To the Quakers, Bethlemites, Moderate Men, Refugees and other the Tories whatsoever, and wheresoever, dispersed. Peace.
I
(1)
entered into the American contest from a love of my fellow-creatures. Lamenting as a Philosopher the consequences of my conduct as a citizen, while I strove to expel despotism I wept over the victims of ambition. That principle which first prompted me remains uneffaced, nor can I except from amongst men, even those who are my enemies. Equally capable of freedom with others it is my earnest prayer that you may equally deserve it. The effects of prejudice are known, and humanity calls on us to remove it if possible; for the same bosom which flows with indignation against guilt, melts in pity of ignorance. But I intreat you to remember, that men who shut their eyes against the light, as they will deserve, so will they receive a double measure of punishment.
That it is the will of Heaven, mankind should be free, is evidenced by the wealth, the vigor, the virtue and consequent happiness of free States. And the idea that providence will establish such governments as he shall deem most fit for his creatures without their efforts is palpably absurd. Did he overturn the walls of Jerusalem by the mere breath of his mouth, or did he stir up the Romans to add Judea to their other provinces? In short, is not his moral government of the earth always performed by the intervention of second causes? How then can you expect that he should miraculously destroy our enemies, merely to convince you that he favours our cause? Sufficient notifications of his will are always given, and those who will not then believe, neither would they believe though one should
I am led to these reflections and to this address, partly from perceiving and more from being informed, that you derive pleasing hopes from the following circumstances. First, the taking of Georgia. Secondly, the calumnies against Congress, and supposed divisions among them. And Thirdly, the symptoms of discontent, lately exhibited by the Executive Council of Pennsylvania. I shall take notice of these in their order, make some short observations on public affairs, and then leave you to judge. I exhort you to read with attention, and to determine with that coolness which is due to a subject so important to your welfare, perhaps your existence.
The expedition against Georgia was dictated by the necessities of the British army, and the danger of their own dominions. In the first case they expected considerable supplies of rice for an army, and for islands in a starving condition. In the second they labored to establish a barrier between these States and East-Florida, the better to secure that latter, and thereby in case of a war with Spain check the free navigation of the gulf of Florida, thro' which the treasures of the new world are conveyed to Europe. The consequences are, first, to inspirit your brethern in the Southern States, and thereby to purge them of men who would have been pernicious members of a free society. These men will be justly stripped of that property and those rights which they have not spirit to contend for, and by banishment, poverty and lasting remorse expiate the guilt of endeavoring to subjugate their fellow-citizens. Secondly, this expedition will rouse the States of North and South-Carolina. They will derive from it that energy which is acquired in a state of war, and which produces obedience and subordination so necessary to society in a state of peace. But thirdly, what is of more importance to such of you as dwell in the middle and eastern States, is, that by dividing the force of your friends, whatever may be the lot of those wretches who are doomed to wrestle with a baneful southern clime, it renders their army at New York less efficient and consequently less capable of assisting you.
As to the calumnies against Congress and supposed divisions in that body, you are greatly tho' not altogether mistaken in the latter fact, and at any rate draw from it very false conclusion. The late abusive writings shew indeed the illiberality of the respective writers, but by no means impeach those against whom they are directed. Being equally indifferent to the several performers, I wish not to balance their respective merits. This is certain that Billingsgate language marks at most a Billingsgate
To say there are divisions in Congress is only saying in other words that it is a popular Assembly. Different views of the same subject naturally lead men to differ in sentiments. Personal connections excite personal emotions, and the conflict of such emotions sometimes produces personal altercation. The heats inevitable on such occasions seldom evaporate within the walls of one house, but stimulate to bitter observations easily credited, because they flatter a self-importance which is uneasy at any kind of superiority. Perhaps you will ask how it happens that such things did not exist formerly? They did; but the public dangers and distresses taught men to keep more secret those things which they readily divulge in an hour of greater security. The appearance of such divisions therefore in personal matters are striking marks of national prosperity, and you will find, that however the members of Congress may disagree about who shall be in and who shall be out, they will be firmly united in refusing to accept the independance Great-Britain is about to offer, and insist on a clear, explicit and pointed acknowledgment of it in the most extensive sense previous to any treaty whatsoever.
For what regards the dispute between the Executive Council of this State and Congress it is, as far as your views may be served by it, the most trifling of all trifling things. Stimulated by a laudable zeal to discover public abuses, their suspicions were turned on one to whose gallantry America is much indebted. Greatness and weakness are sometimes nearly
And even if any such dispute should exist, can you suppose, that in case of necessity, the President of that State would hesitate a moment to head his militia? That he would not instantly take the field with his wonted alacrity? That he would not fight under the banners of America with his former zeal? Those who know him know better. It would be equally absurd for you to suppose that the Council are disposed to promote public divisions, in order to favor the negociations of the enemy. Do not dwell on the mysteriousness in Doctor Berkenhout's affair. It is nothing new that an
As little ground have you for hope in the depreciation of the Continental money. You know that this is in a great degree to be attributed to the arts of interested men whose efforts to acquire it shew their conviction of it's value. I know it hath been a fashionable doctrine, that after the emissions should amount to a certain sum, the bubble, as the phrase was, would burst. But the absurdity of this to men acquainted with human nature was evident. The reasons are needless, because we may appeal to experience to shew whether there is the least danger of this event. When two emissions were called in, and every method, consistent with justice and good faith, taken to stop their circulation; those who had principally contributed to depreciate the money were the very persons who continued to receive the vicious emissions. For as soon as it became a question, whether they should lose not the value, but merely the use of so much money, they made every effort to uphold the credit of it. A few days ago, when a report prevailed of the arrivals of some favorable intelligence from Europe, such of you as are in this city cannot but remember the rapid fall of every article, specie not excepted. Hence the deduction is clear that the money issued by Congress is intrinsically worth what they contend, but is depreciated by the quantity in some degree, and more by the arts of engrossers. Take the familiar proposition, that a country will easily bear taxation to the amount of some given part of the circulating medium, suppose a tenth, tho' in fact one fifth may be raised among a free people, and you will see that, let the paper medium be increased to any degree, it may be sunk in a short period.
