Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32nd Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the "Red Arrow's" 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32nd Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book.

This rapid advance was a blow to any remaining capability of the Japanese for a counteroffensive on Luzon. General Yamashita had assumed that he could hold the Santa Fe-Imugan position until the end of June. By that time he expected to develop defensive positions commanding Highway No. 5 in the Aritao area and beyond. These positions would protect Bagabac, a village important because it was at the junction of the highways on which Yamashita could shift his forces and supplies between Cagayan Valley and the mountain stronghold to the west in the vicinity of Bontoc.

Although it was estimated that the Japanese commander had at least 25,000 troops remaining in northern Luzon, the capture of Bagabac area kept him from uniting his forces, and made their defeat possible in detail.

To exploit the now favorable situation further, the 6th Infantry Division pushed one column forward on Highway No. 4 while another column moved west and southwest form Bambang. The 33rd Division also advanced against increased resistance on front. Philippine Guerrilla Forces, North Luzon, now under command of I Corps, cleared large areas in the northwest part of the island.

On 21 June, the port of Aparri at the north end of the Cagayan Valley was captured by guerrillas and Rangers. And on the 23rd, paratroops from the 11th Airborne Division dropped near Aparri, moved southward, and made contact with the 37th Division. By 30 June, Cagayan Valley was under American control but not yet cleared of enemy troops.

The 6th and 33rd Divisions had by that time made considerable progress in closing in on the enemy’s mountain positions to the west of Cagayan Valley.

When the 32nd Division came back into the combat picture its principal mission was to eliminate the remaining Japanese troops in its zone of action. Three divisions-the 6th, 32nd, and 37th-were now available, with the help of the guerrilla forces, to clean up northern Luzon under the orders of the commanding general, XIV Corps.

It is impossible to arrive at precise figures as to the effective strength of the remaining Japanese troops in northern Luzon at this time. General Eichelberger says that after the official Japanese capitulation General Yamashita came out of the “Mountain wilderness to the northeast of Baguio” and surrendered 40,000 well disciplined troops.

The 32nd took over an area extending clear across the island. It included Highway No. 5, from Bagabac to a point considerably to the south of Balete Pass, the Villa Verde Trail area, and all of the Baguio area. The 6th and 37th Divisions plus Philippine Guerrilla Forces, North Luzon, continued to operate in zones north of that of the 32nd.

On 28 June, G2 estimated that there were 1,500 to 1,800 Japanese in the Division’s zone of action. These were believed to be concentrated in three sectors: in the mountains northeast of Baguio, west and southwest of Bagabac, and southeast of Aritao. There was the possibility of movement into the Division’s zone of some of the 12,000 Japanese troops estimated to be farther to the north in the mountains of northwest Luzon, and of some of the 14,000 enemy troops believed to be in the northern Cagayan Valley and the mountains to the east of it.

To the 127th RCT went the job of taking over the whole western part of the Division zone. The 127th had been short its Company G and one platoon of 81mm mortars from Company H since 2 June when those units left to join the Volckmann guerrilla force operating in the northern Cagayan Valley. Company G and the mortar platoon were now returned to the 127th, but Company F was detached on 27 June and sent to join the guerrilla forces operating in the vicinity of Cervantes to the northwest of the Division’s area. The 127th RCT relieved the remaining 33rd Division troops in the Baguio area.

The 126th RCT which had passed to control of the 25th Infantry Division in the latter part of May had not included the 120th Field Artillery Battalion, normally part of the RCT. The 120th had been left in the Villa Verde Trail part of the operation, furnishing direct support to the 1st BN of the Buena Vista Regiment. Early in June the 120th had been withdrawn from combat along with all the other units of Division Artillery, but on 26 June it moved to the vicinity of Aritao and was attached to the 126th Infantry to complete the combat team. The 126th RCT took over the southeast area of the Division’s zone. Its missions included keeping Highway No. 5 open in its zone.

The 128th Infantry, with the 129th FA BN and other units attached, was assigned the northeast part of the Division’s zone. Its missions also included keeping Highway No. 5 open in its zone.

The Division CP was established at Anabat on Highway No. 5 south of Balete Pass.

The orders for each of the regimental combat teams included instructions to “patrol vigorously” and to “destroy all enemy encountered.”

The Division’s entire area was wild, rough country. Heavy rains fell often, to make washouts and landslides which blocked the few roads. The official announcement that the Luzon campaign was over was justified in terms of control of major cities, ports and airfields. But to the Red Arrow men trying to “mop up” it was a long way from ended. Although the enemy was disorganized, and suffering from shortage of ammunition and food, and in a hopeless situation, he was nevertheless still capable of fanatical resistance when cornered. This willingness to fight to the death is proved by the Division’s report at the end of the mopping up period: Only some 200 Japanese taken prisoners, but over 2,800 killed.

