-state armed groups-including terrorists, not just in Iraq but in Colombia and elsewhere.

The Washington Post's recent story on the "fusion cells" gets at the core of the program: The integration and blending of field intelligence (human and signal) with the ability to act rapidly on that information.

The NSA targeted its listening operations, the Treasury Department began tracing anything to do with money and Special Operations Forces, with the help of the latest technology and imaging capabilities, carry out the operations. This website was the first media outlet to discuss the operations of the joint DoD-Treasury "threat finance" cell unit in Baghdad in posts last November 2 and again on November 20, and the first publicly available monograph or study of terrorist financing by the Defense Department was released on October 12 of last year. "Threat finance" units are now operational in each of the military commands.

"To me, it's not just war-fighting now but in the future," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the newspaper. "It's been the synergy, it's been the integration that has had such an impact."

One of the keys has been the ability, over time, to force the sharing of a range of skills in a single unit, so that the traditional segregation and stove pipes have ended. The value of tracing even useless-looking information, particularly from the "pocket litter" of those captured or killed, has proved itself on many occasions.

While this is integration is a fact at the level of these small task forces, it remains far from accomplished on broad level. In fact, much of the upper tiers of the intelligence community are just as resistant to change and perhaps less inclined to share intelligence than 9-11.

But the success of fusing all elements of intelligence and force to capture often elusive enemies is not just evident in Iraq. In its own way, the Colombian military and policy have been on the cutting edge of the program in combatting the FARC. My full blog is here.

  September 7, 2008

Mainstream Media Diverting Terrorism Reporters Into Political Investigations

By Andrew Cochran

I see one after another of the mainstream media outlets which have made important contributions to the factual underpinnings of the counter-terrorism effort dropping off that beat. Editors in the print media are shifting terrorism experts on their staffs towards investigations of political candidates. At least three such reporters at three major papers are now chasing Sarah Palin stories (I haven't had time to chase down everybody in "the business"). The move away from terrorism investigations started over a year ago as the print media entered into a long-term decline in ad revenues, but the trend has been accelerated in this election year. It is an unfortunate coincidence that true experts, with some of the best contacts and intel in the private CT community, are being moved out of their chosen fields just as we approach the anniversary of the 9-11 attacks. It's especially disconcerting to see this trend at the very moment when President Bush is committing more counterinsurgency resources to capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and/or Ayman al-Zawahiri before he leaves office, a strategic decision with serious ramifications for relations between the U.S. and Pakistan and other nations in South Asia.

A number of veteran reporters in the mainstream media have broken important stories using sources and methods that the intelligence community could not or chose not to exploit. The broad CT community would suffer a serious loss if these bona fide experts leave the field for any length of time. In the meantime, nonprofit organizations and dedicated blogs have the opportunity and capability to inform the public.

  September 6, 2008

Russia's War Leads Administration to Drop One Objection to Iran Sanctions Bill

By Andrew Cochran

The Associated Press reports this morning that Secretary of State Rice has announced that the Administration will not pursue the U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement in light of Russia's invasion of Georgia. As the AP notes, Congress was probably unlikely to approve the agreement before it adjourns later the month and President Bush leaves office. But the action could move a new Iran sanctions bill one step closer to passage in Congress and approval by the President. As I posted on June 12, the agreement was the basis of one of two official Administration objections to a version of a new Iran sanctions bill which barred entry by the U.S. into the agreement. As Congress left for the August work period, there were two Senate versions of the bill, one of which did not include the bar objected to by the Administration.

Now that the Administration has dropped the attempt to pass the agreement, an Iran sanctions bill is one step closer to approval. But the Administration is still be opposed to bill language imposing extra-territorial sanctions on firms from other nations. Even if that objection were resolved soon, a final Senate bill would have to be reconciled with one or more House bills, and that's difficult given the shortened Congressional schedule due to the November elections.

