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Updated September 2008
Introduction
A recipient of substantial U.S. military aid, Egypt does not appear to be aggressively pursuing nonconventional weapons capabilities at this time. Nonetheless, it is one of the few countries that has used chemical weapons in warfare (Yemen Civil War, 1963-1967) and is suspected of maintaining a chemical warfare (CW) capability, as well as a moderately advanced missile program. Cairo has been a leader in promoting a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East and the strongest critic of Israel's nuclear weapons program, linking its refusal to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to Israel's nonparticipation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
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Nuclear
Egypt's efforts to develop nuclear technology likely began in the late 1950s. The program is housed at the Inshas Nuclear Research Center, 40 km outside of Cairo. Inshas hosts a Soviet-supplied 2 MW research reactor that went critical in 1961, and an Argentine-supplied 22 MW light water research reactor that went critical in 1997. Cairo has long expressed the desire to import power-generation reactors, but thus far these efforts have proven unsuccessful. In the 1970s, there was apparently a debate within Egypt about pursuing a weapons capability and, as part of that effort, developing an independent fuel cycle. However, it appears that no serious work was done towards these ends. In 1981, Egypt acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, one year later, began implementing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards. Egypt has been a vocal critic of the NPT—beginning notably at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference—and has supported a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, citing Israel's non-ascension to the NPT as an obstacle to this process.
Biological
There is very limited open-source information indicating that Egypt is pursuing a biological weapons (BW) program. The country acceded to the Geneva Protocol on December 6, 1928 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on April 10, 1972. Most assessments by security experts indicate that while Egypt has a strong technical base in applied microbiology, it lacks the necessary infrastructure for developing or producing BW. Furthermore, there is no corroborated open-source evidence of any organized BW-related research activity. There have, however, been some allegations by Israel that Egypt is conducting research to develop anthrax and plague bacteria, botulinum toxin, and Rift Valley fever virus for military purposes. The Egyptian government strongly denies these accusations.
Excerpts from the Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism Listserv
Chemical
Egypt is one of a limited number of countries known to have employed chemical weapons against its enemies since the end of the First World War. Despite this history of use and contemporary concerns regarding the possession and proliferation of chemical weapons there is relatively little open-source information concerning Egypt's chemical warfare (CW) programs. There is strong evidence that during their intervention in the Yemen Civil War (1963-1967) Egyptian forces employed bombs and artillery shells filled with phosgene and mustard against the Royalist troops and civilians in North Yemen. Claims that Egyptian forces also used nerve agent in the Yemen conflict are less well substantiated. There is also some evidence pointing to Egyptian cooperation on CW issues with Syria in the 1970s and Iraq in the 1980s. However, there is relatively little evidence of ongoing Egyptian offensive CW efforts since the late 1970s. A further consideration is the close alliance between the United States and Egypt since the 1980s which may be seen as reducing Egypt's freedom of action in respect of CW.
Egypt appears to have inherited stocks of phosgene and mustard agents left behind by British forces when their occupation of Egypt ended in 1954. Egypt definitely received defensive CW assistance from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and early 1970s and might have received support for an offensive CW program. Since the 1980s Egypt has received training in defensive CW from the United States. Egypt maintains a substantial defensive CW capability and produces personal protective equipment and decontamination equipment for domestic use and export. It is strongly suspected, though not firmly established, that since the early 1960s Egypt has expanded its CW capability to include domestic production of nerve agents and psychoactive chemicals. By the early 1970s Egypt was believed to possess stocks of mustard, tabun and sarin. Reports in the 1990s claimed that Egypt had begun the production of VX nerve agent. Egypt possesses a sufficiently advanced chemical and industrial infrastructure to allow it to pursue the production of chemical weapons and their associated delivery systems if it chose to do so. A suspected Egyptian CW facility is the Abu-Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides.
Egypt has been involved in at least two instances of chemical weapons related proliferation. The first case was the direct provision of weaponized agents in bombs and artillery shells to Syria prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur war. In the second instance Egypt was a conduit for the supply of precursor chemicals to Iraq's to Iraq's CW program in the early to mid 1980s. These chemicals were often obtained from European suppliers and then re-exported to Iraq. It is possible, though unconfirmed, that Egyptian personnel provided assistance to Iraqi forces in the development of tactics and doctrines for the use of chemical weapons. Egypt maintains commercial links with Syria and may supply Syria with many of its chemical needs thus directly or indirectly supporting that country's own chemical weapons program. Despite the widely held suspicion that it maintains an offensive CW program Egypt is still able to import the materials and equipment that it requires for the functioning of its chemical industries. Egypt is not subject to military or economic sanctions but is subject to some restrictions associated with the enforcement of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Egypt acceded to the Geneva Protocol on December 6, 1928, but remains outside the CWC. The Egyptian government publicly denies developing, acquiring, or producing CW but has indicated that it will not accede to the CWC until questions regarding Israel's nuclear weapons are satisfactorily addressed. In the 1990s Egypt undertook and increasingly ineffective campaign to discourage Arab states from signing, ratifying or acceding to the CWC. Since 2005 there have been a small number of contacts between the Egyptian government, or state-sponsored NGOs, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Although it is possible that these contacts reflect Egyptian consideration of a change in its policy towards the CWC, it is equally possible that they are of no real significance.
Excerpts from the Chemical and Biological Weapons Terrorism Listserv
Missile
Egypt's missile program began in earnest in the 1960s. With West German assistance, Egypt began developing three missile systems: al-Zafar (375-km range), al-Kahir (600-km range) and al-Raid (1,000-km range); however, with the withdrawal of West German assistance in 1966, these programs were abandoned. In the 1980s, Egypt aligned with Iraq and Argentina in an effort to develop a short-range, solid-fueled missile known in Argentina as Condor-II and in Iraq as Badr-2000 (the internal Egyptian designation is not known publicly). In 1989, Cairo ended the cooperative relationship with Baghdad, but it is likely that domestic-based efforts continue on this missile. Egypt has been more successful in its pursuit of Scud-B and perhaps Scud-C manufacturing capabilities. With the assistance of North Korea, Egypt was able to develop an indigenous Scud-B production capability, and there are reports that it has developed an enhanced Scud-C missile. In 2001, Egypt reportedly signed an agreement with North Korea to purchase its 1000km-range Nodong missile system. Egypt is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