The Division’s G2 reports for 31 July give a rather typical picture of the Japanese resistance as it was in northern Luzon on that day. The General Summary of Enemy Information issued by CPT Carl K. Bomberger, acting G2, records the reports received from the areas outside the Division’s zone during the last 24 hours. In the 6th Division’s area, its 1st Infantry Regiment had secured a ridge west of Kiangan, killing 30 Japanese. The enemy had staged a strong counterattack which was repulsed, but 37 more Japanese were killed in this encounter. Another infantry regiment of the same Division had received five enemy night attacks. In another action, elements of the 6th Division had killed 20 enemy while capturing a hill. The 37th Division and the guerrilla forces reported several patrol contacts, but no serious engagement.

The 32nd Division’s activities were covered by the G2 periodic report. A total of 44 Japanese had been killed and 22 captured in patrol contacts throughout the Division’s zone of action during the 24 hour period ended at 1500 on 31 July. The 126th Infantry, in the Division’s southeast area, had conducted routine patrolling without finding any enemy. The 128th, in the northeast area, reported four firefights resulting in enemy deaths or capture. The 127th, covering the western part of the Division’s zone, also had several skirmishes. In giving the details of one of these actions in which four Japanese were killed, the report states, “The Japs were unarmed and in poor condition.” The not unnatural reaction that a report such as this indicates ruthless and unnecessary slaughter must be balanced against the conditions that actually existed. Most of the enemy groups met with were armed, and resisted fiercely. Some groups had insufficient arms and ammunition for all, but nevertheless fought vigorously. Finally, and probably most important, the American doughboy had learned from hard experience that his enemies were capable of treachery, not only in the ordinary meaning of the term, but in suicidal use of hand grenades at the moment of capture.

The weather report for the periods records the poor visibility and scattered showers typical of this part of Luzon.

An annex of 21 pages and a map contains some reports on translations of captured documents and on interrogations of prisoners by the 171st Language Detachment, commanded by Lt. R. B. Gage. One of the interrogations is of particular interest both as a human document and as a commentary of the Formosans whose position in the Chinese situation later became so important after the Communist victory on the mainland.

The prisoner, a 29-year-old surgeon in the employ of the Japanese Navy, had surrendered, along with 5 Formosan medical assistants. All were unarmed and in good physical condition. The doctor is described in the report as unusually well educated, “of educated parents,” and the third generation of surgeons in his family. He was hired under pressure by the Japanese Navy on a civilian basis. After answering many questions about Japanese medical methods and conditions, he was asked to write in English a short commentary on the Formosan’s position in the war. “He was,” says the report, “left alone for hours.” The result, in part, follows:

     All of the Formosans have stronger resistance than Japs towards tropical diseases, like malaria, dysentery and other infectious diseases. This is the only reason that Japs need Formosans, when he fight in south-island. So all youth of Formosans are forced to build airfields at New Guinea, New Britain, and Philippine Islands where are bad condition for human healthy.
     Under which condition they work? I must say he next by, under very poor supply. One suit cloth and two gumi shoes a year, and above all they eat only rice with salt – and in spite of working hard day and night – Japs treat them very crully. When anybody of Formosans has a mistake Japs strike him bitterly and sometimes to dead. So all of Formosans don’t like Japs because of cruelity and unhumanity, and if he has any chance to get gun, perhaps he will kill him. All of the Formosans want to surrender, but they have no chance, because of being watched strictly by Japs and above all are afraid of being shot by Filipinos and guerrillas. So if America stop Filipino to shot them, maybe, some Formosans come down from mountain to surrender.

July and early August of 1945 was a confused period for the Red Arrow men. They were not under the same pressure as they had been at Buna, Aitape, Leyte or on the Villa Verde Trail. Many expected to be able to go home soon; others supposed that they would soon be engaged in a major assault on the Japanese homeland. In the meantime, aggressive patrolling and the destruction of enemy troops had to be kept up.

The Red Arrow News for 6 August 1945 reflected the situation. The lead story was the official offer of the Division commander to grant a 45-day furlough to the States to any man who captured a Japanese general. “Incidentally,” the story concluded, “the captured general must be in suitable condition for questioning.”

There were accounts of bombings of Japanese cities, installations, and shipping, but, of course, no mention of the atomic bomb which was being dropped on Hiroshima at the time that the news sheet was being distributed.