  September 5, 2008

Ten Questions about al Qaeda and its Jihadi nebulous

By Walid Phares

At the eve of the this year's anniversary of 9/11, World Defense Review (WDR) conducted an interview with me on the current debate about al Qaeda and its Jihadi nebulous. The conversation took place with Thomas Smith, military expert and writer, based on themes raised by an article published in el Publico, a daily in Portugal and in other publications. The Ten questions asked by WDR focused on the central issue of how to analyze the war with al Qaeda, hence on the conclusions drawn in the ongoing debate within the expert, academic and political communities. My answers to the Ten Questions are certainly not exhaustive but tried to address the general directions of the current studies provided by a number of think tanks and colleagues in the field. Based on my more comprehensive analysis covered by my last three books, the points addressed the essence of the conflict with the Jihadists, the accuracy of identification of the ideology and the movement, and the strategic reasons for dissidence within the Jihadi realm. These remarks are a contribution to the discussion which is taking place during this 7th anniversary of the attacks of September 11. Following is the text of the interview.

Read More »


  September 4, 2008

The War on Drugs Hits Some Severe Snags

By Douglas Farah

The almost-forgotten war on drugs has taken some serious hits recently, particularly in Latin America. This cyclical war waxes and wanes with the political will of each country involved and the consumption habits of drug users.

I take it seriously in large part because drug money is rapidly replacing state sponsorship for terrorist organizations that have reaches far beyond the world of drug trafficking. As I have written earlier, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) links 19 of the 43 designated terrorist organizations to drug trafficking activities at various levels.

These include Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, Tamil Tigers, ETA, as well as the FARC and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

A Washington Post story yesterday captured the paradox of the drug war, a paradox I have been pondering since my recent trip to Colombia.

It is this: The law enforcement community (particularly the DEA and Colombian National Police, along with the Colombian military) has made unprecedented strides in both dismantling drug trafficking organizations (in the case of Colombia, these include two designated terrorist organizations, the AUC and FARC rebels).

For the first time in 25 years there are no clearly identifiable drug kingpins running the cocaine trade from Colombia. The FARC and AUC are both seriously degraded.

Yet, production has not diminished, and, according to Colombian and U.S. officials, the amount of cocaine moving out of the Andean region (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) has showed almost no variation despite the tactical successes against the organizations. My full blog is here.

Al-Arian Released On Bail

By Bill West

Sami Al-Arian, convicted of supporting the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), who has served a 57-month federal prison sentence for that offense is now under what is believed to be a final removal order (deportation order) requiring his departure from the United States. That removal order stems from his felony conviction relating to the support of a foreign terrorist organization. That support included assisting an alien relative who was a PIJ operative with immigration matters. Al-Arian continues to face federal criminal contempt charges in the Eastern District of Virginia due to his refusal to testify before a federal grand jury investigating northern Virginia Islamic organizations with whom he and his Tampa, Florida PIJ-affiliated front groups were associated and did business.

As reported by various media outlets, including the Investigative Project on Terrorism, Al-Arian was just released from the custody of immigration authorities to await further proceedings on the criminal contempt charges. His release by immigration authorities was likely because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was caught between a legal "rock and a hard place."

U.S. immigration law and court decisions, particularly the 2001 Supreme Court decision, Zadvydas v. Davis, allow the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to detain aliens who are under final removal orders only as long as it takes to make reasonable arrangements to physically deport them but generally no more than 90 days. There are certain limited exceptions, including aliens who are involved in terrorism activities, who could be detained for longer periods including an indefinite time if actual removal is not possible. Arguably, Al-Arian could fall into that category.

However, if ICE is ready to physically deport Al-Arian, having finalized all the arrangements of that process, yet the Department of Justice wants to keep Al-Arian in the U.S. for the pending contempt prosecution, there may have been no legal recourse but to release him under the conditions imposed by U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema.

On the other hand, if there is still some genuine pending, time-consuming arrangements left in the deportation process for Al-Arian, ICE would have legitimate cause to further detain him as a terrorism-related convicted alien felon and could have so argued before the Court. So far, neither ICE nor DHS has publicly commented on the specifics of Al-Arian's release.

