I have given, in some of my letters to Lowell and Jackson, (3) a partial view of the state of politics; those letters I suppose you have seen, as I desired them to be communicated to you and a few others. They will show you how far the opinions of our politicians in Massachusetts have been right, as to the views and conduct of the powers in alliance with us. There has been for a long time a party in Congress so thoroughly in the interest of France as to have preferred her interest to ours, whenever they came into competition. They carried through the memorable instructions to our ministers, which threw them entirely into the hands of Mons. Vergennes. Their views, however, by the inadvertence of Vergennes and the firmness of Jay and Adams, have been completely defeated. Their surprise and chagrin when the despatches were read, they could not conceal; and, finding that these instructions would no longer bind those ministers, and that if they remained in Europe commercial negotiations would next engage their attention, though not sufficiently commissioned to complete them, they have endeavored to remove such dangerous persons, by passing an unjust censure on their conduct during the negotiations for peace; -- but in this also have they failed.

   I expect, when the definitive treaty arrives, and we have a full view of the whole negotiations, that Congress will, in the strongest terms, approve of their conduct, though I am sure every possible means will be used to prevent it. Should this happen, their chagrin will be complete I think, for it will necessarily open the way for a commission to negotiate a commercial treaty with Britain. France has been, and still

    is, exceedingly afraid of such a connection. She wishes, if possible, to prevent it, especially since she finds that Britain has wisely determined to give us every advantage in trade. (4) But shall we neglect to avail ourselves of such an opening? It is our business to cultivate a friendly intercourse with every trading nation, and to secure to ourselves as great and extensive advantages, in the way of commerce, as possible. The extravagant ideas which Europeans have formed of the advantages that they will derive from a trade with us, we certainly ought by no means to root out, but rather to make the most we can of them all. To lose so lucky a moment, and to neglect the improving such impressions to our own benefit, would surely argue a great want of discernment, and show a great deficiency in our political character. The advices from Mr. Dana discover a knowledge of mankind and the interests of the powers in Europe, which does him honor; but the same leaven has leavened the whole lump. He is so restrained by the French Minister at Petersburg, that I am afraid he will derive no advantage to us from his mission. Being bound to consult him, he dares not make any direct and explicit overtures, though persuaded that everything in that court was ripe for negotiation. I wish he may follow the example of Jay and Adams, and show the world that no dishonorable bands can fetter Americans.

   We are still hammering on a strange, though artful, plan of finance,(5) in which are combined a heterogeneous mixture of imperceptible and visible, constitutional and unconstitutional taxes. It contains the impost, quotas, and cessions of Western lands, and no part of it is to be binding unless the whole is adopted by all the States. This connection and dependence of one part on another is designed to produce the adoption of the whole. The cessions are to serve as sweeteners to those who oppose the impost; the impost is intended to make the quotas more palatable to some States; and the receiving it in whole is made necessary to secure the adoption of the whole, by working on the fears of those States who wish to reject a part of it only. It may happen that a State, strongly impressed with the necessity of public taxes, may be thereby induced to receive it in whole, though opposed to some part of it, lest, through the failure of public funds, great evils may result; but I cannot imagine that such a plan will succeed -- the artifice is not complete. The States will see, I trust, that Virginia and New York mean only to give them what is of no value, and not their property to dispose of, in order to secure to themselves a valuable territory which they now have no good claim to, and oblige the continent hereafter to guarantee and defend it for them. Madison has clearly, I think, shown that such is their intention in this scheme; this he did in an unguarded moment.

   Rhode Island has approved in the fullest and strongest terms of Mr. Howell's conduct. South Carolina and Massachusetts have repealed

   Congress have not yet tried the strength of the Confederation, nor have they had a good opportunity to do it. If quotas are assigned to the several States, equal to the interest of the public debt and the current expenses, and a majority of the States should make provision competent to the discharge of their quotas, will they not find means to coerce those that are delinquent? Will not two or three frigates in time of peace be sufficient for that purpose? Every State except Jersey depends much on its trade, and could not long bear the suppression of it; but should a majority of these prove delinquent, a vote for coercion could not obtain, though Congress were possessed of the means. There must be a thorough disposition in the States, or a large majority of them, to act honestly, to take their respective shares of the common burden, and to adhere strictly to the principles of the Confederation, or the Union will necessarily be dissolved.

   I am sorry that Massachusetts has proposed a general impost through New England;(7) it cannot succeed, and may excite jealousies. New Hampshire and Connecticut will imagine it to be against their interest. The same reasons that induce them to push for a general one,

   I saw a letter from Mr. Dalton to Mr. Gorham that diverted me; he writes that our late impost operates very kindly -- that those evils which he apprehended do not result from it, and that our people have become so fond of that mode of taxing, and are so very desirous of extending it, as to be prepared for a general impost through the Continent. This was written at or about the time of their repealing their late law, and appeared to me extraordinary. But when I considered the person writing, and him to whom it was written, my surprise ceased. It must, I think, be a mistake. How agreeable it is to see a man open to conviction!

   I shall send you by Mr. Osgood, in three weeks, your dividend of the bank interest. The power will not answer the purpose of letting me into the management of the bank stock. My respects to all friends in Newbury, &c.

    I am, with due esteem, your most humble servant,

    S. Higginson.

   P.S. I can't spend time to copy -- you must read as well as you can. Pray let me have a long letter, showing the state of politics with you.

   MS not found; reprinted from Theophilus Parsons, Memoir of Theophilus Parsons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Boston: Tichnor and Fields, 1859), pp. 456-60.