PFC Manuel Perez Garcia, of the 126th Infantry, “Cuban-borne Jap killer,” was saluted in a neat little account of how the Red Arrow News reporter had gone to the hospital to interview this 37 year old soldier who had been credited with killing and capturing 83 Japanese and also with being a model soldier. It turned out that the exemplary doughboy was AWOL, but only from the hospital. He was back with his outfit, and out on a 6-day patrol.

The editor put a rather bitter headline over a story from Washington announcing that President Truman had authorized medals for Selective Service personnel: “Your Draft Board Does It Again ! ! ! Will Get Medals Soon.”

The return of some amenities to Division routine was indicated by the listing of movies in five areas, and by the announcement that, rather more surprisingly, “a series of weekly recorded concerts of classical music has been arranged for all men of this Division.”

The first atomic bomb was being dropped on the Japanese homeland as this issue of the Red Arrow News was being distributed to the men of the Division. On 9 August a second bomb was dropped, this time on Nagasaki. The next day the Japanese government sued for peace.

On 15 August 1945, the Division received orders to discontinue aggressive action. Peace had officially come, but it was not yet an actuality in northern Luzon. In spite of radio broadcasts and dropped leaflets, some Japanese units either remained in ignorance of the end of the war or were unwilling to accept the news, and some 32nd Division patrols were fired on and some positions attacked.

In its issue of 10 November 1945, The Saturday Evening Post featured a well-written and well-illustrated article by Technician Fourth Grade Charles P. Murdock. It was titled “The Red Arrow Pierced Every Line,” and told for the first time the story of the 32nd Division’s “unique fighting record from Buna to Luzon.” The first few paragraphs give a good picture of the situation in the Division immediately after VJ-day.

     The walkie-talkie said, “The war’s over.” The grimy sergeant from A Company flicked the butterfly on the mike and said, “Yeah, all over these damned mountains.”
     It was the morning of August 15, 1945. For the book, it was the 32nd Division’s 654th – and last – day of combat in World War II. But not for the men of A Company. Part of the company had just beaten off a banzai charge. One dough was dead and two were wounded. The platoon was cut off. Back through the mountains at B Company, eleven miles by trail, 1LT Troy Ricks, one-time basketball star from Boonville, Mississippi, said, somewhat grimly, “There’s no celebrating here. This is the Thirty-second. We always fight after the campaigns are over,” which made him somewhat of a prophet.
    Less than eighteen hours later, A Company was hit by another banzai. Another dough was killed and seven were wounded.
     Back at the divisional public-relations office, CPT William A. Fleischer, of New York City, said, “That’s the Thirty-second – first to start fighting, last to finish.”
     Sgt. Marion Hargrove, of YANK, up to cover the 32nd’s “reaction” to the end of the war, jotted down some notes.
     He’d just come from talking to some doughs who had started it out almost three full years before by hiking over the Owen Stanley Mountains from Port Moresby to Buna.
     A T/5 rolled a piece of paper into the typewriter and started writing: WITH THE 32ND INFANTRY DIVISION IN NORTHERN LUZON, AUG. 15 – MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM H. GILL, COMMANDER OF THE 32ND (RED ARROW) INFANTRY DIVISION SAID, “I DOUBT IF ANYONE, ANYWHERE, IS MORE PROFOUNDLY MOVED BY THIS NEWS THAN THE MEN OF THIS DIVISION, WHO HAVE FOUGHT SO HARD, SUFFERED SO MUCH AND WAITED SO LONG FOR THIS MOMENT.”
     Thirty miles farther up the Cagayan Valley the Japs apparently hadn’t got the word.

On 20 August, a Luzon Area Command was activated to assume tactical control of the remaining operations on the island of Luzon. The new headquarters was organized with Major General Robert S. Beightler, the commander of the 37th Infantry Division, in command. This change was made in order to release the XIV Corps headquarters which was scheduled for occupation duties in Japan. The 32nd Division was also scheduled for early relief for the same reason.

Before the changes were well under way, and American pilot who had parachuted to earth behind the Japanese lines from his disabled plane, been captured, and taken to Yamashita’s headquarters, was released, after VJ-day, and came into the American lines with a message from Yamashita explaining the circumstances of his capture and commending him for his devotion to duty in refusing to answer questions during the lengthy interrogation.

General Gill had the pilot, flying an L-5 Liaison plane, drop a message and ground panels in the vicinity of Yamashita’s headquarters. The message instructed Yamashita to put out the panels if he was ready to make arrangements for surrender. The next day, another pilot found the panels staked out according to instructions. He dropped a message suggesting that Yamashita send a representative to the U.S. lines.