Ironically, in late 2000, Al-Arian's brother-in-law Mazen Al-Najjar (the PIJ operative Al-Arian assisted with his immigration case), had been similarly detained by then INS for several years pending deportation action while he appealed his deportation order, a deportation order that was issued by an Immigration Court after several weeks of public, open due process hearings wherein Al-Najjar was fully represented by legal counsel (hardly the "never charged" posture represented by most media and apologists at the time). INS, working with the FBI, attempted to keep Al-Najjar detained while he appealed that deportation order because the agencies knew he, like Al-Arian, was involved with the PIJ. Al-Najjar, however, had already been charged in U.S. Immigration Court and had a deportation order issued against him. The custody matter in his case was based, in part, on classified information. That, of course, stirred a hornet's nest with much of the media and Al-Najjar's supporters and apologists. The debate about using "secret" evidence in immigration proceedings became widespread and ultimately, because of the Al-Najjar case and the negative publicity, as misrepresented as it was, the utilization of classified information in immigration removal proceedings has been greatly curtailed, even after the 9/11 attacks and the so-called war on terror.

More ironically, during the Al-Najjar detention proceedings, then Attorney General Janet Reno ultimately authorized his release on a meager $8,000 bail after three and a half years of detention, knowing fully his terrorism support background, when she had the option of overriding an Immigration Judge's release order. That Reno release authorization was ordered, coincidentally, at the end of her tenure as the Attorney General and during a presidential election season. Al-Najjar ultimately lost his appeal, was re-arrested in November of 2001, detained and deported in 2002. Reportedly, he currently lives in Cairo.

We now have Sami Al-Arian similarly released from immigration custody. No doubt, due to the high profile nature of this case, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff has been involved in the custody decision-making process. Notably, this occurs at the end of his tenure and during a presidential election season.

So, Al-Arian's release from custody really could be either a rock and a hard place decision or a cave-in as far as DHS is concerned.


Now the U.S. Is Chasing OBL to His Cave

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. has taken the gloves are off: In a first, senior U.S. officials acknowledged that U.S. ground forces entered Pakistan to pursue high-value Al Qaeda targets, and the hunt for Osama bin Laden is moving at full speed before President Bush leaves office. "(A) small team of commandos crossed the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan to go after an al Qaida cell operating out of a village less than a mile from the border. The officials said the cell was using the village as a base to plan and conduct cross border raids into Afghanistan. The leader of the cell - whose name the officials did not release - was reported killed along with several women and at least one child." The reactions from the Pakistanis include not just the usual official protests, but also a column from the chairman of the PPP, Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of assassinated ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the leading candidate for President. Writing in the Washington Post, Zardari didn't explicitly criticize any U.S. raid into Pakistan. "It is important to remember that Pakistan, too, is a victim of terrorism. Our soldiers are dying on the front lines; our children are being blown up by suicide bombers. We stand with the United States, Britain, Spain and others who have been attacked. Fundamentally, however, the war we our fighting is our war."

Two days ago, Jonathan Winer discussed the need for a broad counterinsurgency effort in the FATA and the Administration's recent determination to now rely on Zardari as a partner in the pursuit of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Pakistanis publicly claimed credit for an attack designed to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, a positive sign of such cooperation. But for the U.S. to attack and admit it just days from the presidential vote appears to be a statement that, with or without Zardari's assistance, the U.S. will attack specific terrorist targets inside Pakistan with sufficient force. I assume that we will mount other such attacks, perhaps frequently, in President Bush's remaining term in office. That's a strategic direction of major consequence which the next President will have to review, but I cannot imagine either of the current candidates putting the gloves back on and withdrawing that capability.

  September 3, 2008

Hurricane Gustav Success Shows Improvements in Attack Readiness

By Andrew Cochran

Three years ago, as the Hurricane Katrina disaster unfolded, we were the first site in the counterterrorism niche to point out the obvious negative implications for our ability to protect the homeland from terrorist attack or to recover from one (see Bill West's and Walid Phares' observations at that time). Since then, we've read numerous government reports and hearings indicating continued trouble in DHS operations and homeland security planning, including several just last month. So as Hurricane Gustav approached, it was reasonable to wonder if FEMA, DHS, and the states could pull off a mass evacuation in time and then recover quickly. The evacuation proceeded smoothly, the recovery efforts are underway with efficiency, and all parties involved deserve our congratulations for a job well done. It helped that Gustav weakened to the point that the New Orleans levees weren't breached, but everyone seemed prepared for that possibility. While DHS is still not capable of protecting the U.S. against important threats, it looks like FEMA is ready for whatever comes.