Not pretending to great knowledge of national secrets, and little desirous of communicating whatever of this kind it hath fallen to my lot to know, I shall reason with you on these things as I have reasoned for myself, and I trust the event will verify my conclusions. And first I consider it to be manifestly the interest of every Court in Europe to foster our independence because it is in effect the dividing a great empire, whose power was formidable, and whose insolence was insupportable.
Beginning with Russia; iron, potash and such other commodities as that country produces in common with this, will now have equal advantages at the London market, because no bounties will in future be granted by Parliament to the produce of these States. Sailcloth and the other articles produced there and consumed here will come hither directly from thence, and in direct return they will take our rice and tobacco, the commercial advantages of which are evident, not to mention the increase of naval force they may expect from it. Add to these solid reasons of national interest the personal character of the Empress. This is strongly marked by benevolence and the love of that fame which results from contributing to the happiness of mankind, a disposition evidenced by giving to her subjects all the liberty they are at present capable of. These considerations will naturally lead you to the answer filled with disdain which she gave to a proposal of the British Ambassador requesting her troops to subdue us.
"My glory shall never be tarnished by the infamy of oppressing those who only contend for freedom and justice." They will also account for her refusal to accede to subsequent propositions from our enemies the most disgraceful to them as well as apparently advantageous to her.
The spirit of the State reasons abovementioned applies generally all the Northern Courts, and it must be observed that the lesser will be very cautious how they contravene the veiws of the greater. As to Denmark her imbecility is the best possible reason why she should not side with the weaker party, especially when she holds the little of her West-India possessions as a tenant at will to the maritime powers.
Sweden, the faithful ally of France, if she acts at all, will certainly take part in our favour, and with twenty ships of the line ready at a moment's warning, is in capacity to afford us no inconsiderable aid.
Prussia and Austria, equally desirous of becoming maritime powers, equally desirous to obtain for that purpose a share of the American commerce, and actually at war with each other, will neither of them be willing to send force against America. Nor will the smaller German Powers dare to weaken their dominions, by the loss of a single soldier, whilst the Emperor and King of Prussia are armed in motion, and in capacity to swallow them up.
Of the United Netherlands and Italy nothing need be said, unless that at least a strict neutrality may be depended on from them; the reasons of which are too obvious.
France is already at war with Great-Britain for American Independence; and those who know the connection between the Courts of Versailles and Madrid, their enmity to that of St. James's, and their national interests, cannot but perceive that Spain will soon be joined in this contest, unless it be terminated agreeably to our wishes.
Hence then it is evident, either that we shall immediately conclude a safe and honorable peace, or that Great-Britain must carry on the war alone, and unsupported against France, Spain and America, in which case the two former will give every aid in their power, to our trade and finances, so that on the whole no well founded doubt can exist, that the Continental currency will rise greatly in its value, and that the independence and safety of America will be established on the firmest foundation.
Convinced as you must be of these things, what ought your conduct to be? You cannot pretend tb plead conscience on this occasion, because the success of our measures being apparent, it is on your own principles the will of God, to which you are conscientiously bound to conform. If you oppose your countrymen you may indeed incourage the enemy, and thereby lengthen out the contest, in which case you yourselves shall determine, whether you will not in some degree be answerable for the consequences. You have seen enough of war to wish a termination of it. You have sense enough to perceive that you can live happily under those governments which you wished in vain to prevent. You ought to fear that if the enemy perform their threats of wasting our country, your persons
1 Almost certainly Gouverneur Morris, who wrote several letters for Pennsylvania newspapers in 1778 and 1779 over the pseudonym "An American." He apparently wrote this article to quiet public alarm over divisions within Congress and between Congress and certain states, as well as in response to information contained in William Lee's recently received September 12, 1778, letter to Congress "that orders have already been sent to [Great Britain's] commissioners in America to acknowledge our independance if nothing else will answer, in order to commence a treaty and make peace." In an apparent allusion to the former motive, Morris later explained to Joseph Reed that "My object was to prevent our Friends from being alarmed and our Enemies encouraged by Appearances of Disunion." See JCC, 13:219; Wharton, Diplornatic Correspondense, 2:715; and Gouverneur Morris to Joseph Reed, April 9, 1779.
Morris evidently feared that reports of impending peace negotiations and recognition of American independence would lessen support for the war and fuel sentiment for a separate peace with Great Britain-a constant concern of the French minister Conrad Alexandre Gerard, who considered himself a close collaborator of Gouverneur Morris. And since Congress was simultaneously in the midst of reviewing the conduct of its overseas commissioners and establishing its peace ultimata, the subject was both timely and exceedingly delicate. Gerard manifested his interest in the essay by sending a copy of it to Paris, with several passages underlined, because, as he explained in a March I letter to the comte de Vergennes, he believed they were important "pour connoitre L'etat des affaires en Amerique." Meng, Gerard Despatches, p. 548.
Having ventured into the propaganda war then raging in the Philadelphia newspapers, exhorting Americans to stand firm against Britain's assault on their independence, Morris quickly found himself under attack, for two letters denouncing him, published over the signatures "T.G." and "Common Sense," were printed on March 2 in the next issue of the Packet. For additional information on the response of "T.G.," who attacked not only Morris but also his "late colleague, William Duer," see William Duer's Statement, March 9, 1779, printed below.