On 26 August, late in the afternoon, a Japanese captain, accompanied by a small party of enlisted men, delivered a message to an outpost of the 3rd BN, 128th Infantry, in the vicinity of Kiangan. It was Yamashita’s answer:

Sir:
    1. I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication addressed to me, dropped by your airplane on August 24th as well as your papers dropped on August 25th in response to our ground signal.
     2. I am taking this opportunity to convey to you that order from Imperial Headquarters pertaining to cessation of hostilities was duly received by me on August 20th and that I have immediately issued orders to cease hostilities to all units under my command insofar as communications were possible. I also wish to add at this point the expression of my heartfelt gratitude to you, fully cognizant of the sincere efforts and deep concern you have continuously shown with reference to cessation of hostilities as evidenced by the various steps and measures taken in this connection. To date of writing, however, I have failed to receive order from Imperial Headquarters authorizing me to enter into direct negotiations here in the Philippines with the United States Army concerning the carrying out of the order for the cessation of hostilities, but I am of the fond belief that upon receipt of this order, negotiations can be immediately entered into. Presenting my compliments and thanking you for your courteous letter, I remain, yours respectfully,

General Gill promptly relayed Yamashita’s message to the commanding general, Luzon Area Command, and replied directly to General Yamashita:

General Yamashita, Tomoyuki
Highest Commander of the
        Imperial Japanese Army
        in the Philippines

General Yamashita:

     1. Your courier contacted my forces in the vicinity of Kiangan at 1701, 25 August, and delivered your excellent message and map with the proposed patrol route change. I now have these two documents before me and hereby acknowledge receipt of them.
     2. It is most regrettable that you have not yet received authority to enter into direct negotiations with the United States Army. It is disheartening to learn that your men must continue to suffer privations of food and medicine. I have the authority to negotiate surrender terms directly with your headquarters, and will supply food and administer medical care to all members of the Imperial Japanese Forces who surrender to my Command. It is my wish that this take place with the least possible delay.
     3. In order to make adequate preparations for the proper care of your forces after they surrender, it is desired that you furnish me with the approximate number of officers, men and nurses who will come under my care.
     4. In order to continue the best possible liaison, your courier is returning to your headquarters today with a radio and with instructions that the new patrol route proposed by you is satisfactory. I have instructed my forces to remain at Kiangan and be prepared to meet any representatives which you may dispatch to that point. Each day (weather permitting) a liaison plane equipped with a radio and adjusted to the proper frequency will fly over your area and effect radio contact with your headquarters. It is my desire that all transmissions be in English.
     5. Your message states that due to communication difficulties some units of your command may not be aware of the cessations of hostilities. It is, therefore, desired that you prepare letters addressed to the commanders of these units advising them to cease hostilities. If you will deliver these letters by messenger to my forces at Kiangan with instructions as to where they are to be delivered, I will see that the messages reach the designated commanders.

A tragedy of particular poignancy for the veterans of the 32nd’s long series of campaigns from Papua to Luzon was the death of COL Merle H. Howe in an airplane accident. In the Saturday Evening Post article previously referred to, COL Howe was called “a sort of living symbol of what the Division had been through.” General Eichelberger, in his book, makes several highly complimentary references to COL Howe: “a stalwart fighting man,” “the driving leader who helped make the Buna victory possible,” and “I never knew of a more determined or more courageous fighter.” The former Grand Rapids school teacher and longtime National Guard officer was 49 years old when he died at the moment of victory.

COL Howe, commander of the 128th Infantry at the time of his death, had served with distinction throughout World War II with the 32nd Infantry Division. The only commanding officer who commanded the 126th, 127th and 128th Regimental Combat Teams in various campaigns against the Japanese Imperial Forces. Inducted into service October 15, 1940 as Captain of Company K, 126th Infantry, Grand Rapids, Michigan. He was killed in an airplane accident while communicating with the Supreme General of the Japanese Imperial Forces, Tomoyuki Yamashita during the negotiation for surrender of all Japanese Forces in the Philippine Islands.