One sector about which I had no concerns was the financial services sector, which has been the best at protecting and recovering its critical infrastructure in this decade. In this post on November 30, 2006, I discussed in detail the quick reaction by the sector to several disasters, from the 9-11 attacks to the great Northeast blackout of 2003. The sector made still more improvements in the Gulf region following Hurricane Katrina. So we shouldn't be surprised that no one suffered any inability to gain access to their financial assets during Hurricane Gustav.

Voices of the Awakening

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

FDD's Center for Terrorism Research, which I direct, is proud to introduce an important new regular feature, our Voices of the Awakening project. Iraq's Awakening movement, which originated in the Anbar province, was one of the keys to the turnaround that the country has experienced since January 2007. This collection of Sunni tribesmen, Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, and others, took great risks to help drive al-Qaeda from their country; many members of the Awakening, and their families, lost their lives in the struggle. Though the Awakening—which remains a potent force in Iraq—is often discussed by Western analysts, often the voice of the movement itself is absent from the discussion.

Thus, the Center for Terrorism Research is introducing a new feature by Sterling Jensen, a foremost expert on the Awakening. Jensen, who is currently enrolled in a Master's program at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, worked as an Army contract linguist from the spring of 2006 to June 2007. He was heavily involved in the U.S. government's tribal engagements as the Anbar Awakening formed in the fall of 2006. He then returned to Anbar in February 2008 as the Marines' first ever civilian Foreign Area Officer, tasked with facilitating the First Marine Expeditionary Force's relations with Awakening leadership, religious leaders, and foreign regime elements. Jensen's contacts in the Awakening are unparalleled, as is his knowledge of the movement. The Voices of the Awakening project will feature his observations and analysis, which will include critical translations of Awakening news and documents, as well as occasional interviews with the movement's leaders.

The first installment of the series can be found here, featuring discussion of Iraqi defense minister Abdul Qadr Jassim al-Obeidi's visit with Awakening leader Sheikh Ahmad Bezia; statements on the government of Iraq's supposed crackdown on Awakening councils in Baghdad; and information about the second conference of Anbar tribes.

An excerpt:

It is important to differentiate between two different types of Awakening councils. First, Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq, or the Iraqi Awakening, is a registered national political party that began as the Anbar Awakening tribal movement mid-2006 in Ramadi, Anbar. By early 2007, the Anbar Awakening's popularity grew into other Sunni areas in Baghdad, Salahideen, and Diyala, at the same time coalition forces started recruiting tribal-oriented Sunnis into its Sons of Iraq programs. Many Sons of Iraq program participants organized themselves into self-proclaimed Awakening councils, even though they might not have any official affiliation with the Anbar Awakening. In early 2007, as the Anbar Awakening transitioned into the Iraqi Awakening, many of these other Awakening councils either joined the Iraqi Awakening organization, or just continued operating under their own ad hoc organizations.

Today the GOI [the government of Iraq] has good relations with the Iraqi Awakening, and recognizes it as a legal political entity. However, GOI is weary of self-proclaimed Awakening groups not integrated into the Iraqi Awakening, because some of these groups do not operate according to new Iraqi laws and are not seen as subservient to GOI. Some of these ad hoc Awakening councils/Sons of Iraq are basically former nationalist insurgents whose reason for turning against AQI was purely tactical. The Iraqi Awakening would not necessarily be against GOI cracking down on these groups that work against the party's platform principle of recognizing GOI's authority and allowing only ISF [Iraqi security forces]-approved groups to use weapons.

Terrorist Threat and US Response: A Changing Landscape

By Michael Jacobson

The Washington Institute published a monograph that my colleague Matt Levitt and I edited, on the lecture series we've been hosting at the Institute since December 2007. Speakers have included Juan Zarate, the Deputy National Security Advisor, Mike Leiter, the director of NCTC, Don Kerr, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and Charlie Allen, DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis. The monograph includes the prepared remarks of the first seven of the senior US government counterterrorism officials who spoke at the Institute, as well as an assessment that Matt and I wrote on the themes that emerged from the series.

While the series covered a broad spectrum of terrorism-related topics, ranging from terrorism financing to the threat of nuclear terrorism, three major themes emerged: how the threat facing the US has evolved, how the US has adapted its counterterrorism approach, and how the US has revised its governmental structure to address these threats.