Yamashita reported the details of the accident to General Gill:

Sir:

     It is with extreme regret that I inform you that your liaison plane dispatched on the afternoon of August 30, for the purpose of communication with my headquarters crashed in the vicinity of the Third Rest House. The plane dropped one communication tube and was circling once more to drop another communication when it crashed at 1534 o’clock. The cause of the unfortunate accident is believed to be engine trouble.
     Of the crew, Col. Merle H. Howe died instantly while Lt. Edgar T. Irvine was injured. The latter’s injury consists of bruises on his right forehead, left lower lip and the right side of the back of his head. His injury is not believed serious.
     We immediately sent medical officers to the scene of the accident to treat the injured, to take proper care of the dead and to preserve the scene of the accident. Please rest assured that every possible step has been taken.
     In the above manner, Col. Howe died in the line of duty. In view of the unchanging zeal and friendship, from start to finish, with which the late Col. Howe served and distinguished himself in the present negotiations between the Japanese and United States Armies, I, on behalf of the entire Imperial Japanese Army and myself, express our deepest condolence.
     At the same time, the injured pilot has my deepest sympathy and I have ordered my subordinates to take every step in the treatment of his injury. From the bottom of my heart, I pray for his early recovery and hope that he will be able to return to his post at the earliest possible date.
     I, hereby, hurriedly inform you of the gist of the unfortunate accident and at the same time express my sincerest condolence.

On the morning of 2 September 1945 General Yamashita, accompanied by a small staff, surrendered himself to the 32nd Infantry Division. He was met by a detachment commanded by Lt. Russell Bauman, from CPT Roy A. Glisson’s Company I, 128th Infantry. Appropriately, Lt. Bauman was from Wisconsin. At Company I’s CP, COL Ernest A. Barlow, the Division chief of staff, and LTC Alex J. Robinet, commander of the 128th Infantry, were waiting to receive the prisoner. Missing from the ensuing formalities was the 32nd Division’s commander, General Gill, who had left for the States on leave August 30th after turning the Division over to Brigadier General Robert B. McBride Jr., commanding general of Division Artillery.

Arrangements had been made for Yamashita to formally surrender to Major General Robert S. Beightler of the 37th Infantry Division in the latter’s new capacity as commanding general of Luzon Area Command. Yamashita, who had been carried in a sedan chair part of the time, was transferred to a jeep and, at about 1100, arrived at a point near Kiangan where the area commander was waiting. General Beightler, in his account of the meeting, says: “As he walked toward me, he proferred his hand. I refused to shake hands; he then stepped back, saluted, and bowed.”

“I was sorry,” says General Eichelberger in his book, “that General Griswold who, had directed XIV Corps operations could not be there to accept Yamashita’s sword. But it was entirely fitting that the 32nd Division should receive the vanquished enemy. Three years before at Buna they had won the battle that started the infantry on the jungle road to Tokyo.”

Yamashita was then flown to Baguio where formal surrender ceremonies were held the next day. In the presence of Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, who had been forced to surrender his forces on Corregidor in May of 1942, and Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Percival of the British, who had surrendered to Yamashita at Singapore in February of the same year, Yamashita signed the instrument of surrender for the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippine Islands.

Yamashita was later tried by a military commission on charges that he violated the laws of war. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and hanged 23 February 1946.

One of his defense counsel, A. Frank Reel, in a bitter book, The Case of General Yamashita, charged that America’s action in Yamashita’s case was “Unjust, hypocritical, and vindictive.” Whatever history’s verdict may be about Yamashita’s conduct, in the moral sense, as a military commander, there is little question but that he was one of Japan’s outstanding military leaders. This fact gives particular value to the statement made by him during the long interrogation conducted by Sixth Army officers and included by General Krueger in his summary of the results of the questioning: “General Yamashita indicated that he considered the 32nd Division the best his troops had encountered both on Leyte and on Luzon.”

While at the Command and General Staff College in April 1947, General Hill met Colonel White and obtained from him the following statement.

     “On or about 8 September 1945 in my capacity as Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, of the Sixth Army I supervised an interrogation of General Yamashita, the Japanese Commander in the Philippines.
     “At the end of the interrogation he was asked what U.S. troops he considered the best during the Leyte operation. He replied: ‘The 32nd Division.’ Questioned as to the best U.S. troops encountered during the Luzon Campaign, he replied: ‘Those troops encountered in the vicinity of Salacsac.’ This again was a direct reference to the 32nd Division in its arduous advance along the Villa Verde Trail towards Santa Fe.”

    The death of Colonel Merle H. Howe, Commanding Officer of the 128th Infantry Regiment, who was killed in action while participating in an aerial flight on 30 August 1945, is announced with deep regret.
    For many years Colonel Howe served his country with distinction. Enlisting as a private on 15 August 1917, he emerged from World War I as an Air Corps pilot with the rank of First Lieutenant. He completed more than a year of service in France during World War I.
    When the 32nd Infantry Division was re-activated in October 1940, Colonel Howe once again volunteered his services and was assigned to the 126th Infantry as Regimental S-3, and later rendered invaluable services as Division G-3 during the early stages of the Division’s overseas service in World War II. Serving successively as Commanding Officer of the 127th, 126th and 128th Infantry Regiments, he demonstrated exceptional ability and a devotion to duty which earned him the respect and admiration of officers and men throughout the entire Division.
In recognition of his great qualities of leadership and the manner in which he performed his duties during World War II, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service Cross, The Legion of Merit, The Silver Star, the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star, the Bronze Star Medal, the Air Medal, the Purple Heart, the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Purple Heart and the Combat Infantryman Badge.
    The memory of Colonel Howe’s valiant deeds, his unselfish faithful service and fine soldierly qualities will long live in the minds and hearts of the officers and men of the 32nd Infantry Division. His was an honorable and distinguished career and in his death the nation lost one of its finest citizens, the “Red Arrow” Division one of its most distinguished soldiers.

The rest of the Division was reassigned to Sixth Army on 7 September and assembled along the familiar shores of Lingayen Gulf. Scheduled to leave for Kyushu in early October the Division entered into a busy period of personnel changes, replacement and repair of equipment, drawing of supplies, and preparation for loading onto transports for the sea voyage to Kyushu.

Some of the changes experienced in the 121st FA BN during this period will give some idea of the difficult problems met by the Division. The battalion turned in its tractors and was re-equipped with M-4 prime movers to haul its 155mm howitzers. On 24 September, a new commander, LTC Clarence E. Seipel, was assigned and joined. (LTC John B. Taylor, who had been in command of the battalion during the Leyte and Luzon campaigns, had left the battalion late in August.) Between the 17th and 30th of September, the 121st received 222 replacements.

The integration of large numbers of replacements into a military unit is always difficult. With the stimulus of war ended, the Division had a major problem in the necessity of making new arrivals, who had not experienced combat with the Division, into Red Arrow men proud of themselves and their units.

One of the means adopted to build up Division spirit was the publication of a mimeographed summary of the Division’s accomplishments during the war. Perhaps some of the statements in it are subject, in the cold light of history, to qualifying phrases. On the other hand, later developments would permit increases in some of the figures. For example, eleven Medals of Honor were in the end won by Red Arrow men instead of the six listed. See 32nd Division in World War II Highlights for some of the information contained in the summary.

An interesting indication that some men of the Division had kept on working on the Army’s education courses in spite of the demands of combat operations is to be found in an item in Red Arrow News for 24 September 1945: “A small number of End-of-Course Tests has been received at Division I&E Office. They include: Radio for Beginners, Electricity for Beginners, Small Business Bookkeeping and Accounting, and Elementary Photography. Unit I&E Officers who need copies please advise Division I&E at once.”

On 20 September 1945, the Division took time out from its preparations for the move to Japan to dedicate a monument to those who had been killed in the Villa Verde Trail operation. The little two page mimeographed program had an outline drawing of the Red Arrow insignia on the first page along with this text:

DEDICATION CEREMONY  “To dedicate the 32nd Infantry Division Monument, erected by its members in memory of their comrades, those officers and men who made the supreme sacrifice along the Villa Verde Trail, January 30, 1945 – May 28, 1945.”

 Santa Maria, Pangasinan Province, Philippine Islands.

1151, 20 September 1945.

GENERAL’S MARCH                                                                                                       32nd Division Band.
INVOCATION                                                                                                            Chap. D. F. X. Shannon.
INTRODUCTION                                                                                         Brig. Gen. Robert B. McBride, Jr.
DEDICATION                                                                                           Major General Robert S. Beightler.
BENEDICITION                                                                                                          Chaplain W. E. Cooley.
VOLLEYS                                                                                                            Firing Party, 126th Infantry.
TAPS                                                                                                            T/4 I. Petraszewski, T/5 B. Guzik.
NATIONAL ANTHEM                                                                                                      32nd Division Band.
LUNCHEON                                                                                                                      1st Lt. A. G. Miros.

General Beightler concluded his dedicatory address with the words, “Men of the 32nd, you have performed nobly in this war.”

General Valdes, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, although not listed on the program, was present as the representative of President Osmena, and expressed the Commonwealth’s gratitude for the part the 32nd Division had played in the liberation of the Philippines.

Beginning with the movement of an advanced party on 9 October 1945, the Division moved out from Lingayen Gulf during the next few days. The trip was not without danger. Rough seas not only added to the normal discomfort of crowded transports but made more difficult the detection of floating mines.