As the lecture series made clear, the next administration will have many serious challenging in confronting the rapidly evolving threats posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as Hizballah, Hamas and others. The next administration will also inherit and bureacratic structure still very much in transition. As Mike Leiter acknowledged, "the single, overarching challenge -- and the one that I believe looms larges -- is institutionalizing all of the progress we have made in working across the US government on counterterrorism." The next administration will also have to decide whether to continue to established approach of the current administration, including the fairly recent shift in communication strategy and the more complete integration of all elements of power into counterterrorism efforts.

EU High Court Invalidates Sanctions Against Al Qaeda

By Jonathan Winer

In a devastating blow to existing international financial sanctions against terrorist groups, the EU's highest court has today overturned the sanctions program imposed by the European Union on Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The ruling by the European Court of Justice annulled the EU's freezing of the funds of Yassin Al-Kadi, a Saudi businessman who has been on terrorist financier black-lists since his listing as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" by the U.S. Treasury in October 2001.

The ruling only immediately affects Al-Kadi and the charity Al Barakaat, also alleged to have funded Al-Qaeda, and defers the release of their assets 90 days to give the EU the opportunity to come up with a new sanctions regime that provides the due process rights which the Court were not present in the existing EU regulation. But at first reading, it appears essentially to end the ability of the EU to impose economic sanctions against terrorists -- or anyone else -- in the absence of providing the designated person the opportunity to be heard in some kind of contested proceeding, followed by a process of judicial review. What would be required in such a proceeding to make an asset freeze lawful in the EU, and the extent to which assets may be held temporarily prior to such a hearing or process is not spelled out.

The allegations against Al-Kadi are very serious. He has been alleged to have financed Osama bin Laden, Hamas and other terrorist groups by funneling funds through the charities, and has been described in formal testimony by U.S. officials as a key terrorist financier and facilitator. At the request of the U.S, and supported by Saudi Arabia, the United Nations Security Council placed Al-Kadi on its global terrorist list in 2001. In turn, the EU imposed the UN sanctions on Al-Kadi on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution. It is that process that the EU's high court has now invalidated, stating that before the EU may impose sanctions that take away someone's property, the EU must afford the person "a reasonable opportunity fo putting his case to the competent authorities."

How much "due process" is due an alleged terrorist before assets may be frozen is not articulated by the court. But the Court said the EU did not need to unfreeze the funds immediately, as giving the ruling immediate effect could "seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness of the restrictive measures imposed by the regulation" by allowing Al-Kadi and Al Barakaat to move their funds out of the EU. Accordingly, it invited the EU to develop a new sanctions regulation that provides due process to the targets within the 90 day period, acknowledging that on the merits of the case the EU might have the right to impose sanctions on Al-Kadi and Al Barakaat.

The ruling was not unexpected. It follows closely the logic and reasoning of the recommendation made by the EU courts Advocate General, Poiares Maduro, in January. The result, however, represents a damaging outcome for efforts to curtail terrorist financing, in practice, wiping out the existing international sanctions regime, not only against Al Qaeda, but against any and all individuals subject to economic sanctions. The EU (and the UN) will need to act urgently to develop a system capable of meeting the court's due process tests. The U.S., for its part, should have seen this coming, giving last January's ruling. A new system needs to be developed to provide an efficient, effective, and legally sustainable way on a global basis of combining a vital couinter-terrorism objective with sufficient oversight and process to meet the baseline human rights and rule of law requirements now demanded throughout the EU as the result of this decision.

The immediate practical impact of this ruling remains fuzzy indeed, even if the medium-term implications are clear. Each EU member state has independent obligations to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions. Despite the Court of Justice ruling breaks, the UN order continues to require U.N. member states to freeze assets of people and entities designated by the UN for funding terror groups. The contradiction between the UN resolution requiring asset freezes, and the EU ruling, finding the EU sanctions invalid given the lack of due process, provides a further reason the countries that are part of the EU will need to develop a process solution promptly.