The excellent little booklet on the history of the 32nd Division, published by the Division’s Public Relations Office in January of 1946, gives the picture of the arrival of the 32nd in Japan:

    On 14 October, the great convoy of 32 ships nosed slowly into the tortuous harbor of Sasebo, vast Japanese naval base, and dropped anchor before its final objective, Japan. Quickly, administrative details ashore were checked and then the 32nd moved inland and spread over its zone of occupation, some 9,000 square miles. Strange sounding names which had only been designations on maps assumed new meanings. The 128th Infantry and the 107th Medical Battalion moved into the Yamaguchi area. The 126th was dispatched to Kokura and Moji; Division Artillery headquartered at Oita; Division Headquarters, the 127th Infantry, and the 114th Engineers established themselves at Fukuoka, long famed as the seat of Japanese culture.
    The soldiers of the 32nd took stock of Japan. They found a rugged country, intensively cultivated, with excellent railways and miserable roads. In the cities, modern buildings sandwiched flimsy houses. Every available inch of land was gardened.
    The population stood wooden-faced, awaiting orders.

At the time of the surrender, the Japanese had, according to General Marshall, an army of two million men and a remaining air strength of 8,000 planes of all types, training and combat, still available to defend the homeland. The Emperor’s soldiers had amply proved their willingness to literally fight to the death. The surrender terms had farsightedly provided for the use of the prestige of the Emperor to insure the surrender and disarming of these forces, but there was always a chance of fanatical resistance, guerrilla activities, and concealment of arms and ammunition.

As one Division officer said, “The job was unquestionably preferable to the assault landing which we had expected to make as part of the planned Coronet operation in March of 1946, but in some respects it had more headaches.”

Basically, the job was to supervise the demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces in the Division’s area and to act as surveillance force, but the ramifications of the occupation missions were many and difficult. There were thousands of Koreans, Chinese and others to be repatriated – and controlled, fed, and given medical attention until they could be shipped out of Japan. On the other hand, there were thousands of Japanese who must be returned to their homes before conditions could be stabilized. The requirements of everyday living had, of course, been disrupted both by Allied air raids and by the wartime demands of the Japanese government. Something approaching normal standards of water supply, food distribution, sanitation, medical care, and police and fire services had to be reestablished. Agriculture and manufacture had to be encouraged to meet the needs of peacetime economy.

Some of the more immediate problems at the Sasebo Navy Yard and in the City of Sasebo had already been met by the 5th Marine Division which had begun to land in the area on 22 September. The 32nd Division had in fact “joined the Marines” – to some extent at least. Initially, it had been planned that a Marine amphibious corps consisting of the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions was to occupy Kyushu. “At the last moment,” in the words of one Marine unit’s history, the 32nd was substituted for the 3rd Marine Division in V Amphibious Corps, commanded by Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC.

The 5th Marine Division had met with no resistance in the Sasebo area, and the 2nd Marine Division also experienced nothing but willingness to cooperate on the part of Japanese officials and the civilian population in the Nagasaki area.

The 32nd Division gradually took over from some of these Marine units. The difficulties inherent in the occupation tasks were augumented, and efficiency in solving problems often reduced, by the continuing turnover of officers and noncoms as demobilization policies were applied. Most units were also below table of organization strengths. The 126th Infantry, for example, had on 1 December 1945 a strength of only 132 officers and 2,708 enlisted men in spite of the fact that it had received 327 replacements late in November.

The various Division services were also handicapped by shortages and rapid turnover of personnel. The Division finance officer’s staff, with a high percentage of inexperienced clerks and many payroll changes, was so hard hit that the Division’s first payday in Japan was delayed twenty days. More serious, for a time, was the acute shortage of medical officers. For a brief period there were only 23 doctors available for duty in the entire Division.

The near hysterical pressure in the States for rapid demobilization made orderly readjustments in units charged with occupation missions very difficult. The 32nd, during its time in Japan, was put to a test in matters of administration, discipline, and morale which was comparable in everything but physical hazard and hardship to the tests it had met in combat.

The fact that the 5th Marine Division was gradually withdrawn from all occupation duties during the period 23 November to 8 December in preparation for its return to the States increased the 32nd’s area of responsibility. Rather typical of changing requirements was the experience of the 121st FA BN. It was originally attached to the 128th Infantry, then to the 127th Infantry for about 2 weeks, the shifted to attachment to the 13th Marine Regiment of the 5th Marine Division for about 3 weeks, and then re-attached to the 127th. Incidentally, it also required a new commanding officer (LTC William M. Keane) during the period that these changes were taking place.

Some of the experiences of the 126th RCT in carrying out its occupation duties in northern Kyushu also typify the Division’s experiences in this trying duty. This combat team, commanded by COL Nicholas D. Woodward, and later by COL Gerald G. Epley, consisted for much of the occupation period of the 126th Infantry; the 129th FA BN; Company A, 114th Engineers; Company A, 107th Medical BN; 32nd Division MP Detachment; 95th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, a small section of the 37th Military Government Detachment, and a section of the 171st Language Detachment.

Foot and motor patrols were used to maintain surveillance of the RCT’s area of responsibility. Intelligence inspection teams investigated possible locations of concealed arms and munitions. Inventory and disposition teams were organized to evaluate captured stores and to inventory and, where appropriate, to destroy war materiel. Liaison was established with civilian officials and a Korean repatriation center in Tobata.

The regimental I&R Platoon of the 126th Infantry investigated all the islands in the RCT’s zone. “The patrol,” says the report of this operation, “discovered the islands had been a carefully planned antiaircraft network for the defense of northern Kyushu and southern Honshu (the main Japanese island to the north of Kyushu). Searchlights, generators, radar, AA gun batteries, command posts, dummy positions and radio stations were included in the net to provide both and antiaircraft warning system of the first magnitude and a deadly concentration of antiaircraft firepower.”

Many extensive defenses were, incidentally, well along in construction throughout Japan. Among the early discoveries of the 5th Marine Division were 150 swift, wooden suicide boats designed for use against invasion ships. Our troops were in complete agreement with the opinion that an invasion would have been costly.

Machine guns and small arms were uncovered at various places. Bomb dumps, ammunition works, arsenals and airfields gave up great quantities of arms and munitions.

Early in January 1946, a surprise raid was made on all shrines and temples in the 126th RCT’s area. These religious areas had generally been off limits to American troops, and it was believed desirable to check them. “The inspection,” says the 126th’s report, “disclosed the presence of sabers, bomb casings, artillery shells, airplane propellers and similar objects in many Shinto shrines. Quantities were too limited to be of military value, but the objects were considered significant because of their obvious symbolic meaning as related to State Shintoism.”

The 126th RCT found 109 military installations in its area. Most of the ammunition discovered was dumped into the sea, but the bulk of the war material was cut up by Japanese workmen under the supervision of U.S. Army personnel. The Yawata Steel and Iron Works, largest producer of steel in the Orient, was used to melt down much of the scrap. “In all,” reported the 126th, “more than 6,100 machine guns, 813 artillery and coastal guns, 3,826 mortars and grenade dischargers and 247 airplanes of various types were destroyed. This comprised the bulk of the 1,130,521 tons of scrap steel turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry.”

The 126th operated a repatriation center in Tobata capable of handling 2,000 persons at one time.

Housing for the troops was a continuing problem aggravated by several fires. Smallpox also broke out among the troops with some deaths, and a further handicapping of activities because of necessary quarantines.

Military training was continued to the maximum degree possible. In the 126th Infantry virtually every man in the command fired a record course with his basic weapon. Many men voluntarily took school courses in subjects which they felt would help them when they returned to civil life. In the 126th RCT a total of 186 men enlisted for the Regular Army between 1 December 1945 and 15 February 1946.

Throughout the Division, athletics were encouraged by every means possible. The 126th FA BN defeated the 2nd BN, 126th Infantry, in the final game of a hard fought Division basketball league.

On 31 December 1945, the 32nd was transferred to the control of General Eichelberger’s Eighth Army as one of the steps in the relief of Sixth Army from occupation responsibilities in anticipation of its inactivation.

In January 1946 the whole picture suddenly changed. The 32nd Infantry Division was to be inactivated in Japan. The Division began turning over its occupation duties to other units, mostly to the 2nd Marine Division, and concentrated on getting its equipment turned in, its records completed, and its men ready for transfer to other commands of for return to the States and civil life.

On 25 January General McBride represented the Division at ceremonies at Kyoto incident to the inactivation of Sixth Army, and the departure of General Krueger.

During February, these activities, plus recreational events, continued. On 28 February 1946 the Division was formally inactivated.

Back in the States, however, reorganization was soon in progress. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on 8 November 1946, Headquarters 32nd Infantry Division was again Federally recognized.

THE RED ARROW WAS AGAIN AN ACTIVE DIVISION.

Sources:

32nd Infantry Division - World War II
New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II
Papuan Campaign - The Buna/Sanananda Operation