  September 2, 2008

NEFA Foundation Report: "Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell: Aabid Khan et al." (Operation Praline)

By Evan Kohlmann

aabidkhan.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has published a new report that I have written, titled "Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell." The report focuses on the recent criminal trial of Aabid Hussain Khan at the Blackfriars Crown Court in London, as told through the actual evidence seized by U.K. authorities and the detailed testimony of Khan himself. According to Karen Jones, the reviewing lawyer in the case from the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service, "The evidence showed Khan was a committed and active supporter of Al-Qaida ideology… He preyed on vulnerable young people and turned them into recruits to his cause, using internet chat to lure them in then incite them to fight. He arranged their Pakistan for terrorism training, and talked about a 'worldwide battle.'"

During an online chat session with co-conspirators, Khan boasted of his desire “to take out” as many people as possible, even innocent civilians: “attacks are permissable through out this world, so the world a battlefield in my vision, everything, almost, is a target… so if you can find a big target and take it out, say like a military base in uk, then alhamdulillaah.” In another similar conversation, Khan confessed, “you dont know how much fury i have towards these american dogs.” Khan was remarkably forthright in laying out his larger plan: “what i want to do is cause trouble for kuffar [infidels] by hit and runs[,] everywhere[,] cause fear and panic in their countries[,] make them nervous so they make mistakes… insha’allaah commando training. i was all ready[sic] reported to the airport and police by my parents… [but it is] too late, the terrorists have brainwashed us.” When Khan insisted to another prospective cell member “our duty is to cause damage to the kuffar [infidels] in each and every place possible”, the recruit joked that Khan might not be patient enough to actually reach his chosen target: “the way u talk it seems like ur planning out a fidayee [suicide commando] attack on the plane lol.” Grinning, Khan responded, “if it does not come to that, then we wont insha’allaah.”

The 21-page report includes an additional 3-page Appendix with highlights from the evidence seized from Khan--including still images from reconnaissance videos allegedly filmed by Atlanta, Georgia residents Ehsanul Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed; and, from a video Khan himself recorded in July 2006 in a remote region of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Aafia Siddiqui Indicted For Charges Including Attempted Murder and Assault

By Andrew Cochran

Aafia Siddiqui has been indicted by a federal grand jury in New York City and will appear in court on Thursday in connection with this new indictment, which you can download from here. She is charged with: (1) one count of attempting to kill United States nationals outside the United States; (2) one count of attempting to kill United States officers and employees; (3) one count of armed assault of United States officers and employees; (4) one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and (5) three counts of assault of United States officers and employees.

The DOJ press release and the indictment provide details of the incident in question:

"On July 18, 2008, a team of United States servicemen and law enforcement officers, and others assisting them, attempted to interview Aafia Siddiqui in Ghazni, Afghanistan, where she had been detained by local police the day before. The United States interview team included, among others: three officers and employees of the United States Army; two officers and employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and two United States Army contract interpreters.

The interview of Siddiqui was to take place at an Afghan police compound in Ghazni. In a second-floor meeting room at the compound -- where Siddiqui was being held, unbeknownst to the United States interview team, unsecured, behind a curtain -- Siddiqui obtained one of the United States Army officer’s M-4 rifle and attempted to fire it, and did fire it, at another United States Army officer and other members of United States interview team. Siddiqui repeatedly stated her intent and desire to kill Americans.

Siddiqui then assaulted one of the United States Army interpreters, as he attempted to obtain the M-4 rifle from her. Siddiqui subsequently assaulted one of the FBI agents and one of the United States Army officers, as they attempted to subdue her."

The indictment supercedes the criminal complaint filed against Siddiqui in August; a copy of that is available on the NEFA Foundation website. The indictment also cites written notes and computer files taken from Siddiqui when she was captured. For instance, handwritten notes referred to a "mass casualty attack" and listed locations in the U.S., including Plum Island, the Empire State Building, the Statue of Liberty, Wall Street, and the Brooklyn Bridge. Other notes referred to the construction of "dirty bombs" and chemical and biological weapons, and discussed using reconnaissance drones, underwater bombs, and gliders. Her computer thumb drive contained correspondence referring to "cells," "attacks" by certain "cells," and "enemies."

Siddiqui is also believed to have been in Liberia receiving al Qaeda diamonds in 2001. Douglas Farah wrote recently that "a woman had arrived to collect diamonds from al Qaeda operatives in Monrovia, and had returned, with two men, to Karachi, Pakistan, and then moved on to Quetta, where police and intelligence lost her trace. It was not clear to me at the time of the reporting that the woman was Siddiqui. Perhaps the New York trial will help clarify the issue."

The Urgent Need for a Broader Counterinsurgency Approach in the FATA

By Jonathan Winer

Asif Ali Zardari, imminently to become Pakistan’s President, faces a resurgent Taliban, ongoing terrorist attacks and a fractured political environment which makes effective responses all the harder. President Pervez Musharraf’s resignation as President on August 18 could have provided an opportunity for a coalition government to take charge on security issues. But the withdrawal on August 25 of Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) from the coalition has left Zardari’s Pakistan People's Party (PPP) weakened. Immediate political challenges include the Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami’s efforts to have the PML-N to join its All Pakistan Democratic Movement in opposition to the secularist PPP, making it all the harder for the PPP government to take the aggressive military steps needs to combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda where they are operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and South Waziristan.

Located along Pakistan's northwestern border with Afghanistan, FATA consists of seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions with more than 3 million people. The FATA continues to be administered by Pakistan along an administrative scheme developed more than a century ago by the Colonial British. The people of the FATA have limited civil rights, and even more limited social services, with high poverty, high unemployment, low literacy, and an infrastructure that could charitably be called underdeveloped. Many areas remain barely subject to Pakistani rule, providing territory for criminals as well as extremists. The porous border is a narcotics smuggler’s paradise, exploited by the Taliban among others. It is also among the world's primary terrorist safe-havens, despite ongoing U.S.-Pakistani military efforts there, and the center of cross-border Taliban and al-Qaeda destabilization efforts in Afghanistan.

In the best of times, any civilian leader would have his hands full trying to gain control of the FATA, as well as of Pakistan’ two strongest institutions, the Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), both of whom have long-standing ties to extremist groups, including the Taliban, recurrent involvement in drug trafficking, and well-documented histories of corruption.

But these are among the worst of times in Pakistan. Hostilities between Pakistan’s security institutions and the Taliban are intensifying. On August 25, Pakistan banned Pakistan’s most important Taliban organization, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), based in South Waziristan. The government froze its bank accounts and assets, and announced rewards for the arrest of its leaders. This move was prompted after serious assaults by militants on Pakistani governmental installations and officials. These included a bloody suicide assault on a government arms factory located in Wah, just 18 miles from Islamabad, which killed an estimated 100 Pakistani civilians, a bombing of a senior police official in Karachi, and an attack on a container truck carrying two armored personal carriers out of Karachi port leaving for a mission with NATO in Afghanistan. In the same period, Taliban militants operating in Peshawar blew up homes of a senior local official of the Awami National Party, as well as a college for women operated by the government.

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Navy SEAL From Supersecret Unit Falls in Afghan War

By James Gordon Meek

(UPDATED) There were two unrelated developments today in Afghanistan, but each open the door a crack on highly secret aspects of the nearly seven-year-old war.

The first was the Defense Department announcement that Navy SEAL Petty Officer 1st Class Joshua Thomas Harris, 36, of Lexington, N.C., was killed last week during an Afghanistan combat operation.

"Harris was temporarily forward deployed from his assignment at Naval Special Warfare Development Group, Dam Neck, Va.," the Pentagon said in a statement released late Monday night.

The Development Group, also known as "DEVGRU," may seem like a peculiar name for one of the military's most secret counterterror units. Formerly called SEAL Team 6, the unit is charged with carrying out many of the nation's most classified missions, such as top tier kill-or-capture missions targeting senior Al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and other exotic destinations.

A Navy statement said Harris, who had received the Bronze Star with Combat "V" device and other decorations in multiple Afghan and Iraq tours, "drowned after being swept away by turbulent waters while conducting a river crossing during combat operations in Afghanistan."

"Josh was clearly one of the best of the best. He was just an incredible guy," Navy Cmdr. Kent Paro, who commanded Harris when he was in SEAL Team 10, told me tonight.

Harris had a master’s degree but chose to be an enlisted seaman, Paro said.

"He was humble, quiet and extremely capable," he recalled. "He was a junior guy but we gave him a lot of responsibility. He was the kind of guy you'd want your sister to marry."

Another informed source said Harris's grieving family will be supported by the Naval Special Warfare Foundation, which accepts public donations.

In an unrelated story, the U.S. military command in the wartorn country reported this morning on a probe into claims of civilian deaths, which they said had been exaggerated. But the statement from Bagram Airfield revealed some interesting details of enemy spycraft and their surveillance of an American firebase they planned to strike near Heart, close to the Afghan-Iran border.

Investigators collected evidence that "included weapons, explosives, intelligence materials, and an access badge to a nearby base as well as photographs from inside and outside of the base."

Mashal to Leave Damascus? Not Likely.

By David Schenker

Haaretz reported this morning that Hamas politburo head Khalid Mashal is leaving Damascus to take up residence in Sudan. The left-leaning Israeli paper picked up the story from the Kuwaiti daily Al Rai’. Mashal last visited Sudan in early August, where he met with President Omar Bashir.

According to Haaretz, “Israeli sources believe that the move signals a serious desire on Syria’s part to advance the negotiations.”

Meanwhile, reports of Mashal’s imminent departure come the same day as Yoram Turbowitz—Israeli PM Ehud Olmert’s chief of staff and the chief negotiator in the Turkish brokered Israeli-Syrian “negotiations”—announced his resignation.

Hamas today denied that Mashal would be relocating to Sudan. In a press statement issued from Damascus, portions of which appeared on the Hamas website, the organization “call[ed] on the media to strive for the truth in its news.”

  September 1, 2008

Radicals Continue Pressure on Ahmadiyah in Indonesia

By Kenneth Conboy

Due to pressure from radical Islamic groups, the South Sumatra provincial government officially banned the Ahmadiyah sect on 1 September. They are the second province after West Sumatra to impose such a ban.

Earlier, several hard-line Muslim organizations under the Islamic People's Forum, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Islamic Defender's Front, and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council, demanded the dissolution of Ahmadiyah due to its heretical teachings that its founder, Ghulam Ahmad, was a prophet after Mohammad.

The South Sumatra ban is set to affect an estimated 600 Ahmadiyah followers. There are nine Ahmadiyah mosques in the province.

Monday's ban is yet the latest in a series of government decisions seen as appeasing Muslim radicals ahead of next year's national elections. One of the most glaring waffles has been the continued delays in carrying out the death sentence against three of the masterminds behind the 2002 Bali bombings. The bombers have lost all of their legal appeals, and the government had earlier stated that the three would face a firing squad before the onset of this year's Ramadhan. But as the fasting month started yesterday, this window has obviously been missed, leaving many to wonder whether the current Indonesian administration does not want to risk being perceived as bowing to Western pressure ahead of their 2009 polls.

Iran’s Fantasy: A Renewed Cold War between "Infidels" Russia and America

By Walid Phares

Following is a short commentary I wrote about the Iranian regime strategic opportunity to dodge the international sanctions and the rise of its own opposition, seized through the ongoing tensions between the Russian Federation and NATO. The main point in this article is the Khomeinist Strategic thinking as it pushes hard to widen these international tentions and take advantage of the possibilities of a return of a kind of a Cold war. Evidently Counter Terrorism experts in the US and across the Atlantic have different views on the crisis with Russia and how to address it. But in view of the opportunity given to Iran and other Jihadists, the new East-West tensions may have to be addressed with this reality in mind. Following is my commentary, initially posted in the Cutting Edge News today

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A Hidden Grain of Truth That Should Resonate

By Douglas Farah

The Los Angeles Times has an interesting feature on the late Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah and his rather mysterious death on Feb. 12 in Damascus.

Mughniyah, of course, was one of the true pioneers in the use of terrorist tactics by radical Islamists against the West. Among the interesting details the report has is that, on the night his car blew up, incinerating him inside, Mughniyah was on his way to meet Syrian president Bashar Assad.

But there was one Mughniyah quote buried deep in the story that I thought was perhaps the most important in looking at what Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are up to. This should particularly resonate for those looking at Hezbollah in Latin America.

In an interview that he gave just before his death, and which was published afterward, Mughniyah was quoted as saying the following:

"The Americans are making up stories about me and hold me responsible for a lot of attacks against them that happened around the world," he told Ibrahim al-Amine of Lebanon's Al-Akhbar. "Sometimes they think of me as if I have the key to the universe. It is difficult for them to understand that I am part of an institution that patiently plans and designs its moves." My full blog is here.